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NOTES ABOUT
DEMOCRACY
THE WORKS OF H. L. MENCKEN
THE WORKS OF H. L. MENCKEN
PREJUDICES FIRST SERIES¹
PREJUDICES SECOND SERIES¹
PREJUDICES THIRD SERIES¹
PREJUDICES FOURTH SERIES¹
PREJUDICES FIFTH SERIES¹
SELECTED PREJUDICES²
A BOOK OF BURLESQUES¹
BOOK OF PREFACES¹
IN DEFENSE OF WOMEN¹ ³
THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE¹ ³
NOTES ON DEMOCRACY¹
THE AMERICAN CREDO
[With George Jean Nathan]
PREJUDICES FIRST SERIES¹
PREJUDICES SECOND SERIES¹
PREJUDICES THIRD SERIES¹
PREJUDICES FOURTH SERIES¹
PREJUDICES FIFTH SERIES¹
SELECTED PREJUDICES²
A BOOK OF BURLESQUES¹
BOOK OF PREFACES¹
IN DEFENSE OF WOMEN¹ ³
THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE¹ ³
NOTES ON DEMOCRACY¹
THE AMERICAN CREDO
[With George Jean Nathan]
OUT OF PRINT
Sold Out
1 Also Published in England
Also published in England
2 Published only in England
Published solely in England
TRANSLATIONS
Translations
THE ANTICHRIST, BY F W NIETZSCHE
THE ANTICHRIST, BY F W NIETZSCHE
BOOKS ABOUT MR MENCKEN
Books about Mr. Mencken
H. L. MENCKEN, BY ERNEST BOYD
[Robert M. McBride & Company]
THE MAN MENCKEN, BY ISAAC GOLDBERG
[Simon & Schuster]
H. L. MENCKEN, BY ERNEST BOYD
[Robert M. McBride & Company]
THE MAN MENCKEN, BY ISAAC GOLDBERG
[Simon & Schuster]
NEW YORK: ALFRED · A · KNOPF
NEW YORK: ALFRED · A · KNOPF
NOTES ON
DEMOCRACY
NOTES ON
DEMOCRACY
By H. L. MENCKEN
By H. L. MENCKEN

PUBLISHED AT THE BORZOI · NEW YORK · BY
ALFRED · A · KNOPF
PUBLISHED BY BORZOI · NEW YORK · BY
ALFRED A. KNOPF
COPYRIGHT, 1926, BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC.
COPYRIGHT, 1926, BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC.
PUBLISHED, OCTOBER, 1926
SECOND PRINTING, NOVEMBER, 1926
PUBLISHED, OCTOBER, 1926
SECOND PRINTING, NOVEMBER, 1926
MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Made in the USA
v
v
CONTENTS
I. | Democratic Guy | |
1. | His Appearance in the World | 3 |
2. | Varieties of Homo Sapiens | 9 |
3. | The New Psychology | 15 |
4. | Politics Under Democracy | 22 |
5. | The Rôle of the Hormones | 28 |
6. | Envy as a Philosophy | 35 |
7. | Liberty and Democratic Man | 43 |
8. | The Effects Upon Progress | 51 |
9. | The Eternal Mob | 64 |
II. | The Democratic Nation | |
1. | The Two Kinds of Democracy | 71 |
2. | The Popular Will | 77 |
3. | Disproportional Representation | 88 |
4. | The Politician Under Democracy | 99 |
5. | Utopia | 106 |
6. | The Occasional Exception | 115 |
7. | The Maker of Laws | 122 |
8. | The Rewards of Virtue | 129 |
9. | Footnote on Lame Ducks | 138 |
III. | Democracy and Freedom | |
1. | The Will to Peace | 147 |
2. | The Democrat as Moralist | 152 |
3. | Where Puritanism Fails | 166 |
4. | Corruption Under Democracy | 176 |
IV. | Coda | |
1. | The Future of Democracy | 195 |
2. | Last Words | 206 |
1
1
DEMOCRATIC MAN
I
3
3
DEMOCRATIC MAN
1.
His Appearance in the World
His Entrance into the World
Democracy came into the Western World to the tune of sweet, soft music. There was, at the start, no harsh bawling from below; there was only a dulcet twittering from above. Democratic man thus began as an ideal being, full of ineffable virtues and romantic wrongs—in brief, as Rousseau’s noble savage in smock and jerkin, brought out of the tropical wilds to shame the lords and masters of the civilized lands. The fact continues to have important consequences to this day. It remains impossible, as it was in the Eighteenth Century, to separate the democratic idea from the theory that there is a mystical merit, an esoteric and ineradicable rectitude, in the man at the bottom of the scale—that inferiority, by some strange magic, becomes a sort of superiority—nay, the superiority of superiorities. Everywhere on earth, save4 where the enlightenment of the modern age is confessedly in transient eclipse, the movement is toward the completer and more enamoured enfranchisement of the lower orders. Down there, one hears, lies a deep, illimitable reservoir of righteousness and wisdom, unpolluted by the corruption of privilege. What baffles statesmen is to be solved by the people, instantly and by a sort of seraphic intuition. Their yearnings are pure; they alone are capable of a perfect patriotism; in them is the only hope of peace and happiness on this lugubrious ball. The cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy!
Democracy entered the Western world to the sound of sweet, gentle music. At first, there wasn't any harsh noise from below; there was just a soft chirping from above. Democratic individuals began as ideal beings, filled with indescribable virtues and romantic flaws—in short, like Rousseau’s noble savage dressed in simple clothes, brought from the wild to challenge the lords and masters of the civilized world. This idea still has significant consequences today. It's just as impossible now as it was in the Eighteenth Century to separate the concept of democracy from the belief that there’s a mystical merit and an inherent goodness in the person at the bottom of the social ladder—that somehow, inferiority magically transforms into a kind of superiority—indeed, the highest form of superiority. Everywhere in the world, except where the enlightenment of modern times is admittedly in temporary decline, the movement is toward greater and more enthusiastic empowerment of the lower classes. Down there, people say, lies a deep, limitless pool of righteousness and wisdom, untainted by the corruption of privilege. What puzzles politicians can be resolved by the people, instantly and with a kind of heavenly insight. Their desires are pure; they alone have the ability for perfect patriotism; in them lies the sole hope for peace and happiness on this grim planet. The solution to the problems of democracy is more democracy!
This notion, as I hint, originated in the poetic fancy of gentlemen on the upper levels—sentimentalists who, observing to their distress that the ass was over-laden, proposed to reform transport by putting him into the cart. A stale Christian bilge ran through their veins, though many of them, as it happened, toyed with what is now called Modernism. They were the direct ancestors of the more saccharine Liberals of to-day, who yet mouth their tattered phrases and dream their preposterous dreams. I can find no record that these phrases, in the beginning, made much impression upon the actual5 objects of their rhetoric. Early democratic man seems to have given little thought to the democratic ideal, and less veneration. What he wanted was something concrete and highly materialistic—more to eat, less work, higher wages, lower taxes. He had no apparent belief in the acroamatic virtue of his own class, and certainly none in its capacity to rule. His aim was not to exterminate the baron, but simply to bring the baron back to a proper discharge of baronial business. When, by the wild shooting that naturally accompanies all mob movements, the former end was accidentally accomplished, and men out of the mob began to take on baronial airs, the mob itself quickly showed its opinion of them by butchering them deliberately and in earnest. Once the pikes were out, indeed, it was a great deal more dangerous to be a tribune of the people than to be an ornament of the old order. The more copiously the blood gushed, the nearer that old order came to resurrection. The Paris proletariat, having been misled into killing its King in 1793, devoted the next two years to killing those who had misled it, and by the middle of 1796 it had another King in fact, and in three years more he was King de jure, with an6 attendant herd of barons, counts, marquises and dukes, some of them new but most of them old, to guard, symbolize and execute his sovereignty. And he and they were immensely popular—so popular that half of France leaped to suicide that their glory might blind the world.
This idea, as I suggested, came from the imaginative thinking of upper-class gentlemen—sentimentalists who, realizing with frustration that the donkey was overloaded, proposed to improve transportation by putting him in the cart. A tired Christian ideology flowed through their veins, even though many of them, as it turned out, flirted with what we now call Modernism. They were the direct ancestors of today’s more syrupy Liberals, who still regurgitate their worn-out phrases and dream their absurd dreams. I can't find any record that these phrases, at the start, made much of an impression on the actual5 targets of their rhetoric. Early democratic individuals seemed to care little about the democratic ideal, and even less about honoring it. What they wanted was something tangible and very materialistic—more food, less work, higher pay, lower taxes. They showed no significant faith in the supposed virtue of their class, and absolutely none in its ability to govern. Their goal wasn't to eliminate the baron, but simply to make the baron fulfill his responsibilities properly. When, with the rampant violence that naturally comes with mob activity, the former goal was accidentally achieved, and members of the mob began to adopt baronial behavior, the mob quickly expressed its views by brutally killing them with intention and seriousness. Once the pikes were out, in fact, being a representative of the people became far more dangerous than being a figure of the old order. The more bloodshed there was, the closer that old order came to coming back to life. The Paris working class, having been misguided into killing their King in 1793, spent the next two years eliminating those who had led them astray, and by mid-1796, they had another King in reality, and in three years, he was King de jure, surrounded by an6 entourage of barons, counts, marquises, and dukes, some new and most old, to protect, represent, and execute his sovereignty. He and they were extremely popular—so popular that half of France resorted to suicide so that their glory could dazzle the world.
Meanwhile, of course, there had been a certain seeping down of democratic theory from the metaphysicians to the mob—obscured by the uproar, but still going on. Rhetoric, like a stealthy plague, was doing its immemorial work. Where men were confronted by the harsh, exigent realities of battle and pillage, as they were everywhere on the Continent, it got into their veins only slowly, but where they had time to listen to oratory, as in England and, above all, in America, it fetched them more quickly. Eventually, as the world grew exhausted and the wars passed, it began to make its effects felt everywhere. Democratic man, contemplating himself, was suddenly warmed by the spectacle. His condition had plainly improved. Once a slave, he was now only a serf. Once condemned to silence, he was now free to criticize his masters, and even to flout them, and the ordinances of God with them. As he gained skill and fluency7 at that sombre and fascinating art, he began to heave in wonder at his own merit. He was not only, it appeared, free to praise and damn, challenge and remonstrate; he was also gifted with a peculiar rectitude of thought and will, and a high talent for ideas, particularly on the political plane. So his wishes, in his mind, began to take on the dignity of legal rights, and after a while, of intrinsic and natural rights, and by the same token the wishes of his masters sank to the level of mere ignominious lusts. By 1828 in America and by 1848 in Europe the doctrine had arisen that all moral excellence, and with it all pure and unfettered sagacity, resided in the inferior four-fifths of mankind. In 1867 a philosopher out of the gutter pushed that doctrine to its logical conclusion. He taught that the superior minority had no virtues at all, and hence no rights at all—that the world belonged exclusively and absolutely to those who hewed its wood and drew its water. In less than half a century he had more followers in the world, open and covert, than any other sophist since the age of the Apostles.
Meanwhile, there was a gradual spreading of democratic ideas from the thinkers to the general public—hidden by the noise, but still happening. Rhetoric, like a subtle plague, was doing its age-old work. Where people were faced with the harsh, demanding realities of war and looting, as they were everywhere on the Continent, it seeped in slowly. But where they had time to listen to speeches, like in England and especially in America, it impacted them much faster. Eventually, as the world grew weary and the wars ended, it began to show its effects all over. Democratic individuals, looking at themselves, were suddenly uplifted by what they saw. Their situation had clearly improved. Once a slave, they were now merely a serf. Once silenced, they were now free to criticize their rulers, and even to defy them, along with the divine laws. As they became more skilled and articulate in this somber yet fascinating art, they began to marvel at their own worth. They realized they were not only free to praise and condemn, challenge and object; they also possessed a unique clarity of thought and will, as well as a strong talent for ideas, especially in politics. So, their desires, in their minds, began to take on the stature of legal rights, and eventually, of inherent and natural rights. In contrast, the desires of their rulers diminished to mere selfish urges. By 1828 in America and by 1848 in Europe, the belief took hold that all moral greatness, along with all pure and unrestrained wisdom, resided in the lower four-fifths of humanity. In 1867, a philosopher from the streets pushed this belief to its extreme conclusion. He argued that the superior minority had no virtues whatsoever, and therefore no rights at all—that the world belonged entirely and exclusively to those who did the labor. In less than fifty years, he had more followers in the world, both openly and secretly, than any other deceiver since the time of the Apostles.
Since then, to be sure, there has been a considerable recession from that extreme position.8 The dictatorship of the proletariat, tried here and there, has turned out to be—if I may venture a prejudiced judgment—somewhat impracticable. Even the most advanced Liberals, observing the thing in being, have been moved to cough sadly behind their hands. But it would certainly be going beyond the facts to say that the underlying democratic dogma has been abandoned, or even appreciably overhauled. To the contrary, it is now more prosperous than ever before. The late war was fought in its name, and it was embraced with loud hosannas by all the defeated nations. Everywhere in Christendom it is now official, save in a few benighted lands where God is temporarily asleep. Everywhere its fundamental axioms are accepted: (a) that the great masses of men have an inalienable right, born of the very nature of things, to govern themselves, and (b) that they are competent to do it. Are they occasionally detected in gross and lamentable imbecilities? Then it is only because they are misinformed by those who would exploit them: the remedy is more education. Are they, at times, seen to be a trifle naughty, even swinish? Then it is only a natural reaction against the oppressions they suffer:9 the remedy is to deliver them. The central aim of all the Christian governments of to-day, in theory if not in fact, is to further their liberation, to augment their power, to drive ever larger and larger pipes into the great reservoir of their natural wisdom. That government is called good which responds most quickly and accurately to their desires and ideas. That is called bad which conditions their omnipotence and puts a question mark after their omniscience.
Since then, there has definitely been a significant pullback from that extreme viewpoint.8 The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, attempted here and there, has proven to be—if I can express a biased opinion—somewhat unworkable. Even the most progressive Liberals, witnessing the reality, have been prompted to cough regretfully behind their hands. However, it would be inaccurate to claim that the essential democratic principle has been abandoned, or even significantly revised. On the contrary, it is now more prosperous than ever before. The recent war was fought in its name, and it was enthusiastically embraced by all the defeated nations. Everywhere in Christendom, it is now official, except in a few neglected places where God seems to be temporarily absent. Across the board, its core beliefs are accepted: (a) that the large masses of people have an inherent right, given by the very nature of things, to govern themselves, and (b) that they are capable of doing so. Are they sometimes caught in blatant and unfortunate foolishness? That's only because they're misled by those who seek to exploit them: the solution is more education. Are they occasionally seen as a bit unruly, even piggish? Then it’s just a natural response to the oppression they experience:9 the solution is to free them. The main goal of all the Christian governments today, in theory if not in practice, is to promote their liberation, to increase their power, to channel more and more resources into the vast reservoir of their natural wisdom. A government is considered good when it responds most quickly and accurately to their wishes and ideas. It's deemed bad when it limits their power and questions their knowledge.
2.
Varieties of Homo Sapiens
Types of Homo Sapiens
So much for the theory. It seems to me, and I shall here contend, that all the known facts lie flatly against it—that there is actually no more evidence for the wisdom of the inferior man, nor for his virtue, than there is for the notion that Friday is an unlucky day. There was, perhaps, some excuse for believing in these phantasms in the days when they were first heard of in the world, for it was then difficult to put them to the test, and what cannot be tried and disproved has always had a lascivious lure for illogical man. But now we know a great deal more about the10 content and character of the human mind than we used to know, both on high levels and on low levels, and what we have learned has pretty well disposed of the old belief in its congenital intuitions and inherent benevolences. It is, we discover, a function, at least mainly, of purely physical and chemical phenomena, and its development and operation are subject to precisely the same natural laws which govern the development and operation, say, of the human nose or lungs. There are minds which start out with a superior equipment, and proceed to high and arduous deeds; there are minds which never get any further than a sort of insensate sweating, like that of a kidney. We not only observe such differences; we also begin to chart them with more or less accuracy. Of one mind we may say with some confidence that it shows an extraordinary capacity for function and development—that its possessor, exposed to a suitable process of training, may be trusted to acquire the largest body of knowledge and the highest skill at ratiocination to which Homo sapiens is adapted. Of another we may say with the same confidence that its abilities are sharply limited—that no conceivable training can move it beyond11 a certain point. In other words, men differ inside their heads as they differ outside. There are men who are naturally intelligent and can learn, and there are men who are naturally stupid and cannot.
So much for the theory. It seems to me, and I argue here, that all the known facts completely contradict it—that there’s really no more evidence for the wisdom of the less capable person, nor for their goodness, than there is for the idea that Friday is an unlucky day. There was, maybe, some reason for believing in these illusions back when they first became known, because it was hard to test them, and things that can't be tested or disproven have always had a tempting allure for illogical people. But now we know a lot more about the content and nature of the human mind than we used to, both at high levels and at low levels, and what we've learned has mostly discredited the old belief in its inherent intuitions and natural kindness. We find that it is, at least mainly, a function of purely physical and chemical processes, and its development and functioning are governed by the same natural laws that control the development and functioning of the human nose or lungs. Some minds start out with a superior setup and go on to achieve great and challenging things; others never get beyond a sort of mindless activity, much like a kidney. We not only see these differences; we are also starting to map them out with more or less accuracy. For one mind, we can confidently say it shows an extraordinary capacity for function and growth—that its owner, with the right kind of training, can be expected to gain the most knowledge and the highest reasoning skills that are possible for Homo sapiens. For another, we can say just as confidently that its abilities are sharply limited—that no conceivable training can push it beyond a certain point. In other words, people differ in their minds just as they do in other ways. There are people who are naturally intelligent and can learn, and there are people who are naturally dull and cannot.
Here, of course, I flirt with the so-called intelligence tests, and so bring down upon my head that acrid bile which they have set to flowing. My plea in avoidance is that I have surely done my share of damning them: they aroused, when they were first heard of, my most brutish passions, for pedagogues had them in hand. But I can only say that time and experience have won me to them, for the evidence in favor of them slowly piles up, pedagogues or no pedagogues. In other words, they actually work. What they teach is borne out by immense accumulations of empiric corroboration. It is safe, nine times out of ten, to give them credence, and so it seems to me to be safe to generalize from them. Is it only a coincidence that their most frantic critics are the Liberals, which is to say, the only surviving honest believers in democracy? I think not. These Liberals, whatever their defects otherwise, are themselves capable of learning, and so they quickly mastered12 the fact that MM. Simon and Binet offered the most dangerous menace to their vapourings ever heard of since the collapse of the Holy Alliance. Their dudgeon followed. In two ways the tests give aid and comfort to their enemies. First, they provide a more or less scientific means of demonstrating the difference in natural intelligence between man and man—a difference noted ages ago by common observation, and held to be real by all men save democrats, at all times and everywhere. Second, they provide a rational scale for measuring it and a rational explanation of it. Intelligence is reduced to levels, and so given a reasonable precision of meaning. An intelligent man is one who is capable of taking in knowledge until the natural limits of the species are reached. A stupid man is one whose progress is arrested at some specific time and place before then. There thus appears in psychology—and the next instant in politics—the concept of the unteachable. Some men can learn almost indefinitely; their capacity goes on increasing until their bodies begin to wear out. Others stop in childhood, even in infancy. They reach, say, the mental age of ten or twelve, and then they develop no more. Physically, they become13 men, and sprout beards, political delusions, and the desire to propagate their kind. But mentally they remain on the level of school-boys.
Here, of course, I flirt with the so-called intelligence tests, which brings down on me the harsh criticism they provoke. My excuse is that I've certainly played my part in condemning them: at first, they stirred up my most primitive emotions because educators had them in hand. However, I can only say that time and experience have brought me around, as the evidence in their favor gradually stacks up, with or without educators. In other words, they actually work. What they teach is supported by a huge amount of empirical evidence. It's safe, nine times out of ten, to trust them, and that makes it seem reasonable to generalize from them. Is it just a coincidence that their most fervent critics are the Liberals, who are, in other words, the only remaining genuine believers in democracy? I don’t think so. These Liberals, despite their other flaws, are themselves capable of learning, so they quickly understood that MM. Simon and Binet posed the biggest threat to their ideas since the fall of the Holy Alliance. Their outrage followed. In two ways, the tests assist and support their opponents. First, they provide a more or less scientific way of demonstrating the differences in natural intelligence among people—a difference noted long ago through common observation and accepted as real by everyone except democrats, in all times and places. Second, they provide a rational scale for measuring intelligence and a logical explanation for it. Intelligence is categorized into levels, giving it a clear definition. An intelligent person is someone who can absorb knowledge until they reach the natural limits of the species. A less intelligent person is one whose growth is halted at some specific time and place before that. This introduces, in psychology—and immediately in politics—the concept of the unteachable. Some people can learn almost endlessly; their capacity continues to grow until their bodies start to age. Others plateau in childhood, even in infancy. They reach, say, a mental age of ten or twelve and then stop developing mentally. Physically, they become adults, growing beards, developing political fantasies, and wanting to procreate. But mentally, they remain at the level of schoolboys.
The fact here is challenged sharply by the democrats aforesaid, but certainly not with evidence. Their objection to it is rather of a metaphysical character, and involves gratuitous, transcendental assumptions as to what ought and what ought not to be true. They echo also, of course, the caveats of other and less romantic critics, some of them very ingenious; but always, when hard pressed, they fall back pathetically upon the argument that believing such things would be in contempt of the dignity of man, made in God’s image. Is this argument sound? Is it, indeed, new? I seem to have heard it long ago, from the gentlemen of the sacred faculty. Don’t they defend the rubbish of Genesis on the theory that rejecting it would leave the rabble without faith, and that without faith it would be one with the brutes, and very unhappy, and, what is worse, immoral? I leave such contentions to the frequenters of Little Bethel, and pause only to observe that if the progress of the human race had depended14 upon them we’d all believe in witches, ectoplasms and madstones to-day. Democracy, alas, is also a form of theology, and shows all the immemorial stigmata. Confronted by uncomfortable facts, it invariably tries to dispose of them by appeals to the highest sentiments of the human heart. An anti-democrat is not merely mistaken; he is also wicked, and the more plausible he is the more wicked he becomes. As I have said, the earliest of modern democrats were full of Christian juices. Their successors never get very far from Genesis I, 27. They are Fundamentalists by instinct, however much they may pretend to a mellow scepticism.
The fact here is strongly disputed by the mentioned Democrats, but certainly not with any evidence. Their objection is more of a metaphysical nature and rests on assumptions about what should and shouldn’t be true. They also repeat the warnings of other, less romantic critics, some of whom are quite clever; but whenever they’re pushed hard, they sadly revert to the argument that believing such things would go against the dignity of humanity, which is made in God’s image. Is this argument valid? Is it even new? It seems like I've heard it ages ago from those in the sacred profession. Don’t they defend the nonsense of Genesis by claiming that rejecting it would leave ordinary people without faith, and that without faith, they would be like beasts, very unhappy, and worse yet, immoral? I’ll leave such debates to the attendees of Little Bethel and just note that if the progress of humanity depended on them, we’d all believe in witches, ectoplasm, and madstones today. Unfortunately, democracy is also a kind of theology and shows all the age-old signs. When faced with uncomfortable facts, it always tries to dismiss them by appealing to the noblest feelings of the human heart. An anti-democrat isn’t just wrong; he’s also immoral, and the more convincing he is, the more immoral he becomes. As I mentioned, the early modern democrats were full of Christian ideals. Their successors don’t stray far from Genesis I, 27. They are Fundamentalists by instinct, no matter how much they might claim to hold a relaxed skepticism.
One undoubted fact gives them a certain left-handed support, though they are far too discreet to make use of it. I allude to the fact that man on the lower levels, though he quickly reaches the limit of his capacity for taking in actual knowledge, remains capable for a long time thereafter of absorbing delusions. What is true daunts him, but what is not true finds lodgment in his cranium with so little resistance that there is only a trifling emission of heat. I shall go back to this singular and beautiful phenomenon later on. It lies at the heart of what is called religion,15 and at the heart of all democratic politics no less. The thinking of what Charles Richet calls Homo stultus is almost entirely in terms of palpable nonsense. He has a dreadful capacity for embracing and cherishing impostures. His history since the first records is a history of successive victimizations—by priests, by politicians, by all sorts and conditions of quacks. His heroes are always frauds. In all ages he has hated bitterly the men who were labouring most honestly and effectively for the progress of the race. What such men teach is beyond his grasp. He believes in consequence that it is unsound, immoral and of the devil.
One undeniable fact gives them a certain awkward support, though they are too careful to use it. I'm referring to the idea that people on the lower rungs, while they quickly reach their limit for absorbing real knowledge, can for a long time still take in falsehoods. What is true intimidates them, but what is not true can settle into their minds with so little pushback that there's barely any heat emitted. I’ll come back to this strange and beautiful phenomenon later. It’s at the core of what we call religion,15 and it’s central to all democratic politics too. The thinking of what Charles Richet calls Homo stultus mainly revolves around obvious nonsense. He has a terrible ability to accept and hold onto deceptions. His history since the earliest records is a tale of being repeatedly victimized—by priests, by politicians, by all kinds of frauds. His heroes are always fakes. Throughout history, he has fiercely hated those who worked most honestly and effectively for the advancement of humanity. What these individuals teach is beyond his understanding. He therefore believes it is unsound, immoral, and the work of the devil.
3.
The New Psychology
The New Psychology
The concept of arrested development has caused an upheaval in psychology, and reduced the arduous introspections of the old-time psychologists to a series of ingenious but unimportant fancies. Men are not alike, and very little can be learned about the mental processes of a congressman, an ice-wagon driver or a cinema actor by studying the mental processes of16 a genuinely superior man. The difference is not only qualitative; it is also, in important ways, quantitative. One thus sees the world as a vast field of greased poles, flying gaudy and seductive flags. Up each a human soul goes shinning, painfully and with many a slip. Some climb eventually to the high levels; a few scale the dizziest heights. But the great majority never get very far from the ground. There they struggle for a while, and then give it up. The effort is too much for them; it doesn’t seem to be worth its agonies. Golf is easier; so is joining Rotary; so is Fundamentalism; so is osteopathy; so is Americanism.
The idea of arrested development has shaken up psychology, turning the deep explorations of old psychologists into a bunch of clever but trivial ideas. People are not the same, and you can’t learn much about the mental processes of a congressman, an ice-wagon driver, or a movie actor by studying the thoughts of a truly exceptional person. The difference isn’t just in kind; it’s also, in important ways, a matter of degree. One sees the world as a huge arena with slick poles and brightly colored, tempting flags. Up each one, a human soul struggles upward, shining but often slipping. Some eventually reach higher levels; a few reach the most astonishing heights. But most never get very far off the ground. They struggle for a bit and then give up. The effort is too overwhelming; it doesn’t seem worth the pain. Golf is easier; so is joining Rotary; so is Fundamentalism; so is osteopathy; so is Americanism.
In an aristocratic society government is a function of those who have got relatively far up the poles, either by their own prowess or by starting from the shoulders of their fathers—which is to say, either by God’s grace or by God’s grace. In a democratic society it is the function of all, and hence mainly of those who have got only a few spans from the ground. Their eyes, to be sure, are still thrown toward the stars. They contemplate, now bitterly, now admiringly, the backsides of those who are above them. They are bitter when they sense anything rationally17 describable as actual superiority; they admire when what they see is fraud. Bitterness and admiration, interacting, form a complex of prejudices which tends to cast itself into more or less stable forms. Fresh delusions, of course, enter into it from time to time, usually on waves of frantic emotion, but it keeps its main outlines. This complex of prejudices is what is known, under democracy, as public opinion. It is the glory of democratic states.
In an aristocratic society, governance is handled by those who have climbed the social ladder, either through their own abilities or by standing on the shoulders of their parents—which means, either by luck or by luck. In a democratic society, it involves everyone, especially those who are only a few steps off the ground. Their eyes, of course, are still aimed at the stars. They view, now bitterly and now admirably, the backs of those who are above them. They feel resentment when they perceive something that can rationally be called actual superiority; they admire when what they see is deception. Bitterness and admiration, interacting, create a mix of prejudices that tends to settle into more or less stable patterns. New delusions, of course, occasionally emerge, often driven by intense emotions, but the main structure remains. This mix of prejudices is what is known, in a democracy, as public opinion. It is the pride of democratic states.
Its content is best studied by a process of analysis—that is, by turning from the complex whole to the simpler parts. What does the mob think? It thinks, obviously, what its individual members think. And what is that? It is, in brief, what somewhat sharp-nosed and unpleasant children think. The mob, being composed, in the overwhelming main, of men and women who have not got beyond the ideas and emotions of childhood, hovers, in mental age, around the time of puberty, and chiefly below it. If we would get at its thoughts and feelings we must look for light to the thoughts and feelings of adolescents. The old-time introspective psychology offered little help here. It concerned itself almost exclusively with the mental processes18 of the more reflective, and hence the superior sort of adults; it fell into the disastrous fallacy of viewing a child as simply a little man. Just as modern medicine, by rejecting a similar fallacy on the physical plane, has set up the science and art of pediatrics, so the new behaviourist psychology has given a new dignity and autonomy to the study of the child mind. The first steps were very difficult. The behaviourists not only had to invent an entirely new technique, like the pediatricians before them; they also had to meet the furious opposition of the orthodox psychologists, whose moony speculations they laughed at and whose authority they derided. But they persisted, and the problems before them turned out, in the end, to be relatively simple, and by no means difficult to solve. By observing attentively what was before everyone’s nose they quickly developed facts which left the orthodox psychologists in an untenable and absurd position. One by one, the old psychological categories went overboard, and with them a vast mass of vague and meaningless psychological terminology.
Its content is best understood through analysis—by breaking down the complex whole into simpler parts. What does the crowd think? It thinks, clearly, what its individual members think. And what is that? Essentially, it reflects what somewhat sharp-nosed and unpleasant children think. The crowd is mostly made up of men and women who haven’t evolved beyond childhood ideas and emotions, hovering mentally around puberty and often below it. To understand its thoughts and feelings, we must look to the thoughts and feelings of adolescents. Traditional introspective psychology offered little assistance here; it focused almost exclusively on the mental processes of more reflective, and therefore superior, adults, falling into the misleading assumption that a child is merely a smaller adult. Just as modern medicine, by rejecting a similar misconception on the physical level, established the science and art of pediatrics, today's behaviorist psychology has given new respect and autonomy to the study of the child mind. The initial steps were challenging. Behaviorists not only had to create an entirely new approach, much like pediatricians had previously; they also faced fierce opposition from orthodox psychologists, whose fanciful ideas they mocked and whose authority they challenged. But they persevered, and the challenges they encountered ultimately proved to be relatively straightforward, not particularly hard to resolve. By closely observing what was right in front of everyone, they quickly gathered facts that left orthodox psychologists in a ridiculous and untenable position. One by one, the old psychological categories were discarded, along with a huge amount of vague and meaningless psychological jargon.
On the cleared ground remained a massive discovery: that the earliest and most profound19 of human emotions is fear. Man comes into the world weak and naked, and almost as devoid of intelligence as an oyster, but he brings with him a highly complex and sensitive susceptibility to fear. He can tremble and cry out in the first hours of his life—nay, in the first minute. Make a loud noise behind an infant just born, and it will shake like a Sunday-school superintendent taken in adultery. Take away its support—that is, make it believe that it is falling—and it will send up such a whoop as comes from yokels when the travelling tooth-puller has at them. These fears, by their character, suggest that they have a phylogenic origin—that is, that they represent inherited race experience, out of the deep darkness and abysm of time. Dr. John B. Watson, the head of the behaviourist school, relates them to the daily hazards of arboreal man—the dangers presented by breaking tree branches. The ape-man learned to fear the sudden, calamitous plunge, and he learned to fear, too, the warning crack. One need not follow Dr. Watson so far; there is no proof, indeed, that man was ever arboreal. But it must be obvious that this emotion of fear is immensely deep-seated—that it is instinctive if anything is20 instinctive. And all the evidence indicates that every other emotion is subordinate to it. None other shows itself so soon, and none other enters so powerfully into the first functioning of the infant mind. And to the primeval and yet profoundly rational fears that it brings into the world it quickly adds others that depart farther and farther from rationality. It begins to fear ideas as well as things, strange men as well as hostile nature. It picks up dreads and trepidations from its mother, from its nurse, from other children. At the age of three years, as Dr. Watson shows, its mental baggage is often little more than a vast mass of such things. It has anxieties, horrors, even superstitions. And as it increases in years it adds constantly to the stock.
On the cleared ground was a significant discovery: the earliest and most profound of human emotions is fear. Humans enter the world weak and naked, and almost as clueless as an oyster, but they come equipped with a highly complex and sensitive vulnerability to fear. They can tremble and cry out in the first hours of their lives—indeed, within the first minute. If you make a loud noise behind a newborn, it will shake like a Sunday-school superintendent caught in an affair. If you take away its support—meaning, if you make it feel like it's falling—it will let out a scream similar to what rural folks make when the traveling tooth-puller arrives. These fears suggest a phylogenetic origin—that is, they represent inherited experiences from our ancestral past. Dr. John B. Watson, the leader of the behaviorist school, links them to the everyday dangers faced by our tree-dwelling ancestors—the risks associated with breaking tree branches. The ape-man learned to fear a sudden, disastrous fall, and he also learned to fear the warning crack. One doesn't have to agree with Dr. Watson completely; there's no proof that humans were ever tree-dwelling. However, it's clear that the emotion of fear is extremely deep-rooted and instinctive if anything is. All evidence indicates that every other emotion is secondary to fear. None appear as early, and none have such a powerful impact on the initial functioning of an infant's mind. Along with the primal yet profoundly rational fears that it brings into the world, it quickly adds more emotions that stray further from rationality. It begins to fear ideas as well as objects, unfamiliar people as well as a hostile nature. It absorbs worries and anxieties from its mother, nurse, and other children. By the age of three, as Dr. Watson points out, its mental load is often just a huge collection of such fears. It carries anxieties, terrors, and even superstitions. And as it grows older, it continually adds to that collection.
The process of education is largely a process of getting rid of such fears. It rehearses, after a fashion, the upward struggle of man. The ideal educated man is simply one who has put away as foolish the immemorial fears of the race—of strange men and strange ideas, of the powers and principalities of the air. He is sure of himself in the world; no dread of the dark rides him; he is serene. To produce such men is the central aim of every rational system of education;21 even under democracy it is one of the aims, though perhaps only a subordinate one. What brings it to futility is simply the fact that the vast majority of men are congenitally incapable of any such intellectual progress. They cannot take in new ideas, and they cannot get rid of old fears. They lack the logical sense; they are unable to reason from a set of facts before them, free from emotional distraction. But they also lack something more fundamental: they are incompetent to take in the bald facts themselves. Here I point to the observations of Dr. Eleanor R. Wembridge, a practical psychologist of great shrewdness. Her contribution is the discovery that the lower orders of men, though they seem superficially to use articulate speech and thus to deal in ideas, are actually but little more accomplished in that way than so many trained animals. Words, save the most elemental, convey nothing to them. Their minds cannot grasp even the simplest abstractions; all their thinking is done on the level of a few primitive appetites and emotions. It is thus a sheer impossibility to educate them, as much so as it would be if they were devoid of the five senses. The school-marm who has at them wastes her time shouting22 up a rain-spout. They are imitative, as many of the lower animals are imitative, and so they sometimes deceive her into believing that her expositions and exhortations have gone home, but a scientific examination quickly reveals that they have taken in almost nothing. Thus ideas leave them unscathed; they are responsive only to emotions, and their emotions are all elemental—the emotions, indeed, of tabby-cats rather than of men.
The process of education mainly involves overcoming fears. It mirrors, in a way, humanity’s struggle to rise. The ideal educated person is simply one who has dismissed as silly the age-old fears of humanity—fear of strangers, unfamiliar ideas, and uncontrollable forces. They are confident in the world; they aren’t haunted by the darkness; they are at peace. Creating such individuals is the main goal of any sound educational system; even in a democracy, it's one of the goals, although perhaps not the most important one. What renders this aim fruitless is that most people are fundamentally unable to achieve any real intellectual growth. They can’t absorb new ideas, nor can they let go of old fears. They lack logical reasoning; they can’t think critically about the facts in front of them without emotional distractions. But they also lack something even more basic: they can’t fully understand those fundamental facts. Here, I refer to the insights of Dr. Eleanor R. Wembridge, a sharp practical psychologist. She has discovered that lower social classes, despite seeming to communicate through speech and engage with ideas, are not much more advanced in this regard than trained animals. Most words, except for the simplest ones, don’t mean anything to them. Their minds can’t grasp even the most basic concepts; all their thinking operates at the level of a few basic urges and feelings. Therefore, it’s utterly impossible to educate them, as impossible as if they lacked all five senses. The teacher who tries to reach them is wasting her time, shouting up a rain-spout. They are imitative, much like lower animals, so they occasionally trick her into thinking her lessons have taken hold, but a scientific assessment quickly shows that they’ve absorbed almost nothing. As such, ideas pass over them without effect; they only respond to feelings, and their feelings are quite basic—the feelings of tabby cats rather than of human beings.
4.
Politics Under Democracy
Politics in a Democracy
Fear remains the chiefest of them. The demagogues, i. e., the professors of mob psychology, who flourish in democratic states are well aware of the fact, and make it the corner-stone of their exact and puissant science. Politics under democracy consists almost wholly of the discovery, chase and scotching of bugaboos. The statesman becomes, in the last analysis, a mere witch-hunter, a glorified smeller and snooper, eternally chanting “Fe, Fi, Fo, Fum!” It has been so in the United States since the earliest days. The whole history of the country23 has been a history of melodramatic pursuits of horrendous monsters, most of them imaginary: the red-coats, the Hessians, the monocrats, again the red-coats, the Bank, the Catholics, Simon Legree, the Slave Power, Jeff Davis, Mormonism, Wall Street, the rum demon, John Bull, the hell hounds of plutocracy, the trusts, General Weyler, Pancho Villa, German spies, hyphenates, the Kaiser, Bolshevism. The list might be lengthened indefinitely; a complete chronicle of the Republic could be written in terms of it, and without omitting a single important episode. It was long ago observed that the plain people, under democracy, never vote for anything, but always against something. The fact explains, in large measure, the tendency of democratic states to pass over statesmen of genuine imagination and sound ability in favour of colourless mediocrities. The former are shining marks, and so it is easy for demagogues to bring them down; the latter are preferred because it is impossible to fear them. The demagogue himself, when he grows ambitious and tries to posture as a statesman, usually comes ignominiously to grief, as the cases of Bryan, Roosevelt and Wilson dramatically demonstrate. If Bryan had confined24 himself, in 1896, to the chase of the bugaboo of plutocracy, it is very probable that he would have been elected. But he committed the incredible folly of throwing most of his energies into advocating a so-called constructive program, and it was thus easy for his opponents to alarm the mob against him. That program had the capital defect of being highly technical, and hence almost wholly unintelligible to all save a small minority; so it took on a sinister look, and caused a shiver to go down the democratic spine. It was his cross-of-gold speech that nominated him; it was his cow State political economy that ruined him. Bryan was a highly unintelligent man, a true son of the mob, and thus never learned anything by experience. In his last days he discovered a new issue in the evolutionary hypothesis. It was beyond the comprehension of the mob, and hence well adapted to arousing its fears. But he allowed his foes to take the offensive out of his hands, and in the last scene of all he himself was the pursued, and the tide of the battle was running so heavily against him that even the hinds at Dayton, Tenn., were laughing at him.
Fear is the biggest factor. The demagogues, meaning the experts in mob psychology, who thrive in democratic societies know this well and make it the foundation of their powerful tactics. Politics in a democracy is mostly about identifying, pursuing, and dispelling fears. A statesman ultimately becomes a mere witch-hunter, a glorified seeker and snooper, constantly echoing "Fe, Fi, Fo, Fum!" This has been the case in the United States since its founding. The entire history of the country has been filled with dramatic hunts for terrible monsters, most of them imaginary: the redcoats, the Hessians, the monarchists, again the redcoats, the Bank, Catholics, Simon Legree, the Slave Power, Jeff Davis, Mormonism, Wall Street, the rum demon, John Bull, the dreaded plutocrats, the trusts, General Weyler, Pancho Villa, German spies, hyphenates, the Kaiser, Bolshevism. The list could go on indefinitely; a complete account of the Republic could be created based on it, without leaving out a single important event. It was noted long ago that the average people under democracy never vote for something, but always against something. This fact largely explains the tendency in democratic states to overlook genuinely imaginative and capable statesmen in favor of bland mediocrities. The former are easy targets, and so demagogues can easily take them down; the latter are preferred because there’s nothing to fear from them. When a demagogue gets too ambitious and tries to act like a statesman, he typically fails miserably, as seen in the cases of Bryan, Roosevelt, and Wilson. If Bryan had focused solely on the fear of plutocracy in 1896, he likely would have been elected. Instead, he made the foolish mistake of putting most of his energy into promoting a so-called constructive program, which made it easy for his opponents to stir up fear in the public against him. That program had the major flaw of being very technical, thus almost completely incomprehensible to all but a small minority; it consequently seemed sinister and sent shivers down the spine of the democratic masses. It was his cross-of-gold speech that got him nominated; it was his clumsy economic policies that brought him down. Bryan was not very bright, a true son of the mob, and never learned anything from experience. In his later years, he latched onto a new issue with the theory of evolution. It was beyond the comprehension of the masses and was perfect for stirring up their fears. But he allowed his opponents to take the offensive, and in the final moments, he himself was on the defensive, with the tide of the battle against him so heavily that even the locals in Dayton, Tennessee, were laughing at him.
Government under democracy is thus government25 by orgy, almost by orgasm. Its processes are most beautifully displayed at times when they stand most naked—for example, in war days. The history of the American share in the World War is simply a record of conflicting fears, more than once amounting to frenzies. The mob, at the start of the uproar, showed a classical reaction: it was eager only to keep out of danger. The most popular song, in the United States, in 1915, was “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to be a Soldier.” In 1916, on his fraudulent promise to preserve that boy from harm, Wilson was reëlected. There then followed some difficult manœuvres—but perhaps not so difficult, after all, to skilful demagogues. The problem was to substitute a new and worse fear for the one that prevailed—a new fear so powerful that it would reconcile the mob to the thought of entering the war. The business was undertaken resolutely on the morning after election day. Thereafter, for three months, every official agency lent a hand. No ship went down to a submarine’s torpedo anywhere on the seven seas that the State Department did not report that American citizens—nay, American infants in their mothers’ arms—were aboard. Diplomatic26 note followed diplomatic note, each new one surpassing all its predecessors in moral indignation. The Department of Justice ascribed all fires, floods and industrial accidents to German agents. The newspapers were filled with dreadful surmises, many of them officially inspired, about the probable effects upon the United States of the prospective German victory. It was obvious to everyone, even to the mob, that a victorious Germany would unquestionably demand an accounting for the United States’ gross violations of neutrality. Thus a choice of fears was set up. The first was a fear of a Germany heavily beset, but making alarming progress against her foes. The second was a fear of a Germany delivered from them, and thirsting for revenge on a false and venal friend. The second fear soon engulfed the first. By the time February came the mob was reconciled to entering the war—reconciled, but surely not eager.
Government in a democracy is basically government by frenzy, almost like an orgasm. Its processes are most clearly revealed when they are at their most exposed—like during times of war. The history of America's involvement in the World War is really a record of conflicting anxieties, often reaching extreme levels. At the beginning of the chaos, the public displayed a typical reaction: they just wanted to stay out of danger. The most popular song in the United States in 1915 was “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to be a Soldier.” In 1916, based on his deceptive promise to keep that boy safe, Wilson was re-elected. Then came some tricky maneuvers—but perhaps not so tricky after all for skilled manipulators. The challenge was to instill a new and more intense fear to replace the existing one—a fear strong enough to make the public okay with the idea of going to war. This task was taken on decisively the morning after election day. For the next three months, every official agency got involved. No ship sank from a submarine's torpedo anywhere in the world without the State Department reporting that American citizens—yes, even American babies in their mothers’ arms—were on board. Diplomatic note followed diplomatic note, each new one outdoing the last in moral outrage. The Department of Justice blamed all fires, floods, and industrial accidents on German agents. Newspapers were full of terrible speculations, many of them officially encouraged, about what a German victory might mean for the United States. It was clear to everyone, including the public, that a victorious Germany would definitely seek accountability for the United States’ major violations of neutrality. Thus, a choice of fears emerged. The first was a fear of a Germany facing pressure but making alarming progress against its enemies. The second was a fear of a Germany freed from that pressure, eager for payback against a deceitful and corrupt ally. The second fear quickly overshadowed the first. By February, the public had come to accept entering the war—not eagerly, but reconciled to it.
There remained the problem of converting reluctant acquiescence into enthusiasm. It was solved, as always, by manufacturing new fears. The history of the process remains to be written by competent hands: it will be a contribution to27 the literature of mob psychology of the highest importance. But the main outlines are familiar enough. The whole power of the government was concentrated upon throwing the plain people into a panic. All sense was heaved overboard, and there ensued a chase of bugaboos on a truly epic scale. Nothing like it had ever been seen in the world before, for no democratic state as populous as the United States had ever gone to war before. I pass over the details, and pause only to recall the fact that the American people, by the end of 1917, were in such terror that they lived in what was substantially a state of siege, though the foe was 3000 miles away and obviously unable to do them any damage. It was only the draft, I believe, that gave them sufficient courage to attempt actual hostilities. That ingenious device, by relieving the overwhelming majority of them of any obligation to take up arms, made them bold. Before it was adopted they were heavily in favour of contributing only munitions and money to the cause of democracy, with perhaps a few divisions of Regulars added for the moral effect. But once it became apparent that a given individual, John28 Doe, would not have to serve, he, John Doe, developed an altruistic eagerness for a frontal attack in force. For every Richard Roe in the conscript camps there were a dozen John Does thus safely at home, with wages high and the show growing enjoyable. So an heroic mood came upon the people, and their fear was concealed by a truculent front. But not from students of mob psychology.
There was still the challenge of turning hesitant agreement into genuine enthusiasm. This was, as usual, solved by creating new fears. The history of this process is yet to be documented by knowledgeable individuals: it will be a significant addition to the literature on mob psychology. However, the main points are well-known. The entire power of the government focused on throwing ordinary people into a panic. Common sense was completely disregarded, leading to a truly epic pursuit of imaginary threats. Nothing like it had ever been witnessed before, as no democratic nation as large as the United States had ever gone to war prior to this. I won’t get into the specifics, but I’d like to note that by the end of 1917, the American public was gripped by such fear that they effectively lived under a state of siege, even though the enemy was 3,000 miles away and clearly unable to cause any harm. I believe it was only the draft that gave them the courage to engage in actual combat. That clever strategy, by relieving the vast majority of them from any obligation to fight, made them bold. Before this was implemented, they strongly preferred to contribute only weapons and money to the cause of democracy, with perhaps a few divisions of regulars for a morale boost. But once it became clear that a specific person, John Doe, would not have to serve, he, John Doe, suddenly developed a selfless eagerness for a large-scale attack. For every Richard Roe in the conscript camps, there were a dozen John Does comfortably at home, enjoying high wages and an increasingly enjoyable spectacle. As a result, a heroic spirit overcame the people, and their fear was masked by a defiant demeanor. But not from those studying mob psychology.
5.
The Rôle of the Hormones
The Role of Hormones
Two other emotions are observed in the raw human being, fresh from God’s hands: one is rage, and the other is what, for want of a more accurate name, may be called love. This love, of course, is something quite different from the thing that poets sing. It is a great deal more earthly, and perhaps a great deal more honest. It manifests itself typically in a delight in being tickled; its psychic overtones take the form of being amiable. The child that is capable of it in the fullest measure is the one that coos loudest when its mother pats and strokes it, and tucks it into bed. In these sad days, when every flapper29 has read Freud and ponders on the libido, there is no need, I take it, for me to explain that such delights have their seats chiefly in erogenous zones, and have more to do with the hormones than with the soul. Here the new child psychology confirms the observations of the Freudians, and reinforces their allegation that even the most tender and innocent infant may be worthy of suspicion. Dr. Watson says that the dreadful phenomenon of tumescence in the male can occur at birth—a satirical fact of the first calibre, if a fact. It concerns us here only because the incurable infantilism of the inferior man brings him to manhood with his emotions in this department substantially what they were when he yielded himself to auto-erotic exercises in the cradle.
Two other emotions can be seen in a raw human being, fresh from God's creation: one is anger, and the other, for lack of a better term, might be called love. This love, of course, is quite different from what poets celebrate. It's much more down-to-earth and perhaps much more genuine. It typically shows up as a joy in being tickled, and its emotional undertones are expressed through friendliness. The child who exhibits this the most is the one who coos the loudest when their mother pats, strokes, and tucks them into bed. In these troubling times, when every flapper29 has read Freud and thinks about the libido, I don't think I need to explain that such delights are primarily located in erogenous zones and have more to do with hormones than with the soul. Here, modern child psychology backs up the Freudian observations and strengthens their claim that even the most gentle and innocent infant may deserve some scrutiny. Dr. Watson notes that the significant phenomenon of male arousal can happen at birth—a satirical fact of the utmost significance, if indeed it is a fact. This matters to us only because the unending childishness of the inferior man carries his emotions in this area into adulthood pretty much unchanged from when he engaged in self-pleasure as an infant.
But there is yet a difference, and it is important. In character his amorous fancies are the same; in intensity they are immensely exaggerated. His brain, in the first years of his second decade, ceases to develop, but simultaneously his glands begin to unfold gloriously, and presently they dominate his whole organism. In his middle teens, he is no more than a vast geyser of hormones. The sweet passion of love, in these30 years, is to him precisely what it is to a Tom cat. If he is of the bucolic variety of Homo stultus he has his will of his neighbour’s daughter, and there begins a race between the village pastor and the village sage-femme. If he is of the urban proletariat, he finds the outer world more inhospitable to the inner urge, for there are no dark lanes in the cities and no moonlight nights, but the urge itself remains irresistible and so in some way or other, vicariously or in harsh physiological terms, he yields himself to it, and loses his immortal soul.
But there’s still a difference, and it’s important. His romantic ideas are the same in nature, but they are greatly intensified. His brain, in the early years of his teenage years, stops developing, but at the same time, his glands start to bloom magnificently, and soon they take over his entire being. In his mid-teens, he is just a huge burst of hormones. The sweet feeling of love during these years means to him exactly what it does to a male cat. If he’s the rural type of Homo stultus, he gets what he wants with the neighbor’s daughter, leading to a competition between the village pastor and the local sage-femme. If he’s from the urban working class, he finds the outside world less welcoming to his inner desires, as there are no dark alleyways or moonlit nights in the cities, but the urge itself remains impossible to resist. So, in one way or another, whether indirectly or through harsh physical means, he gives in to it and loses his immortal soul.
Later on the thing grows more subtle and even more refined. His vast capacity for illusion, his powerful thirst for the not true, embellishes his anthropoid appetite without diminishing it, and he begins to toy with sentiment, even with a sort of poetry. If you want to discover the content of that poetry go look at any movie, or listen to any popular song. At its loftiest, it is never far from the poetry of a rooster in a barnyard. Love, to the inferior man, remains almost wholly a physical matter. The heroine he most admires is the one who offers the grossest sexual provocation; the hero who makes his wife roll her eyes is a perambulating phallus. The eminent psychologists31 who conduct tabloid newspapers make this fact the corner-stone of their metaphysical system. Their ideal piece of news is one in which nothing is left to the imagination that can be wormed through the mails. Their readers want no sublimation and no symbolism.
Later on, things become more subtle and even more refined. His great ability to create illusions and his strong craving for what isn't true enhance his basic desires without lessening them, and he starts to play with feelings, even a kind of poetry. If you want to uncover the essence of that poetry, just check out any movie or listen to any popular song. At its best, it’s never far from the poetry of a rooster in a barnyard. For the lesser man, love is mostly a physical thing. The heroine he admires the most is the one who shows the most blatant sexual provocations; the hero who makes his wife roll her eyes is just a walking phallus. The prominent psychologists31 who run tabloid newspapers make this truth the foundation of their philosophical beliefs. Their ideal news story is one where nothing is left to the imagination that can be delivered through the mail. Their readers crave no sublimation and no symbolism.
Love, as Freud explains, has many meanings. It runs from the erotic to the philanthropic. But in all departments and on all planes the inferior man reduces it to terms of his own elemental yearnings. Of all his stupidities there is none more stupid than that which makes it impossible for him to see beyond them, even as an act of the imagination. He simply cannot formulate the concept of a good that is not his own good. The fact explains his immemorial heat against heretics, sacred and secular. His first thought and his last thought, contemplating them, is to stand them up against a wall, and have at them with musketry. Go back into history as far as you please, and you will find no record that he has ever opened his mouth for fairness, for justice, for decency between man and man. Such concepts, like the concepts of honour and of liberty, are eternally beyond him, and belong only to his superiors. The slaughters32 in the Roman arena delighted him; he applauded Torquemada; only yesterday he was marching against radicals—i. e., idiots who lamented his exploitation and sought to end it—with the American Legion. His natural cowardice, of course, moves him powerfully in such situations: his congenital fear is easily translated into cruelty. But something must also be said for his mere incapacity to project himself into the place of the other, his deficiency in imagination. Are the poor charitable? Then it is only to the poor. When their betters stand before them, asking for something that they may withhold—when they are thus confronted, though the thing asked for be only fair dealing, elemental justice, common decency, they are wolves.
Love, as Freud points out, has many meanings. It ranges from the sexual to the charitable. But in every area and on every level, the lesser man reduces it to his own basic desires. Of all his foolishness, none is more foolish than his inability to see beyond them, even as an imaginative exercise. He just can't grasp the idea of a good that isn't his own. This explains his long-standing hostility towards heretics, both religious and secular. His first thought and his last thought, when considering them, is to line them up against a wall and attack them with gunfire. Look back through history as far as you'd like, and you'll find no record of him ever advocating for fairness, justice, or decency between people. Such ideas, along with notions of honor and freedom, are eternally beyond him and belong only to those who are his superiors. The brutality in the Roman arena thrilled him; he cheered for Torquemada; just recently, he was marching against radicals—i.e., people who complained about his exploitation and wanted to put an end to it—with the American Legion. His natural cowardice certainly drives him strongly in these situations: his inherent fear easily turns into cruelty. But we must also note his sheer inability to imagine himself in someone else's shoes, his lack of imagination. Are the poor charitable? Only towards other poor people. When their betters stand before them, asking for something they might hold back—when they are faced with this, even if the request is just for fair treatment, basic justice, or common decency, they turn into wolves.
In a previous work I have adverted to the appalling development of this wolfishness among peasants. They may be safely assumed, I believe, to represent the lowest caste among civilized men. They are the closest, both in their avocations and in their mental processes, to primeval man. One may think of them as the sediment remaining in the filter after the stream of progress has gone through. Even the city proletariat is appreciably superior, if only because33 it embraces those more intelligent yokels who have had the wit to escape from the dreadful drudgery of the dunghill. Well, give a glance at the theology and politics prevailing on the land. The former, in all countries and all ages, has kept contact with the primitive animism of savages: it bristles everywhere with demons, witches and ghosts. In its public aspect it is as intolerant of heresy as Thibetan lamaism. The yokel not only believes that all heretics are doomed to be roasted in hell through all eternity; he also holds that they should be harassed as much as possible on this earth. The anti-evolution laws of the South afford an instructive glimpse into the peasant mind. They are based frankly upon the theory that every man who dissents from the barnyard theology is a scoundrel, and devoid of civil rights. That theory was put very plainly by the peasant attorney-general during the celebrated Scopes trial, to the visible satisfaction of the peasant judge.
In a previous work, I mentioned the alarming rise of this primal behavior among peasants. They can safely be seen, I believe, as the lowest social class among civilized people. They are the closest, both in their jobs and thought processes, to primitive man. You can think of them as the leftover residue after the flow of progress has passed through. Even the urban working class is significantly better off, if only because it includes those smarter country folk who managed to escape the terrible grind of backbreaking work. Now, take a look at the religious beliefs and politics in the countryside. The former, in every country and throughout history, remains connected to the primitive animism of the savages: it is full of demons, witches, and ghosts. In its public expression, it is as intolerant of differing beliefs as Tibetan lamaism. The country folk not only believe that all heretics are destined to be tormented in hell for eternity; they also think they should be persecuted as much as possible on this earth. The anti-evolution laws in the South provide a telling insight into the peasant mindset. They are openly rooted in the idea that anyone who disagrees with the simplistic rural beliefs is a criminal and lacks civil rights. That idea was clearly articulated by the peasant attorney-general during the famous Scopes trial, much to the visible satisfaction of the peasant judge.
In politics the virtuous clod-hopper, again speaking for inferior man, voices notions of precisely the same sort. The whole process of government, as he views it, is simply a process of promoting his private advantage. He can imagine34 no good save his own good. When his affairs are prospering—which is to say, when the needs of the city man are acute, and the latter is thus at his mercy—he rams his advantage home with relentless ferocity. For him to show any altruism in such a situation, or even any common humanity, would be so strange as to appear fabulous. But when things are running against him he believes that the city man should be taxed to make up his losses: this is the alpha and omega of all the brummagem progressivism that emanates from the farm. That “progressivism,” in the hands of political mountebanks, is swathed in the trappings of Service, but at the heart of it there is nothing but bald self-seeking. The yokel hates everyone who is not a yokel—and is afraid of everyone. He is democratic man in the altogether. He is the glory and bulwark of all democratic states. The city proletarian may be flustered and run amok by ideas—ideas without any sense, true enough, but still ideas. The yokel has room in his head for only one. That is the idea that God regards him fondly, and has a high respect for him—that all other men are out of favour in heaven and abandoned to the devil.
In politics, the simple country folk, once again speaking for the lower class, express ideas that are essentially the same. To him, the whole process of government is merely a way to promote his own interests. He can see no good beyond his personal gain. When things are going well for him—which means when the needs of city dwellers are urgent, putting them at his mercy—he pushes his advantage with relentless intensity. For him to show any selflessness in such a situation, or even basic humanity, would seem so odd it might as well be a fairy tale. But when times are tough for him, he thinks the city folks should be taxed to cover his losses: that's the core principle of all the fake progressiveness that comes from the farms. That "progressivism," in the hands of political charlatans, is dressed up in the guise of Service, but at its core, it's nothing but sheer self-interest. The country bumpkin dislikes everyone who's not like him—and is wary of everyone. He represents the true essence of democratic man. He is the pride and protection of all democratic states. The city worker might be overwhelmed and driven mad by ideas—ideas that make no sense, it's true, but still ideas. The simpleton can grasp only one idea: that God looks kindly upon him and respects him, while all other people are out of favor in heaven and left to the devil.
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6.
Envy As a Philosophy
Jealousy as a Philosophy
But under this pretension to superiority, of course, there lies an uncomfortable realization of actual inferiority. The peasant hates; ergo, he envies—and “l’envie,” as Heine said to Philarète Chasles, “est une infériorité qui s’avoue.” The disdain that goes with genuine superiority is something quite different; there is no sign of it in him. He is so far from it, indeed, that he can imagine no higher delights than such as proceed from acts which, when performed by the hated city man, he denounces as crimes, and tries to put down by law. It is the cabaret that makes a Prohibitionist of him, not the drunkard in the gutter. Doomed himself to drink only crude and unpalatable stimulants, incompetently made and productive of depressing malaises, and forced to get them down in solitary swinishness behind the door, he naturally longs for the varieties that have a more delicate and romantic smack, and are ingested in gay society and to the music of harps and sackbuts. That longing is vain. There are no36 cabarets in the village, but only sordid speak-easies, selling raw spirits out of filthy jugs. Drinking cider in the barn is so lonely as to be a sort of onanism. Where is the music? Where are the whirling spangles, the brilliant lights? Where is the swooning, suffocating scent of lilies-of-the-valley, Jockey Club? Where, above all, are the lost and fascinating females, so thrillingly described by the visiting evangelist? The yokel peeks through a crack in the barn-door and glimpses his slatternly wife laboriously rounding up strayed pigs: to ask her in for a friendly bumper would be as appalling as asking in the cow. So he gets down his unappetizing dram, feels along his glabella for the beginning headache, and resumes his melancholy heaving of manure—a Prohibitionist by conscience, doubly-riveted and immovable.
But beneath this act of superiority, there’s an uncomfortable acknowledgment of actual inferiority. The peasant resents; therefore, he envies—and “desire,” as Heine told Philarète Chasles, “is an admitted inferiority.” The contempt that comes with real superiority is something entirely different; it’s not present in him. He’s so far from it that he can’t even fathom greater pleasures than those that come from actions he condemns as crimes when carried out by the despised city dweller, whom he tries to regulate with the law. It’s the cabaret that turns him into a Prohibitionist, not the drunkard passed out in the gutter. Condemned to drink only harsh and unpalatable substances, poorly made and causing distressing hangovers, and forced to consume them alone in squalor behind closed doors, he naturally yearns for the more refined and romantic experiences enjoyed in lively company accompanied by the music of harps and sackbuts. That desire is futile. There are no 36 cabarets in the village, only grimy speakeasies selling crude alcohol from filthy jugs. Drinking cider in the barn is so isolating that it feels like a sort of solitary pleasure. Where’s the music? Where are the twinkling lights, the dazzling decor? Where’s the intoxicating, suffocating scent of lilies-of-the-valley, Jockey Club? Most importantly, where are the alluring and captivating women, so enticingly described by the visiting preacher? The country bumpkin looks through a crack in the barn door and sees his disheveled wife struggling to round up wayward pigs: inviting her in for a drink would be as shocking as inviting in the cow. So he takes his unappealing shot, checks for the start of a headache, and resumes his dreary task of shoveling manure—a Prohibitionist by conviction, firmly locked into his position.
In all his politics this envy is manifest. He hates the plutocrats of the cities, not only because they best him in the struggle for money, but also because they spend their gains in debaucheries that are beyond him. Such yellow-backs as “Night Life in Chicago” have done more, I believe, to propagate “idealism” in the corn-and-hog37 belt than all the eloquence of the Pfeffers and Bryans. The yokels, reading them in secret, leave them full of a passionate conviction that such Babylonish revels must be put down, if Christianity is to survive—that it is obviously against the will of God that a Chicago stock-broker should have five wives and fifty concubines, and an Iowa swineherd but one—and that one a strictly Christian woman, even at the purple moments when wits and principles tend naturally to scatter. In the cities, as everyone knows, women move toward antinomianism: it is a scandal throughout Christendom. Their souls, I daresay, are imperilled thereby, but certainly no one argues that it makes them less charming—least of all the husbandman behind his remote plough, tortured by ruby reflections of the carnalities at Atlantic City and Miami. On the land, however, that movement has but little genuine force, despite a general apeing of its externals. The female young may bob their hair, but they do not reject divine revelation. I am told by experts that it is still a sort of marvel, as it was in the youth of Abraham Lincoln, to find a farm-wife who has definitely renounced the theology of the local pastors. The fact has38 obvious moral—and, by an easy step, political—consequences. There are about six and a half million farmers in the United States. Keep in mind the fact that at least six millions of them are forced to live in unmitigated monogamy with wives whose dominant yearning is to save the heathen hordes in India from hell fire, and you will begin to get some grasp of the motives behind such statutes as the celebrated Mann Act. The sea-sick passenger on the ocean liner detests the “good sailor” who stalks past him a hundred times a day, obscenely smoking large, greasy, gold-banded cigars. In precisely the same way democratic man hates the fellow who is having a better time of it in this world. Such, indeed, is the origin of democracy. And such is the origin of its twin, Puritanism.
In all his politics, this envy is obvious. He hates the wealthy elites in the cities, not just because they outshine him in the competition for money, but also because they spend their earnings on indulgences that he can't afford. Books like “Night Life in Chicago” have, I believe, done more to spread “idealism” in the Midwest than all the speeches from people like Pfeffer and Bryan. The locals, secretly reading these works, come away convinced that such excessive parties must be stopped if Christianity is to thrive—that it clearly goes against God’s will for a Chicago stockbroker to have five wives and fifty mistresses, while an Iowa farmer has just one—and one who is a strictly Christian woman, even during the moments when reason and values are naturally pulled apart. In the cities, as everyone knows, women are moving toward rejecting traditional morals: it’s a scandal throughout the Christian world. Their souls, I assume, may be in danger because of it, but no one argues that it makes them any less appealing—least of all the farmer behind his remote plow, troubled by vivid thoughts of the temptations in Atlantic City and Miami. On the land, however, that trend has little real impact, even though there’s a general imitation of its surface. The younger women may cut their hair, but they aren’t turning away from divine revelation. Experts tell me that it’s still somewhat remarkable, as it was in Abraham Lincoln’s youth, to find a farm wife who has completely rejected the beliefs of the local pastors. This fact has clear moral—and, by extension, political—implications. There are about six and a half million farmers in the United States. Keep in mind that at least six million of them are stuck in unyielding monogamy with wives whose main desire is to save the heathen in India from eternal damnation, and you’ll start to understand the motivations behind laws like the famous Mann Act. The seasick passenger on the ocean liner despises the “good sailor” who passes him a hundred times a day, crudely smoking large, greasy, gold-banded cigars. In exactly the same way, democratic people resent those who seem to be enjoying a better life in this world. That, in fact, is the root of democracy. And that is also the root of its counterpart, Puritanism.
The city proletarian, of course, is a cut above the hind, if only because his natural envy of his betters is mitigated and mellowed by panem et circenses. His life may be swinish, but it is seldom dull. In good times there is actual money in his hand, and immense and complicated organizations offer him gaudy entertainment in return for it. In bad times his basic wants are met out of the community funds, and39 he is even kept in certain luxuries, necessary to his contentment. The immense development of public charity in the cities of the United States has yet to find adequate analysis and record. Nothing quite like it was ever known in past ages, nor is it paralleled in any other country to-day. What lies under it, I daresay, is simply the fact that the plutocracy of the Republic, having had more experience with democracy than the plutocracy anywhere else, has attained to a higher skill in dealing with the proletarian. He is never dangerous so long as his belly is filled and his eyes kept a-pop; and in this great land, by Divine Providence, there is always enough surplus wealth, even in the worst times, to finance that filling and popping. The plethora of means has bred a large class of experts, professionally devoted to the business. They swarm in all the American cities, and when genuine wants fail them they invent artificial wants. This enterprise in the third theological virtue has gone to great lengths. The proletarian, in his office as father, is now reduced by it to the simple biological function of a boar in a barnyard. From the moment the fertilized ovum attaches itself to the decidua serotina he is free to give40 himself whole-heartedly to politics, drink and the radio. There is elaborate machinery for instructing the partner of his ecstasies in the whole art and mystery of maternity, and all the accompanying expenses are provided for. Obstetricians of the highest eminence stand ready to examine her and counsel her; gynecologists are at hand to perform any necessary operations; trained nurses call at her home, supply and prepare her diet, warn her against a too animated social life, hand her instructive literature, and entertain her with anecdotes suitable to her condition. If she is too clumsy or too lazy to fashion a layette, or can’t afford the materials, it is provided free of charge. And when she comes to term at last she is taken into a steam-heated hospital, boarded without cost, and delivered in a brilliant, aseptic, and, in so far as money can make it so, painless manner.
The city worker, of course, is a step above the rest, mainly because his natural jealousy of those who are better off is softened and toned down by panem et circenses. His life may be miserable, but it’s rarely boring. In good times, he actually has cash in hand, and large, complicated organizations provide him flashy entertainment in exchange for it. In bad times, his basic needs are taken care of through community funds, and he’s even kept in certain luxuries that keep him content. The extensive growth of public charity in American cities hasn’t been adequately analyzed or documented. Nothing like it has been seen in previous eras, nor is it matched in any other country today. What drives this, I would say, is simply the fact that the wealthy elite in the Republic, having had more experience with democracy than wealthy elites elsewhere, have become more skilled at managing the working class. He is never a threat as long as his stomach is full and his eyes are entertained; and in this great country, by divine providence, there’s always enough surplus wealth, even in the toughest times, to keep that stomach full and those eyes entertained. The abundance of resources has produced a large group of specialists, dedicated professionally to this task. They are everywhere in American cities, and when genuine needs run out, they create artificial ones. This effort in the third theological virtue has reached significant lengths. The worker, in his role as a father, is reduced to the simple biological role of a pig in a pen. From the moment the fertilized egg attaches itself to the decidua serotina, he can fully immerse himself in politics, drinking, and the radio. There is an elaborate system to teach his partner in joy the entire art and mystery of motherhood, with all the associated costs covered. Top obstetricians are ready to examine and advise her; gynecologists are available to perform any needed procedures; trained nurses visit her home, provide and prepare her meals, advise her against too active a social life, give her educational reading materials, and entertain her with stories suitable for her condition. If she is too awkward or too lazy to put together a layette, or can’t afford the materials, it’s provided for free. And when she finally gives birth, she is taken to a steam-heated hospital, fed at no cost, and delivered in a bright, sterile, and, as much as money can achieve, painless way.
Nor is this all. Once she has become a mother her benefits only increase. If she wants to get rid of her child it is taken off her hands, and eager propagandists instruct her in the science of avoiding another. If she chooses to keep it there is elaborate machinery for reducing the care and cost of it to nothing. Visiting nurses41 of a dozen different varieties stand ready to assume the burdens of washing it, dosing it with purges, and measuring out its victuals. Milk is supplied free—and not simply common cow’s milk, but cow’s milk modified according to the subtlest formulæ of eminent pediatricians. Ice is thrown in as a matter of course. Medicines are free at the neighbourhood dispensary. If the mother, recovering her figure, wishes to go shopping, she may park her baby at a crèche, and, on the plea that she is employed as a charwoman, leave it there all day. Once it can toddle the kindergarten yawns for it, and in holiday time the public playground, each officered by learned experts. The public school follows, and with it a host of new benefits. Dentists are in attendance to plug and pull the youngster’s teeth at the public charge. Oculists fit it with horn-rimmed spectacles. It is deloused. Free lunches sustain it. Its books cost nothing. It is taught not only the three R’s, but also raffiawork, bookkeeping, basketball, salesmanship, the new dances, and parliamentary law. It learns the causes of the late war and the fallacies of Socialism.
Nor is this all. Once she becomes a mother, her benefits only increase. If she wants to give up her child, it is taken off her hands, and eager advocates teach her how to avoid having another. If she chooses to keep it, there are elaborate systems in place to reduce the care and cost to nothing. Visiting nurses41 of various types are ready to take on the challenges of washing the baby, giving it medication, and measuring out its meals. Milk is provided for free—not just regular cow’s milk, but cow’s milk specially modified according to the most advanced formulas from top pediatricians. Ice is included as a standard. Medicines are available for free at the local dispensary. If the mother, working on getting her figure back, wants to go shopping, she can leave her baby at a crèche and, pretending she’s working as a cleaner, leave it there all day. As soon as the child can walk, a kindergarten awaits, and during holidays, the public playground, both supervised by qualified experts. Public school follows, bringing a whole new set of benefits. Dentists are available to fill and extract the child’s teeth at no cost. Oculists provide it with stylish glasses. It is cleaned of lice. Free lunches are provided. Its books are free. It learns not only the basics but also crafts, bookkeeping, basketball, sales techniques, the latest dances, and parliamentary procedure. It studies the reasons behind the recent war and the flaws of Socialism.
The rest you know as well as I do. The proletarian42 is so artfully relieved of the elemental gnawings which constantly terrorize the peasant and so steadily distracted from all sober thinking that his natural envy of his betters is sublimated into a sort of boozy contentment, like that of a hog in a comfortable sty. He escapes boredom, and with it, brooding. The political imbecilities which pile up in great waves from the prairies break upon the hard rock of his urban cynicism like rollers upon the strand. His pastors have but a slight hold upon him, and so cannot stir him up to the frantic hatreds which move the yokel. Even his wife emancipates herself from the ancient demonology of the race: his typical complaint against her is not that she is made anaphrodisiacal by Christian endeavour but that she is too worldly and extravagant, and spreads her charms too boldly. The rustic, alone upon his dung-hill, has time to nurse his grievances; the city moron is diverted from them by the shows that surround him. There was a time when yellow journalism promised to prod him to dudgeon, and even to send him yelling to the barricades. But the plutocracy has deftly drawn its fangs, and in its place are the harmless tabloids. They ease his envy by43 giving him a vicarious share in the debaucheries of his economic superiors. He is himself, of course, unable to roar about the country in a high-powered car, accompanied by a beautiful coloured girl of large gifts for the art of love, but when he reads of the scions of old Knickerbocker families doing it he somehow gets a touch of the thrill. It flatters him to think that he lives in a community in which such levantine joys are rife. Thus his envy is obscured by civic pride, by connoisseurship, and by a simple animal delight in good shows. By the time the tale reaches the yokel it is reduced to its immoral elements, and so makes him smell brimstone. But the city proletarian hears the frou-frou of perfumed skirts.
The rest you know just as well as I do. The working class is cleverly kept away from the basic worries that constantly haunt the rural folk, and they’re consistently distracted from serious thoughts. Their natural envy for those better off becomes a sort of tipsy satisfaction, much like a pig lounging in a comfy pen. They avoid boredom, and along with it, any deep thinking. The political nonsense that builds up in waves from the farmlands crashes against their urban skepticism like waves on the shore. Their leaders hardly influence them, so they can’t incite the intense hatred that drives the country folks. Even their wives break free from the age-old superstitions: the typical complaint a husband has is not that his wife’s lost her desire because of religious beliefs, but that she’s too materialistic and shows off too much. The farmer, alone on his farm, has time to brood over his grievances; the city dweller is distracted by the entertainment around him. There was a time when sensational journalism promised to stir him into anger, even pushing him to protest. But the wealthy have skillfully dulled that outrage, leaving behind innocuous tabloids. These tabloids soothe his envy by giving him a vicarious taste of the indulgences enjoyed by those with more money. He can’t race around the country in a flashy car with a stunning girlfriend renowned for her charm, but when he reads about the heirs of wealthy families doing just that, he feels a thrill. It flatters him to be part of a community where such extravagant pleasures exist. So, his envy is masked by civic pride, by a refined appreciation, and by a straightforward joy in good entertainment. By the time this story reaches the country bumpkin, it’s stripped down to its immoral aspects, making him feel like he’s smelling sulfur. But the city dweller catches the sound of luxurious dresses swishing.
7.
Liberty and Democratic Man
Freedom and Democratic Individual
Under the festive surface, of course, envy remains: the proletarian is still a democrat. The fact shows itself grimly whenever the supply of panem et circenses falls off sharply, and the harsh realities make themselves felt. All the revolutions in history have been started by hungry44 city mobs. The fact is, indeed, so plain that it has attracted the notice even of historians, and some of them deduce from it the doctrine that city life breeds a love of liberty. It may be so, but certainly that love is not visible in the lower orders. I can think of no city revolution that actually had liberty for its object, in any rational sense. The ideas of freedom that prevail in the world to-day were first formulated by country gentlemen, aided and abetted by poets and philosophers, with occasional help from an eccentric king. One of the most valid of them—that of free speech—was actually given its first support in law by the most absolute monarch of modern times, to wit, Frederick the Great. When the city mob fights it is not for liberty, but for ham and cabbage. When it wins, its first act is to destroy every form of freedom that is not directed wholly to that end. And its second is to butcher all professional libertarians. If Thomas Jefferson had been living in Paris in 1793 he would have made an even narrower escape from the guillotine than Thomas Paine made.
Under the festive surface, envy definitely lingers: the working-class person is still a democrat. This reality becomes painfully obvious whenever the supply of panem et circenses drops sharply, and harsh truths are felt. All the revolutions in history have been sparked by starving city mobs. This fact is so evident that even historians have taken notice, with some concluding that city life fosters a love of liberty. It might be true, but that love is certainly not visible among the lower classes. I can't think of any city revolution that actually aimed for liberty in any sensible way. The concepts of freedom that are common today were initially developed by country gentlemen, supported by poets and philosophers, with occasional input from an eccentric king. One of the most legitimate ideas—free speech—was actually first backed by the most absolute monarch of modern times, Frederick the Great. When the city mob fights, it's not for liberty, but for food like ham and cabbage. When it wins, its first action is to eliminate any form of freedom that doesn't directly serve that purpose. Its second action is to slaughter all professional advocates for freedom. If Thomas Jefferson had been in Paris in 1793, he would have had an even narrower escape from the guillotine than Thomas Paine did.
The fact is that liberty, in any true sense, is a concept that lies quite beyond the reach of45 the inferior man’s mind. He can imagine and even esteem, in his way, certain false forms of liberty—for example, the right to choose between two political mountebanks, and to yell for the more obviously dishonest—but the reality is incomprehensible to him. And no wonder, for genuine liberty demands of its votaries a quality he lacks completely, and that is courage. The man who loves it must be willing to fight for it; blood, said Jefferson, is its natural manure. More, he must be able to endure it—an even more arduous business. Liberty means self-reliance, it means resolution, it means enterprise, it means the capacity for doing without. The free man is one who has won a small and precarious territory from the great mob of his inferiors, and is prepared and ready to defend it and make it support him. All around him are enemies, and where he stands there is no friend. He can hope for little help from other men of his own kind, for they have battles of their own to fight. He has made of himself a sort of god in his little world, and he must face the responsibilities of a god, and the dreadful loneliness. Has Homo boobiens any talent for this magnificent self-reliance? He has the same46 talent for it that he has for writing symphonies in the manner of Ludwig van Beethoven, no less and no more. That is to say, he has no talent whatsoever, nor even any understanding that such a talent exists. Liberty is unfathomable to him. He can no more comprehend it than he can comprehend honour. What he mistakes for it, nine times out of ten, is simply the banal right to empty hallelujahs upon his oppressors. He is an ox whose last proud, defiant gesture is to lick the butcher behind the ear.
The truth is that freedom, in any real sense, is a concept that is completely beyond the grasp of45 an inferior person's mind. They can envision and even value, in their own way, certain false versions of freedom—like the right to choose between two political frauds and to cheer for the one who’s clearly more dishonest—but the actual concept is beyond their understanding. And it’s not surprising, because true freedom requires a quality they entirely lack: courage. The person who cherishes it must be ready to fight for it; blood, as Jefferson said, is its natural fertilizer. More importantly, they must be able to endure it—an even tougher challenge. Freedom means self-reliance, it means determination, it means initiative, it means the ability to get by without. A free person is someone who has carved out a small and fragile space from the larger crowd of their inferiors and is prepared to defend it and make it sustain them. All around them are adversaries, and where they stand, there are no friends. They can expect little help from others like them, as they have their own battles to fight. They have made themselves a kind of god in their small world, and they must bear the responsibilities of a god and the deep loneliness that comes with it. Does Homo boobiens have any talent for this remarkable self-reliance? They have the same46 talent for it that they have for composing symphonies in the style of Ludwig van Beethoven, not more and not less. That is to say, they have no talent at all, nor any understanding that such a talent even exists. Freedom is incomprehensible to them. They can no more grasp it than they can grasp honor. What they mistakenly believe it to be, nine times out of ten, is simply the trivial right to shower empty praises on their oppressors. They are like an ox whose last proud, defiant action is to lick the butcher behind the ear.
“The vast majority of persons of our race,” said Sir Francis Galton, “have a natural tendency to shrink from the responsibility of standing and acting alone.” It is a pity that the great pioneer of studies in heredity did not go beyond the fact to its obvious causes: they were exactly in his line. What ails “the vast majority of persons of our race” is simply the fact that, to their kind, even such mild and narrow liberties as they can appreciate are very recent acquisitions. It is barely a century and a half—a scant five generations—since four-fifths of the people of the world, white and black alike, were slaves, in reality if not in name. I could fill this book with evidence, indubitable and overwhelming.47 There are whole libraries upon the subject. Turn to any treatise on the causes of the French Revolution, and you will find the French peasant of 1780 but little removed, in legal rights and daily tasks, from the fellahin who built Cheops’ pyramid. Consult any work on the rise of the Industrial System in England, and you will find the towns of that great liberty-loving land filled, in the same year, with a half-starved and anthropoid proletariat, and the countryside swarming with a dispossessed and despairing peasantry. Open any school-book of American history, and you will see Germans sold like cattle by their masters. If you thirst for more, keep on: the tale was precisely the same in Italy, in Spain, in Russia, in Scandinavia, and in what remained of the Holy Roman Empire. The Irish, at the close of the Eighteenth Century, were clamped under a yoke that it took more than a century of effort to throw off. The Scotch, roving their bare intolerable hills, were only two steps removed from savagery, and even cannibalism. The Welsh, but recently delivered from voodooism to Methodism, were being driven into their own coal-mines. There was no liberty anywhere in Europe, even in name, until 1789,48 and there was little in fact until 1848. And in America? Again I summon the historians, some of whom begin to grow honest. America was settled largely by slaves, some escaped but others transported in bondage. The Revolution was imposed upon them by their betters, chiefly, in New England, commercial gents in search of greater profits, and in the South, country gentlemen ambitious to found a nobility in the wilderness. Universal manhood suffrage, the corner-stone of modern free states, was only dreamed of until 1867, and economic freedom was little more than a name until years later.
“The vast majority of people from our race,” said Sir Francis Galton, “have a natural tendency to avoid the responsibility of standing and acting alone.” It’s unfortunate that the great pioneer of heredity studies didn’t delve into the obvious reasons behind this: they were right in his field. What troubles “the vast majority of people from our race” is simply the fact that, for them, even the mildest and most limited freedoms they can appreciate are very recent. It’s barely a century and a half—a little over five generations—since four-fifths of the world’s population, both white and black, were slaves, in reality if not in name. I could fill this book with undeniable and overwhelming evidence. There are entire libraries on this topic. Look at any discussion on the causes of the French Revolution, and you’ll see that the French peasant of 1780 was not much different, in legal rights and daily tasks, from the fellahin who built Cheops’ pyramid. Check any work on the rise of the Industrial System in England, and you’ll find that the towns of that liberty-loving nation were filled, in the same year, with a half-starved working class, while the countryside was full of a dispossessed and desperate peasantry. Open any American history schoolbook, and you’ll see Germans sold like cattle by their masters. If you want more, keep going: the story was exactly the same in Italy, Spain, Russia, Scandinavia, and what was left of the Holy Roman Empire. The Irish, at the end of the Eighteenth Century, were under a yoke that took more than a century of effort to break. The Scots, roaming their harsh hills, were barely two steps away from savagery, and even cannibalism. The Welsh, just moved from voodooism to Methodism, were being forced into their own coal mines. There was no freedom anywhere in Europe, even in name, until 1789, and there was little in practice until 1848. And what about America? Again, I call upon historians, some of whom are starting to be honest. America was largely settled by slaves, some who escaped but others who were transported in bondage. The Revolution was imposed on them by their betters, mainly in New England, where merchants were seeking greater profits, and in the South, where country gentlemen were eager to establish a nobility in the wilderness. Universal manhood suffrage, the cornerstone of modern free states, was only imagined until 1867, and economic freedom was little more than a concept until many years later.47
Thus the lower orders of men, however grandiloquently they may talk of liberty to-day, have actually had but a short and highly deceptive experience of it. It is not in their blood. The grandfathers of at least half of them were slaves, and the great-grandfathers of three-fourths, and the great-great-grandfathers of seven-eighths, and the great-great-great-grandfathers of practically all. The heritage of freedom belongs to a small minority of men, descended, whether legitimately or by adultery, from the old lords of the soil or49 from the patricians of the free towns. It is my contention that such a heritage is necessary in order that the concept of liberty, with all its disturbing and unnatural implications, may be so much as grasped—that such ideas cannot be implanted in the mind of man at will, but must be bred in as all other basic ideas are bred in. The proletarian may mouth the phrases, as he did in Jefferson’s day, but he cannot take in the underlying realities, as was also demonstrated in Jefferson’s day. What his great-great-grand-children may be capable of I am not concerned with here; my business is with the man himself as he now walks the world. Viewed thus, it must be obvious that he is still incapable of bearing the pangs of liberty. They make him uncomfortable; they alarm him; they fill him with a great loneliness. There is no high adventurousness in him, but only fear. He not only doesn’t long for liberty; he is quite unable to stand it. What he longs for is something wholly different, to wit, security. He needs protection. He is afraid of getting hurt. All else is affectation, delusion, empty words.
So, the lower classes of people, no matter how grandly they talk about freedom today, have actually had a short and very misleading experience with it. It's not in their nature. The grandfathers of at least half of them were slaves, and the great-grandfathers of three-fourths, and the great-great-grandfathers of seven-eighths, and the great-great-great-grandfathers of almost all of them. The legacy of freedom belongs to a small minority of individuals, who are descended, whether legitimately or through infidelity, from the old landowners or from the affluent residents of the free towns. I believe that such a legacy is essential for understanding the concept of freedom, with all its unsettling and unnatural implications; these ideas cannot simply be forced into a person's mind but must be ingrained like all other fundamental ideas. The working class may repeat the slogans, as they did in Jefferson’s time, but they can't grasp the deeper truths, as was also evident back then. I’m not concerned with what their great-great-grandchildren may achieve; my focus is on the person as he is now in the world. Viewed this way, it’s clear that he still can’t handle the challenges of freedom. They make him uneasy; they scare him; they leave him feeling very alone. There's no sense of adventure in him, only fear. He doesn't just not yearn for freedom; he simply can't deal with it. What he really wishes for is something completely different: security. He needs protection. He's afraid of being hurt. Everything else is just pretentiousness, an illusion, empty talk.
The fact, as we shall see, explains many of50 the most puzzling political phenomena of so-called free states. The great masses of men, though theoretically free, are seen to submit supinely to oppression and exploitation of a hundred abhorrent sorts. Have they no means of resistance? Obviously they have. The worst tyrant, even under democratic plutocracy, has but one throat to slit. The moment the majority decided to overthrow him he would be overthrown. But the majority lacks the resolution; it cannot imagine taking the risk. So it looks for leaders with the necessary courage, and when they appear it follows them slavishly, even after their courage is discovered to be mere buncombe and their altruism only a cloak for more and worse oppressions. Thus it oscillates eternally between scoundrels, or, if you would take them at their own valuation, heroes. Politics becomes the trade of playing upon its natural poltroonery—of scaring it half to death, and then proposing to save it. There is in it no other quality of which a practical politician, taking one day with another, may be sure. Every theoretically free people wonders at the slavishness of all the others. But there is no actual difference between them.
The fact, as we’ll see, explains many of50 the most confusing political situations in so-called free states. The large masses of people, although theoretically free, often submit meekly to various forms of oppression and exploitation. Do they have no means to resist? Clearly, they do. The worst tyrant, even in a democratic plutocracy, has only one throat to cut. The moment the majority decides to overthrow him, he would be taken down. But the majority lacks the determination; they can’t imagine taking the risk. So, they look for leaders with the necessary bravery, and when such leaders appear, they follow them blindly, even after discovering their courage is just empty bravado and their supposed altruism is merely a disguise for more and worse oppression. Thus, it swings back and forth endlessly between scoundrels, or, if you believe them, heroes. Politics becomes the game of exploiting its natural cowardice—scaring it nearly to death, and then offering to save it. There’s no other guarantee for a practical politician, day in and day out. Every theoretically free society wonders about the submissiveness of all the others. But there’s no real difference between them.
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8.
The Effects Upon Progress
The Impact on Progress
It follows that the inferior man, being a natural slave himself, is quite unable to understand the desire for liberty in his superiors. If he apprehends that desire at all it is only as an appetite for a good of which he is himself incapable. He thus envies those who harbour it, and is eager to put them down. Justice, in fact, is always unpopular and in difficulties under democracy, save perhaps that false form of so-called social justice which is designed solely to get the laborer more than his fair hire. The wars of extermination that are waged against heretical minorities never meet with any opposition on the lower levels. The proletarian is always ready to help destroy the rights of his fellow proletarian, as was revealed brilliantly by the heroic services of the American Legion in the pogrom against Reds, just after the late war, and even more brilliantly by the aid that the American Federation of Labour gave to the same gallant crusade. The city workman, oppressed by Prohibition, mourns the loss of his beer, not the loss52 of his liberty. He is ever willing to support similar raids upon the liberty of the other fellow, and he is not outraged when they are carried on in gross violation of the most elemental principles of justice and common decency. When, in a democratic state, any protest against such obscenities is heard at all, it comes from the higher levels. There a few genuine believers in liberty and justice survive, huddled upon a burning deck. It is to be marvelled at that most of them, on inspection, turn out to be the grandsons of similar heretics of earlier times? I think not. It takes quite as long to breed a libertarian as it takes to breed a race-horse. Neither may be expected to issue from a farm mare.
It follows that the below-average person, being a natural slave himself, really can’t understand the desire for freedom in those above him. If he does grasp that desire at all, it's just as a craving for something he's incapable of achieving. He thus envies those who have it and is eager to bring them down. Justice, in fact, is often unpopular and faces challenges in a democracy, except perhaps for that false form of so-called social justice aimed solely at getting workers more than their fair share. The wars waged against heretical minorities rarely meet with opposition from the lower classes. The working-class individual is always ready to help undermine the rights of his fellow workers, as was brilliantly shown by the American Legion's involvement in the crackdown on Communists just after the recent war, and even more so by the support that the American Federation of Labour provided to that same brave effort. The city worker, burdened by Prohibition, grieves over the loss of his beer, not the loss of his freedom. He is consistently willing to back similar attacks on the freedom of others, and he isn't outraged when they violate the most basic principles of justice and decency. When, in a democratic state, any protest against such outrages is heard at all, it typically comes from the higher classes. There, a few genuine believers in freedom and justice remain, huddled on a burning platform. It's surprising that most of them, upon closer look, turn out to be the grandsons of similar rebels from earlier times? I don't think so. It takes just as long to raise a libertarian as it does to raise a racehorse. Neither should be expected to come from a farm mare.
The whole progress of the world, even in the direction of ameliorating the lot of the masses, is always opposed by the masses. The notion that their clamour brought about all the governmental and social reforms of the last century, and that those reforms were delayed by the superior minority, is sheer nonsense; even Liberals begin to reject it as absurd. Consider, for example, the history of the American Department of Agriculture. Whatever the corruptions and imbecilities of this department in democratic53 hands, it must be plain to everyone that the net effect of its work over many years has been a series of immense benefits to the American farmer—benefits that have at once reduced his labour and augmented his profits. Nevertheless, it is a matter of history that the farmers of the United States, when the Department began as a bureau of the Patent Office in 1830, opposed it almost unanimously, and that for years their bitter derision kept it feeble. Without leaving the United States one may go even farther back. When John Adams, during his presidency, proposed to set up a Weather Bureau, he was denounced as an idiot and a scoundrel, as Henry Adams has set forth in the introduction to “The Decay of Democratic Dogma.” Examples from our own time are so numerous and notorious that it is needless to direct attention to them. It is axiomatic that all measures for safeguarding the public health are opposed by the majority, and that getting them upon the books is mainly a matter of deceiving and checkmating it. What happened in Los Angeles when a vaccination ordinance was submitted to a popular referendum is typical of what would happen anywhere under the same circumstances. The ordinance was54 rejected, and smallpox spread in the town. The proletariat, alarmed, then proceeded against it by going to Christian Scientists, osteopaths and chiropractors. Precisely the same thing happened in Switzerland.
The overall progress of the world, even when it comes to improving the situation for the general public, is often met with resistance from that very public. The idea that their outcry was responsible for all the governmental and social reforms of the last century, and that these reforms were delayed by a more privileged minority, is complete nonsense; even Liberals are starting to see it as ridiculous. Take, for instance, the history of the American Department of Agriculture. Despite the corruption and incompetence that may have plagued this department under democratic control, it’s clear to everyone that its long-term impact has been a series of significant benefits for American farmers—benefits that have reduced their workload and increased their profits. However, historically, the farmers of the United States opposed the Department almost entirely when it started as a branch of the Patent Office in 1830, and their mockery kept it weak for years. One doesn’t even need to leave the United States to find earlier examples. When John Adams proposed a Weather Bureau during his presidency, he was labeled as a fool and a crook, as noted by Henry Adams in the introduction to “The Decay of Democratic Dogma.” There are so many examples from our own time that it’s unnecessary to highlight them. It’s a given that any measures aimed at protecting public health are met with resistance from the majority, and getting them enacted usually involves deceiving and outmaneuvering the public. The situation in Los Angeles, where a vaccination ordinance was put to a popular vote, exemplifies what could happen anywhere under similar circumstances. The ordinance was rejected, and smallpox spread throughout the city. The worried working class then sought help from Christian Scientists, osteopaths, and chiropractors. The same situation occurred in Switzerland.
Turn now to Germany, a country lately delivered from despotism by the arms of altruistic heroes. The social legislation of that country, for more than half a century, afforded a model to all other countries. All the workingmen’s insurance, minimum wage, child labour and other such acts of the United States are bald imitations of it, and in England, before the war, the mountebank Lloyd-George borrowed his whole bag of tricks from it. Well, Dr. Hans Delbrück, in his “Regierung und Volkswille,” tells us that this legislation was fought step by step at home, and with the utmost ferocity, by the beneficiaries of it. When Bismarck formulated it and essayed to get it through the Reichstag he was opposed by every mob-master in the Empire, save only his kept Socialist, Ferdinand Lassalle. The common people were so heavily against him for several years that he had to carry on the government without the consent of the Reichstag—that is, unconstitutionally, and at the risk of his55 head. If the proletariat had been able to get control of the German courts, as it had got control of the Reichstag, it would have deposed him from office and condemned him to death for high treason. His treason consisted in trying to formulate a code of legislation designed to restore its old rights under the Prussian common law, destroyed by the rise of the industrial system, and to grant it many new and valuable benefits.
Turn now to Germany, a country recently freed from dictatorship by the efforts of selfless heroes. For more than fifty years, the social legislation in that country has served as a model for others. All the workers' insurance, minimum wage, child labor laws, and similar measures in the United States are straightforward copies of it, and in England, before the war, the showman Lloyd-George borrowed extensively from it. Well, Dr. Hans Delbrück, in his "Regierung und Volkswille," tells us that this legislation was fiercely opposed at home by those who would benefit from it. When Bismarck tried to implement it in the Reichstag, he faced opposition from every rabble-rouser in the Empire, except for his own socialist associate, Ferdinand Lassalle. The general public was so strongly against him for several years that he had to run the government without the approval of the Reichstag—that is, unconstitutionally, and at great personal risk. If the working class had been able to take control of the German courts as it had of the Reichstag, they would have ousted him and condemned him to death for treason. His treason lay in attempting to create a set of laws aimed at restoring their former rights under the Prussian common law, which had been undermined by the rise of the industrial system, while also providing many new and valuable benefits.
“Let any competently instructed person,” says Sir Henry Maine, “turn over in his mind the great epochs of scientific invention and social change during the past two centuries, and consider what would have occurred if universal suffrage had been established at any one of them.” Here, obviously, Sir Henry speaks of universal suffrage that is genuinely effective—suffrage that registers the actual will of the people accurately and automatically. As we shall see, no such thing exists in the world to-day, save in limited areas. Public policies are determined and laws are made by small minorities playing upon the fears and imbecilities of the mob—sometimes minorities of intelligent and honest men, but usually minorities of rogues. But the fact does not disturb the validity of Maine’s argument.56 “Universal suffrage,” he goes on, “would certainly have prohibited the spinning-jenny and the power loom. It would certainly have forbidden the threshing-machine. It would have prevented the adoption of the Gregorian Calendar; it would have restored the Stuarts. It would have proscribed the Roman Catholics, with the mob which burned Lord Mansfield’s house and library in 1780; and it would have proscribed the Dissenters, with the mob which burned Dr. Priestley’s house and library in 1791.” So much for England. What of the United States? I point briefly to the anti-evolution acts which now begin to adorn the statute-books of the Hookworm Belt, all of them supported vociferously by the lower orders. I point to the anti-vivisection and anti-contraception statutes, to the laws licensing osteopaths and other such frauds, and to the multitude of acts depriving relatively enlightened minorities of the common rights of free assemblage and free speech. They increase in proportion as vox populi is the actual voice of the state; they run with that “more democracy” which Liberals advocate. “Nothing in ancient alchemy,” says Lecky, “was more irrational than the notion that increased ignorance in the elective57 body will be converted into increased capacity for good government in the representative body; that the best way to improve the world and secure rational progress is to place government more and more under the control of the least enlightened classes.”
“Let any well-informed person,” says Sir Henry Maine, “think about the major milestones of scientific invention and social change over the past two centuries, and consider what would have happened if universal suffrage had been established at any of those times.” Here, clearly, Sir Henry is talking about universal suffrage that is truly effective—suffrage that accurately and automatically reflects the real will of the people. As we’ll see, no such system exists in the world today, except in limited areas. Public policies are set and laws are created by small minorities manipulating the fears and weaknesses of the masses—sometimes by intelligent and honest individuals, but more often by dishonest ones. However, this does not undermine the validity of Maine’s argument. “Universal suffrage,” he continues, “would certainly have stopped the spinning-jenny and the power loom. It would have definitely banned the threshing-machine. It would have prevented the adoption of the Gregorian Calendar; it would have brought back the Stuarts. It would have banned Roman Catholics, along with the mob that torched Lord Mansfield’s house and library in 1780; and it would have prohibited Dissenters, along with the mob that burned down Dr. Priestley’s house and library in 1791.” So much for England. What about the United States? I briefly point to the anti-evolution laws that are now appearing in the legislature of the Hookworm Belt, all strongly supported by the lower classes. I mention the anti-vivisection and anti-contraception laws, the regulations allowing osteopaths and similar scams, and the numerous laws stripping relatively enlightened minorities of basic rights to assembly and free speech. These increase as vox populi becomes the actual voice of the state; they align with the “more democracy” that Liberals promote. “Nothing in ancient alchemy,” says Lecky, “was more irrational than the idea that greater ignorance in the electorate will translate into greater capacity for good governance in the representatives; that the best way to improve the world and achieve rational progress is to place government more and more in the hands of the least enlightened classes.”
The hostility of Homo neandertalensis to all exact knowledge, even when its effect is to work him benefits, is not hard to understand. He is against it because it is complex, and, to his dark mind, occult—because it puts an unbearable burden upon his meagre capacity for taking in ideas, and thus propels him into the realm of the unknowable and alarming. His search is always for short cuts, simple formulæ, revelation. All superstitions are such short cuts, whether they issue out of the African jungle or out of Little Bethel. So are all political platitudes and shibboleths. Their one aim is to make the unintelligible simple, and even obvious. No man who has not had a long and arduous education in the physical sciences can understand even the most elementary concepts of, say, pathology, but even a hind at the plow can take in the theory of chiropractic in two lessons. Hence the vast popularity of chiropractic among the submerged,58 and of osteopathy, Christian Science, spiritualism and all the other half rational and half supernatural quackeries with it. They are idiotic, like the tales displayed in the movies, but, again like the tales displayed in the movies, they are simple—and every man, high or low, prefers what he can understand to what puzzles and dismays him. The popularity of the farrago of absurdities called Fundamentalism—and it is popular among peasants, not only in the United States, but everywhere in Christendom—is thus easily understood. The cosmogonies that educated men toy with are all inordinately complex. To comprehend their veriest outlines requires an immense stock of exact knowledge and a special habit of thought, quite different in kind from the habit of thought which suffices for listening to the radio. It would be as vain to try to teach these cosmogonies to peasants as it would be to try to teach them to streptococci. But the cosmogony set forth in the first chapter of Genesis is so simple that a yokel can grasp it instantly. It collides ludicrously with many of the known facts, but he doesn’t know the known facts. It is logically nonsensical, but to him the nonsensical, in the sciences as in politics, has an irresistible59 fascination. So he accepts the Word with loud hosannas, and has one more excuse for hating his betters.
The resistance of Homo neandertalensis to all precise knowledge, even when it benefits him, is easy to understand. He's against it because it's complicated and, to his limited understanding, mysterious—because it creates an overwhelming burden on his meager ability to grasp ideas and pushes him into the unsettling realm of the unknown. He’s always looking for shortcuts, simple formulas, and revelations. All superstitions serve as those shortcuts, whether they come from the African jungle or from Little Bethel. The same goes for all political slogans and catchphrases. Their sole purpose is to make the incomprehensible simple and even obvious. No one who hasn’t undergone extensive and difficult education in the physical sciences can grasp even the most basic concepts of, say, pathology, but even a farmhand can understand the theory of chiropractic in just two lessons. This is why chiropractic is so popular among the underprivileged, alongside osteopathy, Christian Science, spiritualism, and all the other half-rational and half-supernatural quackeries. They may be foolish, like the stories shown in movies, but, just like those stories, they're simple—and everyone, regardless of status, prefers what they can understand over what confuses and frightens them. The widespread appeal of the absurdities known as Fundamentalism—and it's popular among peasants, not just in the United States but everywhere in Christendom—is therefore easily understood. The cosmogonies that well-educated people contemplate are all excessively complex. To grasp even their basic outlines requires a vast amount of precise knowledge and a different way of thinking, quite unlike what’s needed to listen to the radio. Trying to teach these cosmogonies to peasants would be as futile as trying to teach them to bacteria. But the creation story in the first chapter of Genesis is so straightforward that a country person can understand it right away. It contradicts many established facts, but he’s unaware of those facts. It’s logically absurd, but to him, nonsense—both in science and politics—has an irresistible charm. So he embraces the Word with loud praises and finds one more reason to resent those who are better off than he is.
Turn to any other field of knowledge, and the story remains the same. It is a tragic but inescapable fact that most of the finest fruits of human progress, like all of the nobler virtues of man, are the exclusive possession of small minorities, chiefly unpopular and disreputable. Of the sciences, as of the fine arts, the average human being, even in the most literate and civilized of modern States, is as ignorant as the horned cattle in the fields. What he knows of histology, say, or protozoölogy, or philology, or paleontology is precisely nothing. Such things lie beyond his capacity for learning, and he has no curiosity about them. The man who has any acquaintance with them seems to him to be a ridiculous figure, with a touch of the sinister. Even those applied sciences which enter intimately into his everyday existence remain outside his comprehension and interest. Consider, for example, chemistry and biology. The whole life of the inferior man, including especially his so-called thinking, is purely a biochemical process, and exactly comparable to60 what goes on in a barrel of cider, yet he knows no more about chemistry than a cow and no more about biology than its calf. The new physics, in the form of the radio, saves him from the appalling boredom of his hours of leisure, but physics itself remains as dark to him as theosophy. He is more ignorant of elementary anatomy and physiology than the Egyptian quacks of 4000 B.C. His knowledge of astronomy is confined to a few marvels, most of which he secretly doubts. He has never so much as heard of ethnology, pathology or embryology. Greek, to him, is only a jargon spoken by boot-blacks, and Wagner is a retired baseball player. He has never heard of Euripides, of Hippocrates, of Aristotle, or of Plato. Or of Vesalius, Newton, and Roger Bacon. The fine arts are complete blanks to him. He doesn’t know what a Doric column is, or an etching, or a fugue. He is as ignorant of sonnets and the Gothic style as he is of ecclesiastical politics in Abyssinia. Homer, Virgil, Cervantes, Bach, Raphael, Rubens, Beethoven—all such colossal names are empty sounds to him, blowing idly down the wind. So far as he is concerned these great and noble men might as well have perished in61 the cradle. The stupendous beauties that they conjured into being are nothing to him: he sticks to the tabloids and the movies, with Hot Dog or its like for Sunday afternoon. A politician by instinct and a statesman by divine right, he has never heard of “The Republic” or “Leviathan.” A Feinschmecker of pornography, he is unaware of Freud.
Turn to any other field of knowledge, and the story is the same. It’s a tragic but unavoidable fact that most of the greatest achievements of humanity, like all of the nobler virtues, belong solely to small groups, mainly those who are unpopular and look down upon. In both science and the fine arts, the average person, even in the most educated and civilized modern societies, is as clueless as cattle in the fields. What he knows about histology, protozoology, philology, or paleontology is absolutely nothing. These topics are beyond his ability to learn, and he has no interest in them. The person who is knowledgeable in these areas seems ridiculous to him, with a hint of something creepy. Even the applied sciences that affect his daily life are beyond his understanding or interest. Take chemistry and biology as an example. The entire life of an average person, especially his so-called thinking, is purely a biochemical process, comparable to what happens in a barrel of cider, yet he knows as little about chemistry as a cow and knows nothing of biology beyond what a calf might. The new physics, like radio, distracts him from the dullness of his free time, but physics itself is as obscure to him as theosophy. He is less informed about basic anatomy and physiology than the ancient Egyptian doctors of 4000 B.C. His knowledge of astronomy is limited to a few wonders, most of which he secretly suspects aren't real. He has never even heard of ethnology, pathology, or embryology. Greek sounds to him like a language spoken by shoe shiners, and Wagner is just a name he associates with a retired baseball player. He's never heard of Euripides, Hippocrates, Aristotle, or Plato. Or Vesalius, Newton, and Roger Bacon. The fine arts are entirely beyond his comprehension. He doesn’t know what a Doric column, an etching, or a fugue is. He’s as unaware of sonnets and Gothic architecture as he is of church politics in Abyssinia. Homer, Virgil, Cervantes, Bach, Raphael, Rubens, Beethoven—all those monumental names are just empty sounds to him, drifting away. As far as he's concerned, these great and noble figures might as well have died in infancy. The incredible beauties they created mean nothing to him: he sticks to the tabloids and the movies, favoring something like Hot Dog on a Sunday afternoon. A politician by instinct and a statesman by divine right, he has never heard of “The Republic” or “Leviathan.” A connoisseur of pornography, he's unaware of Freud.
The Egyptian night that hedges him round is not, perhaps, without its high uses and consolations. Learning survives among us largely because the mob has not got news of it. If the notions it turns loose descended to the lowest levels, there would be an uprising against them, and efforts would be made to put them down by law. In a previous treatise, adverting to this probability, I have sounded a warning against the fatuous effort to put the fine arts into the common-school curriculum in the United States. Its dangers are diminished, no doubt, by the fact that the teachers told off to execute it are themselves completely ignorant, but they remain dangers none the less. The peasants of Georgia, getting wind of the fact that grand operas were being played in Atlanta, demanded that the State Legislature discourage them with a tax of $100062 a performance. In the Middle West, after the late war, the American Legion proceeded with clubs against fiddlers who played Beethoven and Bach. Everywhere in America galleries of paintings are under suspicion, and in most States it is impossible for them to display works showing the female figure below the clavicle. Nor is this distrust of the fine arts confined to the rural sections. The most active censorship of literature, for example, is to be found in Boston. The Methodist anthropoids of the town, supported by the Chandala of the Latin rite, clerical and lay, carry on so violent a crusade against certain hated books, unquestionably of sound quality, that the local booksellers fear to stock them. Much of the best literature of the world, indeed, is forbidden to the Bostonian, heir though he may be to Emerson and Thoreau. If he would read it, he must procure it by stealth and read it behind the door, as a Kansan (imagining that so civilized a one exists) procures and consumes Clos Vougeot.
The Egyptian night surrounding him isn't without its benefits and comforts. Learning continues to exist among us mainly because the masses are unaware of it. If the ideas it brings to light reached the lowest tiers of society, there would be a rebellion against them, and attempts would be made to suppress them legally. In a previous work, I raised a warning about the foolish effort to include fine arts in the public school curriculum in the United States. The risks are lessened, of course, by the fact that the teachers assigned to implement it are entirely uninformed, but the risks still remain. The farmers in Georgia, upon discovering that grand operas were being performed in Atlanta, urged the State Legislature to impose a $1000 tax per performance to discourage them. In the Midwest, after the recent war, members of the American Legion took action against musicians who played Beethoven and Bach. Everywhere in America, art galleries are viewed with suspicion, and in most states, it’s not allowed to display works featuring the female figure below the clavicle. This mistrust of the fine arts isn't limited to rural areas. The most stringent censorship of literature, for instance, can be found in Boston. The Methodist extremists in the town, backed by the local clerical and lay followers of the Latin rite, wage such an aggressive campaign against certain disliked books—without a doubt, of high quality—that local booksellers are afraid to stock them. Much of the finest literature in the world is essentially banned for Bostonians, even though they may be heirs to Emerson and Thoreau. If they wish to read it, they must obtain it secretly and read it behind closed doors, much like a Kansan (imagining that such a civilized person exists) procures and enjoys Clos Vougeot.
In all this there is a great deal less of yearning for moral perfection than there is of mere hatred of beauty. The common man, as a matter of fact, has no yearning for moral perfection.63 What ails him in that department is simply fear of punishment, which is to say, fear of his neighbours. He has, in safe privacy, the morals of a variety actor. Beauty fevers and enrages him for another and quite different reason. He cannot comprehend it, and yet it somehow challenges and disturbs him. If he could snore through good music he would not object to it; the trouble with it is that it keeps him awake. So he believes that it ought to be put down, just as he believes that political and economic ideas which disturb him and yet elude him ought to be put down. The finest art is safe from him simply because he has no contact with it, and is thus unaware of it. The fact, in this great Republic, saves the bacon of Johann Sebastian Bach. His music remains lawful because it lies outside the cognizance of the mob, and of the abandoned demagogues who make laws for the mob. It has thus something of the quality of the colours beyond violet and of the concept of honour. If, by some abominable magic, it could be brought within range, it would at once arouse hostility. Its complexity would puzzle and dismay; its lack of utilitarian purpose would affright. Soon there would be a movement to proscribe64 it, and Baptist clergymen would rove the land denouncing it, as they now denounce the plays of Shakespeare and the science of Darwin. In the end some poor musician, taken playing it in rural Tennessee, would be hailed before a Judge Raulston, tried by a jury of morons, and railroaded to the calaboose.
In all this, there's a lot less longing for moral perfection and more just a plain hatred of beauty. The average person doesn't really yearn for moral perfection. What bothers him in that area is just a fear of punishment, which means a fear of his neighbors. In private, he has the morals of a variety show performer. Beauty angers and frustrates him for a different reason. He can't understand it, yet it somehow challenges and disturbs him. If he could sleep through good music, he wouldn't mind it; the problem is that it keeps him awake. So he thinks it should be suppressed, just like he believes political and economic ideas that disturb and confuse him should be. The highest art is safe from him because he has no exposure to it, and therefore, he doesn't know about it. This fact, in this great Republic, protects the legacy of Johann Sebastian Bach. His music remains accepted because it’s beyond the awareness of the masses and the corrupt politicians who create laws for them. It has a quality similar to colors beyond violet and the idea of honor. If, through some terrible magic, it were to come into his world, it would immediately provoke hostility. Its complexity would baffle and frighten him; its lack of practical use would terrify him. Soon, there would be a movement to ban it, and Baptist ministers would roam the country denouncing it, just like they currently denounce the plays of Shakespeare and the theories of Darwin. Eventually, some unfortunate musician caught playing it in rural Tennessee would be dragged before Judge Raulston, tried by a jury of fools, and locked up.
9.
The Eternal Mob
The Forever Mob
Such is man on the nether levels. Such is the pet and glory of democratic states. Human progress passes him by. Its aims are unintelligible to him and its finest fruits are beyond his reach: what reaches him is what falls from the tree, and is shared with his four-footed brothers. He has changed but little since the earliest recorded time, and that change is for the worse quite as often as it is for the better. He still believes in ghosts, and has only shifted his belief in witches to the political sphere. He is still a slave to priests, and trembles before their preposterous magic. He is lazy, improvident and unclean. All the durable values of the world, though his labour has entered into them,65 have been created against his opposition. He can imagine nothing beautiful and he can grasp nothing true. Whenever he is confronted by a choice between two ideas, the one sound and the other not, he chooses almost infallibly, and by a sort of pathological compulsion, the one that is not. Behind all the great tyrants and butchers of history he has marched with loud hosannas, but his hand is eternally against those who seek to liberate the spirit of the race. He was in favour of Nero and Torquemada by instinct, and he was against Galileo and Savonarola by the same instinct. When a Cagliostro dies he is ready for a Danton; from the funeral of a Barnum he rushes to the triumph of a Bryan. The world gets nothing from him save his brute labour, and even that he tries to evade. It owes nothing to him that has any solid dignity or worth, not even democracy. In two thousand years he has moved an inch: from the sports of the arena to the lynching-party—and another inch: from the obscenities of the Saturnalia to the obscenities of the Methodist revival. So he lives out his life in the image of Jahveh. What is worth knowing he doesn’t know and doesn’t want to know; what he knows is not true. The66 cardinal articles of his credo are the inventions of mountebanks; his heroes are mainly scoundrels.
This is what humanity looks like at the lower levels. This is the pride and shame of democratic nations. Human progress passes them by. Its goals are beyond their understanding, and its best achievements are out of their reach: what they get is what falls from the tree, shared with their four-legged companions. They haven't changed much since the earliest recorded times, and when change happens, it often makes things worse rather than better. They still believe in ghosts and have simply shifted their belief in witches to politics. They remain enslaved by religious leaders and cower before their ridiculous rituals. They are lazy, short-sighted, and unclean. All the lasting values in the world, even though their hard work has contributed to them, have been created in spite of their resistance. They can’t imagine anything beautiful and can’t grasp anything true. Whenever they face a choice between two ideas, one sound and one not, they almost always, almost compulsively, choose the wrong one. Throughout history, they have rallied behind tyrants and butchers with loud cheers, but they are constantly opposed to those who try to liberate the human spirit. They instinctively favored Nero and Torquemada, while opposing Galileo and Savonarola, doing so without thought. When a Cagliostro dies, they’re ready for a Danton; from the funeral of a Barnum, they rush to celebrate a Bryan. The world gets nothing from them except their brute labor, and even that they try to avoid. They contribute nothing of solid dignity or worth, not even democracy. In two thousand years, they’ve moved only an inch: from the sports of the arena to the lynching party—and another inch: from the vulgarities of the Saturnalia to the vulgarities of the Methodist revival. So they live their lives in the image of Jahveh. What’s worth knowing, they don’t know and don’t want to know; what they do know is not true. The core beliefs of their creed are the fabrications of charlatans; their heroes are mostly scoundrels.
Do I forget his central virtue—at least in Christendom? Do I forget his simple piety, his touching fidelity to the faith? I forget nothing: I simply answer, What faith? Is it argued by any rational man that the debased Christianity cherished by the mob in all the Christian countries of to-day has any colourable likeness to the body of ideas preached by Christ? If so, then let us have a better teaching of the Bible in the public-schools. The plain fact is that this bogus Christianity has no more relation to the system of Christ than it has to the system of Aristotle. It is the invention of Paul and his attendant rabble-rousers—a body of men exactly comparable to the corps of evangelical pastors of to-day, which is to say, a body devoid of sense and lamentably indifferent to common honesty. The mob, having heard Christ, turned against Him, and applauded His crucifixion. His theological ideas were too logical and too plausible for it, and his ethical ideas were enormously too austere. What it yearned for was the old comfortable balderdash under a new and gaudy67 name, and that is precisely what Paul offered it. He borrowed from all the wandering dervishes and soul-snatchers of Asia Minor, and flavoured the stew with remnants of the Greek demonology. The result was a code of doctrines so discordant and so nonsensical that no two men since, examining it at length, have ever agreed upon its precise meaning. But Paul knew his mob: he had been a travelling labour leader. He knew that nonsense was its natural provender—that the unintelligible soothed it like sweet music. He was the Stammvater of all the Christian mob-masters of to-day, terrorizing and enchanting the mob with their insane damnations, eating their seven fried chickens a week, passing the diligent plate, busy among the women. Once the early church emerged from the Roman catacombs and began to yield to that reorganization of society which was forced upon the ancient world by the barbarian invasions, Paul was thrown overboard as Methodists throw Wesley overboard when they acquire the means and leisure for golf, and Peter was put in his place. Peter was a blackguard, but he was at least free from any taint of Little Bethel. The Roman Church, in the aristocratic feudal age, promoted68 him post mortem to the Papacy, and then raised him to the mystical dignity of Rock, a rank obviously quasi-celestial. But Paul remained the prophet of the sewers. He was to emerge centuries later in many incarnations—Luther, Calvin, Wesley, and so on. He remains to-day the arch-theologian of the mob. His turgid and witless metaphysics make Christianity bearable to men who would be repelled by Christ’s simple and magnificent reduction of the duties of man to the duties of a gentleman.
Do I forget his main virtue—at least in Christianity? Do I forget his genuine piety, his touching loyalty to the faith? I forget nothing: I simply ask, What faith? Is there any reasonable person who believes that the twisted version of Christianity embraced by the masses in all the Christian countries today resembles the ideas preached by Christ? If so, then let’s get a better teaching of the Bible in public schools. The plain fact is that this fake Christianity has nothing to do with Christ’s system, just as it has nothing to do with Aristotle’s. It was created by Paul and his crowd of agitators—a group of people comparable to today’s evangelical pastors, which means they lack sense and are sadly indifferent to basic honesty. The masses, after hearing Christ, turned against Him and celebrated His crucifixion. His theological ideas were too logical and too believable for them, and His ethical ideas were way too strict. What they craved was the old comfortable nonsense dressed up in a new, flashy name, and that’s exactly what Paul provided. He borrowed from all the wandering mystics and charlatans of Asia Minor and mixed in bits of Greek demonology. The result was a collection of doctrines so inconsistent and so nonsensical that no two people since then, after studying it closely, have ever agreed on its exact meaning. But Paul understood his audience: he had been a traveling labor leader. He knew that nonsense was what they thrived on—that the incomprehensible soothed them like sweet music. He was the founder of all today’s Christian crowd leaders, mesmerizing and frightening the masses with their insane condemnations, enjoying their seven fried chickens a week, collecting money eagerly, and being busy with the women. Once the early church came out of the Roman catacombs and started to adapt to the societal changes forced upon the ancient world by barbarian invasions, Paul was discarded like Methodists discard Wesley when they find time and resources for golf, and Peter took his place. Peter was a scoundrel, but at least he lacked any connection to Little Bethel. The Roman Church, during the noble feudal age, promoted him posthumously to the Papacy and then elevated him to the mystical status of Rock, a rank that’s clearly somewhat celestial. But Paul remained the prophet of the underclass. He was destined to reappear centuries later in various forms—Luther, Calvin, Wesley, and so on. He still stands today as the main theologian of the masses. His bloated and stupid metaphysics make Christianity acceptable to people who would be turned off by Christ’s simple and magnificent simplification of human duties to the duties of a gentleman.
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THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
II
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THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
1.
The Two Kinds of Democracy
The Two Types of Democracy
The lowly Christian I have limned is not only the glory of democratic states, but also their boss. Sovereignty is in him, sometimes both actually and legally, but always actually. Whatever he wants badly enough, he can get. If he is misled by mountebanks and swindled by scoundrels it is only because his credulity and imbecility cover a wider area than his simple desires. The precise form of the government he suffers under is of small importance. Whether it be called a constitutional monarchy, as in England, or a representative republic, as in France, or a pure democracy, as in some of the cantons of Switzerland, it is always essentially the same. There is, first, the mob, theoretically and in fact the ultimate judge of all ideas and the source of all power. There is, second, the camorra of self-seeking minorities, each seeking to inflame, delude72 and victimize it. The political process thus becomes a mere battle of rival rogues. But the mob remains quite free to decide between them. It may even, under the hand of God, decide for a minority that happens, by some miracle, to be relatively honest and enlightened. If, in common practice, it sticks to the thieves, it is only because their words are words it understands and their ideas are ideas it cherishes. It has the power to throw them off at will, and even at whim, and it also has the means.
The humble Christian I’ve described isn’t just the pride of democratic countries; he’s also in charge. Sovereignty lies within him, sometimes both in reality and legally, but always in reality. Whatever he truly wants, he can achieve. If he’s misled by charlatans and cheated by crooks, it’s because his gullibility and foolishness spread wider than his simple wishes. The specific type of government he endures doesn’t matter much. Whether it’s called a constitutional monarchy, like in England, or a representative republic, like in France, or a pure democracy, like in some parts of Switzerland, it’s essentially the same. First, there’s the crowd, theoretically and actually the ultimate judge of all ideas and the source of all power. Second, there’s the network of self-serving minorities, each trying to manipulate, deceive, and exploit the crowd. Consequently, the political process turns into a mere contest among competing rogues. But the crowd still has the freedom to choose between them. It might even, through divine intervention, pick a minority that happens to be relatively honest and knowledgeable. If it generally sticks with the crooks, it’s only because their words are familiar and their ideas are ones it values. It has the power to reject them whenever it wants, even on a whim, and it has the means to do so.
A great deal of paper and ink has been wasted discussing the difference between representative government and direct democracy. The theme is a favourite one with university pundits, and also engages and enchants the stall-fed Rousseaus who arise intermittently in the cow States, and occasionally penetrate to Governors’ mansions and the United States Senate. It is generally held that representative government, as practically encountered in the world, is full of defects, some of them amounting to organic disease. Not only does it take the initiative in law-making out of the hands of the plain people, and leave them only the function of referees; it also raises certain obvious obstacles to their free exercise73 of that function. Scattered as they are, and unorganized save in huge, unworkable groups, they are unable, it is argued, to formulate their virtuous desires quickly and clearly, or to bring to the resolution of vexed questions the full potency of their native sagacity. Worse, they find it difficult to enforce their decisions, even when they have decided. Every Liberal knows this sad story, and has shed tears telling it. The remedy he offers almost always consists of a resort to what he calls a purer democracy. That is to say, he proposes to set up the recall, the initiative and referendum, or something else of the sort, and so convert the representative into a mere clerk or messenger. The final determination of all important public questions, he argues, ought to be in the hands of the voters themselves. They alone can muster enough wisdom for the business, and they alone are without guile. The cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy.
A lot of paper and ink have been wasted discussing the differences between representative government and direct democracy. This topic is a favorite among university experts and also captivates those who occasionally surface in the Midwest, making their way to the governor's mansions and the U.S. Senate. It's commonly believed that representative government, as we see it in practice, has many flaws, some of which are severe. Not only does it take law-making power away from regular people, leaving them just as referees, but it also creates noticeable barriers to their ability to carry out that role freely. Being scattered and unorganized, except in large, ineffective groups, they struggle to express their good intentions quickly and clearly or to apply their natural wisdom to resolving complicated issues. Even worse, they find it hard to enforce their decisions once they’ve made them. Every Liberal is aware of this unfortunate situation and has shed tears telling this tale. The solution they often suggest is a move toward what they call a purer democracy. In other words, they propose implementing measures like recall, initiative, and referendum, effectively turning representatives into mere clerks or messengers. The final say on all significant public issues, they argue, should be in the hands of the voters themselves. Only they can gather the wisdom needed for the job, and only they are free from deceit. The solution to the problems of democracy is simply more democracy.
All this, of course, is simply rhetoric. Every time anything of the kind is tried it fails ingloriously. Nor is there any evidence that it has ever succeeded elsewhere, to-day or in the74 past. Certainly no competent historian believes that the citizens assembled in a New England town-meeting actually formulated en masse the transcendental and immortal measures that they adopted, nor even that they contributed anything of value to the discussion thereof. The notion is as absurd as the parallel notion, long held by philologues of defective powers of observation, that the popular ballads surviving from earlier ages were actually composed by the folk. The ballads, in point of fact, were all written by concrete poets, most of them not of the folk; the folk, when they had any hand in the business at all, simply acted as referees, choosing which should survive. In exactly the same way the New England town-meeting was led and dominated by a few men of unusual initiative and determination, some of them genuinely superior, but most of them simply demagogues and fanatics. The citizens in general heard the discussion of rival ideas, and went through the motions of deciding between them, but there is no evidence that they ever had all the relevant facts before them or made any effort to unearth them, or that appeals to their reason always, or even usually, prevailed over appeals75 to their mere prejudice and superstition. Their appetite for logic, I venture, seldom got the better of their fear of hell, and the Beatitudes moved them far less powerfully than blood. Some of the most idiotic decisions ever come to by mortal man were made by the New England town-meetings, and under the leadership of monomaniacs who are still looked upon as ineffable blossoms of the contemporary Kultur.
All this is just talk. Every time something like this is attempted, it fails miserably. There's no proof that it has ever succeeded anywhere, today or in the past. No qualified historian thinks that the citizens gathered in a New England town meeting really came together to create the profound and lasting measures they adopted, nor that they contributed anything valuable to the conversation about them. The idea is as ridiculous as the outdated belief held by scholars with poor observational skills that the popular ballads from earlier times were actually written by the people. In reality, all the ballads were created by specific poets, most of whom weren't from the common people; the folks who did get involved mostly acted as judges, deciding which ones should continue to be sung. Similarly, the New England town meeting was guided and controlled by a few individuals with exceptional initiative and determination—some of them genuinely talented, but most of them just demagogues and fanatics. The general citizens listened to the discussion of different opinions and pretended to choose between them, but there's no evidence that they had all the relevant facts or made any effort to find them out, or that reasoning ever won out over their biases and superstitions. Their desire for logic, I dare say, rarely overcame their fear of hell, and the Beatitudes inspired them much less than blood. Some of the most foolish decisions ever made by humanity were made in these New England town meetings, under the guidance of single-minded individuals who are still regarded as shining examples of modern culture.
The truth is that the difference between representative democracy and direct democracy is a great deal less marked than political sentimentalists assume. Under both forms the sovereign mob must employ agents to execute its will, and in either case the agents may have ideas of their own, based upon interests of their own, and the means at hand to do and get what they will. Moreover, their very position gives them a power of influencing the electors that is far above that of any ordinary citizen: they become politicians ex officio, and usually end by selling such influence as remains after they have used all they need for their own ends. Worse, both forms of democracy encounter the difficulty that the generality of citizens, no matter how assiduously they may be instructed, remain congenitally unable76 to comprehend many of the problems before them, or to consider all of those they do comprehend in an unbiased and intelligent manner. Thus it is often impossible to ascertain their views in advance of action, or even, in many cases, to determine their conclusions post hoc. The voters gathered in a typical New England town-meeting were all ardent amateurs of theology, and hence quite competent, in theory, to decide the theological questions that principally engaged them; nevertheless, history shows that they were led facilely by professional theologians, most of them quacks with something to sell. In the same way, the great masses of Americans of to-day, though they are theoretically competent to decide all the larger matters of national policy, and have certain immutable principles, of almost religious authority, to guide them, actually look for leading to professional politicians, who are influenced in turn by small but competent and determined minorities, with special knowledge and special interests. It was thus that the plain people were shoved into the late war, and it is thus that they will be shoved into the next one. They were, in overwhelming majority, against going in, and if they77 had had any sense and resolution they would have stayed out. But these things they lacked.
The truth is that the difference between representative democracy and direct democracy is way less distinct than political idealists think. In both cases, the majority has to rely on representatives to carry out its will, and these representatives may have their own ideas and interests, using whatever means they have to get what they want. Additionally, their very position gives them a level of influence over voters that's much greater than that of any average citizen: they become politicians by default, and usually end up selling whatever influence they have left after using it all for their own purposes. Even worse, both types of democracy face the problem that most citizens, no matter how diligently they are educated, often struggle to understand many of the issues at hand or to think about the ones they do understand in an unbiased and thoughtful way. This often makes it impossible to know their opinions before actions are taken, or even, in many cases, to figure out their conclusions after the fact. The voters at a typical New England town meeting were all enthusiastic amateurs of theology, so they were theoretically capable of deciding the theological issues that mattered to them; however, history shows that they were easily swayed by professional theologians, many of whom were frauds with something to sell. Similarly, the vast majority of Americans today, although they are theoretically equipped to decide major national policies and have certain unchanging principles that are almost religious in nature to guide them, still look to professional politicians for direction, who are in turn influenced by small, knowledgeable, and determined minorities with specific knowledge and unique interests. That's how everyday people were pushed into the last war, and it's how they'll be pushed into the next one. They were overwhelmingly against entering, and if they had had any sense or determination, they would have stayed out. But they lacked both.
2.
The Popular Will
The People's Choice
Thus there is no need to differentiate too pedantically between the two forms of democratic government, for their unlikeness is far more apparent than real. Nor is there any need to set up any distinction between the sort of democracy that is met with in practice, with its constant conflicts between what is assumed to be the popular will and the self-interest of small but articulate and efficient groups, and that theoretical variety which would liberate and energize the popular will completely. The latter must remain purely theoretical for all time; there are insuperable impediments, solidly grounded in the common mind, to its realization. Moreover, there is no reason for believing that its realization, if it should ever be attained by miracle, would materially change the main outlines of the democratic process. What is genuinely important is not that the will of mankind in the mass should be formulated and78 made effective at all times and in every case, but simply that means should be provided for ascertaining and executing it in capital cases—that there shall be no immovable impediment to its execution when, by some prodigy of nature, it takes a coherent and apposite form. If, over and beyond that, a sufficient sense of its immanent and imminent potency remains to make politicians walk a bit warily, if the threat always hangs in the air that under x circumstances and on y day it may be heard from suddenly and devastatingly, then democracy is actually in being. This is the case, it seems to me, in the United States. And it is the case, too, in every European country west of Vienna and north of the Alps.
There's no need to get too caught up in distinguishing between the two types of democratic government, since their differences are more obvious than real. We also don't need to create a divide between the democracy we see in practice, which often has conflicts between what is thought to be the popular will and the self-interests of small but vocal and effective groups, and the theoretical version that would fully free and energize the popular will. The latter will likely always remain purely theoretical; there are major barriers, deeply rooted in common thinking, to making it happen. Furthermore, there's no reason to believe that if it were somehow achieved, it would significantly alter the main features of the democratic process. What really matters is not that the will of the people is expressed and acted on all the time and in every situation, but that there are ways to determine and implement it in crucial cases—there should be no unyielding barriers to its execution when, through some natural miracle, it emerges clearly and appropriately. If, in addition, there’s a strong enough awareness of its potential to make politicians cautious, and if the threat always looms that under certain conditions and on certain days it might suddenly and overwhelmingly manifest, then democracy truly exists. This seems to be the case in the United States and is also true in every European country west of Vienna and north of the Alps.
The American people, true enough, are sheep. Worse, they are donkeys. Yet worse, to borrow from their own dialect, they are goats. They are thus constantly bamboozled and exploited by small minorities of their own number, by determined and ambitious individuals, and even by exterior groups. The business of victimizing them is a lucrative profession, an exact science, and a delicate and lofty art. It has its masters and it has its quacks. Its lowest79 reward is a seat in Congress or a job as a Prohibition agent, i. e., a licensed blackleg; its highest reward is immortality. The adept practitioner is not only rewarded; he is also thanked. The victims delight in his ministrations, as an hypochondriacal woman delights in the flayings of the surgeon. But all the while they have the means in their hands to halt the obscenity whenever it becomes intolerable, and now and then, raised transiently to a sort of intelligence, they do put a stop to it. There are no legal or other bars to the free functioning of their will, once it emerges into consciousness, save only such bars as they themselves have erected, and these they may remove whenever they so desire. No external or super-legal power stands beyond their reach, exercising pressure upon them; they recognize no personal sovereign with inalienable rights and no class with privileges above the common law; they are even kept free, by a tradition as old as the Republic itself, of foreign alliances which would condition their autonomy. Thus their sovereignty, though it is limited in its everyday exercise by self-imposed constitutional checks and still more by restraints which lie in the very nature of government, whatever80 its form, is probably just as complete in essence as that of the most absolute monarch who ever hanged a peasant or defied the Pope.
The American people, it's true, act like sheep. Even worse, they act like donkeys. And to put it in their own words, they’re like goats. They’re constantly fooled and taken advantage of by small minorities within their own ranks, by determined and ambitious individuals, and even by outside groups. Taking advantage of them is a profitable business, a precise science, and a delicate and elevated art. It has its experts and its frauds. The lowest reward is a seat in Congress or a role as a Prohibition agent, basically a sanctioned crook; the highest reward is lasting notoriety. The skilled practitioner not only gets rewarded; he also receives gratitude. The victims appreciate his work, much like a hypochondriac woman finds comfort in the surgeon's cuts. Yet all along, they have the power to stop the absurdity whenever it becomes unbearable, and occasionally, when they gain some awareness, they do put a stop to it. There are no legal or other barriers to the free exercise of their will, once it becomes conscious, except for the barriers they have created themselves, which they can remove whenever they wish. No external or super-legal authority stands outside their control, applying pressure on them; they acknowledge no personal ruler with unassailable rights and no class with privileges above the common law; they even remain free, due to a tradition as old as the Republic itself, from foreign alliances that would limit their autonomy. Therefore, while their sovereignty is often restricted in daily practice by self-imposed constitutional checks and further by the inherent nature of government, regardless of its form, it is probably just as complete in essence as that of the most absolute monarch who ever executed a peasant or defied the Pope.
What is too often forgotten, in discussing the matter, is the fact that no such monarch was ever actually free, at all times and under all conditions. In the midst of his most charming tyrannies he had still to bear it in mind that his people, oppressed too much, could always rise against him, and that he himself, though a king von Gottes Gnaden, was yet biologically only a man, with but one gullet to slit; and if the people were feeble or too craven to be dangerous, then there was always His Holiness of Rome to fear or other agents of the King of Kings; and if these ghostly mentors, too, were silent, then he had to reckon with his ministers, his courtiers, his soldiers, his doctors, and his women. The Merovingian kings were certainly absolute, if absolutism has ever existed outside the dreams of historians; nevertheless, as every schoolboy knows, their sovereignty was gradually undermined by the mayors of the palace, and finally taken from them altogether. So with the emperors of Japan, who succumbed to the shoguns, who succumbed in their turn to a combination81 of territorial nobles and city capitalists, not unlike that which brought King John to bay at Runnymede. It seems to me that the common people, under such a democracy as that which now prevails in the United States, are more completely sovereign, in fact as well as in law, than any of these ancient despots. They may be seduced and enchained by a great variety of prehensile soothsayers, just as Henry VIII was seduced and enchained by his wives, but, like Henry again, they are quite free to throw off their chains whenever they please, and to chop off the heads of their seducers. They could hang Dr. Coolidge to-morrow if they really wanted to do it, or even Bishop Manning. They could do it by the simple device of intimidating Congress, which never fails to leap when their growl is palpably in earnest. And if Congress stood out against them, they could do it anyhow, under protection of the jury system. The executioners, once acquitted, could not be molested more, save by illegal processes. Similar executioners walk the land to-day, especially in the South, and no one dares to challenge them. They are visible symbols of the powers that lie in the mob, once it makes up its mind.
What is often overlooked in this discussion is that no monarch was truly free at all times and under all circumstances. Even in his most charming tyranny, he had to remember that if he oppressed his people too much, they could rise up against him. Even though he was a king von Gottes Gnaden, he was still just a man with one throat to slit; and if the people were weak or too cowardly to pose a threat, there was always the Pope or other representatives of the King of Kings to worry about. If those ghostly figures were silent, he still had to deal with his ministers, courtiers, soldiers, doctors, and women. The Merovingian kings were certainly absolute, if absolutism has ever existed outside the imaginations of historians; however, as every schoolboy knows, their power was gradually eroded by the mayors of the palace, who ultimately took it away from them. Similarly, the emperors of Japan fell to the shoguns, who in turn were overrun by a coalition of regional nobles and city capitalists, much like what brought King John to a standstill at Runnymede. It seems to me that the common people, under the kind of democracy currently in place in the United States, are more fully sovereign, both in practice and by law, than any of these ancient despots. They can be influenced and shackled by a wide range of persuasive figures, just as Henry VIII was influenced and shackled by his wives, but, like Henry, they are entirely free to break their chains whenever they choose and to execute their manipulators. They could hang Dr. Coolidge tomorrow if they truly wanted to, or even Bishop Manning. They could achieve this simply by intimidating Congress, which never fails to respond when their growl is genuine. And if Congress resisted, they could still do it anyway, under the protection of the jury system. Once the executioners are acquitted, they can’t be touched again, except through illegal means. Similar executioners roam the land today, especially in the South, and no one dares challenge them. They are visible symbols of the power that lies within the mob, once it decides to take action.
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Nor is there much force or relevancy in the contention that democracy is incomplete in the United States (as in England, France, Germany and all other democratic countries) because certain classes of persons are barred from full citizenship, sometimes for reasons that appear to be unsound. To argue thus is to argue against democracy itself, for if the majority has not the right to decide what qualifications shall be necessary to participate in its sovereignty, then it has no sovereignty at all. What one usually finds, on examining any given case of class disfranchisement, is that the class disfranchised is not actively eager, as a whole, for the ballot, and that its lack of interest in the matter is at least presumptive evidence of its general political incompetence. The three-class system of voting survived so long in Belgium and Prussia, not because the masses victimized had no means at hand to put an end to it, but simply because they were so inept at politics, and so indifferent to the rights involved, that they made no genuine effort to do so. The agitation against the system was carried on mainly by a small minority, and many of its leaders were not even members of the class transgressed. Here we have a reminder83 of the process whereby democracy itself came in: it was forced upon its beneficiaries by a small group of visionaries, all of them standing outside the class benefited. So again, in our own time, with the extension of the franchise to women. The great masses of women in all countries were indifferent to the boon, and there was a considerable body that was cynically hostile. Perhaps a majority of the more ardent suffragists belonged biologically to neither sex.
Nor is there much force or relevance in the argument that democracy is incomplete in the United States (as in England, France, Germany, and all other democratic countries) because certain groups of people are excluded from full citizenship, sometimes for reasons that seem unjust. To argue this way is to go against democracy itself, because if the majority doesn’t have the right to decide what qualifications are necessary to participate in its governance, then it has no real power at all. What you usually find when looking at any particular case of class disenfranchisement is that the excluded group isn’t actively seeking the right to vote as a whole, and their lack of interest is at least a sign of their general political incompetence. The three-class voting system lasted so long in Belgium and Prussia, not because the disenfranchised masses didn’t have the means to change it, but simply because they were so inept at politics and so indifferent to the rights at stake that they made no real effort to do so. The push against the system was primarily driven by a small minority, and many of its leaders weren’t even part of the affected class. Here we have a reminder83 of how democracy itself came about: it was imposed on its beneficiaries by a small group of visionaries, all of whom were outside the benefited class. Similarly, in our own time, with the extension of the vote to women. The majority of women in all countries were indifferent to this gain, and there was a significant number that was cynically opposed. Perhaps a majority of the most passionate suffragists belonged biologically to neither sex.
Since the abolition of the three-class system in Prussia there has been absolutely no improvement in the government of that country; on the contrary, there has been a vast falling off in its honesty and efficiency, and it has even slackened energy in what was formerly one of its most laudable specialties: the development of legislation for the protection of the working class, i. e., the very class that benefited politically by the change. Giving women the ballot, as everyone knows, has brought in none of the great reforms promised by the suffragists. It has substituted adultery for drunkenness as the principal divertissement at political conventions, but it has accomplished little else. The majority of women, when they vote at all, seem to vote unwillingly84 and without clear purpose; they are, perhaps, relatively too intelligent to have any faith in purely political remedies for the sorrows of the world. The minorities that show partisan keenness are chiefly made up of fat women with inattentive husbands; they are victimized easily by the male politicians, especially those who dress well, and are thus swallowed up by the great parties, and lose all separate effectiveness. Certainly it is usually difficult to discover, in the election returns, any division along anatomical lines. Now and then, true enough, a sentimentality appealing especially to the more stupid sort of women causes a transient differentiation, as when, for example, thousands of newly-enfranchised farm-wives in the United States voted against Cox, the Democratic presidential candidate, in 1920, on the double ground (a) that he was a divorcé and hence an antinomian, and (b) that the titular chief of his party, Dr. Wilson, had married again too soon after the death of his first wife. But such fantastic sentimentalities, after all, rarely enter into practical politics. When they are lacking the women voters simply succumb to the sentimentalities that happen to be engaging their lords and masters.85 The extension of the franchise has not changed the general nature of the political clown-show in the slightest. Campaigns are still made upon the same old issues, and offices go to the same old mountebanks, with a few Jezebels added to the corps to give it refinement.
Since the abolishment of the three-class system in Prussia, there has been no real improvement in the government of that country; instead, there has been a significant decline in its honesty and efficiency, and it has even lost momentum in what used to be one of its most commendable efforts: creating laws to protect the working class, i.e., the very group that gained politically from the change. Granting women the right to vote, as everyone knows, has not brought about the major reforms promised by the suffragists. It has replaced drunkenness with infidelity as the main entertainment at political conventions, but it has achieved little else. Most women, when they do vote, seem to do so reluctantly and without a clear purpose; they are perhaps too intelligent to believe in purely political solutions for the world's problems. The enthusiastic minorities are mostly made up of overweight women with inattentive husbands; they are easily manipulated by male politicians, especially those who dress well, and thus get absorbed by the larger parties, losing any separate effectiveness. It is usually difficult to find any clear division based on anatomy in election results. Occasionally, a sentiment that particularly appeals to less intelligent women causes a brief divide, as when, for example, thousands of newly-enfranchised farm wives in the United States voted against Cox, the Democratic presidential candidate, in 1920, for two main reasons: (a) that he was divorced and thus an outsider, and (b) that the leader of his party, Dr. Wilson, remarried too soon after his first wife died. But these kinds of sentimentalities rarely play a significant role in practical politics. When they are absent, women voters simply fall in line with the sentiments that their husbands and leaders find engaging. The expansion of voting rights has not altered the overall nature of the political circus at all. Campaigns are still centered around the same old issues, and offices go to the same familiar charlatans, with a few women added to bring some polish.
There is little reason for believing that the extension of the franchise to the classes that still remain in the dark would make government more delicately responsive to the general will. Such classes, as a matter of fact, are now so few and so small in numbers in all of the Western nations that they may be very conveniently disregarded. It is as if doctors of philosophy, members of the Society of the Cincinnati or men who could move their ears were disfranchised. In the United States, true enough, there is one disfranchised group that is much larger, to wit, that group of Americans whose African descent is visible to the naked eye and at a glance. But even in this case, the reality falls much below the appearance. The more intelligent American Negroes vote in spite of the opposition of the poor whites, their theological brothers and economic rivals, and not a few of them actually make their livings as professional politicians,86 even in the South. At the Republican National Convention at Chicago, in 1920, such a swart statesman gave an inspiring exhibition of his powers, and in the presence of a vast multitude. His name was Henry Lincoln Johnson, and he has since gone to that bourn where black is white. When he died Dr. Coolidge sent a long and flirtatious telegram of condolence to his widow. The widow of Jacques Loeb got no such telegram. This Johnson was chairman of the Georgia delegation, and his colleagues were all of the Nordic race. But though they came from the very citadel of the Ku Klux Klan, he herded them in a public and lordly manner, and voted them as if they had been stuffed chemises. As Nordics, no doubt, they viewed him with a bitter loathing, but as politicians yearning for jobs they had to be polite to him, and even fawning. He has his peers and successors in all the American States. In many a proud city, North and South, the Aframericans hold the balance of power, and know it.
There’s not much reason to believe that giving the vote to those who are still in the dark would make the government more responsive to the general will. In fact, these groups are now so few and small in number in all Western nations that they can be easily ignored. It’s like if philosophers, members of the Society of the Cincinnati, or people who could wiggle their ears were denied the vote. In the United States, it's true there’s one disenfranchised group that’s much larger—specifically, the group of Americans whose African descent is obvious at first glance. But even in this case, the reality is much less significant than it seems. More educated African Americans vote despite the opposition from poor whites, who are their theological peers and economic competitors. Quite a few of them even make a living as professional politicians, even in the South. At the Republican National Convention in Chicago in 1920, a notable African American politician showcased his skills in front of a huge crowd. His name was Henry Lincoln Johnson, and he has since passed away. When he died, Dr. Coolidge sent a long and somewhat flirtatious telegram of condolence to his widow. Jacques Loeb's widow didn’t receive a such message. Johnson was the chairman of the Georgia delegation, and all of his colleagues were of Nordic descent. However, even though they came from the heart of the Ku Klux Klan, he managed them publicly and confidently and voted as if they had no choice. As Nordics, they probably viewed him with intense disdain, but as politicians looking for jobs, they had to be polite and even ingratiating. He has peers and successors in every American state. In many proud cities, both North and South, African Americans hold the balance of power and are aware of it.86
Moreover, even those who are actually disfranchised, say in the rural wastes of the South, may remove their disability by the simple device of moving away, as, in fact, hundreds of thousands87 have done. Their disfranchisement is thus not intrinsic and complete, but merely a function of their residence, like that of all persons, white or black, who live in the District of Columbia, and so it takes on a secondary and trivial character, as hay-fever, in the pathological categories, takes on a secondary and trivial character by yielding to a change of climate. Moreover, it is always extra-legal, and thus remains dubious: the theory of the fundamental law is that the coloured folk may and do vote. This theory they could convert into a fact at any time by determined mass action. The Nordics might resist that action, but they could not halt it: there would be another Civil War if they tried to do so, and they would be beaten a second time. If the blacks in the backwaters of the South keep away from the polls to-day it is only because they do not esteem the ballot highly enough to risk the dangers that go with trying to use it. That fact, it seems to me, convicts them of unfitness for citizenship in a democratic state, for the loftiest of all the rights of the citizen, by the democratic dogma, is that of the franchise, and whoever is not willing to fight for it, even at the cost of his last drop of gore, is88 surely not likely to exercise it with a proper sense of consecration after getting it. No one argues that democracy is destroyed in the United States by the fact that millions of white citizens, perfectly free under the law and the local mores of their communities to vote, nevertheless fail to do so. The difference between these negligent whites and the disfranchised Negroes is only superficial. Both have a clear legal right to the ballot; if they neglect to exercise it, it is only because they do not esteem it sufficiently. In New York City thousands of freeborn Caucasians surrender it in order to avoid jury duty; in the South thousands of Negroes surrender it in order to avoid having their homes burned and their heads broken. The two motives are fundamentally identical; in each case the potential voter values his peace and security more than he values the boon for which the Fathers bled. He certainly has a right to choose.
Moreover, even those who are actually disenfranchised, say in the rural areas of the South, can remove their disability simply by moving away, as indeed hundreds of thousands have done. Their disenfranchisement is not intrinsic and complete; it’s just a result of where they live, similar to all individuals, regardless of race, living in the District of Columbia. Therefore, it becomes secondary and trivial, much like hay-fever does in medical terms when it responds to a change of climate. Furthermore, it is always outside the law, making it uncertain: the fundamental law suggests that people of color can and do vote. This theory could become a reality at any moment through determined collective action. The Nordics might resist this action, but they couldn’t stop it: there would be another Civil War if they tried, and they would be defeated again. If African Americans in the rural South avoid the polls today, it’s only because they don’t value the ballot enough to face the associated dangers. This reality, it seems to me, demonstrates their unfitness for citizenship in a democratic state. According to democratic principles, the most important right of a citizen is the right to vote, and anyone not willing to fight for it, even at the cost of their life, is unlikely to appreciate it properly once they have it. No one claims that democracy in the United States is undermined by the fact that millions of white citizens, who are completely free under the law and the local customs of their communities to vote, still choose not to. The difference between these apathetic whites and the disenfranchised Black citizens is only surface-level. Both groups have a clear legal right to the ballot; if they fail to use it, it’s simply because they don’t regard it as important enough. In New York City, thousands of free-born Caucasians give it up to avoid jury duty; in the South, thousands of Black citizens give it up to avoid having their homes burned and their heads broken. The motivations in both cases are fundamentally the same; in each situation, the potential voter values their safety and security more than the privilege for which the Founding Fathers fought. They certainly have the right to make that choice.
3.
Disproportional Representation
Unfair Representation
The matter of disproportional representation, already alluded to in connection with the Prussian-Belgian89 voting system, is intimately bound up with this question of disfranchised classes, for it must be plain that a community whose votes, man for man, count for only half as much as the votes of another community is one in which half of the citizens are, to every practical intent, unable to vote at all. As everyone knows, the United States Senate is constituted upon a disproportional plan. Each State, regardless of population, has two Senators and no more, and the votes of the two representing so small and measly a State as Delaware or Nevada count for precisely as much as the votes of the Senators from Pennsylvania or New York. The same sophistication of the one-man-one-vote formula extends into the States themselves. There is hardly a large city in the United States that has completely proportional representation in the State Legislature. In almost every State, sometimes with slight ameliorative differences, the upper house of the Legislature is constituted upon the plan of the Federal Senate—that is, the divisions run according to geographical boundaries rather than according to population, and the congested urban centres tend to be grossly under-represented. Moreover, the lower90 house commonly shows something of the same disharmony, even when it is ostensibly based upon proportional representation, for the cities grow in population much faster than the country districts, and reapportionment always lags behind that growth.
The issue of unequal representation, which was already mentioned in relation to the Prussian-Belgian89 voting system, is closely linked to the problem of disenfranchised groups. It's clear that a community whose votes, one for one, count for only half as much as another community's votes means that half of its citizens effectively can't vote at all. As everyone knows, the United States Senate operates on a disproportional system. Each State, regardless of its population, has two Senators and no more, so the votes of the two Senators from a small and insignificant State like Delaware or Nevada carry the same weight as the votes of Senators from Pennsylvania or New York. This same issue with the one-person-one-vote principle extends into the States themselves. There is hardly a large city in the United States that has completely proportional representation in the State Legislature. In almost every State, often with minor differences, the upper house of the Legislature follows the same model as the Federal Senate—that is, the divisions are based on geographical boundaries rather than population, leading to significant under-representation of densely populated urban areas. Additionally, the lower90 house often exhibits similar disparities, even when it is supposedly based on proportional representation, because cities are growing in population much faster than rural areas, and reallocation of representation regularly falls behind that growth.
These facts fever certain romantic fuglemen of so-called pure democracy, and they come forward with complicated remedies, all of which have been tried somewhere or other and failed miserably. The truth is that disproportional representation is not a device to nullify democracy, but simply a device to make it more workable. All it indicates, at least in the United States, is that the sovereign people have voluntarily sacrificed a moiety of the democratic theory in order to attain to a safer and more efficient practice. If they so desired they could sweep all of the existing inequalities out of existence—not instantly, perhaps, but nevertheless surely. Every such inequality is founded upon their free will, and nearly every one enjoys their complete approval. What lies under most of them is not a wish to give one voter an advantage over another, but a wish to counter-balance91 an advantage lying in the very nature of things. The voters of a large urban centre, for example, are able to act together far more promptly and effectively than their colleagues of the wide-flung farms. They live in close contact both physically and mentally; opinions form among them quickly, and are maintained with solid front. In brief, they show all of the characters of men in a compact mob, and the voters of the rural regions, dispersed and largely inarticulate, cannot hope to prevail against them by ordinary means. So the yokels are given disproportionally heavy representation by way of make-weight: it enables them to withstand the city stampede. There are frequent protests from the cities when, taking advantage of their strength in the State Legislatures, the yokels dodge their fair share of the burden of taxation, but it is perhaps significant that there is seldom any serious protest against the plan of organization of the United States Senate, despite the fact that it has cursed the country with such bucolic imbecilities as Prohibition. In both cases, genuine discontent would make itself felt, for the majority under democracy remains the majority,92 whatever laws and constitutions may say to the contrary, and when its blood is up it can get anything it wants.
These facts ignite certain romantic advocates of what they call pure democracy, and they present complicated solutions, all of which have been tried somewhere and have failed miserably. The reality is that disproportional representation isn't meant to undermine democracy but rather to make it more functional. At least in the United States, it suggests that the sovereign people have willingly sacrificed a part of democratic theory to achieve a safer and more efficient practice. If they wanted to, they could eliminate all existing inequalities—not instantly, maybe, but surely. Each of these inequalities is based on their free will, and almost all of them have their complete approval. What drives most of them is not a desire to give one voter an edge over another, but a need to balance out an advantage inherent in the nature of things. For example, voters in a large city can act together much more quickly and effectively than their counterparts in the sprawling countryside. They are in close physical and mental contact; opinions form quickly among them and are maintained strongly. In short, they display all the characteristics of a tightly packed crowd, while rural voters, who are spread out and often quiet, cannot compete against them by usual means. Therefore, rural voters receive disproportionately more representation to counterbalance this: it helps them resist the dominate influence of city voters. There are frequent complaints from cities when rural voters, using their strength in state legislatures, avoid their fair share of taxes, but it's notable that there is rarely any serious objection to how the United States Senate is organized, even though it has subjected the nation to foolish policies like Prohibition. In both cases, real discontent would be felt, because the majority in a democracy remains the majority, no matter what laws and constitutions might say otherwise, and when they are determined, they can get whatever they want.
Most of the so-called constitutional checks, in fact, have yielded, at one time or other, to its pressure. No one familiar with the history of the Supreme Court, for example, need be told that its vast and singular power to curb legislation has always been exercised with one eye on the election returns. Practically all of its most celebrated decisions, from that in the Dred Scott case to that in the Northern Securities case, have reflected popular rages of the hour, and many of them have been modified, or even completely reversed afterward, as the second thought of the plain people has differed from their first thought. This responsiveness to the shifts of popular opinion and passion is not alone due to the fact that the personnel of the court, owing to the high incidence of senile deterioration among its members, is constantly changing, and that the President and the Senators, in filling vacancies, are bound as practical politicians to consider the doctrines that happen to be fashionable in the cross-roads grocery-stores and barber-shops. It is also due, and in no small93 measure, to the fact that the learned and puissant justices are, in the main, practical politicians themselves, and hence used to keeping their ears close to the grass-roots. Most of them, before they were elevated to the ermine, spent years struggling desperately for less exalted honours, and so, like Representatives, Senators and Presidents, they show a fine limberness of the biceps femoris, semitendinosus and semimembranosus, and a beautiful talent for reconciling the ideally just with the privately profitable. If their general tendency, in late years, has been to put the rights of property above the rights of man then it must be obvious that they have not lost any popularity thereby. In boom times, indeed, democracy is always very impatient of what used to be called natural rights. The typical democrat is quite willing to exchange any of the theoretical boons of freedom for something that he can use. In most cases, perhaps, he is averse to selling his vote for cash in hand, but that is mainly because the price offered is usually too low. He will sell it very willingly for a good job or for some advantage in his business. Offering him such bribes, in fact, is the chief occupation of all political parties under democracy,94 and of all professional politicians.
Most of the so-called constitutional checks have, at one time or another, given in to its influence. Anyone who knows the history of the Supreme Court understands that its significant power to limit legislation has always been applied with an eye on election results. Nearly all of its most notable decisions, from the Dred Scott case to the Northern Securities case, have mirrored the public sentiments of the moment, and many of them have been changed or even completely overturned later, as the public's second thoughts differed from their initial opinions. This responsiveness to shifts in public opinion and enthusiasm is not only because the court's makeup is constantly changing due to the frequent presence of aging members, and that the President and Senators, in filling vacancies, must consider what's trendy in local markets and barbershops. It’s also significantly due to the fact that the educated and powerful justices are mainly practical politicians themselves, so they tend to stay attuned to grassroots voices. Most of them, before they were appointed to the bench, spent years fervently seeking less prestigious roles, and like Representatives, Senators, and Presidents, they exhibit a flexibility of character and a great ability to balance the ideally just with their own interests. If their recent tendency has been to prioritize property rights over human rights, it’s clear that they haven’t lost any popularity because of it. In good economic times, democracy is often very intolerant of what used to be called natural rights. The average democrat is quite willing to trade any theoretical benefits of freedom for something tangible. In many cases, they may be reluctant to sell their vote for cash on the spot, but that’s mostly because the offered price is typically too low. They’ll happily trade it for a good job or some business advantage. Actually, offering such incentives is the primary activity for all political parties in a democracy, and for all professional politicians.
For all these reasons I esteem it a vanity to discuss the question whether the democracy on tap in the United States is really ideal. Ideal or not, it works, and the people are actually sovereign. The governmental process, perhaps, could be made more quickly responsive to the public will, but that is merely a temporal detail; it is responsive enough for all practical purposes. Any conceivable change in the laws could be effected without tampering with the fundamental scheme. The fact, no doubt, largely explains the hostility of the inferior American to the thing called direct action—the darling of his equals in most other countries. He is against it, not merely because he is a coward and distrusts liberty, but also, and maybe mainly, because he believes that revolution, in the United States, is unnecessary—that any reform advocated by a respectable majority, or even by a determined minority, may be achieved peacefully and by constitutional means. In this belief he is right. The American people, keeping strictly within the Constitution, could do anything that the most soaring fancy suggested. They could, by a simple amendment of that hoary scripture, expropriate95 all the private property in the land, or they could expropriate parts of it and leave the rest in private hands; they have already, in fact, by tariff juggling, by Prohibition and by other devices, destroyed billions of dollars of property without compensation and even without common politeness, and the Constitution still survives. They could enfranchise aliens if they so desired, or children not taxed, or idiots, or the kine in the byres. They could disfranchise whole classes, e. g., metaphysicians or adulterers, or the entire population of given regions. They have done such things. They could abolish the Federal and State Legislatures, as they have already abolished the city councils in hundreds of municipalities. They could extend the term of the President to life, or they could reduce it to one year, or even to one day. They could provide that he must shave his head, or that he must sleep in his underclothes. They could legalize his assassination for malfeasance, and the assassination of all other recreant public officers, as I myself once proposed, entirely within my rights as a citizen and a patriot. They could introduce burning at the stake, flogging, castration, ducking and tar-and-feathering96 into our system of legal punishment; they have already done so in the South by acclamation, regardless of the law and the courts, and, as the phrase is, have got away with it. They could abolish the jury system, abandon the writ of habeas corpus, authorize unreasonable searches and seizures, legalize murder by public officers and provide that all Federal judges be appointed by the Anti-Saloon League: a beginning has been made in all these fields by the Volstead Act. They could make war without constitutional authority and refuse to engage in it in the face of a constitutional declaration. They could proscribe individuals or classes, and deny them the protection of the laws. They could convert arson into a laudable act, provide a bounty for persons skilled at mayhem and make it a crime to drink coffee or eat meat. They have already, either by Federal action or by State action, made crimes of such intrinsically harmless acts as drinking wine at meals, smoking cigarettes on the street, teaching the elements of biology, wearing a red necktie on the street, and reading “Das Kapital” and “The Inestimable Life of the Great Gargantua.” They could, with equal facility, make it criminal to97 refuse to do these things. Finally, they could, if they would, abandon the republican form of government altogether, and set up a monarchy in place of it; during the late war they actually did so in fact, though refraining from saying so frankly. They could do all of these things freely and even legally, without departing in the slightest from the principles of their fundamental compact, and no exterior agency could make them do any of them unwillingly.
For all these reasons, I see it as pointless to debate whether the democracy in the United States is truly ideal. Ideal or not, it functions, and the people are genuinely in control. The government process could potentially be faster in responding to public opinion, but that’s just a minor detail; it’s responsive enough for practical needs. Any possible legal change could be made without altering the basic structure. This, no doubt, helps explain why less educated Americans have a problem with direct action—the favorite approach of their counterparts in many other countries. They oppose it not just because they’re afraid and wary of freedom, but also, and perhaps mainly, because they think that revolution in the U.S. is unnecessary—that any reform suggested by a respectable majority or even by a determined minority can be achieved peacefully and constitutionally. In this belief, they are correct. The American people, working strictly within the Constitution, could accomplish anything that the wildest imagination proposed. They could, with a simple amendment to that ancient document, take all private property in the country or expropriate parts of it while leaving the rest in private ownership; in fact, they have already, through tariff changes, Prohibition, and other methods, wiped out billions of dollars in property without compensation and even without basic politeness, and the Constitution still stands. They could grant voting rights to immigrants if they wanted to, or to untaxed children, or the mentally disabled, or livestock in barns. They could revoke the voting rights of whole groups, such as philosophers or cheaters, or the entire population of specific areas. They have done such things. They could eliminate the Federal and State Legislatures, just as they have abolished city councils in hundreds of municipalities. They could extend the President’s term for life, shorten it to one year, or even to just one day. They could rule that he must shave his head, or that he must sleep in his underwear. They could legalize killing him for wrongdoing, as well as the killing of any other untrustworthy public officials, as I myself once suggested, entirely within my rights as a citizen and a patriot. They could introduce punishments like burning, flogging, castration, dunking, and tar-and-feathering into our legal system; they have already done this in the South by popular demand, without regard for the law and the courts, and, as they say, they pulled it off. They could abolish the jury system, ignore the writ of habeas corpus, allow unreasonable searches and seizures, legalize killing by public officials, and stipulate that all Federal judges be appointed by the Anti-Saloon League; progress has been made in all these areas by the Volstead Act. They could go to war without constitutional permission and refuse to do so even with a constitutional declaration. They could ban individuals or groups from receiving legal protection. They could turn arson into a noble act, offer rewards for skilled attackers, and make it illegal to drink coffee or eat meat. They have already, through federal or state action, made it a crime to engage in harmless activities like drinking wine with meals, smoking cigarettes in public, teaching basic biology, wearing a red necktie in public, and reading "Das Kapital" and "The Inestimable Life of the Great Gargantua." They could just as easily make it a crime to refuse to do any of these things. Finally, they could, if they wanted, entirely abandon the republican form of government and establish a monarchy instead; during the recent war, that’s essentially what they did, though they didn’t openly admit it. They could do all of these things freely and legally, without deviating in the slightest from the principles of their foundational agreement, and no external force could make them do any of it against their will.
It is thus idle to amass proofs, as Hans Delbrück does with great diligence, that the result of this or that election was not a manifestation of a concrete popular wish. The answer, nine times out of ten, is that there was no popular wish. The populace simply passed over the matters principally at issue as incomprehensible or unimportant, and voted irrelevantly or wantonly. Or, in large part, it kept away from the polls. Both actions might be defended plausibly by democratic theorists. The people, if they are actually sovereign, have a clear right to be wanton when the spirit moves them, and indifference to an issue is an expression of opinion about it. Thus there is little appositeness in the saying of another German, the philosopher Hegel, that the98 masses are that part of the state which doesn’t know what it wants. They know what they want when they actually want it, and if they want it badly enough they get it. What they want principally are safety and security. They want to be delivered from the bugaboos that ride them. They want to be soothed with mellifluous words. They want heroes to worship. They want the rough entertainment suitable to their simple minds. All of these things they want so badly that they are willing to sacrifice everything else in order to get them. The science of politics under democracy consists in trading with them, i. e., in hoodwinking and swindling them. In return for what they want, or for the mere appearance of what they want, they yield up what the politician wants, and what the enterprising minorities behind him want. The bargaining is conducted to the tune of affecting rhetoric, with music by the choir, but it is as simple and sordid at bottom as the sale of a mule. It lies quite outside the bounds of honour, and even of common decency. It is a combat between jackals and jackasses. It is the master transaction of democratic states.
It’s pointless to gather evidence, as Hans Delbrück does painstakingly, to claim that the outcome of this or that election reflected a genuine public desire. The reality, nine times out of ten, is that there wasn't any public desire. People mostly saw the main issues as confusing or unimportant, and voted randomly or carelessly. Or, for the most part, they stayed away from the polls. Both actions can be reasonably defended by democratic theorists. If the people are truly sovereign, they have every right to act on a whim when they feel like it, and apathy toward an issue conveys their opinion on it. Therefore, it doesn't quite fit to say, as another German philosopher, Hegel, did, that the masses are that part of the state that doesn’t know what they want. They know what they want when they actually desire it, and if they want it badly enough, they’ll make it happen. What they mainly want are safety and security. They want to be freed from the fears that trouble them. They want to be comforted with smooth-talking leaders. They want heroes to admire. They want the straightforward entertainment that matches their simple tastes. They want all of these things so desperately that they’re willing to sacrifice everything else to obtain them. The study of politics in a democracy is about negotiating with them, that is, deceiving and misleading them. In exchange for what they desire, or for the mere illusion of it, they give up what the politician wants, and what the ambitious minorities behind him want. The bargaining unfolds with flashy language and background music from a choir, but at its core, it’s as simple and tawdry as selling a mule. It falls far outside the realm of honor, and even basic decency. It’s a struggle between scavengers and fools. It’s the main transaction in democratic states.
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4.
The Politician Under Democracy
The Politician in Democracy
I find myself quoting yet a third German: he is Professor Robert Michels, the economist. The politician, he says, is the courtier of democracy. A profound saying—perhaps more profound than the professor, himself a democrat, realizes. For it was of the essence of the courtier’s art and mystery that he flattered his employer in order to victimize him, yielded to him in order to rule him. The politician under democracy does precisely the same thing. His business is never what it pretends to be. Ostensibly he is an altruist devoted whole-heartedly to the service of his fellow-men, and so abjectly public-spirited that his private interest is nothing to him. Actually he is a sturdy rogue whose principal, and often sole aim in life is to butter his parsnips. His technical equipment consists simply of an armamentarium of deceits. It is his business to get and hold his job at all costs. If he can hold it by lying he will hold it by lying; if lying peters out he will try to hold it by embracing new truths. His ear is ever close to the ground.100 If he is an adept he can hear the first murmurs of popular clamour before even the people themselves are conscious of them. If he is a master he detects and whoops up to-day the delusions that the mob will cherish next year. There is in him, in his professional aspect, no shadow of principle or honour. It is moral by his code to get into office by false pretences, as the late Dr. Wilson did in 1916. It is moral to change convictions overnight, as multitudes of American politicians did when the Prohibition avalanche came down upon them. Anything is moral that furthers the main concern of his soul, which is to keep a place at the public trough. That place is one of public honour, and public honour is the thing that caresses him and makes him happy. It is also one of power, and power is the commodity that he has for sale.
I find myself quoting a third German: Professor Robert Michels, the economist. He says that the politician is the courtier of democracy. This is a deep statement—perhaps deeper than the professor, who is a democrat himself, realizes. It’s essential to the courtier’s craft that he flatters his boss to exploit him, submits to him to control him. The politician in a democracy does exactly the same thing. His role is never what it seems. Apparently, he’s a selfless person completely dedicated to serving others, so public-spirited that his personal interests mean nothing to him. In reality, he’s a clever trickster whose main, and often only, goal in life is to benefit himself. His toolkit is simply a collection of lies. His job is to get and keep his position at any cost. If he can maintain it by lying, he will; if lying stops working, he’ll try to retain it by embracing new truths. He’s always tuned in to the vibe around him. If he’s skilled, he can sense the first hints of popular unrest before the people even realize it themselves. If he’s a master, he anticipates and stirs up the fantasies that the crowd will embrace next year. In his professional role, there’s no trace of principle or integrity. It’s moral, by his standards, to gain office through deception, as the late Dr. Wilson did in 1916. It’s moral to change beliefs overnight, as many American politicians did when the Prohibition wave hit. Anything is moral if it supports his core interest, which is to maintain a position at the public trough. That position brings public honor, and public honor is what flatters him and makes him content. It’s also one of power, and power is the commodity he has for sale.
I speak here, of course, of the democratic politician in his rôle of statesman—that is, in his best and noblest aspect. He flourishes also on lower levels, partly subterranean. Down there public honour would be an inconvenience, so he hawks it to lesser men, and contents himself with power. What are the sources of that power?101 They lie, obviously, in the gross weaknesses and knaveries of the common people—in their inability to grasp any issues save the simplest and most banal, in their incurable tendency to fly into preposterous alarms, in their petty self-seeking and venality, in their instinctive envy and hatred of their superiors—in brief, in their congenital incapacity for the elemental duties of citizens in a civilized state. The boss owns them simply because they can be bought for a job on the street or a load of coal. He holds them, even when they pass beyond any need of jobs or coal, by his shrewd understanding of their immemorial sentimentalities. Looking at Thersites, they see Ulysses. He is the state as they apprehend it; around him clusters all the romance that used to hang about a king. He is the fount of honour and the mould of form. His barbaric code, framed to fit their gullibility, becomes an example to their young. The boss is the eternal reductio ad absurdum of the whole democratic process. He exemplifies its reduction of all ideas to a few elemental wants. And he reflects and makes manifest the inferior man’s congenital fear of liberty—his incapacity for even the most trivial sort of independent action. Life on102 the lower levels is life in a series of interlocking despotisms. The inferior man cannot imagine himself save as taking orders—if not from the boss, then from the priest, and if not from the priest, then from some fantastic drill-sergeant of his own creation. For years the reformers who flourished in the United States concentrated their whole animus upon the boss: it was apparently their notion that he had imposed himself upon his victims from without, and that they could be delivered by destroying him. But time threw a brilliant light upon that error. When, as and if he was overthrown there appeared in his place the prehensile Methodist parson, bawling for Prohibition and its easy jobs, and behind the parson loomed the grand goblin, natural heir to a long line of imperial worthy potentates of the Sons of Azrael and sublime chancellors of the Order of Patriarchs Militant. The winds of the world are bitter to Homo vulgaris. He likes the warmth and safety of the herd, and he likes a bell-wether with a clarion bell.
I’m talking about the democratic politician in his role as a statesman—that is, in his best and highest form. He also thrives in lower social circles, often behind the scenes. Down there, public honor is more of a hassle, so he sells it to lesser people and settles for power. What fuels that power? It clearly comes from the glaring weaknesses and dishonesty of the average person—like their inability to understand anything beyond the simplest, most obvious issues, their tendency to panic over trivial matters, their selfishness and corruption, and their instinctive jealousy and hatred of those above them—in short, their natural inability to fulfill the basic responsibilities of citizens in a civilized society. The boss controls them simply because they can be swayed with a job on the street or a load of coal. He keeps his grip on them even when they no longer need jobs or coal, using his clever understanding of their deep-seated emotions. When they look at someone like Thersites, they see Ulysses. He embodies the state as they see it; all the romance that used to surround kings now clings to him. He is the source of honor and the example to follow. His crude code, designed to take advantage of their gullibility, becomes a model for their children. The boss is the ultimate illustration of the absurdity within the entire democratic system. He showcases how it simplifies all ideas to just a few basic needs. And he mirrors and highlights the lower individual's inherent fear of freedom—his inability to even engage in the most mundane act of independence. Life at the lower levels is a series of overlapping tyrannies. The average person can’t envision themselves except as someone who takes orders—if not from the boss, then from the priest, and if not from the priest, then from some imaginary drill sergeant they’ve created. For years, the reformers thriving in the United States directed all their energy at the boss: they thought he had imposed himself on his victims from the outside, and that they could be freed by getting rid of him. But time revealed the flaw in that thinking. When he was overthrown, a grasping Methodist minister popped up, demanding Prohibition and its easy jobs, and behind him stood the powerful goblin, a natural successor to a long line of imposing figures from the Sons of Azrael and esteemed leaders of the Order of Patriarchs Militant. The world can be harsh for the average person. They prefer the warmth and security of the group, and they like having a leader who calls the shots.
The art of politics, under democracy, is simply the art of ringing it. Two branches reveal themselves. There is the art of the demagogue, and there is the art of what may be called, by a103 shot-gun marriage of Latin and Greek, the demaslave. They are complementary, and both of them are degrading to their practitioners. The demagogue is one who preaches doctrines he knows to be untrue to men he knows to be idiots. The demaslave is one who listens to what these idiots have to say and then pretends that he believes it himself. Every man who seeks elective office under democracy has to be either the one thing or the other, and most men have to be both. The whole process is one of false pretences and ignoble concealments. No educated man, stating plainly the elementary notions that every educated man holds about the matters that principally concern government, could be elected to office in a democratic state, save perhaps by a miracle. His frankness would arouse fears, and those fears would run against him; it is his business to arouse fears that will run in favour of him. Worse, he must not only consider the weaknesses of the mob, but also the prejudices of the minorities that prey upon it. Some of these minorities have developed a highly efficient technique of intimidation. They not only know how to arouse the fears of the mob; they also know how to awaken its envy, its dislike of privilege,104 its hatred of its betters. How formidable they may become is shown by the example of the Anti-Saloon League in the United States—a minority body in the strictest sense, however skillful its mustering of popular support, for it nowhere includes a majority of the voters among its subscribing members, and its leaders are nowhere chosen by democratic methods. And how such minorities may intimidate the whole class of place-seeking politicians has been demonstrated brilliantly and obscenely by the same corrupt and unconscionable organization. It has filled all the law-making bodies of the nation with men who have got into office by submitting cravenly to its dictation, and it has filled thousands of administrative posts, and not a few judicial posts, with vermin of the same sort.
The art of politics in a democracy is really just the art of manipulation. There are two aspects to this. First, there's the demagogue, and then there's what might be called, as a mix of Latin and Greek, the demaslave. They go hand in hand, and both are degrading for those involved. A demagogue is someone who shares beliefs he knows are false with people he considers fools. A demaslave is someone who listens to these fools and pretends to believe them. Every person running for office in a democracy has to be one or the other, and most end up being both. The whole process is based on deception and dishonesty. No educated person, if they clearly stated the basic ideas that any educated person understands about the key issues of government, could get elected in a democracy—except maybe by a miracle. Their honesty would create fear, and that fear would turn against them; the goal is to create fears that will work in their favor. Even worse, they must not only think about the mob’s weaknesses but also the biases of the minorities that take advantage of it. Some of these minorities have developed very effective tactics for intimidation. They not only know how to stir up the mob’s fears but also how to spark its envy, dislike of privilege, and hatred of those who are better off. The power of such minorities is illustrated by the Anti-Saloon League in the United States—a minority in the strictest sense, despite its skill at rallying popular support, since it doesn’t include a majority of voters among its members, and its leaders aren’t chosen by democratic means. How such minorities can intimidate the entire group of politicians seeking office has been dramatically and outrageously demonstrated by this same corrupt and unscrupulous organization. It has filled all the legislative bodies of the nation with individuals who gained office by submissively following its orders, and it has placed thousands in administrative roles, as well as some judicial positions, with similarly corrupt individuals.
Such men, indeed, enjoy vast advantages under democracy. The mob, insensitive to their dishonour, is edified and exhilarated by their success. The competition they offer to men of a decenter habit is too powerful to be met, so they tend, gradually, to monopolize all the public offices. Out of the muck of their swinishness the typical American law-maker emerges. He is a man who has lied and dissembled, and a man105 who has crawled. He knows the taste of boot-polish. He has suffered kicks in the tonneau of his pantaloons. He has taken orders from his superiors in knavery and he has wooed and flattered his inferiors in sense. His public life is an endless series of evasions and false pretences. He is willing to embrace any issue, however idiotic, that will get him votes, and he is willing to sacrifice any principle, however sound, that will lose them for him. I do not describe the democratic politician at his inordinate worst; I describe him as he is encountered in the full sunshine of normalcy. He may be, on the one hand, a cross-roads idler striving to get into the State Legislature by grace of the local mortgage-sharks and evangelical clergy, or he may be, on the other, the President of the United States. It is almost an axiom that no man may make a career in politics in the Republic without stooping to such ignobility: it is as necessary as a loud voice. Now and then, to be sure, a man of sounder self-respect may make a beginning, but he seldom gets very far. Those who survive are nearly all tarred, soon or late, with the same stick. They are men who, at some time or other, have compromised with their honour, either by106 swallowing their convictions or by whooping for what they believe to be untrue. They are in the position of the chorus girl who, in order to get her humble job, has had to admit the manager to her person. And the old birds among them, like chorus girls of long experience, come to regard the business resignedly and even complacently. It is the price that a man who loves the clapper-clawing of the vulgar must pay for it under the democratic system. He becomes a coward and a trimmer ex officio. Where his dignity was in the days of his innocence there is now only a vacuum in the wastes of his subconscious. Vanity remains to him, but not pride.
Such men definitely have huge advantages in a democracy. The crowd, oblivious to their dishonor, is inspired and excited by their success. The competition they pose to more decent individuals is just too strong, leading them to gradually dominate all public offices. From the depths of their sleaziness, the typical American lawmaker emerges. He is someone who has lied and played games, a man who has crawled his way up. He knows what it's like to shine shoes. He has endured kicks in the backside of his pants. He has taken orders from those who are more unscrupulous than he is and has wooed and flattered those he considers beneath him. His public life is a never-ending series of evasions and deceptions. He’s willing to embrace any ridiculous issue that will get him votes and is ready to abandon any principle, no matter how sound, if it will cost him support. I'm not describing the democratic politician at his absolute worst; I'm describing him as you would see him in everyday life. He might be a local drifter trying to get into the State Legislature thanks to local loan sharks and church leaders, or he could be the President of the United States. It's almost a rule that no one can build a political career in this country without stooping to such unworthy actions: it's as essential as having a loud voice. Occasionally, a man with more self-respect might start off well, but he rarely goes very far. Those who last are nearly all touched by the same stain sooner or later. They are people who have at some point compromised their honor, either by swallowing their beliefs or by cheering for what they think is false. They're in the same position as a chorus girl who, just to secure her lowly job, has had to let the manager get personal with her. And the veterans among them, like seasoned chorus girls, come to see their work with resignation and even acceptance. It’s the price a man who enjoys the attention of the masses pays in a democratic system. He becomes a coward and a schemer by default. Where his dignity once stood in his innocent days, there is now just an emptiness in the depths of his mind. Vanity remains, but pride is gone.
5.
Utopia
Utopia
Thus the ideal of democracy is reached at last: it has become a psychic impossibility for a gentleman to hold office under the Federal Union, save by a combination of miracles that must tax the resourcefulness even of God. The fact has been rammed home by a constitutional amendment: every office-holder, when he takes107 oath to support the Constitution, must swear on his honour that, summoned to the death-bed of his grandmother, he will not take the old lady a bottle of wine. He may say so and do it, which makes him a liar, or he may say so and not do it, which makes him a pig. But despite that grim dilemma there are still idealists, chiefly professional Liberals, who argue that it is the duty of a gentleman to go into politics—that there is a way out of the quagmire in that direction. The remedy, it seems to me, is quite as absurd as all the other sure cures that Liberals advocate. When they argue for it, they simply argue, in words but little changed, that the remedy for prostitution is to fill the bawdy-houses with virgins. My impression is that this last device would accomplish very little: either the virgins would leap out of the windows, or they would cease to be virgins. The same alternatives confront the political aspirant who is what is regarded in America as a gentleman—that is, who is one not susceptible to open bribery in cash. The moment his leg goes over the political fence, he finds the mob confronting him, and if he would stay within he must adapt himself to its tastes and prejudices. In other words,108 he must learn all the tricks of the regular mountebanks. When the mob pricks up its ears and begins to whinny, he must soothe it with balderdash. He must allay its resentment of the fact that he is washed behind the ears. He must anticipate its crazes, and join in them vociferously. He must regard its sensitiveness on points of morals, and get what advantage he can out of his anæsthesia on points of honour. More, he must make terms with the mob-masters already performing upon its spines, chiefly agents of prehensile minorities. If he neglects these devices he is swiftly heaved over the fence, and his career in statecraft is at an end.
Thus, the ideal of democracy has finally been achieved: it has become almost impossible for a gentleman to hold office under the Federal Union without a combination of miracles that would challenge even God's creativity. This fact has been reinforced by a constitutional amendment: every office-holder, when taking an oath to support the Constitution, must swear on their honor that if called to their grandmother's deathbed, they will not bring her a bottle of wine. They can either say this and do it, making them a liar, or say it and not do it, making them dishonorable. Yet, despite this grim choice, there are still idealists, mainly professional Liberals, who argue that a gentleman has a duty to enter politics—that there’s a solution to the mess in that direction. To me, this remedy is just as ridiculous as all the other supposed solutions that Liberals promote. When they advocate for it, they essentially make the same argument that the solution to prostitution is to fill brothels with virgins. I doubt this would achieve much: either the virgins would jump out of the windows, or they would stop being virgins. The same options face the political hopeful who is considered a gentleman in America—that is, someone who isn't easily bribed with cash. The moment they step into the political arena, they find the crowd in front of them, and if they want to stay within, they must conform to its tastes and biases. In other words, they have to learn all the tricks of the regular con artists. When the crowd perks up and starts to stir, they must calm it down with nonsense. They must ease its discomfort at the fact that they come from a respectable background. They must anticipate its crazes and join in enthusiastically. They must be aware of the crowd's sensitivities regarding morals and take advantage of their own lack of concern regarding honor. Furthermore, they must make deals with the power brokers already manipulating the crowd, mainly representatives of self-interested minorities. If they ignore these strategies, they will be quickly thrown out, and their political career will be over.
Here I do not theorize; there are examples innumerable. It is an axiom of practical politics, indeed, that the worst enemies of political decency are the tired reformers—and the worst of the worst are those whose primary thirst to make the corruptible put on incorruption was accompanied by a somewhat sniffish class consciousness. Has the United States ever seen a more violent and shameless demagogue than Theodore Roosevelt? Yet Roosevelt came into politics as a sword drawn against demagogy. The list of such recusants might be run to great109 lengths: I point to the late Mitchel of New York and the late Lodge of Massachusetts and pass on. Lodge lived long enough to become a magnificent reductio ad absurdum of the gentleman turned democratic messiah. It was a sheer impossibility, during the last ten years of his life, to disentangle his private convictions from the fabric of his political dodges. He was the perfect model of the party hack, and if he performed before the actual mob less unchastely than Roosevelt it was only because his somewhat absurd façade unfitted him for that science. He dealt in jobs in a wholesale manner, and with the hearty devotion of a Penrose or a Henry Lincoln Johnson. Popularly regarded as an unflinching and even adamantine fellow, he was actually as limber as an eel. He knew how to jump. He knew when to whisper and when to yell. As I say, I could print a long roster of similar apostates; the name of Penrose himself should not be forgotten. I do not say that a gentleman may not thrust himself into politics under democracy; I simply say that it is almost impossible for him to stay there and remain a gentleman. The haughty amateur, at the start, may actually make what seems to be a brilliant110 success, for he is commonly full of indignation, and so strikes out valiantly, and the mob crowds up because it likes a brutal show. But that first battle is almost always his last. If he retains his rectitude he loses his office, and if he retains his office he has to dilute his rectitude with the cologne spirits of the trade.
Here I don't theorize; there are countless examples. It’s a basic principle of practical politics that the worst enemies of political integrity are the jaded reformers—and the worst of the worst are those whose main desire to rid the corruptible of corruption is accompanied by a somewhat disdainful class consciousness. Has the United States ever seen a more aggressive and shameless demagogue than Theodore Roosevelt? Yet Roosevelt entered politics with a mission to fight against demagogy. The list of such outcasts could go on for a long time: I’ll mention the late Mitchel of New York and the late Lodge of Massachusetts and move on. Lodge lived long enough to become a perfect example of the gentleman turned democratic savior. It was utterly impossible, during the last ten years of his life, to separate his private beliefs from his political maneuvers. He was the ideal representation of a party loyalist, and if he acted less indecently in front of the actual crowd than Roosevelt, it was only because his somewhat ridiculous persona made him unsuitable for that kind of performance. He dealt in jobs on a large scale, with the same enthusiastic commitment as a Penrose or a Henry Lincoln Johnson. While commonly seen as a steadfast and even unyielding individual, he was actually as flexible as an eel. He knew how to jump in and out of situations. He knew when to whisper and when to shout. As I mentioned, I could list many similar defectors; the name of Penrose himself shouldn’t be overlooked. I don’t say that a gentleman can’t enter politics in a democracy; I just say that it’s nearly impossible for him to stay there and remain a gentleman. The arrogant amateur, at first, may actually achieve what seems to be a brilliant success, as he is usually full of indignation and bravely takes action, causing the crowd to gather because they enjoy a brutal spectacle. But that initial victory is almost always his last. If he holds onto his integrity, he loses his position, and if he keeps his position, he has to compromise his integrity with the deceptive practices of the trade.
Such is the pride that we pay for the great boon of democracy: the man of native integrity is either barred from the public service altogether, or subjected to almost irresistible temptations after he gets in. The competition of less honourable man is more than he can bear. He must stand against them before the mob, and the sempiternal prejudices of the mob run their way. In most other countries of a democratic tendency—for example, England—this outlawry and corruption of the best is checked by an aristocratic tradition—an anachronism, true enough, but still extremely powerful, and yielding to the times only under immense pressure. The English aristocracy (aided, in part, by the plutocracy, which admires and envies it) not only keeps a large share of the principal offices in its own hands, regardless of popular rages and party fortunes; it also preserves an influence, and111 hence a function, for its non-officeholding members. The scholarship of Oxford and Cambridge, for example, can still make itself felt at Westminster, despite the fact that the vast majority of the actual members of the Commons are ignoramuses. But in the United States there is no aristocracy, whether intellectual or otherwise, and so the scholarship of Harvard, such as it is, is felt no more on Capitol Hill than it is at Westerville, Ohio. The class of politicians, indeed, tends to separate itself sharply from all other classes. There is none of that interpenetration on the higher levels which marks older and more secure societies. Roosevelt, an imitation aristocrat, was the first and only American President since Washington to make any effort to break down the barriers. A man of saucy and even impertinent curiosities, and very eager to appear to the vulgar as an Admirable Crichton, he made his table the resort of all sorts and conditions of men. Among them were some who actually knew something about this or that, and from them he probably got useful news and advice. Beethoven, if he had been alive, would have been invited to the White House, and Goethe would have come with him. But that eagerness112 for contacts outside the bounds of professional politics is certainly not a common mark of American Presidents, nor, of American public officials of any sort. When the lamented Harding sat in Lincoln’s chair his hours of ease were spent with bootleggers, not with metaphysicians; his notion of a good time was to refresh himself in the manner of a small-town Elk, at golf, poker, and guzzling. The tastes of his successor are even narrower: the loftiest guests he entertains upon the Mayflower are the editors of party newspapers, and there is no evidence that he is acquainted with a single intelligent man. The average American Governor is of the same kidney. He comes into contact with the local Gelehrte only when a bill is up to prohibit the teaching of the elements of biology in the State university.
Such is the cost we pay for the great gift of democracy: a person of true integrity is either completely shut out from public service or faced with nearly irresistible temptations once they are in. The competition from less honorable individuals is more than they can handle. They must confront these challenges before the public, and the long-standing biases of the crowd play their part. In most other democratic countries—like England—this exclusion and corruption of the best is held in check by an aristocratic tradition—an outdated concept, for sure, but still highly influential, only yielding to change under huge pressure. The English aristocracy (bolstered in part by the wealthy elite that admires and envies it) not only retains a significant number of high-ranking positions regardless of public outcry and party shifts; it also maintains influence, and therefore a role, for its members who do not hold office. The academic prestige of Oxford and Cambridge, for instance, can still be felt at Westminster, despite the fact that the vast majority of the actual members of Commons are uninformed. However, in the United States, there is no aristocracy, intellectual or otherwise, so the scholarship of Harvard, whatever it may be, is felt no more on Capitol Hill than in Westerville, Ohio. The class of politicians tends to separate itself sharply from all other classes. There is none of that interaction at the higher levels common in older, more stable societies. Roosevelt, a faux aristocrat, was the first and only American President since Washington to attempt to break down these barriers. A man of bold and even audacious interests, eager to impress the masses as an impressive figure, he made his table a gathering place for all sorts of people. Among them were some who actually knew a thing or two, and he likely received valuable insights and advice from them. Beethoven, if he were alive, would have been invited to the White House, and Goethe would have joined him. But that desire for connections beyond the typical political sphere is certainly not a common trait of American Presidents, nor of American public officials in general. When the much-missed Harding occupied Lincoln’s chair, he spent his leisure hours with bootleggers, not philosophers; his idea of a good time involved unwinding like a small-town Elk, enjoying golf, poker, and drinking. The tastes of his successor are even more limited: the most prominent guests he hosts on the Mayflower are the editors of party newspapers, and there’s no sign that he knows a single intelligent person. The average American Governor shares this inclination. They interact with local Gelehrte only when a bill comes up to ban the teaching of basic biology at the State university.
The judiciary, under the American system, sinks quite as low. Save when, by some miscarriage of politics, a Brandeis, a Holmes, a Cardozo or a George W. Anderson is elevated to the bench, it carries on its dull and preposterous duties quite outside the stream of civilized thought, and even outside the stream of enlightened juridic thought. Very few American113 judges ever contribute anything of value to legal theory. One seldom hears of them protesting, either ex cathedra or as citizens, against the extravagances and absurdities that fast reduce the whole legal system of the country to imbecility; they seem to be quite content to enforce any sort of law that is provided for their use by ignorant and corrupt legislators, regardless of its conflict with fundamental human rights. The Constitution apparently has no more meaning to them than it has to a Prohibition agent. They have acquiesced almost unanimously in the destruction of the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and supinely connived at the invasion of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth. The reason is not far to seek. The average American judge, in his days at the bar, was not a leader but a trailer. The judicial office is not attractive, as a rule, to the better sort of lawyers. We have such a multiplicity of courts that it has become common, and judges are so often chosen for purely political reasons, even for the Supreme Court of the United States, that the lawyer of professional dignity and self-respect hesitates to enter into the competition. Thus the bench tends to be114 filled with duffers, and many of them are also scoundrels, as the frequent complaints against their extortions and tyrannies testify. The English bench, as everyone knows, is immensely better: the fact is often noted with lamentation by American lawyers. And why? Simply because the governing oligarchy in England, lingering on in spite of the democratic upheaval, keeps jealous guard over the judiciary in the interest of its own class, and thereby prevents the elevation of the preposterous shysters who so frequently attain to the ermine in America. Even when, under the pressure of parlous times, it admits an F. E. Smith to the bench, it at least makes sure that he is a competent lawyer. The way is thus blocked to downright ignoramuses, and English jurisprudence, so much more fluent and reasonable than our own, is protected against their dull stupidities. Genuine talent, however humble its origin, may get in, but not imbecility, however pretentious. In the United States the thing runs the other way. In the States, where judges are commonly elected by popular vote, the shyster has every advantage over the reputable lawyer, including that of yearning for the judicial salary with a vast and115 undivided passion. And when it comes to the Federal courts, once so honourable, he has every advantage again, including the formidable one of knowing how to crook his knee gracefully to the local dispenser of Federal patronage (in the South, often a worthless Negro) and to the Methodist wowsers of the Anti-Saloon League.
The judiciary, in the American system, is equally disappointing. Unless there's a rare political twist that brings someone like Brandeis, Holmes, Cardozo, or George W. Anderson to the bench, it tends to perform its tedious and ridiculous duties far removed from civilized thinking and even from enlightened legal thought. Very few American judges ever add anything worthwhile to legal theory. It's rare to hear them speaking out, either officially or as citizens, against the excesses and absurdities that undermine the entire legal system in the country; they seem perfectly fine with enforcing any laws thrown their way by uninformed and corrupt legislators, regardless of how they clash with fundamental human rights. The Constitution seems to mean as little to them as it does to a Prohibition agent. They've almost unanimously accepted the erosion of the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, and passively allowed the violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth. The reason is clear. The average American judge, during their time in practice, was not a leader but a follower. The judicial position typically doesn't appeal to the more respectable lawyers. We have so many courts that it's become routine, and judges are often selected purely for political reasons, including for the Supreme Court, which makes a lawyer with dignity and self-respect hesitant to compete for these roles. As a result, the bench tends to be filled with incompetent people, and many of them are also dishonest, as frequent complaints about their abuses and corrupt practices demonstrate. The English judiciary, as everyone knows, is vastly better: this fact is often lamented by American lawyers. Why is that? Simply because the ruling elite in England, surviving despite the democratic upheaval, carefully oversees the judiciary in its own class's interest, preventing the ridiculous charlatans who often win positions in America. Even when they allow someone like F. E. Smith onto the bench during tough times, they at least ensure he's a capable lawyer. This prevents the entry of complete ignoramuses, and English law, which is far more articulate and reasonable than ours, is safeguarded against their dull stupidity. Genuine talent, no matter how humble its beginnings, can make it through, but ignorance, no matter how grandstanding, cannot. In the United States, it's the opposite. In states where judges are usually elected by popular vote, the charlatan has every advantage over the reputable lawyer, including a deep desire for a judicial paycheck. And when it comes to the Federal courts, once respected, he has every advantage again, especially knowing how to ingratiate himself with the local source of Federal appointments (often a worthless person in the South) and the Methodist agents of the Anti-Saloon League.
6.
The Occasional Exception
The Rare Exception
I do not argue, of course, that the shyster invariably prevails. As I have said, a man of unquestionable integrity and ability occasionally gets to the bench, even of the State courts. In the same way a man of unquestionable integrity and ability sometimes finds himself in high executive or legislative office; there are even a few cases of such men getting into the White House. But the thing doesn’t happen often, and when it does happen it is only by a failure of the rule. The self-respecting candidate obviously cannot count on that failure: the odds are heavily against him from the start, and every effort he makes to diminish them involves some compromise with complete candour. He may take116 refuge in cynicism, and pursue the cozening of the populace as a sort of intellectual exercise, cruel but not unamusing, or he may accept the conditions of the game resignedly, and charge up the necessary dodges and false pretences to spiritual profit and loss, as a chorus girl charges up her favours to the manager and his backer; but in either case he has parted with something that must be tremendously valuable to a self-respecting man, and is even more valuable to the country he serves than it is to himself. Contemplating such a body as the national House of Representatives one sees only a group of men who have compromised with honour—in brief, a group of male Magdalens. They have been broken to the goose-step. They have learned how to leap through the hoops of professional job-mongers and Prohibitionist blackmailers. They have kept silent about good causes, and spoken in causes that they knew to be evil. The higher they rise, the further they fall. The occasional mavericks, thrown in by miracle, last a session, and then disappear. The old Congressman, the veteran of genuine influence and power, is either one who is so stupid that the ideas of the mob are his own ideas, or one so117 far gone in charlatanry that he is unconscious of his shame. Our laws are made, in the main, by men who have sold their honour for their jobs, and they are executed by men who put their jobs above justice and common sense. The occasional cynics leaven the mass. We are dependent for whatever good flows out of democracy upon men who do not believe in democracy.
I’m not saying that the con artist always wins. As I mentioned, a person of undeniable integrity and skill sometimes makes it to the bench, even in the state courts. Similarly, someone with strong integrity and ability can occasionally attain high executive or legislative positions; there are even a few examples of such individuals reaching the White House. But this doesn’t happen very often, and when it does, it’s usually due to a failure of the system. A self-respecting candidate clearly can’t rely on that failure: the odds are heavily stacked against him from the start, and every effort he makes to reduce those odds requires some compromise on complete honesty. He might resort to cynicism and view manipulating the public as a sort of intellectual challenge, harsh but not entirely unentertaining, or he might accept the rules of the game with resignation, charging his necessary tricks and deceptions to spiritual profits and losses, just like a chorus girl tracks her favors with the manager and his backer; but in either case, he gives up something that must be incredibly valuable to a self-respecting person, and is even more valuable to the country he serves than to himself. When looking at something like the national House of Representatives, you see only a group of men who have compromised their honor—in short, a group of male outcasts. They’ve been conditioned to conform. They’ve learned how to jump through the hoops set by professional opportunists and Prohibitionist extortionists. They’ve kept quiet about good causes and spoken up for causes they recognized as wrong. The higher they rise, the further they fall. The occasional rebels, thrown in by chance, last a term and then vanish. The long-serving Congressman, the veteran of real influence and power, is either someone so naive that the crowd's ideas seem like his own, or someone so deep into deception that he isn’t aware of his own disgrace. Our laws are primarily made by men who have traded their honor for their jobs, and they are enforced by men who prioritize their jobs over justice and common sense. The occasional cynics add a bit of balance to the mix. We rely on those who don’t believe in democracy for whatever good comes out of it.
Here, perhaps, it will be urged that my argument goes beyond the democratic scheme and lodges against government itself. There is, I believe, some cogency in the caveat. All government, whatever its form, is carried on chiefly by men whose first concern is for their offices, not for their obligations. It is, in its essence, a conspiracy of a small group against the masses of men, and especially against the masses of diligent and useful men. Its primary aim is to keep this group in jobs that are measurably more comfortable and exhilarating than the jobs its members could get in free competition. They are thus always willing to make certain sacrifices of integrity and self-respect in order to hold those jobs, and the fact is just as plain under a despot as it is under the mob. The mob has118 its flatterers and bosh-mongers; the king has his courtiers. But there is yet a difference, and I think it is important. The courtier, at his worst, at least performs his genuflections before one who is theoretically his superior, and is surely not less than his equal. He does not have to abase himself before swine with whom, ordinarily, he would disdain to have any traffic. He is not compelled to pretend that he is a worse man than he really is. He needn’t hold his nose in order to approach his benefactor. Thus he may go into office without having dealt his honour a fatal wound, and once he is in, he is under no pressure to sacrifice it further, and may nurse it back to health and vigour. His sovereign, at worst, has a certain respect for it, and hesitates to strain it unduly; the mob has no sensitiveness on that point, and, indeed, no knowledge that it exists. The courtier’s sovereign, in other words, is apt to be a man of honour himself. When, in 1848 or thereabout, the late Wilhelm I of Prussia was offered the imperial crown by a so-called parliament of his subjects, he refused it on the ground that he could take it only from his equals, i. e., from the sovereign princes of the Reich. To the democrats of the world this attitude was119 puzzling, and on reflection it began to seem contemptible and offensive. But that was not to be marveled at. To a democrat any attitude based upon a concept of honour, dignity and integrity seems contemptible and offensive. Once Frederick the Great was asked why he gave commissions in his army only to Junker. Because, he answered, they will not lie and they cannot be bought. That answer explains sufficiently the general democratic theory that the Junker are not only scoundrels, but also half-wits.
Here, it might be argued that my point goes beyond the democratic idea and challenges government itself. I believe there is some truth to this caution. All government, regardless of its form, is primarily run by individuals whose main concern is their positions, not their responsibilities. Essentially, it operates as a conspiracy of a small group against the larger population, especially against the hardworking and valuable individuals. Its main goal is to maintain this group in jobs that are generally more comfortable and enjoyable than what they could find in open competition. As a result, they are often willing to sacrifice their integrity and self-respect to keep those positions, and this reality is just as evident under a tyrant as it is under a mob. The mob has its flatterers and deceivers; the king has his courtiers. Yet, there is a key difference that I think is important. At their worst, courtiers at least bow to someone who is theoretically their superior and is certainly no less than their equal. They don’t have to lower themselves before people they usually wouldn’t associate with. They aren’t forced to pretend to be worse than they actually are. They don’t have to hold their noses to approach their benefactor. Thus, they can enter office without damaging their honor significantly, and once they are in, they aren't pressured to further sacrifice it and can restore it to health and strength. Their sovereign, at worst, has some respect for it and is hesitant to undermine it too much; the mob has no sensitivity to that and is usually unaware that it exists. The courtier’s sovereign, in other words, tends to be a man of honor himself. When, around 1848, the late Wilhelm I of Prussia was offered the imperial crown by a so-called parliament of his subjects, he declined it, stating that he could only accept it from his equals, that is, from the sovereign princes of the Reich. To democrats around the world, this response seemed puzzling, and upon reflection, it started to seem contemptible and offensive. But that shouldn't be surprising. To a democrat, any stance based on a sense of honor, dignity, and integrity appears contemptible and offensive. Frederick the Great was once asked why he only awarded commissions in his army to Junkers. He replied that they would not lie and they could not be bought. That response sufficiently explains the general democratic belief that the Junkers are not only dishonest but also foolish.
The democratic politician, facing such plain facts, tries to save his amour propre in a characteristically human way; that is to say, he denies them. We all do that. We convert our degradations into renunciations, our self-seeking into public spirit, our swinishness into heroism. No man, I suppose, ever admits to himself candidly that he gets his living in a dishonourable way, not even a Prohibition agent or a biter off of puppies’ tails. The democratic politician, confronted by the dishonesty and stupidity of his master, the mob, tries to convince himself and all the rest of us that it is really full of rectitude and wisdom. This is the origin of the doctrine that, whatever its transient errors, it always120 comes to right decisions in the long run. Perhaps—but on what evidence, by what reasoning, and for what motives! Go examine the long history of the anti-slavery agitation in America: it is a truly magnificent record of buncombe, false pretences, and imbecility. This notion that the mob is wise, I fear, is not to be taken seriously: it was invented by mob-masters to save their faces: there was a lot of chatter about it by Roosevelt, but none by Washington, and very little by Jefferson. Whenever democracy, by an accident, produces a genuine statesman, he is found to be proceeding on the assumption that it is not true. And on the assumption that it is difficult, if not impossible to go to the mob for support, and still retain the ordinary decencies. The best democratic statesmanship, like the best non-democratic statesmanship, tends to safeguard the honour of the higher officers of state by relieving them of that degrading necessity. As every schoolboy knows, such was the intent of the Fathers, as expressed in Article II, Sections 1 and 2, of the Constitution. To this day it is a common device, when this or that office becomes steeped in intolerable121 corruption, to take it out of the gift of the mob, and make it appointive. The aspirant, of course, still has to seek it, for under democracy it is very rare that office seeks the man, but seeking it of the President, or even of the Governor of a State, is felt to be appreciably less humiliating and debasing than seeking it of the mob. The President may be a Coolidge, and the Governor may be a Blease or a Ma Ferguson, but he (or she) is at least able to understand plain English, and need not be put into good humour by the arts of the circus clown or Baptist evangelist.
The democratic politician, faced with such obvious facts, tries to protect his self-esteem in a typically human way; that is to say, he denies them. We all do this. We turn our failures into sacrifices, our selfishness into community spirit, and our baseness into heroism. No one, I suppose, ever honestly admits to themselves that they earn their living in a dishonorable way, not even a Prohibition agent or someone who harms puppies. The democratic politician, confronted by the dishonesty and ignorance of his boss, the crowd, tries to convince himself and the rest of us that it is actually full of integrity and wisdom. This is the source of the belief that, despite its temporary mistakes, it ultimately makes the right decisions in the long run. Maybe—but based on what evidence, what reasoning, and for what reasons! Go look at the long history of the anti-slavery movement in America: it’s a truly impressive record of nonsense, false claims, and ignorance. This idea that the crowd is wise, I fear, is not credible: it was created by those in power to save face. There was a lot of talk about it from Roosevelt, but hardly any from Washington, and only a little from Jefferson. Whenever democracy accidentally produces a real statesman, he tends to operate on the assumption that it’s not true. And under the assumption that it’s difficult, if not impossible, to go to the crowd for support and still keep the usual decencies. The best democratic leadership, like the best non-democratic leadership, tends to protect the dignity of the higher officials by freeing them from that degrading necessity. As every schoolboy knows, this was the intent of the Founding Fathers, as expressed in Article II, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution. To this day, it’s a common practice, when a certain office becomes seriously corrupt, to remove it from the public's control and make it appointive. The candidate, of course, still has to pursue it, for in a democracy, it’s very rare that a position seeks a person, but seeking it from the President, or even from a State Governor, is generally seen as significantly less humiliating and degrading than seeking it from the crowd. The President might be a Coolidge, and the Governor might be a Blease or a Ma Ferguson, but at least he or she can understand plain English and doesn’t have to be entertained by the tricks of a circus clown or a Baptist evangelist.
To sum up: the essential objection to feudalism (the perfect antithesis to democracy) was that it imposed degrading acts and attitudes upon the vassal; the essential objection to democracy is that, with few exceptions, it imposes degrading acts and attitudes upon the men responsible for the welfare and dignity of the state. The former was compelled to do homage to his suzerain, who was very apt to be a brute and an ignoramus. The latter are compelled to do homage to their constituents, who in overwhelming majority are certain to be both.
To sum up: the main criticism of feudalism (the complete opposite of democracy) was that it forced degrading behaviors and mindsets on the vassal; the main criticism of democracy is that, with few exceptions, it imposes degrading behaviors and mindsets on the people responsible for the welfare and dignity of the state. The former had to show loyalty to his lord, who was often a brute and ignorant. The latter are forced to show loyalty to their constituents, who, in overwhelming numbers, are likely to be both.
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7.
The Maker of Laws
Law Creator
In the United States, the general democratic tendency to crowd competent and self-respecting men out of the public service is exaggerated by a curious constitutional rule, unknown in any other country. This is the rule, embodied in Article I, Sections 2 and 3, of the Constitution and carried over into most of the State constitutions, that a legislator must be an actual resident of the district he represents. Its obvious aim is to preserve for every electoral unit a direct and continuous voice in the government; its actual effect is to fill all the legislative bodies of the land with puerile local politicians, many of them so stupid that they are quite unable to grasp the problems with which government has to deal. In England it is perfectly possible for the remotest division to choose a Morley to represent it, and this, in fact, until the recent rise of the mob, was not infrequently done. But in the United States every congressional district must find its representative within its own borders, and only too often there is no competent123 man available. Even if one happens to live there—which in large areas of the South and many whole States of the newer West, is extremely improbable—he is usually so enmeshed in operations against the resident imbeciles and their leaders, and hence so unpopular, that his candidacy is out of the question. This is manifestly the case in such States as Tennessee and Mississippi. Neither is without civilized inhabitants, but in neither is it possible to find a civilized inhabitant who is not under the ban of the local Fundamentalist clergy, and per corollary, of the local politicians. Thus both States, save for occasional accidents, are represented in Congress by delegations of pliant and unconscionable jackasses, and their influence upon national legislation is extremely evil. It was the votes of such ignoble fellows, piling in from all the more backward States, that forced the Eighteenth Amendment through both Houses of Congress, and it was the votes of even more degraded noodles, assembled from the backwoods in the State Legislatures, that put the amendment into the Constitution.
In the United States, the general democratic trend of pushing capable and self-respecting individuals out of public service is worsened by a strange constitutional rule that doesn’t exist in any other country. This rule, outlined in Article I, Sections 2 and 3, of the Constitution and mirrored in most State constitutions, requires that a legislator must actually reside in the district they represent. The clear purpose is to ensure that every electoral unit has a direct and ongoing voice in the government; however, the actual result is that the legislative bodies across the country are filled with immature local politicians, many of whom are so lacking in intelligence that they can’t understand the issues that government needs to address. In England, it’s entirely possible for the most distant area to choose a Morley to represent it, and until the recent rise of the masses, this actually happened quite often. But in the United States, every congressional district has to find its representative from within its own borders, and too often there simply isn’t a qualified person available. Even if someone lives there—which is very unlikely in large parts of the South and many newer Western states—they are usually too caught up in dealing with the local incompetent leaders and their supporters, making their candidacy impossible. This is clearly the situation in states like Tennessee and Mississippi. Neither state lacks civilized residents, but in both, it’s hard to find a civilized person who isn't at odds with the local fundamentalist clergy and, by extension, the local politicians. Consequently, both states, except for rare cases, have congressional delegations made up of compliant and unscrupulous individuals, and their influence on national legislation is very harmful. It was the votes of these dishonorable individuals, coming in from the more backward states, that pushed the Eighteenth Amendment through both Houses of Congress, and it was the votes of even more degraded representatives, gathered from the backwoods in the State Legislatures, that added the amendment to the Constitution.
If it were possible for a congressional district to choose any man to represent it, as is the case124 in all other civilized countries, there would be more breaks in the monotony of legislative venality and stupidity, for even the rustic mob, in the absence of strong local antipathies, well fanned by demagogues, might succumb occasionally to the magic of a great name. Thus a Roscoe Pound might be sent to Congress from North Dakota or Nevada, though it is obvious that he could not be sent from the Massachusetts district in which he lives, wherein his independence and intelligence are familiar and hence offensive to his neighbours. But this is forbidden by the constitutional rule, and so North Dakota and Nevada, with few if any first-rate men in them, must turn to such men as they have. The result everywhere is the election of a depressing gang of incompetents, mainly petty lawyers and small-town bankers. The second result is a House of Representatives that, in intelligence, information and integrity, is comparable to a gang of bootleggers—a House so deficient in competent leaders that it can scarcely carry on its business. The third result is the immense power of such corrupt and sinister agencies as the Anti-Saloon League: a Morley would disdain its mandates, but Congressman John J. Balderdash is125 only too eager to earn its support at home. A glance through the Congressional Directory, which prints autobiographies (often full of voluptuous self-praise) of all Congressmen, is enough to show what scrub stock is in the Lower House. The average Southern member, for example, runs true to a standard type. He got his early education in a hedge school, he proceeded to some preposterous Methodist or Baptist college, and then he served for a time as a schoolteacher in his native swamps, finally reaching the dignity of county superintendent of schools and meanwhile reading law. Admitted to the bar, and having got a taste of county politics as superintendent, he became district attorney, and perhaps, after a while, county judge. Then he began running for Congress, and after three or four vain attempts, finally won a seat. The unfitness of such a man for the responsibilities of a law-maker must be obvious. He is an ignoramus, and he is quite without the common decencies. Having to choose between sense and nonsense, he chooses nonsense almost instinctively. Until he got to Washington, and began to meet lobbyists, bootleggers and the correspondents of the newspapers, he had perhaps126 never met a single intelligent human being. As a Congressman, he remains below the salt. Officialdom disdains him; he is kept waiting in anterooms by all the fourth assistant secretaries. When he is invited to a party, it is a sign that police sergeants are also invited. He must be in his second or third term before the ushers at the White House so much as remember his face. His dream is to be chosen to go on a congressional junket, i. e., on a drunken holiday at government expense. His daily toil is getting jobs for relatives and retainers. Sometimes he puts a dummy on the pay-roll and collects the dummy’s salary himself. In brief, a knavish and preposterous nonentity, half way between a kleagle of the Ku Klux and a grand worthy bow-wow of the Knights of Zoroaster. It is such vermin who make the laws of the United States.
If a congressional district could choose anyone to represent it, like in all other civilized countries, there would be more diversity in the often dull and corrupt legislative process. Even the rural crowd, without strong local biases and influenced by demagogues, might occasionally be swayed by a notable figure. For instance, a Roscoe Pound could represent North Dakota or Nevada, but it's clear he couldn't win in the Massachusetts district where he lives, since his independence and intelligence are well-known and likely resented by his neighbors. However, this is against the constitutional rule, so North Dakota and Nevada, which have few if any top-tier individuals, must settle for what they have. The outcome is a disheartening group of incompetents, mostly small-time lawyers and local bankers, being elected everywhere. Another result is a House of Representatives that, in terms of intelligence, knowledge, and integrity, compares to a group of bootleggers—a House so lacking in competent leaders that it can barely function. A further consequence is the immense influence of corrupt organizations like the Anti-Saloon League: a Morley would look down on its demands, but Congressman John J. Balderdash is all too eager to secure its backing at home. A quick look through the Congressional Directory, which features autobiographies (often full of self-aggrandizing praise) of all Congress members, reveals the low quality of the Lower House. The typical Southern member, for example, fits a common mold. He received his early education in a rural school, went to some outrageous Methodist or Baptist college, then worked as a schoolteacher in his hometown swamps, eventually becoming the county superintendent of schools while studying law. After passing the bar and experiencing county politics as superintendent, he might become district attorney and possibly a county judge. Then he would start running for Congress, and after three or four failed attempts, finally win a seat. It's obvious that such a person is unfit for the responsibilities of a lawmaker. He’s uninformed and lacks basic decency. When faced with a choice between sense and nonsense, he instinctively chooses nonsense. Until he arrives in Washington and interacts with lobbyists, bootleggers, and newspaper correspondents, he may have never met an intelligent person. As a Congressman, he remains on the outskirts. Officials look down on him; he sits in waiting rooms while fourth assistant secretaries disregard him. When he gets invited to a party, it’s a sign that police sergeants are also invited. It may take until his second or third term for the ushers at the White House to even recognize his face. His biggest aspiration is to be selected for a congressional junket, meaning a boozy holiday at taxpayers' expense. His daily grind involves securing jobs for family and friends. Sometimes he even hires a ghost employee to collect that salary for himself. In short, he’s a deceitful and ridiculous nobody, somewhere between a Ku Klux Klan member and a high-ranking official of a secret society. It’s such lowlifes who create the laws of the United States.
The gentlemen of the Upper House are measurably better, if only because they serve for longer terms. A Congressman, with his two-year term, is constantly running for re-election. Scarcely has he got to Washington before he must hurry home and resume his bootlicking of the local bosses. But a Senator, once sworn in, may safely forget them for two or three years,127 and so, if there is no insuperable impediment in his character, he may show a certain independence, and yet survive. Moreover, he is usually safer than a Congressman, even as his term ends, for his possession of a higher office shows that he is no inconsiderable boss himself. Thus there are Senators who attain to a laudable mastery of the public business, particularly such as lies within the range of their private interests, and even Senators who show the intellectual dignity and vigour of genuine statesmen. But they are surely not numerous. The average Senator, like the average Congressman, is simply a party hack, without ideas and without anything rationally describable as self-respect. His backbone has a sweet resiliency; he knows how to clap on false whiskers; it is quite impossible to forecast his action, even on a matter of the highest principle, without knowing what rewards are offered by the rival sides. Two of the most pretentious Senators, during the Sixty-Ninth Congress, were the gentlemen from Pennsylvania: one of them, indeed, was the successor to the lamented Henry Cabot Lodge as the intellectual snob of the Upper House. Yet both, under pressure, performed such dizzy flops that even the Senate128 gasped. It was amusing, but there was also a touch of pathos in it. Here were men who plainly preferred their jobs to their dignity. Here, in brief, were men whose private rectitude had yielded to political necessity—the eternal tragedy of democracy. I turn to the testimony of a Senator who stands out clearly from the rest: the able and uncompromisingly independent Reed of Missouri. This is what he said of his colleagues, to their faces, on June 2, 1924:
The guys in the Upper House are generally better, mostly because they have longer terms. A Congressman, with his two-year term, is always campaigning for re-election. He barely makes it to Washington before he has to rush back home to kiss up to the local power players. But a Senator, once sworn in, can forget about them for two or three years, and if there isn’t something seriously wrong with his character, he can be a bit more independent and still survive. Plus, he’s usually in a safer position than a Congressman, even as his term ends, since holding a higher office shows that he’s not just a minor player himself. There are Senators who become quite skilled at managing public business, especially when it aligns with their own interests, and even some who display the intellectual dignity and energy of real statesmen. But they aren’t very common. The average Senator, like the average Congressman, is just a party loyalist, lacking ideas and any sense of self-respect. He’s flexible to a fault; he knows how to put on a façade; it’s impossible to predict his actions, even on important issues, without knowing what incentives each side is offering. Two of the most self-important Senators during the Sixty-Ninth Congress were the gentlemen from Pennsylvania: one was the successor to the much-missed Henry Cabot Lodge as the intellectual snob of the Upper House. Yet both, when push came to shove, made such ridiculous turns that even the Senate gasped. It was entertaining, but also a bit sad. Here were men who clearly valued their jobs over their dignity. In short, here were men whose personal integrity had given way to political necessity—the eternal tragedy of democracy. I’ll now share the words of a Senator who stands out from the rest: the capable and fiercely independent Reed of Missouri. This is what he said to his colleagues, directly, on June 2, 1924:
[The pending measure] will be voted for by cowards who would rather hang on to their present offices than serve their country or defend its Constitution. It would not receive a vote in this body were there not many individuals looking over their shoulders toward the ballot-boxes of November, their poltroon souls aquiver with apprehension lest they may pay the price of courageous duty by the loss of the votes of some bloc, clique, or coterie backing this infamous proposal. My language may seem brutal. If so, it is because it lays on the blistering truth.
[The pending measure] will be supported by those who are too cowardly to prioritize their country or defend its Constitution over their current positions. This measure wouldn’t even come up for a vote if it weren't for many people looking over their shoulders at the upcoming November elections, their scared souls trembling with fear that they might face the consequences of doing the right thing by losing votes from some bloc, clique, or group backing this terrible proposal. My words may sound harsh. If they do, it’s because they reflect a painful truth.
Senator Reed, in this startling characterization of his fellow Senators, plainly violated the rules of the Senate, which forbid one member to question the motives of another. But there129 was no Senator present that day who cared to invoke those rules. They all knew that Reed told the truth. Their answer to him was to slink into the cloak-rooms, and leave him to roar at the Vice-President and the clerks. He not only described the Senate accurately; he also described the whole process of law-making under democracy. Our laws are invented, in the main, by frauds and fanatics, and put upon the statute books by poltroons and scoundrels.
Senator Reed, in his shocking portrayal of his fellow Senators, clearly broke the rules of the Senate, which prohibit one member from questioning another's motives. But there129 wasn’t a Senator in the room that day who wanted to call attention to those rules. They all recognized that Reed was speaking the truth. Their response was to retreat into the cloakrooms, leaving him to vent at the Vice-President and the clerks. He not only accurately described the Senate; he also captured the entire law-making process in a democracy. Our laws are mainly created by frauds and fanatics and enacted by cowards and crooks.
8.
The Rewards of Virtue
The Benefits of Virtue
I have spoken of the difficulties confronting an intelligent and honourable man who aspires to public office under this system. If he succeeds, it is only by a suspension of natural laws, and his success is seldom more than transient: his first term is commonly his last. And if, favoured by luck again, he goes on, it is only in the face of opposition of an almost incredible bitterness. The case of the Senator I have just mentioned is aptly in point. He is a man of obvious ability and integrity, but in his last campaign in Missouri he was opposed by a combination130 of all the parties and all their factions, with the waspish ghost of the late Dr. Wilson hanging over the battlefield. It was only his own amazing talents as a popular orator, aided by the post-war Katzenjammer and a local delight in vigorous, rough-and-ready-fighters, that overcame the tremendous odds against him. In most other American States he would have been defeated easily; in many of them his defeat would have been overwhelming. Only in the newer States and in the border States have such men any chance at all. Where party fidelity has run strong for years they are barred from public life completely. No Senator of any genuine dignity and ability could come out of the Georgia of to-day, and none could come out of the Vermont. Such States must be content with party hacks, and the country as a whole must submit to their depressing imbecilities and ignoble contortions. All of them are men who have trimmed and fawned. All of them are forbidden a frank and competent discussion of most of the principal issues facing the nation.
I've talked about the challenges that a smart, honorable person faces when they want to take on public office in this system. If they succeed, it's usually only through some kind of suspension of natural laws, and their success rarely lasts: their first term is often their last. If, by chance, they manage to continue, they face incredible opposition with bitter resentment. The example of the Senator I mentioned is a perfect illustration. He has obvious talent and integrity, but during his last campaign in Missouri, he was challenged by a coalition of all the parties and their factions, with the bitter legacy of the late Dr. Wilson casting a shadow over the fight. It was only his remarkable abilities as a popular speaker, combined with the post-war Katzenjammer and a local passion for tough, gritty fighters, that helped him overcome the enormous obstacles he faced. In most other American states, he would have lost easily; in many, his defeat would have been decisive. Only in the newer states and border states do such individuals have any chance at all. In places where party loyalty has been strong for years, they are completely shut out from public life. No Senator with any real dignity and ability could emerge from today's Georgia, and none could from Vermont. Such states must settle for party loyalists, and the country as a whole has to accept their frustrating incompetence and disgraceful antics. All of them have played the game and flattered. All of them are restricted from having a honest and capable discussion about most of the key issues facing the nation.
But there is something yet worse, and that is the assumption of his cowardice and venality that lies upon even the most honourable man,131 brought into public office by a miracle. The mob is quite unable to grasp the concept of honour, and that incapacity is naturally shared by the vast majority of politicians. Thus the acts of a public man of genuine rectitude are almost always ascribed, under democracy, to sordid and degrading motives, i. e., to the sort of motives that would animate his more orthodox colleagues if they were capable of his acts. I believe that the fact is more potent in keeping decent men out of public life in the United States than even the practical difficulties that I have rehearsed, and that it is mainly responsible for the astounding timorousness of our politics. Its effects were brilliantly displayed during the final stages of the battle over the Eighteenth Amendment. The Prohibitionist leaders, being mainly men of wide experience in playing upon the prejudices and emotions of the mob, developed a technique of terrorization that was almost irresistible. The moment a politician ventured to speak against them he was accused of the grossest baseness. It was whispered that he was a secret drunkard and eager to safeguard his tipple; it was covertly hinted that he was in the pay of the Whiskey Ring, the Beer Trust, or132 some other such bugaboo. The event showed that the shoe was actually on the other foot—that many of the principal supporters of Prohibition were on the pay-roll of the Anti-Saloon League, and that judges, attorneys-general and other high officers of justice afterward joined them there. But the accusations served their purpose. The plain people, unable to imagine a man entering public life with any other motive than that which would have moved them themselves if they had been in his boots—that is to say, unable to imagine any other motive save a yearning for private advantage—reacted to the charges as if they had been proved, and so more than one man of relatively high decency, as decency goes in American life, was driven out of office. Upon those who escaped the lesson was not lost. It was five or six years before any considerable faction of politicians mustered up courage enough to defy the Prohibitionists, and even then what animated them was not any positive access of resolution but simply the fact that the Anti-Saloon League was obviously far gone in corruption, with some of its chief agents in revolt against its methods, and others in prison for grave crimes and misdemeanours.
But there’s something even worse, and that’s the assumption of cowardice and greed that hangs over even the most honorable person,131 who’s been brought into public office by some miracle. The public just can't grasp the idea of honor, and that inability is shared by most politicians. So, when a genuinely decent public figure acts, people often assume, in a democracy, that their motives are selfish and degrading, i.e., the kind of motives that would drive their more conventional colleagues if they were capable of doing what he did. I believe this fact is a stronger deterrent keeping good people out of public life in the United States than even the practical challenges I’ve mentioned, and it mainly explains the incredible caution in our politics. This was dramatically shown during the final stages of the battle over the Eighteenth Amendment. The Prohibitionist leaders, being mostly experienced at playing on the public’s prejudices and emotions, developed a technique of intimidation that was almost impossible to resist. The moment a politician dared to speak out against them, he was accused of the worst kinds of dishonor. Rumors spread that he was a secret drunkard trying to protect his drinking habits; it was subtly suggested that he was being paid off by the Whiskey Ring, the Beer Trust, or some other such fearsome entity. In reality, many of the leading supporters of Prohibition were actually on the payroll of the Anti-Saloon League, and judges, attorneys general, and other high-ranking officials of justice later joined them there. But the accusations served their purpose. The average people, unable to picture someone entering public life with any motive other than what would drive them if they were in his position—that is, unable to imagine any other motive except a desire for personal gain—reacted to the charges as if they had been proven, and so more than one relatively decent man, as decency is understood in American life, was pushed out of office. Those who managed to stay learned a harsh lesson. It took five or six years before any significant group of politicians found the courage to stand up to the Prohibitionists, and even then their motivation came not from any newfound resolve but simply from the clear evidence that the Anti-Saloon League was deeply corrupt, with some of its top agents rebelling against its tactics, while others ended up in prison for serious crimes and misdemeanors.
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I am, myself, not cursed with the itch for public office, but I have been engaged for years in the discussion of public questions, and so I may be forgiven, I hope, for intruding my own experience here. That experience may be described briefly: there has never been a time when, attacking this or that current theory, I have not been accused of being in the pay of its interested opponents, and I believe that there has never been a time when this accusation was not generally believed. Years ago, when the Prohibitionists were first coming to power, they charged me with taking money from the brewers and distillers, and to-day they charge me with some sort of corrupt arrangement with the bootleggers, despite the plain fact that the latter are not their opponents at all, but their allies. The former accusation seemed so plausible to most Americans that even the brewers finally gave it credit: they actually offered to put me on their pay-roll, and were vastly surprised when I declined. It was simply impossible for them, as low-caste Americans, to imagine a man attempting to discharge a public duty disinterestedly; they believed that I had to be paid, as their rapidly dwindling bloc of Congressmen had to be134 paid. So in all other directions. When, fifteen or twenty years ago, I began exposing the quackeries of osteopaths, chiropractors and other such frauds, they resorted instantly to the device of accusing me of taking a retainer from the mythical Medical Trust, i. e., from such men as the Mayo brothers, Dr. George Crile, and the faculty of the Johns Hopkins. Later on, venturing to denounce the nefarious political activity of the Methodist Church, and of its ally, the Ku Klux Klan, I was accused by spokesmen for the former of receiving bribes from the Vatican. The comstocks went even further. When I protested against their sinister and dishonest censorship of literature, they charged me publicly with being engaged in the circulation of pornography, and actually made a vain and ill-starred attempt to railroad me to jail on that charge.
I personally don’t have a desire for public office, but I’ve been involved in discussions about public issues for years, so I hope you can forgive me for sharing my own experiences here. In short, there has never been a time when, while challenging this or that popular belief, I haven’t been accused of being on the payroll of those who are invested in opposing those beliefs, and I believe this accusation has always been widely accepted. Years ago, when the Prohibitionists were gaining power, they accused me of taking money from brewers and distillers, and today they assert I have some sort of corrupt deal with bootleggers, despite the clear fact that the latter aren’t their enemies but their allies. The first accusation seemed so believable to most Americans that even the brewers believed it: they actually offered to hire me, and were shocked when I turned them down. It was simply unimaginable for them, as low-status Americans, to consider a man trying to fulfill a public duty selflessly; they thought I had to be paid, just like their dwindling group of Congressmen had to be paid. This was the case in many areas. When, fifteen or twenty years ago, I started exposing the scams of osteopaths, chiropractors, and other frauds, they immediately accused me of being on retainer for the fictional Medical Trust, meaning people like the Mayo brothers, Dr. George Crile, and the faculty at Johns Hopkins. Later, when I dared to speak out against the harmful political activities of the Methodist Church and its ally, the Ku Klux Klan, I was accused by representatives of the former of taking bribes from the Vatican. The Comstocks went even further. When I protested against their shady and dishonest censorship of literature, they publicly accused me of distributing pornography and even made a failed and desperate attempt to incarcerate me on that charge.
The point is that such accusations are generally believed, especially when they are leveled at a candidate for office. The average American knows what he would do in like case, and he believes quite naturally that every other man is willing and eager to do the same. At the start of my bout with the comstocks, just mentioned, many American newspapers assumed as a matter135 of course that I was guilty as charged, and some of them, having said so, were forced into elaborate explanations afterward to purge themselves of libel. Of the rest, most concluded that the whole combat was a sham battle, provoked on my own motion to give me what they regarded as profitable publicity. When I speak of newspapers, of course, I speak of concrete men, their editors. These editors, under democracy, constitute an extremely powerful class. Their very lack of sound knowledge and genuine intelligence gives them a special fitness for influencing the mob, and it is augmented by their happy obtuseness to notions of honour. Their daily toil consists in part of praising men and ideas that are obviously fraudulent, and in part of denouncing men and ideas that are respected by their betters. The typical American editor, save in a few of the larger towns, may be described succinctly as one who has written a million words in favour of Coolidge and half a million against Darwin. He is, like the politician, an adept trimmer and flatterer. His job is far more to him than his self-respect. It must be plain that the influence of such men upon public affairs is generally evil—that their weight is almost always136 thrown against the public man of dignity and courage—that such a public man cannot hope to be understood by them, or to get any useful support from them. Even when they are friendly they are apt to be so for preposterous and embarrassing reasons. Thus they give their aid to the sublime democratic process of eliminating all sense and decency from public life. Coming out of the mob, they voice the ideas of the mob. The first of those ideas is that a fraud is somehow charming and reassuring—in the common phrase, that he is a regular fellow. The second is that an honest and candid man is dangerous—or, perhaps more accurately, that there is no such animal.
The point is that these accusations are usually taken seriously, especially when aimed at someone running for office. The average American knows what he would do in a similar situation and naturally assumes that every other man would feel the same way. When I first started my fight with the Comstocks, many American newspapers automatically assumed I was guilty, and after making that claim, some had to go to great lengths to explain themselves to avoid being accused of libel. Most of the rest decided that the entire conflict was just a staged act, created by me for what they saw as beneficial publicity. When I refer to newspapers, I mean specific individuals, namely their editors. These editors, in a democratic society, hold a very powerful position. Their lack of solid knowledge and real intelligence actually makes them particularly adept at swaying the masses, and their blissful ignorance of honor only adds to this. Their daily work involves praising obviously fraudulent people and ideas while denouncing those respected by more capable individuals. The typical American editor, with a few exceptions in larger cities, can be summed up as someone who has written a million words in support of Coolidge and half a million against Darwin. He is, like politicians, a skilled manipulator and flatterer. His job means much more to him than his self-respect. It's clear that the influence of these individuals on public matters is mostly harmful—that their support is usually directed against public figures who possess dignity and courage—and that such a public figure cannot expect to be understood or receive any meaningful backing from them. Even when they do show support, it’s often for ridiculous and awkward reasons. Thus, they contribute to the splendid democratic process of stripping public life of all sense and decency. Emerging from the masses, they echo the voices of the crowd. The first idea they promote is that a fraud is somehow likable and comforting—in common terms, that he’s a regular guy. The second is that an honest and straightforward person is viewed as a threat—or more accurately, that such a person doesn’t exist.
The newspaper editor who rises above this level encounters the same incredulous hostility from his fellows and his public that is encountered by the superior politician, cast into public life by accident. If he is not dismissed at once as what is now called a Bolshevik, i. e., one harbouring an occult and unintelligible yearning to put down the Republic and pull God off His throne, he is assumed to be engaged in some nefarious scheme of personal aggrandizement.137 I point, as examples, to the cases of Fremont Older, of San Francisco, and Julian Harris, of Columbus, Ga., two honest, able and courageous men, and both opposed by the vast majority of their colleagues. The democratic process, indeed, is furiously inimical to all honourable motives. It favours the man who is without them, and it puts heavy burdens upon the man who has them. Going further, it is even opposed to mere competence. The public servant who masters his job gains nothing thereby. His natural impatience with the incapacity and slacking of his fellows makes them his implacable enemies, and he is viewed with suspicion by the great mass of democrats. But here I enter upon a subject already discussed at length by a competent French critic, the late Emile Faguet, of the French Academy, who gave a whole book to it, translated into English as “The Cult of Incompetence.” Under democracy, says Faguet, the business of law-making becomes a series of panics—government by orgy and orgasm. And the public service becomes a mere refuge for prehensile morons—get yours, and run.
The newspaper editor who rises above this level faces the same disbelief and hostility from both colleagues and the public that superior politicians encounter when they accidentally find themselves in public life. If he isn’t immediately labeled a Bolshevik—meaning someone who secretly and incomprehensibly wants to overthrow the Republic and remove God from His position—he’s assumed to be scheming for personal gain. I point to the examples of Fremont Older from San Francisco and Julian Harris from Columbus, Ga., two honest, capable, and brave men who were both opposed by the vast majority of their peers. The democratic process, in fact, is fiercely hostile to all honorable motives. It favors those who lack them and places heavy burdens on those who possess them. Moreover, it is even against mere competence. A public servant who excels at their job gains nothing from it. Their natural frustration with the incompetence and laziness of their colleagues turns them into relentless enemies, and they are viewed with suspicion by the majority of democrats. However, I am delving into a topic already thoroughly explored by a knowledgeable French critic, the late Emile Faguet of the French Academy, who dedicated an entire book to it, translated into English as “The Cult of Incompetence.” According to Faguet, under democracy, law-making becomes a series of panics—governing through chaos and excitement. Public service becomes merely a place for opportunistic fools—grab what you can and run. 137
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9.
Footnote on Lame Ducks
Footnote on Lame Ducks
Faguet makes no mention of one of the curious and unpleasant by-products of democracy, of great potency for evil in both England and the United States: perhaps, for some unknown reason, it is less a nuisance in France. I allude to the sinister activity of professional politicians who, in the eternal struggle for office and its rewards, have suffered crushing defeats, and are full of rage and bitterness. All politics, under democracy, resolves itself into a series of dynastic questions: the objective is always the job, not the principle. The defeated candidate commonly takes his failure very badly, for it leaves him stripped bare. In most cases his fellow professionals take pity on him and put him into some more or less gaudy appointive office, to preserve his livelihood and save his face: the Federal commissions that harass the land are full of such lame ducks, and they are not unknown on the Federal bench. But now and then there appears one whose wounds are too painful to be assuaged by such devices, or for whom no139 suitable office can be found. This majestic victim not infrequently seeks surcease by a sort of running amok. That is to say, he turns what remains of his influence with the mob into a weapon against the nation as a whole, and becomes a chronic maker of trouble. The names of Burr, Clay, Calhoun, Douglas, Blaine, Greeley, Frémont, Roosevelt and Bryan will occur to every attentive student of American history. There have been many similar warlocks on lower levels; they are familiar in the politics of every American county.
Faguet doesn't mention one of the strange and unpleasant side effects of democracy that can have a strong negative impact in both England and the United States; perhaps, for some unknown reason, it's less of a problem in France. I'm referring to the harmful actions of professional politicians who, in their relentless quest for office and its rewards, have faced devastating defeats and are filled with anger and resentment. In a democracy, all politics essentially boil down to a series of dynastic issues: the goal is always the position, not the principle. The defeated candidate usually reacts very poorly to his loss, as it leaves him completely exposed. In most cases, his fellow politicians feel sorry for him and give him some flashy appointive role to ensure he can make a living and save face: the Federal commissions that plague the country are filled with such failures, and they also appear on the Federal bench. But occasionally, there's one whose wounds are too deep to be healed by such solutions, or for whom no suitable position can be found. This grand victim often seeks solace by going on the attack, turning whatever remaining influence he has with the public into a weapon against the nation as a whole, becoming a constant source of trouble. The names of Burr, Clay, Calhoun, Douglas, Blaine, Greeley, Frémont, Roosevelt, and Bryan will come to mind for anyone studying American history closely. There have been many similar figures on lower levels; they are well-known in the politics of every American county.
Clay, like Bryan after him, was three times a candidate for the Presidency. Defeated in 1824, 1832 and 1840, he turned his back upon democracy, and became the first public agent and attorney for what are now called the Interests. When he died he was the darling of the Mellons, Morgans and Charlie Schwabs of his time. He believed in centralization and in the blessings of a protective tariff. These blessings the American people still enjoy. Calhoun, deprived of the golden plum by an unappreciative country, went even further. He seems to have come to the conclusion that its crime made it deserve capital punishment. At all events, he140 threw his strength into the plan to break up the Union. The doctrine of Nullification owed more to him than it owed to any other politician, and after 1832, when his hopes of getting into the White House were finally extinguished, he devoted himself whole-heartedly to preparing the way for the Civil War. He was more to blame for that war, in all probability, than any other man. But if he had succeeded Jackson the chances are that he would have sung a far less bellicose tune. The case of Burr is so plain that it has even got into the school history-books. If he had beaten Jefferson in 1800 there would have been no duel with Hamilton, no conspiracy with Blennerhassett, no trial for treason, and no long exile and venomous repining. Burr was an able man, as politicians go under democracy, and the young Republic stood in great need of his peculiar talents. But his failure to succeed Adams made a misanthrope of him, and his misanthropy was vented upon his country, and more than once brought it to the verge of disaster.
Clay, like Bryan after him, was a candidate for the Presidency three times. Defeated in 1824, 1832, and 1840, he turned away from democracy and became the first public agent and attorney for what are now known as the Interests. When he died, he was favored by the Mellons, Morgans, and Charlie Schwabs of his era. He believed in centralization and the benefits of a protective tariff. These benefits are still enjoyed by the American people today. Calhoun, denied the golden opportunity by an unappreciative nation, went even further. He seemed to conclude that the country's failings warranted capital punishment. At any rate, he threw his weight behind the plan to break up the Union. The doctrine of Nullification was more attributable to him than to any other politician, and after 1832, when his hopes of reaching the White House finally faded, he dedicated himself entirely to paving the way for the Civil War. He was likely more responsible for that war than anyone else. However, if he had succeeded Jackson, he probably would have taken a far less aggressive stance. Burr's case is so clear that it has even made it into school history books. If he had won against Jefferson in 1800, there would have been no duel with Hamilton, no conspiracy with Blennerhassett, no treason trial, and no long exile filled with bitterness. Burr was an able politician in a democratic context, and the young Republic desperately needed his unique skills. But his failure to succeed Adams turned him into a misanthrope, and his misanthropy affected his country, almost bringing it to disaster more than once.
There have been others like him in our own time: Blaine, Frémont, Hancock, Roosevelt, Bryan. If Blaine had been elected in 1876 he141 would have ceased to wave the bloody shirt; as it was, he was still waving it, recklessly and obscenely, in 1884. No man laboured more assiduously to keep alive the hatreds flowing out of the Civil War; his whole life was poisoned by his failure to reach the White House, and his dreadful cramps and rages led him into a long succession of obviously anti-social acts. Roosevelt went the same route. His débâcle in 1912 converted him into a sort of political killer, and until the end of his life he was constantly on the warpath, looking for heads to crack. The outbreak of the World War in 1914 brought him great embarrassment, for he had been the most ardent American exponent, for years past, of what was then generally regarded as the German scheme of things. For a few weeks he was irresolute, and seemed likely to stick to his guns. But then, perceiving a chance to annoy and damage his successful enemy, Wilson, he swallowed the convictions of a lifetime, and took the other side. That his ensuing uproars had evil effects must be manifest. Regardless of the consequences, either at home or abroad, he kept on arousing the mob against Wilson, and in the end he helped more than any142 other man to force the United States into the war. His aim, it quickly appeared, was to turn the situation to his own advantage: he made desperate and shameless efforts to get a high military command at the front—a post for which he was plainly unfitted. When Wilson, still smarting from his attack, vetoed this scheme, he broke into fresh rages, and the rest of his life was more pathological than political. The fruits of his reckless demagogy are still with us.
There have been others like him in our own time: Blaine, Frémont, Hancock, Roosevelt, Bryan. If Blaine had been elected in 1876 he141 would have stopped using the "bloody shirt"; as it was, he was still using it, recklessly and offensively, in 1884. No one worked harder to keep alive the hatreds coming from the Civil War; his whole life was tainted by his failure to reach the White House, and his terrible outbursts and rages led him into a long series of clearly anti-social acts. Roosevelt followed the same path. His downfall in 1912 turned him into a sort of political assassin, and until the end of his life, he was always looking for targets to attack. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 embarrassed him greatly, as he had been the most passionate American supporter for years of what was widely seen as the German way of doing things. For a few weeks, he hesitated and seemed likely to stick to his beliefs. But then, seeing an opportunity to annoy and undermine his successful rival, Wilson, he abandoned the convictions of a lifetime and switched sides. The chaos that followed clearly had harmful effects. Regardless of the consequences, whether at home or abroad, he kept rallying the public against Wilson, and ultimately he helped more than anyone else to push the United States into the war. His goal quickly became clear: to turn the situation to his advantage. He made desperate and shameless attempts to secure a top military position on the front lines—a role for which he was clearly unqualified. When Wilson, still reeling from his attacks, vetoed this plan, he erupted into new fits of rage, and the remainder of his life was more about pathology than politics. The results of his reckless demagoguery are still present today.
Bryan was even worse. His third defeat, in 1908, convinced even so vain a fellow that the White House was beyond his reach, and so he consecrated himself to reprisals upon those who had kept him out of it. He saw very clearly who they were: the more intelligent minority of his countrymen. It was their unanimous opposition that had thrice thrown the balance against him. Well, he would now make them infamous. He would raise the mob, which still admired him, against everything they regarded as sound sense and intellectual decency. He would post them as sworn foes to all true virtue and true religion, and try, if possible, to put them down by law. There ensued his frenzied campaign against the teaching of evolution—perhaps143 the most gross attack upon human dignity and decorum ever made by a politician, even under democracy, in modern times. Those who regarded him, in his last years, as a mere religious fanatic were far in error. It was not fanaticism that moved him, but hatred. He was an ambulent boil, as anyone could see who encountered him face to face. His theological ideas were actually very vague; he was quite unable to defend them competently under Clarence Darrow’s cross-examination. What moved him was simply his colossal lust for revenge upon those he held to be responsible for his downfall as a politician. He wanted to hurt them, proscribe them; if possible, destroy them. To that end he was willing to sacrifice everything else, including the public tranquillity and the whole system of public education. He passed out of life at last at a temperature of 110 degrees, his eyes rolling horribly toward 1600 Pennsylvania avenue, N.W. and its leaky copper roof. In the suffering South his fever lives after him. The damage he did was greater than that done by Sherman’s army.
Bryan was even worse. His third defeat in 1908 made even this vain man realize that the White House was out of his reach, so he dedicated himself to getting back at those who had kept him from it. He clearly saw who they were: the more intelligent minority of his fellow citizens. It was their united opposition that had repeatedly tipped the scales against him. Well, he would now make them infamous. He would incite the mob, who still admired him, against everything they considered to be common sense and intellectual integrity. He would portray them as sworn enemies of all true virtue and true religion, and try, if possible, to suppress them by law. This led to his frenzied campaign against the teaching of evolution—perhaps the most disgusting attack on human dignity and decency ever launched by a politician, even in a democracy, in modern times. Those who saw him as just a religious fanatic in his later years were greatly mistaken. It wasn’t fanaticism that drove him, but hatred. He was a walking boil, as anyone who met him face-to-face could tell. His theological ideas were actually quite vague; he was unable to defend them well under Clarence Darrow’s cross-examination. What motivated him was simply his massive desire for revenge against those he blamed for his downfall as a politician. He wanted to hurt them, condemn them; if possible, destroy them. To achieve that, he was willing to sacrifice everything else, including public peace and the entire system of public education. He finally passed away at a temperature of 110 degrees, his eyes rolling horribly toward 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. and its leaky copper roof. In the suffering South, his fever lives on after him. The damage he inflicted was greater than that caused by Sherman’s army.
Countries under the hoof of despotism escape such lamentable exhibitions of human frailty.144 Unsuccessful aspirants for the crown are either butchered out of hand or exiled to Paris, where tertiary lues quickly disposes of them. The Crown Prince, of course, has his secret thoughts, and no doubt they are sometimes homicidal, but he is forced by etiquette to keep them to himself, and so the people are not annoyed and injured by them. He cannot go about praying publicly that the King, his father, come down with endocarditis, nor can he denounce the old gentleman as an idiot and advocate his confinement in a maison de santé. Everyone, of course, knows what his hopes and yearnings are, but no one has to listen to them. If he voices them at all it is only to friendly and discreet members of the diplomatic corps and to the ladies of the half and quarter worlds. Under democracy, they are bellowed from every stump.
Countries under the control of tyranny avoid such sad displays of human weakness.144 Unsuccessful contenders for the throne are either executed on the spot or exiled to Paris, where tertiary syphilis quickly takes care of them. The Crown Prince, of course, has his private thoughts, and no doubt some of them are murderous, but he's required by etiquette to keep them to himself, so the public isn’t bothered or harmed by them. He can't go around praying openly for his father, the King, to suffer from heart disease, nor can he call the old man a fool and push for his confinement in a maison de santé. Everyone knows what his hopes and desires are, but no one has to hear them. If he expresses them at all, it's only to friendly and discreet members of the diplomatic corps and to women from the fringes of society. Under democracy, such thoughts are shouted from every platform.
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DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY
III
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DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY
1.
The Will to Peace
The Desire for Peace
Whenever the liberties of Homo vulgaris are invaded and made a mock of in a gross and contemptuous manner, as happened, for example, in the United States during the reign of Wilson, Palmer, Burleson and company, there are always observers who marvel that he bears the outrage with so little murmuring. Such observers only display their unfamiliarity with the elements of democratic science. The truth is that the common man’s love of liberty, like his love of sense, justice and truth, is almost wholly imaginary. As I have argued, he is not actually happy when free; he is uncomfortable, a bit alarmed, and intolerably lonely. He longs for the warm, reassuring smell of the herd, and is willing to take the herdsman with it. Liberty is not a thing for such as he. He cannot enjoy it rationally himself, and he can think of it in148 others only as something to be taken away from them. It is, when it becomes a reality, the exclusive possession of a small and disreputable minority of men, like knowledge, courage and honour. A special sort of man is needed to understand it, nay, to stand it—and he is inevitably an outlaw in democratic societies. The average man doesn’t want to be free. He simply wants to be safe.
Whenever the freedoms of Homo vulgaris are violated and ridiculed in a blatant and disrespectful way, like what happened in the United States during the time of Wilson, Palmer, Burleson, and their associates, there are always onlookers who are amazed that he endures the injustice with so little complaint. Such observers only show their lack of understanding of democratic principles. The reality is that the common man’s love for freedom, much like his appreciation for reason, justice, and truth, is mostly imaginary. As I have previously stated, he isn’t truly happy when he is free; he feels uneasy, a bit anxious, and extremely lonely. He yearns for the comforting presence of the crowd, and he is willing to accept the leader that comes with it. Freedom is not something meant for people like him. He cannot appreciate it rationally for himself, and he can only view it in148 others as something to be taken away. When it becomes real, it belongs exclusively to a small and disreputable minority, just like knowledge, bravery, and honor. A particular type of person is required to understand it, let alone tolerate it—and that person is inevitably an outsider in democratic societies. The average person doesn’t desire freedom. He simply wants to feel safe.
Nietzsche, with his usual clarity of vision, saw the point clearly. Liberty, he used to say, was something that, to the general, was too cold to be borne. Nevertheless, he apparently believed that there was an unnatural, drug-store sort of yearning for it in all men, and so he changed Schopenhauer’s will-to-live into a will-to-power, i. e., a will-to-free-function. Here he went too far, and in the wrong direction: he should have made it, on the lower levels, a will-to-peace. What the common man longs for in this world, before and above all his other longings, is the simplest and most ignominious sort of peace—the peace of a trusty in a well-managed penitentiary. He is willing to sacrifice everything else to it. He puts it above his dignity and he puts it above his pride. Above all, he puts it149 above his liberty. The fact, perhaps, explains his veneration for policemen, in all the forms they take—his belief that there is a mysterious sanctity in law, however absurd it may be in fact. A policeman is a charlatan who offers, in return for obedience, to protect him (a) from his superiors, (b) from his equals, and (c) from himself. This last service, under democracy, is commonly the most esteemed of them all. In the United States, at least theoretically, it is the only thing that keeps ice-wagon drivers, Y. M. C. A. secretaries, insurance collectors and other such human camels from smoking opium, ruining themselves in the night clubs, and going to Palm Beach with Follies girls. It is a democratic invention.
Nietzsche, with his usual clarity of vision, understood the situation well. He often said that freedom was something too cold for most people to handle. However, he seemingly believed that there was an unnatural, almost drug-like desire for it in all humans, which is why he transformed Schopenhauer’s will-to-live into a will-to-power, or in other words, a will-to-free-function. Here, he overreached and went in the wrong direction; he should have framed it, on the more basic levels, as a will-to-peace. What the average person truly desires in this world, more than anything else, is the simplest and most disreputable kind of peace—the peace of a trusted inmate in a well-run prison. He’s willing to give up everything else for it, placing it above his dignity and pride. Most importantly, he puts it149 above his freedom. This fact may explain his respect for authority figures, in all their forms—his belief in an almost sacred nature of law, no matter how ridiculous it might actually be. A police officer is a fraud who promises, in exchange for compliance, to protect him from (a) his superiors, (b) his equals, and (c) himself. This last service, in a democracy, is often the most valued of all. In the United States, at least in theory, it’s the only thing that keeps ice cream truck drivers, Y. M. C. A. workers, insurance agents, and others like them from using opium, destroying themselves in nightclubs, and heading to Palm Beach with cabaret dancers. It’s a democratic invention.
Here, though the common man is deceived, he starts from a sound premiss: to wit, that liberty is something too hot for his hands—or, as Nietzsche put it, too cold for his spine. Worse, he sees in it something that is a weapon against him in the hands of his enemy, the man of superior kidney. Be true to your nature, and follow its teachings: this Emersonian counsel, it must be manifest, offers an embarrassing support to every variety of the droit de seigneur. The history150 of democracy is a history of efforts to force successive minorities to be untrue to their nature. Democracy, in fact, stands in greater peril of the free spirit than any sort of despotism ever heard of. The despot, at least, is always safe in one respect: his own belief in himself cannot be shaken. But democracies may be demoralized and run amok, and so they are in vast dread of heresy, as a Sunday-school superintendent is in dread of scarlet women, light wines and beer, and the unreadable works of Charles Darwin. It would be unimaginable for a democracy to submit serenely to such gross dissents as Frederick the Great not only permitted, but even encouraged. Once the mob is on the loose, there is no holding it. So the subversive minority must be reduced to impotence; the heretic must be put down.
Here, although the average person is misled, he starts from a solid premise: that freedom is something too intense for his grasp—or, as Nietzsche said, too cold for his spine. Worse still, he perceives it as a tool against him in the hands of his enemy, the man of superior strength. Be true to yourself and follow its guidance: this Emersonian advice clearly provides an uncomfortable backing for every form of the droit de seigneur. The history150 of democracy is a history of attempts to force successive minorities to be untrue to their nature. In fact, democracy is in greater danger from the free spirit than any form of tyranny ever imagined. The tyrant, at least, is always secure in one regard: his own self-belief cannot be shaken. But democracies can become demoralized and chaotic, and thus they have a great fear of dissent, just as a Sunday-school superintendent fears immoral behavior, light alcoholic drinks, and the unreadable works of Charles Darwin. It would be unimaginable for a democracy to calmly accept such blatant disagreements as Frederick the Great not only allowed but even promoted. Once the crowd is unleashed, it's impossible to contain it. Therefore, the disruptive minority must be rendered powerless; the heretic must be silenced.
If, as they say, one of the main purposes of all civilized government is to preserve and augment the liberty of the individual, then surely democracy accomplishes it less efficiently than any other form. Is the individual worth thinking of at all? Then the superior individual is worth more thought than his inferiors. But it is precisely the superior individual who is the chief151 victim of the democratic process. It not only tries to regulate his acts; it also tries to delimit his thoughts; it is constantly inventing new forms of the old crime of imagining the King’s death. The Roman lex de majestate was put upon the books, not by an emperor, nor even by a consul, but by Saturninus, a tribune of the people. Its aim was to protect the state against aristocrats, i. e., against free spirits, each holding himself answerable only to his own notions. The aim of democracy is to break all such free spirits to the common harness. It tries to iron them out, to pump them dry of self-respect, to make docile John Does of them. The measure of its success is the extent to which such men are brought down, and made common. The measure of civilization is the extent to which they resist and survive. Thus the only sort of liberty that is real under democracy is the liberty of the have-nots to destroy the liberty of the haves.
If, as people say, one of the main purposes of any civilized government is to protect and enhance individual freedom, then democracy does this less effectively than any other system. Should we even consider the individual? If we should, then the exceptional individual deserves even more attention than those who are less capable. Yet it is precisely this exceptional individual who suffers most under the democratic system. Not only does it attempt to regulate his actions, but it also seeks to control his thoughts; it constantly comes up with new versions of the old crime of dreaming of the King’s demise. The Roman lex de majestate wasn't established by an emperor or even a consul, but by Saturninus, a tribune of the people. Its goal was to protect the state against aristocrats, meaning free thinkers who only hold themselves accountable to their own beliefs. Democracy aims to break such free spirits into line. It tries to flatten them out, to drain them of self-respect, to turn them into compliant members of society. Its success is measured by how much it can diminish and make these individuals ordinary. The measure of civilization, then, is how much they can resist and endure. Thus, the only real freedom in a democracy is the freedom of those who have nothing to undermine the freedom of those who have something.
This liberty is supposed, in some occult way, to enhance human dignity. Perhaps, in one of its aspects, it actually does. The have-not gains something valuable when he acquires the delusion that he is the equal of his betters. It may not be true—but even a delusion, if it augments152 the dignity of man, is something. Certain apparent realities grow out of it: the peasant no longer pulls his forelock when he meets the baron, he is free to sue and be sued, he may denounce Huxley as a quack. But the thing, alas, works both ways. As one pan of the scale goes up, the other comes down. If democracy really loves the dignity of man, then it kills the thing it loves. Where it prevails, not even the King can be dignified in any rational sense: he becomes Harding, jabbering of normalcy, or Coolidge, communing with his preposterous Tabakparlement around the stove. Nor the Pope: he becomes a Methodist bishop in a natty business-suit, and with a toothbrush moustache. Nor the Generalissimo: he becomes Pershing, haranguing Rotary, and slapping the backs of his fellow Elks.
This freedom is thought, in some mysterious way, to boost human dignity. Maybe, in one way, it actually does. The underprivileged gains something important when they believe they are equal to those who are better off. It might not be true—but even a false belief, if it enhances human dignity, counts for something. Certain apparent truths come from it: the peasant no longer bows his head when he sees the baron, he's allowed to sue and be sued, and he can call Huxley a fraud. But unfortunately, it cuts both ways. As one side of the scale rises, the other side falls. If democracy truly values human dignity, then it undermines what it values. In places where it exists, not even the King can be dignified in any meaningful way: he turns into Harding, rattling on about normalcy, or Coolidge, chatting with his ridiculous Tabakparlement around the stove. Nor can the Pope maintain dignity: he becomes a Methodist bishop in a sharp business suit, sporting a toothbrush mustache. Nor does the Generalissimo remain dignified: he turns into Pershing, giving speeches at Rotary and patting the backs of his fellow Elks.
2.
The Democrat as Moralist
The Democrat as a Moralist
Liberty gone, there remains the majestic phenomenon of democratic law. A glance at it is sufficient to show the identity of democracy and Puritanism. The two, indeed, are but different153 facets of the same gem. In the psyche they are one. For both get their primal essence out of the inferior man’s fear and hatred of his betters, born of his observation that, for all his fine theories, they are stronger and of more courage than he is, and that as they go through this dreadful world they have a far better time. Thus envy comes in; if you overlook it you will never understand democracy, and you will never understand Puritanism. It is not, of course, a speciality of democratic man. It is the common possession of all men of the ignoble and incompetent sort, at all times and everywhere. But it is only under democracy that it is liberated; it is only under democracy that it becomes the philosophy of the state. What the human race owes to the old autocracies, and how little, in these democratic days, it is disposed to remember the debt! Their service, perhaps, was a by-product of a purpose far afield, but it was a service none the less: they held the green fury of the mob in check, and so set free the spirit of superior man. Their collapse under Flavius Honorius left Europe in chaos for four hundred years. Their revival under Charlemagne made the Renaissance possible, and the modern age.154 What the thing was that they kept from the throat of civilization has been shown more than once in these later days, by the failure of their enfeebled successors. I point to the only too obvious examples of the French and Russian Revolutions. The instant such a catastrophe liberates the mob, it begins a war to the death upon superiority of every kind—not only upon the kind that naturally attaches to autocracy, but even upon the kind that stands in opposition to it. The day after a successful revolution is a blue day for the late autocrat, but it is also a blue day for every other superior man. The murder of Lavoisier was a phenomenon quite as significant as the murder of Louis XVI. We need no scientists in France, shouted MM. of the Revolutionary Tribunal. Wat Tyler, four centuries before, reduced it to an even greater frankness and simplicity: he hanged every man who confessed to being able to read and write.
Liberty gone, there still exists the impressive reality of democratic law. A quick look at it reveals the connection between democracy and Puritanism. The two are just different aspects of the same coin. In our minds, they are one. Both draw their core essence from the lower man's fear and resentment of those who are better, stemming from the observation that, despite all his grand theories, they are stronger and braver than he is, and that as they navigate this harsh world, they enjoy life much more. This is where envy comes in; if you ignore it, you'll never grasp democracy, and you won't understand Puritanism either. It isn't unique to democratic people. It's a shared trait among all the ignoble and incompetent types across time and place. But it's only in a democracy that this envy is unleashed; only in democracy does it transform into the official ideology of the state. The human race owes a lot to the old autocracies, yet in these democratic times, it tends to forget that debt! Their contribution, perhaps a side effect of goals far removed from it, was significant nonetheless: they kept the violent anger of the masses in check, freeing the spirit of the superior individual. Their downfall under Flavius Honorius plunged Europe into chaos for four centuries. Their resurgence under Charlemagne made the Renaissance and the modern age possible. What they protected from civilization's throat has been illustrated more than once in recent times by the failure of their weakened successors. I point to the glaring examples of the French and Russian Revolutions. The moment such a disaster releases the mob, it launches a relentless attack on every form of superiority—not just the kind associated with autocracy, but even the kind that stands against it. The day after a successful revolution is a grim one for the former autocrat, but it's also a dismal day for every other superior individual. The murder of Lavoisier was just as significant as the murder of Louis XVI. "We don't need any scientists in France," shouted the members of the Revolutionary Tribunal. Wat Tyler, four centuries earlier, put it even more bluntly: he hanged anyone who admitted they could read and write.
Democracy, as a political scheme, may be defined as a device for releasing this hatred born of envy, and for giving it the force and dignity of law. Tyler, in the end, was dispatched by Walworth; under democracy he becomes almost the ideal Good Man. It is very difficult to disentangle155 the political ideas of this anthropoid Good Man from his theological ideas: they constantly overlap and coalesce, and the democratic state, despite the contrary example of France, almost always shows a strong tendency to be also a Puritan state. Puritan legislation, especially in the field of public law, is a thing of many grandiose pretensions and a few simple and ignoble realities. The Puritan, discussing it voluptuously, always tries to convince himself (and the rest of us) that it is grounded upon altruistic and evangelical motives—that its aim is to work the other fellow’s benefit against the other fellow’s will. Such is the theory behind Prohibition, comstockery, vice crusading, and all its other familiar devices of oppression. That theory, of course, is false. The Puritan’s actual motives are (a) to punish the other fellow for having a better time in the world, and (b) to bring the other fellow down to his own unhappy level. Such are his punitive and remedial purposes. Primarily, he is against every human act that he is incapable of himself—safely. The adverb tells the whole story. The Puritan is surely no ascetic. Even in the great days of the New England theocracy it was impossible156 to restrain his libidinousness: his eyes rolled sideways at buxom wenches quite as often as they rolled upward to God. But he is incapable of sexual experience upon what may be called a civilized plane; it is impossible for him to manage the thing as a romantic adventure; in his hands it reduces itself to the terms of the barnyard. Hence the Mann Act. So with dalliance with the grape. He can have experience of it only as a furtive transaction behind the door, with a dreadful headache to follow. Hence Prohibition. So, again, with the joys that come out of the fine arts. Looking at a picture, he sees only the model’s pudenda. Reading a book, he misses the ordeals and exaltations of the spirit, and remembers only the natural functions. Hence comstockery.
Democracy, as a political system, can be seen as a way to express the hatred that comes from envy, giving it the power and legitimacy of law. In the end, Tyler was taken down by Walworth; under democracy, he nearly becomes the perfect Good Man. It's really hard to separate this almost primate Good Man’s political beliefs from his religious ones: they frequently blend together, and the democratic state, despite what happened in France, often shows a strong inclination to also be a Puritan state. Puritan laws, especially in public policy, have many grand claims but only a few basic and shameful realities. The Puritan, discussing it with pleasure, always tries to convince himself (and the rest of us) that it’s based on selfless and religious motives—that its goal is to help others against their will. This is the idea behind Prohibition, censorship, moral crusades, and all its other familiar forms of oppression. That idea, of course, is false. The Puritan’s real motives are (a) to punish others for having more fun in life, and (b) to drag others down to his own miserable level. These are his punitive and corrective goals. Primarily, he is against every human act that he can’t safely do himself. The adverb tells the whole story. The Puritan is definitely not an ascetic. Even in the great days of the New England theocracy, it was impossible to control his lust; his eyes wandered to attractive women just as often as they looked up to God. But he can’t experience sex in what could be called a civilized way; for him, it becomes a basic, crude act. Hence the Mann Act. The same goes for drinking. He can only enjoy it as a sneaky act behind closed doors, with a terrible hangover to follow. Hence Prohibition. Similarly, regarding the pleasures of fine arts. When he looks at a painting, he only sees the model’s private parts. When reading a book, he overlooks the struggles and uplifting moments of the spirit, only remembering the basic physical functions. Hence censorship.
His delight in his own rectitude is grounded upon a facile assumption that it is difficult to maintain—that the other fellow, being deficient in God’s grace, is incapable of it. So he venerates himself, in the moral department, as an artist of unusual talents, a virtuoso of virtue. His error consists in mistaking a weakness for a merit, an inferiority for a superiority. It is not actually a sign of spiritual eminence to be157 moral in the Puritan sense: it is simply a sign of docility, of lack of enterprise and originality, of cowardice. The Puritan, once his mainly imaginary triumphs over the flesh and the devil are forgotten, always turns out to be a poor stick of a man—in brief, a natural democrat. His triumphs in the field of government are as illusory as his triumphs as metaphysician and artist. No Puritan has ever painted a picture worth looking at, or written a symphony worth hearing, or a poem worth reading—and I am not forgetting John Milton, who was not a Puritan at all, but a libertarian, which is the exact opposite. The whole Puritan literature is comprised in “The Pilgrim’s Progress.” Even in the department wherein the Puritan is most proud of himself, i. e., that of moral legislation, he has done only second and third rate work. His fine schemes for bringing his betters down to his own depressing level always turn out badly. In the whole history of human law-making there is no record of a failure worse than that of Prohibition in the United States. Since the first uprising of the lower orders, the modern age has seen but one genuinely valuable contribution to moral legislation: I allude, of158 course, to the Code Napoléon. It was concocted by a committee of violent anti-Puritans, and in the full tide of a bitter reaction against democracy.
His satisfaction in his own righteousness stems from a simple assumption that is hard to uphold—that others, lacking God's grace, are incapable of it. So he sees himself, in moral terms, as an exceptional artist, a virtuoso of virtue. His mistake lies in confusing weakness with virtue, inferiority with superiority. Being moral in the Puritan sense isn’t actually a mark of spiritual greatness; it’s just a sign of submission, lack of creativity and initiative, of cowardice. Once the mainly imagined victories over sin and temptation are forgotten, the Puritan often turns out to be quite mediocre—a natural democrat. His successes in governance are as imaginary as his achievements as a philosopher and artist. No Puritan has ever created a painting worth seeing, a symphony worth listening to, or a poem worth reading—and I'm not overlooking John Milton, who wasn’t a Puritan at all but a libertarian, which is completely the opposite. The entirety of Puritan literature can be summed up in “The Pilgrim’s Progress.” Even in the area where the Puritan takes most pride, namely moral legislation, he has only produced second and third-rate work. His grand plans to drag his superiors down to his own miserable level consistently backfire. In the entire history of human law-making, there has been no greater failure than Prohibition in the United States. Since the first revolt of the lower classes, the modern era has seen only one truly significant contribution to moral legislation: I’m referring, of course, to the Code Napoléon. It was crafted by a group of fervent anti-Puritans, amid a strong backlash against democracy.
If democracy had not lain implicit in Puritanism, Puritanism would have had to invent it. Each is necessary to the other. Democracy provides the machinery that Puritanism needs for the quick and ruthless execution of its preposterous inventions. Facing autocracy, it faces insuperable difficulties, for its spokesmen can convince the King only in case he is crazy, and even when he is crazy he is commonly restrained by his ministers. But the mob is easy to convince, for what Puritanism has to say to it is mainly what it already believes: its politics is based upon the same brutal envies and quaking fears that lie under the Puritan ethic. Moreover, the political machinery through which it functions provides a ready means of translating such envies and fears into action. There is need only to sound the alarm and take a vote: the debate is over the moment the majority has spoken. The fact explains the ferocious haste with which, in democratic countries, even the most strange and dubious legislative experiments159 are launched. Haste is necessary, lest even the mob be shaken by sober second thought. And haste is easy, for the appeal to the majority is officially the last appeal of all, and when it has been made there is the best of excuses for cutting off debate. I have described the precise process in a previous section. Fanatics inflame the mob, and thereby alarm the scoundrels set up to make laws in its name. The scoundrels precipitately do the rest. The Fathers were not unaware of this danger in the democratic scheme. They sought to counteract it by establishing upper chambers, removed by at least one degree from the mob’s hot rages. Their precaution has been turned to naught by depriving the upper chambers of that prophylactic remoteness, and exposing them to the direct and unmitigated blast.
If democracy hadn’t been a part of Puritanism, Puritanism would have had to create it. Each one is essential to the other. Democracy gives Puritanism the tools it needs for the quick and ruthless implementation of its outrageous ideas. When facing authoritarian rule, Puritanism runs into major problems because its representatives can only persuade the King if he’s irrational, and even then, he is usually restrained by his advisors. But it’s easy to sway the masses, as what Puritanism tells them aligns mainly with what they already think: its politics stem from the same harsh envies and fears that underpin the Puritan way of life. Additionally, the political system it uses conveniently allows these envies and fears to become action. All it takes is to raise the alarm and hold a vote: the conversation ends as soon as the majority has expressed its opinion. This explains the frantic speed with which even the most bizarre and questionable legislative measures159 are put into action in democratic countries. There’s urgency to avoid even the masses reconsidering with a level-headed approach. And urgency is simple to achieve, as the call to the majority is officially the final verdict, and once made, it provides the perfect excuse to end the discussion. I have outlined this specific process in an earlier section. Extremists stir up the masses and, in turn, alarm the unscrupulous individuals tasked with creating laws in their name. The unscrupulous quickly follow through. The Founding Fathers were aware of this risk in the democratic framework. They tried to counter it by creating upper chambers, distanced by at least one step from the mob's intense emotions. Their effort has been undermined by removing that protective distance and exposing these chambers to the direct and unfiltered pressure.
It must be plain that this process of law-making by orgy, with fanatics supplying the motive-power and unconscionable knaves steering the machine, is bound to fill the statute-books with enactments that have no rational use or value save that of serving as instruments of psychopathological persecution and private revenge. This is found to be the case, in fact, in almost every American State. The grotesque anti-syndicalist160 laws of California, the anti-evolution laws of Tennessee and Mississippi, and the acts for the enforcement of Prohibition in Ohio and Indiana are typical. They involve gross invasions of the most elementary rights of the free citizen, but they are popular with the mob because they have a virtuous smack and provide it with an endless succession of barbarous but thrilling shows. Their chosen victims are men the mob naturally envies and hates—men of unusual intelligence and enterprise, men who regard their constitutional liberties seriously and are willing to go to some risk and expense to defend them. Such men are inevitably unpopular under democracy, for their qualities are qualities that the mob wholly lacks, and is uneasily conscious of lacking: it thus delights in seeing them exposed to slander and oppression, and railroaded to prison. There is always a district attorney at hand to launch the prosecution, for district attorneys are invariably men who aspire to higher office, and no more facile way to it is to be found than by assaulting and destroying a man above the general. As I have shown, many an American Congressman comes161 to Washington from a district attorney’s office: you may be sure that he is seldom promoted because he has been jealous of the liberties of the citizen. Many a judge reaches the bench by the same route—and thereafter benignantly helps along his successors. The whole criminal law in America thus acquires a flavour of fraud. It is constantly embellished and reinforced by fanatics who have discovered how easy it is to hurl missiles at their enemies and opponents from behind ranks of policemen. It is executed by law officers whose private prosperity runs in direct ratio to their reckless ferocity. And the business is applauded by morons whose chief delight lies in seeing their betters manhandled and humiliated. Even the ordinary criminal law is so carried out—that is, when the accused happens to be conspicuous enough to make it worth while. Every district attorney in America goes to his knees every night to ask God to deliver a Thaw or a Fatty Arbuckle into his hands. In the criminal courts a rich man not only enjoys none of the advantages that Liberals and other defenders of democracy constantly talk of; he is under very real and very heavy burdens.162 The defence that Thaw offered in the White case would have got a taxi-driver acquitted in five minutes. And had Arbuckle been a waiter, no district attorney in the land would have dreamed of putting him on trial for first-degree murder.
It must be obvious that this law-making process, driven by fanatics and manipulated by unethical individuals, is bound to clutter the law books with laws that have no rational purpose or value other than to act as tools for psychological persecution and personal revenge. This is, in fact, true in almost every American state. The absurd anti-syndicalist laws in California, the anti-evolution laws in Tennessee and Mississippi, and the laws enforcing Prohibition in Ohio and Indiana are typical examples. They involve serious violations of the most basic rights of free citizens, but they are popular with the public because they seem virtuous and provide them with an unending series of brutal yet thrilling spectacles. Their chosen targets are people the public naturally envies and hates—people of exceptional intelligence and ambition, those who take their constitutional liberties seriously and are willing to risk and spend to defend them. Such individuals are inevitably unpopular in a democracy because they possess qualities that the masses lack and are acutely aware of this deficiency: thus, they take pleasure in seeing them slandered and oppressed, and unjustly imprisoned. There is always a district attorney ready to start the prosecution, as district attorneys are usually individuals who aspire to higher office, and there's no easier path to that than by attacking and taking down someone who stands out. As I've shown, many American Congress members come from district attorney positions: you can be sure that they are rarely promoted due to their dedication to protecting citizens' liberties. Many judges follow the same path to the bench—and afterward, they support their successors. The entire criminal justice system in America thus takes on a tone of deceit. It is continually enhanced and supported by fanatics who have learned how easy it is to launch attacks on their enemies while hiding behind police protection. It is enforced by law officers whose personal success is directly linked to their reckless brutality. And this practice is cheered on by idiots whose main pleasure derives from seeing their superiors mistreated and humiliated. Even standard criminal law is applied this way—when the accused is prominent enough to make it worthwhile. Every district attorney in America prays every night for a Thaw or a Fatty Arbuckle to fall into their hands. In criminal courts, a wealthy person not only does not enjoy the advantages that Liberals and other defenders of democracy often talk about; they are actually under very real and heavy pressures. The defense that Thaw offered in the White case would have gotten a taxi driver acquitted in five minutes. And if Arbuckle had been a waiter, no district attorney in the country would have contemplated trying him for first-degree murder.
For such foul and pestiferous proceedings, of course, moral excuses are always offered. The district attorney is an altruist whose one dream is Law Enforcement; he cannot be terrified by the power of money; he is the spokesman of the virtuous masses against the godless and abominable classes. The same buncombe issues from the Prohibitionists, comstocks, hunters of Bolshevists, and other such frauds. Its hollowness is constantly revealed. The Prohibitionists, when they foisted their brummagem cure-all upon the country under cover of the war hysteria, gave out that their advocacy of it was based upon a Christian yearning to abate drunkenness, and so abolish crime, poverty and disease. They preached a millennium, and no doubt convinced hundreds of thousands of naïve and sentimental persons, not themselves Puritans, nor even democrats. That millennium, as everyone knows, has failed to come in. Not only are crime, poverty163 and disease undiminished, but drunkenness itself, if the police statistics are to be believed, has greatly increased. The land rocks with the scandal. Prohibition has made the use of alcohol devilish and even fashionable, and so vastly augmented the number of users. The young of both sexes, mainly innocent of the cup under license, now take to it almost unanimously. In brief, Prohibition has not only failed to work the benefits that its proponents promised in 1917; it has brought in so many new evils that even the mob has turned against it. But do the Prohibitionists admit the fact frankly, and repudiate their original nonsense? They do not. On the contrary, they keep on demanding more and worse enforcement statutes—that is to say, more and worse devices for harassing and persecuting their opponents. The more obvious the failure becomes, the more shamelessly they exhibit their genuine motives. In plain words, what moves them is the psychological aberration called sadism. They lust to inflict inconvenience, discomfort, and, whenever possible, disgrace upon the persons they hate—which is to say, upon everyone who is free from their barbarous theological superstitions, and is having a better time in the164 world than they are. They cannot stop the use of alcohol, nor even appreciably diminish it, but they can badger and annoy everyone who seeks to use it decently, and they can fill the jails with men taken for purely artificial offences, and they can get satisfaction thereby for the Puritan yearning to browbeat and injure, to torture and terrorize, to punish and humiliate all who show any sign of being happy. And all this they can do with a safe line of policemen and judges in front of them; always they can do it without personal risk.
For such disgusting and harmful actions, of course, there are always moral justifications offered. The district attorney is an idealist whose only goal is Law Enforcement; he can't be intimidated by money; he represents the virtuous public against the immoral elite. The same nonsense comes from Prohibitionists, moral enforcers, hunters of Bolsheviks, and other similar frauds. Their emptiness is constantly exposed. When the Prohibitionists pushed their cheap solution on the country under the guise of war hysteria, they claimed their support stemmed from a Christian desire to reduce alcoholism, and thus eliminate crime, poverty, and disease. They preached about a perfect future, convincing countless naive and sentimental people, who were neither Puritans nor even democrats. That perfect future, as everyone knows, has not materialized. Not only are crime, poverty, and disease unchanged, but drunkenness itself, according to police statistics, has greatly increased. The country is rife with scandal. Prohibition has made the use of alcohol not only troublesome but also trendy, significantly increasing the number of users. Young people of both genders, mostly innocent before, now universally embrace it. In short, Prohibition has not only failed to deliver the benefits its supporters promised in 1917; it has introduced so many new problems that even the public has turned against it. But do the Prohibitionists openly acknowledge this failure and reject their original nonsense? They do not. Instead, they keep demanding stricter and harsher enforcement laws—that is, more tools for harassing and persecuting their opponents. The more obvious the failure becomes, the more shamelessly they reveal their true motives. In simple terms, what drives them is a psychological dysfunction known as sadism. They want to inflict inconvenience, discomfort, and, whenever possible, humiliation on people they despise—which means anyone who does not share their brutal religious beliefs and is enjoying life more than they are. They can't stop alcohol use, nor can they significantly reduce it, but they can hassle and irritate everyone trying to enjoy it responsibly, and they can fill the jails with individuals arrested for made-up offenses, deriving satisfaction from their Puritanical desire to dominate and harm, to torture and intimidate, to punish and humiliate anyone who shows any sign of being happy. And they can do all this with a secure line of police and judges backing them; they can always act without personal risk.
It is this freedom from personal risk that is the secret of the Prohibitionists’ continued frenzy, despite the complete collapse of Prohibition itself. They know very well that the American mob, far from being lawless, is actually excessively tolerant of written laws and judicial fiats, however plainly they violate the fundamental rights of free men, and they know that this tolerance is sufficient to protect them from what, in more liberal and enlightened countries, would be the natural consequences of their anti-social activity. If they had to meet their victims face to face, there would be a different story to tell. But, like their brethren, the comstocks and the165 professional patriots, they seldom encounter this embarrassment. Instead, they turn the officers of the law to the uses of their mania. More, they reinforce the officers of the law with an army of bravos sworn to take their orders and do their bidding—the army of so-called Prohibition enforcement officers, mainly made up of professional criminals. Thus, under democracy, the normal, well-behaved, decent citizen—the Forgotten Man of the late William Graham Sumner—is beset from all sides, and every year sees an augmentation of his woes. In order to satisfy the envy and hatred of his inferiors and the blood lust of a pack of irresponsible and unconscionable fanatics, few of them of any dignity as citizens or as men and many of them obviously hypocritical and corrupt, this decent citizen is converted into a criminal for performing acts that are natural to men of his class everywhere, and police and courts are degraded to the abhorrent office of punishing him for them. Certainly it should not be surprising that such degrading work has greatly diminished the authority of both—that Prohibition has made the courts disreputable and increased general crime. A judge who jails a well-disposed and inoffensive citizen166 for violating an unjust and dishonest law may be defended plausibly, perhaps, by legal casuistry, but it is very hard to make out a case for him as a self-respecting man. Like the ordinary politician, he puts his job above his professional dignity and his common decency. More than one judge, unable to square such loathsome duties with his private notions of honor, has stepped down from the bench, and left the business to a successor who was more a lawyer and less a man.
It’s this lack of personal risk that fuels the Prohibitionists’ ongoing hysteria, despite Prohibition itself completely falling apart. They understand that the American mob, instead of being lawless, is actually very tolerant of written laws and judicial mandates, even when these clearly violate the fundamental rights of free individuals. They know this tolerance keeps them safe from what would normally be the expected consequences of their anti-social behavior in more liberal and progressive countries. If they had to face their victims directly, the situation would be quite different. But, like their counterparts, the Comstocks and the165 so-called patriots, they rarely have to deal with this discomfort. Instead, they manipulate law enforcement to serve their obsession. Furthermore, they bolster law enforcement with a crew of enforcers ready to take their orders and carry out their wishes—an army of so-called Prohibition enforcement officers, mostly composed of professional criminals. As a result, under democracy, the ordinary, decent citizen—the Forgotten Man of the late William Graham Sumner—finds himself under siege from all directions, and each year his troubles grow. To appease the envy and hatred of those below him and the bloodlust of a group of reckless and immoral fanatics—many of whom lack dignity as citizens and as individuals, and many of whom are clearly hypocritical and corrupt—this decent citizen is turned into a criminal for doing what is natural for his class everywhere, while the police and courts degrade themselves by punishing him for it. It’s really not surprising that such demeaning work has seriously undermined the authority of both the police and the courts—that Prohibition has tarnished the reputation of the courts and led to increased overall crime. A judge who sentences a good-natured, harmless citizen166 for breaking an unjust and dishonest law might be justifiable in terms of legal technicalities, but it’s tough to argue that he’s a self-respecting man. Like the typical politician, he prioritizes his job over his professional integrity and basic decency. More than one judge, unable to reconcile such repugnant duties with his personal sense of honor, has resigned from the bench, leaving the role to a successor more concerned with lawyering than with being a decent human being.
3.
Where Puritanism Fails
Where Puritanism Falls Short
Under the pressure of fanaticism, and with the mob complacently applauding the show, democratic law tends more and more to be grounded upon the maxim that every citizen is, by nature, a traitor, a libertine, and a scoundrel. In order to dissuade him from his evil-doing the police power is extended until it surpasses anything ever heard of in the oriental monarchies of antiquity. In many American States—for example, California and Pennsylvania—it is almost a literal fact that the citizen has no rights167 that the police are bound to respect. These awful powers, of course, are not exercised against all citizens. The man of influence with the reigning politicians, the supporter of the prevailing delusions, and the adept hypocrite—these are seldom molested. But the man who finds himself in an unpopular minority is at the mercy of the Polizei, and the easiest way to get into such a minority is to speak out boldly for the Bill of Rights. Men have been clubbed and jailed in Pennsylvania for merely mentioning it; scores have been jailed for protesting publicly against its violation. Here the attack was at least frank, and, to that extent, honest; more often it is made disingenuously, and to the tune of pious snuffling. First an unpopular man is singled out for persecution, and then a diligent search is made, with the police and prosecuting officers and even the courts co-operating, for a law that he can be accused of breaking. The enormous multiplicity of sumptuary and inquisitorial statutes makes this quest easy. The prisoner begins his progress through the mill of justice under a vague accusation of disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace; he ends charged with crimes that carry staggering penalties. There are statutes168 in many States, notably California, that explore his mind, and lay him by the heels for merely thinking unpopular thoughts. Once he is accused of such heresy, the subsequent proceedings take on the character of a lynching. His constitutional rights are swept away as of no validity, and all the ancient rules of the Common Law—for example, those against double jeopardy and hearsay—are suspended in order to fetch him. Many of the newer statutes actually suspend these safeguards formally, and though they are to that extent plainly unconstitutional, the higher courts have not interfered with their execution. The Volstead Act, for instance, destroys the constitutional right to a jury trial, and in its administration the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and the rule against double jeopardy are habitually violated. But no protest comes save from specialists in liberty, most of whom are so busy keeping out of jail themselves that their caveats are feeble and ineffective. The mob is always in favour of the prosecution, for the prosecution is giving the show. In the face of its applause, very few American judges have the courage to enforce the constitutional guarantees—and still169 fewer prosecuting attorneys. As I have said, a prosecuting attorney’s success depends very largely upon his ferocity. American practice permits him an extravagance of attack that would land him in jail, and perhaps even in a lunatic asylum, in any other country, and the more passionately he indulges in it the more certain becomes his promotion to higher office, including the judicial. Perhaps a half of all American judges, at some time or other, have been prosecuting officers. They carry to the bench the habits of mind acquired on the other side of the bar; they seem to be generally convinced that any man accused of crime is ipso facto guilty, and that if he is known to harbour political heresies he is guilty of a sort of blasphemy when he mentions his constitutional rights.
Under the pressure of fanaticism, and with the crowd complacently applauding the spectacle, democratic law increasingly assumes that every citizen is, by nature, a traitor, a libertine, and a scoundrel. To discourage him from wrongdoing, police power is extended until it exceeds anything seen in the ancient Eastern monarchies. In many American states—like California and Pennsylvania—it’s practically true that citizens have no rights the police are obligated to respect. These dreadful powers, of course, aren’t exercised against everyone. Influential individuals with the ruling politicians, supporters of the prevailing delusions, and skilled hypocrites are rarely targeted. But those who find themselves in an unpopular minority are at the mercy of the police, and the simplest way to become part of such a minority is to boldly advocate for the Bill of Rights. People have been beaten and jailed in Pennsylvania for merely mentioning it; many have been imprisoned for publicly protesting its infringement. Here, the attack is at least straightforward and, to that extent, honest; more often it’s conducted deceitfully, under the guise of pious concerns. Initially, an unpopular person is singled out for persecution, followed by an exhaustive search—conducted by the police, prosecutors, and even the courts—for a law he can be charged with breaking. The vast number of sumptuary and inquisitorial statutes makes this search easy. The accused begins his journey through the justice system under vague accusations of disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace; he ultimately faces charges that carry severe penalties. There are statutes in many states, particularly California, that delve into his thoughts and penalize him for merely thinking unpopular thoughts. Once he’s accused of such heresy, the subsequent proceedings resemble a lynching. His constitutional rights are disregarded as if they hold no validity, and all the ancient rules of Common Law—like those against double jeopardy and hearsay—are suspended to secure a conviction. Many of the newer statutes explicitly suspend these safeguards, and while they are clearly unconstitutional, higher courts have not intervened in their enforcement. The Volstead Act, for example, undermines the constitutional right to a jury trial, and in its enforcement, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and the prohibition against double jeopardy are often violated. Yet protests come only from advocates of liberty, most of whom are so preoccupied with avoiding jail themselves that their warnings are weak and ineffective. The mob consistently backs the prosecution, as it provides the spectacle. In the face of their applause, very few American judges have the bravery to uphold constitutional guarantees—and even fewer prosecuting attorneys do. As I mentioned, the success of a prosecuting attorney heavily relies on their aggressiveness. American practice allows for an extreme level of attack that would land someone in jail, or even a mental institution, in any other country, and the more passionately an attorney engages in it, the more likely they are to be promoted to higher positions, including judgeships. Perhaps half of all American judges have, at some point, been prosecuting attorneys. They bring to the bench the mindset they developed on the other side of the bar; they generally seem convinced that anyone accused of a crime is guilty, and if he is known to hold political heresies, he is guilty of a form of blasphemy for even mentioning his constitutional rights.
This doctrine that a man who stands in contempt of the prevailing ideology has no rights under the law is so thoroughly democratic that in the United States it is seldom questioned save by romantic fanatics, robbed of their wits by an uncritical reading of the Fathers. It not only goes unchallenged otherwise; it is openly stated and defended, and by high authorities. I point, for example, to the Right Rev. Luther B. Wilson,170 who, as a bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, occupies an office that is both ecclesiastical and political, and is of dignity and puissance in both fields. Some time ago this Wilson was invited to preach in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York—a delicate acknowledgment of his importance by his rival prelate of the Anglican Church, Monsignor Manning. His sermon, in brief, was a passionate plea for the putting down of heresy, law or no law, Constitution or no Constitution. “Atheism,” he declared, “is not only folly, but to the state a traitor. It does not deserve a place and should not be defended by any specious claim for immunity under the constitutional guaranties of the right of free speech.” This bloodthirsty and astounding dictum, though it came from a Christian ecclesiastic of a rank higher than that attained by Christ Himself, seemed so natural that it attracted no notice whatever. Not a single New York newspaper challenged it; even the Liberal weeklies let it pass as too obvious for cavil. A week or so later it was printed with approbation in all the Methodist denominational organs, and since then many other bishops of that sect have ratified it. The same doctrine is171 frequently stated plainly by high legal officers, especially when a man accused of political heresy is on trial—usually, of course, for an alleged infraction of the ordinary law. As I have said in a previous chapter, it was applied to atheists, exactly as Bishop Wilson applied it, during the celebrated Scopes trial at Dayton, Tenn. Arthur Garfield Hays, defending Scopes, arose at one point in the proceedings to protest that they were going beyond the bounds of due process—that his client was not getting a fair and impartial trial within the meaning of the Constitution. At once the prosecuting attorney general, Stewart, answered candidly that an atheist had no right to a fair trial in Tennessee, and the judge on the bench, the learned Raulston, approved with a nod. Hays, who is a Liberal, was so overcome that he sank in his place with a horrified gurgle, but the Tennesseans in the courtroom saw nothing strange in Stewart’s reply. They knew very well that, in all the States South of the Potomac, save only Louisiana, Catholics, Negroes and all the persons unable to speak the local dialects fluently shared the disability of atheists. And if they were learned in American law, they knew that anti-Catholics172 faced the same disability in Massachusetts, like anti-Semites in New York, and that in every State there were classes similarly proscribed. I do not here allude to the natural difficulty that every man of notoriously heterodox ideas must encounter every time he faces a jury, which is to say, twelve men of limited information and intelligence, chosen precisely because of their lack of intellectual resilience. I am speaking of the hostility he must look for in prosecuting officers and judges, and in the newspapers that sit in judgment upon them and largely determine their fortunes. I am speaking of what has come to be a settled practice in American criminal law.
This belief that a person who goes against the dominant ideology has no rights under the law is so fundamentally democratic that in the United States, it’s rarely questioned except by idealistic fanatics, who have lost their sense due to an uncritical reading of the Founding Fathers. It not only goes unchallenged otherwise; it is openly expressed and defended, even by high-ranking officials. For example, consider Right Rev. Luther B. Wilson,170 who, as a bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, holds a position that is both religious and political, and respected in both areas. Some time ago, Wilson was invited to preach at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York—a subtle acknowledgment of his significance by his Anglican Church rival, Monsignor Manning. His sermon, in short, was an emotional appeal to suppress heresy, regardless of law or Constitution. “Atheism,” he declared, “is not just foolishness, but a betrayal to the state. It doesn't deserve a place and shouldn't be defended by any false claim of immunity under the constitutional guarantees of free speech.” This aggressive and shocking statement, though made by a Christian leader of a rank higher than that of Christ Himself, seemed so normal that it went completely unnoticed. Not a single newspaper in New York challenged it; even the Liberal weeklies let it slide as too obvious to debate. A week or so later, it was published with approval in all the Methodist denominational publications, and since then, many other bishops from that denomination have echoed it. The same belief is171 often clearly articulated by high-ranking legal officials, especially during trials of individuals accused of political heresy—typically related to an alleged violation of ordinary law. As I've mentioned in a previous chapter, this was applied to atheists, exactly as Bishop Wilson indicated, during the famous Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee. Arthur Garfield Hays, defending Scopes, stood up at one point in the proceedings to protest that they were exceeding the limits of due process—that his client wasn't receiving a fair and impartial trial as defined by the Constitution. Immediately, the prosecuting attorney general, Stewart, candidly replied that an atheist had no right to a fair trial in Tennessee, and the presiding judge, the knowledgeable Raulston, nodded in approval. Hays, who is a Liberal, was so shocked that he slumped in his seat with a horrified gasp, but those in the Tennessee courtroom found nothing unusual about Stewart’s response. They knew very well that in all the States south of the Potomac, except for Louisiana, Catholics, Black people, and anyone unable to speak the local dialect fluently shared the same limitations as atheists. And if they understood American law, they knew that anti-Catholics172 faced the same restrictions in Massachusetts, like anti-Semites in New York, and that in every State, there were similarly excluded groups. I’m not just referring to the natural challenges anyone with notably unconventional ideas must face whenever they confront a jury, meaning twelve individuals with limited knowledge and insight, chosen specifically for their lack of intellectual flexibility. I’m talking about the prejudice they must anticipate from prosecuting officials and judges, and in the media that judge them and largely influence their outcomes. I’m discussing what has become standard practice in American criminal law.
It is difficult, indeed, for democracy to reconcile itself to what may be called common decency. By this common decency I mean the habit, in the individual, of viewing with tolerance and charity the acts and ideas of other individuals—the habit which makes a man a reliable friend, a generous opponent, and a good citizen. The democrat, despite his strong opinion to the contrary, is seldom a good citizen. In that sense, as in most others, he falls distressfully short. His eagerness to bring all his fellow-citizens,173 and especially all those who are superior to him, into accord with his own dull and docile way of thinking, and to force it upon them when they resist, leads him inevitably into acts of unfairness, oppression and dishonour which, if all men were alike guilty of them, would quickly break down that mutual trust and confidence upon which the very structure of civilized society rests. Where democratic man is so firmly in possession of his theoretical rights that resistance to him is hopeless, as it is in large areas of the United States, he actually produces this disaster. To live in a community so cursed is almost impossible to any man who does not accept the democratic epistemology and the Puritan ethic, which is to say, to any well-informed and self-respecting man. He is harassed in so many small ways, and with such depressing violence and lack of decency, that he is usually compelled to clear out. This fact, in large part, explains the cultural collapse of New England and the marked cultural backwardness of whole regions in the South and Middle West. A man of sound sense, born into the Tennessee hinterland, not only feels lonesome as he comes to maturity; he also feels unsafe. The morons surrounding174 him hate him, and if they can’t lay him for mere heresy, they will wait their chance and lay him for burning barns, for poisoning wells, or for taking Russian gold. So he departs.
It’s really tough for democracy to be in tune with what we might call common decency. By common decency, I mean the practice of treating the actions and ideas of others with tolerance and kindness—the kind of habit that makes someone a trustworthy friend, a gracious opponent, and a decent citizen. The democrat, despite what he might think, is rarely a good citizen. In that regard, like in many others, he falls short. His eagerness to get all his fellow citizens, especially those who are better than him, to agree with his dull and compliant way of thinking, and to force it on them when they resist, pushes him into unfairness, oppression, and dishonor. If everyone acted this way, it would quickly destroy the mutual trust and confidence that civilized society is built on. When a democratic individual is so secure in his supposed rights that resistance is futile, like in many parts of the United States, he brings about this disaster. Living in such a cursed community is nearly impossible for anyone who doesn’t accept the democratic mindset and the Puritan ethic, which means, for any informed and self-respecting person. He faces a lot of small, annoying issues and a depressing amount of violence and rudeness, which usually drives him away. This largely explains the cultural decline of New England and the significant cultural lag in many areas of the South and Midwest. A sensible person born in rural Tennessee not only feels lonely as he grows up; he also feels unsafe. The fools around him despise him, and if they can’t get him for just being different, they’ll find an opportunity to accuse him of burning barns, poisoning wells, or taking Russian money. So he leaves.
This irreconcilable antagonism between democratic Puritanism and common decency is probably responsible for the uneasiness and unhappiness that are so marked in American life, despite the great material prosperity of the United States. Theoretically, the American people should be happier than any other; actually, they are probably the least happy in Christendom. The trouble with them is that they do not trust one another—and without mutual trust there can be no ease, and no genuine happiness. What avails it for a man to have money in the bank and a Ford in his garage if he knows that his neighbours on both sides are watching him through knotholes, and that the pastor of the tabernacle down the road is planning to have him sent to jail? The thing that makes life charming is not money, but the society of our fellow men, and the thing that draws us toward our fellow men is not admiration for their inner virtues, their hard striving to live according to the light that is in them, but admiration for their outer175 graces and decencies—in brief, confidence that they will always act generously and understandingly in their intercourse with us. We must trust men before we may enjoy them. Manifestly, it is impossible to put any such trust in a Puritan. With the best intentions in the world he cannot rid himself of the delusion that his duty to save us from our sins—i. e., from the non-Puritanical acts that we delight in—is paramount to his duty to let us be happy in our own way. Thus he is unable to be tolerant, and with tolerance goes magnanimity. A Puritan cannot be magnanimous. He is constitutionally unable to grasp the notion that it is better to be decent than to be steadfast, or even than to be just. So with the democrat, who is simply a Puritan doubly damned. When the late Dr. Wilson, confronted by the case of poor old silly Debs, decided instantly that Debs must remain in jail, he acted as a true democrat and a perfect Puritan. The impulse to be magnanimous, to forgive and forget, to be kindly and generous toward a misguided and harmless old man, was overcome by the harsh Puritan compulsion to observe the letter of the law at all costs. Every Puritan is a lawyer, and so is every democrat.
This unresolvable clash between democratic Puritanism and basic decency likely causes the discomfort and unhappiness that are so evident in American life, despite the country's significant material wealth. Theoretically, Americans should be happier than anyone else; in reality, they are probably the least happy people in Christendom. The issue is that they don’t trust each other—and without mutual trust, there can be no comfort or true happiness. What good is it for someone to have money in the bank and a Ford in the garage if they know that their neighbors are spying on them through knotholes, and that the pastor down the road is planning to have them locked up? The charm of life doesn't come from money, but from the company of others, and what draws us to our fellow humans isn’t admiration for their internal virtues or their efforts to live by the best of their abilities, but admiration for their external grace and decency—in short, confidence that they will always treat us with generosity and understanding. We must trust people before we can enjoy their company. Clearly, it's impossible to trust a Puritan. No matter how good their intentions, they can’t shake the belief that their duty to save us from our sins—i.e., from the non-Puritanical things we enjoy—is more important than letting us be happy in our own way. Thus, they're unable to be tolerant, and with tolerance comes generosity. A Puritan cannot be generous. They fundamentally can’t understand that being decent is often better than being steadfast or even just. The same applies to the democrat, who is basically a doubly cursed Puritan. When the late Dr. Wilson faced the case of poor old naive Debs, he immediately decided that Debs had to stay in jail; he acted like a true democrat and a perfect Puritan. The urge to be generous, to forgive and forget, to be kind and generous toward a misguided and harmless old man was overshadowed by the harsh Puritan need to stick to the letter of the law at all costs. Every Puritan is a lawyer, and so is every democrat.
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4.
Corruption Under Democracy
Corruption in Democracy
This moral compulsion of the Puritan and democrat, of course, is mainly bogus. When one has written off cruelty, envy and cowardice, one has accounted for nine-tenths of it. Certainly I need not argue at this late date that the Ur-Puritan of New England was by no means the vestal that his heirs and assigns think of when they praise him. He was not only a very carnal fellow, and given to lamentable transactions with loose women and fiery jugs; he was also a virtuoso of sharp practices, and to this day his feats in that department survive in fable. Nor is there any perceptible improvement in his successors. When a gang of real estate agents (i. e. rent sweaters), bond salesman and automobile dealers gets together to sob for Service, it takes no Freudian to surmise that someone is about to be swindled. The cult of Service, indeed, is half a sop to conscience, and half a bait to catch conies. Its cultivation in the United States runs parallel with the most gorgeous development of imposture as a fine art that Christendom has ever177 seen. I speak of a fine art in the literal sense; in the form of advertising it enlists such talents as, under less pious civilizations, would be devoted to the confection of cathedrals, and even, perhaps, masses. A sixth of the Americano’s income is rooked out of him by rogues who have at him officially, and in the name of the government; half the remainder goes to sharpers who prefer the greater risks and greater profits of private enterprise. All schemes to save him from such victimizations have failed in the past, and all of them, I believe, are bound to fail in the future; most of the more gaudy of them are simply devices to facilitate fresh victimizations. For democratic man, dreaming eternally of Utopias, is ever a prey to shibboleths, and those that fetch him in his political capacity are more than matched by those that fetch him in his rôle of private citizen. His normal and natural situation, held through all the vicissitudes of his brief history, has been that of one who, at great cost and effort, has sneaked home a jug of contraband whiskey, sworn to have issued out of a padlocked distillery, and then finds, on uncorking it, that it is a compound of pepper, prune juice and wood alcohol. This, in a sentence, is178 the history of democracy. It is, in detail, the history of all such characteristically democratic masterpieces as Bryanism, Ku Kluxery, and the war to end war. They are full of virtuous pretences, and they are unmitigated swindles.
This moral pressure from the Puritan and democrat is mostly fake. Once you've dismissed cruelty, envy, and cowardice, you've explained most of it. There's no need for me to argue at this point that the Ur-Puritan of New England was far from the pure figure that his descendants imagine when they praise him. He was a very earthly man, engaging in regrettable interactions with loose women and strong drinks; he was also a master of dishonest tactics, and his exploits in that realm are still legendary today. There hasn’t been much improvement among his successors. When a group of real estate agents (i.e., rental brokers), bond sellers, and car dealers come together to lament about Service, it doesn’t take a Freudian to guess that someone’s about to be scammed. The concept of Service is really half a way to soothe their conscience and half a way to attract the gullible. Its growth in the United States parallels the most extravagant rise of deception as an art form that the Western world has ever seen. I mean “art” in the literal sense; through advertising, it harnesses talents that, in less pious societies, would have gone into building cathedrals or perhaps even masses. One-sixth of an American’s income is taken from him by crooks working officially, and in the name of the government; half of what’s left goes to swindlers who prefer the bigger risks and bigger rewards of private business. All attempts to protect him from such fraud have failed in the past, and I believe all will continue to fail in the future; many of the flashier schemes are just setups for even more scams. Democratic man, always dreaming of Utopias, is constantly vulnerable to catchphrases, and those that snag him in his political role are outnumbered by those that trap him as a private citizen. His typical situation, maintained through all the ups and downs of his short history, has been that of someone who, at a great cost and with much effort, has sneakily brought home a jug of illegal whiskey, claiming it comes from a locked distillery, only to find, upon opening it, that it's a mix of pepper, prune juice, and wood alcohol. In a nutshell, this is the story of democracy. In detail, it’s the story of all those characteristically democratic failures like Bryanism, the Ku Klux Klan, and the war to end all wars. They are full of virtuous claims, yet they are straightforward frauds.
All observers of democracy, from Tocqueville to the Adams brothers and Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, have marveled at its corruptions on the political side, and speculated heavily as to the causes thereof. The fact was noted in the earliest days of the democratic movement, and Friedrich von Gentz, who began life as an Anglomaniac, was using it as an argument against the parliamentary system so early as 1809. Gentz, who served Metternich as the current Washington correspondents serve whatever dullard happens to be President, contended that the introduction of democracy on the Continent would bring in a reign of bribery, and thus destroy the integrity and authority of the state. The proofs that he was right were already piling up, in his day, in the United States. They were destined to be greatly reinforced when the Third Republic got under way in France in 1870, and to be given impressive support when the German Republic set up shop in 1918. In 1919, for the first time179 since the coronation of Henry the Fowler, a German Cabinet minister crossed the border between days, his loot under his arm. The historians, immersed in their closets, marvel that such things happen, and marvel even more that democracy takes them calmly, and even lightly. Somewhere in “The Education of Henry Adams” you will find an account of the gigantic peculations that went on during the second Grant administration, and melancholy reflections upon the populace’s philosophic acceptance of them as inevitable, and even natural. In our own time we have seen the English mob embrace and elevate to higher office the democratic statesmen caught in the Marconi scandal, and the American mob condone almost automatically the herculean raids upon the Treasury that marked the Wilson administration, and the less spectacular but even more deliberate thievings that went on under the martyred Harding. In the latter case it turned upon the small body of specialists in rectitude who ventured to protest, and in the end they found themselves far more unpopular than the thieves.
All observers of democracy, from Tocqueville to the Adams brothers and Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, have been amazed by its political corruption and have speculated heavily about its causes. This was noted in the early days of the democratic movement, and Friedrich von Gentz, who started off as an Anglomaniac, was using it as an argument against the parliamentary system as early as 1809. Gentz, who served Metternich much like today’s Washington correspondents serve whatever dullard is in the White House, claimed that bringing democracy to the Continent would lead to widespread bribery, ultimately undermining the integrity and authority of the state. Even in his time, evidence that he was right was already piling up in the United States. This would be massively reinforced when the Third Republic began in France in 1870 and further backed when the German Republic was established in 1918. In 1919, for the first time since Henry the Fowler's coronation, a German cabinet minister crossed the border between days with his stolen loot under his arm. Historians, buried in their archives, are astonished that such events occur, and even more so that democracy accepts them with calmness and even a sense of lightness. Somewhere in “The Education of Henry Adams,” you'll find a description of the massive corruption that occurred during the second Grant administration and the somber reflections on how the public philosophically accepted them as unavoidable and even natural. In our own time, we've witnessed the English public embrace and elevate democratic leaders involved in the Marconi scandal, while the American public almost automatically condoned the significant raids on the Treasury during the Wilson administration and the less obvious but even more deliberate thefts under the late Harding. In that latter case, the small group of dedicated individuals who dared to protest ended up being far more unpopular than the actual thieves.
Such phenomena, as I say, puzzle the more academic pathologists of democracy, but as180 for me, I only say that they seem to be in strict accord with God’s invariable laws. Why should democracy rise against bribery? It is itself a form of wholesale bribery. In place of a government with a fixed purpose and a visible goal, it sets up a government that is a mere function of the mob’s vagaries, and that maintains itself by constantly bargaining with those vagaries. Its security depends wholly upon providing satisfactory bribes for the prehensile minorities that constitute the mob, or that have managed to deceive and inflame the mob. One day the labour leaders—a government within the general government—must be bought with offices; the next day the dupes of these labour leaders must be bought with legislation, usually of a sort loading the ordinary scales of justice in their favour; the day after there must be something for the manufacturers, for the Methodists, for the Catholics, for the farmers. I have exhibited, in another work, the fact that this last class demands bribes pure and simple—that its yearnings for its own private advantage are never ameliorated by yearnings for the common good. The whole process of government under democracy, as everyone knows, is a process of similar181 trading. The very head of the state, having no title to his office save that which lies in the popular will, is forced to haggle and bargain like the lowliest office-seeker. There has been no President of the United States since Washington who did not go into office with a long list of promises in his pocket, and nine-tenths of them have always been promises of private reward from the public store. It is surely not regarded as immoral, by the democratic ethic, to make and execute such promises, though statesmen of lofty pretensions, e. g., Lincoln, sometimes deny having made them. What is reproached as immoral is making them, and then not keeping them. When the late Dr. Wilson made William Jennings Bryan his Secretary of State the act brought forth only tolerant smiles, though it was comparable to appointing a chiropractor Surgeon-General of the Army—a feat which Dr. Harding, a few years later, escaped performing only by a hair. But if Wilson had forgotten his obligation to Bryan there would have been an outburst of moral indignation, even among Bryan’s enemies, and the collapse of Wilson would have come long before it did. When he blew up at last it was not because, after promulgating182 his Fourteen Points, he joined in swindling a helpless foe at Versailles; it was because he tried, at Paris, to undo some of the consequences of that fraud by forcing the United States into the League of Nations. A democratic state, indeed, is so firmly grounded upon cheats and humbugs of all sorts that they inevitably colour its dealings with other nations, and so one always finds it regarded as a dubious friend and a tricky foe. That the United States, in its foreign relations, has descended to gross deceits and tergiversations since the earliest days of the Republic was long ago pointed out by Lecky; it is regarded universally to-day as a pious fraud—which is to say, as a Puritan. Nor has England, the next most eminent democratic state, got the name of perfide Albion for nothing. Ruled by shady men, a nation itself becomes shady.
Such phenomena, as I said, confuse the more scholarly pathologists of democracy, but as for me, I only say that they appear to align perfectly with God’s unchanging laws. Why should democracy oppose bribery? It actually represents a form of widespread bribery. Instead of establishing a government with a clear purpose and goal, it creates a government that merely reflects the whims of the crowd and holds itself together by constantly negotiating with those whims. Its stability relies entirely on providing satisfactory benefits to the influential minorities that make up the crowd or those who have managed to mislead and excite the crowd. One day, labor leaders—a government within the larger government—must be appeased with positions; the next day, the followers of these labor leaders must be placated with laws, often biased in their favor; the day after, there needs to be something for the manufacturers, for the Methodists, for the Catholics, for the farmers. I have illustrated, in another work, that this last group demands simple bribes—that their desires for personal gain are never balanced by a longing for the common good. The entire process of government under democracy, as everyone knows, is a process of similar trading. The very leader of the state, lacking any title to his position except that which comes from the people's wishes, is compelled to negotiate and bargain like the most insignificant office-seeker. No President of the United States since Washington has entered office without a long list of promises in his pocket, and nine-tenths of those have always been promises of personal rewards from the public resources. The democratic ethic certainly does not view it as immoral to make and fulfill such promises, although statesmen with high ideals, e.g., Lincoln, sometimes deny having made them. What is criticized as immoral is making promises and then failing to keep them. When the late Dr. Wilson appointed William Jennings Bryan as his Secretary of State, it elicited only tolerant smiles, although it was comparable to appointing a chiropractor as Surgeon-General of the Army—a feat that Dr. Harding, a few years later, avoided only by a narrow margin. But if Wilson had overlooked his obligation to Bryan, there would have been an uproar of moral outrage, even among Bryan’s adversaries, and Wilson’s collapse would have come much sooner. When he finally blew up, it was not because, after announcing his Fourteen Points, he joined in deceiving a helpless opponent at Versailles; it was because he attempted, at Paris, to reverse some of the outcomes of that deception by pushing the United States into the League of Nations. A democratic state, indeed, is so firmly built on deceit and trickery of all sorts that they inevitably influence its interactions with other nations, leading it to often be seen as a questionable ally and a crafty adversary. That the United States has resorted to blatant deceptions and evasions in its foreign relations since the earliest days of the Republic was pointed out long ago by Lecky; it is universally regarded today as a well-intentioned fraud—which is to say, a Puritan. Nor has England, the next most prominent democratic state, earned the nickname perfide Albion for no reason. Governed by shady individuals, a nation itself becomes shady.
In its domestic relations, of course, the same causes have the same effects. The government deals with the citizens from whom it has its mandate in a base and disingenuous manner, and fails completely to maintain equal justice among them. It not only follows the majority in persecuting those who happen to be unpopular; it183 also institutes persecutions of its own, and frequently against men of the greatest rectitude and largest public usefulness. I marvel that no candidate for the doctorate has ever written a realistic history of the American Department of Justice, ironically so called. It has been engaged in sharp practices since the earliest days, and remains a fecund source of oppression and corruption to-day. It is hard to recall an administration in which it was not the centre of grave scandal. Within our own time it has actually resorted to perjury in its efforts to undo men guilty of flouting it, and at all times it has laboured valiantly to nullify the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The doings of its corps of spies and agents provocateurs are worthy the pen of some confectioner of dime novels; at one time they were employed against the members of the two houses of Congress, and the alarmed legislators threw them off only by threatening to hold up their pay. As Mill long ago pointed out, the tyranny of the majority under democracy is not only shown in oppressive laws, but also in a usurped power to suspend the operation of laws that are just. In this enterprise a democratic government always184 marches ahead of the majority. Even more than the most absolute oriental despotism, it becomes a government of men, not of laws. Its favourites are, to all intents and purposes, immune to criminal processes, whatever their offences, and its enemies are exposed to espionage and persecution of the most aggravated sort. It takes advantage of every passing craze and delusion of the mob to dispose of those who oppose it, and it maintains a complex and highly effective machine for launching such crazes and delusions when the supply of them lags. Above all, it always shows that characteristically Puritan habit of which Brooks Adams wrote in “The Emancipation of Massachusetts”: the habit, to wit, of inflicting as much mental suffering as possible upon its victims. That is to say, it not only has at them by legal means; it also defames them, and so seeks to ruin them doubly. The constant and central aim of every democratic government is to silence criticism of itself. It begins to weaken, i. e., the jobs of its component rogues begin to be insecure, the instant such criticism rises. It is thus fidei defensor before it is anything else, and its whole power, legal and extra-legal, is thrown against the sceptic185 who challenges its infallibility. Constitutional checks have little effect upon its operations, for the only machinery for putting them into effect is under its control. No ruler, indeed, ever wants to be a constitutional ruler, and least of all the ruler whose reign has a term, and who must make hay, in consequence, while the sun shines. Under republics, as under constitutional monarchies, the history of government is a history of successive usurpations. I avoid the banality of pointing to the cases of Lincoln and Wilson. No man would want to be President of the United States in strict accordance with the Constitution. There is no sense of power in merely executing laws; it comes from evading or augmenting them.
In its domestic relationships, the same issues lead to the same outcomes. The government engages with citizens, from whom it derives its authority, in a manipulative and insincere way, completely failing to uphold equal justice among them. It not only follows the majority in targeting those who are unpopular; it also initiates its own persecutions, often against individuals of strong integrity and significant public service. I’m surprised that no doctoral candidate has ever produced an honest history of the so-called American Department of Justice. It has engaged in unethical practices since its inception and continues to be a fertile ground for oppression and corruption today. It's hard to recall an administration that wasn’t at the heart of a serious scandal. In recent times, it has resorted to lying under oath in its attempts to go after people who challenge it, and consistently works hard to undermine the protections of the Bill of Rights. The activities of its spies and agents provocateurs read like the plot of a cheap novel; at one point, they were used against members of Congress, and panicked legislators only managed to get rid of them by threatening to withhold their salaries. As Mill pointed out long ago, the tyranny of the majority in a democracy is evident not only in oppressive laws but also in the seized ability to suspend just laws. In this effort, a democratic government often outpaces the majority. Even more than a harsh Eastern despotism, it becomes a government run by people rather than laws. Its favorites are, effectively, immune to criminal charges, no matter their crimes, while its foes face extreme surveillance and persecution. It exploits every passing trend and collective delusion to eliminate those who oppose it, and it maintains a complex and highly effective system for creating such trends and delusions when they're in short supply. Above all, it displays that typical Puritan tendency that Brooks Adams referred to in “The Emancipation of Massachusetts”: the tendency to inflict as much mental anguish as possible on its victims. This means it not only attacks them through legal means; it also slanders them, seeking to ruin them in multiple ways. The constant and main goal of every democratic government is to silence its critics. It begins to weaken—the jobs of its various miscreants become threatened—the moment such criticism arises. Thus, it acts as fidei defensor before it is anything else, throwing all its power, both legal and illegal, against the skeptic who challenges its infallibility. Constitutional checks have little impact on its actions, as the only machinery for enforcing them is under its control. No ruler ever truly aspires to be a constitutional ruler, especially not one whose term is limited, who must make the most of their time while possible. In republics, as in constitutional monarchies, the history of governance is one of continuous power grabs. I can skip the cliché of referencing Lincoln and Wilson. No one would want to be President of the United States strictly according to the Constitution. There’s no real feeling of power in simply enforcing laws; it comes from bending or expanding them.
I incline to think that this view of government as a group of men struggling for power and profit, in the face and at the expense of the generality of men, has its place somewhere in the dark recesses of the popular mind, and that it accounts, at least in large part, for the toleration with which public corruption is regarded in democratic states. Democratic man, to begin with, is corrupt himself: he will take whatever he can safely get, law or no law. He assumes,186 naturally and accurately, that the knaves and mountebanks who govern him are of the same kidney—in his own phrase, that they are in public life for what there is in it. It thus does not shock him to find them running true to the ordinances of their nature. If, indeed, any individual among them shows an unusual rectitude, and refuses spectacularly to take what might be his for the grabbing, Homo boobiens sets him down as either a liar or an idiot, and refuses to admire him. So with private rogues who tap the communal till. Democratic man is stupid, but he is not so stupid that he does not see the government as a group of men devoted to his exploitation—that is, as a group external to his own group, and with antagonistic interests. He believes that its central aim is to squeeze as much out of him as he can be forced to yield, and so he sees no immorality in attempting a contrary squeeze when the opportunity offers. Beating the government thus becomes a transaction devoid of moral turpitude. If, when it is achieved on an heroic scale by scoundrels of high tone, a storm of public indignation follows, the springs of that indignation are to be found, not in virtue, but in envy. In187 point of fact, it seldom follows. As I have said, there was little if any public fury over the colossal stealings that went on during the Wilson administration, and there was still less over the smaller but perhaps even more cynical stealings that glorified the short reign of Harding; in the latter case, in fact, most of the odium settled upon the specialists in righteousness who laid the thieves by the heels. The soldiers coming home from the War for Democracy did not demand that the war profiteers be jailed; they simply demanded that they themselves be paid enough to make up the difference between what they got for fighting for their country and what they might have stolen had they escaped the draft. Their chief indignation was lavished, not upon the airship contractors who made off with a billion, but upon their brothers who were paid $10 a day in the shipyards. The feats of the former were beyond their grasp, but those of the latter they could imagine—and envy.
I tend to think that this view of government as a group of people fighting for power and profit, often at the expense of the general public, is embedded somewhere in the collective mindset. It explains, at least in part, the tolerance with which public corruption is seen in democratic societies. To start with, the average democratic citizen is corrupt themselves: they’ll take whatever they can get away with, whether it's legal or not. They naturally and accurately assume that the dishonest and flashy leaders are cut from the same cloth—in their own words, that they are in public office for personal gain. So, it doesn’t surprise them to see these leaders acting according to their true nature. If, indeed, one of these leaders shows unusual integrity and dramatically refuses to take what could easily be theirs, the average person considers them either a liar or a fool and refuses to admire them. The same goes for private thieves who steal from the community funds. While democratic citizens may be somewhat naïve, they aren't so naïve that they don't see the government as a group of individuals focused on exploiting them—that is, as a separate group with opposing interests. They believe the main goal of the government is to extract as much from them as possible, so they see no immorality in trying to turn the tables whenever the chance arises. Therefore, beating the government becomes a morally neutral transaction. If there’s a wave of public outrage when this is done on a grand scale by sophisticated crooks, that outrage comes not from virtue, but from envy. In fact, it rarely happens. As I mentioned, there was little to no public anger over the massive thefts during the Wilson administration, and even less over the smaller but perhaps more cynical thefts during Harding’s brief time in office; in that case, most of the resentment fell on the righteous individuals who exposed the thieves. Soldiers returning from the War for Democracy didn’t demand jail time for war profiteers; they simply wanted to be paid enough to cover the gap between what they earned fighting for their country and what they might have stolen if they had avoided the draft. Their biggest anger was directed not at the airship contractors who pocketed a billion, but at their fellow soldiers who were paid $10 a day in the shipyards. The actions of the former were beyond their understanding, but they could easily envision—and envy—the feats of the latter.
This fellow feeling for thieves is probably what makes capitalism so secure in democratic societies. Under absolutism it is always in danger, and not infrequently, as history teaches, it is exploited and undone, but under democracy188 it is safe. Democratic man can understand the aims and aspirations of capitalism; they are, greatly magnified, simply his own aims and aspirations. Thus he tends to be friendly to it, and to view with suspicion those who propose to overthrow it. The new system, whatever its nature, would force him to invent a whole new outfit of dreams, and that is always a difficult and unpleasant business, to workers in the ditch as to philosophers in the learned grove. Capitalism under democracy has a further advantage: its enemies, even when it is attacked, are scattered and weak, and it is usually easily able to array one half of them against the other half, and thus dispose of both. That is precisely what happened in the United States after the late war. The danger that confronted capitalism was then a double one. On the one side there was the tall talk that the returning conscripts, once they got out of uniform, would demand the punishment of the patriots who had looted the public treasury while they were away. On the other side there was an uneasy rumour that a war Katzenjammer was heavily upon them, and that they would demand a scientific inquiry into the true causes and aims of the war, and into the manner and purposes189 of their own uncomfortable exploitation. This double danger was quickly met and turned off, and by the simple device of diverting the bile of the conscripts against those of their own class who had escaped servitude, to wit, the small group of draft-dodgers and conscientious objectors and the larger group of political radicals, who were represented to be slackers in theory if not in fact. Thus one group of victims was set upon the other, and the fact that both had a grievance against their joint exploiters was concealed and forgotten. Mob fears, easily aroused, aided in the achievement of the coup. Within a few weeks gallant bands of American Legionaries were hunting Reds down all the back-alleys of the land, and gaudily butchering them, when found, at odds of a hundred to one. I know of nothing more indicative of the strength of capitalism under democracy than this melodramatic and extremely amusing business. The scheme succeeded admirably, and it deserved to succeed, for it was managed with laudable virtuosity, and it was based upon a shrewd understanding of democratic psychology.
This sympathy for thieves is likely what keeps capitalism strong in democratic societies. Under absolute rule, it's always at risk, and as history shows, it can be taken advantage of and destroyed, but under democracy, it's secure. A democratic person can grasp the goals and desires of capitalism; they are, in an exaggerated sense, simply his own goals and desires. So, he tends to support it and view with suspicion anyone suggesting its overthrow. The new system, whatever it is, would force him to come up with an entirely new set of dreams, and that's usually a tough and unpleasant task, for workers in the trenches just as much as for philosophers in their ivory towers. Capitalism under democracy has another advantage: its enemies, even when attacking it, are divided and weak, and it often manages to pit one group against the other, eliminating both. That's exactly what happened in the United States after the recent war. The threat to capitalism was twofold. On one side, there were fears that the returning soldiers, once out of uniform, would call for the punishment of those patriots who had pillaged the public funds while they were away. On the other side, there was an unsettling rumor that a post-war hangover was looming, and that they would demand a serious investigation into the real causes and goals of the war, as well as into how they had been exploited uncomfortably. This double threat was quickly addressed and deflected, simply by redirecting the anger of the soldiers toward those in their own class who had avoided service, namely, a small group of draft dodgers and conscientious objectors, as well as a larger group of political radicals, who were portrayed as slackers in theory if not in practice. So, one group of victims was turned against the other, and the fact that both shared grievances against their common exploiters was hidden and forgotten. Mob fears, easily ignited, helped to pull off the scheme. Within weeks, brave bands of American Legionnaires were hunting down Reds in every alley, brutally attacking them when found, often at odds of a hundred to one. I can't think of anything more indicative of capitalism's strength under democracy than this dramatic and highly entertaining situation. The plan worked brilliantly, and it deserved to succeed because it was executed with impressive skill and was rooted in a clever understanding of democratic psychology.
I believe that every other emergency that is likely to arise, at least in the United States, will190 be dealt with in the same adroit and effective manner. The same thing has been done in other democratic states: I point to the so-called general strike in England in 1926, which was wrecked by pitting half of the proletariat against the other half. The capitalistic system now enlists the best brains in all the democratic nations, including France and Germany, and I believe that, instead of losing such support hereafter, it will get more and more of it. As the old aristocracies decline, the plutocracy is bound to inherit their hegemony, and to have the support of the nether mob. An aristocratic society may hold that a soldier or a man of learning is superior to a rich manufacturer or banker, but in a democratic society the latter are inevitably put higher, if only because their achievement is more readily comprehended by the inferior man, and he can more easily imagine himself, by some favour of God, duplicating it. Thus the imponderable but powerful force of public opinion directs the aspirations of all the more alert and ambitious young men toward business, and what is so assiduously practised tends to produce experts. E. W. Howe, I incline to think, is quite right when he argues that the average American191 banker or business man, whatever his demerits otherwise, is at least more competent professionally than the average American statesman, musician, painter, author, labour leader, scholar, theologian or politician. Think of the best American poet of our time, or the best soldier, or the best violoncellist, and then ask yourself if his rank among his fellows in the world is seriously to be compared with that of the late J. Pierpont Morgan among financial manipulators, or that of John D. Rockefeller among traders. The capitalists, in fact, run the country, as they run all democracies: they emerged in Germany, after the republic arose from the ruins of the late war, like Anadyomene from the sea. They organize and control the minorities that struggle eternally for power, and so get a gradually firmer grip upon the government. One by one they dispose of such demagogues as Bryan and Roosevelt, and put the helm of state into the hands of trusted and reliable men—McKinley, Harding, Coolidge. In England, Germany and France they patronize, in a somewhat wistful way, what remains of the old aristocracies. In the United States, through such agents as the late Gompers, they keep Demos penned192 in a gilt and glittering cage. Public opinion? Walter Lippmann, searching for it, could not find it. A century before him Fichte said “es gar nicht existirte.” Public opinion, in its raw state, gushes out in the immemorial form of the mob’s fears. It is piped to central factories, and there it is flavoured and coloured, and put into cans.
I believe that every other emergency likely to happen, at least in the United States, will190 be handled in the same skilled and effective way. The same has been seen in other democratic countries: I point to the so-called general strike in England in 1926, which was undermined by turning one half of the working class against the other half. The capitalist system now attracts the best minds in all democratic nations, including France and Germany, and I think that, instead of losing this support in the future, it will gain even more. As the old aristocracies fade, the wealthy elite is bound to take over their dominance and have the backing of the lower classes. An aristocratic society might consider a soldier or a scholar to be superior to a wealthy manufacturer or banker, but in a democratic society, the latter are inevitably held in higher regard, if only because their success is more easily understood by the average person, who can more readily imagine himself, by some chance, achieving it. Thus, the unquantifiable but powerful influence of public opinion drives the ambitions of all the more driven and aspiring young men toward business, and what is so diligently practiced leads to the emergence of experts. E. W. Howe seems to be right when he claims that the typical American banker or business person, despite any other shortcomings, is at least more professionally capable than the average American politician, musician, painter, author, labor leader, scholar, theologian, or politician. Think about the best American poet of our time, or the best soldier, or the best cellist, and then consider whether their standing among their peers in the world truly compares to that of the late J. Pierpont Morgan among financiers, or John D. Rockefeller among traders. In fact, the capitalists run the country, just as they do in all democracies: they emerged in Germany, after the republic rose from the ruins of the last war, like Venus from the sea. They organize and control the minorities that endlessly vie for power, thus gaining a progressively firmer hold on the government. One by one, they eliminate demagogues like Bryan and Roosevelt and put the reins of state into the hands of trusted and reliable leaders—McKinley, Harding, Coolidge. In England, Germany, and France, they somewhat wistfully support what remains of the old aristocracies. In the United States, through agents like the late Gompers, they keep the masses contained192 in a shiny and glamorous cage. Public opinion? Walter Lippmann couldn’t find it while searching for it. A century before him, Fichte stated that it “es gar nicht existirte.” Public opinion, in its raw form, spills out in the ancient expression of the masses' fears. It is sent to central factories, where it is flavored and colored, and then packaged.
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CODA
1.
The Future of Democracy
The Future of Democracy
Whether or not democracy is destined to survive in the world until the corruptible puts on incorruption and the immemorial Christian dead leap out of their graves, their faces shining and their yells resounding—this is something, I confess, that I don’t know, nor is it necessary, for the purposes of the present inquiry, that I venture upon the hazard of a guess. My business is not prognosis, but diagnosis. I am not engaged in therapeutics, but in pathology. That simple statement of fact, I daresay, will be accepted as a confession, condemning me out of hand as unfit for my task, and even throwing a certain doubt upon my bona fides. For it is one of the peculiar intellectual accompaniments of democracy that the concept of the insoluble becomes unfashionable—nay, almost infamous. To lack a remedy is to lack the very license to196 discuss disease. The causes of this are to be sought, without question, in the nature of democracy itself. It came into the world as a cure-all, and it remains primarily a cure-all to this day. Any boil upon the body politic, however vast and raging, may be relieved by taking a vote; any flux of blood may be stopped by passing a law. The aim of government is to repeal the laws of nature, and re-enact them with moral amendments. War becomes simply a device to end war. The state, a mystical emanation from the mob, takes on a transcendental potency, and acquires the power to make over the father which begat it. Nothing remains inscrutable and beyond remedy, not even the way of a man with a maid. It was not so under the ancient and accursed systems of despotism, now happily purged out of the world. They, too, I grant you, had certain pretensions of an homeric gaudiness, but they at least refrained from attempts to abolish sin, poverty, stupidity, cowardice, and other such immutable realities. Mediæval Christianity, which was a theological and philosophical apologia for those systems, actually erected belief in that immutability into a cardinal article of faith. The evils of the world were incurable:197 one put off the quest for a perfect moral order until one got to heaven, post mortem. There arose, in consequence, a scheme of checks and balances that was consummate and completely satisfactory, for it could not be put to a test, and the logical holes in it were chinked with miracles. But no more. To-day the Holy Saints are deposed. Now each and every human problem swings into the range of practical politics. The worst and oldest of them may be solved facilely by travelling bands of lady Ph.D.’s, each bearing the mandate of a Legislature of kept men, all unfaithful to their protectors.
Whether or not democracy is meant to last in the world until the corruptible become incorrupt and the long-departed Christian dead rise from their graves, their faces shining and their voices echoing—this is something I honestly don't know, nor is it necessary for the purposes of this discussion for me to take a risk on a guess. My job isn't to predict the future, but to analyze the present situation. I’m not working on treatment, but on understanding the problem. I have to say, this simple fact will likely be seen as a confession that makes me unqualified for my role, and it might even cast some doubt on my integrity. One of the strange things about democracy is that the idea of an unsolvable problem becomes out of fashion—almost disgraceful, really. To lack a solution is to be unqualified to even talk about problems. The reasons for this can undoubtedly be found in the essence of democracy itself. It emerged as a cure-all, and it still is primarily seen that way today. Any issue in the political body, no matter how big and urgent, can be treated by voting; any bleeding can be stopped by passing a law. The goal of government is to cancel out the laws of nature and replace them with moral amendments. War becomes merely a way to end war. The state, a mystical product of the people, gains a transcendent power and can reshape the authority that created it. Nothing remains mysterious or beyond solution, not even the way a man interacts with a woman. This was not the case under the ancient and despised systems of despotism, which have thankfully been eradicated from the world. Admittedly, those systems had some pretensions to grandeur, but they at least avoided the attempt to eliminate sin, poverty, ignorance, cowardice, and other such unchangeable realities. Medieval Christianity, which served as a theological and philosophical defense of those systems, actually established belief in that unchangeability as a core tenet. The world's evils were deemed incurable: one postponed the quest for perfect moral order until reaching heaven, post mortem. As a result, there emerged a scheme of checks and balances that was perfect and entirely satisfying, as it could not be tested, and its logical flaws were filled with miracles. But no more. Today, the Holy Saints are removed from their positions. Now every single human problem falls within the reach of practical politics. Even the worst and oldest problems can be easily resolved by roaming groups of women with Ph.D.s, each bearing the mandate of a Legislature made up of unfaithful supporters.
Democracy becomes a substitute for the old religion, and the antithesis of it: the Ku Kluxers, though their reasoning may be faulty, are not far off the facts in their conclusion that Holy Church is its enemy. It shows all the magical potency of the great systems of faith. It has the power to enchant and disarm; it is not vulnerable to logical attack. I point for proof to the appalling gyrations and contortions of its chief exponents. Read, for example, the late James Bryce’s “Modern Democracies.” Observe how he amasses incontrovertible evidence198 that democracy doesn’t work—and then concludes with a stout declaration that it does. Or, if his two fat volumes are too much for you, turn to some school reader and give a judicious perusal to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, with its argument that the North fought the Civil War to save self-government to the world!—a thesis echoed in falsetto, and by feebler men, fifty years later. It is impossible, by any device known to philosophers, to meet doctrines of that sort; they obviously lie outside the range of logical ideas. There is, in the human mind, a natural taste for such hocus-pocus. It greatly simplifies the process of ratiocination, which is unbearably painful to the great majority of men. What dulls and baffles the teeth may be got down conveniently by an heroic gulp. No doubt there is an explanation here of the long-continued popularity of the dogma of the Trinity, which remains unstated in plain terms after two thousand years. And no doubt the dogma of Transubstantiation came under fire in the Reformation because it had grown too simple and comprehensible—because even the Scholastic philosophy had been unable to convert its plain propositions into something that could be believed without199 being understood. Democracy is shot through with this delight in the incredible, this banal mysticism. One cannot discuss it without colliding with preposterous postulates, all of them cherished like authentic hairs from the whiskers of Moses himself. I have alluded to its touching acceptance of the faith that progress is illimitable and ordained of God—that every human problem, in the very nature of things, may be solved. There are corollaries that are even more naïve. One, for example, is to the general effect that optimism is a virtue in itself—that there is a mysterious merit in being hopeful and of glad heart, even in the presence of adverse and immovable facts. This curious notion turns the glittering wheels of Rotary, and is the motive power of the political New Thoughters called Liberals. Certainly the attitude of the average American Liberal toward the so-called League of Nations offered superb clinical material to the student of democratic psychopathology. He began by arguing that the League would save the world. Confronted by proofs of its fraudulence, he switched to the doctrine that believing in it would save the world. So, later on, with the Washington Disarmament Conference. The200 man who hopes absurdly, it appears, is in some fantastic and gaseous manner a better citizen than the man who detects and exposes the truth. Bear this sweet democratic axiom clearly in mind. It is, fundamentally, what is the matter with the United States.
Democracy serves as a replacement for the old religion and stands in opposition to it: the Ku Klux Klan, despite their flawed reasoning, aren't entirely wrong in their belief that the Church is their enemy. Democracy possesses all the magical allure of major belief systems. It can captivate and disarm; it isn’t easily challenged by logic. Take, for instance, the troubling twists and turns of its main advocates. Look at the late James Bryce’s “Modern Democracies.” Note how he gathers undeniable evidence198 that democracy fails—only to wrap up with a strong claim that it succeeds. Or, if his lengthy volumes are too much to handle, check out a school reader and take a careful look at Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, which argues that the North fought in the Civil War to protect self-government for the world!—an idea echoed in a high-pitched voice by weaker men fifty years later. It is impossible, by any means known to philosophers, to debate ideas like this; they clearly fall outside the scope of logical reasoning. The human mind has a natural attraction to such nonsense. It greatly simplifies the process of thinking, which is painfully difficult for most people. What can dull and perplex the senses can often be swallowed down quickly without thought. This could explain the long-lasting appeal of the doctrine of the Trinity, which remains unexpressed in straightforward terms after two thousand years. And the doctrine of Transubstantiation was criticized during the Reformation because it became too simple and understandable—because even Scholastic philosophy couldn't turn its straightforward statements into something that could be believed without199 being comprehended. Democracy is filled with this fascination for the unbelievable, this common mysticism. You can't discuss it without running into ridiculous assumptions, all of which are cherished as if they were genuine hairs from the beard of Moses himself. I've mentioned its touching faith in the belief that progress is limitless and decreed by God—that every human issue can, by its very nature, be resolved. There are even more naïve corollaries. For instance, one idea is that optimism is a virtue in itself—that there is a mysterious value in being hopeful and cheerful, even in the face of harsh and unchangeable realities. This peculiar belief keeps the wheels of Rotary turning and fuels the political New Thought participants known as Liberals. Certainly, the mindset of the average American Liberal towards the League of Nations provided excellent material for examining democratic psychopathy. They initially argued that the League would save the world. When faced with evidence of its deceitfulness, they shifted to the belief that simply believing in it would save the world. The same occurred with the Washington Disarmament Conference. The person who hopes absurdly, it seems, is in some fantastical and surreal way a better citizen than the one who uncovers and reveals the truth. Keep this sweet democratic principle in mind. It is, at its core, what’s wrong with the United States.
As I say, my present mandate does not oblige me to conjure up a system that will surpass and shame democracy as democracy surpasses and shames the polity of the Andaman Islanders or the Great Khan—a system full-blown and perfect, like Prohibition, and ready to be put into effect by the simple adoption of an amendment to the Constitution. Such a system, for all I know, may lie outside the farthest soarings of the human mind, though that mind can weigh the stars and know God. Until the end of the chapter the ants and bees may flutter their sardonic antennæ at us in that department, as they do in others: the last joke upon man may be that he never learned how to govern himself in a rational and competent manner, as the last joke upon woman may be that she never had a baby without wishing that the Day of Judgment were a week past. I am not even undertaking to prove here that democracy is too full of evils to be further201 borne. On the contrary, I am convinced that it has some valuable merits, not often described, and I shall refer to a few of them presently. All I argue is that its manifest defects, if they are ever to be got rid of at all, must be got rid of by examining them realistically—that they will never cease to afflict all the more puissant and exemplary nations so long as discussing them is impeded by concepts borrowed from theology. As for me, I have never encountered any actual evidence, convincing to an ordinary jury, that vox populi is actually vox Dei. The proofs, indeed, run the other way. The life of the inferior man is one long protest against the obstacles that God interposes to the attainment of his dreams, and democracy, if it is anything at all, is simply one way of getting ’round those obstacles. Thus it represents, not a jingling echo of what seems to be the divine will, but a raucous defiance of it. To that extent, perhaps, it is truly civilized, for civilization, as I have argued elsewhere, is best described as an effort to remedy the blunders and check the cruel humours of the Cosmic Kaiser. But what is defiant is surely not official, and what is not official is open to examination.
As I said, my current role doesn’t require me to create a system that would outdo and embarrass democracy, just as democracy outdoes and embarrasses the governance of the Andaman Islanders or the Great Khan—a perfect and complete system, like Prohibition, that could be implemented by simply amending the Constitution. Such a system, for all I know, might be beyond the limits of human imagination, even though the human mind can measure the stars and understand God. Until the end of the chapter, the ants and bees might mock us with their sarcastic antennae in this area, as they do in others: the final irony for mankind might be that he never figured out how to govern himself rationally and competently, just as the last irony for women may be that they never gave birth without wishing that Judgment Day had already passed. I'm not trying to prove here that democracy is too flawed to endure any longer. On the contrary, I believe it has some valuable qualities that aren’t often highlighted, and I’ll mention a few of them shortly. My only point is that its obvious shortcomings, if they are ever to be addressed, must be tackled realistically—that they will continue to trouble even the most powerful and exemplary nations as long as discussing them is hampered by ideas borrowed from theology. Personally, I have never seen any convincing evidence, persuasive enough for a regular jury, that vox populi is genuinely vox Dei. In fact, the evidence points in the opposite direction. The life of the common man is a continuous protest against the barriers that God puts in the way of his dreams, and democracy, if it means anything at all, is merely a way to navigate around those barriers. Therefore, it signifies not a harmonious reflection of what seems to be the divine will, but a loud challenge to it. To that extent, perhaps, it is truly civilized, for civilization, as I've argued elsewhere, is best described as an effort to correct the mistakes and temper the harsh whims of the Cosmic Kaiser. But what is defiant is certainly not official, and what is not official is open to scrutiny.
202
202
For all I know, democracy may be a self-limiting disease, as civilization itself seems to be. There are obvious paradoxes in its philosophy, and some of them have a suicidal smack. It offers John Doe a means to rise above his place beside Richard Roe, and then, by making Roe his equal, it takes away the chief usufructs of the rising. I here attempt no pretty logical gymnastics: the history of democratic states is a history of disingenuous efforts to get rid of the second half of that dilemma. There is not only the natural yearning of Doe to use and enjoy the superiority that he has won; there is also the natural tendency of Roe, as an inferior man, to acknowledge it. Democracy, in fact, is always inventing class distinctions, despite its theoretical abhorrence of them. The baron has departed, but in his place stand the grand goblin, the supreme worthy archon, the sovereign grand commander. Democratic man, as I have remarked, is quite unable to think of himself as a free individual; he must belong to a group, or shake with fear and loneliness—and the group, of course, must have its leaders. It would be hard to find a country in which such brummagem serene highnesses are revered with more passionate203 devotion than they get in the United States. The distinction that goes with mere office runs far ahead of the distinction that goes with actual achievement. A Harding is regarded as genuinely superior to a Halsted, no doubt because his doings are better understood. But there is a form of human striving that is understood by democratic man even better than Harding’s, and that is the striving for money. Thus the plutocracy, in a democratic state, tends to take the place of the missing aristocracy, and even to be mistaken for it. It is, of course, something quite different. It lacks all the essential characters of a true aristocracy: a clean tradition, culture, public spirit, honesty, honour, courage—above all, courage. It stands under no bond of obligation to the state; it has no public duty; it is transient and lacks a goal. Its most puissant dignitaries of to-day came out of the mob only yesterday—and from the mob they bring all its peculiar ignobilities. As practically encountered, the plutocracy stands quite as far from the honnête homme as it stands from the Holy Saints. Its main character is its incurable timorousness; it is for ever grasping at the straws held out by demagogues. Half a dozen gabby Jewish204 youths, meeting in a back room to plan a revolution—in other words, half a dozen kittens preparing to upset the Matterhorn—are enough to scare it half to death. Its dreams are of banshees, hobgoblins, bugaboos. The honest, untroubled snores of a Percy or a Hohenstaufen are quite beyond it.
For all I know, democracy might be a self-limiting issue, just like civilization itself seems to be. There are clear contradictions in its philosophy, some of which feel self-destructive. It gives John Doe a way to rise above his position next to Richard Roe, but by making Roe his equal, it takes away the main benefits of that rise. I’m not trying to perform any fancy logic tricks here: the history of democratic nations is a history of insincere attempts to resolve that dilemma. Doe naturally wants to use and enjoy the superiority he has gained; there’s also Roe’s natural tendency, as someone lower down, to acknowledge it. In reality, democracy constantly creates class distinctions, even though it theoretically opposes them. The nobleman is gone, but in his place are the powerful figures, the supreme leaders, and the grand commanders. Democratic individuals, as I’ve mentioned, can’t see themselves as free individuals; they need to belong to a group, or else feel fear and loneliness—and the group, of course, needs its leaders. It’s hard to find any country where these faux noble figures are revered with more intense devotion than in the United States. The status that comes merely from holding an office is valued far more than the status that comes from actual achievement. A Harding is seen as genuinely superior to a Halsted, likely because his actions are better known. However, there’s a form of human ambition that the democratic individual understands even better than Harding’s, and that’s the ambition for money. As a result, the wealthy class in a democratic state tends to take the place of the missing aristocracy and can even be mistaken for it. Yet, it is something entirely different. It lacks all the essential qualities of a true aristocracy: a solid tradition, culture, public spirit, honesty, honor, courage—most importantly, courage. It has no obligation to the state; it has no public duty; it is temporary and lacks a purpose. Its most powerful leaders today came from the masses just yesterday—and they bring all the unique dishonor of the masses with them. In practice, the wealthy class is just as far from the honest individual as it is from the Holy Saints. Its main characteristic is its unshakeable fear; it’s constantly grasping at the straws offered by demagogues. Half a dozen talkative Jewish young men meeting in a back room to plan a revolution—in other words, half a dozen kittens trying to take down the Matterhorn—are enough to send it into a panic. Its nightmares are filled with ghosts, fairies, and monsters. The peaceful, undisturbed snores of a Percy or a Hohenstaufen are entirely beyond it.
The plutocracy, as I say, is comprehensible to the mob because its aspirations are essentially those of inferior men: it is not by accident that Christianity, a mob religion, paves heaven with gold and precious stones, i. e., with money. There are, of course, reactions against this ignoble ideal among men of more civilized tastes, even in democratic states, and sometimes they arouse the mob to a transient distrust of certain of the plutocratic pretensions. But that distrust seldom arises above mere envy, and the polemic which engenders it is seldom sound in logic or impeccable in motive. What it lacks is aristocratic disinterestedness, born of aristocratic security. There is no body of opinion behind it that is, in the strictest sense, a free opinion. Its chief exponents, by some divine irony, are pedagogues of one sort or another—which is to say, men chiefly marked by their haunting fear of205 losing their jobs. Living under such terrors, with the plutocracy policing them harshly on one side and the mob congenitally suspicious of them on the other, it is no wonder that their revolt usually peters out in metaphysics, and that they tend to abandon it as their families grow up, and the costs of heresy become prohibitive. The pedagogue, in the long run, shows the virtues of the Congressman, the newspaper editorial writer or the butler, not those of the aristocrat. When, by any chance, he persists in contumacy beyond thirty, it is only too commonly a sign, not that he is heroic, but simply that he is pathological. So with most of his brethren of the Utopian Fife and Drum Corps, whether they issue out of his own seminary or out of the wilderness. They are fanatics; not statesmen. Thus politics, under democracy, resolves itself into impossible alternatives. Whatever the label on the parties, or the war cries issuing from the demagogues who lead them, the practical choice is between the plutocracy on the one side and a rabble of preposterous impossibilists on the other. One must either follow the New York Times, or one must be prepared to swallow Bryan and the Bolsheviki. It is a pity that this is so. For what206 democracy needs most of all is a party that will separate the good that is in it theoretically from the evils that beset it practically, and then try to erect that good into a workable system. What it needs beyond everything is a party of liberty. It produces, true enough, occasional libertarians, just as despotism produces occasional regicides, but it treats them in the same drum-head way. It will never have a party of them until it invents and installs a genuine aristocracy, to breed them and secure them.
The plutocracy, as I mentioned, is understandable to the masses because its ambitions are essentially those of lesser individuals: it's not a coincidence that Christianity, a religion of the masses, paves heaven with gold and precious stones, meaning with money. Of course, there are reactions against this base ideal among more civilized men, even in democratic states, and sometimes they inspire the masses to develop a temporary distrust of certain plutocratic claims. However, that distrust rarely goes beyond simple envy, and the arguments that create it are often not logical or justifiable. What’s missing is an aristocratic detachment that comes from aristocratic stability. There isn’t a strong body of opinion that is truly free. Its main advocates, ironically, are educators of various types—men primarily defined by their constant fear of losing their jobs. Living under such pressures, with the plutocracy enforcing harsh control on one side and the masses inherently suspicious of them on the other, it’s no surprise that their rebellion usually fizzles out into abstract reasoning, and they tend to abandon it as their families grow, facing the steep costs of dissent. In the long run, the educator reflects the characteristics of a Congressman, a newspaper editorialist, or a butler, not those of an aristocrat. When, for some reason, he continues to resist past the age of thirty, it’s often a sign, not of heroism, but of some kind of dysfunction. The same goes for most of his fellow members of the Utopian Fife and Drum Corps, whether they come from his own institution or from the wild. They are fanatics, not statesmen. Thus, politics in a democracy comes down to impossible choices. Regardless of the labels of the parties or the slogans from the demagogues leading them, the practical option is between the plutocracy on one side and a group of ridiculous idealists on the other. One must either follow the New York Times, or be ready to accept Bryan and the Bolsheviks. It’s unfortunate that it’s this way. What democracy really needs is a party that can separate its theoretical goodness from the practical evils it faces, and then work to put that goodness into a practical system. What it needs most of all is a party of liberty. True, it sometimes produces libertarians, just as tyranny produces the occasional regicide, but it treats them in the same heavy-handed way. It will never have a true party of them until it creates and establishes a real aristocracy to nurture and protect them.
2.
Last Words
Final Words
I have alluded somewhat vaguely to the merits of democracy. One of them is quite obvious: it is, perhaps, the most charming form of government ever devised by man. The reason is not far to seek. It is based upon propositions that are palpably not true—and what is not true, as everyone knows, is always immensely more fascinating and satisfying to the vast majority of men than what is true. Truth has a harshness that alarms them, and an air of finality that collides with their incurable romanticism. They207 turn, in all the great emergencies of life, to the ancient promises, transparently false but immensely comforting, and of all those ancient promises there is none more comforting than the one to the effect that the lowly shall inherit the earth. It is at the bottom of the dominant religious system of the modern world, and it is at the bottom of the dominant political system. The latter, which is democracy, gives it an even higher credit and authority than the former, which is Christianity. More, democracy gives it a certain appearance of objective and demonstrable truth. The mob man, functioning as citizen, gets a feeling that he is really important to the world—that he is genuinely running things. Out of his maudlin herding after rogues and mountebanks there comes to him a sense of vast and mysterious power—which is what makes archbishops, police sergeants, the grand goblins of the Ku Klux and other such magnificoes happy. And out of it there comes, too, a conviction that he is somehow wise, that his views are taken seriously by his betters—which is what makes United States Senators, fortune-tellers and Young Intellectuals happy. Finally, there comes out of it a glowing consciousness of208 a high duty triumphantly done—which is what makes hangmen and husbands happy.
I have hinted somewhat vaguely at the benefits of democracy. One of them is pretty clear: it’s probably the most appealing form of government ever created by humans. The reason is easy to identify. It’s based on ideas that are obviously not true—and what’s not true, as everyone knows, is always way more interesting and satisfying to most people than what is true. Truth tends to have a harshness that scares them and a sense of finality that clashes with their unshakeable romanticism. They turn, in all the major crises of life, to the old promises, transparently false but incredibly comforting, and of all those old promises, there’s none more comforting than the one that says the humble will inherit the earth. This idea is foundational to the main religious system of the modern world, and it’s also at the core of the main political system. The latter, democracy, gives it even more credibility and authority than the former, Christianity. Moreover, democracy provides it with an illusion of objective and demonstrable truth. The average person, acting as a citizen, feels that they are genuinely important to the world—that they are really in charge. From their sentimental following of tricksters and swindlers comes a sense of vast and mysterious power—which is what makes archbishops, police sergeants, the grand leaders of the Ku Klux Klan, and other such figures happy. And from it, there also arises a belief that they are somehow wise, that their opinions are taken seriously by their superiors—which is what makes U.S. Senators, fortune-tellers, and young intellectuals happy. Finally, from this comes a proud awareness of a high duty successfully performed—which is what makes hangmen and husbands happy.
All these forms of happiness, of course, are illusory. They don’t last. The democrat, leaping into the air to flap his wings and praise God, is for ever coming down with a thump. The seeds of his disaster, as I have shown, lie in his own stupidity: he can never get rid of the naïve delusion—so beautifully Christian!—that happiness is something to be got by taking it away from the other fellow. But there are seeds, too, in the very nature of things: a promise, after all, is only a promise, even when it is supported by divine revelation, and the chances against its fulfilment may be put into a depressing mathematical formula. Here the irony that lies under all human aspiration shows itself: the quest for happiness, as always, brings only unhappiness in the end. But saying that is merely saying that the true charm of democracy is not for the democrat but for the spectator. That spectator, it seems to me, is favoured with a show of the first cut and calibre. Try to imagine anything more heroically absurd! What grotesque false pretences! What a parade of obvious imbecilities! What a welter of fraud! But is fraud unamusing?209 Then I retire forthwith as a psychologist. The fraud of democracy, I contend, is more amusing than any other—more amusing even, and by miles, than the fraud of religion. Go into your praying-chamber and give sober thought to any of the more characteristic democratic inventions: say, Law Enforcement. Or to any of the typical democratic prophets: say, the late Archangel Bryan. If you don’t come out paled and palsied by mirth then you will not laugh on the Last Day itself, when Presbyterians step out of the grave like chicks from the egg, and wings blossom from their scapulæ, and they leap into interstellar space with roars of joy.
All these forms of happiness, of course, are just illusions. They don’t last. The democrat, jumping into the air to flap his wings and praise God, always comes crashing down. The roots of his downfall, as I've shown, are in his own foolishness: he can never shake off the naïve belief—so beautifully Christian!—that happiness is something to be gained by taking it from someone else. But there are also roots in the very nature of things: a promise is just a promise, even when backed by divine revelation, and the odds against it being fulfilled can be put into a really depressing mathematical formula. Here the irony under all human ambition reveals itself: the pursuit of happiness, as always, ends up bringing only unhappiness. But saying that just means the true charm of democracy is for the observer, not for the democrat. That observer, it seems to me, is treated to a first-rate performance. Try to imagine anything more absurdly heroic! What ridiculous pretenses! What a display of obvious foolishness! What a mess of deceit! But is deceit not entertaining?209 Then I’ll step back as a psychologist. The deception of democracy, I argue, is more entertaining than any other—more entertaining by far than the deceit of religion. Go into your prayer room and seriously reflect on any of the more typical democratic creations: take Law Enforcement, for example. Or consider any of the usual democratic prophets: take the late Archangel Bryan. If you don’t come out feeling weak with laughter, then you won’t laugh on the Last Day itself, when Presbyterians rise from the grave like chicks from an egg, wings sprouting from their shoulders, and they leap into interstellar space with roars of joy.
I have spoken hitherto of the possibility that democracy may be a self-limiting disease, like measles. It is, perhaps, something more: it is self-devouring. One cannot observe it objectively without being impressed by its curious distrust of itself—its apparently ineradicable tendency to abandon its whole philosophy at the first sign of strain. I need not point to what happens invariably in democratic states when the national safety is menaced. All the great tribunes of democracy, on such occasions, convert themselves, by a process as simple as taking210 a deep breath, into despots of an almost fabulous ferocity. Lincoln, Roosevelt and Wilson come instantly to mind: Jackson and Cleveland are in the background, waiting to be recalled. Nor is this process confined to times of alarm and terror: it is going on day in and day out. Democracy always seems bent upon killing the thing it theoretically loves. I have rehearsed some of its operations against liberty, the very corner-stone of its political metaphysic. It not only wars upon the thing itself; it even wars upon mere academic advocacy of it. I offer the spectacle of Americans jailed for reading the Bill of Rights as perhaps the most gaudily humorous ever witnessed in the modern world. Try to imagine monarchy jailing subjects for maintaining the divine right of Kings! Or Christianity damning a believer for arguing that Jesus Christ was the Son of God! This last, perhaps, has been done: anything is possible in that direction. But under democracy the remotest and most fantastic possibility is a commonplace of every day. All the axioms resolve themselves into thundering paradoxes, many amounting to downright contradictions in terms. The mob is competent to rule the rest of us—but211 it must be rigorously policed itself. There is a government, not of men, but of laws—but men are set upon benches to decide finally what the law is and may be. The highest function of the citizen is to serve the state—but the first assumption that meets him, when he essays to discharge it, is an assumption of his disingenuousness and dishonour. Is that assumption commonly sound? Then the farce only grows the more glorious.
I have previously mentioned the idea that democracy might be a self-limiting condition, like measles. However, it could be something even more severe: it seems to be self-destructive. It's hard to look at it objectively without noticing its strange distrust of itself—its apparent inability to hold onto its principles at the first hint of difficulty. I don’t need to point out what consistently happens in democratic nations when national safety is threatened. During such times, all the major advocates of democracy quickly turn into despots of almost unbelievable cruelty, a transformation as easy as taking a deep breath. Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Wilson immediately come to mind, with Jackson and Cleveland in the background, waiting to be mentioned. This shift isn’t limited to moments of crisis; it’s happening all the time. Democracy always seems intent on destroying what it claims to cherish. I've outlined some of its actions against liberty, which is the very foundation of its political philosophy. It not only attacks liberty itself but even goes after mere academic discussion of it. The sight of Americans being jailed for reading the Bill of Rights is perhaps the most absurdly ironic thing ever seen in the modern world. Imagine a monarchy imprisoning citizens for believing in the divine right of kings! Or Christianity condemning a believer for claiming that Jesus Christ was the Son of God! This last scenario may have occurred: anything is possible in that regard. But under democracy, the most remote and bizarre possibilities become everyday realities. All the maxims turn into loud paradoxes, many of them practically contradictions. The mob has the capability to govern the rest of us—but it must be strictly policed itself. There’s a government of laws, not of men—but it’s men who occupy benches to ultimately decide what the law is and can be. The highest duty of the citizen is to serve the state—but the first presumption he faces when trying to fulfill this duty is that of his own dishonesty and lack of honor. If that presumption is generally valid, then the farce only becomes more extravagant.
I confess, for my part, that it greatly delights me. I enjoy democracy immensely. It is incomparably idiotic, and hence incomparably amusing. Does it exalt dunderheads, cowards, trimmers, frauds, cads? Then the pain of seeing them go up is balanced and obliterated by the joy of seeing them come down. Is it inordinately wasteful, extravagant, dishonest? Then so is every other form of government: all alike are enemies to laborious and virtuous men. Is rascality at the very heart of it? Well, we have borne that rascality since 1776, and continue to survive. In the long run, it may turn out that rascality is necessary to human government, and even to civilization itself—that civilization, at bottom, is nothing but a colossal swindle. I do212 not know: I report only that when the suckers are running well the spectacle is infinitely exhilarating. But I am, it may be, a somewhat malicious man: my sympathies, when it comes to suckers, tend to be coy. What I can’t make out is how any man can believe in democracy who feels for and with them, and is pained when they are debauched and made a show of. How can any man be a democrat who is sincerely a democrat?
I’ll admit, it really makes me happy. I enjoy democracy a lot. It’s ridiculously foolish, and that's what makes it so entertaining. Does it elevate idiots, cowards, opportunists, liars, and scoundrels? Then the pain of watching them rise is outweighed and erased by the joy of watching them fall. Is it insanely wasteful, extravagant, and dishonest? So is every other form of government; they all pose a threat to hardworking and virtuous people. Is trickery at the core of it? Well, we've dealt with that trickery since 1776 and still manage to get by. In the end, it might turn out that trickery is essential to human governance, and even to civilization itself—that at its core, civilization is just a massive con. I don’t know: I can only say that when the fools are thriving, the show is incredibly thrilling. But I might be a bit mean-spirited: my feelings toward fools tend to be reserved. What I can’t understand is how anyone can believe in democracy while genuinely empathizing with them and feeling hurt when they’re corrupted and put on display. How can a person truly be a democrat if they sincerely are a democrat?
THE END
THE END
213
213
A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN
WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET
This book is composed on the Linotype in Bodoni, so-called after its designer, Giambattista Bodoni (1740–1813) a celebrated Italian scholar and printer. Bodoni planned his type especially for use on the more smoothly finished papers that came into vogue late in the eighteenth century and drew his letters with a mechanical regularity that is readily apparent on comparison with the less formal old style. Other characteristics that will be noted are the square serifs without fillet and the marked contrast between the light and heavy strokes.
This book is typeset on the Linotype in Bodoni, named after its designer, Giambattista Bodoni (1740–1813), a well-known Italian scholar and printer. Bodoni created his type specifically for the smoother papers that became popular in the late eighteenth century and crafted his letters with a mechanical precision that is clear when compared to the more casual old style. Other features to note are the square serifs without a fillet and the strong contrast between the light and heavy strokes.

SET UP AND ELECTROTYPED BY THE
VAIL-BALLOU PRESS, INC., BING-
HAMTON, N. Y.·PAPER SUPPLIED
BY TILESTON AND HOLLINGS-
WORTH, HYDE PARK, MASS. ·
PRINTED AND BOUND BY
THE PLIMPTON PRESS,
NORWOOD, MASS.
SET UP AND ELECTROTYPED BY THE
VAIL-BALLOU PRESS, INC., BING-
HAMTON, NY. · PAPER SUPPLIED
BY TILESTON AND HOLLINGS-
WORTH, HYDE PARK, MA. ·
PRINTED AND BOUND BY
THE PLIMPTON PRESS,
NORWOOD, MA.
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation and hyphenation were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.
Punctuation and hyphenation were standardized when a clear preference was identified in the original book; otherwise, they remained unchanged.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.
Simple typos were fixed; mismatched quotation marks were adjusted when it was clear, and otherwise left as they were.
The illustrations are the publisher’s logo: a running dog.
The illustrations feature the publisher’s logo: a running dog.
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