THE IMPERIAL
JAPANESE NAVY

[Pg ix]

This book is uniform with my similar book on the Russian Navy, and is designed to have an exactly similar scope; that is to say, it traces the Japanese Navy from the earliest period up to the time of the outbreak of the war with Russia in February, 1904. It then deals with the dockyards of Japan, the armament and equipment of her Fleet, with her personnel, both officers and men, and finally with all those side issues and semi-political questions which have brought the modern Japanese Fleet into existence and governed the Japanese building programme. In an Appendix, certain matters that may seem to demand detailed attention are dealt with separately.

In preparing this book for the press—a task that I began so long ago as the year 1900—I have received the most kind and willing assistance of a great many personal friends in the Fleet of “Britain’s ally.” To them I would express my most cordial thanks. Especially would I mention my indebtedness in various—I might say innumerable—ways to Admirals Yamamoto Gombey, Dewa, Kamimura, Ito, and Ijuin; Captains Yamada, Uchida, Kawashima, and Kashiwabara; Commanders Kuroi, Takarabé, Hirose, [Pg x] Takeshita, Yamanaka; Lieut.-Commanders Nomaguchi, Hideshima, Sato, Horiuchi; Staff-Paymaster Minuma; Lieutenants Ishikawa, Yamamoto, Yamagi, Fukura, Matsui, Sasaki; Engineer-Lieutenant Kimura; Chief-Constructor Matsuo; Constructor Kondo; and a great many others—all personal friends, to whose suggestions it is due that I came to write this book at all.

I am neither pro-Japanese nor pro-Russian. As I write, disaster is thick upon the Russian Fleet, and to many close friends in it go those sympathies which, had things been the other way about, would have gone as surely to the Japanese Fleet. To write this book without bias has been my special aim; and in view of the enthusiastic admiration which the Japanese Fleet is now evoking in the Anglo-Saxon world, I have especially tried not to be blind to such defects as the Japanese Navy may exhibit. This, however, is obvious in the body of the book, and needs no mention here, any more than reference is required in this Preface to the courage and skill which Japanese sailors have shown.

Portions of some of the chapters have, in some form or other, appeared in the Engineer, Daily Chronicle, Daily Mail, Fortnightly Review, Collier’s Weekly, or Forum. To the editors of these papers I desire to make the usual acknowledgments,

F. T. J.

Portsmouth.
  1904.

The earliest Japanese history, like that of all other nations, is a mass of myths and legends. But out of this one solid fact has been evolved: the Japanese were a race who invaded the island kingdom by way of Korea, much as the Saxons and other Teutonic tribes invaded Britain. They therefore used the sea at a very early period of their history.

They found aboriginal tribes when they came, and of these the Ainu still exist in the north, a race as distinct as our Celts in the north of Scotland. The immigrant race are always spoken of and accepted as Mongolians, though in Japanese legend the invaders had, as in similar Western myths, a divine origin. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that a Japanese, with kindred tastes to those Western savants who have found the cradle of the human race in Lapland or in Central Africa, has built a theory by which ancient Egypt was the early home of the Japanese. To support this theory numerous small similarities were [Pg 2] brought forward; but it does not seem to have made headway in Japan, or to be known in the Western world. It is, as regards plausibility, about on a par with the Anglo-Israelite theory that had once quite a vogue in this country, and is by no means without disciples to-day.

Whence they came, however, is a matter of no moment here. Japanese national history begins with the expedition led by the Emperor Jimmu, at a date which a loose chronology fixes at 660 b.c. This is the earliest over-sea operation unconnected with deities and myths.

Jimmu, who, according to the legends, was the grandson of the Sea Deity’s daughter, led an expedition eastward from Mount Takachiho, and eventually found himself on the shores of the Inland Sea, and here built a fleet, by means of which he reached Naniwa (Osaka), and consolidated the empire.

For the next seven or eight centuries the nation was forming; but beyond a legend, suggestive of the story of Jonah, nothing is heard of ships or boats till 202 a.d., when the Empress Jingo equipped a great fleet for the invasion of Korea. As an early instance of the use of “sea-power,” this expedition has laid great hold on Japanese imagination; but since the transportation of the flagship by legions of fishes, with which the Empress has made an alliance, is the central point of the story, its nautical details can hardly be seriously considered. What is of more moment is the undoubted fact that the expedition took place, that it was a complete success for Japan, and laid the foundations of that Japanese interest in Korea which is to-day so potent a factor in the Far Eastern problem. [Pg 3]

[Pg 5]

Korea paid tribute without question for some three hundred years. About the year 520, however, the Emperor Keitai Tenno collected a fleet, and conducted some operations against the Koreans that served to tighten Japan’s hold on her over-sea possessions. From this time onward for the next two or three hundred years Japan grew as a trading nation, and intercourse with both Korea and China became common. As in those days every merchant ship became a warship when required, Japan must have ranked as a considerable naval power.

As for the ships, these may have been either mere boats or small coasting junks, probably differing very little from the boats and junks of the present day.

About the year 650 Japanese garrisons were driven out of Korea by hostile tribes, assisted by the Chinese, and with the expelled Japanese came many Koreans, an immigration that continued for some considerable period.

In the middle of the ninth century the Samaurii, or military caste, whose descendants to-day provide the bulk of naval officers, first began to arise. The Shoguns, afterwards to become such a power, were originally generals, there being one in command of each of the four military districts into which the Emperor Sujin had divided Japan. A Shogun with any special powers did not arise till the year 1200 or so, when Yoshinaka made himself Sei-i-Shogun (Chief Shogun). [Pg 6]

As he was driven to suicide soon afterwards in the civil war then desolating the empire, the post did not convey any great advantage to him; but Yaritomo whose troops had defeated him, became after a time Sei-i-tai-Shogun (great barbarian compelling Shogun). This civil war—between the Taira and the Minamoto clans—culminated in a naval battle. The former are credited with 500 junks, which, in addition to the soldiers, were crowded with women and children and the fugitive emperor. At Dan-no-ura, on the Inland Sea, these were overtaken by the Minamoto with 700 vessels, and the smaller fleet was annihilated. This decisive action ended the civil war, but it created the system of Shogun rule, whereby all the governing of the country was in the hands of Yoritomo, the Emperor being a mere figure-head and puppet in his hands.

The descendants of Yaritomo, as Shoguns de jure, did not exercise much power de facto, for regents (the Hojo) acted for them. In time, too, tutors came to act for the regents, and under this condition of government, plunged into a species of anarchy, Japan faced the great Chinese invasion of 1281.

Having resolved on the capture of Japan, the Chinese sent envoys demanding its surrender. These, after being sent from pillar to post in a search for the real governing power, were eventually killed by the populace. The Chinese then prepared a fleet of 300 of their own and Korean ships, added the Japanese sun to the consuming dragon on the [Pg 7] Chinese flag, and invaded to consummate the capture. On the water they encountered no opposition, but on landing they were met and defeated by the Japanese, united in the presence of a common danger. A great storm at the same time destroyed the hostile fleet, and the invasion was at an end.

It was followed by more internal strife, till in 1333 the Hojo were finally put down. Shortly afterwards the chief power came into the hands of the Shoguns.

Despite the civil warfare, Japan still made headway as a maritime State. Trade and piracy were conducted not only with Korea and China, but Japanese vessels sailed regularly to the distant shores of Siam.

In 1542 the Portuguese first came into touch with Japan. Three cannon were presented to the Shogun, and a little later Pinto arrived on the scene, and taught the manufacture of gunpowder. Jesuits followed, and made such headway that in the next civil war the Christian Japanese, to the number of 600,000 or more, were a strong political factor.

In 1587 Hideyoshi the Taikio, the de facto ruler of Japan, issued an edict against the Christians, many missionaries were expelled, and the ports open to foreign vessels were finally limited to one only, Nagasaki, as at that time the suspicion first began that soldiers would presently follow the missionaries.

About the same period Hideyoshi, who had designs upon China and Korea, [Pg 8] began to prepare warships. He also endeavoured to create a fleet of European-built ships, but the traders whom he approached on the matter refused to sell their vessels. He had, therefore, to content himself with a junk navy, which was raised much as fleets were raised in England at the same period, by levies upon the coast districts. The princes of these districts were required to furnish sailors to man the ships that they provided.

The invasion of Korea was carried out by two divisions, the first of which, under Konishi, reached Fusan on April 13, 1592. The town, which had for some two hundred years been used as a Japanese trading port, was easily captured, and the army then marched to the capital. The fleet lay inactive at Fusan for some time, but Konishi, in the midst of a victorious career on land, presently conceived the idea of using his fleet also. It was, therefore, sent round to the westward, where it met a Korean fleet.

The Koreans, whose ships were constructionally superior, made out to sea, and the Japanese following, sustained a defeat that caused them to retire to Fusan again.

After this Chinese troops appeared in large numbers, and, though the invaders won a few battles, they were checked, and compelled to fall back.

Peace negotiations were opened in 1596, but these fell through, and in 1597 130,000 fresh Japanese troops were sent to Korea.

In the latter part of this same year the Korean fleet attempted to [Pg 9] signally defeated by the Japanese vessels. Most of the attacking fleet were destroyed. No headway was, however, made by the Japanese land force, and in 1598 the expedition withdrew.

In the year 1600 William Adams, an Englishman, reached Japan, and, though for a time imprisoned at the instigation of the Jesuits, he eventually gained liberty and consideration from Ieyasu, the Shogun. He built for the Shogun, first a small 18-tonner, and then, in 1609, a ship of 120 tons. In this ship some Spaniards who had been wrecked on the east coast of Japan were sent to Acapulco. They appear to have navigated themselves, and the vessel was kept, but a much larger ship was sent to the Shogun as a present in return for his kindness.

In 1611, owing to Adams’s partiality for the Dutch, these secured from the Shogun permission to trade with any port in the country. A little later the British East India Company secured the same advantages, but, owing to the outbreak of war between England and Holland, a good deal of isolated fighting took place between the traders, till it ended in the withdrawal or destruction of the English.

In 1614 the Japanese ruler began to be thoroughly alarmed at the progress of Christianity, and the expected advent of Portuguese soldiers to take possession of the land. All foreign Christians were ordered to leave the country, all native ones to renounce their creed. In 1616 the majority of Christians who still held to their faith were [Pg 10] disposed of by the same means that in Europe were used to ensure conversion to Christianity.

In 1637 a revolution broke out amongst some of the Samaurai, or soldier class, who had been compelled to become farmers. Such Christians as had survived the massacres joined these.

After some defeats, the rebels were shut up in a large deserted castle at Hara, where 160,000 men besieged them. A tremendous defence was made, and the besiegers, failing to make much headway, applied for and secured aid from the Dutch factory at Hivado. Guns were lent, and finally a Dutch warship, the de Ryp, 20 guns, bombarded the castle from the bay, without, however, effecting its reduction. Eventually the castle was taken, and practically the whole garrison executed.

In 1640 the rivalry between the Dutch and Portuguese, of which the Dutch assistance against the rebellious Jesuit converts was probably an incident, came to a head. It ended in the expulsion of the Portuguese, and the establishment of the Dutch at Nagasaki as the sole Western nation having dealings with Japan.

Here for two hundred years the Dutch traded unmolested. The civil commotion quieted down, and with her seclusion from the outside world Japan entered upon an era of domestic peace. There were no more great civil wars, and, save for the conflicts of the Samaurai against each other, the nation grew ignorant of the art of war. [Pg 11]

As these Samaurai were the ancestors of modern Japanese naval officers, some account of their methods of training may be worthy of study, for to them it is undoubtedly due that Japan exists as one of the great Powers to-day. Otherwise she would assuredly have sunk to the Chinese level of an ultra-high civilisation in which courage has no place, and in which the military profession is lower than the meanest civil calling. From all this the Samaurai saved Japan.

The country was then under a feudal system. The Emperor, the nominal head of the State, was a mere figure-head, too sacred to concern himself with mundane affairs—a condition of mind which generations of clever tutelage at the hands of various Shoguns had produced. More often than not the Shogun’s rule was of a similar nature, a regent being the real head of the State. Under the Shogun or his regent were the governors of provinces; under these the great feudal lords, each of whom maintained his Samaurai, or fighting men. The soldier-ant is the nearest natural equivalent to these Samaurai, who only very partially resembled our knights of the Middle Ages. Below the Samaurai, and cordially despised by them, were the lower classes, engaged in trade and agriculture. The exact social equivalent of the Samaurai in our society system does not exist, but probably the old “squireens,” a now almost extinct class of small country gentry, would most nearly occupy the same social status. The Samaurai might be richer or poorer than the [Pg 12] working class, but in all cases they cordially despised them, and were in turn respected or feared.

These Samaurai lived in a constant state of killing and being killed. If one of them left his house, he took his life in his hand from that moment. Duels were frequent, murders common, and the fearful form of suicide known as hari-kari was performed by them without a shudder at the slightest hint of an insult that could not be avenged. Vendettas, too, were everlasting, so that altogether the Samaurai were by heredity inured to a callous disregard of life and suffering. In all their crimes and vices they cultivated the grand Spartan virtues, and Japan will yet, perhaps, reap the benefit of those centuries of training.

The knowledge of the Dutch hold upon Japan inspired other nations with a desire to secure similar benefits. Russia, in particular, strove to secure a footing, but all her attempts were unavailing. British and Americans met with a like fate; there was no Government that would deal with them, the law of isolation had gone forth, and isolated Japan remained. So greatly, too, did the nation esteem its state, that a law long existed whereby the building of a ship of any size was a crime punishable by death.

At last, in 1848, the United States, which had deep interests in the whale fisheries in Far Eastern waters, and was also concerned in establishing a line of steamers between California and the recently opened free ports in China, took official instead of merely individual measures to open up communication with Japan. A coaling station in Japan was an absolute necessity if the projected line of steamers was to be realised; but the reaching of any governing body with power to [Pg 14] grant such a station was the difficulty. However, in 1852, Commodore Perry was sent with a squadron to Japan, and reached the Bay of Yeddo in July, 1853, bearing a friendly letter from the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan.[1] The commodore had orders to use force, if necessary, as a last resort;[2] but the thousands of troops that were gathered to meet him made no attack. Having managed to deliver his message and impress the authorities with the fact that an answer would be required, the commodore left.

So soon as he had gone the Shogun’s Government found itself on the horns of a dilemma. If a treaty were made with the foreigners, internal trouble from a people already permeated with a desire to restore to power the real Emperor might be expected to a certainty; if they refused, the American show of force convinced them that grave trouble would lie ahead, trouble which the Japanese, with their old-fashioned fighting methods, could never successfully combat.

The most prominent personage in Japan at that moment was the Daimio of Mito. He advocated absolute refusal of the American demands, and the exclusion of all foreigners by force of arms, if necessary. He recalled the famous wars of the past, and nearly every Daimio in the country followed his lead. Forts were erected on the shore, the bells [Pg 15] of temples melted and made into cannon, and as many Samaurai as possible were drilled with the most modern fire-arms procurable. They got these through the Dutch at Nagasaki.

In the midst of this a Russian squadron appeared, also demanding a treaty and the opening up of the country, but again no force was used. Seven months after his first visit, Commodore Perry returned for his answer, and the war fever having evaporated to some extent, a treaty was actually signed on March 31, 1854.

This treaty provided for peace and goodwill between the United States and Japan, the opening of Shimoda as a treaty port, and the similar opening of Hakodate after an interval, the Americans agreeing that their ships should visit no other ports except from necessity. The other articles dealt with the care of shipwrecked mariners and the like, and “the most favoured nation” clause. England, Russia, and Holland soon secured similar treaties, Russia having the same ports as America, England and Holland having Nagasaki instead of Shimoda.

All this split Japan into two hostile parties, the Jo-i and the Kai-koku. The former, under the leadership of the Daimio of Mito, were bitterly anti-foreign, and also desirous of restoring the Emperor. The Kai-koku, on the other hand, supported the Shogun action, and had as their watchword the words spoken by one of them at the debate over Commodore Perry’s demands: “As we are not the equals of [Pg 16] the foreigners in the mechanical arts, let us have intercourse with foreign lands, let us learn their drill and tactics. Then, when we shall have made our nation united as one family, we shall be able to go abroad, and give lands in foreign countries to those who have distinguished themselves in battle.”

For a time this party had the upper hand. Commercial treaties were made, and by 1860 Ni-igata, Hyogo, and Yokohama had been opened, with the Consuls of most nations established there. Ii-Kamon-no-kami, head of the Kai-Koku party, imprisoned the Daimio of Mito, and executed several Samaurai who had killed his adherents. Then, in 1860, on March 23, Ii-Kamon-no-kami was assassinated, and his party, no longer with a powerful head, made isolated preparations for civil war. Ships were purchased and manned by the retainers of the local governors of provinces, and troops raised. Meanwhile the foreign Legations were attacked, an American secretary was murdered, and other foreigners injured. Other murders, notably that of an English merchant named Richardson, followed, and an indemnity was refused. This led to the arrival of Admiral Kuper with seven ships at Kagoshima, August 11, 1863. He bombarded the forts and city, and also sank or burned three steamers belonging to the Daimio of Satsuma, whose men had committed the murder. After this the indemnity was forthcoming, but the Daimio promptly ordered more warships, and sent many of his naval officers to Holland to learn European methods. [Pg 17]

In this same year the Daimio of Choshu, a member of the Jo-i, who had also secured a small fleet for himself, fired upon an American steamer, and afterwards upon the French gunboat Kienchang, which latter he damaged severely. The Dutch frigate Medusa was also roughly handled by his shore batteries at Shimonoseki, but replying, silenced them.

Both these acts led to reprisals. The United States warship Wyoming at once proceeded to Shimonoseki, where she blew up one Japanese steam warship, and sank a second, a small brig. The French warships Sémiramis and Tancrède followed, and subjected Shimonoseki to a bombardment that did considerable damage.

An indemnity was demanded and paid by the Shogun’s Government for these attacks of foreign shipping, while the suppression of the Daimio of Choshu at Shimonoseki was also promised. This, however, was a task beyond the power of the Government, and finally the Powers interested decided to take action. A combined fleet, consisting of nine British, four Dutch, three French, and one hired United States steamer, went to Shimonoseki to reduce this bar to passage on the Inland Sea.

The attacking vessels were:— [Pg 18]

The United States ship was merely chartered to indicate American interest; all American vessels were then busy sinking each other in the civil war.

This fleet left Yokohama on August 28, 1864, and from September 5th to 9th it bombarded all the new forts that the Daimio had erected. At the end of that time Shimonoseki surrendered unconditionally, and an indemnity of three million dollars was claimed from the Shogun, and eventually paid.

For the next two years the Shogun’s Government was busy trying conclusions with the Daimio, but as he had raised a large force of the common people, and drilled these in Western fashion, he easily held his own. British and French troops meanwhile were permanently stationed at Yokohama to guard foreign interests. Friction between these and the Jo-i party was common, and more than one assassination took place, but no naval demonstrations followed. [Pg 19]

As already recounted, the sight of foreign ships had gradually put ideas of sea-power into the minds of the various governors of Japanese provinces. One of the first, if not the first, ships to be acquired was the Tsukuba, which still survives as a hulk. Her first name was the Malacca, and she was launched in the United States in 1851. She was, in her time, a fine-looking screw frigate of 1950 tons, carrying 20 guns, and able to steam at the then satisfactory speed of 8 knots.

The Riaden, a small screw yacht of 370 tons, and the Chiyoda-nata (Chiyoda type), of less than 140 tons, both schooner rigged, were enrolled about the same time, and then followed by the Kasuga, a two-funnelled, three-masted paddler, originally the Kiang-tse. She carried six guns, and for some time served as the Shogun’s yacht.

Following this, the Fuji Yama, a full-rigged ship—a sailing frigate of about 1010 tons and 24 guns—and the 523-ton barque-rigged sailing-ship Ken-he were purchased. [Pg 22]

To learn how to work this naval militia, Japan imported instructors of various kinds from the Western world. In response to applications, the present Admiral Tracy was sent out by the British Government, and with him a small host of other Westerners. With their natural aptitude, the Japanese rapidly acquired the rudiments of sea service, while on shore the beginnings of a shipbuilding yard were made at Yokosuka. The British naval uniform was adopted with some slight differences. Officers were sent to Europe—chiefly to Holland—to study the principles of naval warfare, and at once a desire to possess ironclads arose.

Out of this came the purchase of Japan’s first ironclad, the Adsuma.

The dimensions, etc., of the Adsuma were as follows:—

[Pg 23]

[Pg 25] The armour was 4½ to 4¾ ins. thick, and distributed on a complete water-line belt and over both of the raised batteries. Though a very famous vessel as the Stonewall Jackson, her war services under that name were not extensive. She was built in France, and at the end of 1864, when ready for sea, carried one large 13-in. 300-pounder (smooth bore) in the bow, and the two 70-pounders (rifled) in the main battery. No ship like her had ever been constructed before, and the Confederates, to whom she then belonged, spread alarming reports as to her power. Putting to sea, she reached Corunna in February, 1865, and was there blockaded by the unarmoured Federal ships Niagara and Sacramento. The former was a famous vessel in her way, of 5013 tons, 345 ft. long, 12-knot speed, and armed with twelve 11-in. smooth bores, throwing a 135-lb. shell each. These guns were not able to fire shot apparently, and the Sacramento was a weaker vessel. The Stonewall Jackson challenged these two to a duel à la Kearsarge and Alabama, but Craven, the Federal commodore, declined—wisely enough, for he could not have done anything against the ironclad with his few heavy pieces, while the ironclad would certainly have disabled and then rammed him.[3] Consequently, the Stonewall Jackson did not smell powder on that occasion, and the war ended very soon afterwards.

In 1866 a mysterious Japanese deputation came to America. Its object was long unknown, but the curiosity it excited was sufficient to cause telegraphic reports of its movements, and surmises as to its intentions, to appear in the London Times every now and again. Finally came the news that “the Japanese deputation have come to buy ironclads”—a statement at first treated as a joke. [Pg 26]

The Japanese do not, however, appear to have been large bidders for the forty odd ironclads that America then had to dispose of. Few of these “on sale” craft were fit for a sea voyage—they were merely hastily constructed monitors intended more often than not for river service. The Stonewall Jackson, however, being a sea-going ship, was purchased for the Shogun, and re-named Adsuma.

A gunboat or two changed hands at this period, and altogether the various Japanese governors collected between them a small, heterogeneous fleet, the very existence of which was scarcely known outside their own country. Indeed, twenty years later comparatively few people knew, and still fewer cared, that Japan possessed a navy at all.

The Adsuma has long been removed from the effective list and relegated to hulk duty. On account of her enormous ram, she was somewhat of a curio to naval visitors for many years, and the most vivid memory retained by some of our people of the harbour in which the Adsuma lay was the fashion in which the Japanese sailors used her ram. They walked down over it into the water when bathing.

Of the smaller vessels previously referred to the following may be mentioned:—

No. 1 Tébo was a swan-bow, three-masted, schooner-rigged screw steamer of 250 tons only. Two or three other ships like her existed. [Pg 27]

[Pg 29] The Unyo, built at Amsterdam, was little larger—295 tons only. She was a brig-rigged and ram-bowed screw steamer, carrying three pivot guns (Krupp’s), disposed in the centre line, as were the three big guns in the French Baudin and Formidable till these ships were reconstructed. The Unyo was wrecked many years ago.

The Moisshin, screw gunboat of 357 tons, is worthy of more attention, as she was the first ship ever built in Japan since the days of Adams. She was an enlarged edition of No. 1 Tébo, and exactly like her in appearance. Between the funnel and foremast a single Long Tom was carried. She was launched somewhere about the year 1865. Her construction was not, of course, purely Japanese—she was a craft upon which the Islanders practised and learnt construction with important material.

The Setsu, 935 tons, 8 guns, a sailing frigate, and the Chio-bin, a barque of 650 tons, originally used for trading purposes, also belong to this early period.

So also does a ship with more history, the Asama, a composite sailing-ship of 1445 tons and 14 guns. Her exact early history is shrouded in some mystery, but just previous to her entry into the Japanese fleet she was the property of a too-confiding pirate, who went into a Japanese harbour to refit, and had his ship taken possession of by the Japanese in consequence. The ship still exists as a gunnery hulk, and carries, or did till recently, eight 7-in. breech-loaders and four 4½-in. muzzle-loaders.

With these ships, built and building, Japan found herself engaged [Pg 30] in that civil war of which the Mikasa, Asama, and other ships of to-day are the direct outcome. The officers had had some years of Western training, chiefly in Holland and Denmark. The accompanying illustration, from a Japanese photograph, indicates the uniform of the period. There were in the Navy in those days two schools—the party of progress and those opposed to change—by no means necessarily identical with the same political parties. Indeed, of the two, the Jo-i seem to have chiefly availed themselves of the war-training to be secured from the foreigners whose expulsion was one of their political tenets. This, perhaps, was due in part or in great measure to the other factor in the dispute—the question as to whether the Emperor or the Shogun and his representatives should be ruler of the country. This became eventually the sole question.

[Pg 31]

[Pg 33]

[Pg 35] In 1867 the Emperor Kōmei died, and was succeeded by his son, the present Emperor, Mutsohito, then a boy. His advisers had by now concluded that the anti-foreign agitation was a mistake, and thence forward it was only carried on by a few isolated Daimios. The real problem was one of ruling, and this culminated in 1867 by the Shogun resigning his power, and becoming a species of minister.

The adherents of neither party were favourably disposed towards this middle course; and ultimately civil war, in which the ex-Shogun’s party were continually defeated, resulted.

The ironclad Adsuma was in the hands of the Imperialists, as also were most of the other warships; but the ex-Shogun had owned seven ships, mounting between them 83 guns, and these Yenomoto, his admiral (one of the Dutch-trained officers) absolutely refused to surrender. Chased by Nahamoto, the Imperial admiral, he took refuge in Hakodate, where the remnants of the rebels had collected. A naval action resulted disastrously for Yenomoto. In July, 1869, the rebels finally surrendered, and Japan entered upon a new era, in which much of the power hitherto wielded by the Daimios passed into the hands of the Samaurai, whose descendants now supply the bulk of naval and military officers, retaining all the courage of their fierce ancestors, and more of their exclusiveness than is generally supposed. But further particulars under this head will be found in a later chapter.[4]

With the sea fight off Hakodate the civil war ended. The feudal fleets were abolished, and all ships were enrolled in an Imperial Navy—a proceeding that, of course, increased its strength. Some reorganisation of personnel was also effected, bringing the Navy more into line with the Western model.

Naval advisers came and went. They included, during the period 1865-1885, the present British admirals Tracy and Hopkins, the eminent French naval architect M. Bertin, and finally Captain Ingles, R.N., of whom more will be found in the Appendix.

The same year in which the Adsuma was launched the Riu Jo[5] was set afloat at Aberdeen. She, too, was possibly originally destined to fly the Confederate flag, but about this details are hard to procure. Particulars are:—

[Pg 37]

[Pg 39] The horse-power was 975 nominal, the speed 9 knots. She was single-screwed, and carried 350 tons of coal. Like all the early sea-going ironclads, she had a 4½-in. iron armour belt, and 4 inches over the amidship battery. The heaviest gun was carried in the bow on a pivot. The ship still exists as a hulk. She did not reach Japan till the Civil War was over.

The he-sho, launched in England in 1867, is also retained as a gunnery tender at the present day. She is a small gunboat of 320 tons, carrying one 7-in. Armstrong M.L. and one 5½-in. Krupp B.L.

Some other early Japanese ships may now be referred to.

The Nisshin was built at Amsterdam, and ordered, probably, previously to the Civil War.

The Amagi of the same period was built in Japan. Particulars of her are:— [Pg 40]

In appearance she more or less resembles the foregoing.

She was followed by the Seiki, also built in Japan, and famous in her way, because she was the first Japanese ship to make a voyage to England. Particulars:—

Save that her stern was sharper, she was, to look at, much like the Amagi. She is now removed from the Japanese Navy list.

A sailing training brig of 153 tons, the Ishikawa, and a larger brig, the Tateyama, of 543 tons, were built or acquired prior to 1877.

The Banjo was built by the Japanese on the same model as the Amagi. Particulars are:—

This ended this particular period of Japanese shipbuilding. [Pg 41]

[Pg 43] In the year 1875, or thereabouts, the Japanese finally decided to embark upon a war navy, and laid the foundations of that fleet which some twenty years later was to vindicate its existence at Yalu and Wei-hei-wei. In that year a then modern ironclad, up-to-date ironclad, and two armoured cruisers, on what was then the best accepted model, were ordered.

Of these the Fu-So,[6] designed by Sir E. J. Reed, and launched at Samuda’s Yard, Poplar, England, in 1877, was then a powerful second-class battleship. In design she resembles the French Rédoutable, though of only half her size. Particulars are:—

[Pg 44] The armour is distributed in a complete belt of iron from 9 to 4 ins. in thickness. The battery armour is 8 ins., with 7-in. bulkheads forming a redoubt. The engines, by Penn, are horizontal compound trunk. She was then barque-rigged, with a single funnel. She carried no torpedo tubes, but these were added later. Just previous to the war with China the Japanese reconstructed and re-armed her, removing the mainmast, and fitting military tops to the fore and mizzen; 6-in. Q.F. were mounted in the barbettes in place of the old 6.6-in. Either immediately before or directly after the war, two additional 6-in. Q.F. (as shown in the photograph of her at sea) were mounted, one on the forecastle and one on the poop behind shields; and subsequently four further 6-in. Q.F. replaced the old guns in the battery, these having been found well-nigh useless for modern warfare. This by no means [Pg 45] exhausts the history of the Fu-So, but her subsequent adventures will be found on a later page.[7]

[Pg 47] Russia with the General Admiral would appear to have inspired the idea of the Hi-Yei[8] and Kon-go. The former of these was launched early in 1878 at Milford Haven, the latter at Hull towards the end of 1877. The ships are sisters. Details are:—

The armour is a mere iron strip on the water-line, varying from 4½ to 3 ins. in thickness.

In 1876 a new Imperial yacht, the Jin-Jei, was launched. She is a paddler, with swan-bow, two funnels, and two high pole masts—a pretty-looking vessel.

In 1879 began what later events constituted the supplementary Japanese shipbuilding programme. In 1879 Elswick built for China those once famous “alphabetical gunboats,” a series of “flat-irons” of the Rendel [Pg 48] type, to carry one gun. Like a good many other Chinese vessels, they were destined to fly the Japanese flag at a later period of their existence. Altogether there were eleven of these craft, named after letters of the Greek alphabet, but re-named by the Chinese. They were named Lung-shang (Alpha), he-wei (Beta), Fei-ting (Gamma), Tche-tien (Delta), the first two of 340 tons, the other two of 420 tons, and which the Chinese still own. The remainder are a little larger, four, Cheng-tung (Epsilon), Chen-Sei (Zeta), Chen-nan (Eta), Chen-pei (Theta), of 490 tons, and Chin-pen (Kappa), Hai-chang-ching (Lambda), and Chen-chung (Iota) of 500 tons. Japan now owns all of this last batch, except the Hai-chang-ching.

Gamma and Delta carry a 38-ton Armstrong M.L.; all the others are armed with the 11-in. 25-ton gun. Horse-power varies from 235 in the smaller craft to 472 in the larger. There are slight differences in dimensions, but the largest only runs to 125 ft. long by 29 ft. broad. Two other rather smaller gunboats once existed, but these the French sunk at Foochow in the early eighties. The development of small guns has long since rendered this type of gunboat useless; but, apart from that, the bad care taken of them by the Chinese would have made them of no service.

China in 1881 was making some considerable efforts towards being a naval power, efforts that continued till 1889, when they suddenly died out, or resolved themselves into the building of small craft by Chinamen. A Chino-Japanese war was a possibility in 1881 as much as in [Pg 49] 1890. Neither side was, however, ready for the conflict, and in the early eighties Japan’s energies were concentrated on training personnel, China’s on acquiring materiel. In 1881 the latter had launched for her the big ironclad Ting Yuen at Stettin, followed a little later by the Chin Yuen, now in the Japanese service. From the time China first had them, Japan coveted these ironclads; by the irony of fate, she did not secure them (or rather the one that was left) till far superior ships of her own were on the stocks.

The Tung Yuen sank at Wei-hai-wei during the war; the Chen Yuen, her sister, was taken at the same time. Her details are:—

The arrangement of the heavy armament is upon the system that in 1880 was held to be the system of the future—four big guns able to fire [Pg 50] end-on or on the broadside. The ideal warship of those days was to fight in line abreast. The advantages of that disposition were seen, while its disadvantages were ignored. It was not realised how easily an enemy could get round upon either flank and mask the fire of nearly all the units in this cumbersome formation, the advantages of which lie only in going into action against an enemy right ahead.

When the Chin Yen was the Chinese Chen Yuen she carried thin shields over her big guns. The 6-in. pieces were in the extreme bow and stern, each in a 3-in. turret. The big gun shields were removed before the war. The Japanese captured these with Port Arthur, and have since replaced them. They have also mounted a 6-in. Q.F. in the bow turret, substituted a 6-in. Q.F. behind a shield for the after turret, and mounted two additional Q.F.’s upon sponsons specially built near the mainmast. Two 6-pounder Q.F. and a number of 3- or 2½-pounders have also been added on the upper deck. The photograph shows the ship as she now is.

The armour of the Chin Yen is distributed as follows: Amidships for 150 ft. is a 14-in. compound belt. Under-water and at the end of it this belt thins to 10 ins. Forward and aft of it is a protective deck 3 ins. thick. The ends of the belt are joined by flat bulkheads of 14 ins. Rising from this redoubt are the barbettes, 12 ins. compound. The starboard one is forward, the port somewhat aft of it.[9] The big gun hoods are quite thin, 4 ins. or less; between the big guns in the conning-tower, 8 ins. in thickness. [Pg 51]

[Pg 53] The ship, it will be seen, is of the British Ajax or Colossus type—very much a “soft ender.” She is, however, given a good deal of protection in the way of specially arranged watertight compartments, and there is also a species of cofferdam.

In 1881 Elswick set afloat the Arturo Prat, a small cruiser originally intended for Chili, but subsequently purchased by Japan and re-named Tsukushi. China had two sisters built at the same time, the Tchao Yong and Yang-wei, both of which were sunk at Yalu. Particulars of the Tsukushi are as follows:—

The ship has no armour deck, or protection of any sort. [Pg 54]

In 1882 the construction of wooden ships was still proceeding in Japan. In that year they launched at Yokosuka the Kaimon, of which the measurements are:—

The engines were constructed in Japan at the Yokosuka Dockyard, and are of the horizontal compound type. This was the first ship put together by them of which they constructed the engines also.

The following year they launched the Tenriu at Yokosuka. Details are:—

[Pg 57] The ship is practically a sister to the Kaimon. The engines of both were made at Yokosuka, and are of the same type. Both ships have swan bows, one funnel, and are barque-rigged. The sterns are rather square.

In 1884 Elswick suddenly sprang the deck-protected cruiser on the world. In that year was launched the famous Esmeralda. She was, like the Arturo Prat, built for Chili, and as a Chilian cruiser bore a share in the Chilian revolution. When the Chino-Japanese war broke out Japan made overtures for this ship, and in 1895 purchased her through the agency of Ecuador. The war was over before the cruiser could be employed, but she was probably purchased against possible eventualities with Russia, France, and Germany. Being now obsolete, she has not proved a valuable acquisition, and the Japanese speak of her as a very bad sea boat. Particulars of this once famous vessel are:—

The six 6-in. B.L. have been removed by the Japanese, and six 4.7-in. Q.F. of 40 calibres substituted.

[Pg 58]

When new the Esmeralda was one of the swiftest ships afloat. Her I.H.P. natural draught was 6500, with an 18.5-knot speed on her trials in 1885. She carries 400 tons of coal, with provision for 200 tons more.

Protection is afforded by a steel deck 1 in. thick on the slopes and ½ in. on the flat. Over the loading stations of the big guns a 1-in. steel skin is carried.

News of the Esmeralda’s fame soon reached Japan, and two glorified editions of her, the Naniwa and Takachiho, were promptly ordered. Japanese home construction was not, however, affected, and three composite vessels, Yamato, Katsuragi, and Mushashi, were put in hand, and launched in 1885-86. Details of these are as follows:— [Pg 59]

As before, Yokosuka made the horizontal compound engines, and in the Katsuragi twin screws were attempted for the first time. These ships are now employed for training squadron duties. They have clipper bows, and are, generally speaking, small editions of the British Raleigh. They are all three barque-rigged. The Mushashi is distinguished by a red band, the Katsuragi a yellow one.

The “warship Naniwa-kan,” as she used to be called in England, in defiance to all explanations to the effect that the affix “kan” simply meant “warship,” attained a good deal of celebrity while under construction. The British Navy had then no ships like her, and the Mersey class, then building, though more heavily gunned on about the same displacement, were popularly considered very poor substitutes, since their biggest guns were 8-in. pieces only, against the Naniwa’s 10-in. The big gun had at that time a very great hold on popular imagination.

Details of the Naniwa, and her sister, the Takachiho, are as follows:— [Pg 60]

(Elswick 6-in. Q.F. have lately been substituted for the old 6-in. B.L.).

The big guns are generally described as Elswick pieces, but they are not, although Elswick built the ships.

Protection is afforded by a steel deck 3 ins. on the slopes, 2 ins. on the flat. The engine hatches have a 3-in. glacis. The conning-tower is 1½-in. steel, and the loading stations of the big guns have a similar protection. [Pg 61]

Note.—The sinking of the Kow-shing will be found described in the chapter on the Chino-Japanese war. Special interest attaches to the Naniwa on account of the fact that during this war she was commanded by the present Admiral Togo. [Pg 62]

[Pg 63] As originally rigged, the Naniwa and Takachiho carried a top on each mast. After the war, in which they did not exhibit the best of sea-keeping qualities, these tops were lowered, and light platforms erected where they used to be, as in the illustration. The old rig, which is tolerably familiar, will be noticed in the illustrations dealing with the war. The Naniwa and Takachiho both took part in the first engagement at Asan; the Naniwa subsequently made her name familiar to the world over the Kow-shing affair. Both ships participated at Yalu and Wei-hai-wei. The Naniwa was launched on March 18, 1885, at Elswick, the Takachiho on May 16th in the same year. In appearance the two craft are almost absolutely identical; for convenience, and to enable their own officers to distinguish them, the Takachiho has a red band round her instead of the orthodox black one. As a further guide, she carries a couple of signal yards on the main, in place of the single yard carried there by the Naniwa.

Meanwhile China continued to have ships built in England and Germany, and in 1886 there was launched at Stettin a small cruiser, the Tche-Yuen (Tsi-Yuen is a more familiar spelling), which was destined to [Pg 64] be taken over by the Japanese at Wei-hai-wei in 1895. Her details are:—

This ship represents an application of the Italian Lepanto idea to a small cruiser. She is provided with a steel protective deck, 3 ins. thick on the slopes; the hull is otherwise unprotected, but the fore turret, containing the 8-in. guns, is heavily armoured with 10-in. compound, thus rendering it proof against any of the 10-in. guns afloat in the Japanese Fleet at the time she was built. Indeed, at Yalu there were only three guns present in the Japanese Fleet against which the Tche-Yuen’s turret armour was not proof. However, the possession of a little impenetrable armour is of small service to a warship—the odds being always against any one particular spot being hit. At Asan, in which the Tche-Yuen suffered rather severely, none of the Japanese guns against her were able to pierce this forward turret. [Pg 65]

[Pg 67] In 1879 Japan had already had four torpedo boats built for her at Yarrow’s. These craft displaced only 40 tons. In 1886, however, Yarrow’s built the first-class twin-screw torpedo boat Kotaka. This boat is remarkable as the first armoured torpedo boat ever constructed. She has 1-in. steel plating all over her machinery compartment, and the subdivision of the hull is, for a torpedo boat, singularly complete. In her way the Kotaka was the forerunner of the destroyers, being larger than the run of torpedo boats even now. Full details of her are:—

The torpedo tubes are thus disposed: two forward, firing right ahead, a pair amidships, and another pair a little abaft of them. The Kotaka made a name for herself in the war, and previously to that was a successful craft. However, for some reason Japan had no more boats from Yarrow, or, indeed, from England, for the next ten years, the next, a batch of fourteen, being ordered from Creusot. These were launched in [Pg 68] 1889. The Kotaka, after being built, was sent out to Japan in sections, and there put together again. The Creusot boats were sent out in similar fashion, while a further seven were put together entirely at Kobé, in Japan. All these boats were small ones of 56 tons, 114½ ft. long, 10½ ft. beam, and 6 ft. draught. With 525 I.H.P., they made 20 knots on trial. They have two torpedo tubes, carry two 1-pounder Q.F., a complement of 16 men, and are single screw. One of them was lost off the Pescadores in December, 1895, and a couple at Wei-hai-wei in February of the same year.

Japan still continued the construction of other craft, having launched the Maya[11] at Onohama in 1886, the Akagi[12] at the same yard in 1887, the Atago[13] at Yokosuka in 1887, and the Chiokai[14] at Tokio in the same year. The Maya and Chiokai were, as before, composite, but the other two are noteworthy as being constructed entirely of steel. A large proportion of the material for them was imported, and the building was rather a case of merely putting together.

The dimensions, etc., of all are identical, and are as follows:—

[Pg 71] In appearance and armament they vary much. The Maya carries a couple of 6-in. Krupp’s, with two 3-pounder Q.F. and a couple of machine guns; the Chiokai and Atago are armed with one 8-in. Krupp and one 4.7-in. gun and two machine guns; the Akagi carries two special French guns of about 4.7-in. calibre. These guns are the only ones of the kind in the world, and singularly powerful pieces—Hebrieu guns. The objection to them is that their lives are short. They proved too powerful for the little Akagi, and shook her up badly on trial. They were afterwards fired with reduced charges, except at Yalu, where they proved very useful, owing to their power.

The Akagi has a raised forecastle, the other three have not. All used to be schooner-rigged, but just before the war a fighting-top was fitted to the Akagi’s foremast, and a crow’s-nest to her main. To distinguish them, the Maya has a black band, the Chiokai a red one, the Atago yellow. The Akagi’s band is black, but her forecastle and fighting-top distinguish her. In addition, she has a rather elaborate green scrollwork on the bow. She has also sponsons for her machine guns. At Yalu this ship lost her mainmast, and the damage was left unrepaired for a long time in deference to naval sentiment; it has, however, been replaced lately. [Pg 72]

Reference has already been made to the transfer of torpedo-boat building from British to French firms. M. Bertin was at that time naval adviser to the Japanese Government, consequently French design for large ships secured a similar victory in the year 1887-8. With such ships as she now had, Japan was beginning to be able to stand alone, many English instructors were dispensed with; but she was yet some distance from her present independence. French enterprise saw its chance and took it; all the foreign-built ships of the new programme came from France.

These were the Itsukushima, Matsushima, and Hashidate (this last put together in Japan), the Unebi, Tschishima, and some smaller ships (laid down in Japanese yards), Yayeyama, Oshima, and Takao.

The ships built in Japan during the Bertin régime, 1887 to 1890, are distinctly French in design and appearance. The first to take the water was the Takao, launched at Yokosuka in 1888. Particulars are:—

[Pg 73] She is fitted with military and searchlight tops on both masts. The four 6-in. guns are in sponsons in the waist, the 4.7-in. is carried right aft. There is no protection of any sort to the machinery. She was the first steel ship built in Japan.

About 1887 Japan definitely decided to draw all her Q.F. guns, 6-in. or 4.7-in., from Elswick, and all heavy guns from Canet. Krupp’s pieces were discarded. This resolution was adhered to till 1902-03, so far as Elswick was concerned, but Canet guns were given up some years ago. Elswick guns were, in 1890, shipped to France for the Itsukushima and her sister. At present (1904) new guns are on the Vickers model. [Pg 74]

Following the Takao, Yokosuka launched the despatch vessel Yayeyama in 1899. She was designed by M. Bertin. Her dimensions, etc., are:—

The engines were provided by Messrs. Hawthorn, Leslie & Co. of England, and, instead of the horizontal compound previously fitted in Japanese-built ships, are horizontal, direct-acting, triple expansion. The boilers are of steel; there are six of these—cylindrical.

Over the engines and boilers a ½-in. steel deck is carried, affording, in conjunction with the bunkers, some slight protection.

The Onohama Yard laid down a vessel in this year, the Oshima. She was launched in 1890. Particulars:—

[Pg 77] There is no protection to the machinery. The engines were built at Yokosuka.

Meanwhile, shipbuilding abroad had been proceeding apace, but disaster attended both the earlier vessels. The first, the Unebi, a cruiser of 3650 tons, with four 6-in. Q.F. as her principal armament, mysteriously disappeared while on her way out to Japan[15] and still in the contractors’ hands. Her loss was officially attributed to instability, and seems to have inspired the Japanese authorities with a profound distrust for French shipbuilding; at any rate, the Chiyoda, a vessel generally resembling the lost Unebi, was given to Thomson Yard at Clydebank for construction. She will be described in due course later on.

The second French-built ship, upon the same general plan as the French Milan and Japanese Yayeyama, was the Tschishima, of 750 tons displacement. In appearance she was nearly identical to the French Milan. She met with disaster in the Inland Sea almost immediately after the Japanese took her over (1892), and all her crew were drowned. The Tatsuta was ordered from Elswick to replace her.

The Itsukushima, the first of the “Bertin cruisers,” so-called after their designer, was launched at La Seyne in 1889. Captain Ingles, R.N., [Pg 78] naval adviser to the Japanese, had strongly persuaded them against ironclads; they had been advised against the big gun also. However, they were bent on mounting a gun able to pierce any armour in the Chinese Navy or in foreign warships likely to come to the Far East. By the irony of fate, these big guns contributed nothing to the victory of the Yalu; however, the decision of the Japanese to have them cannot be condemned, in view of the fact that naval construction everywhere in ’88 was based upon the big gun. Having a full idea of their requirements, the Japanese settled upon the Italian Lepanto as embodying the most useful type of ship for them, and the Itsukushimas were ordered on that principle.

Particulars of the Itsukushima are as follows:—

[Pg 81] For protection there is a steel deck 1½ ins. thick on the slopes. With this is associated a cellulose belt and coal protection. The total protection, so far as penetration is concerned, is not, however, more than equivalent to what a 6-in. belt of old iron armour would afford, and it would keep out nothing above a 4.7-in. shot, and that only at long ranges. Over the engine hatches is a patch of thick steel armour.

The heavy gun barbette is a strip of 12-in. Creusot steel, with a 4-in. steel shield over the breech of the gun. There is an armoured hoist that affords some support, but, speaking generally, the gun is more or less at the mercy of shell bursting underneath it. [Pg 82]

The Hashidate was built from the same designs at Yokosuka, and is practically identical with the Itsukushima, save that the battery guns aft are in small unarmoured sponsons, and obtain thereby a slightly greater angle of fire. She is further distinguished by a red band; the Itsukushima, being the first of the class, has, of course, a black band.

Grave doubts were soon entertained as to the seaworthiness of these two ships, and the Matsushima being a little more behindhand than the others, her design was altered. She carries the big gun aft, which makes her a better sea boat. The battery is shifted forward in the main deck. In place of the single 4.7-in. that her companions carry in the stern, the raised fok’s’le of the Matsushima contains two of these pieces, firing through recessed port.

Her small quickfiring armament is also different, there being sixteen 3-pounders.

All three ships have a single tripod mast abaft the funnel, with a couple of tops on it. Each now carries three signal yards.

The Itsukushima was launched on July 11, 1889, and commissioned in Japan in 1891. The Matsushima, launched on January 22, 1890, went out in 1892. The Hashidate was not launched till March 24, 1891, but early in 1893 she was in commission.

It had been hoped that these ships would attain speeds of 17.5 knots; none of them, however, ever reached it. [Pg 83]

[Pg 84]

[Pg 85]

Torpedo Boats. 1891.

In 1891 Japan had built for her by Normand at Le Havre a 75-ton torpedo boat, 118 ft. long, two tubes, and a trial speed of 23 knots. She is a twin-screw boat.

Two other boats, 90-tonners, were also launched in Germany at Elbing. Length, 128 ft.; trial speed, 23 knots; one screw; armament, three tubes and three 1-pounder Q.F.

China in 1890 launched a home-built diminutive of the Itsukushima, the Ping Yuen. The Japanese took her at Wei-hai-wei, but she has never been of any use to them, and she now does duty as a gunnery hulk. Particulars of this craft are:—

The old 6-in. Krupp are now replaced by a couple of 45-calibre Elswick 6-in. Q.F. for drill purposes. The old 10-in. gun remains, and, being always cocked up in the air at an extreme elevation, is the most noticeable and characteristic feature of this ship, which every Japanese regards as a standing joke. An enormous dragon adorns each [Pg 86] broadside. Japanese officers who come to Portsmouth always, by the way, christen our Hero “the British Ping Yen.”

The Ping Yuen was begun as a 16-knot, 2850-ton ship, a copy in fine of the Stettin-built King Yuen. In an early stage of construction, however, her length was much reduced, for economical reasons. She appears to have had much the same machinery as the King Yuen originally. This, however, was tinkered in fitting, and some of her boilers were stolen, or otherwise dispensed with! On trial she made 10.5 knots for a short period, but, after being taken care of by the Chinese, soon sank below that modest speed. It is doubtful whether she made as much as 6 knots at Yalu.

There is a 2-in. steel protective deck in places; amidships and under water there is a small patch of 8-in. compound armour. The barbette is a 5-in. strip of armour; the conning-tower has the same thickness. A thin shield—removed during the war—covers the big gun.

On June 3, 1890, the third-class cruiser Chiyoda, built to replace the lost Unebi, took the water at Clydebank. Particulars of her are as follows:—

[Pg 89]

[Pg 91] She was the first ship in any navy to be fitted with water-tube boilers, which were barely coming into existence in those days. Hers are of the Belleville type.

For protection she depends on a 4¼-in. chrome steel armour belt, 200 ft. long, amidships. Forward and aft of this is a protective deck 1½ ins. thick on the slopes. Throughout the entire water-line is a cellulose belt, and she is divided into 84 watertight compartments. The guns have no protection beyond the ordinary shields. They are, however, very well disposed.

In 1898 she was practically re-boilered, the old tubes being replaced by some specially large ones, in order to enable her to burn Japanese coal, which sooted the ordinary tubes.

[Pg 92]

In 1890 the Akitsushima was laid down at Yokosuka. It was at first supposed that she was a sister to the Matsushima. The Yoshino was contracted for at Elswick towards the end of this year. Both were launched in 1892, and commissioned just before the war with China.

The Akitsushima was the last ship to be built in Japan with imported material. She is practically a small copy of the U.S.S. Baltimore. Details of the two, for comparison, are as follows:—

[Pg 95]

The Akitsushima mounts 6-in. guns in the foremost and aftermost sponsons; four 4.7-in. are carried amidships, the fifth on the forecastle, and the sixth astern. She has thus a broadside fire of two 6-in. and four 4.7-in., against two 8-in. and three 6-in. in the Baltimore. Assuming that ship’s guns to be now replaced by Q.F., the Akitsushima would bring the equivalent of a 6-in. gun less.

The Yoshino, when new, was the swiftest cruiser in the world, and very few ships are equal to her yet. Particulars of her are:—

The normal coal supply, at 4150 tons displacement, is about 400 tons. Bunkers are disposed amidships in the usual fashion above the armour deck. Amidships this deck is 4½ ins. thick on the slopes (= c) and 2 ins. on the flat. Allowing for the additional resistance of the coal, nothing under a 10-in., or modern 9.2 or 9.4-in., could penetrate to the engine-room, and then only with solid shot. The watertight compartments are exceptionally numerous. With natural draught the ship has made 21.6 knots.

The 6-in. guns are thus distributed: one on the forecastle, one on the poop, the other two in the foremost sponsons. The other broadside guns are 4.7-in. and 3-pounders. The bow and stern chasers have an arc of fire of 270 degrees, the 6-in. guns in sponsons fire 3 degrees across the bow and 60 degrees abaft it. [Pg 97]

[Pg 99] The aftermost 4.7-in. fire 3 degrees across the stern and 60 degrees before it. The broadside guns have an arc of about 120 degrees. Each of the fighting-tops carries a couple of 3-pounder Q.F., four on each bridge, two under the forecastle forward, two under the poop well aft, the remaining six between the guns amidships.

Towards the end of 1893 a violent agitation against the Navy filled the Japanese newspapers. The existing types of ships—particularly the Chiyoda and Itsukushima class—were unfavourably criticised. The personnel was not free from these attacks; it was in some quarters demonstrated useless and inefficient. In the midst of these attacks the war with China loomed and broke out. After that war nothing further was heard on the subject of the personnel’s “defects.”

The primary result of the agitation was a new shipbuilding programme. The only ships actually under construction at that time were the Suma, building at Yokosuka, and laid down in March, 1893, and the Tatsuta, ordered to replace the lost Tschishima, building at Elswick. The new programme embodied “two first-class battleships of the most powerful type,” a cruiser at Yokosuka of the Suma type, and a sloop Miyako, laid down at Kuré in 1894. This programme was also a subject of attack in a portion of the Japanese press.

Before, however, anything could be done, the battle of Asan and the [Pg 100] affair of the Kow-shing precipitated the war with China. Consequently, on the outbreak of war, the Tatsuta, launched at Elswick on April 6, 1894, and hastily completed in August of the same year, was stopped as contraband on her way out at Aden.

The Tatsuta is a torpedo gunboat. Particulars as follows:—

Japan was not long in finding uses for her navy.

The massacre of some shipwrecked Japanese in Formosa led to the despatch of a punitive expedition, the expense of which was paid by China, the suzerain, without any too much goodwill.

In 1875 Koreans gave trouble, by attacking a Japanese steamer that had visited one of their ports for coal and provisions, and in the midst of wild excitement a fleet was despatched, which, however, accomplished its object without bloodshed. A commercial treaty was concluded, and Japanese influences once more begun to gain ground in the Hermit Kingdom.

Mention has already been made of the Satsuma clan, whose anti-foreign sentiments had brought them into conflict with the British ten years before. A large portion of this clan were still violently conservative, and Saigo, the then head, having retired from Tokio, set up military schools, which something like 20,000 young Samaurai entered. Owing to [Pg 102] his known reactionary ideas, Saigo was naturally viewed with some suspicion, but it is questionable whether he was at first imbued with anything but a strong imperialism. Amongst other things, he advocated the seizure of Korea, which, at that time, could have been done without much opposition, if any, from Russia, then busy over her war with Turkey. The Russian danger crusade was not, however, taken seriously by the people at large, and Saigo, in preaching war with Russia, was regarded as a visionary, crying “wolf” where no wolf was to be found.

On the other hand, war with China was a foregone conclusion for a long time before it occurred. Both China and Japan wanted Korea, and while China claimed a suzerainty over Korea, Japan insisted that it was an independent State. On account of this, strained relations were continual.

In the spring of 1894 an insurrection broke out in Korea, and China, to indicate her suzerainty, despatched troops to quell it. At the same time she sent a Note to the Japanese Government, notifying her intentions, using the term “tributary State” for Korea.

Japan replied by a Note, refusing to accept the “tributary State” expression, and a little later announced her intention of sending 4000 troops to Korea—claiming this as her right under the Chemulpo Convention—which specified that if China sent troops to Korea, Japan might do the like. [Pg 103]

China protested, and, after the exchange of many Notes, despatched ten transports full of troops from Taku between July 21 and July 23. She also sent to Asan in Korea the small cruiser Tche Yuen and the gunboat Kuang-ki. [Pg 104]

On July 25th the Chinese warships Tche Yuen (Tsi Yuen)[17] and Kwang-Yi (Kuang King), coming from Asan in Korea, with awnings up, and generally unprepared for action, encountered off the island of Phung-do a portion of the Japanese flying squadron, consisting of the Naniwa (Captain Togo),[18] Yoshino (Captain Kawara), and Akitsushima (Captain Kamimura), the Yoshino flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Tsuboi.

Many accounts of this action have been written. The one I give here differs in many details from the narrative currently accepted; however, it is based on the personal narratives to me of officers of the Japanese ships engaged, and appears to me to afford by far the most reasonable explanation as to how the fight came about.

The Tche Yuen was never a good steering ship, and her steering-gear, which had been for some time in a state of neglect, broke down just about the time the Japanese ships were sighted.

This caused her to alter her course, and she bore down upon the Japanese, coming nearer and nearer. The idea went round that she purposed torpedoing. [Pg 105]

Every gun in the Japanese fleet was thereupon laid upon the Tche Yuen’s conning-tower, red flags hoisted, and the Chinese ships ordered to keep off. This the leading vessel, Tche Yuen (Captain Fong), was unable to do, and she pressed so closely on the Naniwa that Captain Togo turned and headed towards her.

The Tche Yuen hoisted a white flag, but still continued to approach. Thereupon the Naniwa opened fire, the other ships following suit. The Japanese version, that the Tche Yuen fired a torpedo first of all, while under the white flag, generally credited, is, on the evidence of Japanese officers, quite incorrect. No torpedo was fired; they expected one—that is all.

The conning-tower of the Tche Yuen was hit five times at the first discharge, the first lieutenant and a sub-lieutenant, who were inside, being killed, though the captain, who stood beside them, was unhurt. He vacated the tower, and gave orders to clear for action. In the circumstances he made a very passable fight for it, despite the subsequent Chinese allegations of cowardice. Caught unprepared, his fighting did not amount to much; but that was a natural sequel to his unpreparedness.

Long before the Chinese could reply, the Japanese, at 3000 yards, had practically put the ship hors de combat. A large shell hit the armour-deck, and glancing up, struck the fore-turret, disabling one of the 8-in. guns. All men on deck were killed, wounded, or driven away, and in a little while the fore-turret was again hit and the gun’s crews [Pg 106] killed. A shell burst in the funnel base, killing or wounding men in the stokehold, and all the upper works were riddled.

At about this stage the Tche Yuen did what she should have done long before, got the hand-steering wheel going, and, this done, she made off for Wei-hai-wei, keeping up a mild fire on the Japanese ships from her after 6-in. gun. This retreat was the only thing she could do; to remain would have been madness.

The Japanese attempted no pursuit, despite Chinese stories to the contrary. They believed that the Chinese battle-fleet was near by, and were chary accordingly. The only hit obtained by the Tche Yuen was on the Yoshino’s bridge, and this did little harm. On the other hand, the Tche Yuen, though she lost three officers and thirteen men killed, and twenty-five wounded, was not seriously damaged structurally, for within a week she was repaired. She, however, looked a fearful wreck; and an idea obtains that the Japanese thought that the sight of her would have a strong moral effect on the Chinese, which to some extent it did. If so, it was no unwise move; the ship, sound or damaged, could never be a serious enemy to them.

While this was going on the Kuang-Yi, disregarding orders to retire, attempted to charge and torpedo the enemy.[19] In this, of course, she failed, and, being on fire, most of her crew killed or wounded, she ran ashore. What was left of her crew—eighteen men all told—reached the land. The Naniwa, which had engaged the gunboat, continued to pound her, till a torpedo in the stern-tube blew up, and practically destroyed her completely. [Pg 107]

[Pg 109] This battle, save that it began the war, was a quite unimportant event, and has never been regarded in the Japanese Navy for more than it is worth. It is chiefly interesting on account of the pluck exhibited by the Chinese captain of the Kuang-Yi, and for the fact that in it Togo of the Naniwa first came to the front. [Pg 110]

The Battle of Asan began at 7.5 a.m. on July 25, 1894. It was well over when, at 8.30 a.m., the British-owned transport Kow-shing was sighted in the distance, and at 9.15 a.m. the Naniwa fired two blank charges at her and signalled to her to stop.

The Kow-shing was perfectly well known to the Japanese, Lieutenant Kuroi, of the Intelligence Department, having informed his Government on July 14th that she was chartered as a transport for Chinese troops. She was commanded by Captain Galsworthy of the British mercantile marine, and had on board, besides her officers and crew of 64 men, 1100 Chinese soldiers and the German Von Hannacken, who was in the Chinese service.

The Naniwa ordered the Kow-shing to follow her, and to this capture the captain assented, but the Chinese on board insisted on returning to Taku instead. Four hours were spent in negotiations, at the end of which time Captain Togo advised the Europeans in the Kow-shing to leave. Before this was complied with the Chinese were in a state of mutiny, and Togo, dreading the arrival of the Chinese battle-fleet, gave the order to open fire on the transport. At 1.10 p.m. he fired a torpedo, which missed, and a broadside that hit the Kow-shing in the engine-room. Five minutes later she began to sink, and at 1.46 went under. [Pg 111]

Most of the European officers jumped overboard, and the majority were rescued by the Naniwa’s boats. The Chinese on board the sinking ship opened a heavy rifle-fire on everything and everybody. The story that the Japanese fired on the men in the water does not appear to have any foundation in fact. The statement that they did so rests on the authority of the German Von Hannacken, who was hardly in a position to observe the exact facts as he swam to safety. It is probable, and, indeed, to be presumed, that the men on the Naniwa’s tops fired at the Kow-shing, in order to keep down the fire which the Chinese soldiers directed at the Japanese boats sent to pick up the European survivors.

About half the Chinese were picked up by a French gunboat or escaped to the islands; no attempt to save any was made by the Japanese. For this they have received stronger condemnation than they merit. To risk being killed by one lot of the enemy in order to save another lot is not a necessary act in war ethics. This was Captain Togo’s view, situated as he was in a position of considerable danger, owing to the supposed propinquity of the Chinese fleet. From panic, or the idea that the Japanese would give no quarter, the Chinese had to all intents and purposes gone mad en masse; and whatever theories armchair critics may evolve, the amount of blame actually due to Captain Togo is of a trifling nature. He had to choose between two evils, and chose the least.

The legality of the attack on the Kow-shing was hotly contested; but in [Pg 112] the end it was established that Japan was inside her legal rights. As to the ethics of the matter—well, the moralist who objects is apt to fail to realise that the Kow-shing carried 1100 of the best soldiers China could put in the field, and they had been destined to fight the Naniwa’s countrymen. To allow them to proceed would have been a splendid exhibition of legal-mindedness, but it would also have been a criminally stupid act from the patriotic standpoint. [Pg 113]

After this there was a lull. The Chinese battle-fleet, led by Admiral Ting in the Ting Yuen, put to sea searching for the Japanese. Ting was anxious to fight, and his personnel was in a good state of efficiency; his materiel was otherwise. Still, at this early stage, had he encountered the Japanese fleet, he was far more likely to have destroyed it than he was later on.

He had, however, to reckon with Li Hung Chang and Loh Feng Lo. These presently ordered him not to cruise east of Wei-hai-wei and the Yalu river; and this order practically put the Chinese fleet out of the operations. It has been stated many times that Li Hung Chang was bribed by the Japanese to give this order, and it is possible that he was. It is more probable, however, that for the Chinese to be defeated was a part of his own peculiar policy.

For some time, therefore, nothing happened. The Japanese feinted at Wei-hai-wei and Port Arthur, but for a good six weeks they spent most of their time in sea work—drilling and preparing for battle. The Chinese ships, on the other hand, lay inactive, steadily deteriorating morally, as inactive ships must.

It was stated in Japan that British cruisers at this time acted as Chinese scouts, giving information as to Japanese movements. It is a [Pg 114] difficult matter to authenticate or even to refer to. I have seen Chinese official reports (translated ones) in which two cruisers are specifically mentioned, but a Chinese official report is not necessarily confirmation. There is no question whatever but that the Chinese spread the rumour of British sympathy and benevolent neutrality; it is fairly clear, too, that now and again they obtained information as to Japanese whereabouts from British men-of-war. But it is not proved that this was anything more than in the course of ordinary conversation, and there is no reason whatever to believe that the British Government had a hand in the matter.

Japan, having been as good as presented with the command of the sea, swiftly moved an army into Korea. This went on till, in September, China began to realise that if she wished to hold that country she must use the sea as transport. At Ping Yang her land forces had suffered a severe defeat; reinforcements were urgently required. Ting was, therefore, ordered to convey these to the Yalu River.

On Sunday, September 1st, at 1 a.m., Ting sailed from Talien Bay, having with him the Ting Yuen (flag), Chen Yuen, Lai Yuen, King Yuen, Ping Yuen, battleships;[20] and the cruisers Chin Yuen, Chih Yuen, Tche Yuen, Tchao Yong, and Yank Wei; two gunboats, Kuang Kai and Kuang Ping; four “flat-iron” Rendel gunboats; four torpedo boats; and five transports, carrying a thousand men each.

Reaching the mouth of the Yalu on the same evening, he sent the transports, under convoy of the Ping Yuen, Kuang Ping, and torpedo boats, up the Yalu River, anchoring twelve miles out with his main fleet. [Pg 116]

Early next morning the smoke of the Japanese, burning Takashima coal, was observed on the horizon.

It has never been clearly demonstrated whether the meeting was accidental or designed. The balance of evidence, to my mind, is in favour of the theory that Admiral Ito calculated that the Chinese would, after Ping Yang, send ships to the mouth of the Yalu, conveying troops. That certainly was Admiral Ito’s theory.

The Chinese lay with banked fires. On seeing the Japanese smoke, they got up anchor, and adopted the prearranged battle-formation—line abreast en échelon, the centre strong, the wings weak. Line abreast was the best formation for the Chinese fleet, which was best in bow fire, but the weak ends of the wings were a serious error. In addition, the Yang Wei and Tcho Yong were slow at getting up anchor.

The Japanese came along in line ahead, the flying squadron leading the main astern of it.

The rival squadrons were as follows:—

Japan: 8 cruisers, 1 old battleship, 1 old “belted cruiser,” 1 gunboat, and 1 armed liner.

China: 4 battleships, 3 cruisers, 3 gunboats, with (coming from the Yalu) 1 battleship, 1 gunboat, and 2 torpedo boats.

The Japanese fleet fought by signals throughout; the Chinese fought without signals, on a prearranged plan. In materiel, so far as ships went, the fleets were about on a par in fighting value. Actually, the Japanese were superior—in part from the possession of Q.F. guns, in part because the Chinese were very badly supplied with shell. Had they had a good supply of shell, there is little question but that, with their preponderance of large calibre guns, they would have destroyed the Japanese fleet, especially as Admiral Ito made a considerable error at the outset. [Pg 117]

[Pg 119]

[Pg 120]

[Pg 123] The first shot, which fell short, was fired by the Ting Yuen at 12.30. A moment later the battle was general.

The sea was smooth—almost glassy—the sky dull. There was, however, a growing breeze, and this blew towards the Chinamen, so that the black smoke from the Japanese cruisers acted as a helpful screen.

The Japanese came on, and passed right across the Chinese front, turning in succession eight points to port, when they opened on the Chinese at 3000 yards. This passing across the front was dangerous, and the Chinese nearly succeeded in cutting the Japanese line. They lost station in doing so, masking each other; and to this the Japanese fleet owed much, and only their tail was endangered. The Fuso was badly hit. The Hi Yei, in danger of being rammed, had to alter her course. She passed between the Chinese battleships at short range, getting badly hit as she cleared them. The Akagi was badly knocked about; the Saikio alone passed on unhurt.

The Chinese had by now half won the battle, but they were in such a muddle with their ships that the advantage was never followed up. At this time the flying squadron, which had cut off the two old gunboats to [Pg 124] starboard of the Chinese line, was masked by the remaining four vessels of the main fleet; and an inspection of the plan of the second stage will show how near victory was for the Chinamen had their fleet only been in hand. Overwhelming heavy gunfire was theirs.

They lost the opportunity, however, and the flying squadron, after a short engagement with the Ping Yuen division, circled and came round on the Chinese front, while the main squadron, also turning, assailed its rear. The Ping Yuen devoted herself to a fruitless attempt at chasing the main Japanese fleet, while the bulk of the Chinese wasted effort in an attempt to complete the destruction of the little Akagi. In doing this they came under fire of the flying squadron, which sank both the King Yuen and Chih Yuen with its 10.2-in. guns.

Attempts by one of the torpedo boats to sink the Saikio-maru failed; she also survived a fire from the Chinese battleships. The Lai Yuen was by now ablaze; the Ching Yuen was no better off. Both battleships were also on fire. The pendulum had swung round, and everything pointed to a complete victory for Japan.

Matters were thus when, at 3.30, the Matsushima was put out of action. The incidents enabled the battleships to recover, and they took, without much serious harm, a hammering from the entire Japanese fleet that remained. [Pg 125]

[Pg 127] This stage continued till nightfall, when the Chinese got into line and steamed away, followed for a short distance only by the Japanese.

Both sides claimed the victory; as a matter of fact, it was a drawn battle. When the length of time the battle took is considered, the damages were relatively small. In detail, they were as follows:—

The Japanese flagship, Matsushima, went through the battle without any particular harm for a considerable while, when one of the Chinese ironclads fired a 12-in. common shell at her, which hit her, making a big hole. It went in and wiped out practically the entire battery, disabled two or three guns completely, and exploded some spare ammunition. Altogether 100 men were killed or wounded by that one shell, and she had to be hauled out of action. When that 12-in. shell hit, the majority of the men were in working dresses, in cotton things and so on, and a great many of them were men with beards, and a Japanese officer who was on board the ship at the time tells me that every single one of these men with cotton dresses was set on fire, and all the men with beards and long hair also had their beards and hair set on fire, and were rushing all over the ship, whereas several officers, who happened to be in serge uniform near by, were comparatively little hurt. The ship was set on fire to a certain extent, but a few buckets of water very easily put the fire out. [Pg 128]

This ship was also hit by a 10.2-in. shell a little earlier in the action. It hit her torpedo-room, glanced up, and knocked up against the barbette; but as the shell was loaded with cement its burst did not do very much harm.

The second ship in the Japanese line was the Chiyoda. She was also hit by a 12-in. shell, but that was another cement or coal-dust shell, so did not burst. It went through just above the belt. Had it hit the belt it ought to have sunk her; above, it simply made a large hole through and went out again, and the ship was none the worse; there was not a single man killed or wounded.

The Naniwa was hit by an 8.2-in. on the water-line, which went into the coal bunkers, but it did no particular harm there. The shell was afterwards picked up and pieced together, and a photograph taken of such sections as were got. Twenty-seven pieces were recovered, and they say there must have been a great many more. But that 8.2-in. shell practically did no harm whatever to the ship. The coal bunkers acted very efficiently.

In the Itsukushima there were shells in the torpedo-room, but none of the torpedoes exploded—if there were any there with war-heads, which is rather uncertain. There was also a shell in the engine-room, which, curiously enough, did no harm.

The Hashidate had a 6-in. shell burst right up against the barbette of a big gun, which was not hurt at all by it. [Pg 129]

[Pg 131] The Hi Yei, an oldish ship, was raked by a 12-in. common shell, and also by some smaller shells, which set her on fire and practically blew the ship to pieces.

The Sakio-maru was quite a small vessel. She was hit first of all by a 12-in. common shell, which, in theory, ought to have blown her to atoms. It disabled her steering-gear and wounded one man. She altogether got eleven hits from pieces of 4.7-in. or over. Of these, four were 12-in. shell, of which two burst inside; and the net result of those eleven hits was to wound eleven men, to kill nobody, but to make the ship leak a bit. The torpedoes fired at her missed, as has already been stated. The reason was that the boat fired as she turned, and the torpedo went under. Two others fired at longer ranges missed badly. The torpedo boat was not hit. The Chinese version of the affair runs to the effect that the Japanese on board the Saikio deserted their guns in panic at the attack. This statement rests, of course, only on the Chinese assertion.

The Akagi was hit by a 12-in. common shell, which struck the mainmast and sent it overboard, and killed the captain. The peculiar thing about it was that all the hits took her about that part; there was not a single hit forward, but the bridge, which stands somewhere aft, was continually swept, and the second in command was wounded almost immediately after he went on the bridge. The third officer, Lieut. Sato, then went up, and was hit by a fragment of shell that scraped the [Pg 132] top of his head off, and he went down below. A fourth man went up; he got wounded, and the third man went up again and carried on. She was able to steam and go home quite comfortably after the battle.

A gun shield, about two inches thick, was struck, and the shell that hit it is supposed to have been a 6-in. common. It simply scooped out the shield about an inch or so, and did no harm to the men inside, who were just round the corner, and did no harm whatever to the gun.

One shell burst on the upper deck, wrecked everything, made a tremendous mess, and riddled the deck all over, but the harm was practically nil.

The old battleship Fuso was hit more than any other Japanese ship, but every hit upon her has been kept confidential. Still, so far as can be guessed, the Japanese opinion of the result of the fire on this ship was that armour under the peculiar circumstances of the Yalu tended to aggravate hits rather than the reverse, and it is certainly interesting that this ship, with an armoured battery, completely armoured belt, and fairly thick armour which could not be penetrated by any of the Chinese 6-in. shell, should have been one of the most damaged ship of any. [Pg 133]

[Pg 135]

The Chinese flagship was an ironclad of 7000 tons displacement, the Ting Yuen. The first thing that hit her was a big ricochet which flew up and knocked the mast, carried it over the side, and killed all the men in the fighting-top. She was peppered all over by the Japanese, and hit something like 300 times, the result of the 300 hits being 14 men killed and 25 wounded. She was set on fire practically continuously all through the action. As soon as one fire was put out she was set on fire again in another place; but the Chinese managed to get these fires out without any bother, and no harm was done to her that way.

The second principal Chinese ship was the Chen Yuen. She was hit 400 times. The photograph of her in dock is how she appeared shortly after the battle. The funnel was peppered over everywhere. All the men in the fighting-tops were killed. The fore 6-in. turret was hit; it is only about an inch thick, and this shell went through and killed or wounded the gun’s crew, but did not hurt the gun. The only gun that was disabled at all in the battle was one of the 12-in., and it appears to have been disabled by something very big—probably one of the Japanese 12.6-in. shell hit the barbette of the ship, and the concussion upset the training gear of the guns in some way. Nothing could be done with them for about ten minutes. After that they were got in working order and fired again: This ship was also set on fire all over the place, but was perfectly able to fight when the battle was over. [Pg 136]

The Chen Yuen had on board her the famous Captain McGiffin, who wrote a great deal about his adventures in the fight. He was an American, who was usually described as commander of the ship and as having fought the battle. He was photographed against the hits in a desperately wounded condition, but afterwards it was surmised that he was not blind to dramatic effect. His narratives can hardly be accepted as historical evidence, save in a general way.

The next ship of interest at the battle of Yalu was the Elswick cruiser, Chih Yuen. She is described in most accounts of the Yalu as having very gallantly charged the entire Japanese fleet, attempting to ram; a tremendous fire was poured into her till she went down, and there was an end of her. According to Japanese officers, what really happened was that at an early stage in the action her steering-gear got disabled; she was simply wandering about unable to do anything. She was simply a cloud of white smoke drifting along. The Takachiho, one of the Japanese cruisers, had a 10-in. gun. She waited until the Chih Yuen was within something like 400 yards, when they could not miss, then let drive with this 10-in. They did not attempt to pick out any particular part of the Chih Yuen; they simply fired “into the brown.” They hit her somewhere rather high up near the funnel; there was a tremendous cloud of white smoke, which became red, and when that cloud went the ship was gone. There is no idea that any magazine was hit, or that there was any ammunition on deck to account for it, and the favourite theory of the Japanese officers is that this particular hit upset her stability in some way and did the finishing touch, and thus caused her to capsize. [Pg 137]

[Pg 139] Opposite is a sketch by a Japanese officer of the sinking of the King Yuen, which was a small Chinese ironclad. There is a great deal of mystery in all the histories as to how that ship really did go down. The Japanese account of it is that “she was on fire, and apparently the fire could not be put out; she began to roll very much indeed—first very heavily over one way and then very heavily over the other way; she continued rolling like that, and one time she rolled and did not come back.”

She had a sister ship, the Lai Yuen. This ship was set on fire at an early stage of the action, and the Chinese apparently did not trouble to put the fire out. The consequence was it got a large hold and burnt every scrap of woodwork in the ship. But the extraordinary thing is that her people managed to go on fighting. Of her deck nothing was left but twisted beams. The ship was nearly white-hot, and a number of men got roasted to death in her; but she was still in fighting condition when the battle ended. Probably only Chinamen could have fought in such conditions.

The Ching Yuen was set on fire, but not badly hit in any way.

There were two other Chinese ships lost, the Tchao Yung and the Yang [Pg 140] Wei. These were set on fire at a very early stage, and most of the accounts that we hear of the danger of fire in action are based upon these two particular ships. It appears that their captains were economical men, who liked to make a little money; so when the ships were painted they did not scrape off the old paint, and as the ships were about twelve years old the paint got very thick. Moreover, as they found kerosine cheaper than linseed oil, they mixed the paint always with kerosine. The ships, therefore, were of a somewhat inflammable nature. When they got hit, the men trying to put the fire out got hit also, and the ships were then simply left to blaze away. That is the true cause of most of the fire scares that happened just after Yalu.

The Chinese shell were very defective indeed. They had very few shell with any charges; nearly all they had to fire with were solid shot or cement shell, the very worst possible thing for firing at cruisers with; and this fact that they had no good shell must, perhaps, account for the survival of the Japanese fleet. For although just after Yalu the Japanese said that their shooting was 15 per cent. and the Chinese 10 per cent., they have since stated that the Chinese hits were something like 25 per cent. and their own about 12 per cent., and they say that in the early stages of the battle the Chinese never missed a single shot with their big guns—they hit every ship that they fired at; and they describe them as being some of the best gunners in the world—that these No. 1 Chinese gunners were born shots; but gradually, as the battle went on, the Japanese 3-pounders and machine guns playing on the Chinese ships took off the heads of those men, and they were replaced by other men who were not such good shots, and this went on until, towards the end of the battle, practically no hitting at all was done by the Chinese. But in the early part of the fight their shooting was very good indeed. [Pg 141]

[Pg 143] The Japanese in their fleet had three enormous guns, each of 66 tons, which would penetrate something like double the thickness of any armour opposed to them. Only one of those guns seems to have been in a condition to fire. In the excitement of the battle the Japanese got something wrong with the gear, and had to manipulate them by hand; and the consequence was that two of those guns fired about once each, and the third once an hour. It is unfortunate that these guns did not secure at least one fair and square hit—the data of it would have been extremely valuable.

After the battle of Yalu the Chinese ships were patched up. The Tche Yuen, which had already taken part in the battle of Asan, took part in Yalu, but was then knocked about and ran away. Although she had been so badly hit in the battle of Asan, when she was doing the strategical movement at the rear, she only took eight days to patch up, and she was then able to go out to sea again. After Yalu she was very quickly got ready once more.

The first conclusion one is forced to is that penetration does not seem [Pg 144] to have done anything in this battle. Where a gun was matched against some very inferior armour, it went through and smashed it up, but wherever the armour that it ought to penetrate was anything like equal to the gun, the result was failure.

The second point is the astonishing amount of hitting that all these ships seem to have been able to stand. There are many cases of quite little ships that in theory one single shell would finish, but it has taken five or six shells to disable them at all, and in a week or two they have been fit to go out fighting again. The Saikio-maru, and the way she was hammered and still managed to go on fighting and remain in a fairly good condition, is a particular case in point. Although the upper works may be knocked about and splintered, and so on, it does not seem much good splintering the upper works and making a mess of the ship unless there is a gun near it, and somebody to be disabled. Now, this conclusion is dead against the “moral effect” theory. It is almost a gospel that if the upper works are shelled enough the crew somewhere else will get demoralised. I do not believe it; they will not in a modern war be aware of it. I think this point should be laid to heart and thought over by those who have 6-in. guns to attack ships with. To do harm, they must fire those guns with all the intelligence they can bring to bear.

On the other hand, it is well to remember, as in the case of the King Yuen and Chih Yuen, that hits in the upper works caused the loss of these ships by affecting stability, so far as can be gathered in the absence of the hulls now at the bottom of the Yellow Sea. [Pg 145]

[Pg 147] A third point is, that the danger from fire in action is grossly exaggerated. As to the Japanese, they one and all say that they had no trouble with fire at Yalu. They have not entirely done away with woodwork in their ships. Following the fashion set by the Germans, they have done away with a fair amount, but their ships are by no means without wood, like German ships and others which have not been in action—though even Germans are now reverting to a certain amount of wood. The Japanese say that they had buckets of water standing round; the men ran to the buckets of water, and the fire was under. The Chinese had exactly the same system, and they had no trouble till about the end of the action, when they got demoralised, and then the fire began to get headway. Hose pipes seem to have always been untrustworthy, too liable to be holed by splinters. Wet sand proved excellent. It may be noted that hits on the sea near the ships deluged all the exposed parts of ships at Yalu with water. The loss of life was returned as follows:—

Details (official) of the losses are:— [Pg 148]

During the battle both the Tche Yuen and Kuang Chi ran away. The first [Pg 149] reached Port Arthur, and her captain was beheaded; the other ran ashore at Talienwan, and remained there till she was found on the 23rd by the Naniwa and Akitsushima, which destroyed her. The Yang Wei was finished by a spar torpedo on the 18th.

The remaining Chinese ships reached Port Arthur without adventure, and “victory” was celebrated by the draping of all guns, save those of the Tche Yuen, in red. They refitted very slowly.[25]

The Japanese, on the other hand, kept the sea, repairing ships—except the Matsushima—in secluded bays. The least damaged cruisers watched Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei.

On October 20th the Chinese were all repaired, and went to Wei-hai-wei, whence Admiral Ting meanwhile cruised aimlessly; but no action took place, and on November 7th he returned to Wei-hai-wei. Here the Chen Yuen ran ashore while entering harbour, and did not get off for three weeks. She was not repaired till the middle of January, a great hole in her bottom having to be mended. This was done with cement.

Meanwhile the Japanese, ignoring Ting, concentrated efforts on Port Arthur, the Lao Tung Peninsula being invaded while the Japanese fleet lay blockading the enemy in Wei-hai-wei. On the 20th he returned to Port Arthur, leaving a few cruisers to watch Ting, and the rest of the fleet took part in the fighting there. [Pg 150]

The fleet was in four divisions:—

On the 21st the fleet steamed past the harbour entrance, about seven miles out. They then detached the Chiyoda, which went to Pigeon Bay, and shelled Port Arthur at extreme range till 4 p.m.

At that time the Chinese fired at the fleet without result, till a heavy squall came on, in the midst of which the torpedo boats rushed the harbour. Excellently manœuvred, they got in untouched, and shelled the disorganised Chinese in the town. Outside, the Japanese soldiers were carrying fort after fort, the defence being poor, as the Chinese grew panic-stricken. [Pg 151]

Then followed the Port Arthur massacre, horrible stories of which flooded the world for the next few days. It has been strenuously denied that any massacre took place, but this is not correct. Few, if any, civilians were killed; there were next to none in the place, the supposed dead civilians being Chinese soldiers, who had discarded the overcoats, which were the only uniform they had, in order to continue the fight on guerilla lines. But very little quarter was given.

A Japanese disavowal and explanation will be found below:—

This disposes of the most gruesome fictions about the massacre, but it does not deal with what took place on shore.

The true story, as I had it from a Japanese army officer who was there, is as follows:—

The battle was over, and the Japanese were marching into the town, a few Chinese retreating before them. Isolated fighting continued; but the place was, to all intents and purposes, captured.

As the victorious Japanese pressed forward, a young officer suddenly came across the remains of his brother, who had been captured, wounded, a day or two before. The body showed that death had been inflicted with atrocious Chinese tortures. [Pg 155]

Maddened at this dreadful sight, the young officer practically ran amok. Crying “No quarter,” he began to kill. His men, understanding the cause, started on the same career of vengeance; and it spread like wildfire through the army, that the town was full of the corpses of tortured Japanese prisoners, and two or three regiments got out of hand. For some time “Vengeance” was the battle-cry, and terrible things happened that night.

Before we blame the Japanese, we should remember that our own hands are not quite clean in this matter; human nature has its limitations, and there are many men still living who can recall what they did when, in the Indian Mutiny, they found rebels red-handed among the tortured and outraged bodies of British ladies and children. Armchair ethics may condemn; but the armchair critics sit at home doing the condemnation. It is less easy to be philosophical in the hour of battle. The philosopher must have been through it, and abstained from slaughter, for his strictures to be worth anything. Personally, I think few things come more under the head of “excusable” than the Port Arthur massacre, so long as human nature remains human.

Port Arthur was converted into a Japanese base, and for a few weeks events languished, while preparations were made for the attack on Wei-hai-wei.

On January 18, 1895, the Japanese fleet bombarded Teng-ckow-foo, facing Port Arthur on the Chinese mainland. It is about eight miles west of Wei-hai-wei.

On the 19th the bombardment was continued; on the 20th the army was landed to the east of Wei-hai-wei.

Wei-hai-wei was moderately fortified, chiefly with 8-in. Krupp guns. There were a few larger ones, and a sprinkling of modern pieces. Mostly, however, the guns were old. On Leu-Kun tau[26] were some more forts, a gunnery school, and a coaling station. The Chinese fleet lay behind this island, the Japanese watching both entrances, which were protected by booms.

On the 30th the Japanese fleet and army opened fire on the defences. In this affair the Chao-pei-tsui defences were silenced by the Naniwa, Akitsushima, and Katsuragi, the division being under command of Captain (now Admiral) Togo. The magazine was exploded, and the forts taken possession of by the Japanese soldiers. Before retreating, however, the Chinese destroyed all save a few old guns. [Pg 157]

[Pg 159] The rest of the fleet bombarded Leu-Kun tau without much result on either side. The Chinese warships took part in the defence. A photograph of this battle, taken from a captured fort, is given.

The net result, however, of the operations of the 30th to 31st was that the Japanese took practically everything except the island. On the night of the 31st, Admiral Ito decided on a torpedo-boat attack. Both entrances had some boom defence, with gaps here and there. The Japanese attempted to attack by the east with sixteen boats.

The Japanese soldiers in the forts took them for Chinese, so they retired.

A heavy gale came on next day, and the whole Japanese fleet ran to shelter at Teng-chow, returning on February 2nd, when another ineffectual bombardment at 2500 metres took place. An equally ineffective torpedo attack was tried in the night. It failed, as the Chinese sighted the boats, and they wisely did not try to force their way in.

Next day, and the next again, the bombardment was violently renewed, but on both sides it led to nothing save expenditure of ammunition. Landings on Leu-Kun tau led to nothing, and the only incident of real [Pg 160] moment was the rushing out of twelve Chinese torpedo boats on the 4th.

Several were sunk as they came out; the rest ran ashore, and were captured or destroyed. So far as can be gathered, Ting had found his boats a nuisance, and was in terror of the Japanese boats being allowed in in mistake for Chinese ones. He also appears to have imagined that a daylight attack might produce something in his favour; but the balance of evidence seems to point to the fact that the boats were a nuisance to him.

Whatever was intended, the Chinese boats made no attack on the Japanese cruisers; escape was their only objective. Only two succeeded in getting away.

On the night of the 4th the third torpedo attack was made. The boats went in in three divisions of four each, though only the second and third divisions went in—the first being employed to create a diversion at the western entrance.

The eastern boats crept in slowly, in a cold so intense that an officer and two men were frozen to death. Two boats (8 and 21), their steersmen frost-bitten, grounded as they tried to enter.

By four o’clock a boat had got quite near the Chinese, and fired two torpedoes without result; a second boat was no luckier with three. Not till then did the Chinese open fire, and this boat ran ashore immediately afterwards. [Pg 161]

[Pg 163] Two more boats collided in the confusion, another had her boilers burst, yet another was badly hit. Only one boat came out unscathed. As mentioned further on in “Personal Characteristics,” the real truth of the attack has never been known, and never will be, save vaguely.[27]

Its result, however, is well known, the battleship Ting Yuen was hit in the stern and sank in the mud, where she lay with her upper works above water and guns still firing.

Throughout the 5th the bombardment continued unabated, and though no harm was done, the ceaseless worry told heavily on the Chinese.

On the night of the 5th a fourth attack was made by the first division. It met with little resistance, torpedoed the Lai Yuen and a despatch vessel, the Wei Yuen, and also hit the Ching Yuen in the bow without sinking her. The boats met with no defence worth mentioning; the Chinese look-outs, worn out with the ceaseless bombardments, were mostly asleep.

On the 6th a landing was effected on Leu-Kun tau, and on the 7th the usual bombardment continued. The Matsushima, Naniwa, and Yoshino were hit, but the Chinese lost a magazine, blown up.

On the 9th the Ching Yuen sank, her end being accelerated by a water-line hit from a shore gun. The Itsukushima was hit on the water-line this day by a shell from the 12-in. guns of the Chen Yuen, but the shell failed to burst. On the 10th and 11th the bombardment still continued. Only one fort now remained to the Chinese, but their [Pg 164] ships still afloat were comparatively little hurt. The moral effect of the continuous firing finally broke them down, and on the 12th, in the midst of the firing, a gunboat flying a white flag came out.

The Japanese ceased fire, and the gunboat came to the Matsushima. Two officers from the Chinese fleet came on board, and delivered a letter from Admiral Ting to Admiral Ito, suggesting terms of surrender. It is worthy of note that, so one of the Malsushima’s officers told me, these two Chinamen, on being taken to the wardroom to await Admiral Ito’s reply, promptly and instantly fell asleep, and were only awakened later with the greatest difficulty. They were absolutely worn out. It is stated, also, that the whole of the beleaguered crews did the same thing directly firing ceased; want of sleep was, indeed, the immediate cause of Admiral Ting’s surrender, though, of course, his position was absolutely hopeless.

Ting surrendered on condition that the lives of his men were spared, but he and his principal officers committed suicide. The whole of the defenders were executed by the Chinese at the first available opportunity.

Japanese naval losses during this affair were officially given as:—

On shore the army lost much more heavily, as during the fighting the entire force occupying one captured fort were destroyed by the Chen Yuen, which steamed up close to them and opened fire. [Pg 165]

[Pg 167] Chinese losses were never stated, but they are believed to have been much less than was expected. The entire crews of the Lai Yuen and Wei Yuen were lost, and most of those in the Ching Yuen.

Wei-hai-wei was won chiefly through sheer human inability to stand the strain of the everlasting bombardment and torpedo menace. Guns accomplished practically nothing directly towards it, and even the torpedo per se was not decisive. The principal factor was Admiral Ito’s persistent and unremitting attack.

With Wei-hai-wei the war was practically over. The only remaining incident of note was an attack on Formosa, in which, if all accounts are true, the Japanese did not shine very greatly, or else there are problems in war which in peace cannot be conceived. It is stated that the Japanese began to bombard at 8 a.m. The Chinese had loaded all guns; they left a few men to fire them, and then retired. Reply ceased about 8.30, but the Japanese did not, it is said, discover it till about 2 p.m. An explanation, of course, is that they did not trust the silence of the forts—which is reasonable enough. That they did not notice it is the accusation of their critics.

Save for a few torpedo boats lost, the war left the Japanese fleet unimpaired; the ships damaged at Yalu were in trim again when peace was declared. On the other hand, beyond the Chin Yen, Japan gained little in the ships she took. The Tche Yuen is of very small fighting value, the Ping Yuen of none, and none of the gunboats are of any utility. Of the captured torpedo boats, one was superior to any Japanese boat; the rest, from long neglect, were in a bad way.

Towards the end of the war the Esmeralda (now Idzumi), already described, passed from the Chilian to the Japanese Navy, and at its close the Tatsuta, detained en route, proceeded on her way.

Just before war broke out—in May, 1894—the Akaski, a sister to the Suma, had been laid down at Yokosuka; the two battleships Fuji and Yashima, of an improved Royal Sovereign type, were progressing in England, the former at the Thames Ironworks, the latter at Elswick. [Pg 169]

[Pg 171] The Suma was launched at Yokosuka on March 9, 1895. Unlike the Akitsushima and other ships which had preceded her, she is of entirely Japanese design and workmanship, and nothing more Western than an odd “stand-by man” or two assisted in her construction. Practically, she is the first Japanese-built ship. Particulars of her are:—

Protection is afforded by a steel deck 2 ins. on the slopes and 1 in. on the flat.

The Akashi, launched two years later, is a sister, without fighting-tops and more built-up amidships.

The Yashima was launched at Elswick on February 28, 1896; the Fuji at the Thames Ironworks on March 31st in the same year. Mr. G. C. Mackrow, of the Thames Ironworks, was the designer. [Pg 172]

The following are particulars:—

[Pg 174] These ships are, as has been before noted, improved Royal Sovereigns. As designed, they would have differed from these ships only in that, being some 1500 tons smaller, they are able to carry less weight in the way of coal, etc. Their big guns, 12 in. against 13.5 in., are lighter, but against this must be put the fact that they carry heavy shields to them. Further, the introduction of Harvey steel in the place of compound armour greatly increased the value of their armour without adding to its weight. Regarded in the light of present-day developments, they are defective in protection to the secondary armament nearly as much as the Royal Sovereigns were before reconstruction. A comparison of the two ships, Fuji and Royal Sovereign, is of interest.

The difference in armour value, caused by the introduction of Harvey process in time to allow of its adoption on the Fuji, is very marked. Since then, of course, Harvey has given place to Harvey nickel, and this in its turn to Krupp process armour, of which 9 ins. would nearly equal 17 ins. of Royal Sovereign armour. But their fine 12-in. guns, as powerful still as any afloat, keep the Fuji class still in the ranks of good fighting ships. [Pg 175]

[Pg 177]

[Pg 178] In appearance the two ships are almost identical, the only difference being in the arrangement of the ventilators.

Between them, however, an important difference exists; the Yashima has her dead wood cut away aft, while the Fugi has not. Consequently, the Yashima is much the handier vessel, but, in part from the fact that she was the first ship to have the dead wood aft cut away, in part from inherent weaknesses thereby engendered, the Fuji is regarded as the better ship of the two. The Yashima, being docked without proper precautions suitable to the case, exhibited some dropping aft, in consequence of the effect of the unsupported weight. This led to such sterns being countermanded for subsequent Japanese battleships, though in cruisers it is always applied. The turning circle of the Yoshima, it may be mentioned, is extremely small.

Finally, it may be noted that these two ships were the first to be fitted with the Elswick submerged torpedo tube. They have the earliest pattern, and it will not deliver torpedoes very successfully when the ship is at high speed.

After the war Japan decided to have a really first-class modern fleet of four battleships, six cruisers, and a proportionate number of smaller craft. [Pg 179]

[Pg 181] The four big battleships are practically sisters, though differing in appearance and detail. The main differences are as follows:—

Little differences in rig have been purposely introduced; thus the Hatsuse is shorter-masted than the Shikishima, and the Asahi and Mikasa have their funnels differently placed, those of the latter being more amidships.

Also, instead of casemates, the Mikasa has her 6-in. battery protected by a continuous armoured wall. Essentially, however, the ships are sisters.

They were produced as follows:—

Although she differs considerably from the Shikishima in appearance, the Asahi is practically a sister ship, the sole points of difference being (1) funnels; (2) distribution of the 2½-pounders; (3) absence of a bow torpedo boat; and (4) mounting of the big guns. There are, of course, certain minor structural differences—such, for instance, as the fact that the Asahi has a slightly larger wardroom, and that this [Pg 182] wardroom is a trifle further aft—but, generally speaking, for fighting purposes they are identical, save for the points of difference noted above. There are unseen differences of detail also, such as the thickness of the armour deck, but none of these affect the fighting value. There is a difference, too, in the coal carried, but coal capacity does not show to the eye.

The details of the Asahi, with those of the Shikishima and the British Formidable, are as follows:—

[Pg 184] There is some doubt about the Asahi’s coal, 1400 tons may be the maximum and 700 the normal. Japanese ships do not need to carry much coal, being designed to operate in waters where friendly coal stations are numerous. True, ships thus kept short are likely to be out of action because they are coaling, about once a week; but, on the other hand, as they get two extra 6-in. quickfirers and four 12-pounders for this sacrifice, they are rather envied by our naval officers. After all, the primary duty of a battleship is to hit the enemy hard, and an extra 6-in. in the broadside is no mean advantage. There are other incidental advantages too—a single 6-in. shell would put all the eight 12-pounders out of action on the upper deck of the Formidable, while, thanks to the casemates acting as screens, the Asahi could only lose four of her 3-in. by a single shell. In the placing of her 3-in. guns she is altogether better off than the Formidable, the sole point in which the British ship is superior being the four guns carried on the main deck forward. The Formidable can fight all these on the broadsides; it is doubtful if the Asahi could, because of the blast from the big guns firing above them. But per contra she has her other 3-in. quickfirers much better placed; they are more distributed.

The positions of these are: four on the main deck forward; four on the main deck aft; four on the upper deck amidships; two on top of the forward upper deck casemates; two beside the fore conning-tower; and four beside the after conning-tower—a total of twenty. Those of the Shikishima are placed in exactly the same fashion. Those of the Formidable are: four on main deck forward (extreme bow); four on main deck aft; and eight on upper deck amidships; a total of sixteen. Three [Pg 185] units instead of six; or, to put it another way, work for only three shells instead of six shells.

The Asahi is an improvement on the Shikishima in the matter of the 2½-pounders—a very small detail. In the Shikishima these are grouped on top of the amidship upper-deck casemates; in the Asahi only two are over these casemates, the other four being distributed, a couple on each bridge. Two theories are at work here, and it will need a war to say which is the better. In the Shikishima it is easy to concentrate three 2½-pounders on a single torpedo boat or portion of a big enemy, while, as a price for this, they are at the mercy of a single shell. Those of the Asahi are not thus at the mercy of one shell, but it will be far less easy to concentrate them.

The next point of difference between the Shikishima and the Asahi is that the former carries a bow above-water torpedo tube, with 6-in. Harvey nickel protection to it. This tube, similarly protected, is in the Fuji, Yashima, Asama, Tokiwa, and Yakumo. After some experiments and practice the Japanese authorities decided that this tube was of no use practically, and decreed its abolition. That of the Shikishima had, however, already been built in, so this ship has it. In the Asahi the design was modified, and the bow tube dropped out. It is absent also in the Hatsuse, a sister, and in the Iwate and Idzumo.

Under certain circumstances such a tube might be of great use in action—for instance, approaching an enemy who presented his broadside [Pg 186] while the ship possessing the tube wished to make a feint to close. But to use it it would be necessary to slow down or reverse engines—both things that might be awkward to do in an action. Still, the real objection does not lie there, so much as in the trouble with sea that a bow tube causes. Bow guns, even high up, are always liable to get “washed out,” a bow torpedo tube is still more likely to be so. In addition to this, it raises an unnecessary large bow wave.

In comparison with the Formidable, the Asahi and Shikishima have—beside the 6-in. and 3-in. guns—other points of distinct difference. They have (1) complete instead of partial belts; (2) 6-in. instead of 9-in. armour protecting the lower deck; (3) much higher barbettes; and (4) quite differently shaped hoods to the big guns.

Of these differences the armour one is of no immediate moment at present. The Asahi, in the matter of armour, is practically a Majestic with 3-in. stripped off the lower deck amidships and disposed on the ends plus some extra armour paid for in the weight of coal carried. Now, the 6-in. lower deck armour of the Asahi is proof against any 6-in. projectile at any range, and though a steel-pointed 9.2-in. common shell has been through 6-in. Harvey nickel at Whale Island, this is probably an isolated proving-ground case, and nothing but an armour-piercing shell of large calibre is ever likely to get through such armour in actual warfare. Also it is at least doubtful whether such a shell would do more harm than a solid shot, and against a 12-in. solid shot 9-in. armour is no more protection than 6-in. In either case the shot will go through and dance about inside, and it is this “dancing about” that makes shot dangerous, and all armour save the very best a snare and a delusion so far as solid projectiles are concerned. However, medium armour is imperatively needed to keep off shells, for it is good-bye to any ship inside of which a big common shell is comfortably planted. The Admiral class, for instance, would do no more fighting once a big common shell got them amidships. [Pg 187]

[Pg 189] As for the complete belt, the Formidable, of course, has something on the bow, and this may be considered proof against 6-in. shell in action, save at short range. It is, at any rate, proof against the deadly little shell from 12-pounders and the like. As for any 6-in. shot—well, very few 6-in. shot are carried in any ship, and holes made by them are easily plugged.

The real gain of the Asahi is the extra gun-power, but since it is held essential that British ships shall have a large coal supply, it is useless to decry the Formidable over the two missing 6-in. guns. The defect of the Formidable, and one that might have been remedied, is the position of the 12-pounders. These could and should have been either more distributed, or else placed right up above everything and clear of everything, much as the French place their 4-in. quickfirers. Such a gun is extremely unlikely to be actually hit, whereas if it is crowded about with bulwarks, boats, and so on, a shell coming anywhere near is bound to burst with devastating effect. [Pg 190]

In appearance it is difficult to tell the Asahi from our Canopus class, save for colour. A critical eye could detect the much higher barbettes of the Japanese vessel and their different shape, but that is about all, for the extra casemate would hardly be visible at any appreciable distance. Like the Canopus class, the Asahi has the huge after funnel, and the resemblance is increased by the tautness of her masts. The sign manual of a British man-of-war is the rake forward of the top masts, in the smartest Channel Fleet ships this is most noticeable; but the Asahi also is taut.

The Asahi has a slight sheer forward, like all our new ships, in consequence of which, though both pairs of guns are at the same height above the water, the after barbette looks a good deal higher than the fore one. The shields are peculiar. The plan gives a general idea of their appearance—sloping fronts but straight sides. The British pattern slopes all round, and is generally more squat—and of the two is more favourably regarded afloat. If by any off chance a big shot hit the side of the Asahi shield it would get through, from the inclined sides of the British pattern it would rebound at any range. However, a shot is very unlikely to hit the sides of the shield, and probably the mere shock of a big projectile would effectually displace everything and put the turret out of action. Wherever a big projectile hits it must do some harm, whether it gets through or not, and the old American idea of battering in preference to penetration is not so unsound as [Pg 191] many folk are now disposed to regard it. Especially must this be so with certain foreign-built ships; the least little thing wrong and the colossal blow will find it out.

The guns and mountings of the Asahi are from Elswick. They embody some slight improvements upon those of the Shikishima, but are on exactly the same general principle. The 12-in. can easily do a round a minute, and should be able to do a round every two minutes in action. The rate of the 12.5-in. Canet gun at Yalu was one round per sixty minutes, but there were special circumstances involved. Still, there is no doubt that big guns have made enormous strides towards quick-fire in the last year or two, and two of the Asahi or Formidable 12-in. are equal to three of those in the Majestic probably.

The Asahi is fitted with the Barr and Stroud transmitters, each casemate having an indicator—in English and Japanese—to give the range automatically from the conning-tower. The official British view is against these transmitters, on the grounds that action will derange them; but there is no getting away from the fact that, even so, till deranged they will be exceedingly useful. Our methods of passing the range are cumbersome, and, in addition, by the time it is passed it has probably altered. Moreover, gunnery is not so much a matter of good shooting as knowing the range; the wrong range given accounts for most misses—at any rate, in the British Navy.

All the hoists in the Asahi are electrical, with auxiliary hand-power in case of need. [Pg 192]

All the ships have twenty-five Belleville boilers each, fitted with economisers.

Full-speed trial results were:—

[Pg 195]

The armoured cruisers are of two classes. The first comprises the British (Elswick) built Asama, Tokiwa, Idzumo, Iwate; the second the Stettin-built Yakumo, and the St. Nazaire-built Azuma.

These last were the original Japanese design; Elswick put the extra guns at its own discretion, and rearranged the positions as the plans indicate.

Particulars are:—

All six have four of the 6-in. guns unprotected, the other 6-in. and the 8-in. guns are in casemates and turrets (for the 8-in.).

All have 7-in. belts reduced to 3½ ins. forward, with 5-in. armour on the lower deck side. Their decks reinforce the belts. [Pg 196]

[Pg 199] The Iwate, Idzumo, Azuma, and Yakumo have Belleville boilers, the other two cylindrical. The type ship had very high horse-power; in the later vessels this was reduced, and the saving effected spent in substituting Krupp process armour for Harvey nickel on the sides.

Trial (full-speed) results were:—

The first two have a pair of funnels only.

The ships are very good ones, equal in many ways to second-class battleships, but not calculated to stand battleship fire, I fancy.

The Kasuga and Nisshin were launched for Argentina in 1902 and 1903 respectively, by Messrs. Ansalds, of Genoa, Italy. They were purchased by Japan immediately before the war with Russia.

Details are—

[Pg 203] These ships belong to the well-known Garibaldi class. The belt is 6-in. Terni armour reduced to 4½ ins. at the ends, and reinforced by a deck 1½ in. on the slopes.

Above the main belt is a 6-in. redoubt, with 4¾ in. ends, above again a 6-in. battery containing ten 6-in. guns.

The primary guns are protected by 5½-in. armour.

The remaining 6-in. guns are carried without protection on the upper deck. Six 12-pounders are carried between them, the remainder under the poop and forecastle.

The torpedo tubes are in special casements.

The ships originally had a single military mast, but just before completion the fighting-tops were removed.

They are the heaviest-armed armoured cruisers of their size in the world. Compared to the Russian Bayan, of about the same displacement, this superiority is manifest.

[Pg 207] The Bayan is the product of La Seyne. She is somewhat faster, better protected by 2 ins. on the water-line, but less protected on the guns, and with only half as many. She would take more punishment than the Nisshin and Kasuga; but, given equal crews and tactics, the heavy fire of the Nisshin type would seem to convey an immense advantage. [Pg 208]

The three ships Takasago, Kasagi, and Chitose, are slightly improved editions of the Yoshino already described. The first was built at Elswick, the other two in America.

There are slight differences in dimensions, otherwise the description of the Yoshino stands for them. The armament is not quite the same as in the Yoshino, as these three later vessels carry two 8-in. guns in heavy turrets, ten 4.7’s on the broadsides, and 12-pounders instead of 6-pounders.

They are very fast, but the heavy gun turret forward does not improve their behaviour at sea. Per contra, the 8-in. guns give them the power to deal a knock-out blow to other cruisers of their size; so their value depends on whether scouting or fighting is the more important métier for a second-class cruiser. The Yoshino type is intended to be both, and the Yoshino herself in a great measure is; the others are too heavily armed to be ideal scouts.

The Niitaka and Tsushima were launched in 1902. A sister, the Otawa, was laid down in 1903. They are improved Sumas, and entirely of Japanese design and construction. [Pg 209]

[Pg 212] Particulars are:—

The ships embody no novelty, except in the selection of armament. The Suma’s 4.7’s disappear, and 6-in. and 12-pounders take their place.

[Pg 213]

The Miyako was launched in 1897.

Details are:—

The Chihaya was launched in 1901.

Details are:—

There is no armour protection. [Pg 214]

[Pg 215]

Japan has selected two types of destroyers, the Yarrow and the Thornycroft. The Thornycroft boats are practically replicas of similar boats in the British Navy, and the Yarrow boats do not greatly differ, except that they have the usual Yarrow stern.

Details will be found in the Appendix.

The feature of most interest concerns the disposition of the guns—the 12-pounder being carried aft instead of forward. This is a preferable system to the usual one of the 12-pounder forward, as the bow is thus less weighted down.

Mention may also be made of the fact that a railway is fitted on deck for the conveyance of torpedoes. This is convenient, but the raised rails are apt to get in the way of the crew a good deal.

In the war with Russia the Japanese destroyers appear to have stood the strains to which they have been subjected remarkably well, and no cases of “broken backs” and similar catastrophies which had been foretold seem to have occurred.

[Pg 216]

Till recently, the fastest Japanese torpedo boat was one captured from the Chinese at Wei-hai-wei. Some very fast boats were built in the period 1898-1901, the types being Normand and Yarrow (Viper type), mostly the former. Details will be found in the Appendix. Some recent boats reached 29 knots on trial, and they are practically small destroyers.

The early Japanese torpedo boats were of the “second-class” variety, usually of the Normand or some similar French type, and the boats which sealed the fate of the Chinese Fleet at Wei-hai-wei were mostly of this pattern.

[Pg 217]

Japan had no submarines when the war with Russia broke out, but orders for an experimental Holland type boat are said to have been placed.

The new programme began, in 1904, with the ordering of two 16,400-ton battleships at Elswick and Barrow respectively. They have been named Kashima and Katori.

The following description of the Elswick battleship appeared in the Engineer:—

Her length on the water-line is 455 ft.; her breadth, 78 ft. 2 ins.; her draught, 26 ft. 7½ ins.; and her displacement, in tons, 16,400; and she will carry for her armament four 12-in. guns, twin mounted in barbettes; four 10-in. guns, mounted singly in barbettes; twelve 6-in. guns in the citadel; twelve 12-pounder guns; six Maxim guns; three 3-pounder guns; and five torpedo tubes. The plan shows the disposition of the above-named armament, the arrangement of which has been most carefully considered, so that there is no interference with one another in the firing of the different guns, which, however, are all capable of being trained through large arcs. The 12-in. guns are 26 ft., and the 10-in. 22 ft., above the water-line. The 6-in. guns in the battery are from 13 ft. to 14 ft. above the water-line. [Pg 219]

The general disposition of the armour protection is that adopted in the latest and most powerful battleships, the armour amidships being carried from below the water-line right up to the upper deck. Above the level of the upper deck additional protection has been adopted, a 4-in. screen being worked to a height of 7 ft. 6 ins. above the upper deck, and extending between the 10-in. gun positions. The main armour belt, which extends the whole length of the vessel, has a thickness of 9 ins. for more than half its length, tapering to rather less at the extremities. The depth of this belt is from 5 ft. below water to 2 ft. 6 ins. above water. Immediately above this is a belt of 6-in. armour, extending in length from the after 12-in. barbette right forward to the stem. Above this again is the 6-in. citadel armour carried to the height of the upper deck, and enclosing the two 12-in. barbettes. In this citadel are placed ten of the 6-in. guns, divided from one another by screens of 80-lb. armour plating, and firing through ports similar to those adopted in casemates. This citadel arrangement, which is one of the most important features of this and other recent battleships, is really a revival or development of the old box battery arrangement adopted in some of our battleships built in the seventies, such as the Shannon and Alexandra. This arrangement fell into disuse when the great improvement made in ordnance—which for a time kept so far ahead of the improvements in armour—made it necessary to increase the thickness of the armour to make it efficient, and therefore it was only possible to [Pg 220] cover a comparatively small area of the vessel’s side. However, the recent improvements in armour have been such that again comparatively thin armour is efficient in keeping out projectiles, which has once more made it possible to protect a greater area of side. In more recent years the same system with protective divisions between the guns in the battery was adopted in the Nile and Trafalgar, but as the 4-in. armour protecting the battery of each of these vessels was not of a quality to keep out even the smaller armour-piercing shell, the system was not repeated until the latest and most improved armour was adopted in such vessels as our King Edward VII. class, and in the much-talked-of Swiftsure and Triumph. The remaining two 6-in. guns fire through similar ports in the 4-in. screen armour on the upper deck amidships. The barbette armour of the 12-in. guns is 9 ins. thick on the upper portions where exposed, and 5 ins. thick where protection is afforded by the citadel armour. The barbette armour of the 10-in. guns has a thickness of 6 ins., the conning-tower armour is 9 ins. thick, and the observer tower 5 ins. thick. In addition to these two armoured positions for commanding officers, three officers’ shelters are to be built of 3-in. armour, one above the conning-tower and one on each side. Besides the armour described above, a steel protective deck runs throughout the entire length of the vessel, the whole of the machinery, magazines, etc., being kept below. This protective deck has a thickness of 2 ins. on the flat portions amidships, and 3 ins. on the sloping sides, which are carried down to meet the bottom of the main armour belt. At the ends where the armour protection is reduced, this deck has a thickness of 2½ ins. all over. Thick protective plating is also worked on the top of the screen armour at the boat deck level. [Pg 221]

[Pg 222] Special attention has been paid to the arrangement and disposition of the magazines, so that the ammunition can be got to all the guns with the greatest speed and minimum of trouble. There are independent magazines for each pair of 12-in. guns, and for each 10-in. gun, and an ammunition passage is provided running right round the machinery spaces below the protective deck for the supply of ammunition to the various 6-in. and smaller quickfiring guns. The torpedo tubes are situated in watertight chambers—two tubes forward and two aft firing on the broadsides, and one tube firing right astern, also under water. Special means are provided for rapidly clearing water from these submerged torpedo-rooms in case of emergency.

The general particulars of the main propelling machinery and boilers are as follows: There are twenty Niclausse boilers disposed in three separate boiler-rooms. These boilers will have a working pressure of 230 lbs., and a grate surface of 1300 sq. ft., and a heating surface of 43,000 sq. ft. The twin engines will have four cylinders each, of 36 ins., 56 ins., 63 ins., and 63 ins., with a stroke of 48 ins., and the horse-power will be sufficient to give a speed of at least 18½ knots. The coal bunkers are so arranged as to reinforce the protection given [Pg 223] by the armour and protective deck to the engines and boilers, whilst their disposition is such as to require very little trimming to get the coal to the furnaces. The bulk of the coal can also be got to the stokeholds without opening any of the doors in the main watertight bulkheads—a point of very great importance when the vessel is in action. In addition to the coal bunkers below the protective deck, reserve bunkers are arranged on the slopes of the protective deck up to the height of the main deck over the length of the machinery spaces amidships, the total capacity being approximately 2000 tons, which is sufficient to give the vessel a very large radius of action.

A very complete outfit is being provided for the vessel, including the following boats: Two 56-ft. vedette torpedo boats of high speed, one 36-ft. steam pinnace, one 40-ft. launch, one 32-ft. pinnace, three 30-ft. cutters, two 30-ft. gigs. For lifting these boats two powerful electrically worked derricks are provided—one on each side of the vessel.

There is also a powerful electrical equipment, both for providing energy for the numerous machines on board, and also for lighting. The latter will include provision for six searchlights and some 1250 incandescent lamps.

The equipment of anchors and cables includes three stockless bower anchors of 120 cwt. each, and other smaller anchors. There are also three main cables of 150 fathoms each of 2⅝ ins. stud chain.

The vessel being of such an immense weight—over 17,000 tons with her [Pg 224] full equipment of coal, stores, etc.—special arrangements have been provided for docking her with safety, and, in addition to shoring ribbands for giving special support to the armour in dock, two docking keels are provided on the flat portions of the bottom under the bilges amidships. These keels will rest on separate lines of blocks in the dock, as well as the usual blocks along the middle line of the vessel. Bilge keels are also provided to reduce rolling in a seaway.

The watertight subdivision of the vessel is of a most thorough description; the inner bottom extends over the whole length of the vessel, and is minutely subdivided, and above this the number of transverse and longitudinal watertight bulkheads is too numerous to mention.

An elaborate system of pumping and draining has been worked out, and in addition to the main pumps in the engine-rooms, which can be used in case of emergency for dealing with a large inrush of water, are two 9-in. pumps, two 5½-in., and one 4½-in., besides pumps for fresh and salt water services.

In a vessel of this description the ventilation arrangements are not the least important of the many items which have to be thought out, and every precaution has been taken for efficiently ventilating spaces both above and below the protective deck. In addition to the natural ventilation, artificial means have to be largely adopted, even in the upper portions of the vessel where she is entirely enclosed in with armour and protective plating, and here, as well as below the protective [Pg 225] deck, numerous electrical fans, with air trunks, branches, pipes, etc., are being provided for.

Two complete sets of steering engines, independent of one another and in separate watertight compartments, are fitted, with steering positions both forward and aft. Hand gear is also provided, and appliances for changing as quickly as possible from hand to steam gear, and vice versâ. Tiller indicators are fitted in all the steering and conning-tower positions. Helm signals are provided for the purpose of communicating the position of the helm to other vessels in the neighbourhood. Voice-pipes, telegraphs, and telephones are fitted throughout the vessel to communicate between all the important positions. The vessel is also to be supplied with a wireless telegraphy installation. Torpedo net defence is to be fitted around the greater part of the vessel, which, in view of recent experience, appears to be not an unnecessary precaution.

With the exception of the main propelling machinery and boilers, which are being supplied by Messrs. Humphrys, Tennant and Co., the whole of the ship, with armour, armament, fittings, etc., will be supplied by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., Limited.

The 12-in. guns will weigh approximately 59 tons each. The length is 46 ft. 9½ ins. (46.7 calibres). The weight of the projectile is 850 lbs. The charge will be cordite, probably of the modified type. The exact weight of the charge is not yet fixed, and neither can the velocity be given, but these guns will be the most powerful 12-in. guns which have [Pg 226] yet been constructed. No armour which any ship can carry can hope to cope with their penetrating powers at 3000 yards. The breech-screw is arranged for a parallel motion, which obviates the necessity of having a steep cone at the seating of the obturating pad. It is yet early to speak of the rapidity of fire to be obtained with these guns, but it is anticipated that, in conjunction with the mounting described, the hitherto obtained rate of approximately two rounds per minute from each gun will be exceeded.

The 10-in. guns will weigh approximately 34 tons each. The length is 39 ft. (46.76 calibres). The weight of the projectile is 500 lbs. The charge will be cordite, probably of the modified type. As in the 12-in. guns, the exact weight of the charge has yet to be fixed, but here again this will be the most powerful gun of its calibre in existence. As a gauge of the power of these guns, it may be noticed that their penetrating power is equal to the penetrating power at 3000 yards of any of the 12-in. guns at present afloat in any navy. The breech mechanism will be somewhat similar in design to that of the 12-in., and will embody all the essential advantages of that design. The rapidity of fire of these guns on the Elswick mounting it is anticipated will at least be at the rate of three rounds per minute with a well-drilled gun’s crew.

The 6-in. guns will weigh approximately 8½ tons. The length is 23 ft. 6 ins. approximately (47 calibres). The weight of the projectile is 100 lbs. The charge will be probably M.D. cordite; but here again this is [Pg 227] not definitely fixed, but these guns will be the most powerful guns of their description made, having a penetrating power at 3000 yards equal to, if not exceeding, any 6-in. guns hitherto built. The breech mechanism will be of the Elswick modified coned type, actuated by the single motion of the lever, and, as in the other gun, the necessity for the steep-coned obturator is obviated. The exact type of the smaller guns is not yet settled, but they will also follow the general advances in power and efficiency noted in the case of the heavier armaments.

The 12-in. guns are mounted forward and aft on the midship line, as shown in the sketch on the ship. Owing to the powerful nature of the guns, these mountings are necessarily stronger than any hitherto manufactured in this or any other country. The design is arranged with a view to occupying the least possible space in the ship, and, at the same time, to give ample room for working the machinery. The general features of the design are the turn-table proper containing the mountings for the gun, the working chamber underneath into which the ammunition is received from the magazine and shell-rooms in preparation for sending up into the secondary or loading hoist, the trunk connecting the working chamber with the magazines and shell-rooms, and the hoist connecting the working chamber and the gun. This latter hoist [Pg 228] is so arranged that a gun can be loaded at any angle of elevation or training. The charge for each gun, consisting of the projectile and the cordite charge, the latter in two halves, is brought up at one time in a loading cage, which is automatically stopped in its proper position in line with the breech opening of the gun. It is then rammed home by means of a chain rammer actuated by a hydraulic motor. The breech-block of the gun is opened or closed by a hydraulic motor, thus enabling this operation to be performed with great rapidity. In the working chamber, by an ingenious arrangement, the projectile and the two halves of the cordite charge are simultaneously transferred from the cage which works in the trunk connecting the shell-rooms and magazines with the working chamber, to the cage working in the hoist connecting the working chamber with the gun position. The ammunition trunk is of a new design, which enables the ammunition cage always to come to the same position in the magazines and shell-rooms; but when it is brought up to the top of the trunk the cage is in its proper position with respect to the ammunition loading hoist, although the turret may be revolving at a quick rate; or, in other words, the ammunition trunk does not revolve at the bottom, but revolves with the turn-table at the top. The guns are protected by 10-in. hard armour in the front, and 8-in. at the sides and back. The feature of the turret is that it is quite balanced, thus enabling it to be readily trained by hand, although the ship may have a heel at the time.

[Pg 229]

There are three systems for performing the operation of training, primarily by hydraulic power, and should this fail through any of the piping being shot away, electric training gear can be quickly put into operation; and finally, should this be disabled, the turret can be trained by hand. Similarly the operation of elevating and depressing the gun can be performed by working primarily by hydraulic power, and then either by electric or hand. The operations of loading can also be performed by hand should the hydraulic system be disabled. To safeguard against accident by freezing in the intense cold which is found in the China seas during the winter months, heating apparatus is fitted throughout the turret installation. The gun mountings are so arranged as to give the gun 18 deg. elevation and 3 deg. depression, a greater range of elevation than has hitherto been provided for mountings of this description. The training angle is arranged for 270 deg., that is to say, from right ahead or right astern to 45 deg. before or abaft the beam. The turret can be trained at the rate of one complete revolution (viz. 360 deg.) per minute. In the shell-room, suitable overhead hydraulic lifting and traversing arrangements are made for lifting the shell out of the bays and placing them in the cage, but this operation can also be done by hand should necessity require it.

The sighting of the guns is provided for by a central sighting station and two side sighting stations, one on the left and the other on the right. By an ingenious arrangement the captain of the turret is enabled [Pg 230] by working one lever to train or elevate the gun or to perform both these motions at the same time. Voice-pipes and other apparatus are fitted to enable the officer in charge of the turret to communicate his orders to the magazines and shell-rooms. A complete system of electric circuits enables the guns to be fired from any one of the eight positions either simultaneously or independently. Percussion firing arrangements are also provided.

Each 10-in. gun is placed in an armoured revolving gun-house, or turret. The ammunition is sent up in a lifting cage from the magazine and shell-room direct to the gun platform, each cage containing a projectile and cordite charge in two parts. On reaching the gun platform the projectile is quickly transferred to a hinged loading tray fixed on the gun-cradle by means of an intermediate resting tray, the cordite being transferred by hand to the loading tray. By this arrangement three projectiles are always in waiting for loading, ensuring rapidity of fire. The projectile and charges can then be rammed into the gun by a telescopic hydraulic rammer. This rammer is arranged to follow the gun in elevation or depression, so that it always remains in line with the gun axis, enabling the operation of loading to take place at any angle within the usual fighting limits. The training of the gun-house is performed as in the case of the [Pg 231] 12-in., primarily by hydraulic power; then by electric, and finally, if necessity occasions it, by hand, and, like the larger mounting, it is balanced so that the operation of training by hand can be readily performed although the ship may have a heel. The breech-block of the gun is arranged to be operated either by hydraulic power or by hand. The gun can be elevated by hydraulic power as in the 12-in. The operations of training and elevating are performed by the single motion of a lever. These guns also have the large range in elevation of 18 deg., with 3 deg. depression. The sighting of the gun is provided for by two positions, placed on the right and the left of the gun respectively. A complete set of electric firing circuits is fitted to enable the gun to be fired from either of these positions. Percussion firing gear is also provided. The guns are protected in front by 9 ins. of hard armour, and on the sides and back 6 ins. The training angle is from right ahead to 30 deg. before or abaft the beam, or a total angle of 120 deg.

The 6-in. guns are mounted on the well-known central pivot principle. This principle was first introduced by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co., and has since been adopted for mounting guns of medium calibre by all the Governments and armament constructors in the world. Briefly, to describe this system, it may be said that the gun is mounted in a [Pg 232] cradle in which it recoils, the recoil being absorbed by an oil buffer attached to it forming a part of the cradle, the piston of which is attached to the gun. The cradle is mounted by means of trunnions on a Y piece, which revolves on hard steel balls placed on a fixed pedestal. This pedestal is bolted to the ship’s structure, the elevating arrangements are attached to the cradle, thus enabling the elevating gun number to work the gear even during the firing of the gun without injury to himself. Telescopic sights are fitted in a convenient position. Electric circuits are fitted to enable the guns to be fired by the simple operation of pressing the trigger of a pistol. Arrangements for percussion firing are also provided. A circular shield is attached to the revolving Y piece, so as to keep the port opening in the ship’s side blocked up at any angle of training. This port opening allows for the guns to be trained through a range of 120 deg., viz. 60 deg. before the beam and 60 deg. abaft.

The 12-pounder mountings are similar in principle to the 6-in. above described, but, of course, arranged to suit the smaller size of the gun. They are protected by revolving shields attached to the Y pieces by elastic stays.

The vessel carries four 18-in. torpedo tubes on the Armstrong-Whitworth [Pg 233] principle, which has been fitted to all the Japanese warships built either in this country or abroad since the date of the Fuji and the Yashima, which were the two first ships to have this apparatus. The vessel will also be fitted with a torpedo tube for firing 18-in. torpedoes in the line of keel astern. This also will be a special design by the builders.

The ammunition supply to the 12-in. and 10-in. guns has been described under the heading of mountings for these guns. The ammunition supply for the 6-in. and 12-pounder guns is arranged for by supplying to each 6-in. gun an electrically driven ammunition hoist of the improved Elswick design. These hoists will bring up the projectile and the cordite charge, and maintain a continuous supply. The operation of the hoist is extremely simple, and necessitates the minimum personal attendance. The seaman working the hoist has only to start it in motion and then keep it supplied with the necessary ammunition, which is automatically discharged in a position best situated for the working of the gun. The hoists for supplying the 12-pounder guns are of similar design; eight of them will be placed in suitable positions for supplying the 12-pounder guns.

Yokosuka is the oldest Imperial dockyard in Japan, and was a going concern in the sixties. It is at present expanding considerably as a building yard. There are large engine shops for machinery construction. There are three dry docks opening into the outer basin, their dimensions being—

No. 2 is able to take any ship in the Japanese Navy; but the others are not available for any of the large battleships or armoured cruisers. [Pg 235]

There are two slips. On these, amongst others, the following ships have been built: Hashidate, Akitsushima, Suma, Akashi, Takao, and Yaeyama.

The dockyard lies at the foot of a picturesquely wooded hill, in the Bay of Tokio, and is well defended by sea forts. To the landward the defence is, however, poor, and Yokosuka could be taken by an army that could secure a foothold on the southern coast, supposing it able to defeat the defenders.

[Pg 236]

At Tokio, roughly twenty-five miles from Yokosuka, there is a small dry dock belonging to the Japanese Government. It is, however, only suitable for gunboats and destroyers.

Dimensions—

There is also a private dock here, belonging to the Tokio Shipbuilding Company.

Dimensions—

The water front of Tokio is very shallow. [Pg 237]

Kuré, in the province of Aki, is the coming dockyard of Japan. Situated on the Inland Sea, it is almost impossible of access by an enemy, while it is far nearer any possible base of operations than Yokosuka. Two large dry docks have been built here, but the larger is not yet complete.

Dimensions—

This dock is able to take the Asama class, but not the battleships.

This dock is building for the new 16,400-ton battleships, and its dimensions indicate that still larger vessels are expected in the future. It will be the largest dry dock in the world. [Pg 238]

Sassebo, in Hizen, near Nagasaki, is not of much account as a dockyard. It has neither dry docks nor slips, and is essentially a place for minor repairs. For these it is very fully equipped.

It was found most useful in the Chino-Japanese War, and its utility continued in the war with Russia.

The dockyard lies well inside a deep, sheltered bay. The navigation around it would be very difficult to a hostile fleet, as many shoals exist.

[Pg 239]

[Pg 241]

Maitzuru, in the province of Tango, lies at the end of an inlet which has a uniform depth of seven fathoms at low water. The position is not very unlike that of Kiel, in Germany.

A dockyard is building here, but its resources are nil as yet.

Nagasaki is not a dockyard town, though it is generally supposed to be outside Japan, on account of its being a naval harbour.

It is the oldest port in Japan, its history dating from the Dutch trading days. It contains two docks, as follows:—

There is also a patent slip, of which the rails are 750 ft. long, the breadth 30 ft., and the lifting power in tons 1200. [Pg 243]

It has already been mentioned that Nagasaki was an old Dutch station; but the present Tategami yard was established about the time of the Crimean War, by the Tokugawa Government, with the assistance of Dutch engineers. After the civil war it was taken over by the Imperial Government, who in 1884 sold it to the Mitsu Bishi Company, to which it now belongs.

This company built the present granite dry docks. In 1889 they had begun to build ships—a tug of 206 tons gross being their first effort. Since then quite large vessels have been constructed, not always with success; but, as an invariable rule, the failures on one have led to successes on another, and the yard is now a very going concern, employing about 4000 men.

The harbour and docks are extensively used by men-of-war.

As yet, judged by European standards, no really excellent work has been turned out at Nagasaki. The main trouble has been with riveting; but this is being steadily overcome, and it is purely a question of time before ocean greyhounds will be turned out at this yard.

The work is not entirely Japanese; “stand-by” Westerners still exist. These are kept in the background, in case their services are needed. So far as I can gather, they are not requisitioned unless a difficulty occurs, which is another way of saying that they are less and less in demand. The majority of these stand-by men have Japanese wives, and have adopted Japan as their country; as often as not they are naturalised Japanese subjects.

[Pg 244]

Takeshiki, on the island of Tsushima, is the advanced coaling station of Japan. There are two approaches, on the west and on the south-east, but only the first is possible to big ships. In the centre of the western entrance is a large shoal, three and a half fathoms below low-water mark, leaving very deep channels close inshore on either [Pg 245] side. As the whole entrance is only some two thousand yards wide, flanked by high hills, it will be seen that it is impregnable. Inside is a large and very deep harbour, where the whole Japanese Fleet could lie.