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DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA



By Alexis De Tocqueville





Translated by Henry Reeve





Volume II.










CONTENTS


Book Two: Influence Of Democracy On Progress Of Opinion


De Tocqueville's Preface To The Second Part


Section I: Influence of Democracy on the Action of Intellect

Chapter I: Philosophical Method Among the Americans

Chapter II: Of The Principal Source Of Belief Among Democratic Nations

Chapter III: Why The Americans Display More Readiness And More Taste

Chapter IV: Why The Americans Have Never Been So Eager As The French

Chapter V: Of The Manner In Which Religion In The United States Avails

Chapter VI: Of The Progress Of Roman Catholicism In The United States

Chapter VII: Of The Cause Of A Leaning To Pantheism

Chapter VIII: The Principle Of Equality Suggests To The Americans

Chapter IX: The Example Of The Americans Does Not Prove

Chapter X: Why The Americans Are More Addicted To Practical

Chapter XI: Of The Spirit In Which The Americans Cultivate The Arts

Chapter XII: Why The Americans Raise Some Monuments So Insignificant

Chapter XIII: Literary Characteristics Of Democratic Ages

Chapter XIV: The Trade Of Literature

Chapter XV: The Study Of Greek And Latin Literature Peculiarly Useful

Chapter XVI: The Effect Of Democracy On Language

Chapter XVII: Of Some Of The Sources Of Poetry

Chapter XVIII: Of The Inflated Style Of American Writers And Orators

Chapter XIX: Some Observations On The Drama

Chapter XX: Characteristics Of Historians In Democratic Ages

Chapter XXI: Of Parliamentary Eloquence In The United States


Section 2: Influence of Democracy on the Feelings of Americans

Chapter I: Why Democratic Nations Show A More Ardent And Enduring Love

Chapter II: Of Individualism In Democratic Countries

Chapter III: Individualism Stronger

Chapter IV: That The Americans Combat The Effects Of Individualism

Chapter V: Of The Use Which The Americans Make Of Public Associations

Chapter VI: Of The Relation Between Public Associations And Newspapers

Chapter VII: Connection Of Civil And Political Associations

Chapter VIII: The Americans Combat Individualism

Chapter IX: That The Americans Apply The Principle Of Interest Rightly

Chapter X: Of The Taste For Physical Well-Being In America

Chapter XI: Peculiar Effects Of The Love Of Physical Gratifications

Chapter XII: Causes Of Fanatical Enthusiasm In Some Americans

Chapter XIII: Causes Of The Restless Spirit Of Americans

Chapter XIV: Taste For Physical Gratifications United In America

Chapter XV: That Religious Belief Sometimes Turns The Thoughts

Chapter XVI: That Excessive Care Of Worldly Welfare

Chapter XVII: That In Times Marked By Equality Of Conditions

Chapter XVIII: That Amongst The Americans All Honest Callings

Chapter XIX: That Almost All The Americans Follow Industrial Callings

Chapter XX: That Aristocracy May Be Engendered By Manufactures


Book Three: Influence Of Democracy On Manners, Properly So Called

Chapter I: That Manners Are Softened As Social Conditions Become

Chapter II: That Democracy Renders The Habitual Intercourse

Chapter III: Why The Americans Show So Little Sensitiveness

Chapter IV: Consequences Of The Three Preceding Chapters

Chapter V: How Democracy Affects the Relation Of Masters And Servants

Chapter VI: That Democratic Institutions And Manners Tend To Raise Rents

Chapter VII: Influence Of Democracy On Wages

Chapter VIII: Influence Of Democracy On Kindred

Chapter IX: Education Of Young Women In The United States

Chapter X: The Young Woman In The Character Of A Wife

Chapter XI: That The Equality Of Conditions Contributes

Chapter XII: How The Americans Understand The Equality Of The Sexes

Chapter XIII: That The Principle Of Equality Naturally Divides

Chapter XIV: Some Reflections On American Manners

Chapter XV: Of The Gravity Of The Americans

Chapter XVI: Why The National Vanity Of The Americans Is More Restless

Chapter XVII: That The Aspect Of Society In The United States

Chapter XVIII: Of Honor In The United States And In Democratic

Chapter XIX: Why So Many Ambitious Men And So Little Lofty Ambition

Chapter XX: The Trade Of Place-Hunting In Certain Democratic Countries

Chapter XXI: Why Great Revolutions Will Become More Rare

Chapter XXII: Why Democratic Nations Are Naturally Desirous Of Peace

Chapter XXIII: Which Is The Most Warlike And Most Revolutionary Class

Chapter XXIV: Causes Which Render Democratic Armies Weaker

Chapter XXV: Of Discipline In Democratic Armies

Chapter XXVI: Some Considerations On War In Democratic Communities


Book Four: Influence Of Democratic Opinions On Political Society

Chapter I: That Equality Naturally Gives Men A Taste For Freedom

Chapter II: That The Notions Of Democratic Nations On Government

Chapter III: That The Sentiments Of Democratic Nations Accord

Chapter IV: Of Certain Peculiar And Accidental Causes

Chapter V: That Amongst The European Nations Of Our Time

Chapter VI: What Sort Of Despotism Democratic Nations Have To Fear

Chapter VII: Continuation Of The Preceding Chapters

Chapter VIII: General Survey Of The Subject


Appendix to Parts I. and II.


Part I.

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C

Appendix D

Appendix E

Appendix F


Part II.

Appendix G

Appendix H

Appendix I

Appendix K

Appendix L

Appendix M

Appendix N

Appendix O

Appendix P

Appendix Q

Appendix R

Appendix S

Appendix T

Appendix U

Appendix V

Appendix W

Appendix X

Appendix Y

Appendix Z


Constitution Of The United States Of America

Article I

Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested

Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed

Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed

Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections

Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections

Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation

Section 7. All Bills for Raising Revenue shall originate in the House

Section 8. The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes

Section 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons

Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance

Article II

Section 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President

Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army

Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information

Section 4. The President, Vice-President and all civil Officers

Article III

Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested

Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all cases

Section 3. Treason against the United States shall consist

Article IV

Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State

Section 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled

Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union

Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State

Article V

Article VI

Article VII


Bill Of Rights

CONTENTS


Book Two: Influence Of Democracy On Progress Of Opinion


De Tocqueville's Preface To The Second Part


Section I: Influence of Democracy on the Action of Intellect

Chapter I: Philosophical Method Among the Americans

Chapter II: Of The Principal Source Of Belief Among Democratic Nations

Chapter III: Why The Americans Display More Readiness And More Taste

Chapter IV: Why The Americans Have Never Been So Eager As The French

Chapter V: Of The Manner In Which Religion In The United States Avails

Chapter VI: Of The Progress Of Roman Catholicism In The United States

Chapter VII: Of The Cause Of A Leaning To Pantheism

Chapter VIII: The Principle Of Equality Suggests To The Americans

Chapter IX: The Example Of The Americans Does Not Prove

Chapter X: Why The Americans Are More Addicted To Practical

Chapter XI: Of The Spirit In Which The Americans Cultivate The Arts

Chapter XII: Why The Americans Raise Some Monuments So Insignificant

Chapter XIII: Literary Characteristics Of Democratic Ages

Chapter XIV: The Trade Of Literature

Chapter XV: The Study Of Greek And Latin Literature Peculiarly Useful

Chapter XVI: The Effect Of Democracy On Language

Chapter XVII: Of Some Of The Sources Of Poetry

Chapter XVIII: Of The Inflated Style Of American Writers And Orators

Chapter XIX: Some Observations On The Drama

Chapter XX: Characteristics Of Historians In Democratic Ages

Chapter XXI: Of Parliamentary Eloquence In The United States


Section 2: Influence of Democracy on the Feelings of Americans

Chapter I: Why Democratic Nations Show A More Ardent And Enduring Love

Chapter II: Of Individualism In Democratic Countries

Chapter III: Individualism Stronger

Chapter IV: That The Americans Combat The Effects Of Individualism

Chapter V: Of The Use Which The Americans Make Of Public Associations

Chapter VI: Of The Relation Between Public Associations And Newspapers

Chapter VII: Connection Of Civil And Political Associations

Chapter VIII: The Americans Combat Individualism

Chapter IX: That The Americans Apply The Principle Of Interest Rightly

Chapter X: Of The Taste For Physical Well-Being In America

Chapter XI: Peculiar Effects Of The Love Of Physical Gratifications

Chapter XII: Causes Of Fanatical Enthusiasm In Some Americans

Chapter XIII: Causes Of The Restless Spirit Of Americans

Chapter XIV: Taste For Physical Gratifications United In America

Chapter XV: That Religious Belief Sometimes Turns The Thoughts

Chapter XVI: That Excessive Care Of Worldly Welfare

Chapter XVII: That In Times Marked By Equality Of Conditions

Chapter XVIII: That Amongst The Americans All Honest Callings

Chapter XIX: That Almost All The Americans Follow Industrial Callings

Chapter XX: That Aristocracy May Be Engendered By Manufactures


Book Three: Influence Of Democracy On Manners, Properly So Called

Chapter I: That Manners Are Softened As Social Conditions Become

Chapter II: That Democracy Renders The Habitual Intercourse

Chapter III: Why The Americans Show So Little Sensitiveness

Chapter IV: Consequences Of The Three Preceding Chapters

Chapter V: How Democracy Affects the Relation Of Masters And Servants

Chapter VI: That Democratic Institutions And Manners Tend To Raise Rents

Chapter VII: Influence Of Democracy On Wages

Chapter VIII: Influence Of Democracy On Kindred

Chapter IX: Education Of Young Women In The United States

Chapter X: The Young Woman In The Character Of A Wife

Chapter XI: That The Equality Of Conditions Contributes

Chapter XII: How The Americans Understand The Equality Of The Sexes

Chapter XIII: That The Principle Of Equality Naturally Divides

Chapter XIV: Some Reflections On American Manners

Chapter XV: Of The Gravity Of The Americans

Chapter XVI: Why The National Vanity Of The Americans Is More Restless

Chapter XVII: That The Aspect Of Society In The United States

Chapter XVIII: Of Honor In The United States And In Democratic

Chapter XIX: Why So Many Ambitious Men And So Little Lofty Ambition

Chapter XX: The Trade Of Place-Hunting In Certain Democratic Countries

Chapter XXI: Why Great Revolutions Will Become More Rare

Chapter XXII: Why Democratic Nations Are Naturally Desirous Of Peace

Chapter XXIII: Which Is The Most Warlike And Most Revolutionary Class

Chapter XXIV: Causes Which Render Democratic Armies Weaker

Chapter XXV: Of Discipline In Democratic Armies

Chapter XXVI: Some Considerations On War In Democratic Communities


Book Four: Influence Of Democratic Opinions On Political Society

Chapter I: That Equality Naturally Gives Men A Taste For Freedom

Chapter II: That The Notions Of Democratic Nations On Government

Chapter III: That The Sentiments Of Democratic Nations Accord

Chapter IV: Of Certain Peculiar And Accidental Causes

Chapter V: That Amongst The European Nations Of Our Time

Chapter VI: What Sort Of Despotism Democratic Nations Have To Fear

Chapter VII: Continuation Of The Preceding Chapters

Chapter VIII: General Survey Of The Subject


Appendix to Parts I. and II.


Part I.

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C

Appendix D

Appendix E

Appendix F


Part II.

Appendix G

Appendix H

Appendix I

Appendix K

Appendix L

Appendix M

Appendix N

Appendix O

Appendix P

Appendix Q

Appendix R

Appendix S

Appendix T

Appendix U

Appendix V

Appendix W

Appendix X

Appendix Y

Appendix Z


Constitution Of The United States Of America

Article I

Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested

Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed

Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed

Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections

Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections

Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation

Section 7. All Bills for Raising Revenue shall originate in the House

Section 8. The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes

Section 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons

Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance

Article II

Section 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President

Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army

Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information

Section 4. The President, Vice-President and all civil Officers

Article III

Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested

Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all cases

Section 3. Treason against the United States shall consist

Article IV

Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State

Section 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled

Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union

Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State

Article V

Article VI

Article VII


Bill Of Rights





Book Two: Influence Of Democracy On Progress Of Opinion in The United States





De Tocqueville's Preface To The Second Part

The Americans live in a democratic state of society, which has naturally suggested to them certain laws and a certain political character. This same state of society has, moreover, engendered amongst them a multitude of feelings and opinions which were unknown amongst the elder aristocratic communities of Europe: it has destroyed or modified all the relations which before existed, and established others of a novel kind. The—aspect of civil society has been no less affected by these changes than that of the political world. The former subject has been treated of in the work on the Democracy of America, which I published five years ago; to examine the latter is the object of the present book; but these two parts complete each other, and form one and the same work.

Americans live in a democratic society, which has naturally shaped their laws and political character. This society has also created many feelings and opinions that were unknown in the older aristocratic communities of Europe: it has altered or transformed all previous relationships and established new ones. The civil society aspect has been just as influenced by these changes as the political realm. I discussed the former in my book on Democracy in America, which I published five years ago; this book focuses on the latter, but these two topics complement each other and form one cohesive work.

I must at once warn the reader against an error which would be extremely prejudicial to me. When he finds that I attribute so many different consequences to the principle of equality, he may thence infer that I consider that principle to be the sole cause of all that takes place in the present age: but this would be to impute to me a very narrow view. A multitude of opinions, feelings, and propensities are now in existence, which owe their origin to circumstances unconnected with or even contrary to the principle of equality. Thus if I were to select the United States as an example, I could easily prove that the nature of the country, the origin of its inhabitants, the religion of its founders, their acquired knowledge, and their former habits, have exercised, and still exercise, independently of democracy, a vast influence upon the thoughts and feelings of that people. Different causes, but no less distinct from the circumstance of the equality of conditions, might be traced in Europe, and would explain a great portion of the occurrences taking place amongst us.

I need to warn the reader right away about a mistake that could really misrepresent my views. When they see that I connect so many different outcomes to the principle of equality, they might conclude that I think this principle is the only reason for everything happening in today's world. But that would be a misunderstanding on their part. There are many opinions, feelings, and tendencies right now that stem from factors unrelated to, or even opposed to, the principle of equality. For example, if I were to look at the United States, I could easily show that the country's character, the background of its people, the founders' beliefs, their knowledge, and their past behaviors have all had, and continue to have, a significant impact on the thoughts and feelings of its citizens, independent of democracy. In Europe, there are different influences, but equally separate from the idea of equality of conditions, that could explain a large part of what’s happening here.

I acknowledge the existence of all these different causes, and their power, but my subject does not lead me to treat of them. I have not undertaken to unfold the reason of all our inclinations and all our notions: my only object is to show in what respects the principle of equality has modified both the former and the latter.

I recognize all these different causes and their influence, but my topic doesn’t allow me to discuss them. I haven’t set out to explain the reasons behind all our desires and beliefs; my sole aim is to demonstrate how the principle of equality has changed both of these aspects.

Some readers may perhaps be astonished that—firmly persuaded as I am that the democratic revolution which we are witnessing is an irresistible fact against which it would be neither desirable nor wise to struggle—I should often have had occasion in this book to address language of such severity to those democratic communities which this revolution has brought into being. My answer is simply, that it is because I am not an adversary of democracy, that I have sought to speak of democracy in all sincerity.

Some readers might be surprised that, strongly believing that the democratic revolution we are experiencing is an unstoppable reality, and that it would be neither wise nor desirable to resist it, I frequently use such harsh language in this book to address the democratic societies this revolution has created. My answer is straightforward: it’s precisely because I am not against democracy that I have tried to discuss it with complete honesty.

Men will not accept truth at the hands of their enemies, and truth is seldom offered to them by their friends: for this reason I have spoken it. I was persuaded that many would take upon themselves to announce the new blessings which the principle of equality promises to mankind, but that few would dare to point out from afar the dangers with which it threatens them. To those perils therefore I have turned my chief attention, and believing that I had discovered them clearly, I have not had the cowardice to leave them untold.

Men won’t accept the truth from their enemies, and their friends hardly ever offer it: that’s why I’ve said it. I believed many would step up to share the new benefits that the principle of equality brings to humanity, but that few would have the courage to highlight the dangers it poses. So, I’ve focused on those dangers, and since I believe I’ve identified them clearly, I haven’t had the cowardice to leave them unsaid.

I trust that my readers will find in this Second Part that impartiality which seems to have been remarked in the former work. Placed as I am in the midst of the conflicting opinions between which we are divided, I have endeavored to suppress within me for a time the favorable sympathies or the adverse emotions with which each of them inspires me. If those who read this book can find a single sentence intended to flatter any of the great parties which have agitated my country, or any of those petty factions which now harass and weaken it, let such readers raise their voices to accuse me.

I trust that my readers will find in this Second Part the fairness that seems to have been noted in the earlier work. Being in the middle of the conflicting opinions that divide us, I have tried to set aside my own positive or negative feelings toward each of them for a time. If anyone reads this book and discovers even one sentence meant to flatter any of the major parties that have stirred my country, or any of the smaller factions that currently trouble and undermine it, I invite those readers to speak up and hold me accountable.

The subject I have sought to embrace is immense, for it includes the greater part of the feelings and opinions to which the new state of society has given birth. Such a subject is doubtless above my strength, and in treating it I have not succeeded in satisfying myself. But, if I have not been able to reach the goal which I had in view, my readers will at least do me the justice to acknowledge that I have conceived and followed up my undertaking in a spirit not unworthy of success.

The topic I’ve tried to tackle is huge, as it encompasses most of the feelings and opinions that have emerged from our new society. This topic is definitely beyond my capabilities, and I haven’t fully satisfied myself in addressing it. However, even if I haven’t reached the goal I aimed for, I hope my readers will recognize that I approached this task with a spirit deserving of success.

A. De T.

A. De T.

March, 1840

March 1840





Section I: Influence of Democracy on the Action of Intellect in The United States.





Chapter I: Philosophical Method Among the Americans

I think that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States. The Americans have no philosophical school of their own; and they care but little for all the schools into which Europe is divided, the very names of which are scarcely known to them. Nevertheless it is easy to perceive that almost all the inhabitants of the United States conduct their understanding in the same manner, and govern it by the same rules; that is to say, that without ever having taken the trouble to define the rules of a philosophical method, they are in possession of one, common to the whole people. To evade the bondage of system and habit, of family maxims, class opinions, and, in some degree, of national prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a lesson used in doing otherwise, and doing better; to seek the reason of things for one's self, and in one's self alone; to tend to results without being bound to means, and to aim at the substance through the form;—such are the principal characteristics of what I shall call the philosophical method of the Americans. But if I go further, and if I seek amongst these characteristics that which predominates over and includes almost all the rest, I discover that in most of the operations of the mind, each American appeals to the individual exercise of his own understanding alone. America is therefore one of the countries in the world where philosophy is least studied, and where the precepts of Descartes are best applied. Nor is this surprising. The Americans do not read the works of Descartes, because their social condition deters them from speculative studies; but they follow his maxims because this very social condition naturally disposes their understanding to adopt them. In the midst of the continual movement which agitates a democratic community, the tie which unites one generation to another is relaxed or broken; every man readily loses the trace of the ideas of his forefathers or takes no care about them. Nor can men living in this state of society derive their belief from the opinions of the class to which they belong, for, so to speak, there are no longer any classes, or those which still exist are composed of such mobile elements, that their body can never exercise a real control over its members. As to the influence which the intelligence of one man has on that of another, it must necessarily be very limited in a country where the citizens, placed on the footing of a general similitude, are all closely seen by each other; and where, as no signs of incontestable greatness or superiority are perceived in any one of them, they are constantly brought back to their own reason as the most obvious and proximate source of truth. It is not only confidence in this or that man which is then destroyed, but the taste for trusting the ipse dixit of any man whatsoever. Everyone shuts himself up in his own breast, and affects from that point to judge the world.

I think that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States. Americans don’t have their own philosophical school, and they don’t care much for the various European schools, the names of which are barely known to them. Still, it’s easy to see that almost everyone in the U.S. thinks in a similar way and follows the same guidelines; meaning that without ever taking the time to define a philosophical method, they actually share one that’s common to the entire population. They try to escape the constraints of system and habit, family maxims, class opinions, and to some extent, national biases; they accept tradition only as a source of information, and view existing facts merely as lessons to do things differently and improve; they seek the reasoning behind things for themselves, relying solely on their own understanding; they focus on outcomes without being tied to specific methods, and aim for the essence through the form. These are the main features of what I will refer to as the philosophical method of Americans. If I dig deeper and look for the characteristic that stands out and encompasses most of the others, I find that in many of the mental processes, each American relies solely on their own individual understanding. Thus, America is one of the countries in the world where philosophy is studied the least, yet where Descartes' principles are most effectively applied. This isn’t surprising. Americans don’t read Descartes because their social conditions push them away from theoretical studies; however, they follow his principles because those same social conditions naturally lead them to adopt them. Amidst the constant change that impacts a democratic society, the connection between generations becomes weaker or even severed; people easily lose track of their ancestors' ideas or simply don’t care about them. Additionally, individuals living in this social environment can’t base their beliefs on the views of their class, since, in a way, classes have dissolved, or those still existing are so fluid that they never really control their members. The influence one person's intellect has on another's is necessarily limited in a country where citizens, treated equally, are closely observed by one another; and since no one stands out as undeniably great or superior, they continually revert to their own reasoning as the most apparent and immediate source of truth. It’s not just trust in specific individuals that is eroded, but the entire tendency to trust anyone’s word at all. Everyone retracts into themselves and expects to judge the world from that perspective.

The practice which obtains amongst the Americans of fixing the standard of their judgment in themselves alone, leads them to other habits of mind. As they perceive that they succeed in resolving without assistance all the little difficulties which their practical life presents, they readily conclude that everything in the world may be explained, and that nothing in it transcends the limits of the understanding. Thus they fall to denying what they cannot comprehend; which leaves them but little faith for whatever is extraordinary, and an almost insurmountable distaste for whatever is supernatural. As it is on their own testimony that they are accustomed to rely, they like to discern the object which engages their attention with extreme clearness; they therefore strip off as much as possible all that covers it, they rid themselves of whatever separates them from it, they remove whatever conceals it from sight, in order to view it more closely and in the broad light of day. This disposition of the mind soon leads them to contemn forms, which they regard as useless and inconvenient veils placed between them and the truth.

The way Americans tend to rely solely on their own judgment shapes their mindset. As they find that they can handle all the everyday challenges without outside help, they quickly come to believe that everything in the world can be explained and that nothing is beyond their understanding. This leads them to reject anything they can’t grasp, which leaves them with little faith in the extraordinary and a strong aversion to the supernatural. Since they only trust their own experiences, they prefer to see things very clearly. They try to peel away everything that obscures their view, getting rid of anything that separates them from the truth, so they can observe it more closely in full light. This mindset often leads them to look down on formalities, which they see as unnecessary barriers between them and the truth.

The Americans then have not required to extract their philosophical method from books; they have found it in themselves. The same thing may be remarked in what has taken place in Europe. This same method has only been established and made popular in Europe in proportion as the condition of society has become more equal, and men have grown more like each other. Let us consider for a moment the connection of the periods in which this change may be traced. In the sixteenth century the Reformers subjected some of the dogmas of the ancient faith to the scrutiny of private judgment; but they still withheld from it the judgment of all the rest. In the seventeenth century, Bacon in the natural sciences, and Descartes in the study of philosophy in the strict sense of the term, abolished recognized formulas, destroyed the empire of tradition, and overthrew the authority of the schools. The philosophers of the eighteenth century, generalizing at length the same principle, undertook to submit to the private judgment of each man all the objects of his belief.

The Americans didn't need to extract their philosophical approach from books; they discovered it within themselves. The same can be observed in what has happened in Europe. This method has only become established and popular in Europe as society has become more equal, and people have started to resemble each other more. Let's take a moment to consider the connection of the periods where this change can be traced. In the sixteenth century, the Reformers subjected some of the doctrines of the ancient faith to personal scrutiny; however, they still denied this judgment for the rest. In the seventeenth century, Bacon revolutionized the natural sciences, and Descartes redefined philosophy in its strictest sense by eliminating established formulas, dismantling tradition's dominance, and challenging the authority of the schools. The philosophers of the eighteenth century, building on this same principle, aimed to subject all beliefs to the personal judgment of each individual.

Who does not perceive that Luther, Descartes, and Voltaire employed the same method, and that they differed only in the greater or less use which they professed should be made of it? Why did the Reformers confine themselves so closely within the circle of religious ideas? Why did Descartes, choosing only to apply his method to certain matters, though he had made it fit to be applied to all, declare that men might judge for themselves in matters philosophical but not in matters political? How happened it that in the eighteenth century those general applications were all at once drawn from this same method, which Descartes and his predecessors had either not perceived or had rejected? To what, lastly, is the fact to be attributed, that at this period the method we are speaking of suddenly emerged from the schools, to penetrate into society and become the common standard of intelligence; and that, after it had become popular among the French, it has been ostensibly adopted or secretly followed by all the nations of Europe?

Who doesn't see that Luther, Descartes, and Voltaire used the same method, differing only in how much they thought it should be applied? Why did the Reformers stick so closely to religious ideas? Why did Descartes, who created a method applicable to everything, choose to limit it to certain areas and say that people could think for themselves in philosophical matters but not in political ones? How did it happen that in the eighteenth century, general applications suddenly emerged from this same method that Descartes and his predecessors either hadn’t noticed or had dismissed? Finally, why did this method suddenly break out of the schools at this time, making its way into society and becoming a common standard of intelligence; and after gaining popularity among the French, it was visibly adopted or subtly followed by all the nations of Europe?

The philosophical method here designated may have been engendered in the sixteenth century—it may have been more accurately defined and more extensively applied in the seventeenth; but neither in the one nor in the other could it be commonly adopted. Political laws, the condition of society, and the habits of mind which are derived from these causes, were as yet opposed to it. It was discovered at a time when men were beginning to equalize and assimilate their conditions. It could only be generally followed in ages when those conditions had at length become nearly equal, and men nearly alike.

The philosophical method mentioned might have started in the sixteenth century—it was likely more clearly defined and widely used in the seventeenth; however, it wasn't commonly accepted in either century. Political laws, the state of society, and the mindsets shaped by those factors were still against it. It emerged when people were beginning to level and blend their circumstances. It could only be broadly adopted in times when those circumstances had finally become nearly equal, and people were mostly alike.

The philosophical method of the eighteenth century is then not only French, but it is democratic; and this explains why it was so readily admitted throughout Europe, where it has contributed so powerfully to change the face of society. It is not because the French have changed their former opinions, and altered their former manners, that they have convulsed the world; but because they were the first to generalize and bring to light a philosophical method, by the assistance of which it became easy to attack all that was old, and to open a path to all that was new.

The philosophical approach of the eighteenth century isn't just French; it's also democratic. This explains why it was quickly accepted all over Europe, where it has significantly transformed society. It's not that the French changed their previous views or behaviors that shook the world, but because they were the first to generalize and reveal a philosophical method that made it easy to challenge everything old and create a pathway for everything new.

If it be asked why, at the present day, this same method is more rigorously followed and more frequently applied by the French than by the Americans, although the principle of equality be no less complete, and of more ancient date, amongst the latter people, the fact may be attributed to two circumstances, which it is essential to have clearly understood in the first instance. It must never be forgotten that religion gave birth to Anglo-American society. In the United States religion is therefore commingled with all the habits of the nation and all the feelings of patriotism; whence it derives a peculiar force. To this powerful reason another of no less intensity may be added: in American religion has, as it were, laid down its own limits. Religious institutions have remained wholly distinct from political institutions, so that former laws have been easily changed whilst former belief has remained unshaken. Christianity has therefore retained a strong hold on the public mind in America; and, I would more particularly remark, that its sway is not only that of a philosophical doctrine which has been adopted upon inquiry, but of a religion which is believed without discussion. In the United States Christian sects are infinitely diversified and perpetually modified; but Christianity itself is a fact so irresistibly established, that no one undertakes either to attack or to defend it. The Americans, having admitted the principal doctrines of the Christian religion without inquiry, are obliged to accept in like manner a great number of moral truths originating in it and connected with it. Hence the activity of individual analysis is restrained within narrow limits, and many of the most important of human opinions are removed from the range of its influence.

If you ask why, today, the French follow this same method more strictly and more often than the Americans, despite the principle of equality being just as complete and older among Americans, it can be attributed to two key factors that need to be clearly understood. First, it's important to remember that religion was the foundation of Anglo-American society. In the United States, religion is intertwined with the nation's habits and feelings of patriotism, giving it a unique strength. Alongside this, there's another equally significant reason: in America, religion has essentially set its own boundaries. Religious institutions are completely separate from political ones, allowing old laws to change easily while beliefs remain steadfast. Christianity, therefore, has a strong influence on American public consciousness; notably, its influence isn't just as a philosophical doctrine that people adopt after inquiry but as a religion believed without question. In the United States, Christian denominations are incredibly diverse and constantly evolving; however, Christianity itself is so firmly established that no one attempts to either attack or defend it. Americans have accepted the main doctrines of the Christian religion without questioning them, and as a result, they also accept many moral truths that stem from it and are connected to it. This limits the scope of individual analysis and keeps many of the most significant human opinions outside its influence.

The second circumstance to which I have alluded is the following: the social condition and the constitution of the Americans are democratic, but they have not had a democratic revolution. They arrived upon the soil they occupy in nearly the condition in which we see them at the present day; and this is of very considerable importance.

The second situation I've mentioned is this: the social structure and the framework of the Americans are democratic, but they haven't experienced a democratic revolution. They arrived on the land they now inhabit almost in the same state we see them today; and this is very significant.

There are no revolutions which do not shake existing belief, enervate authority, and throw doubts over commonly received ideas. The effect of all revolutions is therefore, more or less, to surrender men to their own guidance, and to open to the mind of every man a void and almost unlimited range of speculation. When equality of conditions succeeds a protracted conflict between the different classes of which the elder society was composed, envy, hatred, and uncharitableness, pride, and exaggerated self-confidence are apt to seize upon the human heart, and plant their sway there for a time. This, independently of equality itself, tends powerfully to divide men—to lead them to mistrust the judgment of others, and to seek the light of truth nowhere but in their own understandings. Everyone then attempts to be his own sufficient guide, and makes it his boast to form his own opinions on all subjects. Men are no longer bound together by ideas, but by interests; and it would seem as if human opinions were reduced to a sort of intellectual dust, scattered on every side, unable to collect, unable to cohere.

There are no revolutions that don't shake up existing beliefs, weaken authority, and cast doubt on commonly accepted ideas. The result of all revolutions is, to some extent, to leave people to navigate their own paths and to open up a nearly limitless space for speculation in everyone's mind. When equality replaces a long-standing conflict between the various classes that made up the old society, feelings of envy, hatred, unkindness, pride, and inflated self-confidence can often take hold of the human heart and dominate for a while. This, aside from the idea of equality itself, strongly tends to divide people—to make them distrust the judgment of others and to look for truth only in their own understanding. Everyone then tries to be their own guide and takes pride in forming their own opinions on everything. People are no longer united by ideas but by interests; it seems as though human opinions have been reduced to a kind of intellectual dust, scattered everywhere, unable to come together or stick.

Thus, that independence of mind which equality supposes to exist, is never so great, nor ever appears so excessive, as at the time when equality is beginning to establish itself, and in the course of that painful labor by which it is established. That sort of intellectual freedom which equality may give ought, therefore, to be very carefully distinguished from the anarchy which revolution brings. Each of these two things must be severally considered, in order not to conceive exaggerated hopes or fears of the future.

Thus, the independence of mind that equality assumes to exist is never so significant, nor does it ever seem so extreme, as when equality is beginning to take hold and during the challenging process through which it is established. The kind of intellectual freedom that equality may bring should, therefore, be clearly distinguished from the chaos that revolution can cause. Each of these two aspects must be examined separately to avoid having unrealistic hopes or fears about the future.

I believe that the men who will live under the new forms of society will make frequent use of their private judgment; but I am far from thinking that they will often abuse it. This is attributable to a cause of more general application to all democratic countries, and which, in the long run, must needs restrain in them the independence of individual speculation within fixed, and sometimes narrow, limits. I shall proceed to point out this cause in the next chapter.

I believe that the people living in the new societal structures will often rely on their own judgment; however, I don't think they'll misuse it frequently. This is due to a reason that applies broadly to all democratic nations and, over time, will likely limit individual thinking within set, and sometimes tight, boundaries. I'll explain this reason in the next chapter.





Chapter II: Of The Principal Source Of Belief Among Democratic Nations

At different periods dogmatical belief is more or less abundant. It arises in different ways, and it may change its object or its form; but under no circumstances will dogmatical belief cease to exist, or, in other words, men will never cease to entertain some implicit opinions without trying them by actual discussion. If everyone undertook to form his own opinions and to seek for truth by isolated paths struck out by himself alone, it is not to be supposed that any considerable number of men would ever unite in any common belief. But obviously without such common belief no society can prosper—say rather no society can subsist; for without ideas held in common, there is no common action, and without common action, there may still be men, but there is no social body. In order that society should exist, and, a fortiori, that a society should prosper, it is required that all the minds of the citizens should be rallied and held together by certain predominant ideas; and this cannot be the case, unless each of them sometimes draws his opinions from the common source, and consents to accept certain matters of belief at the hands of the community.

At different times, firm beliefs are more or less widespread. They arise in various ways and can change in focus or form; however, firm beliefs will never disappear completely. In other words, people will always hold some unexamined opinions without discussing them. If everyone tried to form their own opinions and seek truth through their own separate paths, it’s unlikely that many people would ever come together around a shared belief. Clearly, without shared beliefs, no society can thrive—actually, no society can even exist. Without commonly held ideas, there can be no collective action, and without collective action, while individuals may still exist, there is no social structure. For society to exist, and even more so for it to thrive, it’s essential that all citizens' minds are united and connected by certain prevalent ideas. This can only happen if each person occasionally draws their opinions from a common source and agrees to accept certain beliefs from the community.

If I now consider man in his isolated capacity, I find that dogmatical belief is not less indispensable to him in order to live alone, than it is to enable him to co-operate with his fellow-creatures. If man were forced to demonstrate to himself all the truths of which he makes daily use, his task would never end. He would exhaust his strength in preparatory exercises, without advancing beyond them. As, from the shortness of his life, he has not the time, nor, from the limits of his intelligence, the capacity, to accomplish this, he is reduced to take upon trust a number of facts and opinions which he has not had either the time or the power to verify himself, but which men of greater ability have sought out, or which the world adopts. On this groundwork he raises for himself the structure of his own thoughts; nor is he led to proceed in this manner by choice so much as he is constrained by the inflexible law of his condition. There is no philosopher of such great parts in the world, but that he believes a million of things on the faith of other people, and supposes a great many more truths than he demonstrates. This is not only necessary but desirable. A man who should undertake to inquire into everything for himself, could devote to each thing but little time and attention. His task would keep his mind in perpetual unrest, which would prevent him from penetrating to the depth of any truth, or of grappling his mind indissolubly to any conviction. His intellect would be at once independent and powerless. He must therefore make his choice from amongst the various objects of human belief, and he must adopt many opinions without discussion, in order to search the better into that smaller number which he sets apart for investigation. It is true that whoever receives an opinion on the word of another, does so far enslave his mind; but it is a salutary servitude which allows him to make a good use of freedom.

If I think about a person all by themselves, I see that having a solid belief system is just as essential for them to live alone as it is for them to work with others. If people had to prove every truth they use in their daily lives, they would never finish. They would wear themselves out in endless preparation without making any progress. Because life is short, they don’t have the time, and due to the limits of their understanding, they can’t manage this task, so they have to trust many facts and opinions they haven’t had the opportunity or ability to verify themselves. Instead, they rely on what smarter people have discovered or what society broadly accepts. On this foundation, they build their own thoughts; and it's not so much a choice as it is a necessity imposed by their circumstances. No philosopher, no matter how brilliant, believes everything without relying on others, and many hold beliefs that they never question. This reliance is not just necessary, but it's beneficial. If someone tried to investigate everything on their own, they would be able to dedicate only a little time and attention to each issue. This would keep their mind in constant turmoil, preventing them from truly understanding any single truth or forming solid convictions. Their intellect would be independent but ineffective. Therefore, they need to choose from the many beliefs available to humanity, adopting several opinions without debate, so they can more thoroughly examine the smaller group they decide to investigate. It’s true that when someone accepts an opinion from another, they limit their own thinking to some extent; but this limitation is a helpful kind of restraint that enables them to better utilize their freedom.

A principle of authority must then always occur, under all circumstances, in some part or other of the moral and intellectual world. Its place is variable, but a place it necessarily has. The independence of individual minds may be greater, or it may be less: unbounded it cannot be. Thus the question is, not to know whether any intellectual authority exists in the ages of democracy, but simply where it resides and by what standard it is to be measured.

A principle of authority must always exist, in some form or another, in the moral and intellectual world. Its location may change, but it has to have a place. The independence of individual minds might vary in degree, but it can't be absolute. Therefore, the question isn't whether intellectual authority exists in democratic times, but rather where it is found and how we should measure it.

I have shown in the preceding chapter how the equality of conditions leads men to entertain a sort of instinctive incredulity of the supernatural, and a very lofty and often exaggerated opinion of the human understanding. The men who live at a period of social equality are not therefore easily led to place that intellectual authority to which they bow either beyond or above humanity. They commonly seek for the sources of truth in themselves, or in those who are like themselves. This would be enough to prove that at such periods no new religion could be established, and that all schemes for such a purpose would be not only impious but absurd and irrational. It may be foreseen that a democratic people will not easily give credence to divine missions; that they will turn modern prophets to a ready jest; and they that will seek to discover the chief arbiter of their belief within, and not beyond, the limits of their kind.

I’ve explained in the previous chapter how equal conditions cause people to have a kind of instinctive skepticism about the supernatural and a very high, often inflated view of human understanding. People living in a time of social equality aren’t easily swayed to place their intellectual authority outside or above humanity. They generally look for the sources of truth within themselves or in those similar to them. This alone shows that during such times, no new religion could take hold, and any attempts to do so would be seen as not only misguided but also ridiculous and irrational. It’s likely that a democratic society won’t easily accept divine missions; they’ll mock modern prophets and those who try to find the ultimate source of their beliefs within their own community rather than beyond it.

When the ranks of society are unequal, and men unlike each other in condition, there are some individuals invested with all the power of superior intelligence, learning, and enlightenment, whilst the multitude is sunk in ignorance and prejudice. Men living at these aristocratic periods are therefore naturally induced to shape their opinions by the superior standard of a person or a class of persons, whilst they are averse to recognize the infallibility of the mass of the people.

When society is unequal and people differ in status, some individuals possess all the power of greater intelligence, education, and insight, while the majority are trapped in ignorance and bias. During these aristocratic times, people are naturally inclined to form their opinions based on the higher standards of certain individuals or classes, while being reluctant to acknowledge the reliability of the general population.

The contrary takes place in ages of equality. The nearer the citizens are drawn to the common level of an equal and similar condition, the less prone does each man become to place implicit faith in a certain man or a certain class of men. But his readiness to believe the multitude increases, and opinion is more than ever mistress of the world. Not only is common opinion the only guide which private judgment retains amongst a democratic people, but amongst such a people it possesses a power infinitely beyond what it has elsewhere. At periods of equality men have no faith in one another, by reason of their common resemblance; but this very resemblance gives them almost unbounded confidence in the judgment of the public; for it would not seem probable, as they are all endowed with equal means of judging, but that the greater truth should go with the greater number.

The opposite happens in times of equality. The closer citizens are to a common level of equal and similar circumstances, the less likely each person is to have blind faith in a specific individual or group. However, their willingness to trust the majority grows, and public opinion becomes more influential than ever. Not only is common opinion the only guide that individuals have in a democratic society, but it also holds a power far greater than it does in other contexts. In times of equality, people lack faith in one another because of their similar characteristics; yet this very similarity fosters an almost limitless trust in public judgment, as it seems likely that the larger group would hold the greater truth.

When the inhabitant of a democratic country compares himself individually with all those about him, he feels with pride that he is the equal of any one of them; but when he comes to survey the totality of his fellows, and to place himself in contrast to so huge a body, he is instantly overwhelmed by the sense of his own insignificance and weakness. The same equality which renders him independent of each of his fellow-citizens taken severally, exposes him alone and unprotected to the influence of the greater number. The public has therefore among a democratic people a singular power, of which aristocratic nations could never so much as conceive an idea; for it does not persuade to certain opinions, but it enforces them, and infuses them into the faculties by a sort of enormous pressure of the minds of all upon the reason of each.

When a person in a democratic country compares themselves to everyone around them, they feel proud to see that they are equal to anyone else. But when they look at the larger group of people and see themselves alongside such a vast crowd, they quickly feel overwhelmed by their own smallness and vulnerability. This same equality that allows them to stand independently from each individual citizen makes them feel exposed and defenseless against the influence of the majority. Therefore, the public holds a unique power among democratic societies that aristocratic nations can hardly imagine; it doesn’t just persuade people to adopt certain beliefs, but rather imposes them, pushing collective thoughts onto everyone's reasoning through an immense pressure from the minds of all on the mind of each individual.

In the United States the majority undertakes to supply a multitude of ready-made opinions for the use of individuals, who are thus relieved from the necessity of forming opinions of their own. Everybody there adopts great numbers of theories, on philosophy, morals, and politics, without inquiry, upon public trust; and if we look to it very narrowly, it will be perceived that religion herself holds her sway there, much less as a doctrine of revelation than as a commonly received opinion. The fact that the political laws of the Americans are such that the majority rules the community with sovereign sway, materially increases the power which that majority naturally exercises over the mind. For nothing is more customary in man than to recognize superior wisdom in the person of his oppressor. This political omnipotence of the majority in the United States doubtless augments the influence which public opinion would obtain without it over the mind of each member of the community; but the foundations of that influence do not rest upon it. They must be sought for in the principle of equality itself, not in the more or less popular institutions which men living under that condition may give themselves. The intellectual dominion of the greater number would probably be less absolute amongst a democratic people governed by a king than in the sphere of a pure democracy, but it will always be extremely absolute; and by whatever political laws men are governed in the ages of equality, it may be foreseen that faith in public opinion will become a species of religion there, and the majority its ministering prophet.

In the United States, most people tend to offer a lot of ready-made opinions for others to use, which frees individuals from having to create their own views. Everyone seems to adopt various theories on philosophy, morality, and politics without questioning them, simply trusting what’s commonly accepted. If we take a closer look, we can see that religion holds its influence there more as a widely accepted opinion than as a revealed doctrine. The fact that American political laws allow the majority to dominate the community gives that majority even more power over people’s minds. It's quite common for people to recognize superior wisdom in those who oppress them. This political power of the majority in the U.S. surely enhances the sway that public opinion has over each community member; however, the roots of that influence don’t rely on it. They lie in the principle of equality itself, not in the popular systems that people under that condition might establish. The intellectual control of the majority would likely be less absolute in a democratic society ruled by a king than in a pure democracy, but it will always be very strong. Regardless of the political systems in place during times of equality, we can expect that belief in public opinion will evolve into a kind of religion, with the majority acting as its ministering prophet.

Thus intellectual authority will be different, but it will not be diminished; and far from thinking that it will disappear, I augur that it may readily acquire too much preponderance, and confine the action of private judgment within narrower limits than are suited either to the greatness or the happiness of the human race. In the principle of equality I very clearly discern two tendencies; the one leading the mind of every man to untried thoughts, the other inclined to prohibit him from thinking at all. And I perceive how, under the dominion of certain laws, democracy would extinguish that liberty of the mind to which a democratic social condition is favorable; so that, after having broken all the bondage once imposed on it by ranks or by men, the human mind would be closely fettered to the general will of the greatest number.

So, intellectual authority will change, but it won’t be reduced; and far from believing it will vanish, I predict that it might actually become too dominant and limit individual judgment more than is appropriate for the well-being and greatness of humanity. In the principle of equality, I clearly see two tendencies: one pushes everyone toward new ideas, while the other tends to stop them from thinking at all. I notice how, under certain laws, democracy could stifle the freedom of thought that a democratic society actually supports; therefore, after breaking free from the restrictions once imposed by social ranks or individuals, the human mind could become tightly bound to the general will of the majority.

If the absolute power of the majority were to be substituted by democratic nations, for all the different powers which checked or retarded overmuch the energy of individual minds, the evil would only have changed its symptoms. Men would not have found the means of independent life; they would simply have invented (no easy task) a new dress for servitude. There is—and I cannot repeat it too often—there is in this matter for profound reflection for those who look on freedom as a holy thing, and who hate not only the despot, but despotism. For myself, when I feel the hand of power lie heavy on my brow, I care but little to know who oppresses me; and I am not the more disposed to pass beneath the yoke, because it is held out to me by the arms of a million of men.

If the absolute power of the majority were to replace the various powers that limit or hinder the energy of individual minds in democratic nations, the problem would only have shifted in its appearance. People wouldn’t have found the means for independent living; they would have merely created (which isn’t easy) a new form of servitude. There is—and I can’t emphasize this enough—there is in this issue a lot to think about for those who see freedom as sacred and who despise not just the tyrant, but tyranny itself. Personally, when I feel the weight of power pressing down on me, I don’t care much about who is oppressing me; I’m no more inclined to submit to it just because it’s enforced by the strength of a million people.





Chapter III: Why The Americans Display More Readiness And More Taste For General Ideas Than Their Forefathers, The English.

The Deity does not regard the human race collectively. He surveys at one glance and severally all the beings of whom mankind is composed, and he discerns in each man the resemblances which assimilate him to all his fellows, and the differences which distinguish him from them. God, therefore, stands in no need of general ideas; that is to say, he is never sensible of the necessity of collecting a considerable number of analogous objects under the same form for greater convenience in thinking. Such is, however, not the case with man. If the human mind were to attempt to examine and pass a judgment on all the individual cases before it, the immensity of detail would soon lead it astray and bewilder its discernment: in this strait, man has recourse to an imperfect but necessary expedient, which at once assists and demonstrates his weakness. Having superficially considered a certain number of objects, and remarked their resemblance, he assigns to them a common name, sets them apart, and proceeds onwards.

The Deity doesn't see humanity as a whole. He looks at each individual man and woman and recognizes the traits that connect them to others and the differences that make them unique. God doesn't need general ideas; He never feels the need to group many similar things together for the sake of easier thinking. However, that's not true for humans. If we tried to analyze and judge every individual case we encounter, the overwhelming details would confuse us and cloud our judgment. In this situation, we turn to an imperfect but necessary solution, which shows our limitations. After briefly considering several objects and noticing their similarities, we give them a common name, categorize them, and move on.

General ideas are no proof of the strength, but rather of the insufficiency of the human intellect; for there are in nature no beings exactly alike, no things precisely identical, nor any rules indiscriminately and alike applicable to several objects at once. The chief merit of general ideas is, that they enable the human mind to pass a rapid judgment on a great many objects at once; but, on the other hand, the notions they convey are never otherwise than incomplete, and they always cause the mind to lose as much in accuracy as it gains in comprehensiveness. As social bodies advance in civilization, they acquire the knowledge of new facts, and they daily lay hold almost unconsciously of some particular truths. The more truths of this kind a man apprehends, the more general ideas is he naturally led to conceive. A multitude of particular facts cannot be seen separately, without at last discovering the common tie which connects them. Several individuals lead to the perception of the species; several species to that of the genus. Hence the habit and the taste for general ideas will always be greatest amongst a people of ancient cultivation and extensive knowledge.

General ideas aren't proof of the strength of the human mind; instead, they highlight its limitations. In nature, there are no beings exactly the same, no things that are completely identical, and no rules that apply equally to multiple objects at the same time. The main advantage of general ideas is that they allow the human mind to make quick judgments about many objects simultaneously. However, the concepts they provide are always incomplete, and they lead to a loss of accuracy for the sake of broader understanding. As societies progress in civilization, they gain knowledge of new facts and unknowingly grasp specific truths every day. The more of these truths a person understands, the more general ideas they are likely to form. A wide range of specific facts can't be viewed separately without ultimately revealing the common connections among them. Multiple individuals lead to the recognition of a species; multiple species lead to the identification of a genus. Therefore, the inclination and appreciation for general ideas will always be strongest among people with a long history of civilization and extensive knowledge.

But there are other reasons which impel men to generalize their ideas, or which restrain them from it.

But there are other reasons that motivate people to generalize their ideas, or that hold them back from doing so.

The Americans are much more addicted to the use of general ideas than the English, and entertain a much greater relish for them: this appears very singular at first sight, when it is remembered that the two nations have the same origin, that they lived for centuries under the same laws, and that they still incessantly interchange their opinions and their manners. This contrast becomes much more striking still, if we fix our eyes on our own part of the world, and compare together the two most enlightened nations which inhabit it. It would seem as if the mind of the English could only tear itself reluctantly and painfully away from the observation of particular facts, to rise from them to their causes; and that it only generalizes in spite of itself. Amongst the French, on the contrary, the taste for general ideas would seem to have grown to so ardent a passion, that it must be satisfied on every occasion. I am informed, every morning when I wake, that some general and eternal law has just been discovered, which I never heard mentioned before. There is not a mediocre scribbler who does not try his hand at discovering truths applicable to a great kingdom, and who is very ill pleased with himself if he does not succeed in compressing the human race into the compass of an article. So great a dissimilarity between two very enlightened nations surprises me. If I again turn my attention to England, and observe the events which have occurred there in the last half-century, I think I may affirm that a taste for general ideas increases in that country in proportion as its ancient constitution is weakened.

Americans are much more hooked on general ideas than the English and have a much greater appreciation for them. This seems quite strange at first, considering both nations share the same origins, lived under the same laws for centuries, and constantly exchange their opinions and customs. This contrast becomes even clearer when we look at our own region and compare the two most enlightened nations here. It seems like the English mind can only reluctantly and painfully detach itself from specific facts to rise to their causes; it generalizes almost against its will. In contrast, the French seem to have developed such an intense passion for general ideas that it must be satisfied at every opportunity. Every morning, I hear that some general and eternal law has just been discovered, one I've never heard of before. There's not a mediocre writer out there who doesn't attempt to uncover truths applicable to a vast kingdom and feels quite disappointed if they fail to condense humanity into an article. Such a stark difference between two very enlightened nations surprises me. If I turn my attention back to England and observe the events that have taken place there in the last fifty years, I believe I can say that the taste for general ideas is growing in that country as its ancient constitution weakens.

The state of civilization is therefore insufficient by itself to explain what suggests to the human mind the love of general ideas, or diverts it from them. When the conditions of men are very unequal, and inequality itself is the permanent state of society, individual men gradually become so dissimilar that each class assumes the aspect of a distinct race: only one of these classes is ever in view at the same instant; and losing sight of that general tie which binds them all within the vast bosom of mankind, the observation invariably rests not on man, but on certain men. Those who live in this aristocratic state of society never, therefore, conceive very general ideas respecting themselves, and that is enough to imbue them with an habitual distrust of such ideas, and an instinctive aversion of them. He, on the contrary, who inhabits a democratic country, sees around him, one very hand, men differing but little from each other; he cannot turn his mind to any one portion of mankind, without expanding and dilating his thought till it embrace the whole. All the truths which are applicable to himself, appear to him equally and similarly applicable to each of his fellow-citizens and fellow-men. Having contracted the habit of generalizing his ideas in the study which engages him most, and interests him more than others, he transfers the same habit to all his pursuits; and thus it is that the craving to discover general laws in everything, to include a great number of objects under the same formula, and to explain a mass of facts by a single cause, becomes an ardent, and sometimes an undiscerning, passion in the human mind.

The state of civilization alone doesn't explain why the human mind is drawn to broad ideas or why it might shy away from them. When people's circumstances are very unequal and this inequality becomes a constant in society, individuals in different classes start to become so different that each class seems like a separate race. Only one class is visible at any given moment, and by losing sight of the common bond that connects everyone within the larger human family, our attention tends to focus not on humanity as a whole but on specific individuals. Those who live in an aristocratic society rarely develop broad ideas about themselves, which leads them to have a consistent distrust of such ideas and a natural aversion towards them. On the other hand, a person living in a democratic country sees that, on the whole, people are quite similar to each other. When he thinks about any part of humanity, his mind expands to include the entire group. He believes that the truths that apply to him also apply equally and similarly to each of his fellow citizens and fellow humans. By developing the habit of generalizing his ideas based on what interests him most, he starts applying this habit to all his activities. This is how the desire to uncover general laws in everything, to group many things under the same idea, and to link a large set of facts to a single cause becomes a powerful and sometimes blinding passion in the human mind.

Nothing shows the truth of this proposition more clearly than the opinions of the ancients respecting their slaves. The most profound and capacious minds of Rome and Greece were never able to reach the idea, at once so general and so simple, of the common likeness of men, and of the common birthright of each to freedom: they strove to prove that slavery was in the order of nature, and that it would always exist. Nay, more, everything shows that those of the ancients who had passed from the servile to the free condition, many of whom have left us excellent writings, did themselves regard servitude in no other light.

Nothing illustrates the truth of this idea more clearly than the views of ancient people regarding their slaves. The greatest and most insightful minds of Rome and Greece were never able to grasp the straightforward and universal concept of our shared humanity and everyone's inherent right to freedom: they tried to argue that slavery was a natural part of life and that it would always be around. What's more, everything indicates that those ancient individuals who transitioned from being enslaved to being free, many of whom left us remarkable works, saw servitude from no other perspective.

All the great writers of antiquity belonged to the aristocracy of masters, or at least they saw that aristocracy established and uncontested before their eyes. Their mind, after it had expanded itself in several directions, was barred from further progress in this one; and the advent of Jesus Christ upon earth was required to teach that all the members of the human race are by nature equal and alike.

All the great writers from ancient times came from the upper class of masters, or at least they witnessed that upper class established and unchallenged before them. Their minds, after exploring various directions, were blocked from advancing in this one; and the arrival of Jesus Christ on earth was needed to show that all people are naturally equal and the same.

In the ages of equality all men are independent of each other, isolated and weak. The movements of the multitude are not permanently guided by the will of any individuals; at such times humanity seems always to advance of itself. In order, therefore, to explain what is passing in the world, man is driven to seek for some great causes, which, acting in the same manner on all our fellow-creatures, thus impel them all involuntarily to pursue the same track. This again naturally leads the human mind to conceive general ideas, and superinduces a taste for them.

In times of equality, everyone is independent, isolated, and vulnerable. The actions of the masses aren't consistently influenced by any particular individuals; it often feels like humanity just moves forward on its own. To understand what's happening in the world, people feel the need to look for major causes that act similarly on everyone, pushing them all to unconsciously follow the same path. This tendency leads people to develop broad ideas and fosters an appreciation for them.

I have already shown in what way the equality of conditions leads every man to investigate truths for himself. It may readily be perceived that a method of this kind must insensibly beget a tendency to general ideas in the human mind. When I repudiate the traditions of rank, profession, and birth; when I escape from the authority of example, to seek out, by the single effort of my reason, the path to be followed, I am inclined to derive the motives of my opinions from human nature itself; which leads me necessarily, and almost unconsciously, to adopt a great number of very general notions.

I’ve already demonstrated how equality of conditions encourages everyone to seek out truths for themselves. It’s easy to see that this approach naturally fosters a tendency toward broad ideas in the human mind. When I reject the traditions of status, profession, and birth; when I break free from the influence of examples to find my own path solely through my reasoning, I tend to base my opinions on human nature itself. This leads me, almost without realizing it, to embrace a wide range of very general concepts.

All that I have here said explains the reasons for which the English display much less readiness and taste or the generalization of ideas than their American progeny, and still less again than their French neighbors; and likewise the reason for which the English of the present day display more of these qualities than their forefathers did. The English have long been a very enlightened and a very aristocratic nation; their enlightened condition urged them constantly to generalize, and their aristocratic habits confined them to particularize. Hence arose that philosophy, at once bold and timid, broad and narrow, which has hitherto prevailed in England, and which still obstructs and stagnates in so many minds in that country.

Everything I've said here explains why the English show much less eagerness and flair for generalizing ideas compared to their American descendants, and even less than their French neighbors. It also explains why contemporary English people show more of these qualities than their ancestors did. The English have long been a very knowledgeable and aristocratic nation; their enlightened status constantly pushed them to generalize, while their aristocratic customs kept them focused on the specific. This led to a philosophy that is both bold and cautious, broad and narrow, which has prevailed in England until now and continues to hold back and stagnate many minds in that country.

Independently of the causes I have pointed out in what goes before, others may be discerned less apparent, but no less efficacious, which engender amongst almost every democratic people a taste, and frequently a passion, for general ideas. An accurate distinction must be taken between ideas of this kind. Some are the result of slow, minute, and conscientious labor of the mind, and these extend the sphere of human knowledge; others spring up at once from the first rapid exercise of the wits, and beget none but very superficial and very uncertain notions. Men who live in ages of equality have a great deal of curiosity and very little leisure; their life is so practical, so confused, so excited, so active, that but little time remains to them for thought. Such men are prone to general ideas because they spare them the trouble of studying particulars; they contain, if I may so speak, a great deal in a little compass, and give, in a little time, a great return. If then, upon a brief and inattentive investigation, a common relation is thought to be detected between certain obtects, inquiry is not pushed any further; and without examining in detail how far these different objects differ or agree, they are hastily arranged under one formulary, in order to pass to another subject.

Regardless of the reasons I mentioned earlier, there are other, less obvious but equally impactful factors that develop among almost every democratic society a liking, and often an obsession, with broad concepts. It's important to distinguish between different types of ideas. Some are the product of careful, detailed, and thoughtful effort, which expand our understanding of the world; others emerge quickly from a fleeting spark of inspiration, leading to shallow and uncertain thoughts. People living in times of equality are very curious but have little free time; their lives are practical, chaotic, exciting, and active, leaving them with little opportunity for deep thinking. These individuals tend to favor general ideas because they save them from the effort of examining specifics; they pack a lot into a small space and offer significant insights in a short time. So, if a quick and careless examination seems to reveal a common link between certain subjects, they won’t dig deeper; without analyzing in detail how these subjects differ or resemble each other, they are quickly grouped under one label to move on to another topic.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of a democratic period is the taste all men have at such ties for easy success and present enjoyment. This occurs in the pursuits of the intellect as well as in all others. Most of those who live at a time of equality are full of an ambition at once aspiring and relaxed: they would fain succeed brilliantly and at once, but they would be dispensed from great efforts to obtain success. These conflicting tendencies lead straight to the research of general ideas, by aid of which they flatter themselves that they can figure very importantly at a small expense, and draw the attention of the public with very little trouble. And I know not whether they be wrong in thinking thus. For their readers are as much averse to investigating anything to the bottom as they can be themselves; and what is generally sought in the productions of the mind is easy pleasure and information without labor.

One of the key traits of a democratic era is the desire all people have for quick success and immediate gratification. This applies to intellectual pursuits as well as others. Most people living in a time of equality have a kind of ambition that is both hopeful and relaxed: they want to achieve great things quickly but would prefer to avoid putting in a lot of effort to do so. These conflicting desires lead directly to the search for general ideas, which they believe will allow them to seem significant with minimal effort and capture the public's attention with little trouble. I’m not sure they’re wrong in thinking this. After all, their readers are just as reluctant to dig deep into anything as they are; what is generally sought in creative works is easy enjoyment and information without hard work.

If aristocratic nations do not make sufficient use of general ideas, and frequently treat them with inconsiderate disdain, it is true, on the other hand, that a democratic people is ever ready to carry ideas of this kind to excess, and to espouse the with injudicious warmth.

If aristocratic nations don't make enough use of general ideas and often treat them with thoughtless disdain, it's also true that a democratic people is always eager to embrace these ideas excessively and to support them with reckless enthusiasm.





Chapter IV: Why The Americans Have Never Been So Eager As The French For General Ideas In Political Matters

I observed in the last chapter, that the Americans show a less decided taste for general ideas than the French; this is more especially true in political matters. Although the Americans infuse into their legislation infinitely more general ideas than the English, and although they pay much more attention than the latter people to the adjustment of the practice of affairs to theory, no political bodies in the United States have ever shown so warm an attachment to general ideas as the Constituent Assembly and the Convention in France. At no time has the American people laid hold on ideas of this kind with the passionate energy of the French people in the eighteenth century, or displayed the same blind confidence in the value and absolute truth of any theory. This difference between the Americans and the French originates in several causes, but principally in the following one. The Americans form a democratic people, which has always itself directed public affairs. The French are a democratic people, who, for a long time, could only speculate on the best manner of conducting them. The social condition of France led that people to conceive very general ideas on the subject of government, whilst its political constitution prevented it from correcting those ideas by experiment, and from gradually detecting their insufficiency; whereas in America the two things constantly balance and correct each other.

I noted in the last chapter that Americans have a less defined preference for broad ideas compared to the French, especially in politics. While Americans incorporate far more general ideas into their laws than the English do, and while they focus much more on aligning practical matters with theory, no political groups in the U.S. have ever had as strong an attachment to general ideas as the Constituent Assembly and the Convention in France. At no point have Americans embraced such ideas with the passionate intensity that the French did in the eighteenth century, nor have they shown the same blind trust in the value and absolute truth of any theory. This difference between Americans and French people stems from several reasons, mainly this one: Americans are a democratic society that has always managed its own public affairs. The French are also a democratic society, but for a long time, they could only speculate on the best ways to handle them. The social conditions in France led its people to develop very broad ideas about government, while its political system prevented them from testing those ideas through experience and gradually recognizing their shortcomings. In contrast, in America, practical application and theoretical ideas constantly interact and adjust each other.

It may seem, at first sight, that this is very much opposed to what I have said before, that democratic nations derive their love of theory from the excitement of their active life. A more attentive examination will show that there is nothing contradictory in the proposition. Men living in democratic countries eagerly lay hold of general ideas because they have but little leisure, and because these ideas spare them the trouble of studying particulars. This is true; but it is only to be understood to apply to those matters which are not the necessary and habitual subjects of their thoughts. Mercantile men will take up very eagerly, and without any very close scrutiny, all the general ideas on philosophy, politics, science, or the arts, which may be presented to them; but for such as relate to commerce, they will not receive them without inquiry, or adopt them without reserve. The same thing applies to statesmen with regard to general ideas in politics. If, then, there be a subject upon which a democratic people is peculiarly liable to abandon itself, blindly and extravagantly, to general ideas, the best corrective that can be used will be to make that subject a part of the daily practical occupation of that people. The people will then be compelled to enter upon its details, and the details will teach them the weak points of the theory. This remedy may frequently be a painful one, but its effect is certain.

At first glance, it might seem like this contradicts what I've said before about democratic nations getting their appreciation for theory from the excitement of their active lifestyles. However, a closer look reveals that there's no contradiction here. People in democratic countries quickly latch onto broad ideas because they have little free time, and these ideas save them the effort of diving into specifics. This holds true, but it only applies to subjects that aren't central to their everyday thinking. Businesspeople will eagerly embrace general ideas about philosophy, politics, science, or the arts without much scrutiny; however, when it comes to commerce, they won't accept those ideas without questioning them or adopting them outright. The same goes for politicians regarding general ideas in political matters. So, if there's a topic where a democratic society is particularly prone to get swept away by general ideas, the best way to remedy this is to integrate that topic into their daily activities. This way, people will have to deal with the specifics, which will reveal the weaknesses in the theory. While this approach can often be uncomfortable, its impact is guaranteed.

Thus it happens, that the democratic institutions which compel every citizen to take a practical part in the government, moderate that excessive taste for general theories in politics which the principle of equality suggests.

So it turns out that the democratic institutions which require every citizen to actively participate in the government help temper that excessive fondness for broad political theories that the principle of equality implies.





Chapter V: Of The Manner In Which Religion In The United States Avails Itself Of Democratic Tendencies

I have laid it down in a preceding chapter that men cannot do without dogmatical belief; and even that it is very much to be desired that such belief should exist amongst them. I now add, that of all the kinds of dogmatical belief the most desirable appears to me to be dogmatical belief in matters of religion; and this is a very clear inference, even from no higher consideration than the interests of this world. There is hardly any human action, however particular a character be assigned to it, which does not originate in some very general idea men have conceived of the Deity, of his relation to mankind, of the nature of their own souls, and of their duties to their fellow-creatures. Nor can anything prevent these ideas from being the common spring from which everything else emanates. Men are therefore immeasurably interested in acquiring fixed ideas of God, of the soul, and of their common duties to their Creator and to their fellow-men; for doubt on these first principles would abandon all their actions to the impulse of chance, and would condemn them to live, to a certain extent, powerless and undisciplined.

I mentioned in an earlier chapter that people can't function without some form of dogmatic belief, and that it's very important for such beliefs to exist among them. I now add that, of all types of dogmatic belief, the most valuable seems to be a dogmatic belief in religious matters; this conclusion is quite clear, even when considering just the practical interests of this world. Almost every human action, no matter how specific it may seem, stems from some broad idea that people have about God, His relationship to humanity, the nature of their own souls, and their responsibilities to others. Additionally, nothing can stop these ideas from being the common source from which everything else flows. Therefore, people have a tremendous interest in forming strong beliefs about God, the soul, and their shared responsibilities to their Creator and fellow humans; because doubt in these fundamental principles would leave all their actions at the mercy of chance, causing them to live to some extent without power and discipline.

This is then the subject on which it is most important for each of us to entertain fixed ideas; and unhappily it is also the subject on which it is most difficult for each of us, left to himself, to settle his opinions by the sole force of his reason. None but minds singularly free from the ordinary anxieties of life—minds at once penetrating, subtle, and trained by thinking—can even with the assistance of much time and care, sound the depth of these most necessary truths. And, indeed, we see that these philosophers are themselves almost always enshrouded in uncertainties; that at every step the natural light which illuminates their path grows dimmer and less secure; and that, in spite of all their efforts, they have as yet only discovered a small number of conflicting notions, on which the mind of man has been tossed about for thousands of years, without either laying a firmer grasp on truth, or finding novelty even in its errors. Studies of this nature are far above the average capacity of men; and even if the majority of mankind were capable of such pursuits, it is evident that leisure to cultivate them would still be wanting. Fixed ideas of God and human nature are indispensable to the daily practice of men's lives; but the practice of their lives prevents them from acquiring such ideas.

This is the topic on which it's most important for each of us to hold strong beliefs; unfortunately, it's also the topic that's most challenging for each of us to form our opinions solely through reason. Only those whose minds are exceptionally free from everyday worries—minds that are insightful, sharp, and trained by critical thinking—can, even with a lot of time and effort, understand the depth of these essential truths. In fact, we often see that these philosophers are themselves wrapped in uncertainties; with every step, the natural light that guides their way becomes dimmer and less certain; and despite all their efforts, they have only uncovered a small number of conflicting ideas, which the human mind has wrestled with for thousands of years, without securing a firmer grip on the truth or even discovering anything new in their mistakes. Studies like these are far beyond what most people can handle; and even if the majority of humanity were capable of such pursuits, it’s clear they still wouldn’t have the time to develop them. Strong beliefs about God and human nature are essential to the daily lives of people; however, the realities of their lives prevent them from forming such beliefs.

The difficulty appears to me to be without a parallel. Amongst the sciences there are some which are useful to the mass of mankind, and which are within its reach; others can only be approached by the few, and are not cultivated by the many, who require nothing beyond their more remote applications: but the daily practice of the science I speak of is indispensable to all, although the study of it is inaccessible to the far greater number.

The difficulty seems to be unmatched. Among the sciences, some are useful to everyone and accessible to the masses, while others can only be pursued by a select few and are not widely studied by those who only need their more distant applications. However, the everyday practice of the science I'm talking about is essential for all, even though its study is beyond the reach of most.

General ideas respecting God and human nature are therefore the ideas above all others which it is most suitable to withdraw from the habitual action of private judgment, and in which there is most to gain and least to lose by recognizing a principle of authority. The first object and one of the principal advantages of religions, is to furnish to each of these fundamental questions a solution which is at once clear, precise, intelligible to the mass of mankind, and lasting. There are religions which are very false and very absurd; but it may be affirmed, that any religion which remains within the circle I have just traced, without aspiring to go beyond it (as many religions have attempted to do, for the purpose of enclosing on every side the free progress of the human mind), imposes a salutary restraint on the intellect; and it must be admitted that, if it do not save men in another world, such religion is at least very conducive to their happiness and their greatness in this. This is more especially true of men living in free countries. When the religion of a people is destroyed, doubt gets hold of the highest portions of the intellect, and half paralyzes all the rest of its powers. Every man accustoms himself to entertain none but confused and changing notions on the subjects most interesting to his fellow-creatures and himself. His opinions are ill-defended and easily abandoned: and, despairing of ever resolving by himself the hardest problems of the destiny of man, he ignobly submits to think no more about them. Such a condition cannot but enervate the soul, relax the springs of the will, and prepare a people for servitude. Nor does it only happen, in such a case, that they allow their freedom to be wrested from them; they frequently themselves surrender it. When there is no longer any principle of authority in religion any more than in politics, men are speedily frightened at the aspect of this unbounded independence. The constant agitation of all surrounding things alarms and exhausts them. As everything is at sea in the sphere of the intellect, they determine at least that the mechanism of society should be firm and fixed; and as they cannot resume their ancient belief, they assume a master.

General ideas about God and human nature are, above all else, the concepts that it’s best to step back from private judgment and acknowledge a principle of authority. The main goal and one of the key benefits of religions is to provide clear, precise, understandable, and lasting answers to these fundamental questions for everyone. There are religions that are very false and absurd; however, it can be argued that any religion that stays within the boundaries I've outlined, without trying to extend beyond them (as many religions have done to restrict the free progress of human thought), imposes a beneficial limitation on the intellect. It must be acknowledged that, even if such a religion does not save people in the afterlife, it at least significantly contributes to their happiness and greatness in this life. This is especially true for people living in free countries. When a people's religion is destroyed, uncertainty takes hold of the higher aspects of their intellect and partially paralyzes all its other abilities. Each person tends to hold only vague and fluctuating ideas on the issues that concern them and their fellow humans the most. Their opinions are poorly defended and easily abandoned: and, in despair of ever resolving the toughest questions about human destiny on their own, they shamefully decide to stop thinking about them. This state of affairs must weaken the soul, diminish the will's drive, and prepare a people for servitude. It’s not only that they let their freedom be taken from them; they often give it up willingly. When there's no principle of authority in religion any more than in politics, people quickly become frightened by the idea of complete independence. The constant turmoil of everything around them causes anxiety and fatigue. Since nothing is stable in the realm of thought, they decide that at least the structure of society should be solid and unchanging; and as they cannot return to their old beliefs, they accept a master.

For my own part, I doubt whether man can ever support at the same time complete religious independence and entire public freedom. And I am inclined to think, that if faith be wanting in him, he must serve; and if he be free, he must believe.

For my part, I wonder if it's possible for a person to have both total religious independence and complete public freedom at the same time. I tend to think that if someone lacks faith, they will have to serve someone else, and if they are truly free, they must believe in something.

Perhaps, however, this great utility of religions is still more obvious amongst nations where equality of conditions prevails than amongst others. It must be acknowledged that equality, which brings great benefits into the world, nevertheless suggests to men (as will be shown hereafter) some very dangerous propensities. It tends to isolate them from each other, to concentrate every man's attention upon himself; and it lays open the soul to an inordinate love of material gratification. The greatest advantage of religion is to inspire diametrically contrary principles. There is no religion which does not place the object of man's desires above and beyond the treasures of earth, and which does not naturally raise his soul to regions far above those of the senses. Nor is there any which does not impose on man some sort of duties to his kind, and thus draws him at times from the contemplation of himself. This occurs in religions the most false and dangerous. Religious nations are therefore naturally strong on the very point on which democratic nations are weak; which shows of what importance it is for men to preserve their religion as their conditions become more equal.

However, the great benefit of religions is even more apparent in nations where conditions are equal than in others. It's true that while equality brings many advantages, it also introduces some very dangerous tendencies in people, as will be discussed later. It tends to make people more isolated, focusing their attention solely on themselves, and opens their hearts to an excessive love for material things. The greatest benefit of religion is that it instills completely opposite principles. Every religion places the goals of human desires above the riches of the earth and naturally elevates the human spirit to realms far beyond the physical. Additionally, each religion imposes some kind of duty toward others, which helps to pull individuals away from deep self-reflection. This is true even in the most flawed and dangerous religions. Therefore, religious communities are often stronger in areas where democratic societies are weaker, emphasizing the importance of maintaining religion as conditions become more equal.

I have neither the right nor the intention of examining the supernatural means which God employs to infuse religious belief into the heart of man. I am at this moment considering religions in a purely human point of view: my object is to inquire by what means they may most easily retain their sway in the democratic ages upon which we are entering. It has been shown that, at times of general cultivation and equality, the human mind does not consent to adopt dogmatical opinions without reluctance, and feels their necessity acutely in spiritual matters only. This proves, in the first place, that at such times religions ought, more cautiously than at any other, to confine themselves within their own precincts; for in seeking to extend their power beyond religious matters, they incur a risk of not being believed at all. The circle within which they seek to bound the human intellect ought therefore to be carefully traced, and beyond its verge the mind should be left in entire freedom to its own guidance. Mahommed professed to derive from Heaven, and he has inserted in the Koran, not only a body of religious doctrines, but political maxims, civil and criminal laws, and theories of science. The gospel, on the contrary, only speaks of the general relations of men to God and to each other—beyond which it inculcates and imposes no point of faith. This alone, besides a thousand other reasons, would suffice to prove that the former of these religions will never long predominate in a cultivated and democratic age, whilst the latter is destined to retain its sway at these as at all other periods.

I have neither the right nor the intention to examine the supernatural methods God uses to instill religious belief in people's hearts. Right now, I’m looking at religions solely from a human perspective: my goal is to explore how they can best maintain their influence in the democratic times we are entering. It’s been shown that during periods of widespread education and equality, people are reluctant to adopt dogmatic beliefs and only feel their necessity acutely in spiritual matters. This indicates, first of all, that during such times, religions should be more careful than ever to stay within their own boundaries; if they try to extend their influence beyond religious matters, they risk losing all credibility. The scope within which they try to limit human thought should be clearly defined, and beyond that, individuals should have complete freedom to think for themselves. Muhammad claimed to receive revelations from Heaven, and he included not only a set of religious teachings in the Quran but also political principles, civil and criminal laws, and scientific theories. The Gospel, on the other hand, only addresses the general relationships between people and God, imposing no specific beliefs beyond that. This difference, along with a thousand other reasons, is enough to demonstrate that the former religion will not hold power for long in a cultured and democratic society, while the latter is likely to maintain its influence in this and all other eras.

But in continuation of this branch of the subject, I find that in order for religions to maintain their authority, humanly speaking, in democratic ages, they must not only confine themselves strictly within the circle of spiritual matters: their power also depends very much on the nature of the belief they inculcate, on the external forms they assume, and on the obligations they impose. The preceding observation, that equality leads men to very general and very extensive notions, is principally to be understood as applied to the question of religion. Men living in a similar and equal condition in the world readily conceive the idea of the one God, governing every man by the same laws, and granting to every man future happiness on the same conditions. The idea of the unity of mankind constantly leads them back to the idea of the unity of the Creator; whilst, on the contrary, in a state of society where men are broken up into very unequal ranks, they are apt to devise as many deities as there are nations, castes, classes, or families, and to trace a thousand private roads to heaven.

But to continue on this topic, I find that for religions to keep their influence, especially in democratic times, they can't just stick to spiritual matters; their authority also relies heavily on the beliefs they promote, the forms they take, and the duties they impose. The earlier point that equality leads people to broad and extensive ideas is mainly relevant to the topic of religion. People living in similar and equal conditions tend to easily grasp the concept of one God, who governs everyone by the same laws and offers everyone future happiness under the same conditions. The idea of the unity of humanity often brings them back to the concept of the unity of the Creator. In contrast, in a society where people are divided into very unequal classes, they are likely to create as many gods as there are nations, castes, classes, or families, and to find countless private paths to heaven.

It cannot be denied that Christianity itself has felt, to a certain extent, the influence which social and political conditions exercise on religious opinions. At the epoch at which the Christian religion appeared upon earth, Providence, by whom the world was doubtless prepared for its coming, had gathered a large portion of the human race, like an immense flock, under the sceptre of the Caesars. The men of whom this multitude was composed were distinguished by numerous differences; but they had thus much in common, that they all obeyed the same laws, and that every subject was so weak and insignificant in relation to the imperial potentate, that all appeared equal when their condition was contrasted with his. This novel and peculiar state of mankind necessarily predisposed men to listen to the general truths which Christianity teaches, and may serve to explain the facility and rapidity with which they then penetrated into the human mind. The counterpart of this state of things was exhibited after the destruction of the empire. The Roman world being then as it were shattered into a thousand fragments, each nation resumed its pristine individuality. An infinite scale of ranks very soon grew up in the bosom of these nations; the different races were more sharply defined, and each nation was divided by castes into several peoples. In the midst of this common effort, which seemed to be urging human society to the greatest conceivable amount of voluntary subdivision, Christianity did not lose sight of the leading general ideas which it had brought into the world. But it appeared, nevertheless, to lend itself, as much as was possible, to those new tendencies to which the fractional distribution of mankind had given birth. Men continued to worship an only God, the Creator and Preserver of all things; but every people, every city, and, so to speak, every man, thought to obtain some distinct privilege, and win the favor of an especial patron at the foot of the Throne of Grace. Unable to subdivide the Deity, they multiplied and improperly enhanced the importance of the divine agents. The homage due to saints and angels became an almost idolatrous worship amongst the majority of the Christian world; and apprehensions might be entertained for a moment lest the religion of Christ should retrograde towards the superstitions which it had subdued. It seems evident, that the more the barriers are removed which separate nation from nation amongst mankind, and citizen from citizen amongst a people, the stronger is the bent of the human mind, as if by its own impulse, towards the idea of an only and all-powerful Being, dispensing equal laws in the same manner to every man. In democratic ages, then, it is more particularly important not to allow the homage paid to secondary agents to be confounded with the worship due to the Creator alone.

It’s clear that Christianity has been affected, to some degree, by the social and political conditions that shape religious beliefs. When Christianity first emerged, God had prepared the world for its arrival by bringing a large part of humanity, like a massive flock, under the rule of the Caesars. This group of people was marked by many differences, but they shared a commonality: they all followed the same laws, and every individual felt weak and insignificant compared to the imperial power, making them seem equal in relation to him. This unique state of humanity likely made people more receptive to the universal truths of Christianity, explaining how quickly and easily these ideas spread at that time. After the fall of the empire, the situation shifted. The Roman world was essentially shattered into countless pieces, with each nation reclaiming its unique identity. A complex hierarchy soon developed within these nations; different ethnic groups became more distinct, and each nation was divided into various peoples by social classes. Amidst this push for greater voluntary divisions in society, Christianity did not lose sight of the core principles it had introduced. However, it seemed to adapt, as much as it could, to the new trends resulting from the fragmented distribution of humanity. People continued to worship one God, the Creator and Sustainer of everything; yet, each group, each city, and almost every individual sought to gain distinct privileges and the favor of specific patrons at the foot of the Throne of Grace. Unable to divide God, they multiplied and exaggerated the significance of divine intermediaries. The reverence given to saints and angels approached almost idolatrous worship for many Christians, raising concerns that Christ’s religion might regress to the superstitions it had overcome. It seems clear that as the barriers separating nations and individuals dwindle, the human mind’s inclination towards the concept of one all-powerful Being, who offers equal laws to everyone, grows stronger. In democratic times, it’s particularly critical to keep the veneration of secondary beings separate from the worship that belongs solely to the Creator.

Another truth is no less clear—that religions ought to assume fewer external observances in democratic periods than at any others. In speaking of philosophical method among the Americans, I have shown that nothing is more repugnant to the human mind in an age of equality than the idea of subjection to forms. Men living at such times are impatient of figures; to their eyes symbols appear to be the puerile artifice which is used to conceal or to set off truths, which should more naturally be bared to the light of open day: they are unmoved by ceremonial observances, and they are predisposed to attach a secondary importance to the details of public worship. Those whose care it is to regulate the external forms of religion in a democratic age should pay a close attention to these natural propensities of the human mind, in order not unnecessarily to run counter to them. I firmly believe in the necessity of forms, which fix the human mind in the contemplation of abstract truths, and stimulate its ardor in the pursuit of them, whilst they invigorate its powers of retaining them steadfastly. Nor do I suppose that it is possible to maintain a religion without external observances; but, on the other hand, I am persuaded that, in the ages upon which we are entering, it would be peculiarly dangerous to multiply them beyond measure; and that they ought rather to be limited to as much as is absolutely necessary to perpetuate the doctrine itself, which is the substance of religions of which the ritual is only the form. *a A religion which should become more minute, more peremptory, and more surcharged with small observances at a time in which men are becoming more equal, would soon find itself reduced to a band of fanatical zealots in the midst of an infidel people.

Another truth is equally clear—that religions should have fewer external rituals during democratic times than at any other periods. When discussing philosophical methods among Americans, I've pointed out that nothing frustrates the human mind in an age of equality more than the idea of being bound by formalities. People living in such times are impatient with rigid structures; to them, symbols seem like trivial tricks used to hide or embellish truths that should be openly shared: they are indifferent to ceremonial practices and are inclined to view the specifics of public worship as less important. Those responsible for managing the external aspects of religion in a democratic era should pay close attention to these natural tendencies of the human mind, so they don't unnecessarily oppose them. I strongly believe in the need for forms that ground the human mind in the contemplation of abstract truths, energize its search for them, and strengthen its ability to hold onto them firmly. I also don't think it's possible to sustain a religion without external practices; however, I believe that, in the ages we're entering, it would be particularly dangerous to increase them excessively. They should instead be limited to what is absolutely necessary to preserve the core doctrine, which is the essence of religions, while the rituals are merely the form. A religion that becomes more detailed, more rigid, and overburdened with minor observances during a time when people are becoming more equal would quickly find itself reduced to a group of fanatical zealots amid a skeptical society.

a
[ In all religions there are some ceremonies which are inherent in the substance of the faith itself, and in these nothing should, on any account, be changed. This is especially the case with Roman Catholicism, in which the doctrine and the form are frequently so closely united as to form one point of belief.]

a
[ In every religion, there are certain ceremonies that are fundamental to the faith itself, and these should never be changed for any reason. This is particularly true for Roman Catholicism, where doctrine and practice are often so tightly connected that they create a single point of belief.]

I anticipate the objection, that as all religions have general and eternal truths for their object, they cannot thus shape themselves to the shifting spirit of every age without forfeiting their claim to certainty in the eyes of mankind. To this I reply again, that the principal opinions which constitute belief, and which theologians call articles of faith, must be very carefully distinguished from the accessories connected with them. Religions are obliged to hold fast to the former, whatever be the peculiar spirit of the age; but they should take good care not to bind themselves in the same manner to the latter at a time when everything is in transition, and when the mind, accustomed to the moving pageant of human affairs, reluctantly endures the attempt to fix it to any given point. The fixity of external and secondary things can only afford a chance of duration when civil society is itself fixed; under any other circumstances I hold it to be perilous.

I can already see the pushback—that since all religions aim for universal and timeless truths, they can’t adapt to the changing spirit of each era without losing their credibility in the eyes of people. I’d counter this by emphasizing that the core beliefs that form faith, which theologians refer to as articles of faith, must be clearly separated from the additional practices that go along with them. Religions need to hold onto the core beliefs, no matter the spirit of the time, but they should be careful not to cling to the additional practices when everything is shifting, and when people, used to the constant change of human experience, are resistant to being fixed at any one point. The stability of external and secondary practices can only last when civil society itself is stable; otherwise, I believe it’s risky.

We shall have occasion to see that, of all the passions which originate in, or are fostered by, equality, there is one which it renders peculiarly intense, and which it infuses at the same time into the heart of every man: I mean the love of well-being. The taste for well-being is the prominent and indelible feature of democratic ages. It may be believed that a religion which should undertake to destroy so deep seated a passion, would meet its own destruction thence in the end; and if it attempted to wean men entirely from the contemplation of the good things of this world, in order to devote their faculties exclusively to the thought of another, it may be foreseen that the soul would at length escape from its grasp, to plunge into the exclusive enjoyment of present and material pleasures. The chief concern of religions is to purify, to regulate, and to restrain the excessive and exclusive taste for well-being which men feel at periods of equality; but they would err in attempting to control it completely or to eradicate it. They will not succeed in curing men of the love of riches: but they may still persuade men to enrich themselves by none but honest means.

We will see that among all the feelings that arise from or are encouraged by equality, there's one that it makes especially strong, and that it instills in every person: I’m talking about the desire for well-being. The desire for well-being is the key and lasting characteristic of democratic times. It could be argued that any belief system trying to eliminate such a deep-rooted passion would ultimately lead to its own downfall; and if it tried to completely steer people away from thinking about the good things in this world, just to focus solely on the next, it’s likely that the soul would eventually break free and dive into the sole enjoyment of immediate and material pleasures. The main goal of religions is to purify, to manage, and to moderate the overwhelming and exclusive desire for well-being that people experience in times of equality; however, they would be mistaken to think they could fully control it or wipe it out. They won’t succeed in getting rid of people’s love of wealth, but they can still encourage them to seek riches through honest means only.

This brings me to a final consideration, which comprises, as it were, all the others. The more the conditions of men are equalized and assimilated to each other, the more important is it for religions, whilst they carefully abstain from the daily turmoil of secular affairs, not needlessly to run counter to the ideas which generally prevail, and the permanent interests which exist in the mass of the people. For as public opinion grows to be more and more evidently the first and most irresistible of existing powers, the religious principle has no external support strong enough to enable it long to resist its attacks. This is not less true of a democratic people, ruled by a despot, than in a republic. In ages of equality, kings may often command obedience, but the majority always commands belief: to the majority, therefore, deference is to be paid in whatsoever is not contrary to the faith.

This leads me to a final point, which essentially includes all the others. As people's conditions become more equal and similar to one another, it becomes crucial for religions, while staying clear of the daily chaos of worldly matters, to avoid clashing unnecessarily with the prevailing ideas and the lasting interests of the general population. As public opinion increasingly emerges as the most dominant and undeniable force, the religious principle lacks any external backing strong enough to withstand its challenges for long. This applies just as much to a democratic society ruled by a dictator as it does to a republic. In times of equality, kings may still command obedience, but the majority always commands belief. Therefore, we must show respect to the majority in everything that does not contradict the faith.

I showed in my former volumes how the American clergy stand aloof from secular affairs. This is the most obvious, but it is not the only, example of their self-restraint. In America religion is a distinct sphere, in which the priest is sovereign, but out of which he takes care never to go. Within its limits he is the master of the mind; beyond them, he leaves men to themselves, and surrenders them to the independence and instability which belong to their nature and their age. I have seen no country in which Christianity is clothed with fewer forms, figures, and observances than in the United States; or where it presents more distinct, more simple, or more general notions to the mind. Although the Christians of America are divided into a multitude of sects, they all look upon their religion in the same light. This applies to Roman Catholicism as well as to the other forms of belief. There are no Romish priests who show less taste for the minute individual observances for extraordinary or peculiar means of salvation, or who cling more to the spirit, and less to the letter of the law, than the Roman Catholic priests of the United States. Nowhere is that doctrine of the Church, which prohibits the worship reserved to God alone from being offered to the saints, more clearly inculcated or more generally followed. Yet the Roman Catholics of America are very submissive and very sincere.

I previously explained how American clergy keep their distance from worldly matters. This is the most obvious, but not the only example of their self-restraint. In America, religion is a separate realm where the priest holds authority, but he never steps outside of it. Within this space, he controls thought; outside of it, he leaves people to their own devices and surrenders them to the independence and uncertainty that come with their nature and era. I haven’t seen any country where Christianity has fewer rituals, symbols, and practices than in the United States, or where it offers clearer, simpler, and more universal ideas. Although American Christians are divided into many denominations, they all view their faith in a similar way. This is true for Roman Catholicism as well as other beliefs. There are no Catholic priests with less interest in detailed rituals or unique means of salvation, or who are more focused on the spirit and less on the letter of the law, than Roman Catholic priests in the United States. Nowhere is the Church's teaching—prohibiting the worship that belongs solely to God from being offered to the saints—more clearly taught or more widely practiced. Yet, American Catholics are very respectful and very genuine.

Another remark is applicable to the clergy of every communion. The American ministers of the gospel do not attempt to draw or to fix all the thoughts of man upon the life to come; they are willing to surrender a portion of his heart to the cares of the present; seeming to consider the goods of this world as important, although as secondary, objects. If they take no part themselves in productive labor, they are at least interested in its progression, and ready to applaud its results; and whilst they never cease to point to the other world as the great object of the hopes and fears of the believer, they do not forbid him honestly to court prosperity in this. Far from attempting to show that these things are distinct and contrary to one another, they study rather to find out on what point they are most nearly and closely connected.

Another observation applies to clergy of all denominations. American ministers don’t try to focus all of people's thoughts on the afterlife; they’re open to allowing a part of people’s hearts to be concerned with present-day issues. They seem to view the material aspects of life as significant, even if they're secondary. While they might not engage directly in productive work themselves, they definitely care about its progress and are eager to celebrate its outcomes. They always emphasize the afterlife as the ultimate source of a believer's hopes and fears, but they don't discourage people from seeking success in this life. Rather than suggesting that these pursuits are separate and conflicting, they seek to understand how they are interconnected.

All the American clergy know and respect the intellectual supremacy exercised by the majority; they never sustain any but necessary conflicts with it. They take no share in the altercations of parties, but they readily adopt the general opinions of their country and their age; and they allow themselves to be borne away without opposition in the current of feeling and opinion by which everything around them is carried along. They endeavor to amend their contemporaries, but they do not quit fellowship with them. Public opinion is therefore never hostile to them; it rather supports and protects them; and their belief owes its authority at the same time to the strength which is its own, and to that which they borrow from the opinions of the majority. Thus it is that, by respecting all democratic tendencies not absolutely contrary to herself, and by making use of several of them for her own purposes, religion sustains an advantageous struggle with that spirit of individual independence which is her most dangerous antagonist.

All American clergy recognize and respect the intellectual dominance held by the majority; they only engage in necessary conflicts with it. They don’t get involved in party disputes, but they easily adopt the general opinions of their country and their time; they allow themselves to be swept along without resistance in the current of feelings and opinions that carry everything around them. They try to improve their contemporaries, but they don’t distance themselves from them. Consequently, public opinion is rarely against them; it actually supports and protects them; their beliefs gain authority from both their own strength and the support they draw from the majority’s opinions. In this way, by respecting all democratic tendencies that aren’t completely opposed to it and by leveraging some of them for its own benefits, religion successfully navigates the challenge posed by the spirit of individual independence, which is its most significant adversary.





Chapter VI: Of The Progress Of Roman Catholicism In The United States

America is the most democratic country in the world, and it is at the same time (according to reports worthy of belief) the country in which the Roman Catholic religion makes most progress. At first sight this is surprising. Two things must here be accurately distinguished: equality inclines men to wish to form their own opinions; but, on the other hand, it imbues them with the taste and the idea of unity, simplicity, and impartiality in the power which governs society. Men living in democratic ages are therefore very prone to shake off all religious authority; but if they consent to subject themselves to any authority of this kind, they choose at least that it should be single and uniform. Religious powers not radiating from a common centre are naturally repugnant to their minds; and they almost as readily conceive that there should be no religion, as that there should be several. At the present time, more than in any preceding one, Roman Catholics are seen to lapse into infidelity, and Protestants to be converted to Roman Catholicism. If the Roman Catholic faith be considered within the pale of the church, it would seem to be losing ground; without that pale, to be gaining it. Nor is this circumstance difficult of explanation. The men of our days are naturally disposed to believe; but, as soon as they have any religion, they immediately find in themselves a latent propensity which urges them unconsciously towards Catholicism. Many of the doctrines and the practices of the Romish Church astonish them; but they feel a secret admiration for its discipline, and its great unity attracts them. If Catholicism could at length withdraw itself from the political animosities to which it has given rise, I have hardly any doubt but that the same spirit of the age, which appears to be so opposed to it, would become so favorable as to admit of its great and sudden advancement. One of the most ordinary weaknesses of the human intellect is to seek to reconcile contrary principles, and to purchase peace at the expense of logic. Thus there have ever been, and will ever be, men who, after having submitted some portion of their religious belief to the principle of authority, will seek to exempt several other parts of their faith from its influence, and to keep their minds floating at random between liberty and obedience. But I am inclined to believe that the number of these thinkers will be less in democratic than in other ages; and that our posterity will tend more and more to a single division into two parts—some relinquishing Christianity entirely, and others returning to the bosom of the Church of Rome.

America is the most democratic country in the world, and at the same time (according to credible reports) it’s where the Roman Catholic Church is growing the most. At first glance, this is surprising. We need to distinguish two things here: equality encourages people to form their own opinions; however, it also instills a desire for unity, simplicity, and impartiality in the governing power of society. People living in democratic times are thus very likely to reject all religious authority; yet, if they agree to submit to any kind of authority, they at least prefer it to be singular and uniform. Religious powers that don’t come from a common center are naturally unappealing to them; they can imagine a world without religion just as easily as a world with multiple religions. Nowadays, more than ever before, we see Roman Catholics moving towards disbelief, while Protestants are converting to Roman Catholicism. If Roman Catholicism is viewed within the church's bounds, it seems to be losing ground; outside of those bounds, it appears to be gaining. This situation isn’t hard to explain. People today are naturally inclined to believe; but once they choose a religion, they often discover an unconscious pull toward Catholicism. Many doctrines and practices of the Catholic Church surprise them, yet they have a hidden admiration for its discipline, and its strong unity draws them in. If Catholicism could finally distance itself from the political conflicts it has sparked, I have little doubt that the same spirit of the age, which seems to be against it, would become favorable enough to allow for its significant and rapid growth. One of the most common weaknesses of human thought is the attempt to reconcile conflicting principles and to achieve peace at the cost of logic. Thus, there have always been and will always be people who, after surrendering part of their religious beliefs to the principle of authority, seek to exempt various other parts of their faith from that influence, keeping their thoughts in a limbo between freedom and obedience. However, I tend to believe that the number of these thinkers will be smaller in democratic times than in others; and that our future generations will increasingly divide into two groups—some fully abandoning Christianity, and others returning to the fold of the Roman Catholic Church.





Chapter VII: Of The Cause Of A Leaning To Pantheism Amongst Democratic Nations

I shall take occasion hereafter to show under what form the preponderating taste of a democratic people for very general ideas manifests itself in politics; but I would point out, at the present stage of my work, its principal effect on philosophy. It cannot be denied that pantheism has made great progress in our age. The writings of a part of Europe bear visible marks of it: the Germans introduce it into philosophy, and the French into literature. Most of the works of imagination published in France contain some opinions or some tinge caught from pantheistical doctrines, or they disclose some tendency to such doctrines in their authors. This appears to me not only to proceed from an accidental, but from a permanent cause.

I will later take the opportunity to show how the dominant taste of a democratic society for broad ideas shows up in politics; but at this point in my work, I want to highlight its main impact on philosophy. It can't be denied that pantheism has made significant strides in our time. The writings from parts of Europe clearly show this: the Germans incorporate it into philosophy, while the French weave it into literature. Most imaginative works published in France reflect some opinions or influences from pantheistical beliefs, or reveal a tendency toward such beliefs in their authors. I believe this is not just a temporary situation, but the result of a lasting cause.

When the conditions of society are becoming more equal, and each individual man becomes more like all the rest, more weak and more insignificant, a habit grows up of ceasing to notice the citizens to consider only the people, and of overlooking individuals to think only of their kind. At such times the human mind seeks to embrace a multitude of different objects at once; and it constantly strives to succeed in connecting a variety of consequences with a single cause. The idea of unity so possesses itself of man, and is sought for by him so universally, that if he thinks he has found it, he readily yields himself up to repose in that belief. Nor does he content himself with the discovery that nothing is in the world but a creation and a Creator; still embarrassed by this primary division of things, he seeks to expand and to simplify his conception by including God and the universe in one great whole. If there be a philosophical system which teaches that all things material and immaterial, visible and invisible, which the world contains, are only to be considered as the several parts of an immense Being, which alone remains unchanged amidst the continual change and ceaseless transformation of all that constitutes it, we may readily infer that such a system, although it destroy the individuality of man—nay, rather because it destroys that individuality—will have secret charms for men living in democracies. All their habits of thought prepare them to conceive it, and predispose them to adopt it. It naturally attracts and fixes their imagination; it fosters the pride, whilst it soothes the indolence, of their minds. Amongst the different systems by whose aid philosophy endeavors to explain the universe, I believe pantheism to be one of those most fitted to seduce the human mind in democratic ages. Against it all who abide in their attachment to the true greatness of man should struggle and combine.

When society becomes more equal, and individuals become more similar, more weak, and more insignificant, a habit develops of ignoring citizens to focus only on people, and overlooking individuals to think only of their types. During these times, the human mind tries to grasp many different things at once; it constantly strives to connect a range of outcomes to a single cause. The idea of unity dominates people so much that when they think they've found it, they easily give in and rest in that belief. They don't just settle for the idea that everything consists of a creation and a Creator; still troubled by this basic division of things, they seek to expand and simplify their understanding by merging God and the universe into one vast whole. If there's a philosophical system that teaches that all material and immaterial, visible and invisible things in the world should be viewed as parts of a massive Being, which alone remains unchanged amid the ongoing change and endless transformation of everything it encompasses, we can easily conclude that such a system, although it undermines individuality—indeed, precisely because it undermines individuality—will secretly attract people living in democracies. Their ways of thinking prepare them to understand it and make them inclined to accept it. It naturally draws and holds their imagination; it boosts their pride while soothing the laziness of their minds. Among the various systems that philosophy uses to explain the universe, I believe pantheism is one that is particularly suited to captivate the human mind in democratic times. Those who remain committed to the true greatness of humanity should resist and unite against it.





Chapter VIII: The Principle Of Equality Suggests To The Americans The Idea Of The Indefinite Perfectibility Of Man

Equality suggests to the human mind several ideas which would not have originated from any other source, and it modifies almost all those previously entertained. I take as an example the idea of human perfectibility, because it is one of the principal notions that the intellect can conceive, and because it constitutes of itself a great philosophical theory, which is every instant to be traced by its consequences in the practice of human affairs. Although man has many points of resemblance with the brute creation, one characteristic is peculiar to himself—he improves: they are incapable of improvement. Mankind could not fail to discover this difference from its earliest period. The idea of perfectibility is therefore as old as the world; equality did not give birth to it, although it has imparted to it a novel character.

Equality introduces the human mind to several concepts that wouldn't have come from anywhere else, and it changes almost all previously held ideas. For instance, consider the idea of human perfectibility, as it's one of the key concepts that our intellect can grasp, and it forms a significant philosophical theory whose effects can be seen in everyday life. While humans share many similarities with animals, one unique trait sets us apart—our ability to improve; animals cannot improve. Humanity must have recognized this difference since the beginning. Therefore, the idea of perfectibility has existed since the dawn of time; equality didn't create it, but it has given it a fresh perspective.

When the citizens of a community are classed according to their rank, their profession, or their birth, and when all men are constrained to follow the career which happens to open before them, everyone thinks that the utmost limits of human power are to be discerned in proximity to himself, and none seeks any longer to resist the inevitable law of his destiny. Not indeed that an aristocratic people absolutely contests man's faculty of self-improvement, but they do not hold it to be indefinite; amelioration they conceive, but not change: they imagine that the future condition of society may be better, but not essentially different; and whilst they admit that mankind has made vast strides in improvement, and may still have some to make, they assign to it beforehand certain impassable limits. Thus they do not presume that they have arrived at the supreme good or at absolute truth (what people or what man was ever wild enough to imagine it?) but they cherish a persuasion that they have pretty nearly reached that degree of greatness and knowledge which our imperfect nature admits of; and as nothing moves about them they are willing to fancy that everything is in its fit place. Then it is that the legislator affects to lay down eternal laws; that kings and nations will raise none but imperishable monuments; and that the present generation undertakes to spare generations to come the care of regulating their destinies.

When people in a community are categorized by their social status, job, or family background, and when everyone is forced to pursue the path that is available to them, each person believes that the limits of human potential are just within their reach, and no one tries to fight against the unavoidable fate laid out for them. It's not that an elite society completely rejects the idea of self-improvement, but they don't see it as limitless; they envision progress, but not transformation. They think the future of society could be better, but not fundamentally different; and while they acknowledge that humanity has made significant advances and may still have more to achieve, they predefine certain unbreakable boundaries for it. They don't assume they have found the ultimate good or absolute truth (what person has ever been bold enough to think that?), but they believe they have nearly attained the highest level of greatness and knowledge that our flawed nature allows; and as nothing changes around them, they like to think that everything is in its proper place. This is when lawmakers seem to establish eternal rules, kings and nations build only lasting monuments, and the current generation takes it upon themselves to relieve future generations of the responsibility of shaping their own destinies.

In proportion as castes disappear and the classes of society approximate—as manners, customs, and laws vary, from the tumultuous intercourse of men—as new facts arise—as new truths are brought to light—as ancient opinions are dissipated, and others take their place—the image of an ideal perfection, forever on the wing, presents itself to the human mind. Continual changes are then every instant occurring under the observation of every man: the position of some is rendered worse; and he learns but too well, that no people and no individual, how enlightened soever they may be, can lay claim to infallibility;—the condition of others is improved; whence he infers that man is endowed with an indefinite faculty of improvement. His reverses teach him that none may hope to have discovered absolute good—his success stimulates him to the never-ending pursuit of it. Thus, forever seeking—forever falling, to rise again—often disappointed, but not discouraged—he tends unceasingly towards that unmeasured greatness so indistinctly visible at the end of the long track which humanity has yet to tread. It can hardly be believed how many facts naturally flow from the philosophical theory of the indefinite perfectibility of man, or how strong an influence it exercises even on men who, living entirely for the purposes of action and not of thought, seem to conform their actions to it, without knowing anything about it. I accost an American sailor, and I inquire why the ships of his country are built so as to last but for a short time; he answers without hesitation that the art of navigation is every day making such rapid progress, that the finest vessel would become almost useless if it lasted beyond a certain number of years. In these words, which fell accidentally and on a particular subject from a man of rude attainments, I recognize the general and systematic idea upon which a great people directs all its concerns.

As castes fade away and social classes become more similar—as manners, customs, and laws change due to the lively interactions among people—as new facts emerge and new truths are revealed—while old beliefs fade and are replaced by new ones—the idea of an ideal perfection, always just out of reach, appears in the human mind. Constant changes happen all around us: some people's situations worsen, teaching them that no group or individual, no matter how enlightened, can claim to be perfect; while others improve, leading him to conclude that humanity has an endless capacity for growth. His setbacks remind him that no one should expect to find absolute goodness—while his successes encourage him to keep striving for it. Thus, always searching, always falling but getting back up again—often disappointed but never discouraged—he persistently moves toward that boundless greatness, faintly visible at the end of the long journey that humanity still has ahead. It’s hard to believe how many conclusions stem from the philosophical idea of man’s limitless potential for improvement, or how greatly it influences even those who focus entirely on action rather than thought, as they seem to align their actions with it, often without awareness. I speak to an American sailor and ask why ships in his country are built to last only a short time; he replies quickly that the art of navigation is progressing so fast that even the best ship would become nearly useless if it lasted too long. In these words, which came spontaneously from a man with basic knowledge, I see the overarching concept that guides a great nation in its endeavors.

Aristocratic nations are naturally too apt to narrow the scope of human perfectibility; democratic nations to expand it beyond compass.

Aristocratic nations tend to limit the possibilities of human improvement, while democratic nations often stretch them too far.





Chapter IX: The Example Of The Americans Does Not Prove That A Democratic People Can Have No Aptitude And No Taste For Science, Literature, Or Art

It must be acknowledged that amongst few of the civilized nations of our time have the higher sciences made less progress than in the United States; and in few have great artists, fine poets, or celebrated writers been more rare. Many Europeans, struck by this fact, have looked upon it as a natural and inevitable result of equality; and they have supposed that if a democratic state of society and democratic institutions were ever to prevail over the whole earth, the human mind would gradually find its beacon-lights grow dim, and men would relapse into a period of darkness. To reason thus is, I think, to confound several ideas which it is important to divide and to examine separately: it is to mingle, unintentionally, what is democratic with what is only American.

It must be recognized that among the few civilized nations of our time, the higher sciences have made less progress in the United States than elsewhere; and in only a few have great artists, talented poets, or renowned writers been as rare. Many Europeans, struck by this fact, have viewed it as a natural and unavoidable result of equality; they believe that if a democratic society and democratic institutions were to take hold worldwide, the human mind would gradually lose its guiding light, and people would slide back into a dark age. To think this way is, I believe, to confuse several ideas that should be analyzed separately: it mixes what is democratic with what is simply American.

The religion professed by the first emigrants, and bequeathed by them to their descendants, simple in its form of worship, austere and almost harsh in its principles, and hostile to external symbols and to ceremonial pomp, is naturally unfavorable to the fine arts, and only yields a reluctant sufferance to the pleasures of literature. The Americans are a very old and a very enlightened people, who have fallen upon a new and unbounded country, where they may extend themselves at pleasure, and which they may fertilize without difficulty. This state of things is without a parallel in the history of the world. In America, then, every one finds facilities, unknown elsewhere, for making or increasing his fortune. The spirit of gain is always on the stretch, and the human mind, constantly diverted from the pleasures of imagination and the labors of the intellect, is there swayed by no impulse but the pursuit of wealth. Not only are manufacturing and commercial classes to be found in the United States, as they are in all other countries; but what never occurred elsewhere, the whole community is simultaneously engaged in productive industry and commerce. I am convinced that, if the Americans had been alone in the world, with the freedom and the knowledge acquired by their forefathers, and the passions which are their own, they would not have been slow to discover that progress cannot long be made in the application of the sciences without cultivating the theory of them; that all the arts are perfected by one another: and, however absorbed they might have been by the pursuit of the principal object of their desires, they would speedily have admitted, that it is necessary to turn aside from it occasionally, in order the better to attain it in the end.

The religion practiced by the first emigrants, which they passed down to their descendants, is simple in its worship, strict and almost severe in its principles, and opposed to external symbols and ceremonial display. This makes it naturally unsupportive of the fine arts and only reluctantly tolerates the pleasures of literature. Americans are a very old and very educated people who have come into a new and limitless land where they can expand freely and cultivate it with ease. This situation is unmatched in the history of the world. In America, everyone finds opportunities, unknown elsewhere, to make or grow their wealth. The drive for profit is always strong, and the human mind, often distracted from the joys of imagination and intellectual pursuits, is solely focused on the pursuit of wealth. In the United States, there are manufacturing and commercial classes, just like in other countries, but what has never happened elsewhere is that the entire community is actively engaged in productive industry and commerce at the same time. I believe that if the Americans had been alone in the world, with the freedom and knowledge inherited from their ancestors, and their own inherent passions, they would have quickly realized that progress in science requires an understanding of its theories; that all the arts enhance one another; and even if they were deeply absorbed in seeking their primary goals, they would soon recognize the necessity of stepping back occasionally to achieve those goals more effectively in the end.

The taste for the pleasures of the mind is moreover so natural to the heart of civilized man, that amongst the polite nations, which are least disposed to give themselves up to these pursuits, a certain number of citizens are always to be found who take part in them. This intellectual craving, when once felt, would very soon have been satisfied. But at the very time when the Americans were naturally inclined to require nothing of science but its special applications to the useful arts and the means of rendering life comfortable, learned and literary Europe was engaged in exploring the common sources of truth, and in improving at the same time all that can minister to the pleasures or satisfy the wants of man. At the head of the enlightened nations of the Old World the inhabitants of the United States more particularly distinguished one, to which they were closely united by a common origin and by kindred habits. Amongst this people they found distinguished men of science, artists of skill, writers of eminence, and they were enabled to enjoy the treasures of the intellect without requiring to labor in amassing them. I cannot consent to separate America from Europe, in spite of the ocean which intervenes. I consider the people of the United States as that portion of the English people which is commissioned to explore the wilds of the New World; whilst the rest of the nation, enjoying more leisure and less harassed by the drudgery of life, may devote its energies to thought, and enlarge in all directions the empire of the mind. The position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one. Their strictly Puritanical origin—their exclusively commercial habits—even the country they inhabit, which seems to divert their minds from the pursuit of science, literature, and the arts—the proximity of Europe, which allows them to neglect these pursuits without relapsing into barbarism—a thousand special causes, of which I have only been able to point out the most important—have singularly concurred to fix the mind of the American upon purely practical objects. His passions, his wants, his education, and everything about him seem to unite in drawing the native of the United States earthward: his religion alone bids him turn, from time to time, a transient and distracted glance to heaven. Let us cease then to view all democratic nations under the mask of the American people, and let us attempt to survey them at length with their own proper features.

The desire for intellectual pleasures is so natural for civilized people that even among the most refined nations, which tend to shy away from such activities, you will always find some individuals engaged in them. This thirst for knowledge, once experienced, would quickly be satisfied. However, at a time when Americans were primarily focused on practical applications of science to improve daily life, learned and literary Europe was busy exploring the foundations of truth and enhancing everything that contributes to human pleasure and needs. Among the enlightened nations of the Old World, the United States had a unique connection to one nation, sharing a common origin and similar habits. Here, they encountered distinguished scientists, skilled artists, and prominent writers, enabling them to enjoy intellectual treasures without the burden of building them up themselves. I refuse to separate America from Europe despite the ocean that separates them. I view the United States as a part of the English people tasked with exploring the New World's wilderness, while the rest of the nation, enjoying more leisure and less stress from daily toil, can focus on ideas and expand the realm of thought. The situation of Americans is quite unique, and it is unlikely that any democratic people will find themselves in a similar one. Their strict Puritan origins, their purely commercial ways, even the land they inhabit—which seems to pull their attention away from science, literature, and the arts—along with Europe’s proximity, allowing them to ignore these pursuits without slipping back into barbarism, have all contributed to focusing Americans on practical matters. Their passions, needs, education, and everything surrounding them seem to draw them down to Earth, with only their religion prompting them occasionally to cast a fleeting gaze towards the heavens. We should stop viewing all democratic nations through the lens of the American people and instead try to perceive them with their own distinct characteristics.

It is possible to conceive a people not subdivided into any castes or scale of ranks; in which the law, recognizing no privileges, should divide inherited property into equal shares; but which, at the same time, should be without knowledge and without freedom. Nor is this an empty hypothesis: a despot may find that it is his interest to render his subjects equal and to leave them ignorant, in order more easily to keep them slaves. Not only would a democratic people of this kind show neither aptitude nor taste for science, literature, or art, but it would probably never arrive at the possession of them. The law of descent would of itself provide for the destruction of fortunes at each succeeding generation; and new fortunes would be acquired by none. The poor man, without either knowledge or freedom, would not so much as conceive the idea of raising himself to wealth; and the rich man would allow himself to be degraded to poverty, without a notion of self-defence. Between these two members of the community complete and invincible equality would soon be established.

It’s possible to imagine a society without any divisions into castes or hierarchical ranks, where the law, recognizing no special privileges, divides inherited wealth into equal parts. However, this society could also be one that lacks knowledge and freedom. This isn’t just a theoretical idea: a ruler might find it beneficial to make his subjects equal and keep them ignorant to maintain control over them. Such a democratic society wouldn’t have any interest in or capability for science, literature, or art, and it might never develop them at all. The rules of inheritance would lead to the gradual destruction of wealth with each generation, and no new fortunes would emerge. A poor individual, lacking both knowledge and freedom, wouldn’t even consider the possibility of rising to wealth, while a rich person would decline to poverty, unaware of how to protect what they have. Between these two groups, a complete and unbreakable equality would quickly come into existence.

No one would then have time or taste to devote himself to the pursuits or pleasures of the intellect; but all men would remain paralyzed by a state of common ignorance and equal servitude. When I conceive a democratic society of this kind, I fancy myself in one of those low, close, and gloomy abodes, where the light which breaks in from without soon faints and fades away. A sudden heaviness overpowers me, and I grope through the surrounding darkness, to find the aperture which will restore me to daylight and the air.

No one would have the time or interest to dedicate themselves to intellectual pursuits or pleasures; instead, everyone would be stuck in a state of shared ignorance and equal subservience. When I imagine a democratic society like this, I picture myself in one of those dark, cramped, and dreary places, where the light that filters in from outside quickly dims and disappears. A sudden weight presses down on me, and I fumble through the surrounding darkness, searching for an opening that will bring me back to daylight and fresh air.

But all this is not applicable to men already enlightened who retain their freedom, after having abolished from amongst them those peculiar and hereditary rights which perpetuated the tenure of property in the hands of certain individuals or certain bodies. When men living in a democratic state of society are enlightened, they readily discover that they are confined and fixed within no limits which constrain them to take up with their present fortune. They all therefore conceive the idea of increasing it; if they are free, they all attempt it, but all do not succeed in the same manner. The legislature, it is true, no longer grants privileges, but they are bestowed by nature. As natural inequality is very great, fortunes become unequal as soon as every man exerts all his faculties to get rich. The law of descent prevents the establishment of wealthy families; but it does not prevent the existence of wealthy individuals. It constantly brings back the members of the community to a common level, from which they as constantly escape: and the inequality of fortunes augments in proportion as knowledge is diffused and liberty increased.

But all this doesn’t apply to enlightened men who maintain their freedom after abolishing those specific and hereditary rights that kept property in the hands of certain individuals or groups. When people living in a democratic society are enlightened, they quickly realize that they aren’t limited or stuck in their current circumstances. Therefore, they all conceive of ways to improve their situation; if they are free, they all try to do so, though not everyone succeeds in the same way. It's true that the legislature no longer grants privileges, but they are given by nature. Since natural inequality is significant, fortunes become unequal as soon as everyone uses their abilities to get rich. The laws of inheritance prevent the formation of wealthy families, but they don’t stop wealthy individuals from existing. It constantly brings members of the community back to a common level, from which they consistently break free: and the inequality of fortunes increases as knowledge spreads and freedom grows.

A sect which arose in our time, and was celebrated for its talents and its extravagance, proposed to concentrate all property into the hands of a central power, whose function it should afterwards be to parcel it out to individuals, according to their capacity. This would have been a method of escaping from that complete and eternal equality which seems to threaten democratic society. But it would be a simpler and less dangerous remedy to grant no privilege to any, giving to all equal cultivation and equal independence, and leaving everyone to determine his own position. Natural inequality will very soon make way for itself, and wealth will spontaneously pass into the hands of the most capable.

A movement that emerged in our time, known for its skills and excess, aimed to put all property under the control of a central authority, which would then distribute it to individuals based on their abilities. This was seen as a way to avoid the complete and ongoing equality that seems to threaten democratic society. However, a simpler and less risky solution would be to grant no privileges to anyone, providing everyone with equal opportunities and independence, allowing each person to find their own place. Natural inequalities will quickly sort themselves out, and wealth will naturally end up in the hands of those who are most capable.

Free and democratic communities, then, will always contain a considerable number of people enjoying opulence or competency. The wealthy will not be so closely linked to each other as the members of the former aristocratic class of society: their propensities will be different, and they will scarcely ever enjoy leisure as secure or as complete: but they will be far more numerous than those who belonged to that class of society could ever be. These persons will not be strictly confined to the cares of practical life, and they will still be able, though in different degrees, to indulge in the pursuits and pleasures of the intellect. In those pleasures they will indulge; for if it be true that the human mind leans on one side to the narrow, the practical, and the useful, it naturally rises on the other to the infinite, the spiritual, and the beautiful. Physical wants confine it to the earth; but, as soon as the tie is loosened, it will unbend itself again.

Free and democratic communities will always have a significant number of people enjoying wealth or financial stability. The wealthy won’t be as closely connected as members of the old aristocracy; their interests will differ, and they won’t experience leisure that is as secure or complete. However, they will be far more numerous than those who belonged to that aristocratic class. These individuals won’t be limited to just practical life concerns, and they will still be able, albeit to varying degrees, to engage in intellectual pursuits and pleasures. They will seek out these pleasures because while it’s true that the human mind can tend toward the narrow, practical, and useful, it naturally aspires to the infinite, the spiritual, and the beautiful. Physical needs may tether it to the earth, but once those ties are loosened, it will stretch itself again.

Not only will the number of those who can take an interest in the productions of the mind be enlarged, but the taste for intellectual enjoyment will descend, step by step, even to those who, in aristocratic societies, seem to have neither time nor ability to in indulge in them. When hereditary wealth, the privileges of rank, and the prerogatives of birth have ceased to be, and when every man derives his strength from himself alone, it becomes evident that the chief cause of disparity between the fortunes of men is the mind. Whatever tends to invigorate, to extend, or to adorn the mind, instantly rises to great value. The utility of knowledge becomes singularly conspicuous even to the eyes of the multitude: those who have no taste for its charms set store upon its results, and make some efforts to acquire it. In free and enlightened democratic ages, there is nothing to separate men from each other or to retain them in their peculiar sphere; they rise or sink with extreme rapidity. All classes live in perpetual intercourse from their great proximity to each other. They communicate and intermingle every day—they imitate and envy one other: this suggests to the people many ideas, notions, and desires which it would never have entertained if the distinctions of rank had been fixed and society at rest. In such nations the servant never considers himself as an entire stranger to the pleasures and toils of his master, nor the poor man to those of the rich; the rural population assimilates itself to that of the towns, and the provinces to the capital. No one easily allows himself to be reduced to the mere material cares of life; and the humblest artisan casts at times an eager and a furtive glance into the higher regions of the intellect. People do not read with the same notions or in the same manner as they do in an aristocratic community; but the circle of readers is unceasingly expanded, till it includes all the citizens.

Not only will more people be interested in intellectual pursuits, but the appreciation for mental enjoyment will gradually reach even those who, in aristocratic societies, appear to lack the time or ability to engage with them. As hereditary wealth, the privileges of rank, and the rights of birth disappear, and as every person draws their strength solely from themselves, it becomes clear that the main reason for differences in wealth among people is the mind. Anything that helps to energize, broaden, or enhance the mind quickly gains significant value. The usefulness of knowledge becomes distinctly evident to everyone: those who don't appreciate its allure still value its outcomes and make some effort to obtain it. In free and enlightened democratic times, there is nothing to keep people apart or confine them to their specific social class; they can rise or fall very quickly. All social classes are constantly interacting because of their close proximity to one another. They talk and mix every day—they imitate and envy each other: this inspires many ideas, thoughts, and desires in the population that they wouldn’t have considered if social distinctions were rigid and society remained unchanged. In such countries, a servant never feels entirely disconnected from the joys and struggles of their master, nor does a poor person feel alien to those of the wealthy; the rural population blends with that of the cities, and the provinces with the capital. No one easily resigns themselves to just the basic material concerns of life; even the humblest worker sometimes takes a keen and discreet look at the higher realms of intellect. People read differently than they do in an aristocratic society; the group of readers continually expands until it encompasses all citizens.

As soon as the multitude begins to take an interest in the labors of the mind, it finds out that to excel in some of them is a powerful method of acquiring fame, power, or wealth. The restless ambition which equality begets instantly takes this direction as it does all others. The number of those who cultivate science, letters, and the arts, becomes immense. The intellectual world starts into prodigious activity: everyone endeavors to open for himself a path there, and to draw the eyes of the public after him. Something analogous occurs to what happens in society in the United States, politically considered. What is done is often imperfect, but the attempts are innumerable; and, although the results of individual effort are commonly very small, the total amount is always very large.

As soon as people start to pay attention to intellectual pursuits, they realize that excelling in certain areas is a strong way to gain fame, power, or wealth. The restless ambition that equality creates quickly directs itself toward these goals, just like in other areas. The number of people engaging in science, literature, and the arts skyrockets. The intellectual world bursts into incredible activity: everyone tries to carve out their own path and attract public attention. This is somewhat similar to what happens politically in the United States. While individual efforts may often be imperfect, the sheer number of attempts is overwhelming; and even though the results of any single person's work tend to be quite small, the overall impact is always significant.

It is therefore not true to assert that men living in democratic ages are naturally indifferent to science, literature, and the arts: only it must be acknowledged that they cultivate them after their own fashion, and bring to the task their own peculiar qualifications and deficiencies.

It’s not accurate to say that people living in democratic times are naturally indifferent to science, literature, and the arts. However, it should be recognized that they engage with them in their own way, bringing their unique strengths and weaknesses to the endeavor.





Chapter X: Why The Americans Are More Addicted To Practical Than To Theoretical Science

If a democratic state of society and democratic institutions do not stop the career of the human mind, they incontestably guide it in one direction in preference to another. Their effects, thus circumscribed, are still exceedingly great; and I trust I may be pardoned if I pause for a moment to survey them. We had occasion, in speaking of the philosophical method of the American people, to make several remarks which must here be turned to account.

If a democratic society and democratic institutions don't hinder the progress of the human mind, they undoubtedly steer it towards one direction over another. Even with these limitations, their impact is still very significant; I hope it's okay if I take a moment to consider them. Earlier, when discussing the philosophical approach of the American people, we made several comments that should now be useful.

Equality begets in man the desire of judging of everything for himself: it gives him, in all things, a taste for the tangible and the real, a contempt for tradition and for forms. These general tendencies are principally discernible in the peculiar subject of this chapter. Those who cultivate the sciences amongst a democratic people are always afraid of losing their way in visionary speculation. They mistrust systems; they adhere closely to facts and the study of facts with their own senses. As they do not easily defer to the mere name of any fellow-man, they are never inclined to rest upon any man's authority; but, on the contrary, they are unremitting in their efforts to point out the weaker points of their neighbors' opinions. Scientific precedents have very little weight with them; they are never long detained by the subtilty of the schools, nor ready to accept big words for sterling coin; they penetrate, as far as they can, into the principal parts of the subject which engages them, and they expound them in the vernacular tongue. Scientific pursuits then follow a freer and a safer course, but a less lofty one.

Equality fosters in people the desire to judge everything for themselves: it encourages a preference for the tangible and the real, coupled with a disdain for tradition and formalities. These general tendencies are especially noticeable in the specific topic of this chapter. Those studying the sciences in a democratic society are often cautious about getting lost in abstract theories. They are skeptical of systems; they focus closely on facts and rely on their own observations. Since they don't easily defer to anyone's name, they tend not to rely on others' authority; instead, they consistently strive to highlight the weaknesses in their peers' opinions. Scientific precedents don't carry much weight with them; they are not easily distracted by the complexities of academic discussions or impressed by grand terminology. They aim to understand the core aspects of the subjects that interest them and explain them in everyday language. As a result, scientific endeavors take a more open and safer path, but one that is less elevated.

The mind may, as it appears to me, divide science into three parts. The first comprises the most theoretical principles, and those more abstract notions whose application is either unknown or very remote. The second is composed of those general truths which still belong to pure theory, but lead, nevertheless, by a straight and short road to practical results. Methods of application and means of execution make up the third. Each of these different portions of science may be separately cultivated, although reason and experience show that none of them can prosper long, if it be absolutely cut off from the two others.

The mind can be, as I see it, divided into three parts when it comes to science. The first includes the most theoretical principles and those abstract concepts whose practical application is either unknown or very distant. The second consists of general truths that still belong to pure theory but lead directly and swiftly to practical results. The third part includes methods of application and means of execution. Each of these different areas of science can be studied separately, but logic and experience demonstrate that none can thrive for long if it is completely separated from the other two.

In America the purely practical part of science is admirably understood, and careful attention is paid to the theoretical portion which is immediately requisite to application. On this head the Americans always display a clear, free, original, and inventive power of mind. But hardly anyone in the United States devotes himself to the essentially theoretical and abstract portion of human knowledge. In this respect the Americans carry to excess a tendency which is, I think, discernible, though in a less degree, amongst all democratic nations.

In America, the practical side of science is very well understood, and there's a strong focus on the theoretical aspects that are directly applicable. In this area, Americans consistently show a clear, open-minded, original, and creative thinking ability. However, very few people in the United States focus on the purely theoretical and abstract aspects of knowledge. In this regard, Americans take to an extreme a tendency that I believe is also noticeable, though to a lesser extent, in all democratic nations.

Nothing is more necessary to the culture of the higher sciences, or of the more elevated departments of science, than meditation; and nothing is less suited to meditation than the structure of democratic society. We do not find there, as amongst an aristocratic people, one class which clings to a state of repose because it is well off; and another which does not venture to stir because it despairs of improving its condition. Everyone is actively in motion: some in quest of power, others of gain. In the midst of this universal tumult—this incessant conflict of jarring interests—this continual stride of men after fortune—where is that calm to be found which is necessary for the deeper combinations of the intellect? How can the mind dwell upon any single point, when everything whirls around it, and man himself is swept and beaten onwards by the heady current which rolls all things in its course? But the permanent agitation which subsists in the bosom of a peaceable and established democracy, must be distinguished from the tumultuous and revolutionary movements which almost always attend the birth and growth of democratic society. When a violent revolution occurs amongst a highly civilized people, it cannot fail to give a sudden impulse to their feelings and their opinions. This is more particularly true of democratic revolutions, which stir up all the classes of which a people is composed, and beget, at the same time, inordinate ambition in the breast of every member of the community. The French made most surprising advances in the exact sciences at the very time at which they were finishing the destruction of the remains of their former feudal society; yet this sudden fecundity is not to be attributed to democracy, but to the unexampled revolution which attended its growth. What happened at that period was a special incident, and it would be unwise to regard it as the test of a general principle. Great revolutions are not more common amongst democratic nations than amongst others: I am even inclined to believe that they are less so. But there prevails amongst those populations a small distressing motion—a sort of incessant jostling of men—which annoys and disturbs the mind, without exciting or elevating it. Men who live in democratic communities not only seldom indulge in meditation, but they naturally entertain very little esteem for it. A democratic state of society and democratic institutions plunge the greater part of men in constant active life; and the habits of mind which are suited to an active life, are not always suited to a contemplative one. The man of action is frequently obliged to content himself with the best he can get, because he would never accomplish his purpose if he chose to carry every detail to perfection. He has perpetually occasion to rely on ideas which he has not had leisure to search to the bottom; for he is much more frequently aided by the opportunity of an idea than by its strict accuracy; and, in the long run, he risks less in making use of some false principles, than in spending his time in establishing all his principles on the basis of truth. The world is not led by long or learned demonstrations; a rapid glance at particular incidents, the daily study of the fleeting passions of the multitude, the accidents of the time, and the art of turning them to account, decide all its affairs.

Nothing is more essential for the development of advanced sciences than meditation; and nothing is less conducive to meditation than the structure of democratic society. Unlike in an aristocratic society, where one class can enjoy a state of relaxation because they are well-off, and another class remains stagnant due to despair about improving their situation, everyone here is constantly active. Some are seeking power, others are chasing wealth. Amid this overall chaos—this endless clash of conflicting interests—this continuous race after success—where can we find the calm needed for deeper intellectual thought? How can anyone focus on a single idea when everything swirls around it, and individuals are swept along by the powerful current carrying everything forward? However, the ongoing agitation found within a stable and peaceful democracy should be distinguished from the chaotic and revolutionary movements that usually accompany the birth and development of democratic societies. When a violent revolution occurs in a highly civilized society, it inevitably triggers a surge in their emotions and opinions. This is especially true for democratic revolutions, which stir all classes of society and ignite excessive ambition within every individual. The French made remarkable progress in the exact sciences at the same time they were dismantling their former feudal structures; yet this sudden productivity cannot be credited to democracy, but rather to the unprecedented revolution that accompanied its rise. What happened during that time was a unique event, and it would be unwise to see it as evidence of a general principle. Major revolutions aren't any more common in democratic nations than in others; in fact, I think they might be less frequent. However, among those populations, there exists a persistent, troubling motion—a kind of constant jostling of people—that irritates and disrupts the mind without inspiring or uplifting it. People living in democratic communities not only rarely engage in meditation, but they also generally have little regard for it. A democratic society and its institutions immerse most people in constant active life, and the mindset suited for an active life doesn’t always align with a contemplative one. Action-oriented individuals often have to settle for whatever they can manage, as they would never achieve their goals if they tried to perfect every detail. They constantly have to rely on ideas they haven't fully explored, since they benefit more from the timeliness of an idea than its precise accuracy. Ultimately, they risk less by using some flawed principles than by taking the time to ground all their principles in absolute truth. The world isn't guided by lengthy or scholarly arguments; instead, a quick look at specific events, daily observations of the fleeting emotions of the crowd, the circumstances of the moment, and the skill to capitalize on them dictate its affairs.

In the ages in which active life is the condition of almost everyone, men are therefore generally led to attach an excessive value to the rapid bursts and superficial conceptions of the intellect; and, on the other hand, to depreciate below their true standard its slower and deeper labors. This opinion of the public influences the judgment of the men who cultivate the sciences; they are persuaded that they may succeed in those pursuits without meditation, or deterred from such pursuits as demand it.

In times when an active lifestyle is the norm for almost everyone, people tend to place too much importance on quick thoughts and shallow ideas, while undervaluing the slower, more profound work of the mind. This public opinion affects the way those who study sciences think; they believe they can succeed in those areas without deep reflection, or they are discouraged from pursuing fields that require it.

There are several methods of studying the sciences. Amongst a multitude of men you will find a selfish, mercantile, and trading taste for the discoveries of the mind, which must not be confounded with that disinterested passion which is kindled in the heart of the few. A desire to utilize knowledge is one thing; the pure desire to know is another. I do not doubt that in a few minds and far between, an ardent, inexhaustible love of truth springs up, self-supported, and living in ceaseless fruition without ever attaining the satisfaction which it seeks. This ardent love it is—this proud, disinterested love of what is true—which raises men to the abstract sources of truth, to draw their mother-knowledge thence. If Pascal had had nothing in view but some large gain, or even if he had been stimulated by the love of fame alone, I cannot conceive that he would ever have been able to rally all the powers of his mind, as he did, for the better discovery of the most hidden things of the Creator. When I see him, as it were, tear his soul from the midst of all the cares of life to devote it wholly to these researches, and, prematurely snapping the links which bind the frame to life, die of old age before forty, I stand amazed, and I perceive that no ordinary cause is at work to produce efforts so extra-ordinary.

There are various ways to study the sciences. Among many people, you'll find a selfish, commercial interest in mental discoveries, which should not be confused with the selfless passion found in a select few. Wanting to use knowledge is one thing; having a pure desire to know is quite another. I have no doubt that in a few rare minds, a burning, endless love for truth arises, self-sustained, thriving constantly without ever achieving the fulfillment it seeks. It is this passionate love—this proud, selfless love for what is true—that elevates individuals to the fundamental sources of truth, allowing them to draw their foundational knowledge from there. If Pascal had been driven only by the prospect of large profits, or even by a desire for fame alone, I can't imagine he would have been able to harness all the powers of his mind, as he did, to uncover the most hidden aspects of the Creator. When I see him seemingly tear his soul away from the cares of life to entirely dedicate himself to these studies, and then, prematurely breaking the ties that connect him to existence, die of old age before turning forty, I am astounded, and I realize that no ordinary motivation is behind such extraordinary efforts.

The future will prove whether these passions, at once so rare and so productive, come into being and into growth as easily in the midst of democratic as in aristocratic communities. For myself, I confess that I am slow to believe it. In aristocratic society, the class which gives the tone to opinion, and has the supreme guidance of affairs, being permanently and hereditarily placed above the multitude, naturally conceives a lofty idea of itself and of man. It loves to invent for him noble pleasures, to carve out splendid objects for his ambition. Aristocracies often commit very tyrannical and very inhuman actions; but they rarely entertain grovelling thoughts; and they show a kind of haughty contempt of little pleasures, even whilst they indulge in them. The effect is greatly to raise the general pitch of society. In aristocratic ages vast ideas are commonly entertained of the dignity, the power, and the greatness of man. These opinions exert their influence on those who cultivate the sciences, as well as on the rest of the community. They facilitate the natural impulse of the mind to the highest regions of thought, and they naturally prepare it to conceive a sublime—nay, almost a divine—love of truth. Men of science at such periods are consequently carried away by theory; and it even happens that they frequently conceive an inconsiderate contempt for the practical part of learning. "Archimedes," says Plutarch, "was of so lofty a spirit, that he never condescended to write any treatise on the manner of constructing all these engines of offence and defence. And as he held this science of inventing and putting together engines, and all arts generally speaking which tended to any useful end in practice, to be vile, low, and mercenary, he spent his talents and his studious hours in writing of those things only whose beauty and subtilty had in them no admixture of necessity." Such is the aristocratic aim of science; in democratic nations it cannot be the same.

The future will show whether these passions, both so rare and so productive, can arise and grow just as easily in democratic societies as in aristocratic ones. Personally, I admit I'm slow to believe this. In an aristocratic society, the class that shapes opinions and has the ultimate control over affairs, being permanently and hereditarily positioned above the masses, naturally develops a high regard for itself and for humanity. It enjoys creating noble pleasures and crafting grand ambitions for people. Aristocracies often commit very tyrannical and inhumane acts, but they rarely have base thoughts; they display a sort of arrogant disdain for minor pleasures, even while indulging in them. This significantly uplifts the overall level of society. In aristocratic times, there are often grand ideas about the dignity, power, and greatness of humanity. These beliefs influence those who pursue the sciences as well as the wider community. They enhance the natural drive of the mind to explore the highest realms of thought, preparing it to conceive a sublime—almost a divine—love of truth. Scientists in those periods are thus often swept away by theory; they may even develop an unwarranted contempt for practical learning. "Archimedes," says Plutarch, "had such a lofty spirit that he never stooped to write any treatise on how to construct these engines of offense and defense. He viewed the science of inventing and assembling machines, and all arts generally aimed at practical usefulness, as lowly, vile, and mercenary. Instead, he devoted his talents and study time to writing about things whose beauty and subtlety had no element of necessity." This reflects the aristocratic aim of science; in democratic nations, it cannot be the same.

The greater part of the men who constitute these nations are extremely eager in the pursuit of actual and physical gratification. As they are always dissatisfied with the position which they occupy, and are always free to leave it, they think of nothing but the means of changing their fortune, or of increasing it. To minds thus predisposed, every new method which leads by a shorter road to wealth, every machine which spares labor, every instrument which diminishes the cost of production, every discovery which facilitates pleasures or augments them, seems to be the grandest effort of the human intellect. It is chiefly from these motives that a democratic people addicts itself to scientific pursuits—that it understands, and that it respects them. In aristocratic ages, science is more particularly called upon to furnish gratification to the mind; in democracies, to the body. You may be sure that the more a nation is democratic, enlightened, and free, the greater will be the number of these interested promoters of scientific genius, and the more will discoveries immediately applicable to productive industry confer gain, fame, and even power on their authors. For in democracies the working class takes a part in public affairs; and public honors, as well as pecuniary remuneration, may be awarded to those who deserve them. In a community thus organized it may easily be conceived that the human mind may be led insensibly to the neglect of theory; and that it is urged, on the contrary, with unparalleled vehemence to the applications of science, or at least to that portion of theoretical science which is necessary to those who make such applications. In vain will some innate propensity raise the mind towards the loftier spheres of the intellect; interest draws it down to the middle zone. There it may develop all its energy and restless activity, there it may engender all its wonders. These very Americans, who have not discovered one of the general laws of mechanics, have introduced into navigation an engine which changes the aspect of the world.

Most of the people in these nations are very eager for immediate and physical satisfaction. They are never really happy with their current situation and always have the option to leave it, so they focus solely on how to change their fortunes or make them greater. For minds that are inclined this way, every new method that promises a quicker path to wealth, every machine that reduces labor, every tool that cuts production costs, and every discovery that enhances or facilitates pleasure feels like a remarkable achievement of human intellect. This is primarily why a democratic society gravitates towards scientific endeavors—it both understands and respects them. In aristocratic times, science was mainly sought to provide mental gratification; in democracies, the focus shifts to physical benefits. The more a nation is democratic, educated, and free, the more likely you'll find individuals who are keen supporters of scientific innovation, and the more practical discoveries tied to productive industries will bring success, recognition, and even power to their creators. In democracies, the working class participates in public life, and both public accolades and financial rewards can be given to those who earn them. In such a community, it's easy to see how people's minds might gradually overlook theory, while being driven intensely toward practical applications of science, or at least that part of theoretical science relevant to those applications. Any natural inclination toward higher intellectual pursuits may struggle in vain; self-interest pulls it down to the average realm. Here, it can unleash its full energy and relentless activity, and create remarkable innovations. These very Americans, who haven't discovered any universal laws of mechanics, have nonetheless introduced a mechanism in navigation that changes the world.

Assuredly I do not content that the democratic nations of our time are destined to witness the extinction of the transcendent luminaries of man's intelligence, nor even that no new lights will ever start into existence. At the age at which the world has now arrived, and amongst so many cultivated nations, perpetually excited by the fever of productive industry, the bonds which connect the different parts of science together cannot fail to strike the observation; and the taste for practical science itself, if it be enlightened, ought to lead men not to neglect theory. In the midst of such numberless attempted applications of so many experiments, repeated every day, it is almost impossible that general laws should not frequently be brought to light; so that great discoveries would be frequent, though great inventors be rare. I believe, moreover, in the high calling of scientific minds. If the democratic principle does not, on the one hand, induce men to cultivate science for its own sake, on the other it enormously increases the number of those who do cultivate it. Nor is it credible that, from amongst so great a multitude no speculative genius should from time to time arise, inflamed by the love of truth alone. Such a one, we may be sure, would dive into the deepest mysteries of nature, whatever be the spirit of his country or his age. He requires no assistance in his course—enough that he be not checked in it.

Surely, I don’t believe that the democratic nations of our time are destined to see the end of the remarkable thinkers of humanity, nor do I think that no new ideas will ever emerge. Given the age we find ourselves in, surrounded by so many educated nations constantly driven by the urgency of productive work, the connections between different branches of science are undeniable. A genuine interest in practical science should encourage people not to overlook theory. Amidst countless attempts to apply various experiments happening every day, it’s almost impossible not to frequently uncover general laws, meaning that while great inventors may be rare, significant discoveries will happen often. Additionally, I believe in the important role of scientific minds. While the democratic principle might not encourage individuals to pursue science solely for its own sake, it significantly increases the number of people who do engage with it. It’s also hard to believe that among such a large group, no visionary thinker would occasionally emerge, motivated purely by a love for truth. We can be confident that such a person would explore the deepest mysteries of nature, regardless of the spirit of their country or time. They need no help on their journey—just the freedom to pursue it.

All that I mean to say is this:—permanent inequality of conditions leads men to confine themselves to the arrogant and sterile research of abstract truths; whilst the social condition and the institutions of democracy prepare them to seek the immediate and useful practical results of the sciences. This tendency is natural and inevitable: it is curious to be acquainted with it, and it may be necessary to point it out. If those who are called upon to guide the nations of our time clearly discerned from afar off these new tendencies, which will soon be irresistible, they would understand that, possessing education and freedom, men living in democratic ages cannot fail to improve the industrial part of science; and that henceforward all the efforts of the constituted authorities ought to be directed to support the highest branches of learning, and to foster the nobler passion for science itself. In the present age the human mind must be coerced into theoretical studies; it runs of its own accord to practical applications; and, instead of perpetually referring it to the minute examination of secondary effects, it is well to divert it from them sometimes, in order to raise it up to the contemplation of primary causes. Because the civilization of ancient Rome perished in consequence of the invasion of the barbarians, we are perhaps too apt to think that civilization cannot perish in any other manner. If the light by which we are guided is ever extinguished, it will dwindle by degrees, and expire of itself. By dint of close adherence to mere applications, principles would be lost sight of; and when the principles were wholly forgotten, the methods derived from them would be ill-pursued. New methods could no longer be invented, and men would continue to apply, without intelligence, and without art, scientific processes no longer understood.

What I mean to say is this: permanent inequality in conditions causes people to focus on the arrogant and fruitless pursuit of abstract truths, while the social conditions and institutions of democracy prepare them to pursue immediate and practical results from the sciences. This tendency is natural and unavoidable; it's interesting to recognize it, and it may be important to point it out. If those who are meant to guide the nations of our time could clearly see these new tendencies, which will soon become unstoppable, they would understand that with education and freedom, people living in democratic times will inevitably enhance the industrial aspects of science. Therefore, all the efforts of those in power should aim to support the highest levels of learning and to nurture a genuine passion for science itself. In today's world, the human mind needs to be encouraged towards theoretical studies; it naturally gravitates towards practical applications. Instead of constantly directing it to examine secondary effects in detail, it should sometimes be steered away from them to focus on primary causes. Because the civilization of ancient Rome fell due to barbarian invasions, we might be too quick to think that civilization can only fall in that way. If the light that guides us ever goes out, it will gradually diminish and fade away. If we become overly focused on mere applications, we will lose sight of the underlying principles, and when the principles are completely forgotten, the methods based on them will be poorly followed. New methods will no longer be invented, and people will continue to apply scientific processes without understanding or skill.

When Europeans first arrived in China, three hundred years ago, they found that almost all the arts had reached a certain degree of perfection there; and they were surprised that a people which had attained this point should not have gone beyond it. At a later period they discovered some traces of the higher branches of science which were lost. The nation was absorbed in productive industry: the greater part of its scientific processes had been preserved, but science itself no longer existed there. This served to explain the strangely motionless state in which they found the minds of this people. The Chinese, in following the track of their forefathers, had forgotten the reasons by which the latter had been guided. They still used the formula, without asking for its meaning: they retained the instrument, but they no longer possessed the art of altering or renewing it. The Chinese, then, had lost the power of change; for them to improve was impossible. They were compelled, at all times and in all points, to imitate their predecessors, lest they should stray into utter darkness, by deviating for an instant from the path already laid down for them. The source of human knowledge was all but dry; and though the stream still ran on, it could neither swell its waters nor alter its channel. Notwithstanding this, China had subsisted peaceably for centuries. The invaders who had conquered the country assumed the manners of the inhabitants, and order prevailed there. A sort of physical prosperity was everywhere discernible: revolutions were rare, and war was, so to speak, unknown.

When Europeans first arrived in China three hundred years ago, they found that almost all the arts had reached a certain level of perfection there; they were surprised that a people who had achieved this didn't push beyond it. Later, they discovered some remnants of the higher branches of science that had been lost. The nation was focused on productive industry: most of its scientific processes had been preserved, but science itself no longer thrived there. This helped explain the strangely stagnant state of the minds of the people. The Chinese, while following in the footsteps of their ancestors, had forgotten the reasons guiding them. They continued to use formulas without questioning their meaning; they kept the tools, but they no longer had the skill to alter or renew them. Thus, the Chinese had lost the ability to change; improvement was impossible for them. They were always compelled to imitate their predecessors, fearful of falling into complete ignorance by deviating even slightly from the established path. The source of human knowledge was nearly dried up; although the stream still flowed, it could neither grow nor change its course. Despite this, China had lived peacefully for centuries. The invaders who conquered the country took on the customs of the locals, and order was maintained. A kind of physical prosperity was noticeable everywhere: revolutions were rare, and war was, for all intents and purposes, unknown.

It is then a fallacy to flatter ourselves with the reflection that the barbarians are still far from us; for if there be some nations which allow civilization to be torn from their grasp, there are others who trample it themselves under their feet.

It's a mistake to deceive ourselves into thinking that the barbarians are still far away; because while some nations might let civilization slip away from them, there are others that stomp it right into the ground themselves.





Chapter XI: Of The Spirit In Which The Americans Cultivate The Arts

It would be to waste the time of my readers and my own if I strove to demonstrate how the general mediocrity of fortunes, the absence of superfluous wealth, the universal desire of comfort, and the constant efforts by which everyone attempts to procure it, make the taste for the useful predominate over the love of the beautiful in the heart of man. Democratic nations, amongst which all these things exist, will therefore cultivate the arts which serve to render life easy, in preference to those whose object is to adorn it. They will habitually prefer the useful to the beautiful, and they will require that the beautiful should be useful. But I propose to go further; and after having pointed out this first feature, to sketch several others.

It would be a waste of time for both my readers and myself if I tried to prove how the general average of wealth, the lack of excess money, the widespread desire for comfort, and the ongoing efforts everyone makes to achieve it, lead to a preference for the useful over the beautiful in people's hearts. Democratic nations, where all these factors come into play, will tend to focus on arts that make life easier rather than those that simply decorate it. They will routinely choose the useful over the beautiful, expecting that beauty should also serve a purpose. But I want to go further; after highlighting this first characteristic, I plan to outline several others.

It commonly happens that in the ages of privilege the practice of almost all the arts becomes a privilege; and that every profession is a separate walk, upon which it is not allowable for everyone to enter. Even when productive industry is free, the fixed character which belongs to aristocratic nations gradually segregates all the persons who practise the same art, till they form a distinct class, always composed of the same families, whose members are all known to each other, and amongst whom a public opinion of their own and a species of corporate pride soon spring up. In a class or guild of this kind, each artisan has not only his fortune to make, but his reputation to preserve. He is not exclusively swayed by his own interest, or even by that of his customer, but by that of the body to which he belongs; and the interest of that body is, that each artisan should produce the best possible workmanship. In aristocratic ages, the object of the arts is therefore to manufacture as well as possible—not with the greatest despatch, or at the lowest rate.

It often happens that in times of privilege, practicing almost any art becomes a privilege itself, and each profession is a separate field that not everyone is allowed to enter. Even when productive work is open to all, the fixed nature of aristocratic societies gradually separates individuals who work in the same field, eventually forming a distinct class comprised of the same families, where the members know each other well and develop their own public opinion and a kind of collective pride. In such a class or guild, each craftsman not only has to build his fortune but also needs to maintain his reputation. He is not solely motivated by his own interests, or even those of his clients, but by the interests of the group he belongs to; and the goal of that group is for each craftsman to produce the highest quality work possible. In aristocratic times, the aim of the arts is thus to create the best possible products—not to work the fastest or offer the lowest prices.

When, on the contrary, every profession is open to all—when a multitude of persons are constantly embracing and abandoning it—and when its several members are strangers to each other, indifferent, and from their numbers hardly seen amongst themselves; the social tie is destroyed, and each workman, standing alone, endeavors simply to gain the greatest possible quantity of money at the least possible cost. The will of the customer is then his only limit. But at the same time a corresponding revolution takes place in the customer also. In countries in which riches as well as power are concentrated and retained in the hands of the few, the use of the greater part of this world's goods belongs to a small number of individuals, who are always the same. Necessity, public opinion, or moderate desires exclude all others from the enjoyment of them. As this aristocratic class remains fixed at the pinnacle of greatness on which it stands, without diminution or increase, it is always acted upon by the same wants and affected by them in the same manner. The men of whom it is composed naturally derive from their superior and hereditary position a taste for what is extremely well made and lasting. This affects the general way of thinking of the nation in relation to the arts. It often occurs, among such a people, that even the peasant will rather go without the object he covets, than procure it in a state of imperfection. In aristocracies, then, the handicraftsmen work for only a limited number of very fastidious customers: the profit they hope to make depends principally on the perfection of their workmanship.

When, on the other hand, every job is open to everyone—when many people are constantly taking it up and leaving it—and when its members are strangers to one another, indifferent, and often hardly seen together; the social connection disappears, and each worker, standing alone, only tries to make as much money as possible for the least effort. The customer's wishes become the only limit. At the same time, a similar change happens with the customers as well. In countries where wealth and power are concentrated and held by a few, most of life’s goods are owned by a small number of people who are always the same. Necessity, public opinion, or moderate desires keep everyone else from enjoying them. Since this elite class stays fixed at the top without any rise or fall, they are always driven by the same needs and affected in the same ways. The individuals in this class naturally develop a taste for things that are extremely well-made and durable due to their high and inherited status. This influences the overall mindset of the nation regarding the arts. It's common, among such people, for even peasants to prefer going without something they want rather than getting it if it's not perfect. In aristocracies, then, craftsmen only cater to a limited number of very particular customers: the profit they hope to make relies mainly on the quality of their work.

Such is no longer the case when, all privileges being abolished, ranks are intermingled, and men are forever rising or sinking upon the ladder of society. Amongst a democratic people a number of citizens always exist whose patrimony is divided and decreasing. They have contracted, under more prosperous circumstances, certain wants, which remain after the means of satisfying such wants are gone; and they are anxiously looking out for some surreptitious method of providing for them. On the other hand, there are always in democracies a large number of men whose fortune is upon the increase, but whose desires grow much faster than their fortunes: and who gloat upon the gifts of wealth in anticipation, long before they have means to command them. Such men eager to find some short cut to these gratifications, already almost within their reach. From the combination of these causes the result is, that in democracies there are always a multitude of individuals whose wants are above their means, and who are very willing to take up with imperfect satisfaction rather than abandon the object of their desires.

That's no longer the case when all privileges are gone, ranks are mixed, and people are constantly rising or falling on the social ladder. In a democratic society, there are always citizens whose inheritances are being divided and shrinking. They developed certain needs during better times, which remain even after they can no longer afford to meet those needs; and they’re desperately looking for some secret way to fulfill them. On the flip side, there’s always a large number of people in democracies whose wealth is growing, but whose desires are increasing even faster than their fortunes. They get excited about the perks of wealth long before they have the means to obtain them. These individuals are eager to find a shortcut to these pleasures that are almost within their grasp. As a result of these factors, there are always many people in democracies whose wants exceed their means and who are more than willing to settle for imperfect satisfaction rather than give up on what they desire.

The artisan readily understands these passions, for he himself partakes in them: in an aristocracy he would seek to sell his workmanship at a high price to the few; he now conceives that the more expeditious way of getting rich is to sell them at a low price to all. But there are only two ways of lowering the price of commodities. The first is to discover some better, shorter, and more ingenious method of producing them: the second is to manufacture a larger quantity of goods, nearly similar, but of less value. Amongst a democratic population, all the intellectual faculties of the workman are directed to these two objects: he strives to invent methods which may enable him not only to work better, but quicker and cheaper; or, if he cannot succeed in that, to diminish the intrinsic qualities of the thing he makes, without rendering it wholly unfit for the use for which it is intended. When none but the wealthy had watches, they were almost all very good ones: few are now made which are worth much, but everybody has one in his pocket. Thus the democratic principle not only tends to direct the human mind to the useful arts, but it induces the artisan to produce with greater rapidity a quantity of imperfect commodities, and the consumer to content himself with these commodities.

The artisan easily understands these passions because he experiences them himself: in an aristocracy, he would aim to sell his work at a high price to a few wealthy individuals; now, he realizes that a quicker way to get rich is to sell them at a lower price to everyone. However, there are only two ways to lower the price of goods. The first is to find a better, faster, and more clever way to produce them; the second is to make a larger quantity of similar goods that are of lower quality. In a democratic society, all the intellectual skills of the worker are focused on these two goals: he tries to come up with methods that allow him to work not only better but also faster and cheaper; or, if he can't achieve that, to reduce the essential qualities of the things he makes without making them completely unfit for their intended use. When only the wealthy owned watches, most of them were of high quality: now, not many are made that are worth much, but everyone has one in their pocket. Thus, the democratic principle not only directs human thought toward useful skills but also encourages the artisan to produce larger quantities of imperfect goods and the consumer to be satisfied with these goods.

Not that in democracies the arts are incapable of producing very commendable works, if such be required. This may occasionally be the case, if customers appear who are ready to pay for time and trouble. In this rivalry of every kind of industry—in the midst of this immense competition and these countless experiments, some excellent workmen are formed who reach the utmost limits of their craft. But they have rarely an opportunity of displaying what they can do; they are scrupulously sparing of their powers; they remain in a state of accomplished mediocrity, which condemns itself, and, though it be very well able to shoot beyond the mark before it, aims only at what it hits. In aristocracies, on the contrary, workmen always do all they can; and when they stop, it is because they have reached the limit of their attainments.

Not that in democracies the arts can't produce really commendable works if needed. This might happen now and then, especially if there are customers willing to pay for the time and effort. In this competition among all types of industries—amidst this massive competition and countless experiments—some excellent craftsmen emerge who reach the peak of their skills. But they rarely get the chance to show what they can do; they carefully hold back their abilities; they remain in a state of achieved mediocrity, which limits them, and although they could aim higher, they settle for what they can hit. In aristocracies, on the other hand, craftsmen always give their best; they only stop when they’ve hit the limits of their abilities.

When I arrive in a country where I find some of the finest productions of the arts, I learn from this fact nothing of the social condition or of the political constitution of the country. But if I perceive that the productions of the arts are generally of an inferior quality, very abundant and very cheap, I am convinced that, amongst the people where this occurs, privilege is on the decline, and that ranks are beginning to intermingle, and will soon be confounded together.

When I visit a country known for its great art productions, I don’t learn anything about its social conditions or political system from that alone. However, if I notice that the art is generally of low quality, very plentiful, and very cheap, I believe that in such a society, privilege is decreasing, and social classes are starting to mix, soon to blend together completely.

The handicraftsmen of democratic ages endeavor not only to bring their useful productions within the reach of the whole community, but they strive to give to all their commodities attractive qualities which they do not in reality possess. In the confusion of all ranks everyone hopes to appear what he is not, and makes great exertions to succeed in this object. This sentiment indeed, which is but too natural to the heart of man, does not originate in the democratic principle; but that principle applies it to material objects. To mimic virtue is of every age; but the hypocrisy of luxury belongs more particularly to the ages of democracy.

The craftspeople of democratic times try not only to make their useful products accessible to everyone, but they also work hard to give all their goods appealing qualities that they don’t actually have. In the mix of different social classes, everyone wants to seem like something they’re not, and people put in significant effort to achieve this. This feeling, which is quite natural for humans, doesn’t come from the idea of democracy itself; rather, that idea just extends it to physical things. While pretending to be virtuous has existed in all eras, the false appearance of luxury is especially prominent in democratic times.

To satisfy these new cravings of human vanity the arts have recourse to every species of imposture: and these devices sometimes go so far as to defeat their own purpose. Imitation diamonds are now made which may be easily mistaken for real ones; as soon as the art of fabricating false diamonds shall have reached so high a degree of perfection that they cannot be distinguished from real ones, it is probable that both one and the other will be abandoned, and become mere pebbles again.

To satisfy these new desires of human vanity, the arts resort to all kinds of deceit; and these tricks can sometimes undermine their own goals. Imitation diamonds are now made that can easily be confused with real ones; once the art of creating fake diamonds becomes so perfected that they can't be told apart from real ones, it's likely that both will be discarded and reduced to mere pebbles again.

This leads me to speak of those arts which are called the fine arts, by way of distinction. I do not believe that it is a necessary effect of a democratic social condition and of democratic institutions to diminish the number of men who cultivate the fine arts; but these causes exert a very powerful influence on the manner in which these arts are cultivated. Many of those who had already contracted a taste for the fine arts are impoverished: on the other hand, many of those who are not yet rich begin to conceive that taste, at least by imitation; and the number of consumers increases, but opulent and fastidious consumers become more scarce. Something analogous to what I have already pointed out in the useful arts then takes place in the fine arts; the productions of artists are more numerous, but the merit of each production is diminished. No longer able to soar to what is great, they cultivate what is pretty and elegant; and appearance is more attended to than reality. In aristocracies a few great pictures are produced; in democratic countries, a vast number of insignificant ones. In the former, statues are raised of bronze; in the latter, they are modelled in plaster.

This brings me to discuss the arts known as the fine arts, just to be clear. I don't think that a democratic society and democratic institutions necessarily reduce the number of people who pursue fine arts; however, these factors greatly impact how these arts are practiced. Many people who already developed a taste for fine arts are now struggling financially; on the flip side, many who aren't wealthy yet are starting to develop that taste, at least by imitation. The number of consumers is increasing, but wealthy and discerning consumers are becoming rarer. Similar to what I mentioned about useful arts, the fine arts see an increase in the quantity of works produced, but the quality of each piece declines. Unable to aim for greatness, artists focus on what is pretty and elegant; appearances take priority over reality. In aristocratic societies, a few great artworks are created; in democratic nations, a large number of trivial ones are made. In the former, statues are crafted from bronze; in the latter, they are formed from plaster.

When I arrived for the first time at New York, by that part of the Atlantic Ocean which is called the Narrows, I was surprised to perceive along the shore, at some distance from the city, a considerable number of little palaces of white marble, several of which were built after the models of ancient architecture. When I went the next day to inspect more closely the building which had particularly attracted my notice, I found that its walls were of whitewashed brick, and its columns of painted wood. All the edifices which I had admired the night before were of the same kind.

When I arrived in New York for the first time, at the section of the Atlantic Ocean known as the Narrows, I was surprised to see along the shore, a little ways from the city, a significant number of small white marble mansions, many of which were designed in the style of ancient architecture. The next day, when I went to take a closer look at the building that had caught my eye, I found that its walls were made of whitewashed brick and its columns were painted wood. All the buildings I had admired the night before were similar in style.

The social condition and the institutions of democracy impart, moreover, certain peculiar tendencies to all the imitative arts, which it is easy to point out. They frequently withdraw them from the delineation of the soul to fix them exclusively on that of the body: and they substitute the representation of motion and sensation for that of sentiment and thought: in a word, they put the real in the place of the ideal. I doubt whether Raphael studied the minutest intricacies of the mechanism of the human body as thoroughly as the draughtsmen of our own time. He did not attach the same importance to rigorous accuracy on this point as they do, because he aspired to surpass nature. He sought to make of man something which should be superior to man, and to embellish beauty's self. David and his scholars were, on the contrary, as good anatomists as they were good painters. They wonderfully depicted the models which they had before their eyes, but they rarely imagined anything beyond them: they followed nature with fidelity: whilst Raphael sought for something better than nature. They have left us an exact portraiture of man; but he discloses in his works a glimpse of the Divinity. This remark as to the manner of treating a subject is no less applicable to the choice of it. The painters of the Middle Ages generally sought far above themselves, and away from their own time, for mighty subjects, which left to their imagination an unbounded range. Our painters frequently employ their talents in the exact imitation of the details of private life, which they have always before their eyes; and they are forever copying trivial objects, the originals of which are only too abundant in nature.

The social environment and democratic institutions give certain unique tendencies to all the arts, which are easy to identify. They often shift the focus from portraying the soul to concentrating exclusively on the body: they replace the expression of emotion and thought with that of movement and sensation; in short, they prioritize the real over the ideal. I wonder if Raphael studied the intricate details of the human body's mechanics as thoroughly as today's artists do. He didn’t place the same emphasis on strict accuracy as they do, because he aimed to go beyond nature. He wanted to create something that was greater than man and enhance beauty itself. In contrast, David and his students were as skilled in anatomy as they were in painting. They beautifully portrayed the models in front of them, but they rarely envisioned anything beyond that: they faithfully followed nature, while Raphael sought something superior to nature. They provided us with an accurate depiction of humanity, but he revealed a glimpse of Divinity in his works. This observation about how a subject is treated also applies to the selection of subjects. Medieval painters often looked far above themselves and away from their own time for grand subjects, allowing their imaginations to roam freely. Today's painters often use their skills to precisely imitate the details of everyday life, which are always around them; they constantly replicate trivial objects whose originals are all too plentiful in nature.





Chapter XII: Why The Americans Raise Some Monuments So Insignificant, And Others So Important

I have just observed, that in democratic ages monuments of the arts tend to become more numerous and less important. I now hasten to point out the exception to this rule. In a democratic community individuals are very powerless; but the State which represents them all, and contains them all in its grasp, is very powerful. Nowhere do citizens appear so insignificant as in a democratic nation; nowhere does the nation itself appear greater, or does the mind more easily take in a wide general survey of it. In democratic communities the imagination is compressed when men consider themselves; it expands indefinitely when they think of the State. Hence it is that the same men who live on a small scale in narrow dwellings, frequently aspire to gigantic splendor in the erection of their public monuments.

I've just noticed that in democratic times, monuments of the arts tend to be more numerous but less significant. I want to highlight an exception to this trend. In a democratic society, individuals feel quite powerless, but the State, which represents and encompasses everyone, holds significant power. Nowhere do citizens seem as unremarkable as they do in a democratic nation; nowhere does the nation itself seem so vast, and it’s easier to grasp a broader view of it. In democratic societies, people's imaginations are limited when they think about themselves, but they expand immensely when considering the State. This is why the same individuals who live in small spaces often aspire to create grand public monuments.

The Americans traced out the circuit of an immense city on the site which they intended to make their capital, but which, up to the present time, is hardly more densely peopled than Pontoise, though, according to them, it will one day contain a million of inhabitants. They have already rooted up trees for ten miles round, lest they should interfere with the future citizens of this imaginary metropolis. They have erected a magnificent palace for Congress in the centre of the city, and have given it the pompous name of the Capitol. The several States of the Union are every day planning and erecting for themselves prodigious undertakings, which would astonish the engineers of the great European nations. Thus democracy not only leads men to a vast number of inconsiderable productions; it also leads them to raise some monuments on the largest scale: but between these two extremes there is a blank. A few scattered remains of enormous buildings can therefore teach us nothing of the social condition and the institutions of the people by whom they were raised. I may add, though the remark leads me to step out of my subject, that they do not make us better acquainted with its greatness, its civilization, and its real prosperity. Whensoever a power of any kind shall be able to make a whole people co-operate in a single undertaking, that power, with a little knowledge and a great deal of time, will succeed in obtaining something enormous from the co-operation of efforts so multiplied. But this does not lead to the conclusion that the people was very happy, very enlightened, or even very strong.

The Americans laid out the blueprint for a huge city where they planned to establish their capital, which, so far, is hardly more populated than Pontoise. They believe that one day it will house a million residents. They've already cleared trees for ten miles around to avoid interfering with the future residents of this imagined metropolis. In the center of the city, they built an impressive palace for Congress, grandly named the Capitol. Each State in the Union is every day planning and constructing ambitious projects that would amaze engineers from major European nations. Thus, democracy not only drives people to create a countless number of minor productions; it also inspires them to build some massive monuments. However, between these two extremes lies a void. A few scattered remnants of enormous structures don’t reveal anything about the social conditions and institutions of the people who built them. I should mention, although it takes me off-topic, that these remnants don’t help us understand its greatness, civilization, or true prosperity any better. Whenever any kind of power can make an entire population work together on a single project, that power, with some knowledge and a lot of time, can achieve something substantial from the combined efforts. But this doesn't mean that the people were particularly happy, enlightened, or even strong.

The Spaniards found the City of Mexico full of magnificent temples and vast palaces; but that did not prevent Cortes from conquering the Mexican Empire with 600 foot soldiers and sixteen horses. If the Romans had been better acquainted with the laws of hydraulics, they would not have constructed all the aqueducts which surround the ruins of their cities—they would have made a better use of their power and their wealth. If they had invented the steam-engine, perhaps they would not have extended to the extremities of their empire those long artificial roads which are called Roman roads. These things are at once the splendid memorials of their ignorance and of their greatness. A people which should leave no other vestige of its track than a few leaden pipes in the earth and a few iron rods upon its surface, might have been more the master of nature than the Romans.

The Spaniards discovered the City of Mexico filled with stunning temples and huge palaces; however, that didn’t stop Cortes from conquering the Mexican Empire with just 600 infantry soldiers and sixteen horses. If the Romans had understood the principles of hydraulics better, they wouldn't have built all the aqueducts that surround the ruins of their cities—they could have used their power and wealth more effectively. If they had created the steam engine, perhaps they wouldn't have built those long artificial roads known as Roman roads that stretched to the far edges of their empire. These achievements are both impressive reminders of their ignorance and their greatness. A society that left behind nothing more than a few lead pipes in the ground and a handful of iron rods on the surface might have been more in control of nature than the Romans.





Chapter XIII: Literary Characteristics Of Democratic Ages

When a traveller goes into a bookseller's shop in the United States, and examines the American books upon the shelves, the number of works appears extremely great; whilst that of known authors appears, on the contrary, to be extremely small. He will first meet with a number of elementary treatises, destined to teach the rudiments of human knowledge. Most of these books are written in Europe; the Americans reprint them, adapting them to their own country. Next comes an enormous quantity of religious works, Bibles, sermons, edifying anecdotes, controversial divinity, and reports of charitable societies; lastly, appears the long catalogue of political pamphlets. In America, parties do not write books to combat each others' opinions, but pamphlets which are circulated for a day with incredible rapidity, and then expire. In the midst of all these obscure productions of the human brain are to be found the more remarkable works of that small number of authors, whose names are, or ought to be, known to Europeans.

When a traveler enters a bookstore in the United States and looks over the American books on the shelves, the variety of titles seems enormous, while the number of well-known authors appears quite limited. First, he will come across a selection of basic texts aimed at teaching the fundamentals of knowledge. Most of these books are written in Europe; Americans reprint them and adapt them for their own country. Following that, there's a vast collection of religious works, including Bibles, sermons, uplifting stories, debates about theology, and reports from charitable organizations; and finally, there's a lengthy list of political pamphlets. In America, political parties don't write books to challenge each other's viewpoints; instead, they produce pamphlets that get circulated quickly for a day and then fade away. Amidst all these lesser-known works, you'll find the notable pieces by that small group of authors whose names are, or should be, recognized by Europeans.

Although America is perhaps in our days the civilized country in which literature is least attended to, a large number of persons are nevertheless to be found there who take an interest in the productions of the mind, and who make them, if not the study of their lives, at least the charm of their leisure hours. But England supplies these readers with the larger portion of the books which they require. Almost all important English books are republished in the United States. The literary genius of Great Britain still darts its rays into the recesses of the forests of the New World. There is hardly a pioneer's hut which does not contain a few odd volumes of Shakespeare. I remember that I read the feudal play of Henry V for the first time in a loghouse.

Although America may be the civilized country where literature is least valued these days, there are still many people who are interested in intellectual works and consider them, if not the focus of their lives, at least a joy during their free time. However, England provides these readers with the majority of the books they want. Almost every important English book is republished in the United States. The literary brilliance of Great Britain continues to shine into the depths of the forests of the New World. There’s hardly a pioneer’s cabin that doesn’t have a few random volumes of Shakespeare. I remember reading the historical play Henry V for the first time in a log cabin.

Not only do the Americans constantly draw upon the treasures of English literature, but it may be said with truth that they find the literature of England growing on their own soil. The larger part of that small number of men in the United States who are engaged in the composition of literary works are English in substance, and still more so in form. Thus they transport into the midst of democracy the ideas and literary fashions which are current amongst the aristocratic nation they have taken for their model. They paint with colors borrowed from foreign manners; and as they hardly ever represent the country they were born in as it really is, they are seldom popular there. The citizens of the United States are themselves so convinced that it is not for them that books are published, that before they can make up their minds upon the merit of one of their authors, they generally wait till his fame has been ratified in England, just as in pictures the author of an original is held to be entitled to judge of the merit of a copy. The inhabitants of the United States have then at present, properly speaking, no literature. The only authors whom I acknowledge as American are the journalists. They indeed are not great writers, but they speak the language of their countrymen, and make themselves heard by them. Other authors are aliens; they are to the Americans what the imitators of the Greeks and Romans were to us at the revival of learning—an object of curiosity, not of general sympathy. They amuse the mind, but they do not act upon the manners of the people.

Not only do Americans constantly draw from the treasures of English literature, but it's true that they find England's literature thriving on their own land. Most of the few people in the United States working on literary creations are English in content, and even more so in style. They bring into the heart of democracy the ideas and literary trends from the aristocratic nation they look up to. They use influences from foreign cultures; and since they rarely depict their own country as it truly is, they are often not well-received there. Americans themselves are convinced that books aren’t aimed at them, so before they judge the quality of one of their own authors, they usually wait for that author's reputation to be established in England, just like how the creator of an original work is deemed the judge of a copy's worth. Therefore, the people of the United States currently have no literature, strictly speaking. The only writers I consider American are the journalists. They may not be great authors, but they speak in the language of their fellow citizens and connect with them. Other authors are outsiders; to Americans, they are like the imitators of Greeks and Romans were to us during the Renaissance—objects of curiosity, not of widespread sympathy. They entertain, but they don't influence the people's customs.

I have already said that this state of things is very far from originating in democracy alone, and that the causes of it must be sought for in several peculiar circumstances independent of the democratic principle. If the Americans, retaining the same laws and social condition, had had a different origin, and had been transported into another country, I do not question that they would have had a literature. Even as they now are, I am convinced that they will ultimately have one; but its character will be different from that which marks the American literary productions of our time, and that character will be peculiarly its own. Nor is it impossible to trace this character beforehand.

I've already mentioned that this situation doesn't come solely from democracy, and the reasons for it can be found in several unique circumstances that are separate from the democratic principle. If the Americans had the same laws and social conditions but came from a different background and were placed in another country, I have no doubt they would have developed a literature. Even in their current state, I'm convinced they will eventually create one; however, its character will differ from the American literary works we see today, and that character will be distinctly its own. It's also possible to identify this character in advance.

I suppose an aristocratic people amongst whom letters are cultivated; the labors of the mind, as well as the affairs of state, are conducted by a ruling class in society. The literary as well as the political career is almost entirely confined to this class, or to those nearest to it in rank. These premises suffice to give me a key to all the rest. When a small number of the same men are engaged at the same time upon the same objects, they easily concert with one another, and agree upon certain leading rules which are to govern them each and all. If the object which attracts the attention of these men is literature, the productions of the mind will soon be subjected by them to precise canons, from which it will no longer be allowable to depart. If these men occupy a hereditary position in the country, they will be naturally inclined, not only to adopt a certain number of fixed rules for themselves, but to follow those which their forefathers laid down for their own guidance; their code will be at once strict and traditional. As they are not necessarily engrossed by the cares of daily life—as they have never been so, any more than their fathers were before them—they have learned to take an interest, for several generations back, in the labors of the mind. They have learned to understand literature as an art, to love it in the end for its own sake, and to feel a scholar-like satisfaction in seeing men conform to its rules. Nor is this all: the men of whom I speak began and will end their lives in easy or in affluent circumstances; hence they have naturally conceived a taste for choice gratifications, and a love of refined and delicate pleasures. Nay more, a kind of indolence of mind and heart, which they frequently contract in the midst of this long and peaceful enjoyment of so much welfare, leads them to put aside, even from their pleasures, whatever might be too startling or too acute. They had rather be amused than intensely excited; they wish to be interested, but not to be carried away.

I suppose there’s an upper-class society where education is valued; the intellectual work and state affairs are led by a ruling class. Both literary and political careers are mainly limited to this group, or those closely related in status. This idea provides me with a clear understanding of everything else. When a few of the same people focus their efforts on the same goals, they easily collaborate and agree on key principles to guide them all. If their focus is on literature, they will quickly establish strict standards for their creations that they won’t deviate from. If these individuals hold hereditary positions in the country, they are likely to adopt certain established rules for themselves, as well as follow the traditions set by their ancestors; their guidelines will be both strict and traditional. Since they aren't preoccupied with the struggles of everyday life—having never been so, just like their forefathers—they have developed an interest in intellectual pursuits for generations. They’ve come to appreciate literature as an art, ultimately loving it for its own sake, and take satisfaction in seeing others adhere to its principles. Additionally, these individuals have lived their lives in comfort or wealth; this naturally leads them to develop a taste for sophisticated pleasures and a love for finer indulgences. Moreover, an indulgent mindset, which often arises during prolonged periods of comfort and well-being, makes them prefer to avoid experiences that are too jarring or intense. They would rather be entertained than overwhelmed; they want to be engaged, but not swept away.

Now let us fancy a great number of literary performances executed by the men, or for the men, whom I have just described, and we shall readily conceive a style of literature in which everything will be regular and prearranged. The slightest work will be carefully touched in its least details; art and labor will be conspicuous in everything; each kind of writing will have rules of its own, from which it will not be allowed to swerve, and which distinguish it from all others. Style will be thought of almost as much importance as thought; and the form will be no less considered than the matter: the diction will be polished, measured, and uniform. The tone of the mind will be always dignified, seldom very animated; and writers will care more to perfect what they produce than to multiply their productions. It will sometimes happen that the members of the literary class, always living amongst themselves and writing for themselves alone, will lose sight of the rest of the world, which will infect them with a false and labored style; they will lay down minute literary rules for their exclusive use, which will insensibly lead them to deviate from common-sense, and finally to transgress the bounds of nature. By dint of striving after a mode of parlance different from the vulgar, they will arrive at a sort of aristocratic jargon, which is hardly less remote from pure language than is the coarse dialect of the people. Such are the natural perils of literature amongst aristocracies. Every aristocracy which keeps itself entirely aloof from the people becomes impotent—a fact which is as true in literature as it is in politics. *a

Now let's imagine a large number of literary works created by the men, or for the men, that I've just described, and we can easily picture a style of literature that's completely organized and planned out. Even the smallest pieces will be carefully crafted in every detail; art and effort will be evident in all things; each type of writing will have its own rules, and deviation from these rules won’t be permitted, distinguishing it from all others. Style will be seen as just as important as ideas; the form will be valued just as much as the content: the language will be refined, measured, and consistent. The mindset will always be dignified, rarely very lively; and writers will prioritize perfecting what they create over producing a lot of work. Sometimes, the members of the literary community, who only interact with each other and write for themselves, will lose sight of the outside world, which will lead them to adopt an affected and forced style; they will establish intricate literary rules meant just for them, which will gradually cause them to stray from common sense, eventually violating the natural order. In their pursuit of a way of speaking that’s different from everyday language, they will develop a kind of elitist lingo that is nearly as far removed from genuine language as the rough speech of the common people. These are the natural dangers of literature in aristocracies. Any aristocracy that completely isolates itself from the public becomes ineffective—a reality that applies to literature as much as it does to politics.

a
[ All this is especially true of the aristocratic countries which have been long and peacefully subject to a monarchical government. When liberty prevails in an aristocracy, the higher ranks are constantly obliged to make use of the lower classes; and when they use, they approach them. This frequently introduces something of a democratic spirit into an aristocratic community. There springs up, moreover, in a privileged body, governing with energy and an habitually bold policy, a taste for stir and excitement which must infallibly affect all literary performances.]

a
[ All this is especially true of aristocratic countries that have long been peacefully governed by a monarchy. When liberty exists in an aristocracy, the upper classes are regularly required to engage with the lower classes; and as they do, they come closer to them. This often brings a sense of democratic spirit into an aristocratic society. Additionally, within a privileged group that governs with energy and a consistently bold approach, there develops a desire for activity and excitement that will inevitably influence all literary works.]

Let us now turn the picture and consider the other side of it; let us transport ourselves into the midst of a democracy, not unprepared by ancient traditions and present culture to partake in the pleasures of the mind. Ranks are there intermingled and confounded; knowledge and power are both infinitely subdivided, and, if I may use the expression, scattered on every side. Here then is a motley multitude, whose intellectual wants are to be supplied. These new votaries of the pleasures of the mind have not all received the same education; they do not possess the same degree of culture as their fathers, nor any resemblance to them—nay, they perpetually differ from themselves, for they live in a state of incessant change of place, feelings, and fortunes. The mind of each member of the community is therefore unattached to that of his fellow-citizens by tradition or by common habits; and they have never had the power, the inclination, nor the time to concert together. It is, however, from the bosom of this heterogeneous and agitated mass that authors spring; and from the same source their profits and their fame are distributed. I can without difficulty understand that, under these circumstances, I must expect to meet in the literature of such a people with but few of those strict conventional rules which are admitted by readers and by writers in aristocratic ages. If it should happen that the men of some one period were agreed upon any such rules, that would prove nothing for the following period; for amongst democratic nations each new generation is a new people. Amongst such nations, then, literature will not easily be subjected to strict rules, and it is impossible that any such rules should ever be permanent.

Let’s now shift the perspective and examine the other side; let’s immerse ourselves in a democracy, shaped by ancient traditions and current culture, ready to enjoy intellectual pursuits. People from different backgrounds are mixed together; knowledge and power are both widely spread and, if I may say, scattered all around. Here is a diverse crowd with various intellectual needs. These new seekers of knowledge haven't all had the same education; they don’t share the same cultural background as their parents, nor do they resemble them—indeed, they are constantly changing due to shifts in environment, emotions, and circumstances. As a result, each person’s mind is not linked to that of their fellow citizens through tradition or common habits; they have never had the opportunity, motivation, or time to come together. However, it is from this diverse and restless group that authors emerge, and it is from the same source that their success and recognition are derived. I can easily see that, given these conditions, the literature of such a society will feature few of the rigid conventions that readers and writers adhere to in more aristocratic times. If a particular group of men in one era agrees on certain rules, that won't hold true for the next; among democratic societies, each new generation is essentially a new crowd. Therefore, in such nations, literature won’t easily conform to strict guidelines, and it’s unlikely that any such guidelines will ever remain consistent.

In democracies it is by no means the case that all the men who cultivate literature have received a literary education; and most of those who have some tinge of belles-lettres are either engaged in politics, or in a profession which only allows them to taste occasionally and by stealth the pleasures of the mind. These pleasures, therefore, do not constitute the principal charm of their lives; but they are considered as a transient and necessary recreation amidst the serious labors of life. Such man can never acquire a sufficiently intimate knowledge of the art of literature to appreciate its more delicate beauties; and the minor shades of expression must escape them. As the time they can devote to letters is very short, they seek to make the best use of the whole of it. They prefer books which may be easily procured, quickly read, and which require no learned researches to be understood. They ask for beauties, self-proffered and easily enjoyed; above all, they must have what is unexpected and new. Accustomed to the struggle, the crosses, and the monotony of practical life, they require rapid emotions, startling passages—truths or errors brilliant enough to rouse them up, and to plunge them at once, as if by violence, into the midst of a subject.

In democracies, not all the people who engage with literature have a formal literary education. Most of those with a bit of literary flair are either involved in politics or in professions that only allow them to indulge in intellectual pleasures occasionally and secretly. For them, these pleasures aren't the main appeal of their lives; instead, they're seen as a brief and necessary escape from their serious work. Such individuals can never develop a deep understanding of literary art to appreciate its subtle beauties, and they'll likely miss the finer nuances of expression. Since the time they can spend on reading is limited, they try to make the most of it. They prefer books that are easy to find, quick to read, and don’t require extensive study to understand. They want beauty that is self-evident and easy to enjoy; above all, they seek what is surprising and new. Used to the struggles, challenges, and monotony of everyday life, they crave quick emotions and striking moments—truths or mistakes that are exciting enough to capture their attention and throw them headfirst into a topic.

Why should I say more? or who does not understand what is about to follow, before I have expressed it? Taken as a whole, literature in democratic ages can never present, as it does in the periods of aristocracy, an aspect of order, regularity, science, and art; its form will, on the contrary, ordinarily be slighted, sometimes despised. Style will frequently be fantastic, incorrect, overburdened, and loose—almost always vehement and bold. Authors will aim at rapidity of execution, more than at perfection of detail. Small productions will be more common than bulky books; there will be more wit than erudition, more imagination than profundity; and literary performances will bear marks of an untutored and rude vigor of thought—frequently of great variety and singular fecundity. The object of authors will be to astonish rather than to please, and to stir the passions more than to charm the taste. Here and there, indeed, writers will doubtless occur who will choose a different track, and who will, if they are gifted with superior abilities, succeed in finding readers, in spite of their defects or their better qualities; but these exceptions will be rare, and even the authors who shall so depart from the received practice in the main subject of their works, will always relapse into it in some lesser details.

Why should I say more? Who doesn’t understand what’s about to follow before I say it? Overall, literature in democratic times can never show the same order, regularity, science, and art that it does in aristocratic periods; instead, its form is often overlooked or even scorned. The style is often going to be quirky, incorrect, overcomplicated, and loose—almost always passionate and daring. Authors will focus more on speed than on perfecting the details. Short works will be more common than long books; there will be more cleverness than knowledge, more imagination than depth; and literary pieces will show signs of an unrefined and raw energy of thought—often with great variety and unique creativity. Authors will aim to shock rather than to please and to ignite emotions more than to delight the palate. Occasionally, there will certainly be writers who take a different approach and, if they have exceptional talent, may find readers despite their flaws or their superior qualities; however, these exceptions will be rare, and even those authors who stray from the common practice in their main themes will still fall back into it in some minor details.

I have just depicted two extreme conditions: the transition by which a nation passes from the former to the latter is not sudden but gradual, and marked with shades of very various intensity. In the passage which conducts a lettered people from the one to the other, there is almost always a moment at which the literary genius of democratic nations has its confluence with that of aristocracies, and both seek to establish their joint sway over the human mind. Such epochs are transient, but very brilliant: they are fertile without exuberance, and animated without confusion. The French literature of the eighteenth century may serve as an example.

I just described two extreme situations: the shift that a nation goes through from the former to the latter isn’t sudden but gradual, and comes with varying degrees of intensity. In the transition that takes an educated society from one state to another, there’s usually a moment when the literary genius of democratic nations blends with that of aristocracies, and both aim to exert their influence over people's minds. These periods are fleeting but incredibly vibrant: they are productive without excess and lively without chaos. Eighteenth-century French literature is a good example of this.

I should say more than I mean if I were to assert that the literature of a nation is always subordinate to its social condition and its political constitution. I am aware that, independently of these causes, there are several others which confer certain characteristics on literary productions; but these appear to me to be the chief. The relations which exist between the social and political condition of a people and the genius of its authors are always very numerous: whoever knows the one is never completely ignorant of the other.

I should state more than I really mean if I claim that a nation's literature is always influenced by its social situation and political structure. I recognize that, aside from these factors, there are several others that give specific traits to literary works; but I believe these are the main ones. The connections between the social and political conditions of a society and the creativity of its writers are always quite significant: anyone who understands one is never completely unaware of the other.





Chapter XIV: The Trade Of Literature

Democracy not only infuses a taste for letters among the trading classes, but introduces a trading spirit into literature. In aristocracies, readers are fastidious and few in number; in democracies, they are far more numerous and far less difficult to please. The consequence is, that among aristocratic nations, no one can hope to succeed without immense exertions, and that these exertions may bestow a great deal of fame, but can never earn much money; whilst among democratic nations, a writer may flatter himself that he will obtain at a cheap rate a meagre reputation and a large fortune. For this purpose he need not be admired; it is enough that he is liked. The ever-increasing crowd of readers, and their continual craving for something new, insure the sale of books which nobody much esteems.

Democracy not only creates an appreciation for literature among the trading classes, but it also brings a commercial attitude into literature. In aristocracies, readers are picky and few; in democracies, they are much more numerous and easier to please. The result is that in aristocratic nations, no one can expect to succeed without immense effort, which may bring a lot of fame but rarely generates much money; while in democratic nations, a writer might comfort themselves with the belief that they can achieve a modest reputation and a significant fortune at a low cost. For this, they don’t need to be admired; it’s enough that they are liked. The ever-growing audience of readers and their constant desire for something new guarantee the sales of books that aren’t highly regarded.

In democratic periods the public frequently treat authors as kings do their courtiers; they enrich, and they despise them. What more is needed by the venal souls which are born in courts, or which are worthy to live there? Democratic literature is always infested with a tribe of writers who look upon letters as a mere trade: and for some few great authors who adorn it you may reckon thousands of idea-mongers.

In democratic times, the public often treats writers like kings treat their courtiers; they both elevate and belittle them. What more do the opportunistic individuals born in courts, or those deserving to live there, need? Democratic literature is always plagued by a group of writers who see writing as just a business: and for every few great authors who shine in it, there are thousands of idea peddlers.





Chapter XV: The Study Of Greek And Latin Literature Peculiarly Useful In Democratic Communities

What was called the People in the most democratic republics of antiquity, was very unlike what we designate by that term. In Athens, all the citizens took part in public affairs; but there were only 20,000 citizens to more than 350,000 inhabitants. All the rest were slaves, and discharged the greater part of those duties which belong at the present day to the lower or even to the middle classes. Athens, then, with her universal suffrage, was after all merely an aristocratic republic in which all the nobles had an equal right to the government. The struggle between the patricians and plebeians of Rome must be considered in the same light: it was simply an intestine feud between the elder and younger branches of the same family. All the citizens belonged, in fact, to the aristocracy, and partook of its character.

What was referred to as the People in the most democratic republics of ancient times was very different from what we mean by that term today. In Athens, all citizens were involved in public affairs; however, there were only 20,000 citizens out of more than 350,000 residents. The rest were slaves and carried out many of the roles that today would be assigned to the lower or even middle classes. So, Athens, despite its universal suffrage, was really just an aristocratic republic where all the nobles had equal rights to govern. The conflict between the patricians and plebeians in Rome should be viewed similarly: it was essentially an internal struggle between the older and younger branches of the same family. In reality, all citizens were part of the aristocracy and shared its characteristics.

It is moreover to be remarked, that amongst the ancients books were always scarce and dear; and that very great difficulties impeded their publication and circulation. These circumstances concentrated literary tastes and habits amongst a small number of men, who formed a small literary aristocracy out of the choicer spirits of the great political aristocracy. Accordingly nothing goes to prove that literature was ever treated as a trade amongst the Greeks and Romans.

It’s also important to note that in ancient times, books were always scarce and expensive, and there were significant challenges that made it hard for them to be published and distributed. These conditions limited literary interests and practices to a small group of people, who created a kind of literary elite from the more refined members of the political elite. As a result, there’s no evidence that literature was ever regarded as a business among the Greeks and Romans.

These peoples, which not only constituted aristocracies, but very polished and free nations, of course imparted to their literary productions the defects and the merits which characterize the literature of aristocratic ages. And indeed a very superficial survey of the literary remains of the ancients will suffice to convince us, that if those writers were sometimes deficient in variety, or fertility in their subjects, or in boldness, vivacity, or power of generalization in their thoughts, they always displayed exquisite care and skill in their details. Nothing in their works seems to be done hastily or at random: every line is written for the eye of the connoisseur, and is shaped after some conception of ideal beauty. No literature places those fine qualities, in which the writers of democracies are naturally deficient, in bolder relief than that of the ancients; no literature, therefore, ought to be more studied in democratic ages. This study is better suited than any other to combat the literary defects inherent in those ages; as for their more praiseworthy literary qualities, they will spring up of their own accord, without its being necessary to learn to acquire them.

These people, who were not just aristocrats but also highly cultured and free nations, naturally infused their literary works with the strengths and weaknesses typical of aristocratic literature. A quick look at the literary output of the ancients is enough to show us that while those writers sometimes lacked variety, originality in their topics, or boldness, energy, or ability to generalize their ideas, they always exhibited exceptional attention and skill in their details. Nothing in their works appears to be hastily or randomly thrown together; every line is crafted for the discerning reader and is shaped according to some vision of ideal beauty. No literature highlights those fine qualities that writers from democracies often lack as vividly as that of the ancients; therefore, no literature deserves more attention in democratic times. This study is better suited than any other to address the literary shortcomings that come with those times; as for their more commendable literary traits, they will naturally emerge without needing to be deliberately cultivated.

It is important that this point should be clearly understood. A particular study may be useful to the literature of a people, without being appropriate to its social and political wants. If men were to persist in teaching nothing but the literature of the dead languages in a community where everyone is habitually led to make vehement exertions to augment or to maintain his fortune, the result would be a very polished, but a very dangerous, race of citizens. For as their social and political condition would give them every day a sense of wants which their education would never teach them to supply, they would perturb the State, in the name of the Greeks and Romans, instead of enriching it by their productive industry.

It's crucial to understand this point clearly. A specific study might contribute to a culture's literature without addressing its social and political needs. If people continue to teach only the literature of dead languages in a society where everyone is driven to work hard to increase or maintain their wealth, the outcome would be a highly refined but potentially dangerous group of citizens. Their social and political environment would create daily desires that their education wouldn't prepare them to meet, leading them to disrupt the State in the name of the Greeks and Romans rather than enhancing it through productive work.

It is evident that in democratic communities the interest of individuals, as well as the security of the commonwealth, demands that the education of the greater number should be scientific, commercial, and industrial, rather than literary. Greek and Latin should not be taught in all schools; but it is important that those who by their natural disposition or their fortune are destined to cultivate letters or prepared to relish them, should find schools where a complete knowledge of ancient literature may be acquired, and where the true scholar may be formed. A few excellent universities would do more towards the attainment of this object than a vast number of bad grammar schools, where superfluous matters, badly learned, stand in the way of sound instruction in necessary studies.

In democratic societies, the interests of individuals and the safety of the community require that the education of the majority focuses on science, business, and industry rather than just literature. Greek and Latin shouldn’t be part of every school’s curriculum; however, it’s essential that those who are naturally inclined or fortunate enough to appreciate literature have access to schools where they can gain a solid understanding of ancient literature and develop into true scholars. A few great universities would be much more effective for this purpose than a large number of poor grammar schools, where unnecessary subjects, poorly taught, hinder proper instruction in essential studies.

All who aspire to literary excellence in democratic nations, ought frequently to refresh themselves at the springs of ancient literature: there is no more wholesome course for the mind. Not that I hold the literary productions of the ancients to be irreproachable; but I think that they have some especial merits, admirably calculated to counterbalance our peculiar defects. They are a prop on the side on which we are in most danger of falling.

Anyone who aims for literary greatness in democratic societies should regularly draw inspiration from ancient literature; it's the best way to nourish the mind. I don’t believe that the works of the ancients are flawless; however, they possess unique strengths that can effectively offset our specific weaknesses. They provide support on the side where we are most likely to stumble.





Chapter XVI: The Effect Of Democracy On Language

If the reader has rightly understood what I have already said on the subject of literature in general, he will have no difficulty in comprehending that species of influence which a democratic social condition and democratic institutions may exercise over language itself, which is the chief instrument of thought.

If the reader has correctly understood what I've said about literature in general, they should have no trouble grasping the kind of influence that a democratic society and democratic institutions can have on language itself, which is the main tool of thought.

American authors may truly be said to live more in England than in their own country; since they constantly study the English writers, and take them every day for their models. But such is not the case with the bulk of the population, which is more immediately subjected to the peculiar causes acting upon the United States. It is not then to the written, but to the spoken language that attention must be paid, if we would detect the modifications which the idiom of an aristocratic people may undergo when it becomes the language of a democracy.

American authors might as well be living in England instead of their own country because they constantly study English writers and use them as their daily models. However, this isn't true for most of the population, which is more directly impacted by the unique factors affecting the United States. Therefore, we should focus on the spoken language, not the written one, if we want to notice the changes that the language of an aristocratic society can go through when it becomes the language of a democracy.

Englishmen of education, and more competent judges than I can be myself of the nicer shades of expression, have frequently assured me that the language of the educated classes in the United States is notably different from that of the educated classes in Great Britain. They complain not only that the Americans have brought into use a number of new words—the difference and the distance between the two countries might suffice to explain that much—but that these new words are more especially taken from the jargon of parties, the mechanical arts, or the language of trade. They assert, in addition to this, that old English words are often used by the Americans in new acceptations; and lastly, that the inhabitants of the United States frequently intermingle their phraseology in the strangest manner, and sometimes place words together which are always kept apart in the language of the mother-country. These remarks, which were made to me at various times by persons who appeared to be worthy of credit, led me to reflect upon the subject; and my reflections brought me, by theoretical reasoning, to the same point at which my informants had arrived by practical observation.

Educated English speakers, who are better judges than I am of the subtle differences in expression, have often told me that the language of the educated classes in the United States is noticeably different from that of the educated classes in Great Britain. They complain not only that Americans have introduced a number of new words—the difference and distance between the two countries might explain that much—but that these new words are particularly drawn from political slang, technical fields, or business language. They also claim that old English words are often used by Americans in new ways, and finally, that people in the United States often mix their phrases in the oddest ways and sometimes put words together that are always kept separate in the language of the mother country. These comments, made to me at different times by people who seemed credible, prompted me to think about the topic; my reflections led me, through theoretical reasoning, to the same conclusion my informants reached through practical observation.

In aristocracies, language must naturally partake of that state of repose in which everything remains. Few new words are coined, because few new things are made; and even if new things were made, they would be designated by known words, whose meaning has been determined by tradition. If it happens that the human mind bestirs itself at length, or is roused by light breaking in from without, the novel expressions which are introduced are characterized by a degree of learning, intelligence, and philosophy, which shows that they do not originate in a democracy. After the fall of Constantinople had turned the tide of science and literature towards the west, the French language was almost immediately invaded by a multitude of new words, which had all Greek or Latin roots. An erudite neologism then sprang up in France which was confined to the educated classes, and which produced no sensible effect, or at least a very gradual one, upon the people. All the nations of Europe successively exhibited the same change. Milton alone introduced more than six hundred words into the English language, almost all derived from the Latin, the Greek, or the Hebrew. The constant agitation which prevails in a democratic community tends unceasingly, on the contrary, to change the character of the language, as it does the aspect of affairs. In the midst of this general stir and competition of minds, a great number of new ideas are formed, old ideas are lost, or reappear, or are subdivided into an infinite variety of minor shades. The consequence is, that many words must fall into desuetude, and others must be brought into use.

In aristocracies, language naturally reflects a state of stillness where everything remains static. Few new words are created because there aren’t many new things being invented; and even if new things are developed, they’re usually named using familiar words whose meanings have been shaped by tradition. If the human mind eventually stirs or is inspired by fresh ideas from the outside, the new terms that emerge often show a level of sophistication, intelligence, and thoughtfulness that indicates they don’t come from a democratic context. After the fall of Constantinople shifted the focus of science and literature toward the West, the French language quickly became infused with a slew of new words all derived from Greek or Latin. This led to an educated neologism in France, which was primarily embraced by the educated elite and had little immediate impact on the general public, or at least a very gradual one. Other European nations followed suit with similar changes. Milton alone added over six hundred words to the English language, most of which came from Latin, Greek, or Hebrew. The ongoing energy in a democratic society, on the other hand, consistently pushes for changes in language just as it does in various aspects of life. Amid this general activity and mental rivalry, many new ideas are created, old ones fade away, reemerge, or get divided into countless subtle variations. As a result, many words fall out of use, while others become popular.

Democratic nations love change for its own sake; and this is seen in their language as much as in their politics. Even when they do not need to change words, they sometimes feel a wish to transform them. The genius of a democratic people is not only shown by the great number of words they bring into use, but also by the nature of the ideas these new words represent. Amongst such a people the majority lays down the law in language as well as in everything else; its prevailing spirit is as manifest in that as in other respects. But the majority is more engaged in business than in study—in political and commercial interests than in philosophical speculation or literary pursuits. Most of the words coined or adopted for its use will therefore bear the mark of these habits; they will mainly serve to express the wants of business, the passions of party, or the details of the public administration. In these departments the language will constantly spread, whilst on the other hand it will gradually lose ground in metaphysics and theology.

Democratic nations embrace change just for the sake of change, and this is reflected in their language as much as in their politics. Even when they don’t need to change words, they often feel the urge to transform them. The brilliance of a democratic society is not only shown by the vast number of words they use but also by the nature of the ideas these new words represent. Within such a society, the majority sets the rules for language as well as everything else; their dominant attitude is evident in that as in other areas. However, the majority is more focused on practical matters than on academic pursuits—in political and commercial interests rather than philosophical thought or literary interests. Most of the words that are created or adopted for their use will reflect these tendencies; they will primarily express business needs, partisan passions, or details of public administration. In these areas, the language will continuously evolve, while on the flip side, it will gradually lose influence in metaphysics and theology.

As to the source from which democratic nations are wont to derive their new expressions, and the manner in which they go to work to coin them, both may easily be described. Men living in democratic countries know but little of the language which was spoken at Athens and at Rome, and they do not care to dive into the lore of antiquity to find the expression they happen to want. If they have sometimes recourse to learned etymologies, vanity will induce them to search at the roots of the dead languages; but erudition does not naturally furnish them with its resources. The most ignorant, it sometimes happens, will use them most. The eminently democratic desire to get above their own sphere will often lead them to seek to dignify a vulgar profession by a Greek or Latin name. The lower the calling is, and the more remote from learning, the more pompous and erudite is its appellation. Thus the French rope-dancers have transformed themselves into acrobates and funambules.

Regarding the source from which democratic nations tend to derive their new phrases, and the way they go about creating them, both can be easily explained. People living in democratic countries know very little about the language that was spoken in Athens and Rome, and they aren't interested in delving into ancient knowledge to find the expression they need. Occasionally, they may turn to scholarly etymologies, driven by vanity to trace back to the roots of dead languages, but knowledge doesn’t naturally provide them with its resources. Interestingly, the least educated individuals sometimes use them the most. The strong democratic urge to rise above their own social status often leads them to elevate a common profession by giving it a Greek or Latin name. The lower the profession and the further it is from academia, the more grand and scholarly its title becomes. Thus, French rope-dancers have transformed themselves into acrobats and funambules.

In the absence of knowledge of the dead languages, democratic nations are apt to borrow words from living tongues; for their mutual intercourse becomes perpetual, and the inhabitants of different countries imitate each other the more readily as they grow more like each other every day.

Without knowledge of dead languages, democratic nations tend to borrow words from living ones; their interactions become constant, and people from different countries easily imitate each other as they become more similar every day.

But it is principally upon their own languages that democratic nations attempt to perpetrate innovations. From time to time they resume forgotten expressions in their vocabulary, which they restore to use; or they borrow from some particular class of the community a term peculiar to it, which they introduce with a figurative meaning into the language of daily life. Many expressions which originally belonged to the technical language of a profession or a party, are thus drawn into general circulation.

But democratic nations mainly try to make changes through their own languages. Occasionally, they bring back old words from their vocabulary and start using them again; or they take a term unique to a certain group in society and introduce it into everyday language with a new meaning. Many phrases that originally came from the specific language of a profession or a political group end up becoming commonly used.

The most common expedient employed by democratic nations to make an innovation in language consists in giving some unwonted meaning to an expression already in use. This method is very simple, prompt, and convenient; no learning is required to use it aright, and ignorance itself rather facilitates the practice; but that practice is most dangerous to the language. When a democratic people doubles the meaning of a word in this way, they sometimes render the signification which it retains as ambiguous as that which it acquires. An author begins by a slight deflection of a known expression from its primitive meaning, and he adapts it, thus modified, as well as he can to his subject. A second writer twists the sense of the expression in another way; a third takes possession of it for another purpose; and as there is no common appeal to the sentence of a permanent tribunal which may definitely settle the signification of the word, it remains in an ambiguous condition. The consequence is that writers hardly ever appear to dwell upon a single thought, but they always seem to point their aim at a knot of ideas, leaving the reader to judge which of them has been hit. This is a deplorable consequence of democracy. I had rather that the language should be made hideous with words imported from the Chinese, the Tartars, or the Hurons, than that the meaning of a word in our own language should become indeterminate. Harmony and uniformity are only secondary beauties in composition; many of these things are conventional, and, strictly speaking, it is possible to forego them; but without clear phraseology there is no good language.

The most common way democratic societies make changes to language is by giving new meanings to existing words. This method is straightforward, quick, and convenient; no special knowledge is needed to use it correctly, and ignorance actually makes this practice easier. However, it poses a significant risk to the language. When a democratic society expands the meaning of a word, they often make its original meaning just as unclear as the new one. An author might start by slightly altering the usual definition of a familiar term to fit their topic. Then, another writer bends the word's meaning in a different direction; a third writer uses it for yet another purpose. Since there's no definitive authority to determine the word's meaning, it stays ambiguous. As a result, writers rarely seem focused on a single idea but instead give the impression of addressing a cluster of concepts, leaving readers to figure out which one they're actually targeting. This is an unfortunate outcome of democracy. I would prefer that our language incorporate words from Chinese, Tartarians, or Hurons than have a word in our own language become unclear. Consistency and elegance are only secondary qualities in writing; many aspects are conventional and can technically be overlooked, but without precise language, good writing is impossible.

The principle of equality necessarily introduces several other changes into language. In aristocratic ages, when each nation tends to stand aloof from all others and likes to have distinct characteristics of its own, it often happens that several peoples which have a common origin become nevertheless estranged from each other, so that, without ceasing to understand the same language, they no longer all speak it in the same manner. In these ages each nation is divided into a certain number of classes, which see but little of each other, and do not intermingle. Each of these classes contracts, and invariably retains, habits of mind peculiar to itself, and adopts by choice certain words and certain terms, which afterwards pass from generation to generation, like their estates. The same idiom then comprises a language of the poor and a language of the rich—a language of the citizen and a language of the nobility—a learned language and a vulgar one. The deeper the divisions, and the more impassable the barriers of society become, the more must this be the case. I would lay a wager, that amongst the castes of India there are amazing variations of language, and that there is almost as much difference between the language of the pariah and that of the Brahmin as there is in their dress. When, on the contrary, men, being no longer restrained by ranks, meet on terms of constant intercourse—when castes are destroyed, and the classes of society are recruited and intermixed with each other, all the words of a language are mingled. Those which are unsuitable to the greater number perish; the remainder form a common store, whence everyone chooses pretty nearly at random. Almost all the different dialects which divided the idioms of European nations are manifestly declining; there is no patois in the New World, and it is disappearing every day from the old countries.

The principle of equality brings several changes to language. In aristocratic times, when each nation tends to isolate itself and likes to have its own distinct traits, it often happens that different peoples, despite sharing a common origin, become estranged from one another. They may still understand the same language, but they don’t all speak it the same way anymore. In those times, each nation is divided into several classes that rarely interact and don’t mix. Each class develops its own unique mindset and adopts specific words and terms that get passed down through generations, much like their possessions. Thus, a single language can represent the speech of the poor and the rich, the citizens and the nobility, the educated and the uneducated. The deeper the social divisions become, the more pronounced this difference is. I would bet that among the castes in India, there are significant language variations, with almost as much difference between the language of the pariah and that of the Brahmin as there is in their clothing. Conversely, when people no longer have social ranks restraining them and interact frequently—when castes are eliminated and social classes mix—language becomes blended. Words that don't resonate with the majority fade away, and the remaining words create a common vocabulary from which nearly everyone picks at random. Most of the distinct dialects that once separated the languages of European nations are obviously declining; there are no dialects in the New World, and they are fading away every day in the old countries.

The influence of this revolution in social conditions is as much felt in style as it is in phraseology. Not only does everyone use the same words, but a habit springs up of using them without discrimination. The rules which style had set up are almost abolished: the line ceases to be drawn between expressions which seem by their very nature vulgar, and other which appear to be refined. Persons springing from different ranks of society carry the terms and expressions they are accustomed to use with them, into whatever circumstances they may pass; thus the origin of words is lost like the origin of individuals, and there is as much confusion in language as there is in society.

The impact of this social revolution is felt just as much in style as in language. Not only does everyone use the same words, but there’s also a trend of using them indiscriminately. The rules that used to define style are nearly gone: the distinction between words that seem inherently vulgar and those that appear refined has faded. People from different social backgrounds bring their usual terms and expressions into any situation they encounter; as a result, the origins of words become as unclear as the origins of individuals, leading to as much confusion in language as there is in society.

I am aware that in the classification of words there are rules which do not belong to one form of society any more than to another, but which are derived from the nature of things. Some expressions and phrases are vulgar, because the ideas they are meant to express are low in themselves; others are of a higher character, because the objects they are intended to designate are naturally elevated. No intermixture of ranks will ever efface these differences. But the principle of equality cannot fail to root out whatever is merely conventional and arbitrary in the forms of thought. Perhaps the necessary classification which I pointed out in the last sentence will always be less respected by a democratic people than by any other, because amongst such a people there are no men who are permanently disposed by education, culture, and leisure to study the natural laws of language, and who cause those laws to be respected by their own observance of them.

I know that when we classify words, there are rules that apply to all societies, not just one, and these rules come from the nature of things. Some words and phrases are considered vulgar because the ideas they express are inherently low; others have a more elevated character because the things they refer to are naturally better. No mixing of social classes will ever change these differences. However, the principle of equality is sure to eliminate anything that is just conventional and arbitrary in how we think. The necessary classification I mentioned earlier will likely be less valued by a democratic society than by others, as in such a society there are rarely individuals who, through education, culture, and leisure, are inclined to study the natural laws of language and enforce those laws by following them.

I shall not quit this topic without touching on a feature of democratic languages, which is perhaps more characteristic of them than any other. It has already been shown that democratic nations have a taste, and sometimes a passion, for general ideas, and that this arises from their peculiar merits and defects. This liking for general ideas is displayed in democratic languages by the continual use of generic terms or abstract expressions, and by the manner in which they are employed. This is the great merit and the great imperfection of these languages. Democratic nations are passionately addicted to generic terms or abstract expressions, because these modes of speech enlarge thought, and assist the operations of the mind by enabling it to include several objects in a small compass. A French democratic writer will be apt to say capacites in the abstract for men of capacity, and without particularizing the objects to which their capacity is applied: he will talk about actualities to designate in one word the things passing before his eyes at the instant; and he will comprehend under the term eventualities whatever may happen in the universe, dating from the moment at which he speaks. Democratic writers are perpetually coining words of this kind, in which they sublimate into further abstraction the abstract terms of the language. Nay, more, to render their mode of speech more succinct, they personify the subject of these abstract terms, and make it act like a real entity. Thus they would say in French, "La force des choses veut que les capacites gouvernent."

I won't leave this topic without mentioning a feature of democratic languages that might be their most defining aspect. It's been shown that democratic nations have a preference, and sometimes a strong inclination, for general ideas, which comes from their unique strengths and weaknesses. This appreciation for general concepts is evident in democratic languages through the frequent use of generic terms or abstract expressions, and in the way these are used. This is both the significant strength and the major flaw of these languages. Democratic nations are deeply fond of generic terms or abstract expressions because these forms of language expand thought and help the mind operate by allowing it to group multiple ideas together concisely. A French democratic writer would likely use the term *capacites* in the abstract to refer to capable individuals, without specifying what their capabilities pertain to; they might refer to *actualités* to encompass everything happening right before their eyes at that moment; and they use the term *éventualités* to cover anything that could happen in the universe from the moment they speak. Democratic writers constantly create such terms that elevate abstract language to even higher levels of abstraction. Moreover, to make their speech more concise, they often personify the subjects of these abstract terms, treating them as if they were real entities. So, they might say in French, "La force des choses veut que les capacités gouvernent."

I cannot better illustrate what I mean than by my own example. I have frequently used the word "equality" in an absolute sense—nay, I have personified equality in several places; thus I have said that equality does such and such things, or refrains from doing others. It may be affirmed that the writers of the age of Louis XIV would not have used these expressions: they would never have thought of using the word "equality" without applying it to some particular object; and they would rather have renounced the term altogether than have consented to make a living personage of it.

I can't explain my point better than by using my own experience. I've often used the term "equality" in a general way—actually, I've even given it human qualities in several instances; for example, I've said that equality does certain things or avoids doing others. It's true that the writers from the time of Louis XIV wouldn't have expressed themselves this way. They would never have used the word "equality" without referring to something specific, and they would have preferred to abandon the term entirely than to treat it like a living character.

These abstract terms which abound in democratic languages, and which are used on every occasion without attaching them to any particular fact, enlarge and obscure the thoughts they are intended to convey; they render the mode of speech more succinct, and the idea contained in it less clear. But with regard to language, democratic nations prefer obscurity to labor. I know not indeed whether this loose style has not some secret charm for those who speak and write amongst these nations. As the men who live there are frequently left to the efforts of their individual powers of mind, they are almost always a prey to doubt; and as their situation in life is forever changing, they are never held fast to any of their opinions by the certain tenure of their fortunes. Men living in democratic countries are, then, apt to entertain unsettled ideas, and they require loose expressions to convey them. As they never know whether the idea they express to-day will be appropriate to the new position they may occupy to-morrow, they naturally acquire a liking for abstract terms. An abstract term is like a box with a false bottom: you may put in it what ideas you please, and take them out again without being observed.

These vague terms that are common in democratic languages are used all the time without being linked to any specific facts. They expand and muddy the thoughts they’re meant to express, making speech more concise but ideas less clear. When it comes to language, democratic nations tend to prefer ambiguity over effort. I can't help but wonder if this loose style has some hidden appeal for those who speak and write in these countries. Since people there often rely on their individual mental abilities, they’re usually filled with doubt. Their life situations are constantly changing, so they rarely hold onto any opinions because their fortunes aren't stable. People in democratic countries tend to have uncertain ideas, and they need vague expressions to communicate them. Since they never know if what they say today will fit their new circumstances tomorrow, they naturally grow fond of abstract terms. An abstract term is like a box with a false bottom: you can put whatever ideas you want inside and take them out again unnoticed.

Amongst all nations, generic and abstract terms form the basis of language. I do not, therefore, affect to expel these terms from democratic languages; I simply remark that men have an especial tendency, in the ages of democracy, to multiply words of this kind—to take them always by themselves in their most abstract acceptation, and to use them on all occasions, even when the nature of the discourse does not require them.

Among all nations, general and abstract terms are the foundation of language. I don't intend to eliminate these terms from democratic languages; I just point out that people have a strong tendency, during democratic times, to increase the use of such words—to take them at their most abstract meaning, and to use them in every situation, even when the discussion doesn't need them.





Chapter XVII: Of Some Of The Sources Of Poetry Amongst Democratic Nations

Various different significations have been given to the word "poetry." It would weary my readers if I were to lead them into a discussion as to which of these definitions ought to be selected: I prefer telling them at once that which I have chosen. In my opinion, poetry is the search and the delineation of the ideal. The poet is he who, by suppressing a part of what exists, by adding some imaginary touches to the picture, and by combining certain real circumstances, but which do not in fact concurrently happen, completes and extends the work of nature. Thus the object of poetry is not to represent what is true, but to adorn it, and to present to the mind some loftier imagery. Verse, regarded as the ideal beauty of language, may be eminently poetical; but verse does not, of itself, constitute poetry.

The word "poetry" has been given many different meanings. It would bore my readers if I went into detail about which definition should be chosen, so I will just share the one I've picked. In my view, poetry is the quest to define and explore the ideal. A poet is someone who, by omitting parts of reality, adding some imaginary elements to the portrayal, and combining certain real situations that don’t actually occur together, enhances and expands upon nature’s work. Therefore, the goal of poetry isn’t to simply represent the truth, but to embellish it and offer the mind some elevated imagery. Verse, seen as the ideal beauty of language, can certainly be very poetic; however, verse alone doesn’t make poetry.

I now proceed to inquire whether, amongst the actions, the sentiments, and the opinions of democratic nations, there are any which lead to a conception of ideal beauty, and which may for this reason be considered as natural sources of poetry. It must in the first place, be acknowledged that the taste for ideal beauty, and the pleasure derived from the expression of it, are never so intense or so diffused amongst a democratic as amongst an aristocratic people. In aristocratic nations it sometimes happens that the body goes on to act as it were spontaneously, whilst the higher faculties are bound and burdened by repose. Amongst these nations the people will very often display poetic tastes, and sometimes allow their fancy to range beyond and above what surrounds them. But in democracies the love of physical gratification, the notion of bettering one's condition, the excitement of competition, the charm of anticipated success, are so many spurs to urge men onwards in the active professions they have embraced, without allowing them to deviate for an instant from the track. The main stress of the faculties is to this point. The imagination is not extinct; but its chief function is to devise what may be useful, and to represent what is real.

I now want to explore whether there are actions, feelings, and opinions in democratic societies that lead to a vision of ideal beauty, and that can therefore be seen as natural sources of poetry. First of all, it's important to recognize that the appreciation for ideal beauty, and the enjoyment that comes from expressing it, are never as strong or widespread among democratic people as they are among aristocratic ones. In aristocratic societies, it sometimes happens that people act almost spontaneously while their higher faculties are at rest. In these societies, people often display poetic tastes and sometimes let their imaginations wander beyond their immediate surroundings. However, in democracies, the desire for physical pleasure, the idea of improving one's situation, the thrill of competition, and the allure of anticipated success push individuals to focus on their active careers, without allowing them to stray even momentarily from their path. The primary focus of their abilities is directed towards these goals. The imagination isn't dead; rather, its main role is to come up with useful ideas and to depict what is real.

The principle of equality not only diverts men from the description of ideal beauty—it also diminishes the number of objects to be described. Aristocracy, by maintaining society in a fixed position, is favorable to the solidity and duration of positive religions, as well as to the stability of political institutions. It not only keeps the human mind within a certain sphere of belief, but it predisposes the mind to adopt one faith rather than another. An aristocratic people will always be prone to place intermediate powers between God and man. In this respect it may be said that the aristocratic element is favorable to poetry. When the universe is peopled with supernatural creatures, not palpable to the senses but discovered by the mind, the imagination ranges freely, and poets, finding a thousand subjects to delineate, also find a countless audience to take an interest in their productions. In democratic ages it sometimes happens, on the contrary, that men are as much afloat in matters of belief as they are in their laws. Scepticism then draws the imagination of poets back to earth, and confines them to the real and visible world. Even when the principle of equality does not disturb religious belief, it tends to simplify it, and to divert attention from secondary agents, to fix it principally on the Supreme Power. Aristocracy naturally leads the human mind to the contemplation of the past, and fixes it there. Democracy, on the contrary, gives men a sort of instinctive distaste for what is ancient. In this respect aristocracy is far more favorable to poetry; for things commonly grow larger and more obscure as they are more remote; and for this twofold reason they are better suited to the delineation of the ideal.

The principle of equality not only distracts people from the idea of ideal beauty—it also reduces the number of things to be described. Aristocracy, by keeping society in a stable state, supports the strength and longevity of established religions, as well as the stability of political systems. It not only confines the human mind within a certain range of beliefs but also encourages people to adopt one faith over another. An aristocratic society will always be inclined to place intermediaries between God and humanity. In this sense, the aristocratic element is beneficial to poetry. When the universe is filled with supernatural beings that can’t be sensed but can be imagined, creativity flows freely, and poets discover countless topics to explore, along with a vast audience interested in their work. In democratic times, however, people often find themselves adrift in their beliefs, much like they are with their laws. Skepticism then pulls poets’ imaginations back down to reality, confining them to the tangible world. Even when the principle of equality doesn’t disrupt religious belief, it tends to simplify it and shift focus away from secondary influences, placing it mainly on the Supreme Power. Aristocracy naturally prompts people to reflect on the past and keeps their attention there. Democracy, on the other hand, tends to foster a natural dislike for what is old. For this reason, aristocracy is much more conducive to poetry; things typically become larger and more mysterious as they become more distant, and for this dual reason, they are better suited for expressing the ideal.

After having deprived poetry of the past, the principle of equality robs it in part of the present. Amongst aristocratic nations there are a certain number of privileged personages, whose situation is, as it were, without and above the condition of man; to these, power, wealth, fame, wit, refinement, and distinction in all things appear peculiarly to belong. The crowd never sees them very closely, or does not watch them in minute details; and little is needed to make the description of such men poetical. On the other hand, amongst the same people, you will meet with classes so ignorant, low, and enslaved, that they are no less fit objects for poetry from the excess of their rudeness and wretchedness, than the former are from their greatness and refinement. Besides, as the different classes of which an aristocratic community is composed are widely separated, and imperfectly acquainted with each other, the imagination may always represent them with some addition to, or some subtraction from, what they really are. In democratic communities, where men are all insignificant and very much alike, each man instantly sees all his fellows when he surveys himself. The poets of democratic ages can never, therefore, take any man in particular as the subject of a piece; for an object of slender importance, which is distinctly seen on all sides, will never lend itself to an ideal conception. Thus the principle of equality; in proportion as it has established itself in the world, has dried up most of the old springs of poetry. Let us now attempt to show what new ones it may disclose.

After taking away poetry's connection to the past, the principle of equality also partially strips it of the present. Among aristocratic nations, there are certain privileged individuals whose status is, so to speak, beyond the common human condition; they uniquely embody power, wealth, fame, wit, refinement, and distinction in everything. The masses don't often observe them closely or notice the finer details; it takes very little to make these individuals seem poetic. Conversely, within the same society, you'll find classes that are so ignorant, low, and oppressed that their extreme rudeness and misery make them just as suitable for poetry as the former group is because of their greatness and elegance. Additionally, since the various classes in an aristocratic community are sharply divided and have little understanding of one another, the imagination can always embellish them, adding to or subtracting from their true nature. In democratic societies, where everyone is relatively unremarkable and very similar, each person immediately recognizes all their peers when they look at themselves. Consequently, poets in democratic times can't single out anyone in particular as the subject of their work, as a minor figure that stands out clearly from all angles won’t inspire an idealized vision. Thus, the principle of equality, as it has become established in the world, has largely drained the old sources of poetry. Now, let’s explore what new sources it might reveal.

When scepticism had depopulated heaven, and the progress of equality had reduced each individual to smaller and better known proportions, the poets, not yet aware of what they could substitute for the great themes which were departing together with the aristocracy, turned their eyes to inanimate nature. As they lost sight of gods and heroes, they set themselves to describe streams and mountains. Thence originated in the last century, that kind of poetry which has been called, by way of distinction, the descriptive. Some have thought that this sort of delineation, embellished with all the physical and inanimate objects which cover the earth, was the kind of poetry peculiar to democratic ages; but I believe this to be an error, and that it only belongs to a period of transition.

When skepticism emptied heaven, and the rise of equality made each person smaller and more recognizable, the poets, not yet aware of what they could replace the grand themes that were fading with the aristocracy, turned their attention to inanimate nature. As they lost sight of gods and heroes, they focused on describing streams and mountains. This gave rise in the last century to a type of poetry known, by way of distinction, as descriptive poetry. Some have believed that this kind of depiction, filled with all the physical and inanimate objects that cover the earth, is unique to democratic times; however, I think this is a misunderstanding, and that it actually belongs to a transitional period.

I am persuaded that in the end democracy diverts the imagination from all that is external to man, and fixes it on man alone. Democratic nations may amuse themselves for a while with considering the productions of nature; but they are only excited in reality by a survey of themselves. Here, and here alone, the true sources of poetry amongst such nations are to be found; and it may be believed that the poets who shall neglect to draw their inspirations hence, will lose all sway over the minds which they would enchant, and will be left in the end with none but unimpassioned spectators of their transports. I have shown how the ideas of progression and of the indefinite perfectibility of the human race belong to democratic ages. Democratic nations care but little for what has been, but they are haunted by visions of what will be; in this direction their unbounded imagination grows and dilates beyond all measure. Here then is the wildest range open to the genius of poets, which allows them to remove their performances to a sufficient distance from the eye. Democracy shuts the past against the poet, but opens the future before him. As all the citizens who compose a democratic community are nearly equal and alike, the poet cannot dwell upon any one of them; but the nation itself invites the exercise of his powers. The general similitude of individuals, which renders any one of them taken separately an improper subject of poetry, allows poets to include them all in the same imagery, and to take a general survey of the people itself. Democractic nations have a clearer perception than any others of their own aspect; and an aspect so imposing is admirably fitted to the delineation of the ideal.

I believe that ultimately, democracy shifts our focus away from everything outside of humanity and centers it solely on people. Democratic societies might entertain themselves for a bit by contemplating nature, but what truly captivates them is reflecting on themselves. Here, and only here, can we find the genuine sources of poetry in such societies; it's likely that poets who ignore this source will lose their influence over the minds they wish to captivate and will end up with only indifferent spectators of their work. I've pointed out how concepts of progress and the endless perfectibility of the human race belong to democratic times. Democratic nations have little interest in the past, but they are haunted by dreams of the future; in this area, their boundless imagination expands beyond limits. This is where the greatest opportunities lie for poets, allowing them to create works that are removed from immediate perception. Democracy closes off the past to the poet but opens the future wide before them. Since all citizens in a democratic community are quite equal and similar, the poet can't focus on just one individual; instead, the entire nation calls for the expression of their talents. The general similarity among individuals, which makes any single one an unsuitable subject for poetry, allows poets to encompass them all in the same imagery and to take a broader view of the people as a whole. Democratic nations have a clearer understanding of their own identity than any others, and such an impressive identity is perfectly suited for the portrayal of the ideal.

I readily admit that the Americans have no poets; I cannot allow that they have no poetic ideas. In Europe people talk a great deal of the wilds of America, but the Americans themselves never think about them: they are insensible to the wonders of inanimate nature, and they may be said not to perceive the mighty forests which surround them till they fall beneath the hatchet. Their eyes are fixed upon another sight: the American people views its own march across these wilds—drying swamps, turning the course of rivers, peopling solitudes, and subduing nature. This magnificent image of themselves does not meet the gaze of the Americans at intervals only; it may be said to haunt every one of them in his least as well as in his most important actions, and to be always flitting before his mind. Nothing conceivable is so petty, so insipid, so crowded with paltry interests, in one word so anti-poetic, as the life of a man in the United States. But amongst the thoughts which it suggests there is always one which is full of poetry, and that is the hidden nerve which gives vigor to the frame.

I’ll be honest, Americans don’t have poets, but they definitely have poetic ideas. In Europe, people often discuss the wilderness of America, yet Americans themselves rarely think about it. They seem unaware of the incredible beauty of nature around them, only noticing the vast forests when they’re being cut down. Their focus is elsewhere: the American people are fixated on their own progress through these wild areas—draining swamps, redirecting rivers, populating empty lands, and controlling nature. This grand image of themselves isn’t something they think about occasionally; it seems to linger in the minds of everyone, influencing both their small and significant actions. Life in the United States can seem trivial, dull, and filled with petty concerns—essentially, very unpoetic. However, amid these thoughts, there’s always one that holds poetic value, acting as a hidden force that energizes the spirit.

In aristocratic ages each people, as well as each individual, is prone to stand separate and aloof from all others. In democratic ages, the extreme fluctuations of men and the impatience of their desires keep them perpetually on the move; so that the inhabitants of different countries intermingle, see, listen to, and borrow from each other's stores. It is not only then the members of the same community who grow more alike; communities are themselves assimilated to one another, and the whole assemblage presents to the eye of the spectator one vast democracy, each citizen of which is a people. This displays the aspect of mankind for the first time in the broadest light. All that belongs to the existence of the human race taken as a whole, to its vicissitudes and to its future, becomes an abundant mine of poetry. The poets who lived in aristocratic ages have been eminently successful in their delineations of certain incidents in the life of a people or a man; but none of them ever ventured to include within his performances the destinies of mankind—a task which poets writing in democratic ages may attempt. At that same time at which every man, raising his eyes above his country, begins at length to discern mankind at large, the Divinity is more and more manifest to the human mind in full and entire majesty. If in democratic ages faith in positive religions be often shaken, and the belief in intermediate agents, by whatever name they are called, be overcast; on the other hand men are disposed to conceive a far broader idea of Providence itself, and its interference in human affairs assumes a new and more imposing appearance to their eyes. Looking at the human race as one great whole, they easily conceive that its destinies are regulated by the same design; and in the actions of every individual they are led to acknowledge a trace of that universal and eternal plan on which God rules our race. This consideration may be taken as another prolific source of poetry which is opened in democratic ages. Democratic poets will always appear trivial and frigid if they seek to invest gods, demons, or angels, with corporeal forms, and if they attempt to draw them down from heaven to dispute the supremacy of earth. But if they strive to connect the great events they commemorate with the general providential designs which govern the universe, and, without showing the finger of the Supreme Governor, reveal the thoughts of the Supreme Mind, their works will be admired and understood, for the imagination of their contemporaries takes this direction of its own accord.

In aristocratic times, every people and individual tends to stay separate and distinct from others. In democratic times, the constant changes in people's lives and their impatient desires keep them always moving; as a result, people from different countries interact, see, listen to, and take from each other's resources. It's not just that the members of the same community become more alike; communities also blend into each other, creating a wide democracy where each citizen represents a whole people. This shows humanity in a new, broader light. Everything related to the existence of the human race as a whole, its ups and downs, and its future becomes a rich source of inspiration. Poets from aristocratic times have been very good at portraying specific events in the lives of people or individuals; however, none dared to capture the fate of mankind—a challenge that poets in democratic times may take on. At the same time that everyone starts to look beyond their country and recognize humanity as a whole, the divine becomes increasingly clear to the human mind in all its majesty. While faith in established religions may often be shaken in democratic times, and belief in intermediaries of any kind may fade, people are more inclined to develop a broader understanding of Providence itself, seeing its role in human affairs as more significant and meaningful. By viewing humanity as one large entity, they readily believe that its destinies are guided by a shared plan; in every individual’s actions, they find a hint of that universal and eternal design that God uses to govern our race. This idea serves as another rich source of inspiration for poetry in democratic times. Democratic poets may seem trivial and cold if they try to give gods, demons, or angels physical forms or pull them down from heaven to fight for earthly supremacy. But if they work to link the major events they celebrate to the overarching divine plans that steer the universe, revealing the thoughts of the Supreme Mind without explicitly showing the finger of the Supreme Governor, their creations will be appreciated and understood, as their contemporaries’ imaginations naturally gravitate in that direction.

It may be foreseen in the like manner that poets living in democratic ages will prefer the delineation of passions and ideas to that of persons and achievements. The language, the dress, and the daily actions of men in democracies are repugnant to ideal conceptions. These things are not poetical in themselves; and, if it were otherwise, they would cease to be so, because they are too familiar to all those to whom the poet would speak of them. This forces the poet constantly to search below the external surface which is palpable to the senses, in order to read the inner soul: and nothing lends itself more to the delineation of the ideal than the scrutiny of the hidden depths in the immaterial nature of man. I need not to ramble over earth and sky to discover a wondrous object woven of contrasts, of greatness and littleness infinite, of intense gloom and of amazing brightness—capable at once of exciting pity, admiration, terror, contempt. I find that object in myself. Man springs out of nothing, crosses time, and disappears forever in the bosom of God; he is seen but for a moment, staggering on the verge of the two abysses, and there he is lost. If man were wholly ignorant of himself, he would have no poetry in him; for it is impossible to describe what the mind does not conceive. If man clearly discerned his own nature, his imagination would remain idle, and would have nothing to add to the picture. But the nature of man is sufficiently disclosed for him to apprehend something of himself; and sufficiently obscure for all the rest to be plunged in thick darkness, in which he gropes forever—and forever in vain—to lay hold on some completer notion of his being.

It can be expected that poets in democratic times will favor expressing emotions and ideas over focusing on individuals and their achievements. The language, attire, and everyday actions of people in democracies don't align with idealized notions. These aspects aren't poetic on their own; and if they were, they would lose that quality because they're too familiar to those the poet wishes to address. This compels the poet to constantly dig deeper than the obvious surface that can be sensed, to explore the inner soul. Nothing lends itself more to capturing the ideal than examining the hidden complexities of human nature. I don't need to wander the earth or the sky to find a remarkable subject made of contrasts, of boundless greatness and smallness, intense darkness and striking light—capable of evoking pity, admiration, terror, and contempt. I find that subject within myself. Humanity emerges from nothing, moves through time, and eventually fades away into the embrace of God; we are only seen for a moment, teetering on the edge of two abysses, and there we are lost. If a person were completely unaware of themselves, they wouldn't possess any poetry; it's impossible to describe what the mind can't conceive. If a person clearly understood their own nature, their imagination would remain unstimulated, with nothing to contribute to the image. However, human nature is revealed enough for someone to grasp a bit of themselves; yet, it's also obscured sufficiently that the rest remains shrouded in deep darkness, in which they search endlessly—and forever fruitlessly—to grasp a fuller understanding of their existence.

Amongst a democratic people poetry will not be fed with legendary lays or the memorials of old traditions. The poet will not attempt to people the universe with supernatural beings in whom his readers and his own fancy have ceased to believe; nor will he present virtues and vices in the mask of frigid personification, which are better received under their own features. All these resources fail him; but Man remains, and the poet needs no more. The destinies of mankind—man himself, taken aloof from his age and his country, and standing in the presence of Nature and of God, with his passions, his doubts, his rare prosperities, and inconceivable wretchedness—will become the chief, if not the sole theme of poetry amongst these nations. Experience may confirm this assertion, if we consider the productions of the greatest poets who have appeared since the world has been turned to democracy. The authors of our age who have so admirably delineated the features of Faust, Childe Harold, Rene, and Jocelyn, did not seek to record the actions of an individual, but to enlarge and to throw light on some of the obscurer recesses of the human heart. Such are the poems of democracy. The principle of equality does not then destroy all the subjects of poetry: it renders them less numerous, but more vast.

Among a democratic society, poetry won't rely on ancient legends or old traditions. Poets won't try to fill the universe with supernatural beings that both they and their readers have stopped believing in; nor will they showcase virtues and vices through cold personification, which are better presented in their true forms. All these options fall short; however, humanity remains, and that's all the poet needs. The fate of mankind—individuals apart from their time and place, facing Nature and God, with their passions, doubts, fleeting successes, and unimaginable suffering—will emerge as the main, if not the only, theme of poetry in these nations. Experience may support this claim when we look at the works of the greatest poets who have arisen since the world embraced democracy. The authors of our time who have beautifully captured the essence of Faust, Childe Harold, Rene, and Jocelyn aimed not to recount the actions of a single person but to explore and illuminate some of the deeper corners of the human heart. These are the poems of democracy. The principle of equality doesn't eliminate all subjects of poetry; it makes them fewer but broader.





Chapter XVIII: Of The Inflated Style Of American Writers And Orators

I have frequently remarked that the Americans, who generally treat of business in clear, plain language, devoid of all ornament, and so extremely simple as to be often coarse, are apt to become inflated as soon as they attempt a more poetical diction. They then vent their pomposity from one end of a harangue to the other; and to hear them lavish imagery on every occasion, one might fancy that they never spoke of anything with simplicity. The English are more rarely given to a similar failing. The cause of this may be pointed out without much difficulty. In democratic communities each citizen is habitually engaged in the contemplation of a very puny object, namely himself. If he ever raises his looks higher, he then perceives nothing but the immense form of society at large, or the still more imposing aspect of mankind. His ideas are all either extremely minute and clear, or extremely general and vague: what lies between is an open void. When he has been drawn out of his own sphere, therefore, he always expects that some amazing object will be offered to his attention; and it is on these terms alone that he consents to tear himself for an instant from the petty complicated cares which form the charm and the excitement of his life. This appears to me sufficiently to explain why men in democracies, whose concerns are in general so paltry, call upon their poets for conceptions so vast and descriptions so unlimited.

I’ve often noticed that Americans, who typically discuss business in straightforward, simple language without any frills, tend to get overly dramatic when they try to use more poetic language. They express their grandiosity throughout a whole speech; if you hear them use flowery language all the time, you might think they never talk about anything simply. The English are less prone to this issue. The reason for this is fairly clear. In democratic societies, each person usually focuses on something very small, which is themselves. If they ever look up beyond that, they only see the vastness of society or the even more impressive presence of humanity. Their thoughts are either very small and clear or very broad and vague; there’s a big gap in between. When they do step outside their own little world, they expect to see something truly remarkable; it’s only under these conditions that they’ll momentarily pull themselves away from the trivial complexities that add excitement and charm to their lives. This seems to explain why people in democracies, whose issues are generally quite minor, ask their poets for ideas that are enormous and descriptions that are limitless.

The authors, on their part, do not fail to obey a propensity of which they themselves partake; they perpetually inflate their imaginations, and expanding them beyond all bounds, they not unfrequently abandon the great in order to reach the gigantic. By these means they hope to attract the observation of the multitude, and to fix it easily upon themselves: nor are their hopes disappointed; for as the multitude seeks for nothing in poetry but subjects of very vast dimensions, it has neither the time to measure with accuracy the proportions of all the subjects set before it, nor a taste sufficiently correct to perceive at once in what respect they are out of proportion. The author and the public at once vitiate one another.

The authors, for their part, don’t hesitate to follow a tendency they share; they constantly blow up their imaginations, stretching them beyond all limits, and often leave behind the great in order to chase the gigantic. Through this, they hope to grab the attention of the masses and easily keep it on themselves: and their hopes are not in vain; as the masses look for nothing in poetry but extremely grand themes, they have neither the time to accurately measure the proportions of all the subjects presented to them nor a refined enough taste to immediately recognize how they are out of proportion. The author and the public end up corrupting each other.

We have just seen that amongst democratic nations, the sources of poetry are grand, but not abundant. They are soon exhausted: and poets, not finding the elements of the ideal in what is real and true, abandon them entirely and create monsters. I do not fear that the poetry of democratic nations will prove too insipid, or that it will fly too near the ground; I rather apprehend that it will be forever losing itself in the clouds, and that it will range at last to purely imaginary regions. I fear that the productions of democratic poets may often be surcharged with immense and incoherent imagery, with exaggerated descriptions and strange creations; and that the fantastic beings of their brain may sometimes make us regret the world of reality.

We’ve just seen that among democratic nations, the sources of poetry are significant, but not plentiful. They run out quickly: and poets, finding no ideal elements in what is real and true, completely abandon them and create monsters. I’m not worried that the poetry of democratic nations will be too dull or grounded; instead, I’m concerned that it will constantly get lost in the clouds, eventually drifting into purely imaginary realms. I fear that the works of democratic poets may often be overloaded with immense and confusing imagery, exaggerated descriptions, and bizarre creations; and that the fantastical beings they conjure up might sometimes make us long for the world of reality.





Chapter XIX: Some Observations On The Drama Amongst Democratic Nations

When the revolution which subverts the social and political state of an aristocratic people begins to penetrate into literature, it generally first manifests itself in the drama, and it always remains conspicuous there. The spectator of a dramatic piece is, to a certain extent, taken by surprise by the impression it conveys. He has no time to refer to his memory, or to consult those more able to judge than himself. It does not occur to him to resist the new literary tendencies which begin to be felt by him; he yields to them before he knows what they are. Authors are very prompt in discovering which way the taste of the public is thus secretly inclined. They shape their productions accordingly; and the literature of the stage, after having served to indicate the approaching literary revolution, speedily completes its accomplishment. If you would judge beforehand of the literature of a people which is lapsing into democracy, study its dramatic productions.

When a revolution that changes the social and political structure of an aristocratic society starts to influence literature, it usually first shows up in drama and remains very noticeable there. The viewer of a play is, to some extent, surprised by the impression it creates. They don’t have time to think back or consult those with more expertise than themselves. It doesn’t occur to them to push back against the new literary trends they’re experiencing; they simply go along with them before they even understand what they are. Authors quickly pick up on which way the public’s taste is secretly leaning. They adjust their works accordingly, and the literature of the stage, after signaling the coming literary shift, quickly drives it home. If you want to anticipate the literature of a society that’s moving toward democracy, look at its plays.

The literature of the stage, moreover, even amongst aristocratic nations, constitutes the most democratic part of their literature. No kind of literary gratification is so much within the reach of the multitude as that which is derived from theatrical representations. Neither preparation nor study is required to enjoy them: they lay hold on you in the midst of your prejudices and your ignorance. When the yet untutored love of the pleasures of the mind begins to affect a class of the community, it instantly draws them to the stage. The theatres of aristocratic nations have always been filled with spectators not belonging to the aristocracy. At the theatre alone the higher ranks mix with the middle and the lower classes; there alone do the former consent to listen to the opinion of the latter, or at least to allow them to give an opinion at all. At the theatre, men of cultivation and of literary attainments have always had more difficulty than elsewhere in making their taste prevail over that of the people, and in preventing themselves from being carried away by the latter. The pit has frequently made laws for the boxes.

The literature of the stage, even among aristocratic nations, represents the most democratic aspect of their literature. There’s no other type of literary enjoyment that's so accessible to the masses as that which comes from theater performances. You don’t need any preparation or study to appreciate them; they grab your attention right in the midst of your biases and ignorance. When a part of the community begins to develop an untaught appreciation for intellectual pleasures, it immediately pulls them toward the stage. The theaters in aristocratic nations have always been filled with audiences from outside the aristocracy. Only at the theater do the upper classes mingle with the middle and lower classes; it’s the only place where the former agree to listen to the opinions of the latter, or at least let them express their thoughts. At the theater, educated individuals with literary skills have always found it harder than anywhere else to assert their tastes over that of the general public and to avoid being swayed by them. The audience in the pit has often set the rules for those in the boxes.

If it be difficult for an aristocracy to prevent the people from getting the upper hand in the theatre, it will readily be understood that the people will be supreme there when democratic principles have crept into the laws and manners—when ranks are intermixed—when minds, as well as fortunes, are brought more nearly together—and when the upper class has lost, with its hereditary wealth, its power, its precedents, and its leisure. The tastes and propensities natural to democratic nations, in respect to literature, will therefore first be discernible in the drama, and it may be foreseen that they will break out there with vehemence. In written productions, the literary canons of aristocracy will be gently, gradually, and, so to speak, legally modified; at the theatre they will be riotously overthrown. The drama brings out most of the good qualities, and almost all the defects, inherent in democratic literature. Democratic peoples hold erudition very cheap, and care but little for what occurred at Rome and Athens; they want to hear something which concerns themselves, and the delineation of the present age is what they demand.

If it's tough for the upper class to keep the public from taking charge in the theater, it's easy to see that the public will dominate once democratic ideas have made their way into the laws and social norms—when classes are mixed—when minds and fortunes come closer together—and when the elite have lost, along with their inherited wealth, their power, their status, and their free time. The tastes and tendencies typical of democratic societies in relation to literature will first show up in drama, and we can expect they will emerge there with intensity. In written works, the literary standards of the upper class will be gently and gradually altered, while in theater, they will be dramatically overturned. Drama highlights both the strengths and most of the flaws of democratic literature. Democratic societies don't value scholarly knowledge much and are not particularly interested in what happened in Rome and Athens; they want stories that relate to them, and they demand portrayals of the current age.

When the heroes and the manners of antiquity are frequently brought upon the stage, and dramatic authors faithfully observe the rules of antiquated precedent, that is enough to warrant a conclusion that the democratic classes have not yet got the upper hand of the theatres. Racine makes a very humble apology in the preface to the "Britannicus" for having disposed of Junia amongst the Vestals, who, according to Aulus Gellius, he says, "admitted no one below six years of age nor above ten." We may be sure that he would neither have accused himself of the offence, nor defended himself from censure, if he had written for our contemporaries. A fact of this kind not only illustrates the state of literature at the time when it occurred, but also that of society itself. A democratic stage does not prove that the nation is in a state of democracy, for, as we have just seen, even in aristocracies it may happen that democratic tastes affect the drama; but when the spirit of aristocracy reigns exclusively on the stage, the fact irrefragably demonstrates that the whole of society is aristocratic; and it may be boldly inferred that the same lettered and learned class which sways the dramatic writers commands the people and governs the country.

When the heroes and customs of ancient times are often showcased on stage, and playwrights stick closely to the old rules, it suggests that the democratic classes haven't taken control of the theaters yet. Racine humbly apologizes in the preface to "Britannicus" for placing Junia among the Vestals, who, according to Aulus Gellius, he states, "admitted no one below six years of age nor above ten." We can be certain he wouldn't have criticized himself or defended his choices if he were writing for today's audience. This situation not only reflects the literary state of that time but also the society itself. A democratic stage doesn’t necessarily mean the nation is democratic; as we’ve seen, democratic tastes can influence drama even in aristocracies. However, when an aristocratic spirit dominates the stage, it clearly shows that society as a whole is aristocratic, and we can confidently conclude that the educated and literate class that influences playwrights controls the people and governs the country.

The refined tastes and the arrogant bearing of an aristocracy will rarely fail to lead it, when it manages the stage, to make a kind of selection in human nature. Some of the conditions of society claim its chief interest; and the scenes which delineate their manners are preferred upon the stage. Certain virtues, and even certain vices, are thought more particularly to deserve to figure there; and they are applauded whilst all others are excluded. Upon the stage, as well as elsewhere, an aristocratic audience will only meet personages of quality, and share the emotions of kings. The same thing applies to style: an aristocracy is apt to impose upon dramatic authors certain modes of expression which give the key in which everything is to be delivered. By these means the stage frequently comes to delineate only one side of man, or sometimes even to represent what is not to be met with in human nature at all—to rise above nature and to go beyond it.

The sophisticated tastes and haughty demeanor of the elite often lead them, when they take control of the stage, to create a particular selection of human nature. Some social conditions capture their primary interest, and scenes that portray these manners are favored on stage. Certain virtues, and even some vices, are seen as more deserving of being presented there; they receive applause while all others are excluded. On stage, just like in other areas, an elite audience will only encounter characters of high status and experience the emotions of royalty. The same goes for style: the elite tend to dictate to playwrights specific ways of expressing ideas, which sets the tone for everything that is presented. As a result, the stage often ends up depicting only one side of humanity or sometimes even representing what is completely absent from human nature—elevating above nature and surpassing it.

In democratic communities the spectators have no such partialities, and they rarely display any such antipathies: they like to see upon the stage that medley of conditions, of feelings, and of opinions, which occurs before their eyes. The drama becomes more striking, more common, and more true. Sometimes, however, those who write for the stage in democracies also transgress the bounds of human nature—but it is on a different side from their predecessors. By seeking to represent in minute detail the little singularities of the moment and the peculiar characteristics of certain personages, they forget to portray the general features of the race.

In democratic societies, audiences don’t have those biases, and they hardly show any strong dislikes: they enjoy seeing the mix of backgrounds, emotions, and viewpoints that play out in front of them. The drama becomes bolder, more relatable, and more authentic. However, sometimes playwrights in democracies also stray from the essence of human nature—but in a different way than those before them. By trying to depict every little detail of the present moment and the unique traits of specific characters, they overlook the broader aspects of humanity.

When the democratic classes rule the stage, they introduce as much license in the manner of treating subjects as in the choice of them. As the love of the drama is, of all literary tastes, that which is most natural to democratic nations, the number of authors and of spectators, as well as of theatrical representations, is constantly increasing amongst these communities. A multitude composed of elements so different, and scattered in so many different places, cannot acknowledge the same rules or submit to the same laws. No concurrence is possible amongst judges so numerous, who know not when they may meet again; and therefore each pronounces his own sentence on the piece. If the effect of democracy is generally to question the authority of all literary rules and conventions, on the stage it abolishes them altogether, and puts in their place nothing but the whim of each author and of each public.

When democratic groups take the lead, they allow as much freedom in how they approach subjects as they do in choosing them. Since a passion for drama is the most natural literary preference for democratic societies, the number of writers, audiences, and theatrical performances keeps growing in these communities. A crowd made up of such diverse elements and spread across so many different locations can’t agree on the same rules or abide by the same standards. There's no possibility of agreement among so many judges, who have no idea when they might see each other again; so, everyone makes their own judgment about the piece. If democracy generally challenges the authority of all literary rules and conventions, on stage, it completely eliminates them and replaces them with just the preferences of each author and each audience.

The drama also displays in an especial manner the truth of what I have said before in speaking more generally of style and art in democratic literature. In reading the criticisms which were occasioned by the dramatic productions of the age of Louis XIV, one is surprised to remark the great stress which the public laid on the probability of the plot, and the importance which was attached to the perfect consistency of the characters, and to their doing nothing which could not be easily explained and understood. The value which was set upon the forms of language at that period, and the paltry strife about words with which dramatic authors were assailed, are no less surprising. It would seem that the men of the age of Louis XIV attached very exaggerated importance to those details, which may be perceived in the study, but which escape attention on the stage. For, after all, the principal object of a dramatic piece is to be performed, and its chief merit is to affect the audience. But the audience and the readers in that age were the same: on quitting the theatre they called up the author for judgment to their own firesides. In democracies, dramatic pieces are listened to, but not read. Most of those who frequent the amusements of the stage do not go there to seek the pleasures of the mind, but the keen emotions of the heart. They do not expect to hear a fine literary work, but to see a play; and provided the author writes the language of his country correctly enough to be understood, and that his characters excite curiosity and awaken sympathy, the audience are satisfied. They ask no more of fiction, and immediately return to real life. Accuracy of style is therefore less required, because the attentive observance of its rules is less perceptible on the stage. As for the probability of the plot, it is incompatible with perpetual novelty, surprise, and rapidity of invention. It is therefore neglected, and the public excuses the neglect. You may be sure that if you succeed in bringing your audience into the presence of something that affects them, they will not care by what road you brought them there; and they will never reproach you for having excited their emotions in spite of dramatic rules.

The drama also particularly illustrates the truth of what I mentioned earlier about style and art in democratic literature. When reading the critiques of the dramatic works from the era of Louis XIV, it’s striking to see how much emphasis the public placed on the plausibility of the plot and how important they thought it was for characters to be completely consistent and to act in ways that could be easily explained and understood. The value placed on language forms at that time and the trivial debates over words that dramatists faced are equally surprising. It seems that the people of Louis XIV's era gave excessive importance to those details that can be noticed in study but often get overlooked on the stage. After all, the main purpose of a play is to be performed, and its greatest worth lies in its ability to impact the audience. However, during that time, the audience and readers were often the same people: when they left the theater, they would evaluate the work at their own homes. In democracies, people listen to plays but don’t typically read them. Most theatergoers are not looking for intellectual stimulation but rather for strong emotional experiences. They don’t expect to encounter great literature; they just want to see a performance. As long as the author uses language that is clear enough to be understood and the characters spark interest and empathy, the audience is happy. They demand no more from fiction and quickly return to everyday life. Therefore, the precision of style is not as crucial because following its rules is less noticeable on stage. As for plot plausibility, it often conflicts with the need for constant novelty, surprise, and quick creativity. Thus, it tends to be overlooked, and the audience often accepts this neglect. You can be confident that if you manage to engage your audience with something that resonates with them, they won’t mind how you got them there; they won’t blame you for evoking their emotions even if it goes against dramatic conventions.

The Americans very broadly display all the different propensities which I have here described when they go to the theatres; but it must be acknowledged that as yet a very small number of them go to theatres at all. Although playgoers and plays have prodigiously increased in the United States in the last forty years, the population indulges in this kind of amusement with the greatest reserve. This is attributable to peculiar causes, which the reader is already acquainted with, and of which a few words will suffice to remind him. The Puritans who founded the American republics were not only enemies to amusements, but they professed an especial abhorrence for the stage. They considered it as an abominable pastime; and as long as their principles prevailed with undivided sway, scenic performances were wholly unknown amongst them. These opinions of the first fathers of the colony have left very deep marks on the minds of their descendants. The extreme regularity of habits and the great strictness of manners which are observable in the United States, have as yet opposed additional obstacles to the growth of dramatic art. There are no dramatic subjects in a country which has witnessed no great political catastrophes, and in which love invariably leads by a straight and easy road to matrimony. People who spend every day in the week in making money, and the Sunday in going to church, have nothing to invite the muse of Comedy.

Americans show a wide range of behaviors that I've described when they go to theaters; however, it must be noted that only a small number actually attend theaters at all. Even though the number of theatergoers and performances has significantly increased in the United States over the last forty years, the population tends to enjoy this form of entertainment very cautiously. This can be attributed to specific reasons that the reader is already familiar with, and a brief reminder will suffice. The Puritans who established the American republics were not only opposed to any form of entertainment, but they also had a particularly strong disdain for the stage. They viewed it as an objectionable pastime; and as long as their principles held firm, theatrical performances were completely absent among them. The beliefs of the early founders of the colony have left lasting impressions on their descendants. The extreme regularity of habits and the strict moral standards observed in the United States continue to create obstacles to the development of dramatic art. In a country that has not experienced major political upheavals and where love invariably leads straightforwardly to marriage, there are few dramatic themes to explore. People who spend every day of the week focused on making money and spend Sundays in church have little to inspire the muse of Comedy.

A single fact suffices to show that the stage is not very popular in the United States. The Americans, whose laws allow of the utmost freedom and even license of language in all other respects, have nevertheless subjected their dramatic authors to a sort of censorship. Theatrical performances can only take place by permission of the municipal authorities. This may serve to show how much communities are like individuals; they surrender themselves unscrupulously to their ruling passions, and afterwards take the greatest care not to yield too much to the vehemence of tastes which they do not possess.

A single fact is enough to show that theater isn't very popular in the United States. Americans, whose laws allow a great deal of freedom and even excessive language in other areas, have still placed their playwrights under a kind of censorship. Theatrical performances can only happen with permission from local authorities. This illustrates how communities resemble individuals; they give in recklessly to their dominant desires and then work hard to avoid giving too much to the intensity of tastes they don't actually share.

No portion of literature is connected by closer or more numerous ties with the present condition of society than the drama. The drama of one period can never be suited to the following age, if in the interval an important revolution has changed the manners and the laws of the nation. The great authors of a preceding age may be read; but pieces written for a different public will not be followed. The dramatic authors of the past live only in books. The traditional taste of certain individuals, vanity, fashion, or the genius of an actor may sustain or resuscitate for a time the aristocratic drama amongst a democracy; but it will speedily fall away of itself—not overthrown, but abandoned.

No part of literature is more closely or more extensively tied to the current state of society than drama. The drama of one era can never really fit the next if a major revolution has transformed the customs and laws of the country in between. The great writers from the past can still be read, but works created for a different audience won't resonate. Dramatic writers from earlier times exist only in books. The traditional tastes of some people, along with vanity, trends, or the talent of an actor, may temporarily keep the highbrow drama alive in a democratic society, but it will quickly fade away on its own—not because it's being overthrown, but because it's just been left behind.





Chapter XX: Characteristics Of Historians In Democratic Ages

Historians who write in aristocratic ages are wont to refer all occurrences to the particular will or temper of certain individuals; and they are apt to attribute the most important revolutions to very slight accidents. They trace out the smallest causes with sagacity, and frequently leave the greatest unperceived. Historians who live in democratic ages exhibit precisely opposite characteristics. Most of them attribute hardly any influence to the individual over the destiny of the race, nor to citizens over the fate of a people; but, on the other hand, they assign great general causes to all petty incidents. These contrary tendencies explain each other.

Historians writing during aristocratic times often attribute all events to the specific desires or personalities of certain individuals, and they tend to link the most significant upheavals to minor happenings. They skillfully identify the smallest causes but frequently overlook the larger ones. In contrast, historians from democratic eras display the opposite traits. Most of them see little impact from individuals on the fate of humanity or from citizens on the destiny of a nation; instead, they assign major overarching reasons to trivial events. These opposing tendencies clarify one another.

When the historian of aristocratic ages surveys the theatre of the world, he at once perceives a very small number of prominent actors, who manage the whole piece. These great personages, who occupy the front of the stage, arrest the observation, and fix it on themselves; and whilst the historian is bent on penetrating the secret motives which make them speak and act, the rest escape his memory. The importance of the things which some men are seen to do, gives him an exaggerated estimate of the influence which one man may possess; and naturally leads him to think, that in order to explain the impulses of the multitude, it is necessary to refer them to the particular influence of some one individual.

When a historian of aristocratic times looks at the world stage, they immediately notice a very small number of key players who control the entire show. These prominent figures at the front of the stage grab attention and hold it on themselves; while the historian focuses on uncovering the hidden motivations that drive them to speak and act, the rest fade from memory. The significance of what certain individuals are seen doing leads to an overestimation of the influence one person can have, naturally making the historian believe that to understand the motivations of the masses, it's essential to link them to the specific impact of a single individual.

When, on the contrary, all the citizens are independent of one another, and each of them is individually weak, no one is seen to exert a great, or still less a lasting power, over the community. At first sight, individuals appear to be absolutely devoid of any influence over it; and society would seem to advance alone by the free and voluntary concurrence of all the men who compose it. This naturally prompts the mind to search for that general reason which operates upon so many men's faculties at the same time, and turns them simultaneously in the same direction.

When, on the other hand, all citizens are independent from each other, and each one is individually weak, no one appears to have a significant or lasting influence over the community. At first glance, it seems like individuals have no impact on it at all; society appears to move forward solely through the free and voluntary agreement of all the people within it. This naturally leads one to look for that common reason that affects many people's abilities at once and directs them all in the same way.

I am very well convinced that even amongst democratic nations, the genius, the vices, or the virtues of certain individuals retard or accelerate the natural current of a people's history: but causes of this secondary and fortuitous nature are infinitely more various, more concealed, more complex, less powerful, and consequently less easy to trace in periods of equality than in ages of aristocracy, when the task of the historian is simply to detach from the mass of general events the particular influences of one man or of a few men. In the former case the historian is soon wearied by the toil; his mind loses itself in this labyrinth; and, in his inability clearly to discern or conspicuously to point out the influence of individuals, he denies their existence. He prefers talking about the characteristics of race, the physical conformation of the country, or the genius of civilization, which abridges his own labors, and satisfies his reader far better at less cost.

I am completely convinced that even among democratic nations, the talents, flaws, or strengths of certain individuals can either slow down or speed up the natural course of a people’s history. However, these secondary and random causes are infinitely more varied, more hidden, more complicated, less powerful, and therefore harder to trace in times of equality compared to periods of aristocracy, when the historian's task is simply to separate the particular influences of one person or a few people from the mass of general events. In the former case, the historian quickly becomes overwhelmed by the effort; his mind gets lost in this maze, and in his inability to clearly see or distinctly point out the influence of individuals, he denies their existence. He prefers to discuss the traits of a race, the physical features of the land, or the spirit of civilization, which makes his job easier and satisfies his readers much better at a lower cost.

M. de Lafayette says somewhere in his "Memoirs" that the exaggerated system of general causes affords surprising consolations to second-rate statesmen. I will add, that its effects are not less consolatory to second-rate historians; it can always furnish a few mighty reasons to extricate them from the most difficult part of their work, and it indulges the indolence or incapacity of their minds, whilst it confers upon them the honors of deep thinking.

M. de Lafayette mentions in his "Memoirs" that the exaggerated idea of general causes provides surprising comfort to mediocre statesmen. I would add that this idea is just as comforting to mediocre historians; it can always provide a few grand reasons to help them out of the toughest parts of their work, allowing them to indulge their laziness or lack of ability while still giving them the appearance of profound thought.

For myself, I am of opinion that at all times one great portion of the events of this world are attributable to general facts, and another to special influences. These two kinds of cause are always in operation: their proportion only varies. General facts serve to explain more things in democratic than in aristocratic ages, and fewer things are then assignable to special influences. At periods of aristocracy the reverse takes place: special influences are stronger, general causes weaker—unless indeed we consider as a general cause the fact itself of the inequality of conditions, which allows some individuals to baffle the natural tendencies of all the rest. The historians who seek to describe what occurs in democratic societies are right, therefore, in assigning much to general causes, and in devoting their chief attention to discover them; but they are wrong in wholly denying the special influence of individuals, because they cannot easily trace or follow it.

In my view, a significant part of the events in this world can be attributed to general factors, while another part is due to specific influences. These two types of causes are always at work, just in different proportions. General factors help explain more in democratic times than in aristocratic ones, where there tends to be less explanation reliant on specific influences. In aristocratic periods, the opposite is true: specific influences are stronger, and general causes are weaker—unless we consider the very fact of inequality itself as a general cause that allows some individuals to defy the natural tendencies of the majority. Therefore, historians who try to explain what happens in democratic societies are correct in emphasizing general causes and focusing their efforts on identifying them; however, they are mistaken in completely dismissing the special influence of individuals just because it's harder to trace.

The historians who live in democratic ages are not only prone to assign a great cause to every incident, but they are also given to connect incidents together, so as to deduce a system from them. In aristocratic ages, as the attention of historians is constantly drawn to individuals, the connection of events escapes them; or rather, they do not believe in any such connection. To them the clew of history seems every instant crossed and broken by the step of man. In democratic ages, on the contrary, as the historian sees much more of actions than of actors, he may easily establish some kind of sequency and methodical order amongst the former. Ancient literature, which is so rich in fine historical compositions, does not contain a single great historical system, whilst the poorest of modern literatures abound with them. It would appear that the ancient historians did not make sufficient use of those general theories which our historical writers are ever ready to carry to excess.

Historians living in democratic times tend to attribute significant causes to every event and often link incidents together to form a coherent system. In aristocratic times, however, historians focus mainly on individuals, which causes them to overlook the connections between events, or they simply don’t believe any such connections exist. For them, the thread of history seems continuously disrupted by human actions. In democratic times, on the other hand, historians observe far more actions than actors, making it easier for them to establish some sort of sequence and organized pattern among these actions. While ancient literature is rich in excellent historical narratives, it lacks a single major historical system, whereas even the most basic modern literature is filled with them. This suggests that ancient historians did not fully utilize the overarching theories that today’s historical writers often take to extremes.

Those who write in democratic ages have another more dangerous tendency. When the traces of individual action upon nations are lost, it often happens that the world goes on to move, though the moving agent is no longer discoverable. As it becomes extremely difficult to discern and to analyze the reasons which, acting separately on the volition of each member of the community, concur in the end to produce movement in the old mass, men are led to believe that this movement is involuntary, and that societies unconsciously obey some superior force ruling over them. But even when the general fact which governs the private volition of all individuals is supposed to be discovered upon the earth, the principle of human free-will is not secure. A cause sufficiently extensive to affect millions of men at once, and sufficiently strong to bend them all together in the same direction, may well seem irresistible: having seen that mankind do yield to it, the mind is close upon the inference that mankind cannot resist it.

Those who write in democratic times have another, more dangerous tendency. When the impact of individual actions on nations disappears, it often happens that the world continues to change, even though the agent driving that change is no longer identifiable. Since it becomes very challenging to see and analyze the reasons that separately influence each member of the community and ultimately create movement in the larger group, people start to think that this movement is involuntary, and that societies are unconsciously following some greater force governing them. But even when the overall factor believed to guide the individual choices of everyone is supposedly identified, the concept of human free will is not guaranteed. A cause large enough to influence millions at once and powerful enough to pull them all in the same direction may seem unstoppable: after seeing that humanity submits to it, one might easily conclude that humanity cannot resist it.

Historians who live in democratic ages, then, not only deny that the few have any power of acting upon the destiny of a people, but they deprive the people themselves of the power of modifying their own condition, and they subject them either to an inflexible Providence, or to some blind necessity. According to them, each nation is indissolubly bound by its position, its origin, its precedents, and its character, to a certain lot which no efforts can ever change. They involve generation in generation, and thus, going back from age to age, and from necessity to necessity, up to the origin of the world, they forge a close and enormous chain, which girds and binds the human race. To their minds it is not enough to show what events have occurred: they would fain show that events could not have occurred otherwise. They take a nation arrived at a certain stage of its history, and they affirm that it could not but follow the track which brought it thither. It is easier to make such an assertion than to show by what means the nation might have adopted a better course.

Historians living in democratic times not only deny that a few individuals can influence the fate of a people, but they also strip the people of the ability to change their own situation, placing them under either an unyielding fate or some random necessity. According to them, each nation is inextricably linked by its circumstances, origins, past actions, and character to a specific fate that no effort can alter. They tie each generation to those before it, and by tracing back through time and necessity to the beginning of the world, they create a vast chain that restricts and binds humanity. For them, it’s not enough to explain what events have happened; they also want to prove that those events could not have happened any other way. They examine a nation at a particular point in its history and assert that it had no choice but to follow the path that led it there. It’s much easier to make this claim than to demonstrate how the nation could have chosen a better path.

In reading the historians of aristocratic ages, and especially those of antiquity, it would seem that, to be master of his lot, and to govern his fellow-creatures, man requires only to be master of himself. In perusing the historical volumes which our age has produced, it would seem that man is utterly powerless over himself and over all around him. The historians of antiquity taught how to command: those of our time teach only how to obey; in their writings the author often appears great, but humanity is always diminutive. If this doctrine of necessity, which is so attractive to those who write history in democratic ages, passes from authors to their readers, till it infects the whole mass of the community and gets possession of the public mind, it will soon paralyze the activity of modern society, and reduce Christians to the level of the Turks. I would moreover observe, that such principles are peculiarly dangerous at the period at which we are arrived. Our contemporaries are but too prone to doubt of the human free-will, because each of them feels himself confined on every side by his own weakness; but they are still willing to acknowledge the strength and independence of men united in society. Let not this principle be lost sight of; for the great object in our time is to raise the faculties of men, not to complete their prostration.

When reading historians from aristocratic periods, especially those from ancient times, it seems that to take control of one’s fate and lead others, a person only needs to master themselves. In looking through the historical works produced in our era, it appears that people are completely powerless over themselves and everything around them. Historians of the past taught how to take charge; today’s historians only show how to follow orders. In their writings, the author often seems impressive, but humanity is always portrayed as small. If this appealing notion of necessity, which captivates those who write history in democratic times, spreads from authors to their readers, infecting the entire community and taking hold of public opinion, it will soon paralyze the actions of modern society and reduce Christians to the same level as the Turks. I would also point out that these ideas are especially dangerous at this moment in time. Our contemporaries are all too eager to doubt human free will, as each individual feels trapped by their own weaknesses; however, they are still willing to recognize the strength and independence of people together in society. Let’s not lose sight of this principle; the main goal in our time is to elevate the abilities of individuals, not to further debase them.





Chapter XXI: Of Parliamentary Eloquence In The United States

Amongst aristocratic nations all the members of the community are connected with and dependent upon each other; the graduated scale of different ranks acts as a tie, which keeps everyone in his proper place and the whole body in subordination. Something of the same kind always occurs in the political assemblies of these nations. Parties naturally range themselves under certain leaders, whom they obey by a sort of instinct, which is only the result of habits contracted elsewhere. They carry the manners of general society into the lesser assemblage.

Among aristocratic nations, all members of the community are connected and reliant on one another; the hierarchy of different ranks serves as a bond that keeps everyone in their appropriate position and the entire group in order. A similar dynamic always happens in the political gatherings of these nations. Groups naturally align themselves under specific leaders, whom they follow almost instinctively, a behavior that stems from habits formed in other contexts. They bring the social norms of broader society into the smaller assembly.

In democratic countries it often happens that a great number of citizens are tending to the same point; but each one only moves thither, or at least flatters himself that he moves, of his own accord. Accustomed to regulate his doings by personal impulse alone, he does not willingly submit to dictation from without. This taste and habit of independence accompany him into the councils of the nation. If he consents to connect himself with other men in the prosecution of the same purpose, at least he chooses to remain free to contribute to the common success after his own fashion. Hence it is that in democratic countries parties are so impatient of control, and are never manageable except in moments of great public danger. Even then, the authority of leaders, which under such circumstances may be able to make men act or speak, hardly ever reaches the extent of making them keep silence.

In democratic countries, it's common for a lot of citizens to focus on the same goal; however, each person believes they are doing this on their own. Used to following their own impulses, they are reluctant to take orders from anyone else. This desire and habit of independence follow them into national decision-making. Even if they agree to join forces with others to achieve a common goal, they still want the freedom to contribute in their own way. That's why political parties in democratic nations are often resistant to control and are only manageable in times of significant public crisis. Even then, while leaders may be able to prompt people to act or speak, they seldom have the power to make them stay silent.

Amongst aristocratic nations the members of political assemblies are at the same time members of the aristocracy. Each of them enjoys high established rank in his own right, and the position which he occupies in the assembly is often less important in his eyes than that which he fills in the country. This consoles him for playing no part in the discussion of public affairs, and restrains him from too eagerly attempting to play an insignificant one.

Among aristocratic nations, members of political assemblies are also part of the aristocracy. Each person has a high rank by their own merit, and the role they play in the assembly often seems less significant to them than their status in the country. This makes them feel better about not being involved in public affairs and prevents them from being too eager to take on a minor role.

In America, it generally happens that a Representative only becomes somebody from his position in the Assembly. He is therefore perpetually haunted by a craving to acquire importance there, and he feels a petulant desire to be constantly obtruding his opinions upon the House. His own vanity is not the only stimulant which urges him on in this course, but that of his constituents, and the continual necessity of propitiating them. Amongst aristocratic nations a member of the legislature is rarely in strict dependence upon his constituents: he is frequently to them a sort of unavoidable representative; sometimes they are themselves strictly dependent upon him; and if at length they reject him, he may easily get elected elsewhere, or, retiring from public life, he may still enjoy the pleasures of splendid idleness. In a democratic country like the United States a Representative has hardly ever a lasting hold on the minds of his constituents. However small an electoral body may be, the fluctuations of democracy are constantly changing its aspect; it must, therefore, be courted unceasingly. He is never sure of his supporters, and, if they forsake him, he is left without a resource; for his natural position is not sufficiently elevated for him to be easily known to those not close to him; and, with the complete state of independence prevailing among the people, he cannot hope that his friends or the government will send him down to be returned by an electoral body unacquainted with him. The seeds of his fortune are, therefore, sown in his own neighborhood; from that nook of earth he must start, to raise himself to the command of a people and to influence the destinies of the world. Thus it is natural that in democratic countries the members of political assemblies think more of their constituents than of their party, whilst in aristocracies they think more of their party than of their constituents.

In America, a Representative usually only gains significance from their role in the Assembly. As a result, they are constantly driven by a desire to gain importance there, and they feel an impatient urge to push their opinions on the House. Their own vanity isn't the only thing motivating them; it's also their constituents and the ongoing need to win them over. In aristocratic nations, a legislator is rarely completely dependent on their constituents; they often serve as an unavoidable representative to them. Sometimes, the constituents might even depend on the legislator. If they decide to reject him, he can easily get elected elsewhere, or if he steps back from public life, he can still enjoy the luxury of doing nothing. In a democratic country like the United States, a Representative hardly ever has a lasting connection with their constituents. No matter how small the voting group may be, the constant shifts of democracy keep changing its dynamics; therefore, they must constantly seek approval. A Representative can never be sure of their supporters, and if they abandon him, he is left with no options. His position isn’t high enough for him to be well-known to those outside his circle; and with the strong independence among the people, he can't expect his friends or the government to help him get reelected by people who don’t know him. So, the foundation of his success is established in his own community; he must start there to rise to the leadership of a larger population and to influence global affairs. Thus, it’s natural that in democratic countries, members of political assemblies focus more on their constituents than on their party, whereas in aristocracies, they prioritize their party over their constituents.

But what ought to be said to gratify constituents is not always what ought to be said in order to serve the party to which Representatives profess to belong. The general interest of a party frequently demands that members belonging to it should not speak on great questions which they understand imperfectly; that they should speak but little on those minor questions which impede the great ones; lastly, and for the most part, that they should not speak at all. To keep silence is the most useful service that an indifferent spokesman can render to the commonwealth. Constituents, however, do not think so. The population of a district sends a representative to take a part in the government of a country, because they entertain a very lofty notion of his merits. As men appear greater in proportion to the littleness of the objects by which they are surrounded, it may be assumed that the opinion entertained of the delegate will be so much the higher as talents are more rare among his constituents. It will therefore frequently happen that the less constituents have to expect from their representative, the more they will anticipate from him; and, however incompetent he may be, they will not fail to call upon him for signal exertions, corresponding to the rank they have conferred upon him.

But what needs to be said to please constituents isn’t always what should be said to support the party that Representatives claim to represent. Often, the party's overall interest requires its members to avoid discussing major issues that they only partially understand; they should also limit their comments on minor matters that distract from the important ones; and, for the most part, they should just stay quiet. Staying silent is the most helpful thing an uninformed spokesperson can do for the community. However, constituents don’t see it that way. The people in a district send a representative to participate in the government because they have a very high opinion of his abilities. As people seem more impressive against the backdrop of smaller things, it’s likely that the higher the perceived talents of the representative’s constituents, the loftier the view they’ll have of him. This often means that the less constituents can realistically expect from their representative, the more they will expect from him, and no matter how unqualified he may be, they will still demand exceptional efforts that match the status they’ve given him.

Independently of his position as a legislator of the State, electors also regard their Representative as the natural patron of the constituency in the Legislature; they almost consider him as the proxy of each of his supporters, and they flatter themselves that he will not be less zealous in defense of their private interests than of those of the country. Thus electors are well assured beforehand that the Representative of their choice will be an orator; that he will speak often if he can, and that in case he is forced to refrain, he will strive at any rate to compress into his less frequent orations an inquiry into all the great questions of state, combined with a statement of all the petty grievances they have themselves to complain to; so that, though he be not able to come forward frequently, he should on each occasion prove what he is capable of doing; and that, instead of perpetually lavishing his powers, he should occasionally condense them in a small compass, so as to furnish a sort of complete and brilliant epitome of his constituents and of himself. On these terms they will vote for him at the next election. These conditions drive worthy men of humble abilities to despair, who, knowing their own powers, would never voluntarily have come forward. But thus urged on, the Representative begins to speak, to the great alarm of his friends; and rushing imprudently into the midst of the most celebrated orators, he perplexes the debate and wearies the House.

Regardless of his role as a legislator, voters also see their Representative as the natural advocate for their constituency in the Legislature; they almost view him as the voice for each of his supporters, believing he will be just as committed to defending their personal interests as he is to those of the country. This means voters are confident that the Representative they choose will be a speaker; he will talk often if possible, and if he has to hold back, he will still try to fit in a discussion of all the major state issues along with a summary of all their minor complaints. Even if he can’t speak frequently, he should show what he can do each time he does; instead of constantly using up his energy, he should occasionally consolidate it into a powerful compact speech that represents both his constituents and himself. Under these conditions, they will vote for him in the next election. These expectations can lead to despair among capable but ordinary individuals who would never have stepped forward on their own. However, feeling pressured, the Representative begins to speak, causing great concern among his supporters; and as he impulsively throws himself into the ranks of the most famous speakers, he muddles the debate and tires out the House.

All laws which tend to make the Representative more dependent on the elector, not only affect the conduct of the legislators, as I have remarked elsewhere, but also their language. They exercise a simultaneous influence on affairs themselves, and on the manner in which affairs are discussed.

All laws that make the Representative more dependent on the voter not only impact how legislators behave, as I’ve noted before, but also the way they speak. They simultaneously influence both the issues at hand and the way those issues are discussed.

There is hardly a member of Congress who can make up his mind to go home without having despatched at least one speech to his constituents; nor who will endure any interruption until he has introduced into his harangue whatever useful suggestions may be made touching the four-and-twenty States of which the Union is composed, and especially the district which he represents. He therefore presents to the mind of his auditors a succession of great general truths (which he himself only comprehends, and expresses, confusedly), and of petty minutia, which he is but too able to discover and to point out. The consequence is that the debates of that great assembly are frequently vague and perplexed, and that they seem rather to drag their slow length along than to advance towards a distinct object. Some such state of things will, I believe, always arise in the public assemblies of democracies.

There's hardly a member of Congress who can decide to go home without delivering at least one speech to their constituents, nor will anyone tolerate interruptions until they've included any useful suggestions about the twenty-four states that make up the Union, especially regarding the district they represent. They present their audience with a series of grand general truths (which they only understand and express in a confusing way), along with trivial details that they are all too skilled at identifying and pointing out. As a result, the debates in that large assembly often end up being vague and confusing, feeling more like they're dragging on slowly than advancing toward a clear goal. I believe this kind of situation will always happen in the public gatherings of democracies.

Propitious circumstances and good laws might succeed in drawing to the legislature of a democratic people men very superior to those who are returned by the Americans to Congress; but nothing will ever prevent the men of slender abilities who sit there from obtruding themselves with complacency, and in all ways, upon the public. The evil does not appear to me to be susceptible of entire cure, because it not only originates in the tactics of that assembly, but in its constitution and in that of the country. The inhabitants of the United States seem themselves to consider the matter in this light; and they show their long experience of parliamentary life not by abstaining from making bad speeches, but by courageously submitting to hear them made. They are resigned to it, as to an evil which they know to be inevitable.

Favorable conditions and good laws might manage to attract individuals much more capable than those who are sent by Americans to Congress; however, nothing will ever stop the less talented individuals sitting there from imposing themselves confidently on the public in every way. I don’t think this issue can be completely fixed because it stems not only from the tactics of that assembly but from its structure and that of the country as well. The people of the United States seem to view it this way themselves; they demonstrate their long experience with parliamentary life not by avoiding making bad speeches but by bravely enduring them. They accept it as a problem they know is unavoidable.

We have shown the petty side of political debates in democratic assemblies—let us now exhibit the more imposing one. The proceedings within the Parliament of England for the last one hundred and fifty years have never occasioned any great sensation out of that country; the opinions and feelings expressed by the speakers have never awakened much sympathy, even amongst the nations placed nearest to the great arena of British liberty; whereas Europe was excited by the very first debates which took place in the small colonial assemblies of America at the time of the Revolution. This was attributable not only to particular and fortuitous circumstances, but to general and lasting causes. I can conceive nothing more admirable or more powerful than a great orator debating on great questions of state in a democratic assembly. As no particular class is ever represented there by men commissioned to defend its own interests, it is always to the whole nation, and in the name of the whole nation, that the orator speaks. This expands his thoughts, and heightens his power of language. As precedents have there but little weight-as there are no longer any privileges attached to certain property, nor any rights inherent in certain bodies or in certain individuals, the mind must have recourse to general truths derived from human nature to resolve the particular question under discussion. Hence the political debates of a democratic people, however small it may be, have a degree of breadth which frequently renders them attractive to mankind. All men are interested by them, because they treat of man, who is everywhere the same. Amongst the greatest aristocratic nations, on the contrary, the most general questions are almost always argued on some special grounds derived from the practice of a particular time, or the rights of a particular class; which interest that class alone, or at most the people amongst whom that class happens to exist. It is owing to this, as much as to the greatness of the French people, and the favorable disposition of the nations who listen to them, that the great effect which the French political debates sometimes produce in the world, must be attributed. The orators of France frequently speak to mankind, even when they are addressing their countrymen only.

We have highlighted the trivial aspects of political debates in democratic assemblies—now let’s focus on the more significant ones. The discussions within the Parliament of England over the past one hundred and fifty years haven't generated much excitement outside the country; the views and emotions expressed by the speakers rarely evoke much sympathy, even from the nations closest to the center of British liberty. In contrast, Europe reacted with great interest to the very first debates held in the small colonial assemblies of America during the Revolution. This was due not only to specific and random circumstances but also to broader, lasting factors. I can't imagine anything more admirable or powerful than a great orator discussing important state issues in a democratic assembly. Since no particular class is represented there by individuals tasked with promoting their own interests, the orator speaks for the entire nation, and on behalf of the entire nation. This broadens their thinking and enhances their ability to articulate. Since precedents carry little weight there—there are no longer privileges tied to specific property, nor any rights belonging to certain groups or individuals—the mind has to rely on general truths derived from human nature to tackle the specific issue at hand. Therefore, the political debates of a democratic people, no matter how small, have a level of breadth that often makes them appealing to everyone. All people are engaged by them because they focus on humanity, which is universally the same. In the largest aristocratic nations, on the other hand, the most general questions are typically debated based on specific issues related to the practices of a certain era or the rights of a certain class, which only appeal to that class or, at most, the people among whom that class exists. This, along with the greatness of the French people and the favorable attitude of the nations that listen to them, contributes to the significant impact that French political debates can have globally. French orators often speak to humanity, even when they are addressing only their fellow countrymen.





Section 2: Influence of Democracy on the Feelings of Americans





Chapter I: Why Democratic Nations Show A More Ardent And Enduring Love Of Equality Than Of Liberty

The first and most intense passion which is engendered by the equality of conditions is, I need hardly say, the love of that same equality. My readers will therefore not be surprised that I speak of its before all others. Everybody has remarked that in our time, and especially in France, this passion for equality is every day gaining ground in the human heart. It has been said a hundred times that our contemporaries are far more ardently and tenaciously attached to equality than to freedom; but as I do not find that the causes of the fact have been sufficiently analyzed, I shall endeavor to point them out.

The first and strongest feeling that arises from equality is, I hardly need to mention, a love for that same equality. My readers won’t be surprised that I address it before anything else. Everyone has noticed that today, especially in France, this passion for equality is increasingly taking root in people's hearts. It has been said countless times that our contemporaries are much more deeply and resolutely attached to equality than to freedom; however, I believe that the reasons behind this have not been thoroughly examined, so I will try to highlight them.

It is possible to imagine an extreme point at which freedom and equality would meet and be confounded together. Let us suppose that all the members of the community take a part in the government, and that each of them has an equal right to take a part in it. As none is different from his fellows, none can exercise a tyrannical power: men will be perfectly free, because they will all be entirely equal; and they will all be perfectly equal, because they will be entirely free. To this ideal state democratic nations tend. Such is the completest form that equality can assume upon earth; but there are a thousand others which, without being equally perfect, are not less cherished by those nations.

It’s possible to picture an extreme point where freedom and equality blend together. Imagine that every member of the community participates in the government, and each one has an equal right to be involved. Since no one is different from anyone else, no one can wield tyrannical power: people will be completely free because they will all be entirely equal; and they will all be completely equal because they will be entirely free. This is the ideal state that democratic nations strive for. This represents the most complete form of equality on earth; however, there are many other forms that, while not as perfect, are still highly valued by those nations.

The principle of equality may be established in civil society, without prevailing in the political world. Equal rights may exist of indulging in the same pleasures, of entering the same professions, of frequenting the same places—in a word, of living in the same manner and seeking wealth by the same means, although all men do not take an equal share in the government. A kind of equality may even be established in the political world, though there should be no political freedom there. A man may be the equal of all his countrymen save one, who is the master of all without distinction, and who selects equally from among them all the agents of his power. Several other combinations might be easily imagined, by which very great equality would be united to institutions more or less free, or even to institutions wholly without freedom. Although men cannot become absolutely equal unless they be entirely free, and consequently equality, pushed to its furthest extent, may be confounded with freedom, yet there is good reason for distinguishing the one from the other. The taste which men have for liberty, and that which they feel for equality, are, in fact, two different things; and I am not afraid to add that, amongst democratic nations, they are two unequal things.

The principle of equality can exist in society even if it doesn't extend to the political realm. People might enjoy equal rights to pursue the same pleasures, enter the same professions, visit the same places—in short, live similarly and seek wealth through the same means, even though not everyone has an equal say in government. A form of equality could also be found in politics, even in the absence of political freedom. One person might be equal to all their fellow citizens except for one individual who rules over everyone without distinction and chooses his representatives equally from among them. There could be many other scenarios where significant equality exists alongside various degrees of freedom in institutions, or even in completely unfree institutions. While true equality can't be achieved without complete freedom, and pushing equality to its extreme can blur into freedom, it's important to differentiate between the two. The desire for liberty and the desire for equality are actually two distinct concepts, and I can confidently say that in democratic societies, they are not of equal importance.

Upon close inspection, it will be seen that there is in every age some peculiar and preponderating fact with which all others are connected; this fact almost always gives birth to some pregnant idea or some ruling passion, which attracts to itself, and bears away in its course, all the feelings and opinions of the time: it is like a great stream, towards which each of the surrounding rivulets seems to flow. Freedom has appeared in the world at different times and under various forms; it has not been exclusively bound to any social condition, and it is not confined to democracies. Freedom cannot, therefore, form the distinguishing characteristic of democratic ages. The peculiar and preponderating fact which marks those ages as its own is the equality of conditions; the ruling passion of men in those periods is the love of this equality. Ask not what singular charm the men of democratic ages find in being equal, or what special reasons they may have for clinging so tenaciously to equality rather than to the other advantages which society holds out to them: equality is the distinguishing characteristic of the age they live in; that, of itself, is enough to explain that they prefer it to all the rest.

Upon closer look, you'll see that in every era there’s a unique, dominant fact that connects to everything else; this fact usually sparks some powerful idea or strong passion that draws in and influences all the feelings and thoughts of the time: it’s like a massive river that all the smaller streams seem to flow toward. Freedom has emerged in different forms throughout history; it hasn’t been tied to any specific social condition and isn’t limited to democracies. Therefore, freedom can’t be the defining feature of democratic times. The unique and dominant fact that characterizes those times is the equality of conditions; the main passion of people during these periods is their love for this equality. Don’t ask what special appeal democratic individuals find in being equal or what specific reasons they have for holding onto equality more dearly than other benefits that society offers them: equality is the defining feature of their age; that alone is enough to explain why they prioritize it above all else.

But independently of this reason there are several others, which will at all times habitually lead men to prefer equality to freedom. If a people could ever succeed in destroying, or even in diminishing, the equality which prevails in its own body, this could only be accomplished by long and laborious efforts. Its social condition must be modified, its laws abolished, its opinions superseded, its habits changed, its manners corrupted. But political liberty is more easily lost; to neglect to hold it fast is to allow it to escape. Men therefore not only cling to equality because it is dear to them; they also adhere to it because they think it will last forever.

But aside from this reason, there are several others that consistently lead people to prefer equality over freedom. If a society were ever able to destroy, or even reduce, the equality that exists within itself, it would take a lot of time and effort to do so. Its social conditions would need to be changed, its laws overturned, its beliefs replaced, its habits altered, and its manners degraded. However, political liberty is much easier to lose; failing to actively maintain it means letting it slip away. People therefore hold onto equality not only because it means a lot to them; they also stick to it because they believe it will last forever.

That political freedom may compromise in its excesses the tranquillity, the property, the lives of individuals, is obvious to the narrowest and most unthinking minds. But, on the contrary, none but attentive and clear-sighted men perceive the perils with which equality threatens us, and they commonly avoid pointing them out. They know that the calamities they apprehend are remote, and flatter themselves that they will only fall upon future generations, for which the present generation takes but little thought. The evils which freedom sometimes brings with it are immediate; they are apparent to all, and all are more or less affected by them. The evils which extreme equality may produce are slowly disclosed; they creep gradually into the social frame; they are only seen at intervals, and at the moment at which they become most violent habit already causes them to be no longer felt. The advantages which freedom brings are only shown by length of time; and it is always easy to mistake the cause in which they originate. The advantages of equality are instantaneous, and they may constantly be traced from their source. Political liberty bestows exalted pleasures, from time to time, upon a certain number of citizens. Equality every day confers a number of small enjoyments on every man. The charms of equality are every instant felt, and are within the reach of all; the noblest hearts are not insensible to them, and the most vulgar souls exult in them. The passion which equality engenders must therefore be at once strong and general. Men cannot enjoy political liberty unpurchased by some sacrifices, and they never obtain it without great exertions. But the pleasures of equality are self-proffered: each of the petty incidents of life seems to occasion them, and in order to taste them nothing is required but to live.

That political freedom can disrupt the peace, property, and lives of individuals is clear even to the simplest minds. However, only those who are observant and insightful recognize the dangers that equality poses to us, and they often refrain from highlighting these issues. They understand that the struggles they fear are distant and reassure themselves that these problems will only affect future generations, which the present generation pays little attention to. The problems that come with freedom are immediate; they are obvious to everyone, and everyone is somewhat affected by them. The issues arising from extreme equality unfold slowly; they gradually infiltrate society, are only noticed occasionally, and by the time they become most severe, habit makes them harder to feel. The benefits of freedom reveal themselves over time, and it's usually easy to confuse their origin. In contrast, the benefits of equality are immediate and can always be traced back to their source. Political liberty occasionally offers elevated pleasures to some citizens, while equality daily provides numerous small joys to everyone. The appeal of equality is felt constantly and is accessible to all; even the noblest hearts appreciate them, and the most ordinary souls take pride in them. The desire that equality fosters must therefore be both strong and widespread. People cannot enjoy political freedom without making sacrifices, and they never achieve it without significant effort. But the joys of equality are readily available: each small event in life seems to trigger them, and to experience them, all you need to do is live.

Democratic nations are at all times fond of equality, but there are certain epochs at which the passion they entertain for it swells to the height of fury. This occurs at the moment when the old social system, long menaced, completes its own destruction after a last intestine struggle, and when the barriers of rank are at length thrown down. At such times men pounce upon equality as their booty, and they cling to it as to some precious treasure which they fear to lose. The passion for equality penetrates on every side into men's hearts, expands there, and fills them entirely. Tell them not that by this blind surrender of themselves to an exclusive passion they risk their dearest interests: they are deaf. Show them not freedom escaping from their grasp, whilst they are looking another way: they are blind—or rather, they can discern but one sole object to be desired in the universe.

Democratic nations always value equality, but there are certain times when their passion for it escalates to the point of rage. This happens when the old social system, long threatened, finally destroys itself after a last internal struggle, and when the barriers of class are finally removed. During these times, people seize equality as if it were a prize, holding on to it like a precious treasure they fear losing. The desire for equality seeps into everyone’s hearts, expands within them, and occupies them completely. Don’t tell them that by blindly giving themselves over to this singular passion, they risk their most important interests: they're not listening. Don’t show them that freedom is slipping away while they’re focused elsewhere: they can’t see it—or rather, they can only perceive one thing in the universe that they want.

What I have said is applicable to all democratic nations: what I am about to say concerns the French alone. Amongst most modern nations, and especially amongst all those of the Continent of Europe, the taste and the idea of freedom only began to exist and to extend themselves at the time when social conditions were tending to equality, and as a consequence of that very equality. Absolute kings were the most efficient levellers of ranks amongst their subjects. Amongst these nations equality preceded freedom: equality was therefore a fact of some standing when freedom was still a novelty: the one had already created customs, opinions, and laws belonging to it, when the other, alone and for the first time, came into actual existence. Thus the latter was still only an affair of opinion and of taste, whilst the former had already crept into the habits of the people, possessed itself of their manners, and given a particular turn to the smallest actions of their lives. Can it be wondered that the men of our own time prefer the one to the other?

What I just mentioned applies to all democratic countries, but what I’m about to say is specific to France. In most modern nations, especially across Europe, the appreciation and concept of freedom only started to emerge and spread when social conditions were moving towards equality, and as a result of that very equality. Absolute monarchs were the most effective at leveling social classes among their subjects. In these countries, equality came before freedom; equality was already established by the time freedom was still a new idea. The former had already created customs, opinions, and laws that were part of everyday life, while the latter was just starting to take shape. Therefore, freedom remained mostly a matter of opinion and preference, while equality had already woven itself into the habits of the people, influenced their behaviors, and shaped the smallest actions in their lives. Is it any wonder that people today prefer one over the other?

I think that democratic communities have a natural taste for freedom: left to themselves, they will seek it, cherish it, and view any privation of it with regret. But for equality, their passion is ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible: they call for equality in freedom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for equality in slavery. They will endure poverty, servitude, barbarism—but they will not endure aristocracy. This is true at all times, and especially true in our own. All men and all powers seeking to cope with this irresistible passion, will be overthrown and destroyed by it. In our age, freedom cannot be established without it, and despotism itself cannot reign without its support.

I believe that democratic communities naturally crave freedom: when left to their own devices, they will pursue it, value it, and feel regret whenever it is taken away. However, their desire for equality is intense, unquenchable, relentless, and unbeatable: they demand equality in freedom; and if they can’t achieve that, they still call for equality in oppression. They might tolerate poverty, servitude, and cruelty, but they will not accept aristocracy. This holds true at all times, but especially in our own. All people and all authorities trying to manage this unstoppable desire will be overthrown and destroyed by it. In our time, freedom cannot be established without it, and tyranny itself cannot survive without its backing.





Chapter II: Of Individualism In Democratic Countries

I have shown how it is that in ages of equality every man seeks for his opinions within himself: I am now about to show how it is that, in the same ages, all his feelings are turned towards himself alone. Individualism *a is a novel expression, to which a novel idea has given birth. Our fathers were only acquainted with egotism. Egotism is a passionate and exaggerated love of self, which leads a man to connect everything with his own person, and to prefer himself to everything in the world. Individualism is a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellow-creatures; and to draw apart with his family and his friends; so that, after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself. Egotism originates in blind instinct: individualism proceeds from erroneous judgment more than from depraved feelings; it originates as much in the deficiencies of the mind as in the perversity of the heart. Egotism blights the germ of all virtue; individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public life; but, in the long run, it attacks and destroys all others, and is at length absorbed in downright egotism. Egotism is a vice as old as the world, which does not belong to one form of society more than to another: individualism is of democratic origin, and it threatens to spread in the same ratio as the equality of conditions.

I’ve shown how in times of equality, everyone looks for their opinions within themselves; now I’ll explain how, in the same times, all their feelings are focused solely on themselves. Individualism is a new term born from a new concept. Our ancestors only knew egotism. Egotism is a passionate and exaggerated love of oneself, leading a person to connect everything to their own existence and prioritize themselves above all else. Individualism is a more mature and calm sentiment, encouraging each person to distance themselves from the crowd and create a separate space with their family and friends; once they've formed their own little circle, they willingly leave the larger society to fend for itself. Egotism springs from blind instinct, while individualism arises more from flawed judgment than from corrupted feelings; it stems as much from mental shortcomings as from moral flaws. Egotism destroys the roots of all virtues; individualism, initially, only weakens public virtues but ultimately attacks and undermines all others, eventually merging into pure egotism. Egotism is a vice as old as humanity, not tied to any specific society; individualism is a product of democracy and threatens to spread in proportion to the equality of circumstances.

a
[ [I adopt the expression of the original, however strange it may seem to the English ear, partly because it illustrates the remark on the introduction of general terms into democratic language which was made in a preceding chapter, and partly because I know of no English word exactly equivalent to the expression. The chapter itself defines the meaning attached to it by the author.—Translator's Note.]]

a
[ [I'm using the original phrase, even though it might sound odd to English speakers, partly because it supports the earlier comment about using general terms in democratic language, and partly because I can’t find an exact English equivalent. The chapter itself explains the meaning the author gives to it.—Translator's Note.]]

Amongst aristocratic nations, as families remain for centuries in the same condition, often on the same spot, all generations become as it were contemporaneous. A man almost always knows his forefathers, and respects them: he thinks he already sees his remote descendants, and he loves them. He willingly imposes duties on himself towards the former and the latter; and he will frequently sacrifice his personal gratifications to those who went before and to those who will come after him. Aristocratic institutions have, moreover, the effect of closely binding every man to several of his fellow-citizens. As the classes of an aristocratic people are strongly marked and permanent, each of them is regarded by its own members as a sort of lesser country, more tangible and more cherished than the country at large. As in aristocratic communities all the citizens occupy fixed positions, one above the other, the result is that each of them always sees a man above himself whose patronage is necessary to him, and below himself another man whose co-operation he may claim. Men living in aristocratic ages are therefore almost always closely attached to something placed out of their own sphere, and they are often disposed to forget themselves. It is true that in those ages the notion of human fellowship is faint, and that men seldom think of sacrificing themselves for mankind; but they often sacrifice themselves for other men. In democratic ages, on the contrary, when the duties of each individual to the race are much more clear, devoted service to any one man becomes more rare; the bond of human affection is extended, but it is relaxed.

Among aristocratic nations, as families remain in the same status for centuries, often in the same place, all generations seem to coexist. A person typically knows their ancestors and respects them; they imagine their distant descendants and feel love for them. They willingly take on responsibilities toward both those who came before and those who will come after them, often sacrificing their own pleasures for the sake of their predecessors and future generations. Aristocratic institutions also tightly connect individuals to many of their fellow citizens. Because the social classes in an aristocracy are clearly defined and stable, each group sees itself as a smaller community, more tangible and valued than the nation as a whole. In aristocratic societies, since citizens hold fixed ranks above and below one another, each person always looks up to someone whose support they need and down to someone whose help they can request. Therefore, people in aristocratic times are generally closely tied to those outside their immediate situation and often tend to overlook their own needs. While it’s true that in those times the sense of human connection is weak, leading people to rarely think of sacrificing for humanity, they often do make sacrifices for individual men. In contrast, during democratic times when each person's responsibilities to society are much clearer, selfless service to another individual becomes less common; the connection of human affection broadens, but it also becomes weaker.

Amongst democratic nations new families are constantly springing up, others are constantly falling away, and all that remain change their condition; the woof of time is every instant broken, and the track of generations effaced. Those who went before are soon forgotten; of those who will come after no one has any idea: the interest of man is confined to those in close propinquity to himself. As each class approximates to other classes, and intermingles with them, its members become indifferent and as strangers to one another. Aristocracy had made a chain of all the members of the community, from the peasant to the king: democracy breaks that chain, and severs every link of it. As social conditions become more equal, the number of persons increases who, although they are neither rich enough nor powerful enough to exercise any great influence over their fellow-creatures, have nevertheless acquired or retained sufficient education and fortune to satisfy their own wants. They owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands. Thus not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants, and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back forever upon himself alone, and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart.

In democratic nations, new families are constantly emerging, others are always disappearing, and those that remain are always changing. The fabric of time is continuously being disrupted, and the paths of generations are erased. Those who came before are quickly forgotten; nobody has any idea about those who will come after. People are mainly interested in those who are close to them. As each class moves closer to other classes and mixes with them, their members become indifferent and feel like strangers to one another. Aristocracy created a connection between all members of society, from the peasant to the king; democracy breaks that connection and severs every link. As social conditions become more equal, more people are neither wealthy nor powerful enough to have a significant influence over others, yet they have gained or maintained enough education and resources to meet their own needs. They owe nothing to anyone and expect nothing in return; they develop a habit of seeing themselves as independent and often believe that their entire fate lies in their own hands. Thus, democracy not only makes everyone forget their ancestors but also obscures their descendants and distances them from their contemporaries; it ultimately forces them to rely entirely on themselves and threatens to confine them within the solitude of their own hearts.





Chapter III: Individualism Stronger At The Close Of A Democratic Revolution Than At Other Periods

The period when the construction of democratic society upon the ruins of an aristocracy has just been completed, is especially that at which this separation of men from one another, and the egotism resulting from it, most forcibly strike the observation. Democratic communities not only contain a large number of independent citizens, but they are constantly filled with men who, having entered but yesterday upon their independent condition, are intoxicated with their new power. They entertain a presumptuous confidence in their strength, and as they do not suppose that they can henceforward ever have occasion to claim the assistance of their fellow-creatures, they do not scruple to show that they care for nobody but themselves.

The time when a democratic society is built on the remnants of an aristocracy is particularly when the separation between people and the resulting selfishness become most apparent. Democratic communities not only have many independent citizens but are also filled with individuals who have just recently gained their independence and are exhilarated by their newfound power. They have an overconfident belief in their strength, and since they think they will never need help from others again, they don’t hesitate to show that they only care about themselves.

An aristocracy seldom yields without a protracted struggle, in the course of which implacable animosities are kindled between the different classes of society. These passions survive the victory, and traces of them may be observed in the midst of the democratic confusion which ensues. Those members of the community who were at the top of the late gradations of rank cannot immediately forget their former greatness; they will long regard themselves as aliens in the midst of the newly composed society. They look upon all those whom this state of society has made their equals as oppressors, whose destiny can excite no sympathy; they have lost sight of their former equals, and feel no longer bound by a common interest to their fate: each of them, standing aloof, thinks that he is reduced to care for himself alone. Those, on the contrary, who were formerly at the foot of the social scale, and who have been brought up to the common level by a sudden revolution, cannot enjoy their newly acquired independence without secret uneasiness; and if they meet with some of their former superiors on the same footing as themselves, they stand aloof from them with an expression of triumph and of fear. It is, then, commonly at the outset of democratic society that citizens are most disposed to live apart. Democracy leads men not to draw near to their fellow-creatures; but democratic revolutions lead them to shun each other, and perpetuate in a state of equality the animosities which the state of inequality engendered. The great advantage of the Americans is that they have arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; and that they are born equal, instead of becoming so.

An aristocracy rarely gives up without a lengthy fight, during which deep-seated hostilities arise between different social classes. These feelings linger even after the victory, leaving remnants amidst the democratic chaos that follows. Those who were once at the top of the social hierarchy can't easily forget their past greatness; they will continue to see themselves as outsiders in the newly established society. They view everyone who is now considered their equal as oppressors, whose fate evokes no sympathy; they have lost touch with their former peers and no longer feel a connection based on shared interests: each one, isolated, believes they must look out only for themselves. Conversely, those who were previously at the bottom of the social ladder, and who have suddenly risen to an equal status due to a revolution, can't fully enjoy their newfound freedom without some underlying anxiety. When they encounter some of their former superiors who are now on the same level, they distance themselves with a mix of triumph and fear. At the beginning of a democratic society, people are often more inclined to separate from one another. Democracy doesn’t encourage people to come together; rather, democratic revolutions tend to make them avoid one another, perpetuating the resentments that inequality created while maintaining a state of equality. A significant advantage for Americans is that they have achieved democracy without experiencing a democratic revolution; they are born equal, rather than becoming equal through upheaval.





Chapter IV: That The Americans Combat The Effects Of Individualism By Free Institutions

Despotism, which is of a very timorous nature, is never more secure of continuance than when it can keep men asunder; and all is influence is commonly exerted for that purpose. No vice of the human heart is so acceptable to it as egotism: a despot easily forgives his subjects for not loving him, provided they do not love each other. He does not ask them to assist him in governing the State; it is enough that they do not aspire to govern it themselves. He stigmatizes as turbulent and unruly spirits those who would combine their exertions to promote the prosperity of the community, and, perverting the natural meaning of words, he applauds as good citizens those who have no sympathy for any but themselves. Thus the vices which despotism engenders are precisely those which equality fosters. These two things mutually and perniciously complete and assist each other. Equality places men side by side, unconnected by any common tie; despotism raises barriers to keep them asunder; the former predisposes them not to consider their fellow-creatures, the latter makes general indifference a sort of public virtue.

Despotism, which is inherently insecure, is most stable when it can keep people apart; its influence is often directed toward that goal. No flaw in human nature is as favored by despotism as egotism: a despot easily overlooks his subjects' lack of love for him as long as they don't care for one another. He doesn’t expect them to help him govern the State; it’s enough that they don’t seek to govern it themselves. He labels those who would join forces to improve the community as disruptive and unruly, while twisting language to praise as good citizens those who are only concerned with themselves. Thus, the flaws that despotism creates are exactly those that equality promotes. These two concepts feed off each other in harmful ways. Equality puts individuals next to each other without any shared connection; despotism puts up walls to keep them apart; the former encourages them not to think about their fellow beings, while the latter makes widespread indifference seem like a public virtue.

Despotism then, which is at all times dangerous, is more particularly to be feared in democratic ages. It is easy to see that in those same ages men stand most in need of freedom. When the members of a community are forced to attend to public affairs, they are necessarily drawn from the circle of their own interests, and snatched at times from self-observation. As soon as a man begins to treat of public affairs in public, he begins to perceive that he is not so independent of his fellow-men as he had at first imagined, and that, in order to obtain their support, he must often lend them his co-operation.

Despotism, which is always a threat, is especially concerning in democratic times. It's clear that during these times, people need freedom the most. When members of a community are compelled to engage in public matters, they are pulled away from their personal interests and sometimes lose sight of themselves. Once a person starts discussing public issues publicly, they realize they're not as independent from others as they initially thought, and to gain their support, they often need to collaborate with them.

When the public is supreme, there is no man who does not feel the value of public goodwill, or who does not endeavor to court it by drawing to himself the esteem and affection of those amongst whom he is to live. Many of the passions which congeal and keep asunder human hearts, are then obliged to retire and hide below the surface. Pride must be dissembled; disdain dares not break out; egotism fears its own self. Under a free government, as most public offices are elective, the men whose elevated minds or aspiring hopes are too closely circumscribed in private life, constantly feel that they cannot do without the population which surrounds them. Men learn at such times to think of their fellow-men from ambitious motives; and they frequently find it, in a manner, their interest to forget themselves.

When the public is in charge, no one fails to see the importance of public approval, or to try to earn it by winning the respect and affection of those around them. Many of the feelings that divide people have to retreat and hide beneath the surface. Pride has to be masked; disdain can’t show itself; egotism worries about its own image. In a free government, where most public positions are elected, those with high ambitions or dreams that are limited in their private lives constantly realize they can’t succeed without the support of the people around them. People learn to think about their fellow citizens out of ambition, and often find it beneficial to put their own interests aside.

I may here be met by an objection derived from electioneering intrigues, the meannesses of candidates, and the calumnies of their opponents. These are opportunities for animosity which occur the oftener the more frequent elections become. Such evils are doubtless great, but they are transient; whereas the benefits which attend them remain. The desire of being elected may lead some men for a time to violent hostility; but this same desire leads all men in the long run mutually to support each other; and if it happens that an election accidentally severs two friends, the electoral system brings a multitude of citizens permanently together, who would always have remained unknown to each other. Freedom engenders private animosities, but despotism gives birth to general indifference.

I might face an objection based on the dirty politics, the petty behavior of candidates, and the slander from their opponents. These are chances for hostility that happen more often as elections become more frequent. While these issues are certainly significant, they are temporary; the benefits that come from them last longer. The desire to win an election may drive some people to act aggressively for a time, but ultimately, this same desire encourages everyone to support one another. If an election happens to create a rift between two friends, the electoral system brings many citizens together who would have otherwise remained strangers. Freedom generates personal grudges, but tyranny leads to widespread apathy.

The Americans have combated by free institutions the tendency of equality to keep men asunder, and they have subdued it. The legislators of America did not suppose that a general representation of the whole nation would suffice to ward off a disorder at once so natural to the frame of democratic society, and so fatal: they also thought that it would be well to infuse political life into each portion of the territory, in order to multiply to an infinite extent opportunities of acting in concert for all the members of the community, and to make them constantly feel their mutual dependence on each other. The plan was a wise one. The general affairs of a country only engage the attention of leading politicians, who assemble from time to time in the same places; and as they often lose sight of each other afterwards, no lasting ties are established between them. But if the object be to have the local affairs of a district conducted by the men who reside there, the same persons are always in contact, and they are, in a manner, forced to be acquainted, and to adapt themselves to one another.

Americans have used free institutions to combat the tendency of equality to divide people, and they've succeeded. The lawmakers in America didn't think that simply having a general representation of the entire nation would be enough to prevent a disorder that's so natural in a democratic society and so destructive; they also believed it would be beneficial to encourage political engagement in every part of the country. This way, they could create countless opportunities for community members to work together and feel their mutual dependence. That was a smart plan. The broad issues of a country tend to capture the attention of top politicians, who gather occasionally in the same places, and since they often lose touch afterwards, no lasting relationships form between them. However, if local matters are handled by those who live there, the same individuals are always interacting, which compels them to know each other and adapt accordingly.

It is difficult to draw a man out of his own circle to interest him in the destiny of the State, because he does not clearly understand what influence the destiny of the State can have upon his own lot. But if it be proposed to make a road cross the end of his estate, he will see at a glance that there is a connection between this small public affair and his greatest private affairs; and he will discover, without its being shown to him, the close tie which unites private to general interest. Thus, far more may be done by intrusting to the citizens the administration of minor affairs than by surrendering to them the control of important ones, towards interesting them in the public welfare, and convincing them that they constantly stand in need one of the other in order to provide for it. A brilliant achievement may win for you the favor of a people at one stroke; but to earn the love and respect of the population which surrounds you, a long succession of little services rendered and of obscure good deeds—a constant habit of kindness, and an established reputation for disinterestedness—will be required. Local freedom, then, which leads a great number of citizens to value the affection of their neighbors and of their kindred, perpetually brings men together, and forces them to help one another, in spite of the propensities which sever them.

It’s hard to get someone out of their own bubble to care about what happens to the State because they don’t really see how the State’s future affects their own life. But if you suggest building a road that goes through the edge of their property, they’ll immediately grasp the connection between this small public issue and their biggest personal concerns; they'll realize, without needing it pointed out, how closely private interests are tied to the greater good. Therefore, you can achieve much more by allowing citizens to manage minor issues than by giving them control over major ones when it comes to getting them invested in the public welfare and helping them see that they need each other to thrive. A single impressive accomplishment might win the crowd's favor in an instant, but to gain the love and respect of the people around you requires a steady stream of little acts of service and humble good deeds—a consistent habit of kindness, and a solid reputation for selflessness. Local freedom, then, encourages many citizens to value the affection of their neighbors and family, continually bringing people together and compelling them to support one another, despite the tendencies that may otherwise divide them.

In the United States the more opulent citizens take great care not to stand aloof from the people; on the contrary, they constantly keep on easy terms with the lower classes: they listen to them, they speak to them every day. They know that the rich in democracies always stand in need of the poor; and that in democratic ages you attach a poor man to you more by your manner than by benefits conferred. The magnitude of such benefits, which sets off the difference of conditions, causes a secret irritation to those who reap advantage from them; but the charm of simplicity of manners is almost irresistible: their affability carries men away, and even their want of polish is not always displeasing. This truth does not take root at once in the minds of the rich. They generally resist it as long as the democratic revolution lasts, and they do not acknowledge it immediately after that revolution is accomplished. They are very ready to do good to the people, but they still choose to keep them at arm's length; they think that is sufficient, but they are mistaken. They might spend fortunes thus without warming the hearts of the population around them;—that population does not ask them for the sacrifice of their money, but of their pride.

In the United States, wealthy citizens make a point to stay connected with the people; in fact, they regularly maintain friendly relationships with the lower classes. They listen to them and interact with them every day. They understand that the rich in democracies always rely on the poor, and in democratic times, you connect with a poor person more through your behavior than through the help you provide. The size of such help, which highlights the differences in social status, often creates a subtle frustration for those benefiting from it; yet, the appeal of simple manners is almost undeniable. Their friendliness wins people over, and even their lack of sophistication can be endearing at times. This idea doesn't immediately resonate with the rich. They typically resist it for as long as the democratic changes are happening, and they don’t acknowledge it right after the revolution has taken place. They are eager to help the people, but they still prefer to keep them at a distance; they believe that’s enough, but they are wrong. They could spend a fortune without truly connecting with the community; that community doesn’t ask them to sacrifice their money, but rather their pride.

It would seem as if every imagination in the United States were upon the stretch to invent means of increasing the wealth and satisfying the wants of the public. The best-informed inhabitants of each district constantly use their information to discover new truths which may augment the general prosperity; and if they have made any such discoveries, they eagerly surrender them to the mass of the people.

It seems like everyone's imagination in the United States is working hard to come up with ways to increase wealth and meet the public’s needs. The most knowledgeable people in each area consistently use their insights to uncover new ideas that could boost overall prosperity, and if they do make any discoveries, they quickly share them with everyone.

When the vices and weaknesses, frequently exhibited by those who govern in America, are closely examined, the prosperity of the people occasions—but improperly occasions—surprise. Elected magistrates do not make the American democracy flourish; it flourishes because the magistrates are elective.

When we closely examine the flaws and weaknesses often shown by those in power in America, it's surprising—though it shouldn't be—that the people are doing well. Elected officials don’t make American democracy thrive; it thrives because the officials are elected.

It would be unjust to suppose that the patriotism and the zeal which every American displays for the welfare of his fellow-citizens are wholly insincere. Although private interest directs the greater part of human actions in the United States as well as elsewhere, it does not regulate them all. I must say that I have often seen Americans make great and real sacrifices to the public welfare; and I have remarked a hundred instances in which they hardly ever failed to lend faithful support to each other. The free institutions which the inhabitants of the United States possess, and the political rights of which they make so much use, remind every citizen, and in a thousand ways, that he lives in society. They every instant impress upon his mind the notion that it is the duty, as well as the interest of men, to make themselves useful to their fellow-creatures; and as he sees no particular ground of animosity to them, since he is never either their master or their slave, his heart readily leans to the side of kindness. Men attend to the interests of the public, first by necessity, afterwards by choice: what was intentional becomes an instinct; and by dint of working for the good of one's fellow citizens, the habit and the taste for serving them is at length acquired.

It would be unfair to think that the patriotism and enthusiasm every American shows for the well-being of their fellow citizens are completely fake. While personal interests drive most human actions in the United States just like everywhere else, they don’t control everything. I’ve often seen Americans make significant and genuine sacrifices for the public good, and I’ve noticed countless times when they consistently support each other. The freedoms that people in the United States enjoy, along with the political rights they actively engage with, remind every citizen in many ways that they are part of a community. These ideas constantly reinforce the belief that it’s both a duty and an interest for individuals to be helpful to others; and because there’s typically no strong resentment towards one another—since they are neither masters nor slaves—people naturally tend to be kind. Individuals look out for the public’s interests, initially out of necessity and later out of choice: what starts as a deliberate action eventually becomes instinct; and through continuously working for the benefit of their fellow citizens, they develop a habit and a taste for serving them.

Many people in France consider equality of conditions as one evil, and political freedom as a second. When they are obliged to yield to the former, they strive at least to escape from the latter. But I contend that in order to combat the evils which equality may produce, there is only one effectual remedy—namely, political freedom.

Many people in France see equality of conditions as one problem and political freedom as another. When they're forced to accept the first, they at least try to break free from the second. But I argue that the only real solution to the issues that equality can create is political freedom.





Chapter V: Of The Use Which The Americans Make Of Public Associations In Civil Life

I do not propose to speak of those political associations—by the aid of which men endeavor to defend themselves against the despotic influence of a majority—or against the aggressions of regal power. That subject I have already treated. If each citizen did not learn, in proportion as he individually becomes more feeble, and consequently more incapable of preserving his freedom single-handed, to combine with his fellow-citizens for the purpose of defending it, it is clear that tyranny would unavoidably increase together with equality.

I don't intend to discuss those political groups that help people defend themselves against the oppressive power of the majority or against the overreach of royal authority. I've already covered that topic. If every citizen doesn't realize, as they become weaker and less able to protect their freedom on their own, that they need to join forces with their fellow citizens to defend it, it's obvious that tyranny would inevitably grow along with equality.

Those associations only which are formed in civil life, without reference to political objects, are here adverted to. The political associations which exist in the United States are only a single feature in the midst of the immense assemblage of associations in that country. Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive, or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found establishments for education, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; and in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it be proposed to advance some truth, or to foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society. Wherever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association. I met with several kinds of associations in America, of which I confess I had no previous notion; and I have often admired the extreme skill with which the inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a common object to the exertions of a great many men, and in getting them voluntarily to pursue it. I have since travelled over England, whence the Americans have taken some of their laws and many of their customs; and it seemed to me that the principle of association was by no means so constantly or so adroitly used in that country. The English often perform great things singly; whereas the Americans form associations for the smallest undertakings. It is evident that the former people consider association as a powerful means of action, but the latter seem to regard it as the only means they have of acting.

This text focuses on the associations formed in civil life, not related to political purposes. The political associations in the United States are just one aspect of the vast array of associations in that country. Americans of all ages, backgrounds, and personalities consistently create associations. They not only have commercial and manufacturing companies that include everyone, but they also form a wide variety of other groups—religious, moral, serious, trivial, large, or small. Americans establish associations for entertainment, education, building inns, constructing churches, distributing books, and sending missionaries to far-off places; in doing so, they also create hospitals, prisons, and schools. If there's a need to promote some truth or nurture a feeling through a significant example, they form a society. While you might see the government in France or a person of higher status in England leading a new initiative, in the United States, you’ll usually find an association instead. I encountered several types of associations in America that I hadn’t imagined before, and I was often impressed by how effectively the people there manage to rally many individuals around a common purpose and get them to pursue it willingly. I've since traveled through England, where Americans have drawn some of their laws and customs, and I noticed that the principle of association is not as commonly or skillfully applied there. The English often achieve great things individually, while Americans create associations even for the smallest tasks. It’s clear that the former see association as a strong means of action, while the latter seem to see it as their primary way of acting.

Thus the most democratic country on the face of the earth is that in which men have in our time carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of their common desires, and have applied this new science to the greatest number of purposes. Is this the result of accident? or is there in reality any necessary connection between the principle of association and that of equality? Aristocratic communities always contain, amongst a multitude of persons who by themselves are powerless, a small number of powerful and wealthy citizens, each of whom can achieve great undertakings single-handed. In aristocratic societies men do not need to combine in order to act, because they are strongly held together. Every wealthy and powerful citizen constitutes the head of a permanent and compulsory association, composed of all those who are dependent upon him, or whom he makes subservient to the execution of his designs. Amongst democratic nations, on the contrary, all the citizens are independent and feeble; they can do hardly anything by themselves, and none of them can oblige his fellow-men to lend him their assistance. They all, therefore, fall into a state of incapacity, if they do not learn voluntarily to help each other. If men living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence would be in great jeopardy; but they might long preserve their wealth and their cultivation: whereas if they never acquired the habit of forming associations in ordinary life, civilization itself would be endangered. A people amongst which individuals should lose the power of achieving great things single-handed, without acquiring the means of producing them by united exertions, would soon relapse into barbarism.

The most democratic country in the world is one where people today have perfected the art of pursuing their shared goals together and have applied this new approach to a wide range of purposes. Is this just a coincidence, or is there a real connection between the idea of working together and the principle of equality? In aristocratic societies, you often find a small group of powerful and wealthy individuals among many who are powerless on their own. These wealthy individuals can take on significant projects by themselves. In these societies, people don't need to work together to take action because they are tightly united. Each wealthy and powerful person acts as the head of a permanent and forced group made up of those who rely on them or who they have subordinated to help carry out their plans. In contrast, in democratic nations, all citizens are independent and weak; they can't accomplish much alone, and no one can force others to assist them. They all risk becoming ineffective unless they learn to voluntarily support each other. If people in democratic countries had neither the right nor the desire to come together for political purposes, their independence would be at serious risk, but they might still manage to maintain their wealth and education. However, if they never developed the habit of forming groups in everyday life, civilization itself could be in danger. A society where individuals lose the ability to achieve great things on their own without finding ways to do so through combined effort would soon fall back into barbarism.

Unhappily, the same social condition which renders associations so necessary to democratic nations, renders their formation more difficult amongst those nations than amongst all others. When several members of an aristocracy agree to combine, they easily succeed in doing so; as each of them brings great strength to the partnership, the number of its members may be very limited; and when the members of an association are limited in number, they may easily become mutually acquainted, understand each other, and establish fixed regulations. The same opportunities do not occur amongst democratic nations, where the associated members must always be very numerous for their association to have any power.

Unfortunately, the same social condition that makes associations so essential for democratic nations also makes it harder to form them than in other nations. When several members of an aristocracy decide to come together, they can easily do so; each one contributes significant strength to the group, so the number of members can be quite small. When an association has a limited number of members, they can easily get to know each other, understand one another, and establish clear rules. The same opportunities don’t exist in democratic nations, where the members must always be numerous for their association to have any real power.

I am aware that many of my countrymen are not in the least embarrassed by this difficulty. They contend that the more enfeebled and incompetent the citizens become, the more able and active the government ought to be rendered, in order that society at large may execute what individuals can no longer accomplish. They believe this answers the whole difficulty, but I think they are mistaken. A government might perform the part of some of the largest American companies; and several States, members of the Union, have already attempted it; but what political power could ever carry on the vast multitude of lesser undertakings which the American citizens perform every day, with the assistance of the principle of association? It is easy to foresee that the time is drawing near when man will be less and less able to produce, of himself alone, the commonest necessaries of life. The task of the governing power will therefore perpetually increase, and its very efforts will extend it every day. The more it stands in the place of associations, the more will individuals, losing the notion of combining together, require its assistance: these are causes and effects which unceasingly engender each other. Will the administration of the country ultimately assume the management of all the manufacturers, which no single citizen is able to carry on? And if a time at length arrives, when, in consequence of the extreme subdivision of landed property, the soil is split into an infinite number of parcels, so that it can only be cultivated by companies of husbandmen, will it be necessary that the head of the government should leave the helm of state to follow the plough? The morals and the intelligence of a democratic people would be as much endangered as its business and manufactures, if the government ever wholly usurped the place of private companies.

I know that many people in my country aren’t at all troubled by this issue. They argue that as citizens become weaker and less capable, the government should be more active and powerful to help society do what individuals can no longer manage. They believe this solves the problem, but I think they’re wrong. A government could take on some roles of the largest American companies, and some states have already tried this; but what political power could ever handle the countless smaller tasks that American citizens take care of every day, with the help of collaboration? It’s easy to see that the time is coming when people will be less and less able to produce the most basic necessities of life on their own. Therefore, the government’s responsibilities will keep growing, and its actions will expand those needs every day. The more it replaces collaboration, the more individuals, losing the sense of working together, will need its help: these are causes and effects that continuously create each other. Will the government eventually take over all the industries that no individual can manage? And if we reach a point where, due to extreme division of land ownership, the land is broken into countless parcels, so it can only be farmed by groups of farmers, will the head of the government have to abandon their leadership to work the fields? The morals and intelligence of a democratic people would be just as endangered as their businesses and industries if the government completely took over the role of private companies.

Feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is developed by no other means than by the reciprocal influence of men upon each other. I have shown that these influences are almost null in democratic countries; they must therefore be artificially created, and this can only be accomplished by associations.

Feelings and opinions are formed, the heart is opened, and the human mind grows only through the mutual influence people have on one another. I've pointed out that these influences are nearly non-existent in democratic countries; therefore, they need to be artificially created, and this can only happen through associations.

When the members of an aristocratic community adopt a new opinion, or conceive a new sentiment, they give it a station, as it were, beside themselves, upon the lofty platform where they stand; and opinions or sentiments so conspicuous to the eyes of the multitude are easily introduced into the minds or hearts of all around. In democratic countries the governing power alone is naturally in a condition to act in this manner; but it is easy to see that its action is always inadequate, and often dangerous. A government can no more be competent to keep alive and to renew the circulation of opinions and feelings amongst a great people, than to manage all the speculations of productive industry. No sooner does a government attempt to go beyond its political sphere and to enter upon this new track, than it exercises, even unintentionally, an insupportable tyranny; for a government can only dictate strict rules, the opinions which it favors are rigidly enforced, and it is never easy to discriminate between its advice and its commands. Worse still will be the case if the government really believes itself interested in preventing all circulation of ideas; it will then stand motionless, and oppressed by the heaviness of voluntary torpor. Governments therefore should not be the only active powers: associations ought, in democratic nations, to stand in lieu of those powerful private individuals whom the equality of conditions has swept away.

When members of an aristocratic community adopt a new opinion or develop a new sentiment, they elevate it, so to speak, beside themselves on the high platform where they stand. Opinions or sentiments made so visible to the public are easily accepted by everyone around. In democratic countries, only the governing power can naturally act in this way; however, it’s clear that its efforts are often insufficient and can be dangerous. A government can’t effectively keep the flow of opinions and feelings alive among a large population any more than it can manage all the complexities of productive industry. Once a government tries to step beyond its political role and take on this new task, it ends up imposing an unbearable tyranny, even if unintentionally; for a government can only enforce strict rules, the opinions it supports are rigidly imposed, and it’s never simple to tell the difference between its guidance and its orders. It gets even worse if the government genuinely believes it's in its interest to suppress the exchange of ideas; it will then become stagnant, weighed down by a self-imposed inertia. Therefore, governments shouldn’t be the sole active forces: associations should fill the role of those powerful private individuals who have been eliminated by equal conditions in democratic nations.

As soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion or a feeling which they wish to promote in the world, they look out for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found each other out, they combine. From that moment they are no longer isolated men, but a power seen from afar, whose actions serve for an example, and whose language is listened to. The first time I heard in the United States that 100,000 men had bound themselves publicly to abstain from spirituous liquors, it appeared to me more like a joke than a serious engagement; and I did not at once perceive why these temperate citizens could not content themselves with drinking water by their own firesides. I at last understood that 300,000 Americans, alarmed by the progress of drunkenness around them, had made up their minds to patronize temperance. They acted just in the same way as a man of high rank who should dress very plainly, in order to inspire the humbler orders with a contempt of luxury. It is probable that if these 100,000 men had lived in France, each of them would singly have memorialized the government to watch the public-houses all over the kingdom.

As soon as several people in the United States hold an opinion or feeling they want to promote, they seek out others for support; and once they find each other, they come together. From that moment, they are no longer individuals, but a powerful force that can be seen from afar, whose actions serve as an example, and whose words are listened to. The first time I heard in the United States that 100,000 people had publicly committed to abstaining from alcohol, I thought it was more of a joke than a serious commitment; I didn’t immediately understand why these sober individuals couldn’t just enjoy water at home. Eventually, I realized that 300,000 Americans, concerned about the rise of alcoholism around them, decided to promote temperance. They acted just like a high-ranking person who would dress simply to encourage lower classes to look down on luxury. It’s likely that if these 100,000 people had lived in France, each one of them would have individually petitioned the government to keep an eye on taverns across the country.

Nothing, in my opinion, is more deserving of our attention than the intellectual and moral associations of America. The political and industrial associations of that country strike us forcibly; but the others elude our observation, or if we discover them, we understand them imperfectly, because we have hardly ever seen anything of the kind. It must, however, be acknowledged that they are as necessary to the American people as the former, and perhaps more so. In democratic countries the science of association is the mother of science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made. Amongst the laws which rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized, or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.

Nothing is more deserving of our attention than the intellectual and moral connections of America. The political and industrial connections of that country hit us hard; however, the others often go unnoticed, or if we do notice them, we only grasp them partially because we rarely see anything like them. It should be noted, though, that these connections are just as essential to the American people as the former, and maybe even more so. In democratic nations, the science of association is fundamental to all knowledge; the advancement of all other fields relies on its progress. Among the laws that govern human societies, there seems to be one that is clearer and more precise than the rest. If people are to stay civilized, or become civilized, the ability to associate with one another must evolve and improve in direct proportion to the increased equality of conditions.





Chapter VI: Of The Relation Between Public Associations And Newspapers

When men are no longer united amongst themselves by firm and lasting ties, it is impossible to obtain the cooperation of any great number of them, unless you can persuade every man whose concurrence you require that this private interest obliges him voluntarily to unite his exertions to the exertions of all the rest. This can only be habitually and conveniently effected by means of a newspaper; nothing but a newspaper can drop the same thought into a thousand minds at the same moment. A newspaper is an adviser who does not require to be sought, but who comes of his own accord, and talks to you briefly every day of the common weal, without distracting you from your private affairs.

When people are no longer connected by strong and lasting relationships, it's impossible to get a large group of them to work together unless you can convince each individual that their personal interests compel them to join their efforts with everyone else's. This is best and most easily achieved through a newspaper; only a newspaper can spread the same idea into a thousand minds all at once. A newspaper is like a helpful advisor that you don’t have to go looking for; it shows up on its own and gives you a quick daily update on the common good without pulling you away from your personal concerns.

Newspapers therefore become more necessary in proportion as men become more equal, and individualism more to be feared. To suppose that they only serve to protect freedom would be to diminish their importance: they maintain civilization. I shall not deny that in democratic countries newspapers frequently lead the citizens to launch together in very ill-digested schemes; but if there were no newspapers there would be no common activity. The evil which they produce is therefore much less than that which they cure.

Newspapers become more essential as people become more equal, and individualism becomes more concerning. To think that they only exist to protect freedom would underestimate their significance: they sustain civilization. I won’t deny that in democratic countries, newspapers often push citizens to jump into poorly thought-out plans together; however, without newspapers, there would be no collective action. The harm they cause is therefore much less than the problems they resolve.

The effect of a newspaper is not only to suggest the same purpose to a great number of persons, but also to furnish means for executing in common the designs which they may have singly conceived. The principal citizens who inhabit an aristocratic country discern each other from afar; and if they wish to unite their forces, they move towards each other, drawing a multitude of men after them. It frequently happens, on the contrary, in democratic countries, that a great number of men who wish or who want to combine cannot accomplish it, because as they are very insignificant and lost amidst the crowd, they cannot see, and know not where to find, one another. A newspaper then takes up the notion or the feeling which had occurred simultaneously, but singly, to each of them. All are then immediately guided towards this beacon; and these wandering minds, which had long sought each other in darkness, at length meet and unite.

The impact of a newspaper is not just to suggest the same goal to a large group of people, but also to provide a way for them to work together on ideas they may have independently thought of. In an aristocratic society, prominent citizens can easily recognize each other from a distance; if they want to join forces, they move toward each other and draw a crowd along with them. In democratic societies, however, many people who want to come together often struggle to do so because they feel insignificant and lost in the masses, making it hard for them to see or find one another. A newspaper then picks up on the ideas or feelings that each individual had simultaneously but separately. It guides everyone toward this shared focus; these wandering thoughts, which had been searching for each other in the dark, finally come together.

The newspaper brought them together, and the newspaper is still necessary to keep them united. In order that an association amongst a democratic people should have any power, it must be a numerous body. The persons of whom it is composed are therefore scattered over a wide extent, and each of them is detained in the place of his domicile by the narrowness of his income, or by the small unremitting exertions by which he earns it. Means then must be found to converse every day without seeing each other, and to take steps in common without having met. Thus hardly any democratic association can do without newspapers. There is consequently a necessary connection between public associations and newspapers: newspapers make associations, and associations make newspapers; and if it has been correctly advanced that associations will increase in number as the conditions of men become more equal, it is not less certain that the number of newspapers increases in proportion to that of associations. Thus it is in America that we find at the same time the greatest number of associations and of newspapers.

The newspaper brought them together, and it’s still essential to keep them united. For an association among a democratic people to have any influence, it needs to be a large group. The people in it are spread out over a wide area, and each one is held back in their own space by their limited income or by the constant, small efforts they put into earning it. So, we need a way to communicate every day without seeing each other, and to take collective action without meeting up. That’s why hardly any democratic association can exist without newspapers. There’s a necessary link between public associations and newspapers: newspapers create associations, and associations create newspapers; and if it’s true that the number of associations will grow as people become more equal, it’s equally true that the number of newspapers increases along with the number of associations. Thus, in America, we find the greatest number of associations and newspapers at the same time.

This connection between the number of newspapers and that of associations leads us to the discovery of a further connection between the state of the periodical press and the form of the administration in a country; and shows that the number of newspapers must diminish or increase amongst a democratic people, in proportion as its administration is more or less centralized. For amongst democratic nations the exercise of local powers cannot be intrusted to the principal members of the community as in aristocracies. Those powers must either be abolished, or placed in the hands of very large numbers of men, who then in fact constitute an association permanently established by law for the purpose of administering the affairs of a certain extent of territory; and they require a journal, to bring to them every day, in the midst of their own minor concerns, some intelligence of the state of their public weal. The more numerous local powers are, the greater is the number of men in whom they are vested by law; and as this want is hourly felt, the more profusely do newspapers abound.

This link between the number of newspapers and the number of associations leads us to discover another connection between the state of the press and the type of government in a country. It shows that the number of newspapers will either decrease or increase among a democratic population depending on whether the government is more or less centralized. In democratic nations, local powers can't be entrusted to just a few key members of the community as they are in aristocracies. Those powers must either be abolished or given to a large number of people, who then essentially form an association established by law to manage the affairs of a specific area. They need a newspaper to provide daily updates on the state of their public interests amidst their local concerns. The more local powers there are, the greater the number of people legally given those powers; and as this need is constantly felt, newspapers are more likely to thrive.

The extraordinary subdivision of administrative power has much more to do with the enormous number of American newspapers than the great political freedom of the country and the absolute liberty of the press. If all the inhabitants of the Union had the suffrage—but a suffrage which should only extend to the choice of their legislators in Congress—they would require but few newspapers, because they would only have to act together on a few very important but very rare occasions. But within the pale of the great association of the nation, lesser associations have been established by law in every country, every city, and indeed in every village, for the purposes of local administration. The laws of the country thus compel every American to co-operate every day of his life with some of his fellow-citizens for a common purpose, and each one of them requires a newspaper to inform him what all the others are doing.

The remarkable division of administrative power is much more related to the vast number of American newspapers than to the country’s great political freedom and the complete liberty of the press. If all the citizens of the Union had the right to vote—but that right only extended to choosing their legislators in Congress—they would need very few newspapers, as they would only need to act together on a few significant but infrequent occasions. However, within the framework of the nation’s larger association, smaller associations have been established by law in every state, every city, and indeed in every village, for local administration purposes. The laws of the country therefore require every American to work together every day with some of their fellow citizens for a common goal, and each person needs a newspaper to keep up with what everyone else is doing.

I am of opinion that a democratic people, *a without any national representative assemblies, but with a great number of small local powers, would have in the end more newspapers than another people governed by a centralized administration and an elective legislation. What best explains to me the enormous circulation of the daily press in the United States, is that amongst the Americans I find the utmost national freedom combined with local freedom of every kind. There is a prevailing opinion in France and England that the circulation of newspapers would be indefinitely increased by removing the taxes which have been laid upon the press. This is a very exaggerated estimate of the effects of such a reform. Newspapers increase in numbers, not according to their cheapness, but according to the more or less frequent want which a great number of men may feel for intercommunication and combination.

I believe that a democratic society, without any national representative assemblies but with many small local powers, would ultimately have more newspapers than a society governed by a centralized administration and elected representatives. What best explains the huge circulation of daily newspapers in the United States is that among Americans, there is a strong sense of national freedom combined with all kinds of local freedom. There is a common belief in France and England that removing the taxes imposed on the press would greatly increase newspaper circulation. This is an exaggerated view of the impacts of such a change. The number of newspapers grows not because they are cheaper, but because a large number of people have a more or less frequent need for communication and collaboration.

a
[ I say a democratic people: the administration of an aristocratic people may be the reverse of centralized, and yet the want of newspapers be little felt, because local powers are then vested in the hands of a very small number of men, who either act apart, or who know each other and can easily meet and come to an understanding.]

a
[ I refer to a democratic society: the governance of an aristocratic society might not be centralized at all, and yet the absence of newspapers may not be significantly noticed, because local authority is concentrated in the hands of a very small group of individuals, who either operate independently or are familiar with one another and can easily gather and reach an agreement.]

In like manner I should attribute the increasing influence of the daily press to causes more general than those by which it is commonly explained. A newspaper can only subsist on the condition of publishing sentiments or principles common to a large number of men. A newspaper therefore always represents an association which is composed of its habitual readers. This association may be more or less defined, more or less restricted, more or less numerous; but the fact that the newspaper keeps alive, is a proof that at least the germ of such an association exists in the minds of its readers.

Similarly, I would say that the growing impact of daily newspapers is due to broader causes than those usually cited. A newspaper can only survive by sharing opinions or ideas that resonate with a large group of people. Therefore, a newspaper always reflects a community made up of its regular readers. This community can be more or less defined, more or less exclusive, and more or less numerous; but the fact that the newspaper continues to exist shows that at least some connection among its readers exists.

This leads me to a last reflection, with which I shall conclude this chapter. The more equal the conditions of men become, and the less strong men individually are, the more easily do they give way to the current of the multitude, and the more difficult is it for them to adhere by themselves to an opinion which the multitude discard. A newspaper represents an association; it may be said to address each of its readers in the name of all the others, and to exert its influence over them in proportion to their individual weakness. The power of the newspaper press must therefore increase as the social conditions of men become more equal.

This brings me to my final thought, which I'll use to wrap up this chapter. As people's circumstances become more equal and as individuals grow weaker, they tend to follow the crowd more easily, making it harder for them to stick to opinions that the majority rejects. A newspaper acts as a collective; it can be said to speak to each reader on behalf of all the others and exerts its influence based on their individual vulnerabilities. Consequently, the power of the newspaper press must grow as social conditions become more equal among people.





Chapter VII: Connection Of Civil And Political Associations

There is only one country on the face of the earth where the citizens enjoy unlimited freedom of association for political purposes. This same country is the only one in the world where the continual exercise of the right of association has been introduced into civil life, and where all the advantages which civilization can confer are procured by means of it. In all the countries where political associations are prohibited, civil associations are rare. It is hardly probable that this is the result of accident; but the inference should rather be, that there is a natural, and perhaps a necessary, connection between these two kinds of associations. Certain men happen to have a common interest in some concern—either a commercial undertaking is to be managed, or some speculation in manufactures to be tried; they meet, they combine, and thus by degrees they become familiar with the principle of association. The greater is the multiplicity of small affairs, the more do men, even without knowing it, acquire facility in prosecuting great undertakings in common. Civil associations, therefore, facilitate political association: but, on the other hand, political association singularly strengthens and improves associations for civil purposes. In civil life every man may, strictly speaking, fancy that he can provide for his own wants; in politics, he can fancy no such thing. When a people, then, have any knowledge of public life, the notion of association, and the wish to coalesce, present themselves every day to the minds of the whole community: whatever natural repugnance may restrain men from acting in concert, they will always be ready to combine for the sake of a party. Thus political life makes the love and practice of association more general; it imparts a desire of union, and teaches the means of combination to numbers of men who would have always lived apart.

There is only one country in the world where citizens enjoy unlimited freedom to associate for political reasons. This same country is the only one where the continuous exercise of the right to associate is part of civil life, and where all the benefits that civilization can offer are gained through it. In all the countries where political associations are banned, civil associations are rare. It's unlikely this is just a coincidence; rather, it suggests that there’s a natural, and perhaps necessary, link between these two types of associations. Certain individuals share a common interest in some venture—whether it's managing a business or trying out a manufacturing idea; they come together, they collaborate, and little by little, they become familiar with the concept of association. The more small-scale projects there are, the more people, even without realizing it, become skilled at working on larger shared initiatives. Civil associations, therefore, make political associations easier; conversely, political associations significantly strengthen and enhance civil associations. In daily life, every individual might believe they can meet their own needs; in politics, they can’t think that way. When people have any awareness of public life, the idea of associating and the desire to come together arise daily in the minds of the entire community: whatever natural hesitations may hold people back from collaborating, they will always be inclined to unite for the sake of a cause. Thus, political life makes the appreciation and practice of association more widespread; it fosters a desire for unity and teaches many people how to come together who otherwise would have stayed apart.

Politics not only give birth to numerous associations, but to associations of great extent. In civil life it seldom happens that any one interest draws a very large number of men to act in concert; much skill is required to bring such an interest into existence: but in politics opportunities present themselves every day. Now it is solely in great associations that the general value of the principle of association is displayed. Citizens who are individually powerless, do not very clearly anticipate the strength which they may acquire by uniting together; it must be shown to them in order to be understood. Hence it is often easier to collect a multitude for a public purpose than a few persons; a thousand citizens do not see what interest they have in combining together—ten thousand will be perfectly aware of it. In politics men combine for great undertakings; and the use they make of the principle of association in important affairs practically teaches them that it is their interest to help each other in those of less moment. A political association draws a number of individuals at the same time out of their own circle: however they may be naturally kept asunder by age, mind, and fortune, it places them nearer together and brings them into contact. Once met, they can always meet again.

Politics not only create many organizations but also large ones. In everyday life, it's rare for any single interest to bring together a significant number of people to work together; it takes a lot of skill to make such an interest thrive. However, in politics, opportunities arise daily. The true value of the principle of association is revealed mainly in these large groups. Individual citizens may not realize the strength they can gain by joining forces; it needs to be demonstrated to them to be fully understood. That's why it can often be easier to gather a large crowd for a public cause than just a few people; a thousand citizens might not see their common interest in teaming up—whereas ten thousand will clearly recognize it. In the political arena, people unite for major initiatives, and their experiences with the principle of association in significant matters effectively show them that it's beneficial to support each other in less critical issues. A political organization brings together individuals from various backgrounds at once: regardless of their differences in age, thinking, or wealth, it places them closer together and fosters interaction. Once they meet, they can always connect again.

Men can embark in few civil partnerships without risking a portion of their possessions; this is the case with all manufacturing and trading companies. When men are as yet but little versed in the art of association, and are unacquainted with its principal rules, they are afraid, when first they combine in this manner, of buying their experience dear. They therefore prefer depriving themselves of a powerful instrument of success to running the risks which attend the use of it. They are, however, less reluctant to join political associations, which appear to them to be without danger, because they adventure no money in them. But they cannot belong to these associations for any length of time without finding out how order is maintained amongst a large number of men, and by what contrivance they are made to advance, harmoniously and methodically, to the same object. Thus they learn to surrender their own will to that of all the rest, and to make their own exertions subordinate to the common impulse—things which it is not less necessary to know in civil than in political associations. Political associations may therefore be considered as large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of association.

Men can enter into a few civil partnerships without risking some of their assets; this is true for all manufacturing and trading companies. When men are still learning the art of collaboration and are unfamiliar with its main principles, they often fear that joining forces may cost them too much. They prefer to give up a powerful tool for success rather than take the risks that come with using it. However, they are less hesitant to join political associations, which seem less risky to them since they don’t have to invest money in them. But they can’t stay in these groups for long without realizing how order is maintained among a large number of people and how they are encouraged to work together methodically toward the same goals. This way, they learn to give up their own individual will for the collective one, and to align their efforts with the common drive—knowledge that is just as important in civil associations as it is in political ones. Therefore, political associations can be seen as large free schools where all members of the community go to learn the general theory of collaboration.

But even if political association did not directly contribute to the progress of civil association, to destroy the former would be to impair the latter. When citizens can only meet in public for certain purposes, they regard such meetings as a strange proceeding of rare occurrence, and they rarely think at all about it. When they are allowed to meet freely for all purposes, they ultimately look upon public association as the universal, or in a manner the sole means, which men can employ to accomplish the different purposes they may have in view. Every new want instantly revives the notion. The art of association then becomes, as I have said before, the mother of action, studied and applied by all.

But even if political gatherings didn’t directly help civil gatherings, getting rid of the former would hurt the latter. When people can only come together in public for specific reasons, they see those gatherings as unusual and rare, and they hardly think about them at all. When they’re allowed to meet freely for any reason, they begin to see public gatherings as the main, or perhaps the only, way to achieve their various goals. Every new need quickly brings this idea back to mind. So, as I mentioned before, the ability to associate becomes the foundation of action, learned and used by everyone.

When some kinds of associations are prohibited and others allowed, it is difficult to distinguish the former from the latter, beforehand. In this state of doubt men abstain from them altogether, and a sort of public opinion passes current which tends to cause any association whatsoever to be regarded as a bold and almost an illicit enterprise. *a

When some types of associations are banned while others are permitted, it becomes hard to tell the difference between the two beforehand. In this situation of uncertainty, people tend to stay away from all associations, and a kind of public opinion emerges that makes any form of association seem like a risky and almost illegal activity. *a

a
[ This is more especially true when the executive government has a discretionary power of allowing or prohibiting associations. When certain associations are simply prohibited by law, and the courts of justice have to punish infringements of that law, the evil is far less considerable. Then every citizen knows beforehand pretty nearly what he has to expect. He judges himself before he is judged by the law, and, abstaining from prohibited associations, he embarks in those which are legally sanctioned. It is by these restrictions that all free nations have always admitted that the right of association might be limited. But if the legislature should invest a man with a power of ascertaining beforehand which associations are dangerous and which are useful, and should authorize him to destroy all associations in the bud or allow them to be formed, as nobody would be able to foresee in what cases associations might be established and in what cases they would be put down, the spirit of association would be entirely paralyzed. The former of these laws would only assail certain associations; the latter would apply to society itself, and inflict an injury upon it. I can conceive that a regular government may have recourse to the former, but I do not concede that any government has the right of enacting the latter.]

a
[ This is especially true when the government has the power to allow or ban associations. When certain associations are simply against the law, and the courts have to punish violations of that law, the problem is much less significant. Then every citizen pretty much knows what to expect. They assess their own risks before the law does, and by steering clear of banned associations, they engage in those that are legal. It's through these restrictions that all free nations have acknowledged the right to limit association. However, if the legislature were to give someone the power to determine in advance which associations are harmful and which are beneficial, and to either shut down associations before they start or allow them to form, no one would be able to predict when associations would be permitted or suppress, effectively stifling the spirit of association. The first type of law would only target specific associations; the second would impact society as a whole and cause it harm. I can understand why a regular government might resort to the first, but I don’t believe any government has the right to enact the second.]

It is therefore chimerical to suppose that the spirit of association, when it is repressed on some one point, will nevertheless display the same vigor on all others; and that if men be allowed to prosecute certain undertakings in common, that is quite enough for them eagerly to set about them. When the members of a community are allowed and accustomed to combine for all purposes, they will combine as readily for the lesser as for the more important ones; but if they are only allowed to combine for small affairs, they will be neither inclined nor able to effect it. It is in vain that you will leave them entirely free to prosecute their business on joint-stock account: they will hardly care to avail themselves of the rights you have granted to them; and, after having exhausted your strength in vain efforts to put down prohibited associations, you will be surprised that you cannot persuade men to form the associations you encourage.

It's unrealistic to think that the spirit of collaboration, when restricted in one area, will still thrive in others; and that if people are allowed to work together on certain projects, that's enough to motivate them to jump in. When community members are permitted and used to coming together for all kinds of purposes, they will join forces just as easily for small tasks as they will for significant ones. But if they're only allowed to unite for minor issues, they’ll be neither willing nor able to do so. It’s pointless to give them complete freedom to pursue their business collectively: they probably won’t care to take advantage of the rights you've given them; and after exhausting your efforts to suppress banned associations, you’ll be surprised that you can’t get people to form the associations you want to promote.

I do not say that there can be no civil associations in a country where political association is prohibited; for men can never live in society without embarking in some common undertakings: but I maintain that in such a country civil associations will always be few in number, feebly planned, unskillfully managed, that they will never form any vast designs, or that they will fail in the execution of them.

I’m not saying that there can’t be civil associations in a country where political associations are banned; people can’t live together without getting involved in some common activities. However, I argue that in such a country, civil associations will always be limited in number, poorly organized, and badly managed, and they will never undertake any significant projects, or they will struggle to carry them out.

This naturally leads me to think that freedom of association in political matters is not so dangerous to public tranquillity as is supposed; and that possibly, after having agitated society for some time, it may strengthen the State in the end. In democratic countries political associations are, so to speak, the only powerful persons who aspire to rule the State. Accordingly, the governments of our time look upon associations of this kind just as sovereigns in the Middle Ages regarded the great vassals of the Crown: they entertain a sort of instinctive abhorrence of them, and they combat them on all occasions. They bear, on the contrary, a natural goodwill to civil associations, because they readily discover that, instead of directing the minds of the community to public affairs, these institutions serve to divert them from such reflections; and that, by engaging them more and more in the pursuit of objects which cannot be attained without public tranquillity, they deter them from revolutions. But these governments do not attend to the fact that political associations tend amazingly to multiply and facilitate those of a civil character, and that in avoiding a dangerous evil they deprive themselves of an efficacious remedy.

This naturally makes me think that freedom of association in political issues isn't as harmful to public peace as people believe; and that, after stirring up society for a while, it might actually strengthen the State in the long run. In democratic countries, political associations are basically the only powerful groups aiming to control the State. As a result, today's governments view these associations similarly to how medieval monarchs viewed the major vassals of the Crown: they have an instinctive dislike for them and try to fight them at every opportunity. On the other hand, they have a natural inclination to support civil associations because they quickly realize that these organizations divert people's attention from public matters rather than focusing it on them; and by getting people more involved in pursuits that require public peace, they keep them from revolutions. However, these governments overlook the fact that political associations tend to multiply and make civil ones easier to form, and in trying to avoid a dangerous problem, they rob themselves of a powerful solution.

When you see the Americans freely and constantly forming associations for the purpose of promoting some political principle, of raising one man to the head of affairs, or of wresting power from another, you have some difficulty in understanding that men so independent do not constantly fall into the abuse of freedom. If, on the other hand, you survey the infinite number of trading companies which are in operation in the United States, and perceive that the Americans are on every side unceasingly engaged in the execution of important and difficult plans, which the slightest revolution would throw into confusion, you will readily comprehend why people so well employed are by no means tempted to perturb the State, nor to destroy that public tranquillity by which they all profit.

When you see Americans freely and constantly forming groups to promote a political idea, support someone in power, or take power from another, it might be hard to understand how such independent people don’t frequently misuse their freedom. However, if you look at the countless businesses operating in the United States and notice that Americans are constantly busy with important and complex projects that could easily be disrupted by any major change, you'll understand why those who are so engaged are not tempted to disturb the government or disrupt the public peace that benefits everyone.

Is it enough to observe these things separately, or should we not discover the hidden tie which connects them? In their political associations, the Americans of all conditions, minds, and ages, daily acquire a general taste for association, and grow accustomed to the use of it. There they meet together in large numbers, they converse, they listen to each other, and they are mutually stimulated to all sorts of undertakings. They afterwards transfer to civil life the notions they have thus acquired, and make them subservient to a thousand purposes. Thus it is by the enjoyment of a dangerous freedom that the Americans learn the art of rendering the dangers of freedom less formidable.

Is it enough to look at these things individually, or should we explore the hidden connection that links them? In their political interactions, Americans from all backgrounds, perspectives, and ages are constantly developing a shared interest in collaboration and becoming familiar with it. They gather in large groups, engage in conversations, listen to one another, and inspire each other to take on various initiatives. Later, they apply the ideas they’ve gained to their civic lives, using them for countless purposes. In this way, by experiencing a risky freedom, Americans learn how to make the challenges of freedom less intimidating.

If a certain moment in the existence of a nation be selected, it is easy to prove that political associations perturb the State, and paralyze productive industry; but take the whole life of a people, and it may perhaps be easy to demonstrate that freedom of association in political matters is favorable to the prosperity and even to the tranquillity of the community.

If you pick a specific moment in a nation's history, it's easy to show that political groups can disrupt the State and hinder productive industry. However, if you consider the entire life of a people, it might be easier to prove that the freedom to form political associations actually supports the prosperity and even the peace of the community.

I said in the former part of this work, "The unrestrained liberty of political association cannot be entirely assimilated to the liberty of the press. The one is at the same time less necessary and more dangerous than the other. A nation may confine it within certain limits without ceasing to be mistress of itself; and it may sometimes be obliged to do so in order to maintain its own authority." And further on I added: "It cannot be denied that the unrestrained liberty of association for political purposes is the last degree of liberty which a people is fit for. If it does not throw them into anarchy, it perpetually brings them, as it were, to the verge of it." Thus I do not think that a nation is always at liberty to invest its citizens with an absolute right of association for political purposes; and I doubt whether, in any country or in any age, it be wise to set no limits to freedom of association. A certain nation, it is said, could not maintain tranquillity in the community, cause the laws to be respected, or establish a lasting government, if the right of association were not confined within narrow limits. These blessings are doubtless invaluable, and I can imagine that, to acquire or to preserve them, a nation may impose upon itself severe temporary restrictions: but still it is well that the nation should know at what price these blessings are purchased. I can understand that it may be advisable to cut off a man's arm in order to save his life; but it would be ridiculous to assert that he will be as dexterous as he was before he lost it.

I mentioned earlier in this work, "The unrestricted freedom of political association isn't entirely the same as the freedom of the press. One is less necessary and more dangerous than the other. A nation can place certain limits on it without losing control of itself; sometimes it might even need to do so to maintain its authority." Furthermore, I noted: "It's undeniable that unrestricted political association is the highest form of freedom that a people can handle. Even if it doesn't lead to anarchy, it constantly brings them close to it." Therefore, I don't believe that a nation should always grant its citizens an absolute right to politically associate; and I question whether it's wise in any country or any era to impose no limits on freedom of association. It's said that a particular nation couldn't maintain peace, ensure laws were upheld, or create a stable government if the right to associate wasn't limited. These benefits are undoubtedly priceless, and I can imagine that to attain or keep them, a nation might impose strict temporary restrictions. However, it's important for the nation to understand the cost of these benefits. I can see that it might make sense to amputate a man's arm to save his life; but it would be foolish to claim that he would be just as skilled as he was before losing it.





Chapter VIII: The Americans Combat Individualism By The Principle Of Interest Rightly Understood

When the world was managed by a few rich and powerful individuals, these persons loved to entertain a lofty idea of the duties of man. They were fond of professing that it is praiseworthy to forget one's self, and that good should be done without hope of reward, as it is by the Deity himself. Such were the standard opinions of that time in morals. I doubt whether men were more virtuous in aristocratic ages than in others; but they were incessantly talking of the beauties of virtue, and its utility was only studied in secret. But since the imagination takes less lofty flights and every man's thoughts are centred in himself, moralists are alarmed by this idea of self-sacrifice, and they no longer venture to present it to the human mind. They therefore content themselves with inquiring whether the personal advantage of each member of the community does not consist in working for the good of all; and when they have hit upon some point on which private interest and public interest meet and amalgamate, they are eager to bring it into notice. Observations of this kind are gradually multiplied: what was only a single remark becomes a general principle; and it is held as a truth that man serves himself in serving his fellow-creatures, and that his private interest is to do good.

When the world was controlled by a small group of wealthy and powerful people, they liked to promote a lofty idea of what it means to be human. They often claimed that it's admirable to forget oneself and that good should be done without expecting anything in return, just like the Deity does. These were the common moral opinions of that era. I’m not sure if people were more virtuous in aristocratic times than in others, but they talked endlessly about the beauty of virtue while its practical benefits were only considered in private. Now, since people’s imaginations aren't as grand and everyone focuses on themselves, moralists are worried about this notion of self-sacrifice and no longer dare to present it to society. Instead, they simply ask whether each person’s personal benefit is tied to working for the collective good; when they find a point where individual and public interests overlap, they eagerly highlight it. Such observations are gradually increasing: what started as a single comment turns into a general principle, and it is accepted as a truth that when someone helps others, they are also helping themselves, and that an individual's best interest lies in doing good.

I have already shown, in several parts of this work, by what means the inhabitants of the United States almost always manage to combine their own advantage with that of their fellow-citizens: my present purpose is to point out the general rule which enables them to do so. In the United States hardly anybody talks of the beauty of virtue; but they maintain that virtue is useful, and prove it every day. The American moralists do not profess that men ought to sacrifice themselves for their fellow-creatures because it is noble to make such sacrifices; but they boldly aver that such sacrifices are as necessary to him who imposes them upon himself as to him for whose sake they are made. They have found out that in their country and their age man is brought home to himself by an irresistible force; and losing all hope of stopping that force, they turn all their thoughts to the direction of it. They therefore do not deny that every man may follow his own interest; but they endeavor to prove that it is the interest of every man to be virtuous. I shall not here enter into the reasons they allege, which would divert me from my subject: suffice it to say that they have convinced their fellow-countrymen.

I have already shown in several parts of this work how the people of the United States usually find a way to combine their own interests with those of their fellow citizens. My current goal is to highlight the general principle that allows them to do this. In the United States, hardly anyone talks about the beauty of virtue; instead, they argue that virtue is useful and demonstrate it every day. American moralists don’t claim that people should sacrifice themselves for others just because it's noble to do so; rather, they assert that such sacrifices are just as necessary for the person who makes them as they are for the one receiving the sacrifice. They’ve realized that in their country and era, an irresistible force drives people back to their own interests, and since they can’t stop that force, they focus all their thoughts on directing it. Therefore, they don’t deny that each person can follow their own interests; they strive to show that it’s in everyone’s best interest to be virtuous. I won’t go into the reasons they provide, as that would lead me away from my topic; it’s enough to say that they have convinced their fellow countrymen.

Montaigne said long ago: "Were I not to follow the straight road for its straightness, I should follow it for having found by experience that in the end it is commonly the happiest and most useful track." The doctrine of interest rightly understood is not, then, new, but amongst the Americans of our time it finds universal acceptance: it has become popular there; you may trace it at the bottom of all their actions, you will remark it in all they say. It is as often to be met with on the lips of the poor man as of the rich. In Europe the principle of interest is much grosser than it is in America, but at the same time it is less common, and especially it is less avowed; amongst us, men still constantly feign great abnegation which they no longer feel. The Americans, on the contrary, are fond of explaining almost all the actions of their lives by the principle of interest rightly understood; they show with complacency how an enlightened regard for themselves constantly prompts them to assist each other, and inclines them willingly to sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the welfare of the State. In this respect I think they frequently fail to do themselves justice; for in the United States, as well as elsewhere, people are sometimes seen to give way to those disinterested and spontaneous impulses which are natural to man; but the Americans seldom allow that they yield to emotions of this kind; they are more anxious to do honor to their philosophy than to themselves.

Montaigne said a long time ago: "If I didn’t follow the straight path for its straightness, I would follow it because I’ve learned from experience that, in the end, it’s usually the happiest and most beneficial way." The idea of self-interest, when understood correctly, isn’t new, but among today’s Americans, it is widely accepted; it has become popular there. You can see it at the core of all their actions, and it shows up in everything they say. It's just as likely to be heard from a poor person as from a rich one. In Europe, the principle of self-interest is much more obvious than in America, but at the same time, it’s less prevalent and especially less openly acknowledged; here, people still often pretend to have a level of selflessness that they no longer truly feel. Americans, on the other hand, enjoy explaining nearly all their actions through the principle of self-interest understood rightly; they take pride in how a clear sense of self-interest constantly motivates them to help each other and makes them willing to sacrifice some of their time and resources for the good of the State. In this regard, I think they often do themselves a disservice; because in the United States, as anywhere else, people can sometimes succumb to those unselfish and spontaneous feelings that are part of being human. However, Americans rarely admit that they give in to these kinds of emotions; they’re more focused on honoring their philosophy than on acknowledging their own humanity.

I might here pause, without attempting to pass a judgment on what I have described. The extreme difficulty of the subject would be my excuse, but I shall not avail myself of it; and I had rather that my readers, clearly perceiving my object, should refuse to follow me than that I should leave them in suspense. The principle of interest rightly understood is not a lofty one, but it is clear and sure. It does not aim at mighty objects, but it attains without excessive exertion all those at which it aims. As it lies within the reach of all capacities, everyone can without difficulty apprehend and retain it. By its admirable conformity to human weaknesses, it easily obtains great dominion; nor is that dominion precarious, since the principle checks one personal interest by another, and uses, to direct the passions, the very same instrument which excites them. The principle of interest rightly understood produces no great acts of self-sacrifice, but it suggests daily small acts of self-denial. By itself it cannot suffice to make a man virtuous, but it disciplines a number of citizens in habits of regularity, temperance, moderation, foresight, self-command; and, if it does not lead men straight to virtue by the will, it gradually draws them in that direction by their habits. If the principle of interest rightly understood were to sway the whole moral world, extraordinary virtues would doubtless be more rare; but I think that gross depravity would then also be less common. The principle of interest rightly understood perhaps prevents some men from rising far above the level of mankind; but a great number of other men, who were falling far below it, are caught and restrained by it. Observe some few individuals, they are lowered by it; survey mankind, it is raised. I am not afraid to say that the principle of interest, rightly understood, appears to me the best suited of all philosophical theories to the wants of the men of our time, and that I regard it as their chief remaining security against themselves. Towards it, therefore, the minds of the moralists of our age should turn; even should they judge it to be incomplete, it must nevertheless be adopted as necessary.

I might pause here, not trying to judge what I’ve described. The extreme difficulty of the topic could be my excuse, but I won’t use it; I’d rather have my readers understand my purpose and choose not to follow me than leave them uncertain. The principle of interest, when understood correctly, isn’t a grand concept, but it’s clear and reliable. It doesn’t target big goals, but it achieves all those it aims for without requiring too much effort. Because it’s accessible to all, everyone can easily grasp and remember it. Its remarkable alignment with human weaknesses allows it to gain significant influence, and this influence isn’t shaky since it balances one personal interest against another and uses the same drives that spark our passions to guide them. The principle of interest, understood correctly, doesn’t lead to significant self-sacrifice, but it encourages small acts of self-denial every day. On its own, it might not be enough to make someone virtuous, but it helps cultivate habits like orderliness, moderation, foresight, and self-control among many citizens; while it doesn’t directly guide people to virtue through their will, it slowly nudges them that way through their habits. If the principle of interest were to dominate the moral landscape, exceptional virtues would likely be rarer; however, I think that extreme moral corruption would also become less common. The principle of interest may keep some individuals from rising much above the level of society, but it also catches and holds back many others who are sinking below it. Look at a few individuals, and you’ll see they’re dragged down; look at society as a whole, and you’ll see it’s uplifted. I’m not afraid to say that the principle of interest, when properly understood, seems to me the most suitable of all philosophical theories for the needs of people today, and I see it as their main safeguard against themselves. Therefore, the minds of today’s moralists should focus on it; even if they find it incomplete, it must still be recognized as essential.

I do not think upon the whole that there is more egotism amongst us than in America; the only difference is, that there it is enlightened—here it is not. Every American will sacrifice a portion of his private interests to preserve the rest; we would fain preserve the whole, and oftentimes the whole is lost. Everybody I see about me seems bent on teaching his contemporaries, by precept and example, that what is useful is never wrong. Will nobody undertake to make them understand how what is right may be useful? No power upon earth can prevent the increasing equality of conditions from inclining the human mind to seek out what is useful, or from leading every member of the community to be wrapped up in himself. It must therefore be expected that personal interest will become more than ever the principal, if not the sole, spring of men's actions; but it remains to be seen how each man will understand his personal interest. If the members of a community, as they become more equal, become more ignorant and coarse, it is difficult to foresee to what pitch of stupid excesses their egotism may lead them; and no one can foretell into what disgrace and wretchedness they would plunge themselves, lest they should have to sacrifice something of their own well-being to the prosperity of their fellow-creatures. I do not think that the system of interest, as it is professed in America, is, in all its parts, self-evident; but it contains a great number of truths so evident that men, if they are but educated, cannot fail to see them. Educate, then, at any rate; for the age of implicit self-sacrifice and instinctive virtues is already flitting far away from us, and the time is fast approaching when freedom, public peace, and social order itself will not be able to exist without education.

I don't think there's more egotism among us than in America; the only difference is that there it's enlightened—here it isn't. Every American will give up part of their personal interests to protect the rest; we often want to preserve everything, and too often, we lose it all. Everyone I see around me seems determined to teach others, by words and actions, that what's useful is never wrong. Will no one step up to help them understand how what's right can also be useful? No power on earth can stop the growing equality of circumstances from pushing the human mind to focus on what's useful, or from leading each person to be more self-centered. Therefore, it's expected that personal interests will become even more the primary, if not the only, driver of people's actions; but how each person defines their own interests remains to be seen. If community members, as they grow more equal, become more ignorant and crude, it's hard to predict how far their egotism might lead them to foolish extremes; and no one can foretell the disgrace and misery they might bring upon themselves, just to avoid sacrificing any of their own well-being for the good of others. I don't think the system of interests, as it operates in America, is obviously correct in every aspect; but it does contain many truths that are so clear that educated people can't help but recognize them. So, educate, at the very least; for the time of blind self-sacrifice and instinctive virtues is quickly fading, and we are rapidly approaching a time when freedom, public peace, and social order won't survive without education.





Chapter IX: That The Americans Apply The Principle Of Interest Rightly Understood To Religious Matters

If the principle of interest rightly understood had nothing but the present world in view, it would be very insufficient; for there are many sacrifices which can only find their recompense in another; and whatever ingenuity may be put forth to demonstrate the utility of virtue, it will never be an easy task to make that man live aright who has no thoughts of dying. It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the principle of interest rightly understood is easily compatible with religious belief. The philosophers who inculcate this system of morals tell men, that to be happy in this life they must watch their own passions and steadily control their excess; that lasting happiness can only be secured by renouncing a thousand transient gratifications; and that a man must perpetually triumph over himself, in order to secure his own advantage. The founders of almost all religions have held the same language. The track they point out to man is the same, only that the goal is more remote; instead of placing in this world the reward of the sacrifices they impose, they transport it to another. Nevertheless I cannot believe that all those who practise virtue from religious motives are only actuated by the hope of a recompense. I have known zealous Christians who constantly forgot themselves, to work with greater ardor for the happiness of their fellow-men; and I have heard them declare that all they did was only to earn the blessings of a future state. I cannot but think that they deceive themselves; I respect them too much to believe them.

If the principle of interest, when properly understood, only focused on the present world, it would be very inadequate; because there are many sacrifices that can only be rewarded in another life. No matter how clever an argument may be made for the value of virtue, it will never be easy to convince a person to live rightly if they have no thoughts of dying. Therefore, it's necessary to determine whether the principle of interest, when properly understood, is easily compatible with religious belief. Philosophers who promote this moral system tell people that to be happy in this life, they must manage their own desires and control their excesses; that lasting happiness can only be achieved by giving up a thousand fleeting pleasures; and that one must constantly conquer oneself to secure personal benefit. The founders of nearly all religions have said similar things. The path they recommend is the same, except the reward is more distant; instead of placing the results of the sacrifices in this world, they shift them to another. Nevertheless, I can't believe that everyone who practices virtue for religious reasons is solely driven by the hope of reward. I've known passionate Christians who often forget themselves to work harder for the happiness of others; and I've heard them say that everything they do is just to earn blessings in the afterlife. I can't help but think they are kidding themselves; I respect them too much to believe that.

Christianity indeed teaches that a man must prefer his neighbor to himself, in order to gain eternal life; but Christianity also teaches that men ought to benefit their fellow-creatures for the love of God. A sublime expression! Man, searching by his intellect into the divine conception, and seeing that order is the purpose of God, freely combines to prosecute the great design; and whilst he sacrifices his personal interests to this consummate order of all created things, expects no other recompense than the pleasure of contemplating it. I do not believe that interest is the sole motive of religious men: but I believe that interest is the principal means which religions themselves employ to govern men, and I do not question that this way they strike into the multitude and become popular. It is not easy clearly to perceive why the principle of interest rightly understood should keep aloof from religious opinions; and it seems to me more easy to show why it should draw men to them. Let it be supposed that, in order to obtain happiness in this world, a man combats his instinct on all occasions and deliberately calculates every action of his life; that, instead of yielding blindly to the impetuosity of first desires, he has learned the art of resisting them, and that he has accustomed himself to sacrifice without an effort the pleasure of a moment to the lasting interest of his whole life. If such a man believes in the religion which he professes, it will cost him but little to submit to the restrictions it may impose. Reason herself counsels him to obey, and habit has prepared him to endure them. If he should have conceived any doubts as to the object of his hopes, still he will not easily allow himself to be stopped by them; and he will decide that it is wise to risk some of the advantages of this world, in order to preserve his rights to the great inheritance promised him in another. "To be mistaken in believing that the Christian religion is true," says Pascal, "is no great loss to anyone; but how dreadful to be mistaken in believing it to be false!"

Christianity teaches that a person should prioritize their neighbor over themselves to attain eternal life. It also emphasizes that people should help others out of love for God. What a profound idea! Humans, using their intellect to understand the divine purpose, recognize that order is God's intention. They willingly join forces to pursue this grand vision, sacrificing their own interests for the sake of the perfect harmony of all creation, expecting nothing more than the joy of witnessing it. I don't think self-interest is the only motivation for religious people, but I believe it's the main tool religions use to influence people and gain popularity. It's not easy to understand why self-interest, when rightly understood, should keep a distance from religious beliefs; it seems simpler to show why it might attract people to them. Imagine a person who, wanting happiness in this world, constantly battles their instincts and carefully considers every action. Instead of giving in to their initial desires, they learn how to resist them and have trained themselves to effortlessly trade momentary pleasure for their long-term benefit. If such a person believes in the religion they follow, it won’t be difficult for them to accept any restrictions it may impose. Reason advises compliance, and their habits have prepared them to handle it. Even if they have doubts about their hopes, they won’t easily let those doubts deter them; they will likely conclude that it's wise to risk some worldly advantages to keep their rights to the significant reward promised in the next life. "To be mistaken in believing that the Christian religion is true," says Pascal, "is no great loss to anyone; but how dreadful it is to be mistaken in thinking it’s false!"

The Americans do not affect a brutal indifference to a future state; they affect no puerile pride in despising perils which they hope to escape from. They therefore profess their religion without shame and without weakness; but there generally is, even in their zeal, something so indescribably tranquil, methodical, and deliberate, that it would seem as if the head, far more than the heart, brought them to the foot of the altar. The Americans not only follow their religion from interest, but they often place in this world the interest which makes them follow it. In the Middle Ages the clergy spoke of nothing but a future state; they hardly cared to prove that a sincere Christian may be a happy man here below. But the American preachers are constantly referring to the earth; and it is only with great difficulty that they can divert their attention from it. To touch their congregations, they always show them how favorable religious opinions are to freedom and public tranquillity; and it is often difficult to ascertain from their discourses whether the principal object of religion is to procure eternal felicity in the other world, or prosperity in this.

Americans don't pretend to be completely indifferent to the future; they don’t boast about avoiding dangers they hope to escape from. They practice their faith openly and confidently; however, there’s often something so indescribably calm, organized, and intentional in their enthusiasm that it seems like their minds, rather than their hearts, lead them to the altar. Americans not only pursue their religion out of self-interest, but they often prioritize worldly interests that align with it. In the Middle Ages, clergy mostly focused on the afterlife and hardly made the case that a genuinely Christian life can lead to happiness here and now. But American preachers frequently reference life on earth, and it's only with great effort that they can shift their focus away from it. To connect with their congregations, they consistently highlight how favorable religious beliefs are to freedom and societal peace; it often becomes hard to tell from their sermons whether the main goal of religion is to achieve eternal happiness in the afterlife or success in this life.





Chapter X: Of The Taste For Physical Well-Being In America

In America the passion for physical well-being is not always exclusive, but it is general; and if all do not feel it in the same manner, yet it is felt by all. Carefully to satisfy all, even the least wants of the body, and to provide the little conveniences of life, is uppermost in every mind. Something of an analogous character is more and more apparent in Europe. Amongst the causes which produce these similar consequences in both hemispheres, several are so connected with my subject as to deserve notice.

In America, the passion for physical well-being isn't always exclusive, but it's widespread; and even if not everyone feels it the same way, it's a shared experience for all. Meeting even the smallest physical needs and providing life's little conveniences is a priority for everyone. A similar trend is increasingly noticeable in Europe. Among the reasons that create these comparable outcomes in both regions, several are closely related to my topic and deserve attention.

When riches are hereditarily fixed in families, there are a great number of men who enjoy the comforts of life without feeling an exclusive taste for those comforts. The heart of man is not so much caught by the undisturbed possession of anything valuable as by the desire, as yet imperfectly satisfied, of possessing it, and by the incessant dread of losing it. In aristocratic communities, the wealthy, never having experienced a condition different from their own, entertain no fear of changing it; the existence of such conditions hardly occurs to them. The comforts of life are not to them the end of life, but simply a way of living; they regard them as existence itself—enjoyed, but scarcely thought of. As the natural and instinctive taste which all men feel for being well off is thus satisfied without trouble and without apprehension, their faculties are turned elsewhere, and cling to more arduous and more lofty undertakings, which excite and engross their minds. Hence it is that, in the midst of physical gratifications, the members of an aristocracy often display a haughty contempt of these very enjoyments, and exhibit singular powers of endurance under the privation of them. All the revolutions which have ever shaken or destroyed aristocracies, have shown how easily men accustomed to superfluous luxuries can do without the necessaries of life; whereas men who have toiled to acquire a competency can hardly live after they have lost it.

When wealth is passed down through families, many people enjoy the comforts of life without having a strong appreciation for them. People aren’t as captivated by simply owning something valuable as they are by the desire to have it, which is not fully satisfied, and by the constant fear of losing it. In aristocratic societies, the wealthy, having never experienced a different lifestyle, do not fear changes to their situation; the idea of other conditions hardly crosses their minds. The comforts of life aren’t their ultimate goal but just a way of living; they see them as part of existence itself—enjoyed but hardly considered. Since their natural desire to be comfortable is easily met without worry, their attention shifts elsewhere, leading them to take on more challenging and ambitious pursuits that engage their minds. As a result, even while enjoying physical pleasures, aristocrats often show a disdain for these very pleasures and demonstrate remarkable endurance when faced with a lack of them. All the revolutions that have ever shaken or toppled aristocracies reveal how easily those used to excess can do without the basics of life; on the other hand, those who have worked hard for a stable living can hardly cope after losing it.

If I turn my observation from the upper to the lower classes, I find analogous effects produced by opposite causes. Amongst a nation where aristocracy predominates in society, and keeps it stationary, the people in the end get as much accustomed to poverty as the rich to their opulence. The latter bestow no anxiety on their physical comforts, because they enjoy them without an effort; the former do not think of things which they despair of obtaining, and which they hardly know enough of to desire them. In communities of this kind, the imagination of the poor is driven to seek another world; the miseries of real life inclose it around, but it escapes from their control, and flies to seek its pleasures far beyond. When, on the contrary, the distinctions of ranks are confounded together and privileges are destroyed—when hereditary property is subdivided, and education and freedom widely diffused, the desire of acquiring the comforts of the world haunts the imagination of the poor, and the dread of losing them that of the rich. Many scanty fortunes spring up; those who possess them have a sufficient share of physical gratifications to conceive a taste for these pleasures—not enough to satisfy it. They never procure them without exertion, and they never indulge in them without apprehension. They are therefore always straining to pursue or to retain gratifications so delightful, so imperfect, so fugitive.

If I shift my focus from the upper to the lower classes, I notice similar effects caused by opposite factors. In a society where the aristocracy dominates, keeping everything stagnant, people eventually become as used to poverty as the wealthy are to their riches. The wealthy don’t worry about their physical comforts because they enjoy them effortlessly; the poor, on the other hand, don’t think about things they have no hope of getting and barely know enough to desire. In such communities, the imagination of the poor seeks escape to another world; the harsh realities of life constrain them, but their minds break free to find pleasure elsewhere. In contrast, when class distinctions blur and privileges disappear—when inherited wealth is divided up, and education and freedom are widely available—the desire to obtain worldly comforts torments the poor's imagination, while the rich fear losing what they have. Many modest fortunes emerge; those who have them enjoy enough physical comforts to develop a taste for these pleasures—but not enough to fulfill it. They never acquire them without effort and never indulge in them without anxiety. As a result, they are always striving to chase or hold onto pleasures that are so delightful, so inadequate, and so fleeting.

If I were to inquire what passion is most natural to men who are stimulated and circumscribed by the obscurity of their birth or the mediocrity of their fortune, I could discover none more peculiarly appropriate to their condition than this love of physical prosperity. The passion for physical comforts is essentially a passion of the middle classes: with those classes it grows and spreads, with them it preponderates. From them it mounts into the higher orders of society, and descends into the mass of the people. I never met in America with any citizen so poor as not to cast a glance of hope and envy on the enjoyments of the rich, or whose imagination did not possess itself by anticipation of those good things which fate still obstinately withheld from him. On the other hand, I never perceived amongst the wealthier inhabitants of the United States that proud contempt of physical gratifications which is sometimes to be met with even in the most opulent and dissolute aristocracies. Most of these wealthy persons were once poor; they have felt the sting of want; they were long a prey to adverse fortunes; and now that the victory is won, the passions which accompanied the contest have survived it: their minds are, as it were, intoxicated by the small enjoyments which they have pursued for forty years. Not but that in the United States, as elsewhere, there are a certain number of wealthy persons who, having come into their property by inheritance, possess, without exertion, an opulence they have not earned. But even these men are not less devotedly attached to the pleasures of material life. The love of well-being is now become the predominant taste of the nation; the great current of man's passions runs in that channel, and sweeps everything along in its course.

If I were to ask what desire is most natural to people who are held back by the obscurity of their birth or the average nature of their fortunes, I would find none more fitting to their situation than the desire for material prosperity. The longing for physical comforts is fundamentally a desire of the middle class: it grows and spreads with them, and they dominate it. From there, it rises to the upper echelons of society and descends to the masses. I’ve never met anyone in America so poor that they didn’t glance longingly and enviously at the luxuries of the rich, or whose mind didn’t dream of the good things that fate stubbornly kept from them. Conversely, I’ve never noticed among the wealthier people in the United States that proud disdain for physical pleasures that can sometimes be found even in the most well-off and debauched aristocracies. Most of these wealthy individuals were once poor; they’ve felt the pain of need; they’ve been long subjected to misfortune; and now that they've achieved success, the desires that accompanied that struggle have stayed with them: their minds are, in a way, intoxicated by the simple pleasures they’ve sought for forty years. However, in the United States, as elsewhere, there are certainly some wealthy individuals who inherited their fortunes and enjoy wealth they didn’t work for. But even these people are deeply attached to the pleasures of material life. The desire for well-being has now become the dominant preference of the nation; the main current of human passions flows in that direction and carries everything along with it.





Chapter XI: Peculiar Effects Of The Love Of Physical Gratifications In Democratic Ages

It may be supposed, from what has just been said, that the love of physical gratifications must constantly urge the Americans to irregularities in morals, disturb the peace of families, and threaten the security of society at large. Such is not the case: the passion for physical gratifications produces in democracies effects very different from those which it occasions in aristocratic nations. It sometimes happens that, wearied with public affairs and sated with opulence, amidst the ruin of religious belief and the decline of the State, the heart of an aristocracy may by degrees be seduced to the pursuit of sensual enjoyments only. At other times the power of the monarch or the weakness of the people, without stripping the nobility of their fortune, compels them to stand aloof from the administration of affairs, and whilst the road to mighty enterprise is closed, abandons them to the inquietude of their own desires; they then fall back heavily upon themselves, and seek in the pleasures of the body oblivion of their former greatness. When the members of an aristocratic body are thus exclusively devoted to the pursuit of physical gratifications, they commonly concentrate in that direction all the energy which they derive from their long experience of power. Such men are not satisfied with the pursuit of comfort; they require sumptuous depravity and splendid corruption. The worship they pay the senses is a gorgeous one; and they seem to vie with each other in the art of degrading their own natures. The stronger, the more famous, and the more free an aristocracy has been, the more depraved will it then become; and however brilliant may have been the lustre of its virtues, I dare predict that they will always be surpassed by the splendor of its vices.

It might be assumed, based on what’s just been said, that the pursuit of physical pleasures would constantly drive Americans towards moral irregularities, disrupt family peace, and jeopardize the safety of society as a whole. This isn’t the case: the desire for physical pleasures leads to very different outcomes in democracies compared to aristocratic nations. Sometimes, when an aristocracy gets tired of public affairs and is overindulged, and in the midst of lost religious faith and a weakened state, their hearts gradually turn solely towards sensual pleasures. At other times, the power of the monarch or the weakness of the people, without diminishing the nobility's wealth, forces them to disengage from the administration of affairs. As the path to great achievements is blocked, they become trapped in their own cravings; they then heavily depend on themselves and seek physical pleasures to forget their past greatness. When members of an aristocracy become entirely focused on physical pleasures, they usually channel all the energy they’ve gained from their long experience of power in that direction. Such individuals aren’t satisfied with mere comfort; they crave lavish depravity and extravagant corruption. Their devotion to the senses is spectacular, and they seem to compete with one another in the art of debasing their own nature. The stronger, more renowned, and freer an aristocracy has been, the more depraved it will likely become; and no matter how brilliant its virtues have been, I can predict that they will always be overshadowed by the brilliance of its vices.

The taste for physical gratifications leads a democratic people into no such excesses. The love of well-being is there displayed as a tenacious, exclusive, universal passion; but its range is confined. To build enormous palaces, to conquer or to mimic nature, to ransack the world in order to gratify the passions of a man, is not thought of: but to add a few roods of land to your field, to plant an orchard, to enlarge a dwelling, to be always making life more comfortable and convenient, to avoid trouble, and to satisfy the smallest wants without effort and almost without cost. These are small objects, but the soul clings to them; it dwells upon them closely and day by day, till they at last shut out the rest of the world, and sometimes intervene between itself and heaven.

The desire for physical pleasures doesn’t drive a democratic society to any extreme. The pursuit of well-being is seen as a strong, exclusive, universal passion, but its scope is limited. No one thinks about building huge palaces, conquering or imitating nature, or plundering the world to satisfy one person's desires. Instead, the focus is on adding a bit of land to your field, planting an orchard, enlarging a home, continuously making life more comfortable and convenient, avoiding hassle, and meeting minor needs with ease and at little cost. These may seem like small goals, but the spirit holds on to them; it focuses on them closely day by day, until they eventually block out the rest of the world and sometimes create a barrier between itself and heaven.

This, it may be said, can only be applicable to those members of the community who are in humble circumstances; wealthier individuals will display tastes akin to those which belonged to them in aristocratic ages. I contest the proposition: in point of physical gratifications, the most opulent members of a democracy will not display tastes very different from those of the people; whether it be that, springing from the people, they really share those tastes, or that they esteem it a duty to submit to them. In democratic society the sensuality of the public has taken a moderate and tranquil course, to which all are bound to conform: it is as difficult to depart from the common rule by one's vices as by one's virtues. Rich men who live amidst democratic nations are therefore more intent on providing for their smallest wants than for their extraordinary enjoyments; they gratify a number of petty desires, without indulging in any great irregularities of passion: thus they are more apt to become enervated than debauched. The especial taste which the men of democratic ages entertain for physical enjoyments is not naturally opposed to the principles of public order; nay, it often stands in need of order that it may be gratified. Nor is it adverse to regularity of morals, for good morals contribute to public tranquillity and are favorable to industry. It may even be frequently combined with a species of religious morality: men wish to be as well off as they can in this world, without foregoing their chance of another. Some physical gratifications cannot be indulged in without crime; from such they strictly abstain. The enjoyment of others is sanctioned by religion and morality; to these the heart, the imagination, and life itself are unreservedly given up; till, in snatching at these lesser gifts, men lose sight of those more precious possessions which constitute the glory and the greatness of mankind. The reproach I address to the principle of equality, is not that it leads men away in the pursuit of forbidden enjoyments, but that it absorbs them wholly in quest of those which are allowed. By these means, a kind of virtuous materialism may ultimately be established in the world, which would not corrupt, but enervate the soul, and noiselessly unbend its springs of action.

This, one might argue, only applies to those in the community who are struggling financially; wealthier people tend to have tastes similar to those from noble times. I disagree with this idea: when it comes to physical pleasures, the richest members of a democracy aren't much different in taste from everyday people; whether it's because they originate from the people or feel a responsibility to align with them. In democratic societies, the public's sensuality takes on a moderate and calm direction that everyone is expected to follow: it's just as hard to stray from the common norms through bad behavior as it is through good behavior. Wealthy individuals living in democratic nations are more focused on meeting their small needs than indulging in extravagant pleasures; they satisfy many minor desires without engaging in major excesses, which makes them more likely to become weakened than corrupted. The specific fondness that people in democratic eras have for physical pleasures isn't inherently at odds with the principles of public order; in fact, it often requires order to be fulfilled. It's also not opposed to ethical behavior since good morals promote social peace and are beneficial for work. It can even be often linked with a kind of religious morality: people want to be as comfortable as possible in this life without giving up their chances for the next. Some physical pleasures come with a moral cost; they avoid those. Enjoyments that are accepted by religion and morality receive their full attention, heart, imagination, and life; however, in reaching for these lesser pleasures, people lose sight of the more valuable treasures that embody the glory and greatness of humanity. The criticism I find in the principle of equality isn't that it leads people toward forbidden pleasures, but that it fully consumes them in the pursuit of those that are permissible. This could ultimately create a kind of virtuous materialism in the world that wouldn’t corrupt the soul, but rather weaken it, silently dulling its driving forces.





Chapter XII: Causes Of Fanatical Enthusiasm In Some Americans

Although the desire of acquiring the good things of this world is the prevailing passion of the American people, certain momentary outbreaks occur, when their souls seem suddenly to burst the bonds of matter by which they are restrained, and to soar impetuously towards heaven. In all the States of the Union, but especially in the half-peopled country of the Far West, wandering preachers may be met with who hawk about the word of God from place to place. Whole families—old men, women, and children—cross rough passes and untrodden wilds, coming from a great distance, to join a camp-meeting, where they totally forget for several days and nights, in listening to these discourses, the cares of business and even the most urgent wants of the body. Here and there, in the midst of American society, you meet with men, full of a fanatical and almost wild enthusiasm, which hardly exists in Europe. From time to time strange sects arise, which endeavor to strike out extraordinary paths to eternal happiness. Religious insanity is very common in the United States.

Although the desire to obtain the good things in life is the main passion of the American people, there are moments when their souls seem to shake off the limitations of the physical world and soar towards heaven. In all the states of the Union, particularly in the sparsely populated areas of the Far West, you can find traveling preachers who spread the word of God from place to place. Entire families—older men, women, and children—traverse rugged terrain and untouched wilderness, coming from far away to participate in a camp meeting, where they completely forget their business worries and even their most pressing physical needs for several days and nights as they listen to these sermons. Occasionally, you encounter individuals in American society who are filled with a fervent and almost wild enthusiasm that is rarely seen in Europe. Strange new sects occasionally emerge, trying to carve out unique paths to eternal happiness. Religious fanaticism is quite common in the United States.

Nor ought these facts to surprise us. It was not man who implanted in himself the taste for what is infinite and the love of what is immortal: those lofty instincts are not the offspring of his capricious will; their steadfast foundation is fixed in human nature, and they exist in spite of his efforts. He may cross and distort them—destroy them he cannot. The soul has wants which must be satisfied; and whatever pains be taken to divert it from itself, it soon grows weary, restless, and disquieted amidst the enjoyments of sense. If ever the faculties of the great majority of mankind were exclusively bent upon the pursuit of material objects, it might be anticipated that an amazing reaction would take place in the souls of some men. They would drift at large in the world of spirits, for fear of remaining shackled by the close bondage of the body.

These facts shouldn’t surprise us. It wasn’t humans who created the desire for the infinite and the love for the immortal; those deep instincts aren’t the result of a random choice. Their solid foundation is rooted in human nature, and they persist despite our attempts to suppress them. You can twist and distort them, but you can't destroy them. The soul has needs that must be fulfilled, and no matter how hard we try to distract ourselves, it eventually becomes tired, restless, and uneasy in the midst of sensory pleasures. If the majority of humanity were solely focused on chasing after material things, it would be expected that some people's souls would react with a remarkable shift. They would wander freely in the spiritual realm, fearing the limitations imposed by their physical bodies.

It is not then wonderful if, in the midst of a community whose thoughts tend earthward, a small number of individuals are to be found who turn their looks to heaven. I should be surprised if mysticism did not soon make some advance amongst a people solely engaged in promoting its own worldly welfare. It is said that the deserts of the Thebaid were peopled by the persecutions of the emperors and the massacres of the Circus; I should rather say that it was by the luxuries of Rome and the Epicurean philosophy of Greece. If their social condition, their present circumstances, and their laws did not confine the minds of the Americans so closely to the pursuit of worldly welfare, it is probable that they would display more reserve and more experience whenever their attention is turned to things immaterial, and that they would check themselves without difficulty. But they feel imprisoned within bounds which they will apparently never be allowed to pass. As soon as they have passed these bounds, their minds know not where to fix themselves, and they often rush unrestrained beyond the range of common-sense.

It's not surprising that in a community focused on material concerns, a few people look towards the spiritual. I would be shocked if mysticism didn't start to grow among a population that is solely focused on its own worldly success. It's said that the deserts of Thebaid were filled because of the emperors' persecutions and the slaughter in the Circus; I'd argue instead that it was due to the luxuries of Rome and the hedonistic philosophy of Greece. If the social conditions, current circumstances, and laws didn't restrict Americans so tightly to pursuing material wealth, they might show more discretion and insight when contemplating spiritual matters, and they could easily hold back. But they feel trapped within limits they believe they can never exceed. As soon as they push beyond these limits, they don't know where to focus their minds, often leading them to lose touch with common sense.





Chapter XIII: Causes Of The Restless Spirit Of Americans In The Midst Of Their Prosperity

In certain remote corners of the Old World you may still sometimes stumble upon a small district which seems to have been forgotten amidst the general tumult, and to have remained stationary whilst everything around it was in motion. The inhabitants are for the most part extremely ignorant and poor; they take no part in the business of the country, and they are frequently oppressed by the government; yet their countenances are generally placid, and their spirits light. In America I saw the freest and most enlightened men, placed in the happiest circumstances which the world affords: it seemed to me as if a cloud habitually hung upon their brow, and I thought them serious and almost sad even in their pleasures. The chief reason of this contrast is that the former do not think of the ills they endure—the latter are forever brooding over advantages they do not possess. It is strange to see with what feverish ardor the Americans pursue their own welfare; and to watch the vague dread that constantly torments them lest they should not have chosen the shortest path which may lead to it. A native of the United States clings to this world's goods as if he were certain never to die; and he is so hasty in grasping at all within his reach, that one would suppose he was constantly afraid of not living long enough to enjoy them. He clutches everything, he holds nothing fast, but soon loosens his grasp to pursue fresh gratifications.

In some remote areas of the Old World, you might still come across a small district that seems to have been forgotten amid all the chaos, remaining unchanged while everything around it is moving. The people living there are mostly very ignorant and poor; they don’t engage in the affairs of the country and are often oppressed by the government. Yet, their faces are generally calm, and they seem light-hearted. In America, I saw the freest and most knowledgeable people, in the most fortunate circumstances the world has to offer: they seemed to carry a cloud over their heads, looking serious and almost sad even when they were enjoying themselves. The main reason for this difference is that the former do not dwell on the hardships they face, while the latter constantly brood over the advantages they lack. It’s strange to see how fervently Americans chase after their own well-being and to notice the lingering anxiety that they might not have picked the best route to get there. A native of the United States clings to the material things of this world as if they were sure they would never die, and they rush to grab everything they can reach, as if they're afraid they won’t have enough time to enjoy it all. They grasp everything but hold onto nothing for long, quickly letting go to seek new pleasures.

In the United States a man builds a house to spend his latter years in it, and he sells it before the roof is on: he plants a garden, and lets it just as the trees are coming into bearing: he brings a field into tillage, and leaves other men to gather the crops: he embraces a profession, and gives it up: he settles in a place, which he soon afterwards leaves, to carry his changeable longings elsewhere. If his private affairs leave him any leisure, he instantly plunges into the vortex of politics; and if at the end of a year of unremitting labor he finds he has a few days' vacation, his eager curiosity whirls him over the vast extent of the United States, and he will travel fifteen hundred miles in a few days, to shake off his happiness. Death at length overtakes him, but it is before he is weary of his bootless chase of that complete felicity which is forever on the wing.

In the United States, a man builds a house to spend his later years in it, but sells it before the roof is even on. He plants a garden and abandons it just as the trees start to bear fruit. He cultivates a field and lets others harvest the crops. He takes on a profession and then quits it. He settles in one place, only to leave soon after to follow his changing desires elsewhere. If his personal life gives him any free time, he dives right into politics; and if, after a year of relentless work, he finds he has a few days off, his restless curiosity drives him across the vast expanse of the United States, traveling fifteen hundred miles in just a few days, all to escape his happiness. Eventually, death catches up with him, but it happens before he grows tired of his fruitless pursuit of that perfect happiness that always seems to elude him.

At first sight there is something surprising in this strange unrest of so many happy men, restless in the midst of abundance. The spectacle itself is however as old as the world; the novelty is to see a whole people furnish an exemplification of it. Their taste for physical gratifications must be regarded as the original source of that secret inquietude which the actions of the Americans betray, and of that inconstancy of which they afford fresh examples every day. He who has set his heart exclusively upon the pursuit of worldly welfare is always in a hurry, for he has but a limited time at his disposal to reach it, to grasp it, and to enjoy it. The recollection of the brevity of life is a constant spur to him. Besides the good things which he possesses, he every instant fancies a thousand others which death will prevent him from trying if he does not try them soon. This thought fills him with anxiety, fear, and regret, and keeps his mind in ceaseless trepidation, which leads him perpetually to change his plans and his abode. If in addition to the taste for physical well-being a social condition be superadded, in which the laws and customs make no condition permanent, here is a great additional stimulant to this restlessness of temper. Men will then be seen continually to change their track, for fear of missing the shortest cut to happiness. It may readily be conceived that if men, passionately bent upon physical gratifications, desire eagerly, they are also easily discouraged: as their ultimate object is to enjoy, the means to reach that object must be prompt and easy, or the trouble of acquiring the gratification would be greater than the gratification itself. Their prevailing frame of mind then is at once ardent and relaxed, violent and enervated. Death is often less dreaded than perseverance in continuous efforts to one end.

At first glance, it's surprising to see so many content people feeling restless despite their abundance. However, this scene is as old as humanity itself; the novelty lies in witnessing an entire population embody it. Their desire for physical pleasures can be seen as the root cause of the underlying unease that Americans display and the inconsistency they demonstrate daily. Someone who focuses solely on achieving material success is always in a rush because they have limited time to attain, grasp, and savor it. The awareness of life's brevity constantly pushes them forward. In addition to what they already have, they are frequently anxious about missing out on countless opportunities that death will deny them unless they seize them quickly. This mindset breeds anxiety, fear, and regret, keeping their minds in a state of constant turmoil, prompting them to continuously change their plans and locations. If you add to this desire for physical comfort a social environment where laws and customs are always in flux, it amplifies this restlessness. People will be seen constantly shifting their paths, fearing they'll miss the quickest route to happiness. It's easy to understand that if people, intensely focused on physical pleasures, are eager for enjoyment, they can also be easily discouraged: since their ultimate goal is to find pleasure, the methods to achieve it need to be quick and simple, or else the effort becomes greater than the pleasure itself. Their general mindset ends up being both passionate and indifferent, intense and weak. Often, they fear death less than the idea of continuing to strive endlessly towards a single goal.

The equality of conditions leads by a still straighter road to several of the effects which I have here described. When all the privileges of birth and fortune are abolished, when all professions are accessible to all, and a man's own energies may place him at the top of any one of them, an easy and unbounded career seems open to his ambition, and he will readily persuade himself that he is born to no vulgar destinies. But this is an erroneous notion, which is corrected by daily experience. The same equality which allows every citizen to conceive these lofty hopes, renders all the citizens less able to realize them: it circumscribes their powers on every side, whilst it gives freer scope to their desires. Not only are they themselves powerless, but they are met at every step by immense obstacles, which they did not at first perceive. They have swept away the privileges of some of their fellow-creatures which stood in their way, but they have opened the door to universal competition: the barrier has changed its shape rather than its position. When men are nearly alike, and all follow the same track, it is very difficult for any one individual to walk quick and cleave a way through the dense throng which surrounds and presses him. This constant strife between the propensities springing from the equality of conditions and the means it supplies to satisfy them, harasses and wearies the mind.

The equality of conditions leads more directly to several of the effects I’ve described here. When all privileges of birth and wealth are eliminated, when all professions are open to everyone, and a person's own efforts can lift them to the top of any of these fields, a wide and limitless path seems to be available for their ambition, and they will easily convince themselves that they are meant for something special. However, this is a mistaken belief that daily life corrects. The same equality that allows every citizen to have these high hopes also makes it harder for them to achieve them; it limits their abilities in every direction while giving their desires more freedom. Not only are they powerless themselves, but they face enormous obstacles at every turn that they didn’t notice at first. They've removed the privileges that previously obstructed them, but they've opened the door to universal competition: the barrier has simply changed its form, not its location. When people are nearly the same, and all follow the same path, it becomes very difficult for any individual to advance quickly and carve a way through the dense crowd around them. This constant struggle between the urges created by equality and the resources available to fulfill them exhausts and stresses the mind.

It is possible to conceive men arrived at a degree of freedom which should completely content them; they would then enjoy their independence without anxiety and without impatience. But men will never establish any equality with which they can be contented. Whatever efforts a people may make, they will never succeed in reducing all the conditions of society to a perfect level; and even if they unhappily attained that absolute and complete depression, the inequality of minds would still remain, which, coming directly from the hand of God, will forever escape the laws of man. However democratic then the social state and the political constitution of a people may be, it is certain that every member of the community will always find out several points about him which command his own position; and we may foresee that his looks will be doggedly fixed in that direction. When inequality of conditions is the common law of society, the most marked inequalities do not strike the eye: when everything is nearly on the same level, the slightest are marked enough to hurt it. Hence the desire of equality always becomes more insatiable in proportion as equality is more complete.

It's possible to imagine that people could reach a level of freedom that fully satisfies them; they would then enjoy their independence without worry or impatience. However, people will never achieve a complete equality that they can be content with. No matter how hard a society tries, it will never be able to bring all aspects of life to a perfect balance; and even if they sadly managed to reach that absolute level of decline, the inequality of minds would still exist, which, coming directly from God, will always elude human laws. Regardless of how democratic a society and its political system are, every individual will always find various aspects that determine their own status, and we can expect that their focus will stubbornly remain in that direction. When inequality in society is the norm, the most obvious disparities often go unnoticed: when everything is nearly equal, even the smallest differences are enough to be felt. Therefore, the desire for equality becomes increasingly unquenchable as equality itself becomes more complete.

Amongst democratic nations men easily attain a certain equality of conditions: they can never attain the equality they desire. It perpetually retires from before them, yet without hiding itself from their sight, and in retiring draws them on. At every moment they think they are about to grasp it; it escapes at every moment from their hold. They are near enough to see its charms, but too far off to enjoy them; and before they have fully tasted its delights they die. To these causes must be attributed that strange melancholy which oftentimes will haunt the inhabitants of democratic countries in the midst of their abundance, and that disgust at life which sometimes seizes upon them in the midst of calm and easy circumstances. Complaints are made in France that the number of suicides increases; in America suicide is rare, but insanity is said to be more common than anywhere else. These are all different symptoms of the same disease. The Americans do not put an end to their lives, however disquieted they may be, because their religion forbids it; and amongst them materialism may be said hardly to exist, notwithstanding the general passion for physical gratification. The will resists—reason frequently gives way. In democratic ages enjoyments are more intense than in the ages of aristocracy, and especially the number of those who partake in them is larger: but, on the other hand, it must be admitted that man's hopes and his desires are oftener blasted, the soul is more stricken and perturbed, and care itself more keen.

In democratic countries, people easily achieve a certain level of equality in their conditions, but they can never reach the equality they truly want. It constantly seems to elude them, yet it's always in sight, drawing them in as it fades away. They often feel like they’re on the verge of grabbing it, but it slips away again and again. They're close enough to see its appeal but too far to enjoy it fully, and before they can fully experience its pleasures, they're gone. This leads to the peculiar sadness that often affects people in democratic nations even in the midst of plenty, as well as the discontent with life that can arise during calm and comfortable times. In France, people complain about the rising number of suicides; in America, while suicide is rare, there's said to be a higher prevalence of insanity than anywhere else. These are all different expressions of the same issue. Americans may not take their lives, no matter how troubled they feel, because their religion prohibits it, and while materialism seems minimal among them, there's a strong desire for physical pleasure. The will fights back, though reason often fails. In democratic times, pleasures are more intense than in aristocratic times, and more people enjoy them. However, it must be acknowledged that people's hopes and desires are often dashed, souls are more troubled and disturbed, and anxieties are heightened.





Chapter XIV: Taste For Physical Gratifications United In America To Love Of Freedom And Attention To Public Affairs

When a democratic state turns to absolute monarchy, the activity which was before directed to public and to private affairs is all at once centred upon the latter: the immediate consequence is, for some time, great physical prosperity; but this impulse soon slackens, and the amount of productive industry is checked. I know not if a single trading or manufacturing people can be cited, from the Tyrians down to the Florentines and the English, who were not a free people also. There is therefore a close bond and necessary relation between these two elements—freedom and productive industry. This proposition is generally true of all nations, but especially of democratic nations. I have already shown that men who live in ages of equality continually require to form associations in order to procure the things they covet; and, on the other hand, I have shown how great political freedom improves and diffuses the art of association. Freedom, in these ages, is therefore especially favorable to the production of wealth; nor is it difficult to perceive that despotism is especially adverse to the same result. The nature of despotic power in democratic ages is not to be fierce or cruel, but minute and meddling. Despotism of this kind, though it does not trample on humanity, is directly opposed to the genius of commerce and the pursuits of industry.

When a democratic state shifts to absolute monarchy, the focus that was once on both public and private matters suddenly shifts entirely to private ones. The immediate result is a short period of significant economic prosperity; however, this momentum quickly fades, and the level of productive enterprise is stunted. I can't think of a single trading or manufacturing society, from the Tyrians to the Florentines and the English, that wasn't a free society as well. So, there’s a strong connection and necessary relationship between freedom and productive industry. This idea is generally true for all nations, but especially for democratic ones. I've already pointed out that people living in times of equality constantly need to form associations to obtain what they desire; and conversely, I have shown how significant political freedom enhances and spreads the art of association. In these times, freedom is particularly beneficial for wealth creation; it’s also clear that despotism is particularly detrimental to the same outcome. The nature of despotic power in democratic times is not to be brutal or harsh, but rather detailed and intrusive. This kind of despotism, while not outright oppressive, directly contradicts the spirit of commerce and industrial pursuits.

Thus the men of democratic ages require to be free in order more readily to procure those physical enjoyments for which they are always longing. It sometimes happens, however, that the excessive taste they conceive for these same enjoyments abandons them to the first master who appears. The passion for worldly welfare then defeats itself, and, without perceiving it, throws the object of their desires to a greater distance.

Thus, people in democratic times need to be free to more easily pursue the physical pleasures they always crave. However, it sometimes happens that their overwhelming desire for these pleasures makes them surrender to the first leader who comes along. This passion for material well-being eventually backfires, and, without realizing it, pushes the things they want even further away.

There is, indeed, a most dangerous passage in the history of a democratic people. When the taste for physical gratifications amongst such a people has grown more rapidly than their education and their experience of free institutions, the time will come when men are carried away, and lose all self-restraint, at the sight of the new possessions they are about to lay hold upon. In their intense and exclusive anxiety to make a fortune, they lose sight of the close connection which exists between the private fortune of each of them and the prosperity of all. It is not necessary to do violence to such a people in order to strip them of the rights they enjoy; they themselves willingly loosen their hold. The discharge of political duties appears to them to be a troublesome annoyance, which diverts them from their occupations and business. If they be required to elect representatives, to support the Government by personal service, to meet on public business, they have no time—they cannot waste their precious time in useless engagements: such idle amusements are unsuited to serious men who are engaged with the more important interests of life. These people think they are following the principle of self-interest, but the idea they entertain of that principle is a very rude one; and the better to look after what they call their business, they neglect their chief business, which is to remain their own masters.

There’s a really risky stage in the history of a democratic society. When people's craving for immediate pleasure outpaces their education and understanding of free institutions, they will eventually get swept away and lose all self-control when faced with new possessions they want to grab. In their intense and singular desire to make money, they forget the important link between their personal wealth and the prosperity of the community as a whole. It’s not necessary to force such a society into submission to take away their rights; they willingly loosen their grip on them. Fulfilling political responsibilities seems like a bothersome distraction that keeps them from focusing on their work and business. If they're asked to vote for representatives, support the government with personal involvement, or gather for public matters, they claim they have no time—they can’t waste their valuable time on pointless activities: such trivialities are not for serious individuals who are busy with life’s bigger priorities. These people believe they’re acting in their own self-interest, but their understanding of that concept is quite simplistic; in trying to take care of what they consider their business, they end up neglecting their most important priority, which is to remain in control of their own lives.

As the citizens who work do not care to attend to public business, and as the class which might devote its leisure to these duties has ceased to exist, the place of the Government is, as it were, unfilled. If at that critical moment some able and ambitious man grasps the supreme power, he will find the road to every kind of usurpation open before him. If he does but attend for some time to the material prosperity of the country, no more will be demanded of him. Above all he must insure public tranquillity: men who are possessed by the passion of physical gratification generally find out that the turmoil of freedom disturbs their welfare, before they discover how freedom itself serves to promote it. If the slightest rumor of public commotion intrudes into the petty pleasures of private life, they are aroused and alarmed by it. The fear of anarchy perpetually haunts them, and they are always ready to fling away their freedom at the first disturbance.

Since the people who work don’t bother to participate in public affairs, and the group that could spend their free time on these responsibilities has disappeared, the Government’s role is basically vacant. If, at that crucial moment, a capable and ambitious person seizes power, they will find a clear path to all sorts of takeover. If they just focus for a while on boosting the country’s economic success, that will be all that’s expected of them. Above all, they must ensure public peace: people who are driven by a desire for physical pleasure often realize that the chaos of freedom disrupts their well-being before they understand how freedom itself actually supports it. If even a hint of public unrest disrupts their small joys in private life, they become agitated and anxious. The fear of chaos constantly weighs on them, and they are always ready to give up their freedom at the first sign of trouble.

I readily admit that public tranquillity is a great good; but at the same time I cannot forget that all nations have been enslaved by being kept in good order. Certainly it is not to be inferred that nations ought to despise public tranquillity; but that state ought not to content them. A nation which asks nothing of its government but the maintenance of order is already a slave at heart—the slave of its own well-being, awaiting but the hand that will bind it. By such a nation the despotism of faction is not less to be dreaded than the despotism of an individual. When the bulk of the community is engrossed by private concerns, the smallest parties need not despair of getting the upper hand in public affairs. At such times it is not rare to see upon the great stage of the world, as we see at our theatres, a multitude represented by a few players, who alone speak in the name of an absent or inattentive crowd: they alone are in action whilst all are stationary; they regulate everything by their own caprice; they change the laws, and tyrannize at will over the manners of the country; and then men wonder to see into how small a number of weak and worthless hands a great people may fall.

I fully acknowledge that public peace is very important; however, I can’t ignore the fact that all nations have been oppressed by being kept in line. It’s not to say that nations should disregard public peace; rather, that state shouldn’t be enough for them. A nation that expects nothing from its government but order is already a slave at heart—enslaved by its own comfort, waiting for the moment someone will control it. In such a nation, the tyranny of groups is just as dangerous as the tyranny of an individual. When most people are preoccupied with their personal lives, even the smallest factions can gain power in public matters. It’s not uncommon to see, on the grand stage of the world, a large audience represented by just a few actors, who speak for a crowd that is absent or indifferent: they are the only ones taking action while everyone else remains still; they control everything based on their own whims; they change the laws and impose their will on the customs of the country; and then people are amazed to see how a vast population can fall into the hands of a few weak and insignificant individuals.

Hitherto the Americans have fortunately escaped all the perils which I have just pointed out; and in this respect they are really deserving of admiration. Perhaps there is no country in the world where fewer idle men are to be met with than in America, or where all who work are more eager to promote their own welfare. But if the passion of the Americans for physical gratifications is vehement, at least it is not indiscriminating; and reason, though unable to restrain it, still directs its course. An American attends to his private concerns as if he were alone in the world, and the next minute he gives himself up to the common weal as if he had forgotten them. At one time he seems animated by the most selfish cupidity, at another by the most lively patriotism. The human heart cannot be thus divided. The inhabitants of the United States alternately display so strong and so similar a passion for their own welfare and for their freedom, that it may be supposed that these passions are united and mingled in some part of their character. And indeed the Americans believe their freedom to be the best instrument and surest safeguard of their welfare: they are attached to the one by the other. They by no means think that they are not called upon to take a part in the public weal; they believe, on the contrary, that their chief business is to secure for themselves a government which will allow them to acquire the things they covet, and which will not debar them from the peaceful enjoyment of those possessions which they have acquired.

So far, Americans have fortunately avoided all the dangers I've just mentioned, and in this way, they truly deserve admiration. There might not be another country in the world with as few idle people as America, or where everyone who works is more eager to improve their own situation. While Americans have a strong desire for physical pleasures, it's not indiscriminate; reason, even if it can't fully control it, still guides their actions. An American focuses on their personal interests as if they were the only person in the world, and then, in the next moment, throws themselves into the common good as if they had forgotten their own concerns. Sometimes they appear driven by selfishness, and at other times by vibrant patriotism. The human heart can't really be split like that. People in the United States frequently show a strong and similar passion for their own well-being as well as their freedom, suggesting that these feelings are intertwined in their nature. In fact, Americans believe their freedom is the best tool and strongest protection for their well-being; they see a connection between the two. They certainly don't think they should stay out of public affairs; on the contrary, they believe their main responsibility is to secure a government that will let them obtain what they desire and that won't prevent them from peacefully enjoying what they've earned.





Chapter XV: That Religious Belief Sometimes Turns The Thoughts Of The Americans To Immaterial Pleasures

In the United States, on the seventh day of every week, the trading and working life of the nation seems suspended; all noises cease; a deep tranquillity, say rather the solemn calm of meditation, succeeds the turmoil of the week, and the soul resumes possession and contemplation of itself. Upon this day the marts of traffic are deserted; every member of the community, accompanied by his children, goes to church, where he listens to strange language which would seem unsuited to his ear. He is told of the countless evils caused by pride and covetousness: he is reminded of the necessity of checking his desires, of the finer pleasures which belong to virtue alone, and of the true happiness which attends it. On his return home, he does not turn to the ledgers of his calling, but he opens the book of Holy Scripture; there he meets with sublime or affecting descriptions of the greatness and goodness of the Creator, of the infinite magnificence of the handiwork of God, of the lofty destinies of man, of his duties, and of his immortal privileges. Thus it is that the American at times steals an hour from himself; and laying aside for a while the petty passions which agitate his life, and the ephemeral interests which engross it, he strays at once into an ideal world, where all is great, eternal, and pure.

In the United States, on the seventh day of the week, the trading and working life of the nation seems to pause; all noise stops; a deep calm, or rather the peaceful stillness of meditation, replaces the chaos of the week, allowing the soul to reclaim and contemplate itself. On this day, the markets are empty; every member of the community, along with their children, heads to church, where they hear unfamiliar words that seem out of place. They are warned about the numerous problems caused by pride and greed: they are reminded to control their desires, about the higher pleasures that come only from virtue, and of the true happiness that accompanies it. On the way home, they don’t go back to the numbers of their work but instead open the book of the Bible; there, they encounter inspiring or moving depictions of the greatness and goodness of the Creator, the incredible magnificence of God’s creation, the high purposes of humanity, their responsibilities, and their everlasting rights. This is how Americans occasionally take an hour for themselves; putting aside, for a bit, the small passions that stir their lives and the fleeting interests that occupy them, they find themselves in an ideal world, where everything is great, eternal, and pure.

I have endeavored to point out in another part of this work the causes to which the maintenance of the political institutions of the Americans is attributable; and religion appeared to be one of the most prominent amongst them. I am now treating of the Americans in an individual capacity, and I again observe that religion is not less useful to each citizen than to the whole State. The Americans show, by their practice, that they feel the high necessity of imparting morality to democratic communities by means of religion. What they think of themselves in this respect is a truth of which every democratic nation ought to be thoroughly persuaded.

I have tried to explain in another part of this work the reasons behind the stability of the American political system, and religion seems to be one of the key factors. Now, as I discuss Americans on an individual level, I notice again that religion is just as beneficial to each citizen as it is to the entire nation. Americans demonstrate through their actions that they recognize the crucial role of religion in providing moral guidance to democratic societies. This understanding of themselves is a truth that every democratic nation should fully embrace.

I do not doubt that the social and political constitution of a people predisposes them to adopt a certain belief and certain tastes, which afterwards flourish without difficulty amongst them; whilst the same causes may divert a people from certain opinions and propensities, without any voluntary effort, and, as it were, without any distinct consciousness, on their part. The whole art of the legislator is correctly to discern beforehand these natural inclinations of communities of men, in order to know whether they should be assisted, or whether it may not be necessary to check them. For the duties incumbent on the legislator differ at different times; the goal towards which the human race ought ever to be tending is alone stationary; the means of reaching it are perpetually to be varied.

I have no doubt that the social and political makeup of a community influences them to adopt certain beliefs and preferences, which then thrive easily among them; meanwhile, the same factors can lead a community away from specific opinions and tendencies, often without any conscious effort or awareness on their part. The key skill of a legislator is to accurately understand these natural inclinations of groups of people in advance, to determine whether they should be encouraged or if there’s a need to rein them in. The responsibilities of a legislator change over time; while the ultimate goal for humanity remains constant, the methods to achieve it must constantly adapt.

If I had been born in an aristocratic age, in the midst of a nation where the hereditary wealth of some, and the irremediable penury of others, should equally divert men from the idea of bettering their condition, and hold the soul as it were in a state of torpor fixed on the contemplation of another world, I should then wish that it were possible for me to rouse that people to a sense of their wants; I should seek to discover more rapid and more easy means for satisfying the fresh desires which I might have awakened; and, directing the most strenuous efforts of the human mind to physical pursuits, I should endeavor to stimulate it to promote the well-being of man. If it happened that some men were immoderately incited to the pursuit of riches, and displayed an excessive liking for physical gratifications, I should not be alarmed; these peculiar symptoms would soon be absorbed in the general aspect of the people.

If I had been born in an aristocratic era, in a nation where some people inherited wealth while others were stuck in poverty, making it hard for anyone to think about improving their situation and keeping their minds fixated on the afterlife, I would wish to wake those people up to their needs. I'd look for quicker and easier ways to satisfy the new desires I might inspire. By channeling the greatest efforts of people's minds into practical goals, I would try to encourage them to enhance human well-being. If some individuals became overly driven to chase wealth and showed a strong preference for physical pleasures, I wouldn't be worried; those tendencies would soon blend into the broader picture of society.

The attention of the legislators of democracies is called to other cares. Give democratic nations education and freedom, and leave them alone. They will soon learn to draw from this world all the benefits which it can afford; they will improve each of the useful arts, and will day by day render life more comfortable, more convenient, and more easy. Their social condition naturally urges them in this direction; I do not fear that they will slacken their course.

The focus of lawmakers in democracies is directed toward other concerns. Provide democratic nations with education and freedom, and then step back. They will quickly figure out how to gain all the advantages this world has to offer; they'll enhance each of the practical skills, and each day they'll make life more comfortable, convenient, and easier. Their social situation naturally pushes them in this direction; I’m not worried that they'll slow down.

But whilst man takes delight in this honest and lawful pursuit of his wellbeing, it is to be apprehended that he may in the end lose the use of his sublimest faculties; and that whilst he is busied in improving all around him, he may at length degrade himself. Here, and here only, does the peril lie. It should therefore be the unceasing object of the legislators of democracies, and of all the virtuous and enlightened men who live there, to raise the souls of their fellow-citizens, and keep them lifted up towards heaven. It is necessary that all who feel an interest in the future destinies of democratic society should unite, and that all should make joint and continual efforts to diffuse the love of the infinite, a sense of greatness, and a love of pleasures not of earth. If amongst the opinions of a democratic people any of those pernicious theories exist which tend to inculcate that all perishes with the body, let men by whom such theories are professed be marked as the natural foes of such a people.

But while people find joy in the honest and lawful pursuit of their well-being, there's a risk that they may ultimately lose touch with their highest abilities; and while they focus on improving everything around them, they might end up degrading themselves. This is where the danger lies. Therefore, it should be the constant focus of lawmakers in democracies, as well as all the virtuous and enlightened individuals living there, to uplift the souls of their fellow citizens and keep them aspiring toward something greater. It’s essential for everyone who cares about the future of democratic society to come together and make ongoing efforts to spread a love for the infinite, a sense of greatness, and an appreciation for joys beyond this world. If any harmful beliefs exist among a democratic people's opinions that suggest everything ends with the body, then those who promote such beliefs should be recognized as the natural enemies of that society.

The materialists are offensive to me in many respects; their doctrines I hold to be pernicious, and I am disgusted at their arrogance. If their system could be of any utility to man, it would seem to be by giving him a modest opinion of himself. But these reasoners show that it is not so; and when they think they have said enough to establish that they are brutes, they show themselves as proud as if they had demonstrated that they are gods. Materialism is, amongst all nations, a dangerous disease of the human mind; but it is more especially to be dreaded amongst a democratic people, because it readily amalgamates with that vice which is most familiar to the heart under such circumstances. Democracy encourages a taste for physical gratification: this taste, if it become excessive, soon disposes men to believe that all is matter only; and materialism, in turn, hurries them back with mad impatience to these same delights: such is the fatal circle within which democratic nations are driven round. It were well that they should see the danger and hold back.

The materialists annoy me in many ways; I believe their ideas are harmful, and their arrogance disgusts me. If their system had any benefit for humanity, it would seem to be in making people think more modestly of themselves. But these thinkers prove otherwise, and when they think they’ve done enough to show they are nothing more than beasts, they act as if they’ve proven they are gods. Materialism is a dangerous affliction of the human mind across all nations; however, it is particularly concerning in a democratic society because it easily blends with the vices that people are most familiar with in such situations. Democracy fosters a craving for physical pleasure: when this craving becomes excessive, it soon leads people to believe that nothing exists beyond the material. In turn, materialism drives them back with reckless urgency to those same pleasures. This is the dangerous cycle that democratic nations find themselves trapped in. They should recognize the danger and restrain themselves.

Most religions are only general, simple, and practical means of teaching men the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. That is the greatest benefit which a democratic people derives, from its belief, and hence belief is more necessary to such a people than to all others. When therefore any religion has struck its roots deep into a democracy, beware lest you disturb them; but rather watch it carefully, as the most precious bequest of aristocratic ages. Seek not to supersede the old religious opinions of men by new ones; lest in the passage from one faith to another, the soul being left for a while stripped of all belief, the love of physical gratifications should grow upon it and fill it wholly.

Most religions are just basic, straightforward, and practical ways of teaching people about the immortality of the soul. This is the biggest benefit that a democratic society gets from its beliefs, which is why belief is more essential for such a society than for others. So, when any religion is deeply rooted in a democracy, be careful not to disturb it; instead, watch over it as the most valuable gift from earlier, aristocratic times. Don't try to replace people’s old religious beliefs with new ones; doing so might leave the soul temporarily without any beliefs, leading to an overwhelming desire for physical pleasures.

The doctrine of metempsychosis is assuredly not more rational than that of materialism; nevertheless if it were absolutely necessary that a democracy should choose one of the two, I should not hesitate to decide that the community would run less risk of being brutalized by believing that the soul of man will pass into the carcass of a hog, than by believing that the soul of man is nothing at all. The belief in a supersensual and immortal principle, united for a time to matter, is so indispensable to man's greatness, that its effects are striking even when it is not united to the doctrine of future reward and punishment; and when it holds no more than that after death the divine principle contained in man is absorbed in the Deity, or transferred to animate the frame of some other creature. Men holding so imperfect a belief will still consider the body as the secondary and inferior portion of their nature, and they will despise it even whilst they yield to its influence; whereas they have a natural esteem and secret admiration for the immaterial part of man, even though they sometimes refuse to submit to its dominion. That is enough to give a lofty cast to their opinions and their tastes, and to bid them tend with no interested motive, and as it were by impulse, to pure feelings and elevated thoughts.

The idea of metempsychosis is definitely no more rational than materialism; however, if a democracy had to choose between the two, I wouldn't hesitate to say that the community would be less likely to become brutal by believing that the human soul can enter the body of a pig than by believing that the soul is nothing at all. The belief in a spiritual, immortal essence that is temporarily connected to the physical world is so vital to human greatness that its impact is noticeable even when it's not linked to the idea of future rewards and punishments; even when it only holds that after death, the divine essence within a person merges with the divine or gets transferred to animate another creature. People with such an imperfect belief will still view the body as a lesser and inferior part of their being, and they will look down on it even while following its desires; meanwhile, they naturally respect and secretly admire the immaterial aspect of humanity, even if they sometimes resist its authority. This is enough to elevate their opinions and tastes, pushing them to pursue pure feelings and higher thoughts without any selfish motives, almost instinctively.

It is not certain that Socrates and his followers had very fixed opinions as to what would befall man hereafter; but the sole point of belief on which they were determined—that the soul has nothing in common with the body, and survives it—was enough to give the Platonic philosophy that sublime aspiration by which it is distinguished. It is clear from the works of Plato, that many philosophical writers, his predecessors or contemporaries, professed materialism. These writers have not reached us, or have reached us in mere fragments. The same thing has happened in almost all ages; the greater part of the most famous minds in literature adhere to the doctrines of a supersensual philosophy. The instinct and the taste of the human race maintain those doctrines; they save them oftentimes in spite of men themselves, and raise the names of their defenders above the tide of time. It must not then be supposed that at any period or under any political condition, the passion for physical gratifications, and the opinions which are superinduced by that passion, can ever content a whole people. The heart of man is of a larger mould: it can at once comprise a taste for the possessions of earth and the love of those of heaven: at times it may seem to cling devotedly to the one, but it will never be long without thinking of the other.

It’s unclear if Socrates and his followers had definite ideas about what would happen to humanity after death; however, their core belief—that the soul is separate from the body and lives on—was enough to give Platonic philosophy its unique aspiration. Plato’s works indicate that many philosophical writers, either before him or during his time, followed materialistic views. These writers have not come down to us in full, or only in fragments. This has happened throughout history; many of the greatest minds in literature have supported ideas from a higher philosophy. The instincts and tastes of humanity preserve these ideas; they often keep them alive despite people's efforts, and elevate the names of their supporters above the passage of time. Therefore, it should not be assumed that at any time or under any political system, the desire for physical pleasures and the beliefs that stem from that desire can completely satisfy an entire population. The human heart is much broader: it can embrace both a longing for earthly possessions and a love for spiritual things. At times, it may seem devoted to one, but it will never be without thoughts of the other for long.

If it be easy to see that it is more particularly important in democratic ages that spiritual opinions should prevail, it is not easy to say by what means those who govern democratic nations may make them predominate. I am no believer in the prosperity, any more than in the durability, of official philosophies; and as to state religions, I have always held, that if they be sometimes of momentary service to the interests of political power, they always, sooner or later, become fatal to the Church. Nor do I think with those who assert, that to raise religion in the eyes of the people, and to make them do honor to her spiritual doctrines, it is desirable indirectly to give her ministers a political influence which the laws deny them. I am so much alive to the almost inevitable dangers which beset religious belief whenever the clergy take part in public affairs, and I am so convinced that Christianity must be maintained at any cost in the bosom of modern democracies, that I had rather shut up the priesthood within the sanctuary than allow them to step beyond it.

If it's clear that it's especially important in democratic times for spiritual beliefs to be prominent, it's not obvious how those in charge of democratic countries can make that happen. I don't believe in the success, nor the longevity, of official philosophies; and regarding state religions, I've always thought that while they might serve the political power's interests for a time, they end up being harmful to the Church eventually. I also don't agree with those who say that to elevate religion in the people's eyes and to encourage respect for its doctrines, it's necessary to indirectly give its ministers political power that the laws do not allow. I'm very aware of the almost certain dangers that come with religious beliefs when the clergy get involved in politics, and I'm convinced that Christianity must be preserved at all costs within modern democracies, so I would prefer to keep the priesthood confined to their places of worship than allow them to step outside of that.

What means then remain in the hands of constituted authorities to bring men back to spiritual opinions, or to hold them fast to the religion by which those opinions are suggested? My answer will do me harm in the eyes of politicians. I believe that the sole effectual means which governments can employ in order to have the doctrine of the immortality of the soul duly respected, is ever to act as if they believed in it themselves; and I think that it is only by scrupulous conformity to religious morality in great affairs that they can hope to teach the community at large to know, to love, and to observe it in the lesser concerns of life.

What power do the authorities have to bring people back to spiritual beliefs or keep them tied to the religion that informs those beliefs? My answer might not sit well with politicians. I believe the only effective way for governments to ensure that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is respected is by acting as if they truly believe it themselves; and I think that they can only teach the general public to understand, appreciate, and follow this religious morality in their everyday lives through consistent adherence to it in significant matters.





Chapter XVI: That Excessive Care Of Worldly Welfare May Impair That Welfare

There is a closer tie than is commonly supposed between the improvement of the soul and the amelioration of what belongs to the body. Man may leave these two things apart, and consider each of them alternately; but he cannot sever them entirely without at last losing sight of one and of the other. The beasts have the same senses as ourselves, and very nearly the same appetites. We have no sensual passions which are not common to our race and theirs, and which are not to be found, at least in the germ, in a dog as well as in a man. Whence is it then that the animals can only provide for their first and lowest wants, whereas we can infinitely vary and endlessly increase our enjoyments?

There is a closer connection than usually thought between the improvement of the soul and the betterment of the body. People can separate these two aspects and think about each one in turn, but they can't completely disconnect them without eventually losing sight of both. Animals have the same senses as we do and almost the same desires. We don’t have any physical passions that aren’t shared by our species and theirs, and that aren’t present, at least in a basic form, in a dog as well as in a human. So why is it that animals can only satisfy their basic needs, while we can diversify and expand our pleasures infinitely?

We are superior to the beasts in this, that we use our souls to find out those material benefits to which they are only led by instinct. In man, the angel teaches the brute the art of contenting its desires. It is because man is capable of rising above the things of the body, and of contemning life itself, of which the beasts have not the least notion, that he can multiply these same things of the body to a degree which inferior races are equally unable to conceive. Whatever elevates, enlarges, and expands the soul, renders it more capable of succeeding in those very undertakings which concern it not. Whatever, on the other hand, enervates or lowers it, weakens it for all purposes, the chiefest, as well as the least, and threatens to render it almost equally impotent for the one and for the other. Hence the soul must remain great and strong, though it were only to devote its strength and greatness from time to time to the service of the body. If men were ever to content themselves with material objects, it is probable that they would lose by degrees the art of producing them; and they would enjoy them in the end, like the brutes, without discernment and without improvement.

We are better than animals in that we use our minds to seek out the material benefits they pursue only by instinct. In humans, the higher self teaches the animal how to satisfy its desires. It's because humans can rise above physical needs and even disregard life itself, which animals cannot comprehend, that they can accumulate these physical things to an extent that lesser beings cannot even imagine. Anything that elevates, expands, and enriches the soul makes it more capable of succeeding in pursuits that might not directly concern it. Conversely, anything that weakens or diminishes the soul reduces its effectiveness in every way, both significant and trivial, and risks making it almost equally powerless in all areas. Therefore, the soul must remain great and strong, even if it only occasionally uses its strength to support the body. If people ever settled for mere material objects, they would likely gradually lose the ability to create them; in the end, they would enjoy them like animals, without understanding or enhancement.





Chapter XVII: That In Times Marked By Equality Of Conditions And Sceptical Opinions, It Is Important To Remove To A Distance The Objects Of Human Actions

In the ages of faith the final end of life is placed beyond life. The men of those ages therefore naturally, and in a manner involuntarily, accustom themselves to fix their gaze for a long course of years on some immovable object, towards which they are constantly tending; and they learn by insensible degrees to repress a multitude of petty passing desires, in order to be the better able to content that great and lasting desire which possesses them. When these same men engage in the affairs of this world, the same habits may be traced in their conduct. They are apt to set up some general and certain aim and end to their actions here below, towards which all their efforts are directed: they do not turn from day to day to chase some novel object of desire, but they have settled designs which they are never weary of pursuing. This explains why religious nations have so often achieved such lasting results: for whilst they were thinking only of the other world, they had found out the great secret of success in this. Religions give men a general habit of conducting themselves with a view to futurity: in this respect they are not less useful to happiness in this life than to felicity hereafter; and this is one of their chief political characteristics.

In the times of faith, the ultimate goal of life is seen as something beyond this life. People during those times naturally, and almost without realizing it, train themselves to focus for many years on a fixed goal, towards which they are constantly moving. They gradually learn to set aside many fleeting desires to better satisfy that deep and enduring desire that drives them. When these same individuals get involved in the matters of the world, you can also see these habits in their actions. They tend to establish some clear and definite purpose for their actions here, directing all their efforts towards it: they don’t shift day by day to chase after new desires but stick to their established goals, tirelessly pursuing them. This helps explain why religious communities have often achieved such lasting success: while focused on the next world, they uncovered the key to success in this one. Religions instill in people a general inclination to act with the future in mind; in this way, they contribute to happiness in this life as much as they do to joy in the next, and this is one of their major political traits.

But in proportion as the light of faith grows dim, the range of man's sight is circumscribed, as if the end and aim of human actions appeared every day to be more within his reach. When men have once allowed themselves to think no more of what is to befall them after life, they readily lapse into that complete and brutal indifference to futurity, which is but too conformable to some propensities of mankind. As soon as they have lost the habit of placing their chief hopes upon remote events, they naturally seek to gratify without delay their smallest desires; and no sooner do they despair of living forever, than they are disposed to act as if they were to exist but for a single day. In sceptical ages it is always therefore to be feared that men may perpetually give way to their daily casual desires; and that, wholly renouncing whatever cannot be acquired without protracted effort, they may establish nothing great, permanent, and calm.

But as faith starts to fade, people's vision becomes limited, making the goal of human actions seem more attainable. When individuals stop thinking about what happens after life, they easily slip into a complete and harsh indifference to the future, which aligns with certain human tendencies. Once they lose the habit of placing their main hopes on distant events, they naturally try to satisfy their smallest desires without delay; and as soon as they give up on the idea of living forever, they tend to act as if they would only exist for a single day. In skeptical times, there's always a fear that people will give in to their daily impulses and, by completely rejecting anything that requires sustained effort, fail to achieve anything significant, lasting, and stable.

If the social condition of a people, under these circumstances, becomes democratic, the danger which I here point out is thereby increased. When everyone is constantly striving to change his position—when an immense field for competition is thrown open to all—when wealth is amassed or dissipated in the shortest possible space of time amidst the turmoil of democracy, visions of sudden and easy fortunes—of great possessions easily won and lost—of chance, under all its forms—haunt the mind. The instability of society itself fosters the natural instability of man's desires. In the midst of these perpetual fluctuations of his lot, the present grows upon his mind, until it conceals futurity from his sight, and his looks go no further than the morrow.

If a society becomes democratic under these circumstances, the danger I’m pointing out increases. When everyone is constantly trying to improve their situation—when there’s a vast area for competition open to all—when wealth can be gained or lost in the blink of an eye amidst the chaos of democracy, thoughts of getting rich quickly—of great possessions that are easily gained and lost—of chance in all its forms—fill people’s minds. The instability of society itself fuels the natural instability of people’s desires. Amidst these constant ups and downs in their lives, the present dominates their thoughts, hiding the future from view, and their focus rarely extends beyond the next day.

In those countries in which unhappily irreligion and democracy coexist, the most important duty of philosophers and of those in power is to be always striving to place the objects of human actions far beyond man's immediate range. Circumscribed by the character of his country and his age, the moralist must learn to vindicate his principles in that position. He must constantly endeavor to show his contemporaries, that, even in the midst of the perpetual commotion around them, it is easier than they think to conceive and to execute protracted undertakings. He must teach them that, although the aspect of mankind may have changed, the methods by which men may provide for their prosperity in this world are still the same; and that amongst democratic nations, as well as elsewhere, it is only by resisting a thousand petty selfish passions of the hour that the general and unquenchable passion for happiness can be satisfied.

In those countries where, unfortunately, irreligion and democracy exist together, the most important responsibility of philosophers and those in power is to always work towards placing the goals of human actions beyond what is immediately in front of them. Limited by the character of their nation and their time, moralists need to find ways to defend their principles in that context. They must consistently try to show their peers that, even amidst the constant chaos around them, it is easier than they think to conceive and carry out long-term projects. They should teach others that, even though the circumstances of humanity may have changed, the ways in which people can secure their well-being in this world remain the same; and that among democratic nations, just like anywhere else, it is only by resisting a multitude of small selfish desires of the moment that the overall and insatiable desire for happiness can be fulfilled.

The task of those in power is not less clearly marked out. At all times it is important that those who govern nations should act with a view to the future: but this is even more necessary in democratic and sceptical ages than in any others. By acting thus, the leading men of democracies not only make public affairs prosperous, but they also teach private individuals, by their example, the art of managing private concerns. Above all they must strive as much as possible to banish chance from the sphere of politics. The sudden and undeserved promotion of a courtier produces only a transient impression in an aristocratic country, because the aggregate institutions and opinions of the nation habitually compel men to advance slowly in tracks which they cannot get out of. But nothing is more pernicious than similar instances of favor exhibited to the eyes of a democratic people: they give the last impulse to the public mind in a direction where everything hurries it onwards. At times of scepticism and equality more especially, the favor of the people or of the prince, which chance may confer or chance withhold, ought never to stand in lieu of attainments or services. It is desirable that every advancement should there appear to be the result of some effort; so that no greatness should be of too easy acquirement, and that ambition should be obliged to fix its gaze long upon an object before it is gratified. Governments must apply themselves to restore to men that love of the future with which religion and the state of society no longer inspire them; and, without saying so, they must practically teach the community day by day that wealth, fame, and power are the rewards of labor—that great success stands at the utmost range of long desires, and that nothing lasting is obtained but what is obtained by toil. When men have accustomed themselves to foresee from afar what is likely to befall in the world and to feed upon hopes, they can hardly confine their minds within the precise circumference of life, and they are ready to break the boundary and cast their looks beyond. I do not doubt that, by training the members of a community to think of their future condition in this world, they would be gradually and unconsciously brought nearer to religious convictions. Thus the means which allow men, up to a certain point, to go without religion, are perhaps after all the only means we still possess for bringing mankind back by a long and roundabout path to a state of faith.

The role of those in power is quite clear. It's always important for leaders of nations to act with the future in mind, but this is even more crucial in democratic and skeptical times than in any other period. By doing so, leaders in democracies not only ensure the prosperity of public affairs but also set an example for individuals in managing their personal matters. Above all, they should work as hard as possible to eliminate chance from politics. In an aristocratic society, a sudden and unearned promotion of a courtier only leaves a brief impression because the overall institutions and opinions of the nation usually require people to advance slowly in established paths. However, nothing is more harmful than similar favoritism shown to a democratic population; it gives a strong push to public sentiment in a direction that accelerates everything. Especially during times of skepticism and equality, favor from the people or a leader, which can come and go by chance, should never replace real achievements or services. It's preferable that every advancement appears to be the result of effort so that no success seems too easy to obtain, and ambition must spend time focusing on a goal before it is reached. Governments should work to restore that future-oriented mindset in people, which they no longer get from religion or societal conditions; without explicitly stating it, they should show the community daily that wealth, fame, and power come from hard work—that great success lies at the farthest reach of long-held desires, and that nothing lasting can be achieved without effort. When people learn to anticipate what might happen in the world and nurture their hopes, they can hardly limit their thoughts to the immediate aspects of life and become eager to look beyond. I believe that by encouraging community members to consider their future circumstances, they would gradually and unconsciously move closer to religious beliefs. Thus, the ways that allow people to do without religion, up to a point, might actually be the only paths we still have to bring humanity back to a state of faith through a long and indirect journey.





Chapter XVIII: That Amongst The Americans All Honest Callings Are Honorable

Amongst a democratic people, where there is no hereditary wealth, every man works to earn a living, or has worked, or is born of parents who have worked. The notion of labor is therefore presented to the mind on every side as the necessary, natural, and honest condition of human existence. Not only is labor not dishonorable amongst such a people, but it is held in honor: the prejudice is not against it, but in its favor. In the United States a wealthy man thinks that he owes it to public opinion to devote his leisure to some kind of industrial or commercial pursuit, or to public business. He would think himself in bad repute if he employed his life solely in living. It is for the purpose of escaping this obligation to work, that so many rich Americans come to Europe, where they find some scattered remains of aristocratic society, amongst which idleness is still held in honor.

In a democratic society without inherited wealth, everyone works to make a living, has worked, or comes from parents who have worked. Labor is seen everywhere as the necessary, natural, and respectable condition of human life. Rather than being looked down upon, work is actually respected; the bias is in its favor. In the United States, a wealthy person believes they should spend their free time on some form of industrial or commercial activity, or on public service, because they feel they would be viewed negatively if they spent their life just enjoying leisure. To avoid this expectation to work, many affluent Americans travel to Europe, where they discover remnants of aristocratic society that still values idleness.

Equality of conditions not only ennobles the notion of labor in men's estimation, but it raises the notion of labor as a source of profit. In aristocracies it is not exactly labor that is despised, but labor with a view to profit. Labor is honorific in itself, when it is undertaken at the sole bidding of ambition or of virtue. Yet in aristocratic society it constantly happens that he who works for honor is not insensible to the attractions of profit. But these two desires only intermingle in the innermost depths of his soul: he carefully hides from every eye the point at which they join; he would fain conceal it from himself. In aristocratic countries there are few public officers who do not affect to serve their country without interested motives. Their salary is an incident of which they think but little, and of which they always affect not to think at all. Thus the notion of profit is kept distinct from that of labor; however they may be united in point of fact, they are not thought of together.

Equality of conditions not only elevates the idea of labor in people's eyes but also enhances its perception as a source of profit. In aristocracies, it’s not labor itself that is looked down upon, but rather labor done for profit. Labor is seen as honorable in its own right when it is driven solely by ambition or virtue. Yet in aristocratic societies, it's common for those who work for honor to still be drawn to the allure of profit. However, these two desires only intertwine deep within their souls; they carefully hide from everyone the point where they connect, and often try to hide it from themselves too. In aristocratic countries, few public officials don’t pretend to serve their country without personal motives. They regard their salary as a minor detail that they seldom consider, and they always act as if they don’t think about it at all. Thus, the concept of profit remains separate from that of labor; even though they may be intertwined in reality, they are not considered together.

In democratic communities these two notions are, on the contrary, always palpably united. As the desire of well-being is universal—as fortunes are slender or fluctuating—as everyone wants either to increase his own resources, or to provide fresh ones for his progeny, men clearly see that it is profit which, if not wholly, at least partially, leads them to work. Even those who are principally actuated by the love of fame are necessarily made familiar with the thought that they are not exclusively actuated by that motive; and they discover that the desire of getting a living is mingled in their minds with the desire of making life illustrious.

In democratic societies, these two ideas are clearly intertwined. Since the desire for well-being is universal, and since fortunes can be small or unstable, everyone wants to either grow their own resources or create new ones for their children. People clearly recognize that profit, while not the only motivation, is at least partially what drives them to work. Even those who are mainly motivated by a love of fame come to realize that this is not their only reason; they find that the wish to earn a living is mixed with the desire to make life remarkable.

As soon as, on the one hand, labor is held by the whole community to be an honorable necessity of man's condition, and, on the other, as soon as labor is always ostensibly performed, wholly or in part, for the purpose of earning remuneration, the immense interval which separated different callings in aristocratic societies disappears. If all are not alike, all at least have one feature in common. No profession exists in which men do not work for money; and the remuneration which is common to them all gives them all an air of resemblance. This serves to explain the opinions which the Americans entertain with respect to different callings. In America no one is degraded because he works, for everyone about him works also; nor is anyone humiliated by the notion of receiving pay, for the President of the United States also works for pay. He is paid for commanding, other men for obeying orders. In the United States professions are more or less laborious, more or less profitable; but they are never either high or low: every honest calling is honorable.

As soon as the entire community views work as an honorable necessity of human life, and as soon as work is always clearly done, either fully or partially, to earn a paycheck, the vast gap that once separated different jobs in aristocratic societies disappears. While not everyone is the same, they at least share one common trait. No profession exists where people don’t work for money; and the shared earnings across all professions create a sense of similarity among them. This helps explain the attitudes Americans have toward various jobs. In America, no one is looked down upon for working because everyone around them is working too; nor is anyone embarrassed by the idea of getting paid, since the President of the United States also earns a salary. He gets paid for leading, while others are compensated for following directions. In the United States, jobs may vary in how demanding they are or how much they pay, but they’re never seen as superior or inferior: every honest profession is respected.





Chapter XIX: That Almost All The Americans Follow Industrial Callings

Agriculture is, perhaps, of all the useful arts that which improves most slowly amongst democratic nations. Frequently, indeed, it would seem to be stationary, because other arts are making rapid strides towards perfection. On the other hand, almost all the tastes and habits which the equality of condition engenders naturally lead men to commercial and industrial occupations.

Agriculture is probably the slowest to improve among all the useful arts in democratic countries. In fact, it often seems to be stuck because other industries are advancing quickly toward perfection. On the flip side, almost all the preferences and behaviors that come from equal social conditions tend to push people toward business and industrial jobs.

Suppose an active, enlightened, and free man, enjoying a competency, but full of desires: he is too poor to live in idleness; he is rich enough to feel himself protected from the immediate fear of want, and he thinks how he can better his condition. This man has conceived a taste for physical gratifications, which thousands of his fellow-men indulge in around him; he has himself begun to enjoy these pleasures, and he is eager to increase his means of satisfying these tastes more completely. But life is slipping away, time is urgent—to what is he to turn? The cultivation of the ground promises an almost certain result to his exertions, but a slow one; men are not enriched by it without patience and toil. Agriculture is therefore only suited to those who have already large, superfluous wealth, or to those whose penury bids them only seek a bare subsistence. The choice of such a man as we have supposed is soon made; he sells his plot of ground, leaves his dwelling, and embarks in some hazardous but lucrative calling. Democratic communities abound in men of this kind; and in proportion as the equality of conditions becomes greater, their multitude increases. Thus democracy not only swells the number of workingmen, but it leads men to prefer one kind of labor to another; and whilst it diverts them from agriculture, it encourages their taste for commerce and manufactures. *a

Imagine an active, aware, and free person who has a comfortable lifestyle but is filled with desires. They are too poor to live without working but rich enough to not constantly worry about immediate needs, and they think about how to improve their situation. This person has developed a liking for physical pleasures that many around them enjoy; they have started to indulge in these pleasures themselves and are eager to find ways to satisfy these desires even more. However, time is slipping away—what should they do? Farming seems like it could provide steady results from their efforts, but it’s a slow process; people don't get rich from it without patience and hard work. So, agriculture is really only suitable for those who already have excess wealth or those who are so poor that they’re only looking for a basic living. The choice for someone like the person we've imagined is quickly made; they sell their land, leave their home, and dive into some risky but potentially profitable job. In democratic societies, there are many people like this, and as conditions become more equal, their numbers grow. Therefore, democracy not only increases the number of workers but also influences people to favor one type of work over another; while it turns them away from farming, it encourages their interest in trade and manufacturing.

a
[ It has often been remarked that manufacturers and mercantile men are inordinately addicted to physical gratifications, and this has been attributed to commerce and manufactures; but that is, I apprehend, to take the effect for the cause. The taste for physical gratifications is not imparted to men by commerce or manufactures, but it is rather this taste which leads men to embark in commerce and manufactures, as a means by which they hope to satisfy themselves more promptly and more completely. If commerce and manufactures increase the desire of well-being, it is because every passion gathers strength in proportion as it is cultivated, and is increased by all the efforts made to satiate it. All the causes which make the love of worldly welfare predominate in the heart of man are favorable to the growth of commerce and manufactures. Equality of conditions is one of those causes; it encourages trade, not directly by giving men a taste for business, but indirectly by strengthening and expanding in their minds a taste for prosperity.]

a
[It’s often said that manufacturers and business people have a strong attraction to physical pleasures, and this has been linked to commerce and manufacturing. However, I believe that this confuses cause and effect. The desire for physical pleasures isn’t given to people by commerce or manufacturing; rather, it’s this desire that drives them to get involved in commerce and manufacturing as a way to satisfy themselves more quickly and completely. If commerce and manufacturing heighten the desire for well-being, it’s because every passion grows stronger as it is pursued, and it intensifies with all the efforts made to satisfy it. All the factors that amplify the love of material welfare in people's hearts also support the growth of commerce and manufacturing. One of these factors is an equality of conditions; it boosts trade not directly by creating a preference for business but indirectly by strengthening and expanding people's desire for prosperity.]

This spirit may be observed even amongst the richest members of the community. In democratic countries, however opulent a man is supposed to be, he is almost always discontented with his fortune, because he finds that he is less rich than his father was, and he fears that his sons will be less rich than himself. Most rich men in democracies are therefore constantly haunted by the desire of obtaining wealth, and they naturally turn their attention to trade and manufactures, which appear to offer the readiest and most powerful means of success. In this respect they share the instincts of the poor, without feeling the same necessities; say rather, they feel the most imperious of all necessities, that of not sinking in the world.

This mindset can be seen even among the wealthiest people in the community. In democratic societies, no matter how rich someone is said to be, they are usually unhappy with their wealth because they see that they are not as well-off as their father was, and they worry that their children will be even less wealthy than they are. As a result, most wealthy individuals in democracies are constantly driven by the desire to attain more wealth, naturally focusing on business and manufacturing, which seem to provide the quickest and most effective ways to succeed. In this way, they share the instincts of those who are poor, although they don’t feel the same urgent needs; rather, they experience the strongest necessity of all—the need to avoid falling behind in society.

In aristocracies the rich are at the same time those who govern. The attention which they unceasingly devote to important public affairs diverts them from the lesser cares which trade and manufactures demand. If the will of an individual happens, nevertheless, to turn his attention to business, the will of the body to which he belongs will immediately debar him from pursuing it; for however men may declaim against the rule of numbers, they cannot wholly escape their sway; and even amongst those aristocratic bodies which most obstinately refuse to acknowledge the rights of the majority of the nation, a private majority is formed which governs the rest. *b

In aristocracies, the wealthy are also the ones in power. Their constant focus on important public affairs pulls them away from the smaller demands of trade and manufacturing. If someone in this group decides to pay attention to business, their organization will quickly stop them from doing so; because no matter how much people talk against the power of the majority, they can't completely avoid its influence. Even in those aristocratic groups that stubbornly refuse to recognize the rights of the majority of the nation, a private majority forms that ends up governing the others.

b
[ Some aristocracies, however, have devoted themselves eagerly to commerce, and have cultivated manufactures with success. The history of the world might furnish several conspicuous examples. But, generally speaking, it may be affirmed that the aristocratic principle is not favorable to the growth of trade and manufactures. Moneyed aristocracies are the only exception to the rule. Amongst such aristocracies there are hardly any desires which do not require wealth to satisfy them; the love of riches becomes, so to speak, the high road of human passions, which is crossed by or connected with all lesser tracks. The love of money and the thirst for that distinction which attaches to power, are then so closely intermixed in the same souls, that it becomes difficult to discover whether men grow covetous from ambition, or whether they are ambitious from covetousness. This is the case in England, where men seek to get rich in order to arrive at distinction, and seek distinctions as a manifestation of their wealth. The mind is then seized by both ends, and hurried into trade and manufactures, which are the shortest roads that lead to opulence.

b
[ Some aristocracies, however, have eagerly taken to commerce and successfully developed industries. The history of the world could provide several notable examples. But, generally speaking, it can be said that the aristocratic principle does not support the growth of trade and industry. Wealthy aristocracies are the only exception to this rule. Within these aristocracies, there are hardly any desires that do not require money to fulfill; the love of wealth becomes, in a sense, the main route for human passions, linking or intersecting with all smaller paths. The desire for money and the craving for the status that comes with power are so intertwined in the same individuals that it becomes hard to determine whether their greed stems from ambition or their ambition from greed. This is true in England, where people strive to get rich to gain prominence and seek prominence as a demonstration of their wealth. The mind is then driven by both ends, rushing into trade and industry, which are the quickest paths to affluence.

This, however, strikes me as an exceptional and transitory circumstance. When wealth is become the only symbol of aristocracy, it is very difficult for the wealthy to maintain sole possession of political power, to the exclusion of all other men. The aristocracy of birth and pure democracy are at the two extremes of the social and political state of nations: between them moneyed aristocracy finds its place. The latter approximates to the aristocracy of birth by conferring great privileges on a small number of persons; it so far belongs to the democratic element, that these privileges may be successively acquired by all. It frequently forms a natural transition between these two conditions of society, and it is difficult to say whether it closes the reign of aristocratic institutions, or whether it already opens the new era of democracy.]

This, however, seems to me like a unique and temporary situation. When wealth becomes the only sign of aristocracy, it’s really hard for the rich to keep all political power for themselves, leaving everyone else out. The aristocracy of birth and pure democracy are at opposite ends of the social and political spectrum of nations: moneyed aristocracy sits in between. The latter is similar to the aristocracy of birth because it gives significant privileges to a small group of people; it also belongs to the democratic side to some extent since anyone can potentially acquire those privileges. It often serves as a natural bridge between these two societal conditions, and it's tough to determine whether it marks the end of aristocratic systems or if it is already ushering in a new era of democracy.

In democratic countries, where money does not lead those who possess it to political power, but often removes them from it, the rich do not know how to spend their leisure. They are driven into active life by the inquietude and the greatness of their desires, by the extent of their resources, and by the taste for what is extraordinary, which is almost always felt by those who rise, by whatsoever means, above the crowd. Trade is the only road open to them. In democracies nothing is more great or more brilliant than commerce: it attracts the attention of the public, and fills the imagination of the multitude; all energetic passions are directed towards it. Neither their own prejudices, nor those of anybody else, can prevent the rich from devoting themselves to it. The wealthy members of democracies never form a body which has manners and regulations of its own; the opinions peculiar to their class do not restrain them, and the common opinions of their country urge them on. Moreover, as all the large fortunes which are to be met with in a democratic community are of commercial growth, many generations must succeed each other before their possessors can have entirely laid aside their habits of business.

In democratic countries, where money doesn’t usually give its owners political power—and often actually takes them away from it—the rich struggle to make the most of their free time. They're pushed into active lives by their restlessness, strong desires, ample resources, and a desire for the extraordinary, which is commonly felt by those who rise above the masses by any means. Business is the only path available to them. In democracies, nothing is more significant or impressive than commerce: it catches the public eye and captures the imagination of the people; all intense passions are directed towards it. Neither their own biases nor those of others can stop the wealthy from engaging in it. The rich in democracies never form a cohesive group with their own social norms and rules; their class-specific beliefs don't hold them back, while the widespread values of their society push them forward. Additionally, since all the large fortunes in a democratic community come from commercial ventures, it takes many generations before their owners can completely shed their business habits.

Circumscribed within the narrow space which politics leave them, rich men in democracies eagerly embark in commercial enterprise: there they can extend and employ their natural advantages; and indeed it is even by the boldness and the magnitude of their industrial speculations that we may measure the slight esteem in which productive industry would have been held by them, if they had been born amidst an aristocracy.

Limited by the narrow scope that politics allows, wealthy individuals in democracies eagerly engage in business ventures: here, they can leverage their natural advantages; and it's actually through the boldness and scale of their business endeavors that we can gauge the low regard they would have had for productive work if they had been born into an aristocracy.

A similar observation is likewise applicable to all men living in democracies, whether they be poor or rich. Those who live in the midst of democratic fluctuations have always before their eyes the phantom of chance; and they end by liking all undertakings in which chance plays a part. They are therefore all led to engage in commerce, not only for the sake of the profit it holds out to them, but for the love of the constant excitement occasioned by that pursuit.

A similar observation applies to everyone living in democracies, whether they're wealthy or not. Those who experience democratic changes constantly see the shadow of chance; ultimately, they come to enjoy any ventures involving chance. As a result, they are all drawn to engage in business, not just for the potential profit, but for the thrill that comes with that pursuit.

The United States of America have only been emancipated for half a century [in 1840] from the state of colonial dependence in which they stood to Great Britain; the number of large fortunes there is small, and capital is still scarce. Yet no people in the world has made such rapid progress in trade and manufactures as the Americans: they constitute at the present day the second maritime nation in the world; and although their manufactures have to struggle with almost insurmountable natural impediments, they are not prevented from making great and daily advances. In the United States the greatest undertakings and speculations are executed without difficulty, because the whole population is engaged in productive industry, and because the poorest as well as the most opulent members of the commonwealth are ready to combine their efforts for these purposes. The consequence is, that a stranger is constantly amazed by the immense public works executed by a nation which contains, so to speak, no rich men. The Americans arrived but as yesterday on the territory which they inhabit, and they have already changed the whole order of nature for their own advantage. They have joined the Hudson to the Mississippi, and made the Atlantic Ocean communicate with the Gulf of Mexico, across a continent of more than five hundred leagues in extent which separates the two seas. The longest railroads which have been constructed up to the present time are in America. But what most astonishes me in the United States, is not so much the marvellous grandeur of some undertakings, as the innumerable multitude of small ones. Almost all the farmers of the United States combine some trade with agriculture; most of them make agriculture itself a trade. It seldom happens that an American farmer settles for good upon the land which he occupies: especially in the districts of the Far West he brings land into tillage in order to sell it again, and not to farm it: he builds a farmhouse on the speculation that, as the state of the country will soon be changed by the increase of population, a good price will be gotten for it. Every year a swarm of the inhabitants of the North arrive in the Southern States, and settle in the parts where the cotton plant and the sugar-cane grow. These men cultivate the soil in order to make it produce in a few years enough to enrich them; and they already look forward to the time when they may return home to enjoy the competency thus acquired. Thus the Americans carry their business-like qualities into agriculture; and their trading passions are displayed in that as in their other pursuits.

The United States has only been independent for half a century [since 1840] from the colonial dependence on Great Britain; the number of large fortunes there is small, and capital is still hard to come by. Yet no people in the world has made such rapid strides in trade and manufacturing as Americans: they are currently the second-largest maritime nation in the world; and although their manufacturing faces significant natural challenges, they continue to make significant and daily progress. In the United States, the biggest projects and ventures are carried out with ease, as the entire population is involved in productive work, and both the poorest and wealthiest members of society are eager to pool their resources for these efforts. As a result, outsiders are often amazed by the vast public works undertaken by a nation that seems to have no rich individuals. The Americans have only recently arrived on the land they now occupy, and they have already transformed the entire natural landscape to their advantage. They have connected the Hudson River to the Mississippi River and created a link from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico, spanning a continent of over five hundred miles that lies between the two seas. The longest railroads built to date are in America. However, what amazes me most about the United States is not just the impressive scale of some projects, but the countless smaller ones. Nearly all farmers in the United States combine some trade with agriculture; many even turn agriculture itself into a business. It’s rare for an American farmer to settle permanently on the land they farm: especially in the western regions, they cultivate land with the intention of selling it later rather than farming it themselves; they build a farmhouse on the idea that population growth will soon raise its value. Every year, a wave of people from the North moves to the Southern States, settling in areas where cotton and sugarcane are grown. These individuals cultivate the land to make it productive enough to enrich themselves in a few years; they already anticipate the day they can return home to enjoy their newfound wealth. Thus, Americans apply their entrepreneurial spirit to agriculture, and their business-minded approach is evident in this area just as it is in their other endeavors.

The Americans make immense progress in productive industry, because they all devote themselves to it at once; and for this same reason they are exposed to very unexpected and formidable embarrassments. As they are all engaged in commerce, their commercial affairs are affected by such various and complex causes that it is impossible to foresee what difficulties may arise. As they are all more or less engaged in productive industry, at the least shock given to business all private fortunes are put in jeopardy at the same time, and the State is shaken. I believe that the return of these commercial panics is an endemic disease of the democratic nations of our age. It may be rendered less dangerous, but it cannot be cured; because it does not originate in accidental circumstances, but in the temperament of these nations.

Americans make huge strides in productive industry because everyone jumps in together, but this also exposes them to unexpected and serious challenges. Since everyone is involved in commerce, their business dealings are influenced by so many different and complicated factors that it's impossible to predict what issues might come up. Because they’re all more or less involved in productive industry, even the slightest disruption can put everyone's financial stability at risk and shake the government. I think the recurrence of these commercial crises is a common issue in democratic nations today. It can be made less risky, but it can't be eliminated; this is because it doesn't stem from random events, but from the very nature of these nations.





Chapter XX: That Aristocracy May Be Engendered By Manufactures

I have shown that democracy is favorable to the growth of manufactures, and that it increases without limit the numbers of the manufacturing classes: we shall now see by what side road manufacturers may possibly in their turn bring men back to aristocracy. It is acknowledged that when a workman is engaged every day upon the same detail, the whole commodity is produced with greater ease, promptitude, and economy. It is likewise acknowledged that the cost of the production of manufactured goods is diminished by the extent of the establishment in which they are made, and by the amount of capital employed or of credit. These truths had long been imperfectly discerned, but in our time they have been demonstrated. They have been already applied to many very important kinds of manufactures, and the humblest will gradually be governed by them. I know of nothing in politics which deserves to fix the attention of the legislator more closely than these two new axioms of the science of manufactures.

I have demonstrated that democracy encourages the growth of manufacturing and that it continuously increases the number of people in the manufacturing sector. Now, let's explore how manufacturers might potentially lead people back to an aristocracy. It’s recognized that when a worker focuses on the same task every day, the entire product is created more easily, quickly, and cost-effectively. It’s also acknowledged that the cost of producing manufactured goods decreases with the size of the facility where they are made and the amount of capital or credit available. These truths were not fully understood for a long time, but they have been proven in our time. They have already been applied to many important types of manufacturing, and even the simplest will gradually follow suit. I can't think of anything in politics that deserves the close attention of lawmakers more than these two new principles of manufacturing science.

When a workman is unceasingly and exclusively engaged in the fabrication of one thing, he ultimately does his work with singular dexterity; but at the same time he loses the general faculty of applying his mind to the direction of the work. He every day becomes more adroit and less industrious; so that it may be said of him, that in proportion as the workman improves the man is degraded. What can be expected of a man who has spent twenty years of his life in making heads for pins? and to what can that mighty human intelligence, which has so often stirred the world, be applied in him, except it be to investigate the best method of making pins' heads? When a workman has spent a considerable portion of his existence in this manner, his thoughts are forever set upon the object of his daily toil; his body has contracted certain fixed habits, which it can never shake off: in a word, he no longer belongs to himself, but to the calling which he has chosen. It is in vain that laws and manners have been at the pains to level all barriers round such a man, and to open to him on every side a thousand different paths to fortune; a theory of manufactures more powerful than manners and laws binds him to a craft, and frequently to a spot, which he cannot leave: it assigns to him a certain place in society, beyond which he cannot go: in the midst of universal movement it has rendered him stationary.

When a worker is constantly and solely focused on making one thing, he eventually becomes really skilled at it; however, he also loses the ability to think broadly about his work. Day by day, he gets better at his task but less hardworking overall; it can be said that as the worker improves, the person diminishes. What can we expect from someone who has spent twenty years making pin heads? What use can that incredible human intelligence, which has so often changed the world, find in him, except in figuring out the best way to make pin heads? Once a worker has devoted a significant part of his life this way, his thoughts are consumed by his daily grind; his body has developed certain fixed habits that he can’t shake off. In short, he no longer truly belongs to himself, but to the profession he has chosen. It doesn't matter how much laws and societal norms try to break down barriers around such a person, or how many paths to success are opened up to him; a manufacturing theory stronger than social norms and laws ties him to a craft, often in a specific location he can't escape from: it assigns him a particular role in society that he can't exceed; in the midst of constant change, it has made him stagnant.

In proportion as the principle of the division of labor is more extensively applied, the workman becomes more weak, more narrow-minded, and more dependent. The art advances, the artisan recedes. On the other hand, in proportion as it becomes more manifest that the productions of manufactures are by so much the cheaper and better as the manufacture is larger and the amount of capital employed more considerable, wealthy and educated men come forward to embark in manufactures which were heretofore abandoned to poor or ignorant handicraftsmen. The magnitude of the efforts required, and the importance of the results to be obtained, attract them. Thus at the very time at which the science of manufactures lowers the class of workmen, it raises the class of masters.

As the principle of dividing labor is applied more widely, workers become weaker, more narrow-minded, and more dependent. The art improves, while the artisan diminishes. Conversely, as it becomes increasingly clear that manufactured goods are cheaper and better when produced on a larger scale with more capital, wealthy and educated individuals step in to engage in industries that were previously left to poorer or less-skilled craftsmen. The scale of effort required and the significance of the results to be achieved draw them in. Thus, at the same time that the science of manufacturing reduces the worker class, it elevates the owner class.

Whereas the workman concentrates his faculties more and more upon the study of a single detail, the master surveys a more extensive whole, and the mind of the latter is enlarged in proportion as that of the former is narrowed. In a short time the one will require nothing but physical strength without intelligence; the other stands in need of science, and almost of genius, to insure success. This man resembles more and more the administrator of a vast empire—that man, a brute. The master and the workman have then here no similarity, and their differences increase every day. They are only connected as the two rings at the extremities of a long chain. Each of them fills the station which is made for him, and out of which he does not get: the one is continually, closely, and necessarily dependent upon the other, and seems as much born to obey as that other is to command. What is this but aristocracy?

While the worker focuses increasingly on a specific detail, the master looks at the bigger picture, and as one person's perspective narrows, the other's expands. Soon, the worker will only need physical strength without any understanding; the master will need knowledge, and almost a touch of genius, to succeed. This person begins to resemble the leader of a large empire, while that person becomes more like a brute. There is no similarity between the master and the worker, and their differences grow every day. They are only connected like the two ends of a long chain. Each fulfills the role designed for them, and they do not step outside of it: one is constantly, closely, and necessarily reliant on the other, seeming as destined to obey as the other is to command. What is this if not aristocracy?

As the conditions of men constituting the nation become more and more equal, the demand for manufactured commodities becomes more general and more extensive; and the cheapness which places these objects within the reach of slender fortunes becomes a great element of success. Hence there are every day more men of great opulence and education who devote their wealth and knowledge to manufactures; and who seek, by opening large establishments, and by a strict division of labor, to meet the fresh demands which are made on all sides. Thus, in proportion as the mass of the nation turns to democracy, that particular class which is engaged in manufactures becomes more aristocratic. Men grow more alike in the one—more different in the other; and inequality increases in the less numerous class in the same ratio in which it decreases in the community. Hence it would appear, on searching to the bottom, that aristocracy should naturally spring out of the bosom of democracy.

As people's conditions within the nation become more equal, the demand for manufactured goods grows broader and more widespread; and the affordability that allows even those with limited means to access these products becomes a crucial factor for success. Consequently, more wealthy and educated individuals are dedicating their resources and knowledge to manufacturing; they aim to meet the increasing demands from all directions by establishing large operations and implementing a strict division of labor. Thus, as society moves toward democracy, the manufacturing class becomes more elite. People become more similar within one group and more different in the other, leading to greater inequality in the smaller class as it decreases in the broader community. Therefore, it seems that aristocracy can naturally emerge from the heart of democracy.

But this kind of aristocracy by no means resembles those kinds which preceded it. It will be observed at once, that as it applies exclusively to manufactures and to some manufacturing callings, it is a monstrous exception in the general aspect of society. The small aristocratic societies which are formed by some manufacturers in the midst of the immense democracy of our age, contain, like the great aristocratic societies of former ages, some men who are very opulent, and a multitude who are wretchedly poor. The poor have few means of escaping from their condition and becoming rich; but the rich are constantly becoming poor, or they give up business when they have realized a fortune. Thus the elements of which the class of the poor is composed are fixed; but the elements of which the class of the rich is composed are not so. To say the truth, though there are rich men, the class of rich men does not exist; for these rich individuals have no feelings or purposes in common, no mutual traditions or mutual hopes; there are therefore members, but no body.

But this kind of aristocracy doesn't resemble the ones that came before it at all. It's clear that since it applies only to manufacturing and some manufacturing jobs, it's a huge exception in the overall landscape of society. The small aristocratic groups formed by some manufacturers amidst the vast democracy of our time consist, like the great aristocratic groups of earlier times, of some very wealthy individuals and many who are extremely poor. The poor have few ways to escape their situation and become wealthy; meanwhile, the rich are constantly at risk of becoming poor, or they exit the business once they've made their fortune. So, the makeup of the poor class remains fixed, but the composition of the rich class is not. To be honest, even though there are rich individuals, the class of rich people doesn't really exist; these wealthy individuals share no common feelings or goals, no shared traditions or hopes; thus, there are members, but no cohesive body.

Not only are the rich not compactly united amongst themselves, but there is no real bond between them and the poor. Their relative position is not a permanent one; they are constantly drawn together or separated by their interests. The workman is generally dependent on the master, but not on any particular master; these two men meet in the factory, but know not each other elsewhere; and whilst they come into contact on one point, they stand very wide apart on all others. The manufacturer asks nothing of the workman but his labor; the workman expects nothing from him but his wages. The one contracts no obligation to protect, nor the other to defend; and they are not permanently connected either by habit or by duty. The aristocracy created by business rarely settles in the midst of the manufacturing population which it directs; the object is not to govern that population, but to use it. An aristocracy thus constituted can have no great hold upon those whom it employs; and even if it succeed in retaining them at one moment, they escape the next; it knows not how to will, and it cannot act. The territorial aristocracy of former ages was either bound by law, or thought itself bound by usage, to come to the relief of its serving-men, and to succor their distresses. But the manufacturing aristocracy of our age first impoverishes and debases the men who serve it, and then abandons them to be supported by the charity of the public. This is a natural consequence of what has been said before. Between the workmen and the master there are frequent relations, but no real partnership.

Not only are the rich not closely united among themselves, but there's also no real connection between them and the poor. Their relative positions are not permanent; they are constantly brought together or separated by their interests. The worker usually depends on the employer, but not on any specific employer; these two individuals meet in the factory but don’t recognize each other outside of it; and while they interact at one point, they are very distant on all others. The manufacturer asks nothing from the worker except their labor; the worker expects nothing from them except for their wages. One has no obligation to protect, nor the other to defend; and they are not permanently linked by habit or duty. The business-created aristocracy rarely settles among the manufacturing workers it oversees; the goal is not to govern that population but to use it. An aristocracy like this has little grip on those it employs; and even if it manages to keep them for a moment, they escape the next; it doesn't know how to will, and it cannot act. The territorial aristocracy of past ages was either bound by law, or believed it was bound by custom, to help its workers and aid their hardships. But the manufacturing aristocracy of our time first impoverishes and degrades the people who serve it, and then abandons them to rely on public charity. This is a natural result of what has been said before. There are frequent interactions between workers and employers, but no real partnership.

I am of opinion, upon the whole, that the manufacturing aristocracy which is growing up under our eyes is one of the harshest which ever existed in the world; but at the same time it is one of the most confined and least dangerous. Nevertheless the friends of democracy should keep their eyes anxiously fixed in this direction; for if ever a permanent inequality of conditions and aristocracy again penetrate into the world, it may be predicted that this is the channel by which they will enter.

I believe that the manufacturing elite we see emerging today is one of the toughest that has ever existed, but at the same time, it is also one of the most limited and least threatening. Still, supporters of democracy should stay alert in this area, because if a lasting inequality of conditions and aristocracy ever make a comeback in the world, it's likely that this will be the way they come in.





Book Three: Influence Of Democracy On Manners, Properly So Called





Chapter I: That Manners Are Softened As Social Conditions Become More Equal

We perceive that for several ages social conditions have tended to equality, and we discover that in the course of the same period the manners of society have been softened. Are these two things merely contemporaneous, or does any secret link exist between them, so that the one cannot go on without making the other advance? Several causes may concur to render the manners of a people less rude; but, of all these causes, the most powerful appears to me to be the equality of conditions. Equality of conditions and growing civility in manners are, then, in my eyes, not only contemporaneous occurrences, but correlative facts. When the fabulists seek to interest us in the actions of beasts, they invest them with human notions and passions; the poets who sing of spirits and angels do the same; there is no wretchedness so deep, nor any happiness so pure, as to fill the human mind and touch the heart, unless we are ourselves held up to our own eyes under other features.

We notice that for many years, social conditions have been moving toward equality, and we see that during the same time, social manners have become more refined. Are these two developments just happening at the same time, or is there some hidden connection between them that makes one depend on the other? There may be several factors that contribute to making a society's manners less harsh; however, the strongest factor seems to be equality of conditions. In my view, equality of conditions and the rising civility of manners are not just happening simultaneously, but they are linked. When storytellers want to engage us with the actions of animals, they attribute human thoughts and feelings to them; similarly, poets who write about spirits and angels do the same. There is no misery so profound or joy so pure that can truly resonate with the human mind and touch the heart unless we see ourselves reflected in it through different lenses.

This is strictly applicable to the subject upon which we are at present engaged. When all men are irrevocably marshalled in an aristocratic community, according to their professions, their property, and their birth, the members of each class, considering themselves as children of the same family, cherish a constant and lively sympathy towards each other, which can never be felt in an equal degree by the citizens of a democracy. But the same feeling does not exist between the several classes towards each other. Amongst an aristocratic people each caste has its own opinions, feelings, rights, manners, and modes of living. Thus the men of whom each caste is composed do not resemble the mass of their fellow-citizens; they do not think or feel in the same manner, and they scarcely believe that they belong to the same human race. They cannot, therefore, thoroughly understand what others feel, nor judge of others by themselves. Yet they are sometimes eager to lend each other mutual aid; but this is not contrary to my previous observation. These aristocratic institutions, which made the beings of one and the same race so different, nevertheless bound them to each other by close political ties. Although the serf had no natural interest in the fate of nobles, he did not the less think himself obliged to devote his person to the service of that noble who happened to be his lord; and although the noble held himself to be of a different nature from that of his serfs, he nevertheless held that his duty and his honor constrained him to defend, at the risk of his own life, those who dwelt upon his domains.

This applies specifically to the topic we are currently discussing. When all people are irrevocably organized in an aristocratic society based on their professions, wealth, and lineage, the members of each class, seeing themselves as part of the same family, share a consistent and strong sense of empathy towards one another, which citizens in a democracy seldom experience to the same extent. However, this feeling does not extend between the different classes. In an aristocratic society, each caste has its distinct beliefs, emotions, rights, customs, and lifestyles. Therefore, the individuals in each caste do not resemble the broader group of their fellow citizens; they don't think or feel in the same way, and they hardly see each other as part of the same human race. As a result, they cannot fully understand what others feel or judge others based on their own experiences. Yet, they sometimes willingly help each other out; this does not contradict my earlier point. These aristocratic systems, which made individuals of the same race so different, still connected them through strong political ties. While a serf had no inherent interest in the fate of nobles, he still felt compelled to serve the noble who was his lord; and although the noble considered himself different from the serfs, he nonetheless believed that his duty and honor required him to protect, even at the risk of his own life, those living on his land.

It is evident that these mutual obligations did not originate in the law of nature, but in the law of society; and that the claim of social duty was more stringent than that of mere humanity. These services were not supposed to be due from man to man, but to the vassal or to the lord. Feudal institutions awakened a lively sympathy for the sufferings of certain men, but none at all for the miseries of mankind. They infused generosity rather than mildness into the manners of the time, and although they prompted men to great acts of self-devotion, they engendered no real sympathies; for real sympathies can only exist between those who are alike; and in aristocratic ages men acknowledge none but the members of their own caste to be like themselves.

It’s clear that these mutual obligations didn’t come from natural law, but from societal law; and that the expectation of social duty was stronger than just the expectation of humanity. These services weren’t meant to be owed from one person to another, but from the vassal to the lord. Feudal institutions sparked a strong sympathy for the suffering of certain individuals, but not for the struggles of humanity as a whole. They encouraged generosity more than gentleness in people’s behavior, and while they inspired acts of selflessness, they didn’t create any genuine bonds of sympathy; real sympathy can only exist between those who are similar, and in aristocratic times, people only recognize those from their own social class as being like themselves.

When the chroniclers of the Middle Ages, who all belonged to the aristocracy by birth or education, relate the tragical end of a noble, their grief flows apace; whereas they tell you at a breath, and without wincing, of massacres and tortures inflicted on the common sort of people. Not that these writers felt habitual hatred or systematic disdain for the people; war between the several classes of the community was not yet declared. They were impelled by an instinct rather than by a passion; as they had formed no clear notion of a poor man's sufferings, they cared but little for his fate. The same feelings animated the lower orders whenever the feudal tie was broken. The same ages which witnessed so many heroic acts of self-devotion on the part of vassals for their lords, were stained with atrocious barbarities, exercised from time to time by the lower classes on the higher. It must not be supposed that this mutual insensibility arose solely from the absence of public order and education; for traces of it are to be found in the following centuries, which became tranquil and enlightened whilst they remained aristocratic. In 1675 the lower classes in Brittany revolted at the imposition of a new tax. These disturbances were put down with unexampled atrocity. Observe the language in which Madame de Sevigne, a witness of these horrors, relates them to her daughter:—

When the chroniclers of the Middle Ages, who were all aristocrats by birth or education, recount the tragic end of a noble, their sorrow is palpable; yet they speak in a breath and without flinching about the massacres and torture inflicted on common people. It's not that these writers had a deep-seated hatred or consistent disdain for the common folk; there wasn't yet a recognized war between the different social classes. They were driven more by instinct than by passion; since they had no clear understanding of the suffering of the poor, they cared little about their fate. The same feelings were present among the lower classes whenever the feudal bond was broken. The same eras that saw so many heroic acts of loyalty from vassals towards their lords were also marked by horrific acts of violence carried out by the lower classes against the upper classes. It shouldn't be assumed that this mutual insensitivity was solely due to the lack of public order and education; signs of it can still be found in later centuries that became peaceful and enlightened while remaining aristocratic. In 1675, the lower classes in Brittany revolted against a new tax. These uprisings were suppressed with unprecedented brutality. Note the language Madame de Sevigné uses as she describes these horrors to her daughter:—

"Aux Rochers, 30 Octobre, 1675.

"At the Rocks, October 30, 1675."

"Mon Dieu, ma fille, que votre lettre d'Aix est plaisante! Au moins relisez vos lettres avant que de les envoyer; laissez-vous surpendre a leur agrement, et consolez-vous par ce plaisir de la peine que vous avez d'en tant ecrire. Vous avez donc baise toute la Provence? il n'y aurait pas satisfaction a baiser toute la Bretagne, a moins qu'on n'aimat a sentir le vin. . . . Voulez-vous savoir des nouvelles de Rennes? On a fait une taxe de cent mille ecus sur le bourgeois; et si on ne trouve point cette somme dans vingt-quatre heures, elle sera doublee et exigible par les soldats. On a chasse et banni toute une grand rue, et defendu de les recueillir sous peine de la vie; de sorte qu'on voyait tous ces miserables, veillards, femmes accouchees, enfans, errer en pleurs au sortir de cette ville sans savoir ou aller. On roua avant-hier un violon, qui avait commence la danse et la pillerie du papier timbre; il a ete ecartele apres sa mort, et ses quatre quartiers exposes aux quatre coins de la ville. On a pris soixante bourgeois, et on commence demain les punitions. Cette province est un bel exemple pour les autres, et surtout de respecter les gouverneurs et les gouvernantes, et de ne point jeter de pierres dans leur jardin." *a

"Mon Dieu, my daughter, your letter from Aix is delightful! At the very least, read your letters over before sending them; let yourself be surprised by their charm, and console yourself with the pleasure of writing them. So you have kissed all of Provence? There would be no satisfaction in kissing all of Brittany, unless you enjoy the taste of wine... Do you want to hear news from Rennes? They’ve imposed a tax of a hundred thousand écus on the townspeople; if they don’t raise that amount in twenty-four hours, it will be doubled and demanded by the soldiers. They have driven out and banished an entire street, prohibiting anyone from taking them in under penalty of death; so you could see all these poor souls—old men, women who had just given birth, children—wandering in tears out of the city, not knowing where to go. The other day, they hanged a violinist who had started the dance and the pillaging of the stamped paper; he was quartered after his death, and his four parts displayed at the four corners of the city. Sixty townspeople have been taken, and tomorrow the punishments begin. This province is a good example for others, especially to respect the governors and the governing, and not to throw stones into their garden."

a
[ To feel the point of this joke the reader should recollect that Madame de Grignan was Gouvernante de Provence.] "Madame de Tarente etait hier dans ces bois par un temps enchante: il n'est question ni de chambre ni de collation; elle entre par la barriere et s'en retourne de meme. . . ."

a
[ To feel the point of this joke the reader should recollect that Madame de Grignan was Gouvernante de Provence.] "Madame de Tarente was in these woods yesterday on a beautiful day: there's no mention of a room or a snack; she entered through the gate and left in the same way. . . ."

In another letter she adds:—

In another letter, she adds:—

"Vous me parlez bien plaisamment de nos miseres; nous ne sommes plus si roues; un en huit jours, pour entretenir la justice. Il est vrai que la penderie me parait maintenant un refraichissement. J'ai une tout autre idee de la justice, depuis que je suis en ce pays. Vos galeriens me paraissent une societe d'honnetes gens qui se sont retires du monde pour mener une vie douce."

"You're talking to me quite playfully about our troubles; we're no longer so burdened; one court session a week to maintain justice. It's true that the storage room now seems like a refreshing change. I have a completely different idea of justice since I've been in this country. Your galley slaves seem to me like a society of honest people who have withdrawn from the world to lead a comfortable life."

It would be a mistake to suppose that Madame de Sevigne, who wrote these lines, was a selfish or cruel person; she was passionately attached to her children, and very ready to sympathize in the sorrows of her friends; nay, her letters show that she treated her vassals and servants with kindness and indulgence. But Madame de Sevigne had no clear notion of suffering in anyone who was not a person of quality.

It would be a mistake to think that Madame de Sevigne, who wrote these lines, was a selfish or cruel person; she was deeply devoted to her children and very willing to empathize with the struggles of her friends; in fact, her letters show that she treated her tenants and servants with kindness and understanding. However, Madame de Sevigne didn’t fully grasp the idea of suffering in anyone who wasn’t a person of high social standing.

In our time the harshest man writing to the most insensible person of his acquaintance would not venture wantonly to indulge in the cruel jocularity which I have quoted; and even if his own manners allowed him to do so, the manners of society at large would forbid it. Whence does this arise? Have we more sensibility than our forefathers? I know not that we have; but I am sure that our insensibility is extended to a far greater range of objects. When all the ranks of a community are nearly equal, as all men think and feel in nearly the same manner, each of them may judge in a moment of the sensations of all the others; he casts a rapid glance upon himself, and that is enough. There is no wretchedness into which he cannot readily enter, and a secret instinct reveals to him its extent. It signifies not that strangers or foes be the sufferers; imagination puts him in their place; something like a personal feeling is mingled with his pity, and makes himself suffer whilst the body of his fellow-creature is in torture. In democratic ages men rarely sacrifice themselves for one another; but they display general compassion for the members of the human race. They inflict no useless ills; and they are happy to relieve the griefs of others, when they can do so without much hurting themselves; they are not disinterested, but they are humane.

In our time, even the toughest person writing to the most insensitive person they know wouldn’t dare to indulge in the cruel humor I’ve mentioned; and even if they personally felt they could, society as a whole would not allow it. Where does this come from? Do we feel more than our ancestors did? I’m not sure we do, but I am certain that our insensitivity now covers a much wider range of issues. When all members of a community are nearly equal, and when everyone thinks and feels in similar ways, each person can quickly assess the feelings of others; a brief reflection on themselves is enough. There’s no suffering they can’t easily understand, and an instinct guides them to grasp its depth. It doesn’t matter if strangers or enemies are the ones suffering; their imagination allows them to empathize with those in pain, creating a personal connection that makes them feel the hurt while their fellow human is in agony. In democratic times, people rarely sacrifice themselves for one another, yet they show general compassion for humanity. They don’t inflict unnecessary pain; they’re willing to ease others’ suffering if it doesn’t cause them too much trouble; they may not be selfless, but they are humane.

Although the Americans have, in a manner, reduced egotism to a social and philosophical theory, they are nevertheless extremely open to compassion. In no country is criminal justice administered with more mildness than in the United States. Whilst the English seem disposed carefully to retain the bloody traces of the dark ages in their penal legislation, the Americans have almost expunged capital punishment from their codes. North America is, I think, the only one country upon earth in which the life of no one citizen has been taken for a political offence in the course of the last fifty years. The circumstance which conclusively shows that this singular mildness of the Americans arises chiefly from their social condition, is the manner in which they treat their slaves. Perhaps there is not, upon the whole, a single European colony in the New World in which the physical condition of the blacks is less severe than in the United States; yet the slaves still endure horrid sufferings there, and are constantly exposed to barbarous punishments. It is easy to perceive that the lot of these unhappy beings inspires their masters with but little compassion, and that they look upon slavery, not only as an institution which is profitable to them, but as an evil which does not affect them. Thus the same man who is full of humanity towards his fellow-creatures when they are at the same time his equals, becomes insensible to their afflictions as soon as that equality ceases. His mildness should therefore be attributed to the equality of conditions, rather than to civilization and education.

Although Americans have somewhat turned egotism into a social and philosophical theory, they are still very open to compassion. No other country administers criminal justice more gently than the United States. While the English seem inclined to hold onto the brutal practices of the dark ages in their penal laws, Americans have nearly removed the death penalty from their legal systems. North America is, I believe, the only country on earth where no citizen's life has been taken for a political offense in the last fifty years. The fact that this unique gentleness of Americans mainly stems from their social conditions can be observed in how they treat their slaves. Overall, there might not be a single European colony in the New World where the physical condition of black people is less harsh than in the United States; yet, the slaves still suffer terribly there and face brutal punishments constantly. It's easy to see that the plight of these unfortunate individuals evokes little compassion from their masters, who regard slavery not just as a profitable institution but as an evil that doesn't touch them. Thus, the same person who shows humanity to his fellow beings when they are equals becomes indifferent to their suffering as soon as that equality is lost. His gentleness should therefore be attributed to the equality of conditions rather than to civilization and education.

What I have here remarked of individuals is, to a certain extent, applicable to nations. When each nation has its distinct opinions, belief, laws, and customs, it looks upon itself as the whole of mankind, and is moved by no sorrows but its own. Should war break out between two nations animated by this feeling, it is sure to be waged with great cruelty. At the time of their highest culture, the Romans slaughtered the generals of their enemies, after having dragged them in triumph behind a car; and they flung their prisoners to the beasts of the Circus for the amusement of the people. Cicero, who declaimed so vehemently at the notion of crucifying a Roman citizen, had not a word to say against these horrible abuses of victory. It is evident that in his eyes a barbarian did not belong to the same human race as a Roman. On the contrary, in proportion as nations become more like each other, they become reciprocally more compassionate, and the law of nations is mitigated.

What I’ve observed about individuals also somewhat applies to nations. When each nation has its own unique opinions, beliefs, laws, and customs, it views itself as representing all of humanity and cares only about its own grievances. If a war breaks out between two nations with this mindset, it’s likely to be fought with extreme brutality. During their peak, the Romans executed their enemies' generals after parading them in a triumphal procession; they also threw their prisoners to the beasts in the Circus for entertainment. Cicero, who passionately argued against the crucifixion of a Roman citizen, had nothing to say about these horrific abuses of victory. Clearly, he viewed barbarians as not belonging to the same human race as Romans. Conversely, as nations grow more similar to one another, they tend to become more compassionate towards each other, and the laws of nations are softened.





Chapter II: That Democracy Renders The Habitual Intercourse Of The Americans Simple And Easy

Democracy does not attach men strongly to each other; but it places their habitual intercourse upon an easier footing. If two Englishmen chance to meet at the Antipodes, where they are surrounded by strangers whose language and manners are almost unknown to them, they will first stare at each other with much curiosity and a kind of secret uneasiness; they will then turn away, or, if one accosts the other, they will take care only to converse with a constrained and absent air upon very unimportant subjects. Yet there is no enmity between these men; they have never seen each other before, and each believes the other to be a respectable person. Why then should they stand so cautiously apart? We must go back to England to learn the reason.

Democracy doesn’t strongly bond people together, but it makes their usual interactions easier. If two Englishmen happen to meet in the Antipodes, surrounded by strangers whose language and culture are mostly unfamiliar to them, they will first look at each other with curiosity and a bit of unease. Then, they might turn away, or if one of them approaches the other, they will chat in a stiff and distracted manner about trivial topics. Still, there’s no hostility between them; they’ve never met before, and each thinks the other is a decent person. So, why do they keep their distance? We need to look back to England to understand why.

When it is birth alone, independent of wealth, which classes men in society, everyone knows exactly what his own position is upon the social scale; he does not seek to rise, he does not fear to sink. In a community thus organized, men of different castes communicate very little with each other; but if accident brings them together, they are ready to converse without hoping or fearing to lose their own position. Their intercourse is not upon a footing of equality, but it is not constrained. When moneyed aristocracy succeeds to aristocracy of birth, the case is altered. The privileges of some are still extremely great, but the possibility of acquiring those privileges is open to all: whence it follows that those who possess them are constantly haunted by the apprehension of losing them, or of other men's sharing them; those who do not yet enjoy them long to possess them at any cost, or, if they fail to appear at least to possess them—which is not impossible. As the social importance of men is no longer ostensibly and permanently fixed by blood, and is infinitely varied by wealth, ranks still exist, but it is not easy clearly to distinguish at a glance those who respectively belong to them. Secret hostilities then arise in the community; one set of men endeavor by innumerable artifices to penetrate, or to appear to penetrate, amongst those who are above them; another set are constantly in arms against these usurpers of their rights; or rather the same individual does both at once, and whilst he seeks to raise himself into a higher circle, he is always on the defensive against the intrusion of those below him.

When it's just birth, separate from wealth, that defines people's places in society, everyone knows exactly where they stand on the social ladder; they don’t try to climb up, and they’re not afraid of falling down. In such a society, people from different backgrounds interact very little with each other, but if circumstances bring them together, they're willing to chat without worrying about losing their status. Their interactions aren’t equal, but they’re not awkward either. However, when a wealthy aristocracy replaces an aristocracy of birth, the situation changes. Some people's privileges remain extremely significant, but now anyone can pursue those privileges: this creates a constant fear among those who have them of losing their status or of others gaining it; and those who don’t have those privileges desperately want them at any cost or at least want to appear as if they have them—which is possible. Since social standing is no longer clearly defined by birth and is now largely varied by wealth, different ranks still exist, but it’s not easy to see at a glance who belongs to which one. This leads to hidden rivalries in society; one group of people tries in countless ways to break into or seem like they belong to a higher social circle, while another group aggressively defends their rights against these “usurpers”; often, the same person does both at the same time, trying to elevate themselves while also guarding against those who are below them.

Such is the condition of England at the present time; and I am of opinion that the peculiarity before adverted to is principally to be attributed to this cause. As aristocratic pride is still extremely great amongst the English, and as the limits of aristocracy are ill-defined, everybody lives in constant dread lest advantage should be taken of his familiarity. Unable to judge at once of the social position of those he meets, an Englishman prudently avoids all contact with them. Men are afraid lest some slight service rendered should draw them into an unsuitable acquaintance; they dread civilities, and they avoid the obtrusive gratitude of a stranger quite as much as his hatred. Many people attribute these singular anti-social propensities, and the reserved and taciturn bearing of the English, to purely physical causes. I may admit that there is something of it in their race, but much more of it is attributable to their social condition, as is proved by the contrast of the Americans.

This is the current state of England, and I believe the unique characteristics mentioned earlier are mainly due to this situation. With aristocratic pride still very strong among the English, and the boundaries of aristocracy being unclear, everyone lives in fear of someone taking advantage of their familiarity. Unable to quickly assess the social status of those they encounter, an Englishman wisely avoids any interaction. People worry that even a small favor could lead to an inappropriate relationship; they fear politeness and steer clear of the overt gratitude of a stranger just as much as they would avoid hostility. Many attribute these odd anti-social tendencies, as well as the reserved and quiet demeanor of the English, to purely physical factors. I can acknowledge that there is some influence from their heritage, but a lot more is linked to their social environment, which is evident when compared to Americans.

In America, where the privileges of birth never existed, and where riches confer no peculiar rights on their possessors, men unacquainted with each other are very ready to frequent the same places, and find neither peril nor advantage in the free interchange of their thoughts. If they meet by accident, they neither seek nor avoid intercourse; their manner is therefore natural, frank, and open: it is easy to see that they hardly expect or apprehend anything from each other, and that they do not care to display, any more than to conceal, their position in the world. If their demeanor is often cold and serious, it is never haughty or constrained; and if they do not converse, it is because they are not in a humor to talk, not because they think it their interest to be silent. In a foreign country two Americans are at once friends, simply because they are Americans. They are repulsed by no prejudice; they are attracted by their common country. For two Englishmen the same blood is not enough; they must be brought together by the same rank. The Americans remark this unsociable mood of the English as much as the French do, and they are not less astonished by it. Yet the Americans are connected with England by their origin, their religion, their language, and partially by their manners; they only differ in their social condition. It may therefore be inferred that the reserve of the English proceeds from the constitution of their country much more than from that of its inhabitants.

In America, where there are no inherited privileges and where wealth doesn't give anyone special rights, people who don't know each other are quick to gather in the same places, finding no danger or benefit in openly sharing their thoughts. If they happen to meet, they don’t seek or avoid interaction; their behavior is natural, straightforward, and friendly. It’s clear they don't expect much from each other and don't feel the need to show off or hide their status in society. If they seem often serious and reserved, they are never arrogant or stiff; and if they aren’t talking, it’s simply because they’re not in the mood, not because they believe staying silent is beneficial. In a foreign country, two Americans instantly become friends just because they share the same nationality. They aren’t held back by any biases; they are drawn together by their common home. For two Englishmen, shared heritage isn’t enough; they need to be united by social rank. Americans notice this unfriendly attitude from the English just as much as the French do, and they are equally puzzled by it. Still, Americans have ties to England through their heritage, religion, language, and partially through their customs; their main difference lies in their social status. This suggests that the English reserve stems more from the structure of their society than from the individuals within it.





Chapter III: Why The Americans Show So Little Sensitiveness In Their Own Country, And Are So Sensitive In Europe

The temper of the Americans is vindictive, like that of all serious and reflecting nations. They hardly ever forget an offence, but it is not easy to offend them; and their resentment is as slow to kindle as it is to abate. In aristocratic communities where a small number of persons manage everything, the outward intercourse of men is subject to settled conventional rules. Everyone then thinks he knows exactly what marks of respect or of condescension he ought to display, and none are presumed to be ignorant of the science of etiquette. These usages of the first class in society afterwards serve as a model to all the others; besides which each of the latter lays down a code of its own, to which all its members are bound to conform. Thus the rules of politeness form a complex system of legislation, which it is difficult to be perfectly master of, but from which it is dangerous for anyone to deviate; so that men are constantly exposed involuntarily to inflict or to receive bitter affronts. But as the distinctions of rank are obliterated, as men differing in education and in birth meet and mingle in the same places of resort, it is almost impossible to agree upon the rules of good breeding. As its laws are uncertain, to disobey them is not a crime, even in the eyes of those who know what they are; men attach more importance to intentions than to forms, and they grow less civil, but at the same time less quarrelsome. There are many little attentions which an American does not care about; he thinks they are not due to him, or he presumes that they are not known to be due: he therefore either does not perceive a rudeness or he forgives it; his manners become less courteous, and his character more plain and masculine.

The temperament of Americans can be vindictive, like that of other serious and thoughtful nations. They rarely forget an offense, but it’s not easy to offend them; their anger takes time to ignite and even longer to fade. In aristocratic societies where a few people control everything, social interactions follow strict, conventional rules. Everyone believes they know exactly what gestures of respect or condescension to show, and nobody is expected to be ignorant of etiquette. These upper-class customs then set a standard for everyone else, and each social group creates its own rules that all members must follow. This results in a complicated system of manners that can be challenging to master, yet deviating from it can be risky, leading to unintentional insults or offenses. However, as distinctions of rank disappear and people from different backgrounds and educations gather in the same places, it becomes nearly impossible to agree on the standards of good behavior. Because the rules are vague, breaking them isn't seen as a big deal, even by those who understand them; people value intentions over formalities, becoming less polite but also less confrontational. Many small gestures that Americans don’t find significant aren’t considered necessary, so they either overlook rudeness or choose to forgive it; this makes their manners less formal while their character becomes more straightforward and rugged.

The mutual indulgence which the Americans display, and the manly confidence with which they treat each other, also result from another deeper and more general cause, which I have already adverted to in the preceding chapter. In the United States the distinctions of rank in civil society are slight, in political society they are null; an American, therefore, does not think himself bound to pay particular attentions to any of his fellow-citizens, nor does he require such attentions from them towards himself. As he does not see that it is his interest eagerly to seek the company of any of his countrymen, he is slow to fancy that his own company is declined: despising no one on account of his station, he does not imagine that anyone can despise him for that cause; and until he has clearly perceived an insult, he does not suppose that an affront was intended. The social condition of the Americans naturally accustoms them not to take offence in small matters; and, on the other hand, the democratic freedom which they enjoy transfuses this same mildness of temper into the character of the nation. The political institutions of the United States constantly bring citizens of all ranks into contact, and compel them to pursue great undertakings in concert. People thus engaged have scarcely time to attend to the details of etiquette, and they are besides too strongly interested in living harmoniously for them to stick at such things. They therefore soon acquire a habit of considering the feelings and opinions of those whom they meet more than their manners, and they do not allow themselves to be annoyed by trifles.

The mutual friendliness that Americans show each other, along with the confidence they have in their interactions, comes from a deeper and more general reason that I mentioned in the previous chapter. In the United States, social distinctions are minimal, and there are no political rankings; therefore, an American doesn’t feel obligated to pay special attention to any of his fellow citizens, nor does he expect such attention in return. Since he doesn't believe it's in his interest to actively seek out the company of his countrymen, he is not quick to assume that anyone is avoiding him. Not looking down on anyone because of their status, he doesn’t think that anyone would look down on him for the same reason; and until he clearly perceives an insult, he doesn't assume an affront was intended. The social environment in the U.S. naturally shapes people not to take offense over minor issues. On the other hand, the democratic freedom they enjoy spreads this same easygoing attitude throughout the nation’s character. The political systems in the United States consistently bring together citizens of all backgrounds and require them to work on significant projects together. People involved in these projects hardly have time to worry about etiquette, and they are also too invested in getting along to be bothered by such matters. They quickly develop a habit of valuing the feelings and opinions of those they encounter more than their behavior, and they choose not to be upset by minor annoyances.

I have often remarked in the United States that it is not easy to make a man understand that his presence may be dispensed with; hints will not always suffice to shake him off. I contradict an American at every word he says, to show him that his conversation bores me; he instantly labors with fresh pertinacity to convince me; I preserve a dogged silence, and he thinks I am meditating deeply on the truths which he is uttering; at last I rush from his company, and he supposes that some urgent business hurries me elsewhere. This man will never understand that he wearies me to extinction unless I tell him so: and the only way to get rid of him is to make him my enemy for life.

I’ve often noticed in the United States that it’s not easy to get a guy to understand that he can be left out; subtle hints don't always work to push him away. I contradict an American at every word he says to show him that his conversation bores me; he immediately tries even harder to convince me. I stay silent, and he thinks I’m deeply contemplating the stuff he’s saying; eventually, I run off, and he figures some urgent matter is pulling me away. This guy will never realize that he’s exhausting me to the limit unless I spell it out for him: and the only way to get rid of him is to make him my lifelong enemy.

It appears surprising at first sight that the same man transported to Europe suddenly becomes so sensitive and captious, that I often find it as difficult to avoid offending him here as it was to put him out of countenance. These two opposite effects proceed from the same cause. Democratic institutions generally give men a lofty notion of their country and of themselves. An American leaves his country with a heart swollen with pride; on arriving in Europe he at once finds out that we are not so engrossed by the United States and the great people which inhabits them as he had supposed, and this begins to annoy him. He has been informed that the conditions of society are not equal in our part of the globe, and he observes that among the nations of Europe the traces of rank are not wholly obliterated; that wealth and birth still retain some indeterminate privileges, which force themselves upon his notice whilst they elude definition. He is therefore profoundly ignorant of the place which he ought to occupy in this half-ruined scale of classes, which are sufficiently distinct to hate and despise each other, yet sufficiently alike for him to be always confounding them. He is afraid of ranging himself too high—still more is he afraid of being ranged too low; this twofold peril keeps his mind constantly on the stretch, and embarrasses all he says and does. He learns from tradition that in Europe ceremonial observances were infinitely varied according to different ranks; this recollection of former times completes his perplexity, and he is the more afraid of not obtaining those marks of respect which are due to him, as he does not exactly know in what they consist. He is like a man surrounded by traps: society is not a recreation for him, but a serious toil: he weighs your least actions, interrogates your looks, and scrutinizes all you say, lest there should be some hidden allusion to affront him. I doubt whether there was ever a provincial man of quality so punctilious in breeding as he is: he endeavors to attend to the slightest rules of etiquette, and does not allow one of them to be waived towards himself: he is full of scruples and at the same time of pretensions; he wishes to do enough, but fears to do too much; and as he does not very well know the limits of the one or of the other, he keeps up a haughty and embarrassed air of reserve.

It's surprising at first glance that the same man, when taken to Europe, suddenly becomes so sensitive and critical that I often find it just as challenging to avoid offending him here as it was to make him lose his composure before. These two opposite reactions come from the same root cause. Democratic institutions typically give people an inflated sense of themselves and their country. An American leaves home filled with pride; upon arriving in Europe, he quickly realizes that we aren't as consumed by the United States and its great people as he assumed, and this starts to frustrate him. He's been told that social conditions aren’t equal in our part of the world, and he notices that among the nations of Europe, signs of class are not entirely erased; wealth and birth still carry some vague privileges that catch his eye even when they’re hard to define. He is completely clueless about where he should fit into this somewhat unstable hierarchy of classes, which are distinct enough to breed hatred and contempt for each other, yet similar enough for him to always confuse them. He worries about positioning himself too high—he's even more afraid of being placed too low; this dual anxiety keeps his mind in a constant state of tension, complicating everything he says and does. He learns from tradition that in Europe, social customs varied greatly depending on rank; this recollection adds to his confusion, and he’s even more anxious about not receiving the respect he believes he deserves, since he’s not entirely sure what it entails. He feels like a man surrounded by traps: society is not leisure for him, but a serious burden; he weighs your every action, examines your expressions, and analyzes everything you say to ensure there are no hidden insults aimed at him. I doubt there’s ever been a provincial man of status as meticulous about manners as he is: he tries to adhere to the smallest rules of etiquette and won’t let any of them be overlooked toward him; he’s full of scruples and at the same time, pretensions; he wants to do just enough but fears doing too much; and since he doesn’t quite know the boundaries of either, he maintains a proud and awkward air of reserve.

But this is not all: here is yet another double of the human heart. An American is forever talking of the admirable equality which prevails in the United States; aloud he makes it the boast of his country, but in secret he deplores it for himself; and he aspires to show that, for his part, he is an exception to the general state of things which he vaunts. There is hardly an American to be met with who does not claim some remote kindred with the first founders of the colonies; and as for the scions of the noble families of England, America seemed to me to be covered with them. When an opulent American arrives in Europe, his first care is to surround himself with all the luxuries of wealth: he is so afraid of being taken for the plain citizen of a democracy, that he adopts a hundred distorted ways of bringing some new instance of his wealth before you every day. His house will be in the most fashionable part of the town: he will always be surrounded by a host of servants. I have heard an American complain, that in the best houses of Paris the society was rather mixed; the taste which prevails there was not pure enough for him; and he ventured to hint that, in his opinion, there was a want of elegance of manner; he could not accustom himself to see wit concealed under such unpretending forms.

But that's not all: here's another side of the human heart. An American always talks about the great equality that exists in the United States; openly, he proudly boasts about it, but secretly, he laments it for himself. He wants to show that, in his case, he is an exception to the general state of affairs that he praises. Almost every American I meet claims some distant connection to the original founders of the colonies, and as for the descendants of noble families from England, to me, it seems like America is full of them. When a wealthy American arrives in Europe, his first priority is to surround himself with all the luxuries that wealth can buy: he's so worried about being seen as just a plain citizen of a democracy that he adopts countless exaggerated ways to showcase his wealth every day. His home will be in the most fashionable area of the city: he'll always have a bunch of servants around him. I once heard an American complain that in the best houses in Paris, the social scene was a bit mixed; the prevailing taste there wasn't refined enough for him, and he dared to suggest that, in his view, there was a lack of elegance in manners; he couldn't get used to seeing wit hidden beneath such simple forms.

These contrasts ought not to surprise us. If the vestiges of former aristocratic distinctions were not so completely effaced in the United States, the Americans would be less simple and less tolerant in their own country—they would require less, and be less fond of borrowed manners in ours.

These contrasts shouldn't surprise us. If the remnants of former aristocratic distinctions were not so completely erased in the United States, Americans would be less straightforward and less accepting in their own country—they would demand less and be less fond of adopting manners from ours.





Chapter IV: Consequences Of The Three Preceding Chapters

When men feel a natural compassion for their mutual sufferings—when they are brought together by easy and frequent intercourse, and no sensitive feelings keep them asunder—it may readily be supposed that they will lend assistance to one another whenever it is needed. When an American asks for the co-operation of his fellow-citizens it is seldom refused, and I have often seen it afforded spontaneously and with great goodwill. If an accident happens on the highway, everybody hastens to help the sufferer; if some great and sudden calamity befalls a family, the purses of a thousand strangers are at once willingly opened, and small but numerous donations pour in to relieve their distress. It often happens amongst the most civilized nations of the globe, that a poor wretch is as friendless in the midst of a crowd as the savage in his wilds: this is hardly ever the case in the United States. The Americans, who are always cold and often coarse in their manners, seldom show insensibility; and if they do not proffer services eagerly, yet they do not refuse to render them.

When people feel a natural compassion for each other's pain—when they come together through casual and frequent interactions, and nothing keeps them apart—they are likely to help each other when needed. When an American asks for help from fellow citizens, it’s rarely turned down, and I’ve often seen it offered spontaneously and with genuine kindness. If there's an accident on the road, everyone rushes to assist the victim; if a family experiences a sudden disaster, the wallets of countless strangers immediately open up, and small but numerous donations come in to ease their suffering. It often happens in the most advanced countries that a person in need can feel as alone in a crowd as a savage in the wilderness: this is hardly ever the case in the United States. Americans, who may seem cold and sometimes rough around the edges, usually don’t show indifference; even if they don’t eagerly offer their help, they don’t refuse to give it.

All this is not in contradiction to what I have said before on the subject of individualism. The two things are so far from combating each other, that I can see how they agree. Equality of conditions, whilst it makes men feel their independence, shows them their own weakness: they are free, but exposed to a thousand accidents; and experience soon teaches them that, although they do not habitually require the assistance of others, a time almost always comes when they cannot do without it. We constantly see in Europe that men of the same profession are ever ready to assist each other; they are all exposed to the same ills, and that is enough to teach them to seek mutual preservatives, however hard-hearted and selfish they may otherwise be. When one of them falls into danger, from which the others may save him by a slight transient sacrifice or a sudden effort, they do not fail to make the attempt. Not that they are deeply interested in his fate; for if, by chance, their exertions are unavailing, they immediately forget the object of them, and return to their own business; but a sort of tacit and almost involuntary agreement has been passed between them, by which each one owes to the others a temporary support which he may claim for himself in turn. Extend to a people the remark here applied to a class, and you will understand my meaning. A similar covenant exists in fact between all the citizens of a democracy: they all feel themselves subject to the same weakness and the same dangers; and their interest, as well as their sympathy, makes it a rule with them to lend each other mutual assistance when required. The more equal social conditions become, the more do men display this reciprocal disposition to oblige each other. In democracies no great benefits are conferred, but good offices are constantly rendered: a man seldom displays self-devotion, but all men are ready to be of service to one another.

All this doesn't contradict what I've said before about individualism. The two ideas don’t fight against each other; in fact, they complement each other. Equality in circumstances makes people feel independent but also highlights their vulnerabilities: they are free, yet exposed to countless risks. Experience quickly teaches them that, even if they usually manage without help, there always comes a time when they can't. We frequently see in Europe that people in the same profession are always willing to help each other; they all face similar challenges, which teaches them to look out for one another, no matter how self-centered they might otherwise be. When one goes into danger that the others can help him out of with a small temporary sacrifice or sudden effort, they don’t hesitate to try. This doesn’t mean they are deeply invested in his outcome; if their efforts fail, they quickly forget about him and return to their own tasks. However, there's an unspoken and almost instinctive agreement among them: each person owes the others a temporary support that he can expect to receive in return. If you apply this idea about a class to a whole community, you'll grasp my point. A similar understanding exists among all the citizens in a democracy: they recognize that they share the same vulnerabilities and dangers; their shared interest and empathy lead them to help each other when needed. As social conditions become more equal, people show an increasing willingness to assist one another. In democracies, major gifts aren't often exchanged, but small favors are frequently offered: people rarely show self-sacrifice, yet everyone is ready to be helpful to others.





Chapter V: How Democracy Affects the Relation Of Masters And Servants

An American who had travelled for a long time in Europe once said to me, "The English treat their servants with a stiffness and imperiousness of manner which surprise us; but on the other hand the French sometimes treat their attendants with a degree of familiarity or of politeness which we cannot conceive. It looks as if they were afraid to give orders: the posture of the superior and the inferior is ill-maintained." The remark was a just one, and I have often made it myself. I have always considered England as the country in the world where, in our time, the bond of domestic service is drawn most tightly, and France as the country where it is most relaxed. Nowhere have I seen masters stand so high or so low as in these two countries. Between these two extremes the Americans are to be placed. Such is the fact as it appears upon the surface of things: to discover the causes of that fact, it is necessary to search the matter thoroughly.

An American who had traveled for a long time in Europe once said to me, "The English treat their servants with a stiffness and superiority that surprises us; but on the other hand, the French sometimes treat their staff with a level of familiarity or politeness that's hard for us to understand. It seems like they're afraid to give orders: the roles of the boss and the employee are poorly defined." The observation was accurate, and I've often thought the same thing. I've always seen England as the place where, today, the relationship between employers and domestic workers is the strictest, while France is where it's most relaxed. I’ve rarely seen such clear distinctions in status as in these two countries. Americans fall somewhere in between these extremes. That's how things appear on the surface; to understand the reasons behind this, we need to look deeper.

No communities have ever yet existed in which social conditions have been so equal that there were neither rich nor poor, and consequently neither masters nor servants. Democracy does not prevent the existence of these two classes, but it changes their dispositions and modifies their mutual relations. Amongst aristocratic nations servants form a distinct class, not more variously composed than that of masters. A settled order is soon established; in the former as well as in the latter class a scale is formed, with numerous distinctions or marked gradations of rank, and generations succeed each other thus without any change of position. These two communities are superposed one above the other, always distinct, but regulated by analogous principles. This aristocratic constitution does not exert a less powerful influence on the notions and manners of servants than on those of masters; and, although the effects are different, the same cause may easily be traced. Both classes constitute small communities in the heart of the nation, and certain permanent notions of right and wrong are ultimately engendered amongst them. The different acts of human life are viewed by one particular and unchanging light. In the society of servants, as in that of masters, men exercise a great influence over each other: they acknowledge settled rules, and in the absence of law they are guided by a sort of public opinion: their habits are settled, and their conduct is placed under a certain control.

No communities have ever existed where social conditions were so equal that there were neither rich nor poor, and therefore neither masters nor servants. Democracy doesn’t eliminate these two classes, but it changes their attitudes and modifies how they relate to each other. In aristocratic societies, servants form a clear class, just as the masters do. A stable hierarchy quickly establishes itself; both classes have a ranking system with various distinctions and clear levels of status, and generations follow one another without any change in position. These two communities sit one above the other, always distinct, but governed by similar principles. This aristocratic structure influences the beliefs and behaviors of servants just as much as it does the masters; and while the effects differ, the same underlying cause can easily be seen. Both classes form small communities within the nation, and certain lasting ideas of right and wrong develop among them. The various aspects of human life are viewed through a consistent and unchanging lens. In the servant community, just like in the master community, individuals significantly influence one another: they adhere to established rules, and in the absence of formal law, they are guided by a sort of public opinion; their habits are well-defined, and their behavior is subject to certain controls.

These men, whose destiny is to obey, certainly do not understand fame, virtue, honesty, and honor in the same manner as their masters; but they have a pride, a virtue, and an honesty pertaining to their condition; and they have a notion, if I may use the expression, of a sort of servile honor. *a Because a class is mean, it must not be supposed that all who belong to it are mean-hearted; to think so would be a great mistake. However lowly it may be, he who is foremost there, and who has no notion of quitting it, occupies an aristocratic position which inspires him with lofty feelings, pride, and self-respect, that fit him for the higher virtues and actions above the common. Amongst aristocratic nations it was by no means rare to find men of noble and vigorous minds in the service of the great, who felt not the servitude they bore, and who submitted to the will of their masters without any fear of their displeasure. But this was hardly ever the case amongst the inferior ranks of domestic servants. It may be imagined that he who occupies the lowest stage of the order of menials stands very low indeed. The French created a word on purpose to designate the servants of the aristocracy—they called them lackeys. This word "lackey" served as the strongest expression, when all others were exhausted, to designate human meanness. Under the old French monarchy, to denote by a single expression a low-spirited contemptible fellow, it was usual to say that he had the "soul of a lackey"; the term was enough to convey all that was intended. [Footnote a: If the principal opinions by which men are guided are examined closely and in detail, the analogy appears still more striking, and one is surprised to find amongst them, just as much as amongst the haughtiest scions of a feudal race, pride of birth, respect for their ancestry and their descendants, disdain of their inferiors, a dread of contact, a taste for etiquette, precedents, and antiquity.]

These men, who are destined to follow orders, certainly don’t view fame, virtue, honesty, and honor in the same way as their masters do; however, they possess their own sense of pride, virtue, and honesty related to their circumstances, and they have an idea, if I may put it this way, of a kind of servile honor. *a Just because a class is lowly, it doesn't mean everyone in it is low-hearted; to think that would be a big mistake. No matter how humble it may be, the one who stands out in that class, who has no intention of leaving it, holds a kind of aristocratic status that gives him high feelings, pride, and self-respect, preparing him for greater virtues and actions beyond the average. In aristocratic societies, it was not uncommon to find individuals with noble and strong minds serving the elite, who did not feel their servitude and accepted their masters’ will without fear of their anger. But this was rarely seen among the lower ranks of domestic servants. One might imagine that the person at the very bottom of the servant hierarchy is extremely low indeed. The French even created a term specifically to refer to aristocratic servants—they called them lackeys. This term "lackey" became the strongest way to express human meanness when all other words fell short. Under the old French monarchy, to label a contemptible and low-spirited individual in one word, people would say he had the "soul of a lackey"; that term was sufficient to convey everything meant. [Footnote a: If we closely and carefully examine the main opinions that guide people, the similarity becomes even clearer, and one is surprised to find among them, just like among the proudest descendants of a feudal lineage, a sense of pride in their birth, respect for their ancestors and their descendants, disdain for their inferiors, a fear of contact, a preference for etiquette, traditions, and history.]

The permanent inequality of conditions not only gives servants certain peculiar virtues and vices, but it places them in a peculiar relation with respect to their masters. Amongst aristocratic nations the poor man is familiarized from his childhood with the notion of being commanded: to whichever side he turns his eyes the graduated structure of society and the aspect of obedience meet his view. Hence in those countries the master readily obtains prompt, complete, respectful, and easy obedience from his servants, because they revere in him not only their master but the class of masters. He weighs down their will by the whole weight of the aristocracy. He orders their actions—to a certain extent he even directs their thoughts. In aristocracies the master often exercises, even without being aware of it, an amazing sway over the opinions, the habits, and the manners of those who obey him, and his influence extends even further than his authority.

The lasting inequality of conditions not only gives servants specific virtues and flaws but also creates a unique relationship between them and their masters. In aristocratic societies, a poor person grows up accustomed to the idea of being commanded; no matter where they look, the structured hierarchy of society and the concept of obedience are always in view. Therefore, in these countries, a master easily receives prompt, complete, respectful, and effortless obedience from his servants because they not only respect him as their master but also as part of the larger class of masters. He influences their will with the full weight of aristocracy behind him. He directs their actions— to some degree, he even shapes their thoughts. In aristocracies, a master often has an incredible influence over the opinions, habits, and behaviors of those who follow him, and his impact goes beyond just his authority.

In aristocratic communities there are not only hereditary families of servants as well as of masters, but the same families of servants adhere for several generations to the same families of masters (like two parallel lines which neither meet nor separate); and this considerably modifies the mutual relations of these two classes of persons. Thus, although in aristocratic society the master and servant have no natural resemblance—although, on the contrary, they are placed at an immense distance on the scale of human beings by their fortune, education, and opinions—yet time ultimately binds them together. They are connected by a long series of common reminiscences, and however different they may be, they grow alike; whilst in democracies, where they are naturally almost alike, they always remain strangers to each other. Amongst an aristocratic people the master gets to look upon his servants as an inferior and secondary part of himself, and he often takes an interest in their lot by a last stretch of egotism.

In aristocratic communities, there are not only hereditary families of servants but also families of masters, and the same families of servants often stay with the same families of masters for several generations (like two parallel lines that never meet or separate). This significantly changes the relationship between these two classes of people. Even though in aristocratic society the master and servant have no natural similarities—on the contrary, they are placed far apart on the scale of human beings by their wealth, education, and beliefs—over time, they become connected. They share a long history of common memories, and despite their differences, they start to resemble each other. In democracies, where they are naturally more similar, they often remain strangers to one another. Among an aristocratic population, the master begins to see his servants as a lesser and secondary part of himself and often takes an interest in their lives as a last twist of selfishness.

Servants, on their part, are not averse to regard themselves in the same light; and they sometimes identify themselves with the person of the master, so that they become an appendage to him in their own eyes as well as in his. In aristocracies a servant fills a subordinate position which he cannot get out of; above him is another man, holding a superior rank which he cannot lose. On one side are obscurity, poverty, obedience for life; on the other, and also for life, fame, wealth, and command. The two conditions are always distinct and always in propinquity; the tie that connects them is as lasting as they are themselves. In this predicament the servant ultimately detaches his notion of interest from his own person; he deserts himself, as it were, or rather he transports himself into the character of his master, and thus assumes an imaginary personality. He complacently invests himself with the wealth of those who command him; he shares their fame, exalts himself by their rank, and feeds his mind with borrowed greatness, to which he attaches more importance than those who fully and really possess it. There is something touching, and at the same time ridiculous, in this strange confusion of two different states of being. These passions of masters, when they pass into the souls of menials, assume the natural dimensions of the place they occupy—they are contracted and lowered. What was pride in the former becomes puerile vanity and paltry ostentation in the latter. The servants of a great man are commonly most punctilious as to the marks of respect due to him, and they attach more importance to his slightest privileges than he does himself. In France a few of these old servants of the aristocracy are still to be met with here and there; they have survived their race, which will soon disappear with them altogether. In the United States I never saw anyone at all like them. The Americans are not only unacquainted with the kind of man, but it is hardly possible to make them understand that such ever existed. It is scarcely less difficult for them to conceive it, than for us to form a correct notion of what a slave was amongst the Romans, or a serf in the Middle Ages. All these men were in fact, though in different degrees, results of the same cause: they are all retiring from our sight, and disappearing in the obscurity of the past, together with the social condition to which they owed their origin.

Servants, for their part, don't mind seeing themselves in the same light; they sometimes see themselves as an extension of their master, becoming an appendage to him in their own eyes as well as in his. In aristocracies, a servant holds a subordinate position that he can’t escape from; above him is another man, holding a higher rank that he can’t lose. On one side are obscurity, poverty, and lifelong obedience; on the other, and also for life, fame, wealth, and power. The two situations are always separate yet closely linked; the bond that connects them is as enduring as they are. In this situation, the servant eventually disconnects his concept of self-interest from his own identity; he abandons himself, so to speak, or rather, he adopts the persona of his master, and thus takes on an imagined identity. He happily surrounds himself with the wealth of those who command him; he shares in their fame, elevates himself by their status, and nourishes his mind with borrowed greatness, which he values more than those who genuinely possess it. There is something both touching and ironic in this odd mix of two different states of being. The ambitions of masters, when they filter into the minds of their servants, take on the limited scope of the position they occupy—they become constrained and diminished. What was pride in the former turns into childish vanity and petty showiness in the latter. The servants of a great man are usually the most meticulous about the respect owed to him, and they value even his smallest privileges more than he does himself. In France, a few of these old servants of the aristocracy can still be found here and there; they have outlived their class, which will soon vanish along with them. In the United States, I’ve never encountered anyone like them at all. Americans are not only unfamiliar with this kind of person, but it's hard for them to even understand that such people ever existed. It's almost as challenging for them to imagine that as it is for us to accurately envision what a slave was in ancient Rome, or a serf in the Middle Ages. All these individuals were, in fact—albeit in different degrees—results of the same cause: they are all fading from our view and disappearing into the oblivion of the past, along with the social conditions that gave rise to them.

Equality of conditions turns servants and masters into new beings, and places them in new relative positions. When social conditions are nearly equal, men are constantly changing their situations in life: there is still a class of menials and a class of masters, but these classes are not always composed of the same individuals, still less of the same families; and those who command are not more secure of perpetuity than those who obey. As servants do not form a separate people, they have no habits, prejudices, or manners peculiar to themselves; they are not remarkable for any particular turn of mind or moods of feeling. They know no vices or virtues of their condition, but they partake of the education, the opinions, the feelings, the virtues, and the vices of their contemporaries; and they are honest men or scoundrels in the same way as their masters are. The conditions of servants are not less equal than those of masters. As no marked ranks or fixed subordination are to be found amongst them, they will not display either the meanness or the greatness which characterizes the aristocracy of menials as well as all other aristocracies. I never saw a man in the United States who reminded me of that class of confidential servants of which we still retain a reminiscence in Europe, neither did I ever meet with such a thing as a lackey: all traces of the one and of the other have disappeared.

Equality of conditions transforms both servants and masters into new individuals and puts them in new relative positions. When social conditions are nearly equal, people frequently shift their circumstances in life: there is still a group of servants and a group of masters, but these groups are not always made up of the same people, let alone the same families; and those in charge are not any more secure in their position than those who follow. Since servants do not form a distinct community, they have no unique habits, prejudices, or manners; they are not distinguished by any specific mindset or emotional states. They don’t have vices or virtues tied to their status but share in the education, opinions, feelings, virtues, and vices of their peers; they can be honest or dishonest just like their masters. The conditions of servants are just as equal as those of masters. Since there are no clear ranks or established hierarchies among them, they do not exhibit the lowliness or greatness that characterizes the aristocracy of servants as well as other aristocracies. I have never seen a person in the United States who reminded me of the class of trusted servants that we still remember in Europe, nor have I ever encountered something like a footman: all traces of both have vanished.

In democracies servants are not only equal amongst themselves, but it may be said that they are in some sort the equals of their masters. This requires explanation in order to be rightly understood. At any moment a servant may become a master, and he aspires to rise to that condition: the servant is therefore not a different man from the master. Why then has the former a right to command, and what compels the latter to obey?—the free and temporary consent of both their wills. Neither of them is by nature inferior to the other; they only become so for a time by covenant. Within the terms of this covenant, the one is a servant, the other a master; beyond it they are two citizens of the commonwealth—two men. I beg the reader particularly to observe that this is not only the notion which servants themselves entertain of their own condition; domestic service is looked upon by masters in the same light; and the precise limits of authority and obedience are as clearly settled in the mind of the one as in that of the other.

In democracies, servants are not only equal to each other, but it's fair to say they are in some ways equal to their masters. This needs further explanation to be fully understood. At any moment, a servant can become a master and aims to achieve that status: the servant is therefore not fundamentally different from the master. So, why does the former have the right to command, and what makes the latter obey?—the free and temporary agreement of both their wills. Neither is naturally inferior to the other; they only assume those roles temporarily by mutual agreement. Within the terms of this agreement, one is a servant and the other a master; outside of it, they are simply two citizens of the community—two men. I ask the reader to note that this view is not just held by the servants themselves; masters see domestic service in the same way, and the exact boundaries of authority and obedience are clearly defined in the minds of both parties.

When the greater part of the community have long attained a condition nearly alike, and when equality is an old and acknowledged fact, the public mind, which is never affected by exceptions, assigns certain general limits to the value of man, above or below which no man can long remain placed. It is in vain that wealth and poverty, authority and obedience, accidentally interpose great distances between two men; public opinion, founded upon the usual order of things, draws them to a common level, and creates a species of imaginary equality between them, in spite of the real inequality of their conditions. This all-powerful opinion penetrates at length even into the hearts of those whose interest might arm them to resist it; it affects their judgment whilst it subdues their will. In their inmost convictions the master and the servant no longer perceive any deep-seated difference between them, and they neither hope nor fear to meet with any such at any time. They are therefore neither subject to disdain nor to anger, and they discern in each other neither humility nor pride. The master holds the contract of service to be the only source of his power, and the servant regards it as the only cause of his obedience. They do not quarrel about their reciprocal situations, but each knows his own and keeps it.

When most of the community has reached a similar state, and when equality is an established fact, the public mindset, which isn’t swayed by exceptions, sets certain general limits on individual worth, above or below which no one can stay for long. It's pointless for wealth and poverty, power and submission, to create significant gaps between two individuals; public opinion, based on the usual way of things, pushes them to a common ground, creating a kind of imagined equality between them, despite the real difference in their situations. This powerful opinion eventually influences even those who might benefit from resisting it; it shapes their judgment while softening their will. Deep down, both the master and the servant no longer see any fundamental difference between them, and they neither expect nor fear encountering such a difference at any time. As a result, they feel neither contempt nor anger towards each other, and they see neither humility nor arrogance in one another. The master views the service contract as the sole source of his power, while the servant sees it as the only reason for his obedience. They don’t argue about their respective roles; instead, each understands their place and maintains it.

In the French army the common soldier is taken from nearly the same classes as the officer, and may hold the same commissions; out of the ranks he considers himself entirely equal to his military superiors, and in point of fact he is so; but when under arms he does not hesitate to obey, and his obedience is not the less prompt, precise, and ready, for being voluntary and defined. This example may give a notion of what takes place between masters and servants in democratic communities.

In the French army, the regular soldier comes from almost the same backgrounds as the officer and can hold the same positions. When he’s not in uniform, he sees himself as completely equal to his military superiors, and in reality, he is. However, once he’s in uniform, he readily obeys, and his willingness to follow orders is just as quick, accurate, and responsive since it’s voluntary and clear. This example illustrates the dynamics that exist between employers and employees in democratic societies.

It would be preposterous to suppose that those warm and deep-seated affections, which are sometimes kindled in the domestic service of aristocracy, will ever spring up between these two men, or that they will exhibit strong instances of self-sacrifice. In aristocracies masters and servants live apart, and frequently their only intercourse is through a third person; yet they commonly stand firmly by one another. In democratic countries the master and the servant are close together; they are in daily personal contact, but their minds do not intermingle; they have common occupations, hardly ever common interests. Amongst such a people the servant always considers himself as a sojourner in the dwelling of his masters. He knew nothing of their forefathers—he will see nothing of their descendants—he has nothing lasting to expect from their hand. Why then should he confound his life with theirs, and whence should so strange a surrender of himself proceed? The reciprocal position of the two men is changed—their mutual relations must be so too.

It would be ridiculous to think that the strong and deep feelings that can sometimes develop in the homes of the aristocracy would ever grow between these two men, or that they would show significant acts of self-sacrifice. In aristocracies, masters and servants live separately, and often their only communication goes through a third party; yet they usually stand by each other. In democratic countries, the master and servant are close to each other; they have daily personal interaction, but their thoughts don’t really mix; they share common tasks but rarely have common interests. Among such people, the servant always sees himself as a temporary guest in his masters' home. He knows nothing of their ancestors—he will know nothing of their descendants—he doesn't expect anything lasting from them. So why should he intertwine his life with theirs, and where would such a strange sacrifice of himself come from? The relationship between the two men has changed—their mutual roles must change as well.

I would fain illustrate all these reflections by the example of the Americans; but for this purpose the distinctions of persons and places must be accurately traced. In the South of the Union, slavery exists; all that I have just said is consequently inapplicable there. In the North, the majority of servants are either freedmen or the children of freedmen; these persons occupy a contested position in the public estimation; by the laws they are brought up to the level of their masters—by the manners of the country they are obstinately detruded from it. They do not themselves clearly know their proper place, and they are almost always either insolent or craven. But in the Northern States, especially in New England, there are a certain number of whites, who agree, for wages, to yield a temporary obedience to the will of their fellow-citizens. I have heard that these servants commonly perform the duties of their situation with punctuality and intelligence; and that without thinking themselves naturally inferior to the person who orders them, they submit without reluctance to obey him. They appear to me to carry into service some of those manly habits which independence and equality engender. Having once selected a hard way of life, they do not seek to escape from it by indirect means; and they have sufficient respect for themselves, not to refuse to their master that obedience which they have freely promised. On their part, masters require nothing of their servants but the faithful and rigorous performance of the covenant: they do not ask for marks of respect, they do not claim their love or devoted attachment; it is enough that, as servants, they are exact and honest. It would not then be true to assert that, in democratic society, the relation of servants and masters is disorganized: it is organized on another footing; the rule is different, but there is a rule.

I’d like to illustrate all these thoughts with the example of Americans, but for this to work, we need to distinguish between different people and places. In the Southern states, slavery is present; therefore, everything I just mentioned doesn’t apply there. In the North, most servants are either freed slaves or the children of freed slaves; these individuals hold a complicated position in society's eyes. While the laws treat them as equals to their employers, social norms push them away from that status. They often aren’t sure where they stand and can come off as either defiant or submissive. However, in the Northern states, especially in New England, there are a number of white individuals who choose to work for wages and temporarily submit to the authority of their fellow citizens. I’ve heard that these workers typically carry out their duties with reliability and intelligence; they don’t view themselves as naturally inferior to those giving them orders, and they comply willingly. They seem to bring some of the strength and mindset of independence and equality into their jobs. Once they choose a challenging way of life, they don’t look for ways to dodge it, and they have enough self-respect to honor the agreement of obedience they made. In return, employers ask nothing more from their workers than that they fulfill their commitments reliably and honestly; they don’t seek out gestures of respect or affection. It would therefore be inaccurate to say that, in a democratic society, the relationship between servants and masters is chaotic: it’s structured differently; the rules may vary, but there are still rules.

It is not my purpose to inquire whether the new state of things which I have just described is inferior to that which preceded it, or simply different. Enough for me that it is fixed and determined: for what is most important to meet with among men is not any given ordering, but order. But what shall I say of those sad and troubled times at which equality is established in the midst of the tumult of revolution—when democracy, after having been introduced into the state of society, still struggles with difficulty against the prejudices and manners of the country? The laws, and partially public opinion, already declare that no natural or permanent inferiority exists between the servant and the master. But this new belief has not yet reached the innermost convictions of the latter, or rather his heart rejects it; in the secret persuasion of his mind the master thinks that he belongs to a peculiar and superior race; he dares not say so, but he shudders whilst he allows himself to be dragged to the same level. His authority over his servants becomes timid and at the same time harsh: he has already ceased to entertain for them the feelings of patronizing kindness which long uncontested power always engenders, and he is surprised that, being changed himself, his servant changes also. He wants his attendants to form regular and permanent habits, in a condition of domestic service which is only temporary: he requires that they should appear contented with and proud of a servile condition, which they will one day shake off—that they should sacrifice themselves to a man who can neither protect nor ruin them—and in short that they should contract an indissoluble engagement to a being like themselves, and one who will last no longer than they will.

I’m not trying to judge whether the new situation I just described is worse than the old one or just different. What matters to me is that it’s settled and defined: the most important thing among people isn’t a specific arrangement, but order. But what should I say about those unfortunate and chaotic times when equality is established amidst the upheaval of revolution—when democracy, after being introduced into society, still struggles against the country’s old prejudices and customs? The laws, along with some public opinion, already state that there isn’t any natural or permanent inferiority between the servant and the master. But this new belief hasn’t yet reached the deepest beliefs of the master; in fact, his heart pushes it away. Deep down, he thinks he belongs to a special and superior race; he won’t admit it, but he feels uneasy while being brought down to the same level. His authority over his servants becomes both timid and harsh: he can no longer feel the kind, patronizing feelings that come from long-held power, and he’s taken aback that, as he changes, so do his servants. He wants his workers to form regular and lasting habits in a situation of domestic service that is only temporary: he expects them to be satisfied and proud of a servile role they will eventually escape—that they should sacrifice themselves to a man who can neither protect nor ruin them—and ultimately that they should commit themselves to someone just like them, who won’t last any longer than they do.

Amongst aristocratic nations it often happens that the condition of domestic service does not degrade the character of those who enter upon it, because they neither know nor imagine any other; and the amazing inequality which is manifest between them and their master appears to be the necessary and unavoidable consequence of some hidden law of Providence. In democracies the condition of domestic service does not degrade the character of those who enter upon it, because it is freely chosen, and adopted for a time only; because it is not stigmatized by public opinion, and creates no permanent inequality between the servant and the master. But whilst the transition from one social condition to another is going on, there is almost always a time when men's minds fluctuate between the aristocratic notion of subjection and the democratic notion of obedience. Obedience then loses its moral importance in the eyes of him who obeys; he no longer considers it as a species of divine obligation, and he does not yet view it under its purely human aspect; it has to him no character of sanctity or of justice, and he submits to it as to a degrading but profitable condition. At that moment a confused and imperfect phantom of equality haunts the minds of servants; they do not at once perceive whether the equality to which they are entitled is to be found within or without the pale of domestic service; and they rebel in their hearts against a subordination to which they have subjected themselves, and from which they derive actual profit. They consent to serve, and they blush to obey; they like the advantages of service, but not the master; or rather, they are not sure that they ought not themselves to be masters, and they are inclined to consider him who orders them as an unjust usurper of their own rights. Then it is that the dwelling of every citizen offers a spectacle somewhat analogous to the gloomy aspect of political society. A secret and intestine warfare is going on there between powers, ever rivals and suspicious of one another: the master is ill-natured and weak, the servant ill-natured and intractable; the one constantly attempts to evade by unfair restrictions his obligation to protect and to remunerate—the other his obligation to obey. The reins of domestic government dangle between them, to be snatched at by one or the other. The lines which divide authority from oppression, liberty from license, and right from might, are to their eyes so jumbled together and confused, that no one knows exactly what he is, or what he may be, or what he ought to be. Such a condition is not democracy, but revolution.

Among aristocratic nations, it often happens that the role of domestic service doesn't degrade the character of those who enter it because they neither know nor imagine any other way of life. The obvious inequality between them and their master seems to be a necessary and unavoidable result of some hidden law of Providence. In democracies, the role of domestic service also doesn’t degrade the character of those who take it on, because it is a choice made freely and generally temporary; it isn’t looked down upon by public opinion and doesn’t create a permanent inequality between the servant and the master. However, while the transition from one social condition to another is happening, there is usually a time when people's thoughts waver between the aristocratic idea of subordination and the democratic concept of obedience. At this time, obedience loses its moral significance for the person who obeys; they no longer see it as a kind of divine obligation and don’t yet view it in purely human terms; it has no sacred or just character for them, and they submit to it as a degrading but profitable situation. In that moment, a vague and imperfect sense of equality occupies the minds of servants; they aren’t sure whether the equality they deserve is found within or outside the realm of domestic service; and they quietly rebel against a subordination they have accepted, even though they benefit from it. They agree to serve but feel ashamed to obey; they appreciate the benefits of service but not the master; or rather, they aren't sure that they shouldn’t be the ones in charge, and they tend to regard the one who commands them as an unjust usurper of their rights. It is then that every citizen's home presents a scene somewhat similar to the grim state of political society. A secret internal struggle is happening there between powers that are always rivals and distrustful of each other: the master is unpleasant and weak, while the servant is unpleasant and unmanageable; one constantly tries to escape through unfair constraints his duty to protect and pay—while the other seeks to evade his obligation to obey. The reins of domestic authority dangle between them, ready to be grabbed by either side. The lines that separate authority from oppression, liberty from chaos, and rights from power are so tangled and confused in their eyes that no one knows exactly who they are, what they could be, or what they should be. This situation is not democracy but revolution.





Chapter VI: That Democratic Institutions And Manners Tend To Raise Rents And Shorten The Terms Of Leases

What has been said of servants and masters is applicable, to a certain extent, to landowners and farming tenants; but this subject deserves to be considered by itself. In America there are, properly speaking, no tenant farmers; every man owns the ground he tills. It must be admitted that democratic laws tend greatly to increase the number of landowners, and to diminish that of farming tenants. Yet what takes place in the United States is much less attributable to the institutions of the country than to the country itself. In America land is cheap, and anyone may easily become a landowner; its returns are small, and its produce cannot well be divided between a landowner and a farmer. America therefore stands alone in this as well as in many other respects, and it would be a mistake to take it as an example.

What’s been said about servants and masters also applies, to some extent, to landowners and farming tenants; however, this topic deserves to be looked at separately. In America, there really aren’t any tenant farmers; everyone owns the land they farm. It’s true that democratic laws significantly increase the number of landowners and reduce the number of farming tenants. But what happens in the United States is more about the country itself than its institutions. In America, land is affordable, and anyone can easily become a landowner; the profits are small, and the produce can’t easily be split between a landowner and a farmer. Therefore, America is unique in this regard, as well as in many others, and it would be a mistake to use it as an example.

I believe that in democratic as well as in aristocratic countries there will be landowners and tenants, but the connection existing between them will be of a different kind. In aristocracies the hire of a farm is paid to the landlord, not only in rent, but in respect, regard, and duty; in democracies the whole is paid in cash. When estates are divided and passed from hand to hand, and the permanent connection which existed between families and the soil is dissolved, the landowner and the tenant are only casually brought into contact. They meet for a moment to settle the conditions of the agreement, and then lose sight of each other; they are two strangers brought together by a common interest, and who keenly talk over a matter of business, the sole object of which is to make money.

I think that in both democratic and aristocratic countries, there will be landowners and tenants, but their relationship will be different. In aristocracies, renting a farm involves not just paying rent but also showing respect, regard, and duty to the landlord; in democracies, it’s all about cash. When estates get divided and change hands, the lasting bond between families and the land disappears, making the landowner and tenant interact only briefly. They come together momentarily to discuss the details of their agreement and then part ways, remaining essentially strangers who connect over a business matter aimed solely at making money.

In proportion as property is subdivided and wealth distributed over the country, the community is filled with people whose former opulence is declining, and with others whose fortunes are of recent growth and whose wants increase more rapidly than their resources. For all such persons the smallest pecuniary profit is a matter of importance, and none of them feel disposed to waive any of their claims, or to lose any portion of their income. As ranks are intermingled, and as very large as well as very scanty fortunes become more rare, every day brings the social condition of the landowner nearer to that of the farmer; the one has not naturally any uncontested superiority over the other; between two men who are equal, and not at ease in their circumstances, the contract of hire is exclusively an affair of money. A man whose estate extends over a whole district, and who owns a hundred farms, is well aware of the importance of gaining at the same time the affections of some thousands of men; this object appears to call for his exertions, and to attain it he will readily make considerable sacrifices. But he who owns a hundred acres is insensible to similar considerations, and he cares but little to win the private regard of his tenant.

As property gets divided up and wealth spreads throughout the country, the community is filled with people whose past wealth is diminishing, alongside others whose fortunes are new and whose needs are growing faster than their resources. For these individuals, even a small financial gain is significant, and none are willing to give up any of their claims or lose any part of their income. As social classes mix and both very large and very small fortunes become less common, each day brings the situation of landowners closer to that of farmers; neither has any natural claim to superiority over the other. Between two men who are equal and uncomfortable in their circumstances, employment contracts are purely about money. A person who owns an entire district and a hundred farms knows how important it is to gain the goodwill of thousands of people; this goal seems to demand his effort, and he will gladly make significant sacrifices to achieve it. But someone who owns a hundred acres is indifferent to similar concerns and is not very interested in earning the personal loyalty of his tenant.

An aristocracy does not expire like a man in a single day; the aristocratic principle is slowly undermined in men's opinion, before it is attacked in their laws. Long before open war is declared against it, the tie which had hitherto united the higher classes to the lower may be seen to be gradually relaxed. Indifference and contempt are betrayed by one class, jealousy and hatred by the others; the intercourse between rich and poor becomes less frequent and less kind, and rents are raised. This is not the consequence of a democratic revolution, but its certain harbinger; for an aristocracy which has lost the affections of the people, once and forever, is like a tree dead at the root, which is the more easily torn up by the winds the higher its branches have spread.

An aristocracy doesn’t disappear overnight; the aristocratic principle is gradually weakened in people's views before it’s challenged in laws. Long before any open conflict starts, the bond that once connected the upper and lower classes starts to loosen. One class shows indifference and disdain, while the other expresses jealousy and hatred; interactions between the rich and poor become less frequent and less friendly, and rents go up. This isn’t the result of a democratic revolution but a clear sign of it coming; because an aristocracy that has lost the people's affection is like a tree that’s dead at the roots, making it easier to uproot when its branches are high.

In the course of the last fifty years the rents of farms have amazingly increased, not only in France but throughout the greater part of Europe. The remarkable improvements which have taken place in agriculture and manufactures within the same period do not suffice in my opinion to explain this fact; recourse must be had to another cause more powerful and more concealed. I believe that cause is to be found in the democratic institutions which several European nations have adopted, and in the democratic passions which more or less agitate all the rest. I have frequently heard great English landowners congratulate themselves that, at the present day, they derive a much larger income from their estates than their fathers did. They have perhaps good reasons to be glad; but most assuredly they know not what they are glad of. They think they are making a clear gain, when it is in reality only an exchange; their influence is what they are parting with for cash; and what they gain in money will ere long be lost in power.

Over the last fifty years, farm rents have dramatically increased, not just in France but across much of Europe. The significant improvements in agriculture and manufacturing during this time don’t, in my view, fully explain this trend; we need to look for another, more powerful and hidden cause. I believe this cause lies in the democratic institutions that several European nations have adopted, and in the democratic passions that stir all the others to some degree. I’ve often heard wealthy English landowners commend themselves for earning a much higher income from their estates today than their fathers did. They might have good reasons to be pleased, but they definitely don’t realize what they should be pleased about. They think they’re making a clear profit, but it’s really just a trade-off; they’re exchanging their influence for cash, and what they gain in money will soon be lost in power.

There is yet another sign by which it is easy to know that a great democratic revolution is going on or approaching. In the Middle Ages almost all lands were leased for lives, or for very long terms; the domestic economy of that period shows that leases for ninety-nine years were more frequent then than leases for twelve years are now. Men then believed that families were immortal; men's conditions seemed settled forever, and the whole of society appeared to be so fixed, that it was not supposed that anything would ever be stirred or shaken in its structure. In ages of equality, the human mind takes a different bent; the prevailing notion is that nothing abides, and man is haunted by the thought of mutability. Under this impression the landowner and the tenant himself are instinctively averse to protracted terms of obligation; they are afraid of being tied up to-morrow by the contract which benefits them today. They have vague anticipations of some sudden and unforeseen change in their conditions; they mistrust themselves; they fear lest their taste should change, and lest they should lament that they cannot rid themselves of what they coveted; nor are such fears unfounded, for in democratic ages that which is most fluctuating amidst the fluctuation of all around is the heart of man.

Another clear sign that a major democratic revolution is happening or on the way is evident. During the Middle Ages, most lands were leased for life or for very long periods; the economy of that time shows that leases for ninety-nine years were more common then than leases for twelve years are now. People back then believed that families were eternal; social conditions seemed set forever, and society as a whole appeared so stable that it was thought nothing would ever disrupt its structure. In times of equality, however, people's mindsets shift; the common belief becomes that nothing lasts, and individuals are often preoccupied with the idea of change. With this mindset, both landowners and tenants instinctively resist long-term obligations; they worry about being bound by tomorrow to a contract that benefits them today. They have vague expectations of sudden and unexpected changes in their circumstances; they mistrust themselves; they fear that their preferences might shift and that they will regret not being able to let go of what they once desired. Such fears are not unfounded, as in democratic times, the most changeable element amid the uncertainty around them is the human heart.





Chapter VII: Influence Of Democracy On Wages

Most of the remarks which I have already made in speaking of servants and masters, may be applied to masters and workmen. As the gradations of the social scale come to be less observed, whilst the great sink the humble rise, and as poverty as well as opulence ceases to be hereditary, the distance both in reality and in opinion, which heretofore separated the workman from the master, is lessened every day. The workman conceives a more lofty opinion of his rights, of his future, of himself; he is filled with new ambition and with new desires, he is harassed by new wants. Every instant he views with longing eyes the profits of his employer; and in order to share them, he strives to dispose of his labor at a higher rate, and he generally succeeds at length in the attempt. In democratic countries, as well as elsewhere, most of the branches of productive industry are carried on at a small cost, by men little removed by their wealth or education above the level of those whom they employ. These manufacturing speculators are extremely numerous; their interests differ; they cannot therefore easily concert or combine their exertions. On the other hand the workmen have almost always some sure resources, which enable them to refuse to work when they cannot get what they conceive to be the fair price of their labor. In the constant struggle for wages which is going on between these two classes, their strength is divided, and success alternates from one to the other. It is even probable that in the end the interest of the working class must prevail; for the high wages which they have already obtained make them every day less dependent on their masters; and as they grow more independent, they have greater facilities for obtaining a further increase of wages.

Most of the points I've already mentioned about servants and masters can also apply to bosses and workers. As the differences in social status become less noticeable, while the wealthy sink and the humble rise, and as poverty as well as wealth stops being passed down through generations, the gap, both in reality and perception, that used to separate workers from their bosses is getting smaller every day. Workers have a higher opinion of their rights, their future, and themselves; they are filled with new ambitions and desires, and they face new challenges. Every moment, they look longingly at their boss's profits; to share in that, they try to sell their labor for a higher rate, and they generally succeed in that effort eventually. In democratic countries, as well as elsewhere, most sectors of productive industry are run at a low cost by people who aren’t far removed in wealth or education from those they employ. These manufacturing entrepreneurs are very numerous; their interests vary, so they can’t easily coordinate or combine their efforts. On the other hand, workers usually have some reliable resources that allow them to refuse to work if they can’t get what they believe is a fair wage. In the ongoing struggle for wages between these two groups, their power is divided, and success shifts back and forth. It’s also likely that, in the end, the interests of the working class will win out; the high wages they’ve already secured make them less dependent on their bosses every day, and as they become more independent, they find it easier to push for even higher wages.

I shall take for example that branch of productive industry which is still at the present day the most generally followed in France, and in almost all the countries of the world—I mean the cultivation of the soil. In France most of those who labor for hire in agriculture, are themselves owners of certain plots of ground, which just enable them to subsist without working for anyone else. When these laborers come to offer their services to a neighboring landowner or farmer, if he refuses them a certain rate of wages, they retire to their own small property and await another opportunity.

I'll use the example of that branch of productive industry that is still the most commonly pursued in France and in almost every country around the world—I mean farming. In France, most of the people who work for wages in agriculture actually own small plots of land that allow them to get by without having to work for anyone else. When these laborers seek to offer their services to a nearby landowner or farmer, if they are denied a specific wage, they go back to their own small property and wait for another chance.

I think that, upon the whole, it may be asserted that a slow and gradual rise of wages is one of the general laws of democratic communities. In proportion as social conditions become more equal, wages rise; and as wages are higher, social conditions become more equal. But a great and gloomy exception occurs in our own time. I have shown in a preceding chapter that aristocracy, expelled from political society, has taken refuge in certain departments of productive industry, and has established its sway there under another form; this powerfully affects the rate of wages. As a large capital is required to embark in the great manufacturing speculations to which I allude, the number of persons who enter upon them is exceedingly limited: as their number is small, they can easily concert together, and fix the rate of wages as they please. Their workmen on the contrary are exceedingly numerous, and the number of them is always increasing; for, from time to time, an extraordinary run of business takes place, during which wages are inordinately high, and they attract the surrounding population to the factories. But, when once men have embraced that line of life, we have already seen that they cannot quit it again, because they soon contract habits of body and mind which unfit them for any other sort of toil. These men have generally but little education and industry, with but few resources; they stand therefore almost at the mercy of the master. When competition, or other fortuitous circumstances, lessen his profits, he can reduce the wages of his workmen almost at pleasure, and make from them what he loses by the chances of business. Should the workmen strike, the master, who is a rich man, can very well wait without being ruined until necessity brings them back to him; but they must work day by day or they die, for their only property is in their hands. They have long been impoverished by oppression, and the poorer they become the more easily may they be oppressed: they can never escape from this fatal circle of cause and consequence. It is not then surprising that wages, after having sometimes suddenly risen, are permanently lowered in this branch of industry; whereas in other callings the price of labor, which generally increases but little, is nevertheless constantly augmented.

I believe that, overall, it can be said that a slow and steady increase in wages is one of the key trends in democratic societies. As social conditions become more equal, wages go up; and as wages rise, social conditions become more equal. However, a significant and troubling exception exists in our current time. I have pointed out in a previous chapter that aristocracy, pushed out of political life, has taken refuge in certain sectors of productive industry and has established its influence there in a different form; this greatly impacts wage rates. Since a large amount of capital is needed to engage in the major manufacturing ventures I mentioned, the number of people who participate in them is very limited: because their numbers are small, they can easily unite and set wages as they wish. In contrast, their workers are very numerous and always increasing; occasionally, there is a spike in business where wages are exceptionally high, attracting the local population to the factories. However, once people enter this line of work, we’ve already seen that they can’t easily leave it again, as they quickly develop physical and mental habits that make them unfit for other kinds of labor. These workers usually have little education and few resources, leaving them almost entirely at the mercy of their employers. When competition or other unexpected circumstances reduce the employer's profits, they can lower their workers' wages almost at will, making up for losses they incur from business fluctuations. If workers go on strike, the employer, who is wealthy, can easily wait without being ruined until necessity drives the workers back; but the workers must work day to day or they won't survive, since their only asset is their labor. They have long been made poor by oppression, and the poorer they are, the easier it is to oppress them further: they can never break free from this vicious cycle of cause and effect. Therefore, it's not surprising that wages, after sometimes suddenly rising, are permanently lowered in this industry; while in other occupations, the wage for labor, which generally increases only slightly, is nevertheless constantly rising.

This state of dependence and wretchedness, in which a part of the manufacturing population of our time lives, forms an exception to the general rule, contrary to the state of all the rest of the community; but, for this very reason, no circumstance is more important or more deserving of the especial consideration of the legislator; for when the whole of society is in motion, it is difficult to keep any one class stationary; and when the greater number of men are opening new paths to fortune, it is no less difficult to make the few support in peace their wants and their desires.

This state of dependence and misery, where part of today's manufacturing workforce lives, is an exception to the general situation of the rest of society; however, this very fact makes it crucial for lawmakers to pay special attention to it. When society as a whole is progressing, it's tough to keep any one group stagnant, and when most people are chasing new opportunities, it’s equally hard to expect the few to quietly manage their needs and wants.





Chapter VIII: Influence Of Democracy On Kindred

I have just examined the changes which the equality of conditions produces in the mutual relations of the several members of the community amongst democratic nations, and amongst the Americans in particular. I would now go deeper, and inquire into the closer ties of kindred: my object here is not to seek for new truths, but to show in what manner facts already known are connected with my subject.

I have just looked at how equality of conditions affects the relationships among different members of the community in democratic countries, especially in America. Now, I want to dig deeper and explore the closer family ties. My goal here isn’t to find new truths, but to demonstrate how the facts that are already known relate to my topic.

It has been universally remarked, that in our time the several members of a family stand upon an entirely new footing towards each other; that the distance which formerly separated a father from his sons has been lessened; and that paternal authority, if not destroyed, is at least impaired. Something analogous to this, but even more striking, may be observed in the United States. In America the family, in the Roman and aristocratic signification of the word, does not exist. All that remains of it are a few vestiges in the first years of childhood, when the father exercises, without opposition, that absolute domestic authority, which the feebleness of his children renders necessary, and which their interest, as well as his own incontestable superiority, warrants. But as soon as the young American approaches manhood, the ties of filial obedience are relaxed day by day: master of his thoughts, he is soon master of his conduct. In America there is, strictly speaking, no adolescence: at the close of boyhood the man appears, and begins to trace out his own path. It would be an error to suppose that this is preceded by a domestic struggle, in which the son has obtained by a sort of moral violence the liberty that his father refused him. The same habits, the same principles which impel the one to assert his independence, predispose the other to consider the use of that independence as an incontestable right. The former does not exhibit any of those rancorous or irregular passions which disturb men long after they have shaken off an established authority; the latter feels none of that bitter and angry regret which is apt to survive a bygone power. The father foresees the limits of his authority long beforehand, and when the time arrives he surrenders it without a struggle: the son looks forward to the exact period at which he will be his own master; and he enters upon his freedom without precipitation and without effort, as a possession which is his own and which no one seeks to wrest from him. *a

It has been widely noted that in our time, family members relate to each other in completely new ways; the gap that once existed between a father and his sons has narrowed, and while paternal authority isn’t entirely gone, it is certainly weakened. A similar, though even more pronounced, phenomenon can be observed in the United States. In America, the family, in the traditional Roman and aristocratic sense, doesn’t really exist. All that’s left are some remnants in early childhood, when the father exerts his absolute authority without resistance, a necessity due to the vulnerability of his children, justified by both their dependency and his undeniable dominance. However, as soon as a young American approaches adulthood, the bonds of filial obedience gradually loosen: capable of independent thought, he soon takes control of his actions. In America, strictly speaking, there isn’t a true adolescence; as boyhood ends, the man emerges and starts to forge his own path. It would be a mistake to think this transition involves a family struggle where the son gains freedom through some sort of moral rebellion against a father who denies it. The same habits and principles that push one to claim independence encourage the other to view that independence as an unquestionable right. The son doesn’t display the bitter or chaotic emotions that often linger after breaking away from established authority; the father doesn’t harbor any of the resentment or anger that commonly follows a lost power. The father anticipates the limits of his authority well in advance, and when the moment comes, he relinquishes it without a fight: the son eagerly awaits the exact time he’ll be his own master; he steps into his freedom without haste or struggle, seeing it as something that is rightfully his and that no one tries to take away from him.

a
[ The Americans, however, have not yet thought fit to strip the parent, as has been done in France, of one of the chief elements of parental authority, by depriving him of the power of disposing of his property at his death. In the United States there are no restrictions on the powers of a testator. In this respect, as in almost all others, it is easy to perceive, that if the political legislation of the Americans is much more democratic than that of the French, the civil legislation of the latter is infinitely more democratic than that of the former. This may easily be accounted for. The civil legislation of France was the work of a man who saw that it was his interest to satisfy the democratic passions of his contemporaries in all that was not directly and immediately hostile to his own power. He was willing to allow some popular principles to regulate the distribution of property and the government of families, provided they were not to be introduced into the administration of public affairs. Whilst the torrent of democracy overwhelmed the civil laws of the country, he hoped to find an easy shelter behind its political institutions. This policy was at once both adroit and selfish; but a compromise of this kind could not last; for in the end political institutions never fail to become the image and expression of civil society; and in this sense it may be said that nothing is more political in a nation than its civil legislation.]

a
[The Americans, though, have not yet decided to take away from parents, as has been done in France, one of the main aspects of parental authority by removing their ability to decide what happens to their property after they die. In the United States, there are no limits on what a testator can do. In this regard, as in almost all others, it's clear that while American political legislation is much more democratic than that of the French, French civil legislation is far more democratic than that of the Americans. This can be easily explained. The civil legislation in France was created by a man who recognized that it was in his interest to cater to the democratic feelings of his contemporaries in all matters that didn't directly threaten his own power. He was willing to allow some democratic principles to dictate property distribution and family governance, as long as they weren't applied to public administration. While the wave of democracy swept through the country’s civil laws, he hoped to find refuge behind its political structures. This strategy was both clever and self-serving; however, such a compromise could not endure, for ultimately political institutions always reflect the nature of civil society; in this sense, one might say that nothing is more political in a nation than its civil legislation.]

It may perhaps not be without utility to show how these changes which take place in family relations, are closely connected with the social and political revolution which is approaching its consummation under our own observation. There are certain great social principles, which a people either introduces everywhere, or tolerates nowhere. In countries which are aristocratically constituted with all the gradations of rank, the government never makes a direct appeal to the mass of the governed: as men are united together, it is enough to lead the foremost, the rest will follow. This is equally applicable to the family, as to all aristocracies which have a head. Amongst aristocratic nations, social institutions recognize, in truth, no one in the family but the father; children are received by society at his hands; society governs him, he governs them. Thus the parent has not only a natural right, but he acquires a political right, to command them: he is the author and the support of his family; but he is also its constituted ruler. In democracies, where the government picks out every individual singly from the mass, to make him subservient to the general laws of the community, no such intermediate person is required: a father is there, in the eye of the law, only a member of the community, older and richer than his sons.

It might be useful to demonstrate how the changes in family relations are closely tied to the social and political revolution that we are currently witnessing. There are certain fundamental social principles that a society either embraces everywhere or rejects entirely. In countries structured with an aristocracy and various levels of rank, the government doesn’t directly address the general population: as people are organized, it’s enough to lead the prominent figures, and the rest will follow. This applies equally to families as it does to all aristocracies with a leader. In aristocratic societies, social institutions really only recognize the father in the family; children are acknowledged by society through him; society governs him, and he governs them. Therefore, the parent not only has a natural right but also a political right to command them: he is both the creator and the protector of his family; he is also its designated ruler. In democracies, where the government addresses each individual from the broader population to align them with the general laws of the community, there’s no need for such a middleman: a father is seen by the law merely as a member of the community, older and wealthier than his sons.

When most of the conditions of life are extremely unequal, and the inequality of these conditions is permanent, the notion of a superior grows upon the imaginations of men: if the law invested him with no privileges, custom and public opinion would concede them. When, on the contrary, men differ but little from each other, and do not always remain in dissimilar conditions of life, the general notion of a superior becomes weaker and less distinct: it is vain for legislation to strive to place him who obeys very much beneath him who commands; the manners of the time bring the two men nearer to one another, and draw them daily towards the same level. Although the legislation of an aristocratic people should grant no peculiar privileges to the heads of families; I shall not be the less convinced that their power is more respected and more extensive than in a democracy; for I know that, whatsoever the laws may be, superiors always appear higher and inferiors lower in aristocracies than amongst democratic nations.

When most aspects of life are vastly unequal and this inequality is lasting, the idea of a superior becomes ingrained in people's minds: even if the law doesn’t give them any privileges, customs and public opinion will. On the other hand, when people have little differences and don’t always stay in different life situations, the common idea of a superior weakens and becomes less clear: it’s pointless for the law to try to keep someone who obeys far below someone who commands; social norms bring the two closer together and push them toward the same level. Even if the laws of an aristocratic society don’t give special privileges to heads of families, I’m still convinced that their power is more respected and stronger than in a democracy; because I know that, no matter what the laws say, superiors always seem higher and inferiors lower in aristocracies compared to democratic societies.

When men live more for the remembrance of what has been than for the care of what is, and when they are more given to attend to what their ancestors thought than to think themselves, the father is the natural and necessary tie between the past and the present—the link by which the ends of these two chains are connected. In aristocracies, then, the father is not only the civil head of the family, but the oracle of its traditions, the expounder of its customs, the arbiter of its manners. He is listened to with deference, he is addressed with respect, and the love which is felt for him is always tempered with fear. When the condition of society becomes democratic, and men adopt as their general principle that it is good and lawful to judge of all things for one's self, using former points of belief not as a rule of faith but simply as a means of information, the power which the opinions of a father exercise over those of his sons diminishes as well as his legal power.

When people focus more on remembering the past than on caring for the present, and when they pay more attention to their ancestors' thoughts than to forming their own ideas, the father becomes the essential connection between past and present—the link that ties these two periods together. In aristocracies, the father is not just the head of the family, but also the keeper of its traditions, the interpreter of its customs, and the judge of its manners. He's listened to with respect, addressed with formality, and the love felt for him is always mixed with a bit of fear. When society becomes more democratic, and people accept that it's good and okay to judge everything for themselves, using past beliefs only as references rather than rules, the influence a father has over his sons decreases alongside his legal authority.

Perhaps the subdivision of estates which democracy brings with it contributes more than anything else to change the relations existing between a father and his children. When the property of the father of a family is scanty, his son and himself constantly live in the same place, and share the same occupations: habit and necessity bring them together, and force them to hold constant communication: the inevitable consequence is a sort of familiar intimacy, which renders authority less absolute, and which can ill be reconciled with the external forms of respect. Now in democratic countries the class of those who are possessed of small fortunes is precisely that which gives strength to the notions, and a particular direction to the manners, of the community. That class makes its opinions preponderate as universally as its will, and even those who are most inclined to resist its commands are carried away in the end by its example. I have known eager opponents of democracy who allowed their children to address them with perfect colloquial equality.

Maybe the division of estates that democracy brings about contributes more than anything else to changing the relationships between a father and his children. When a family father's property is limited, he and his son often live in the same place and share the same jobs: habit and necessity bring them together and force them to communicate constantly. The inevitable result is a kind of familiar intimacy that makes authority less absolute and doesn't quite fit with the outward forms of respect. In democratic countries, the class of people with small fortunes is exactly what strengthens the ideas and shapes the behavior of the community. This class makes its opinions dominate as universally as its will, and even those most resistant to its commands eventually get swayed by its example. I’ve seen passionate opponents of democracy who let their children talk to them with complete conversational equality.

Thus, at the same time that the power of aristocracy is declining, the austere, the conventional, and the legal part of parental authority vanishes, and a species of equality prevails around the domestic hearth. I know not, upon the whole, whether society loses by the change, but I am inclined to believe that man individually is a gainer by it. I think that, in proportion as manners and laws become more democratic, the relation of father and son becomes more intimate and more affectionate; rules and authority are less talked of; confidence and tenderness are oftentimes increased, and it would seem that the natural bond is drawn closer in proportion as the social bond is loosened. In a democratic family the father exercises no other power than that with which men love to invest the affection and the experience of age; his orders would perhaps be disobeyed, but his advice is for the most part authoritative. Though he be not hedged in with ceremonial respect, his sons at least accost him with confidence; no settled form of speech is appropriated to the mode of addressing him, but they speak to him constantly, and are ready to consult him day by day; the master and the constituted ruler have vanished—the father remains. Nothing more is needed, in order to judge of the difference between the two states of society in this respect, than to peruse the family correspondence of aristocratic ages. The style is always correct, ceremonious, stiff, and so cold that the natural warmth of the heart can hardly be felt in the language. The language, on the contrary, addressed by a son to his father in democratic countries is always marked by mingled freedom, familiarity and affection, which at once show that new relations have sprung up in the bosom of the family.

As the power of aristocracy fades, the strict, traditional, and legal aspects of parental authority also disappear, leading to a kind of equality around the home. I'm not sure if society benefits from this change, but I believe that individuals, particularly men, do. It seems that as manners and laws become more democratic, the relationship between father and son grows closer and more loving; the focus on rules and authority diminishes, while trust and warmth often increase. The natural bond seems to strengthen as social ties loosen. In a democratic family, the father has no other power than what love and age naturally afford him; his commands might be ignored, but his advice carries weight. While he may not command formal respect, his sons approach him with confidence; there's no fixed way to speak to him, and they frequently engage with him and seek his counsel daily. The authoritative figure has disappeared—the father remains. To understand the differences between the two societal states, one need only read family letters from aristocratic times. The tone is always correct, formal, stiff, and so cold that the natural warmth of affection is barely noticeable. In contrast, the language a son uses with his father in democratic societies is characterized by a mix of freedom, familiarity, and affection, indicating that new relationships have developed within the family.

A similar revolution takes place in the mutual relations of children. In aristocratic families, as well as in aristocratic society, every place is marked out beforehand. Not only does the father occupy a separate rank, in which he enjoys extensive privileges, but even the children are not equal amongst themselves. The age and sex of each irrevocably determine his rank, and secure to him certain privileges: most of these distinctions are abolished or diminished by democracy. In aristocratic families the eldest son, inheriting the greater part of the property, and almost all the rights of the family, becomes the chief, and, to a certain extent, the master, of his brothers. Greatness and power are for him—for them, mediocrity and dependence. Nevertheless it would be wrong to suppose that, amongst aristocratic nations, the privileges of the eldest son are advantageous to himself alone, or that they excite nothing but envy and hatred in those around him. The eldest son commonly endeavors to procure wealth and power for his brothers, because the general splendor of the house is reflected back on him who represents it; the younger sons seek to back the elder brother in all his undertakings, because the greatness and power of the head of the family better enable him to provide for all its branches. The different members of an aristocratic family are therefore very closely bound together; their interests are connected, their minds agree, but their hearts are seldom in harmony.

A similar revolution happens in the relationships among children. In aristocratic families, as well as in aristocratic society, every position is predetermined. Not only does the father have his own rank with significant privileges, but even the children aren’t equal among themselves. Each child's age and gender irrevocably define their rank and grant them specific privileges; many of these distinctions are lessened or eliminated by democracy. In aristocratic families, the oldest son inherits most of the property and nearly all the family's rights, becoming the leader and, to some extent, the authority over his siblings. Greatness and power belong to him—mediocrity and dependence belong to them. However, it would be a mistake to think that, among aristocratic nations, the eldest son’s privileges benefit only him or that they only inspire envy and resentment in those around him. The eldest son typically tries to secure wealth and power for his brothers because the overall prestige of the family reflects back on him as its representative; the younger sons tend to support the elder brother in all his ventures since the stature and influence of the family head enable him to provide for all its members. Therefore, the different members of an aristocratic family are closely interconnected; their interests are aligned, their thoughts agree, but their feelings rarely resonate.

Democracy also binds brothers to each other, but by very different means. Under democratic laws all the children are perfectly equal, and consequently independent; nothing brings them forcibly together, but nothing keeps them apart; and as they have the same origin, as they are trained under the same roof, as they are treated with the same care, and as no peculiar privilege distinguishes or divides them, the affectionate and youthful intimacy of early years easily springs up between them. Scarcely any opportunities occur to break the tie thus formed at the outset of life; for their brotherhood brings them daily together, without embarrassing them. It is not, then, by interest, but by common associations and by the free sympathy of opinion and of taste, that democracy unites brothers to each other. It divides their inheritance, but it allows their hearts and minds to mingle together. Such is the charm of these democratic manners, that even the partisans of aristocracy are caught by it; and after having experienced it for some time, they are by no means tempted to revert to the respectful and frigid observance of aristocratic families. They would be glad to retain the domestic habits of democracy, if they might throw off its social conditions and its laws; but these elements are indissolubly united, and it is impossible to enjoy the former without enduring the latter. The remarks I have made on filial love and fraternal affection are applicable to all the passions which emanate spontaneously from human nature itself. If a certain mode of thought or feeling is the result of some peculiar condition of life, when that condition is altered nothing whatever remains of the thought or feeling. Thus a law may bind two members of the community very closely to one another; but that law being abolished, they stand asunder. Nothing was more strict than the tie which united the vassal to the lord under the feudal system; at the present day the two men know not each other; the fear, the gratitude, and the affection which formerly connected them have vanished, and not a vestige of the tie remains. Such, however, is not the case with those feelings which are natural to mankind. Whenever a law attempts to tutor these feelings in any particular manner, it seldom fails to weaken them; by attempting to add to their intensity, it robs them of some of their elements, for they are never stronger than when left to themselves.

Democracy brings people together in a different way. Under democratic laws, everyone is completely equal, which makes them independent. Nothing forces them to come together, but nothing keeps them apart either. Since they share the same background, grow up in the same environment, and receive the same care—without any special privileges setting them apart—they easily form close bonds during their youth. Opportunities to break the connections formed early in life are rare; their brotherhood connects them daily without making things awkward. Therefore, democracy unites people not through self-interest, but through shared experiences and mutual respect for each other’s opinions and tastes. It may divide their inheritance, but it lets their hearts and minds connect. The appeal of democratic ways is so strong that even those who support aristocracy get drawn in; after experiencing it for a while, they don’t feel inclined to return to the cold, formal interactions of aristocratic families. They would like to keep the homey habits of democracy while discarding its social norms and laws, but those aspects are inseparably linked, making it impossible to enjoy one without enduring the other. My observations about familial and sibling love apply to all emotions that arise naturally from human nature. If a certain way of thinking or feeling comes from a specific life situation, then changing that situation usually wipes out those thoughts or feelings. For instance, a law might create a strong bond between two community members, but once that law is removed, they become distant. The connection between a vassal and a lord in the feudal system was once very strong, but today those two wouldn’t even recognize each other; the fear, gratitude, and affection that once tied them together are gone, leaving no trace of their former bond. However, this isn’t true for the feelings inherent to humans. When a law tries to shape these feelings in a certain way, it often ends up weakening them; by trying to intensify them, it actually diminishes some of their core elements, since they’re strongest when left alone.

Democracy, which destroys or obscures almost all the old conventional rules of society, and which prevents men from readily assenting to new ones, entirely effaces most of the feelings to which these conventional rules have given rise; but it only modifies some others, and frequently imparts to them a degree of energy and sweetness unknown before. Perhaps it is not impossible to condense into a single proposition the whole meaning of this chapter, and of several others that preceded it. Democracy loosens social ties, but it draws the ties of nature more tight; it brings kindred more closely together, whilst it places the various members of the community more widely apart.

Democracy breaks down or blurs almost all the old traditional rules of society, making it hard for people to easily agree on new ones. It completely wipes out most of the feelings that these traditional rules have created; however, it only changes some others and often adds a level of energy and sweetness that wasn’t there before. It might be possible to summarize the entire meaning of this chapter, along with several previous ones, in one statement: Democracy loosens social connections but tightens the connections of nature; it brings family members closer together while spreading the different members of the community further apart.





Chapter IX: Education Of Young Women In The United States

No free communities ever existed without morals; and, as I observed in the former part of this work, morals are the work of woman. Consequently, whatever affects the condition of women, their habits and their opinions, has great political importance in my eyes. Amongst almost all Protestant nations young women are far more the mistresses of their own actions than they are in Catholic countries. This independence is still greater in Protestant countries, like England, which have retained or acquired the right of self-government; the spirit of freedom is then infused into the domestic circle by political habits and by religious opinions. In the United States the doctrines of Protestantism are combined with great political freedom and a most democratic state of society; and nowhere are young women surrendered so early or so completely to their own guidance. Long before an American girl arrives at the age of marriage, her emancipation from maternal control begins; she has scarcely ceased to be a child when she already thinks for herself, speaks with freedom, and acts on her own impulse. The great scene of the world is constantly open to her view; far from seeking concealment, it is every day disclosed to her more completely, and she is taught to survey it with a firm and calm gaze. Thus the vices and dangers of society are early revealed to her; as she sees them clearly, she views them without illusions, and braves them without fear; for she is full of reliance on her own strength, and her reliance seems to be shared by all who are about her. An American girl scarcely ever displays that virginal bloom in the midst of young desires, or that innocent and ingenuous grace which usually attends the European woman in the transition from girlhood to youth. It is rarely that an American woman at any age displays childish timidity or ignorance. Like the young women of Europe, she seeks to please, but she knows precisely the cost of pleasing. If she does not abandon herself to evil, at least she knows that it exists; and she is remarkable rather for purity of manners than for chastity of mind. I have been frequently surprised, and almost frightened, at the singular address and happy boldness with which young women in America contrive to manage their thoughts and their language amidst all the difficulties of stimulating conversation; a philosopher would have stumbled at every step along the narrow path which they trod without accidents and without effort. It is easy indeed to perceive that, even amidst the independence of early youth, an American woman is always mistress of herself; she indulges in all permitted pleasures, without yielding herself up to any of them; and her reason never allows the reins of self-guidance to drop, though it often seems to hold them loosely.

No free communities have ever existed without morals, and as I pointed out earlier in this work, morals are shaped by women. Therefore, anything that impacts the lives of women, their habits, and their views holds significant political importance to me. In nearly all Protestant countries, young women have much more control over their own choices than they do in Catholic countries. This independence is even stronger in Protestant nations like England, where self-government is either maintained or achieved; the spirit of freedom then seeps into the home through political traditions and religious beliefs. In the United States, the principles of Protestantism are mixed with significant political freedom and a highly democratic society; nowhere else do young women gain their independence so early or so fully. Long before an American girl is of marriageable age, her liberation from her mother’s control starts; she hardly finishes being a child before she begins to think for herself, speak freely, and act on her own initiative. The vast world is always in front of her; instead of hiding from it, it is revealed to her more each day, and she learns to face it with a steady and composed gaze. Thus, the flaws and risks of society are shown to her from an early age; as she sees them clearly, she perceives them without illusions and confronts them without fear, because she has confidence in her own strength, which seems to be shared by those around her. An American girl rarely displays that innocent bloom coupled with youthful desires or that naïve grace typically seen in European women transitioning from girlhood to young adulthood. It is uncommon for an American woman at any age to show childish shyness or ignorance. Like young women in Europe, she seeks to be pleasing, but she knows exactly the price of being pleasing. Although she doesn’t give in to wickedness, she is aware that it exists; she is noted more for her decent behavior than for her mental chastity. I have often been surprised, and almost intimidated, by the unique skill and confident boldness with which young women in America manage their thoughts and language in all the challenges of engaging conversation; a philosopher would have stumbled at every turn on the narrow path they navigate effortlessly. It is clear that even amid the freedom of early youth, an American woman is always in control of herself; she enjoys all acceptable pleasures without losing herself in any, and her reason never lets go of the reins of self-guidance, even if it sometimes appears to hold them loosely.

In France, where remnants of every age are still so strangely mingled in the opinions and tastes of the people, women commonly receive a reserved, retired, and almost cloistral education, as they did in aristocratic times; and then they are suddenly abandoned, without a guide and without assistance, in the midst of all the irregularities inseparable from democratic society. The Americans are more consistent. They have found out that in a democracy the independence of individuals cannot fail to be very great, youth premature, tastes ill-restrained, customs fleeting, public opinion often unsettled and powerless, paternal authority weak, and marital authority contested. Under these circumstances, believing that they had little chance of repressing in woman the most vehement passions of the human heart, they held that the surer way was to teach her the art of combating those passions for herself. As they could not prevent her virtue from being exposed to frequent danger, they determined that she should know how best to defend it; and more reliance was placed on the free vigor of her will than on safeguards which have been shaken or overthrown. Instead, then, of inculcating mistrust of herself, they constantly seek to enhance their confidence in her own strength of character. As it is neither possible nor desirable to keep a young woman in perpetual or complete ignorance, they hasten to give her a precocious knowledge on all subjects. Far from hiding the corruptions of the world from her, they prefer that she should see them at once and train herself to shun them; and they hold it of more importance to protect her conduct than to be over-scrupulous of her innocence.

In France, where remnants of every era are still strangely mixed in the opinions and tastes of the people, women typically receive a reserved, sheltered, and almost cloistered education, similar to what they had in aristocratic times. Then they’re suddenly left on their own, without guidance or support, in the midst of the irregularities that come with democratic society. Americans are more straightforward. They’ve realized that in a democracy, individual independence is bound to be significant, youth can be reckless, tastes can be unrestrained, customs can be temporary, public opinion can be unstable and ineffective, parental authority is weak, and marital authority is challenged. Given this, they believe that there’s little chance of suppressing the most intense passions of the human heart in women, so the better approach is to teach them how to manage those passions themselves. Since they can’t prevent women’s virtue from facing frequent threats, they decided that she should know how best to protect it; they trust more in the strength of her will than in protective measures that might be compromised. Therefore, instead of encouraging self-doubt, they actively promote her confidence in her own character. Recognizing that it’s neither feasible nor wise to keep a young woman completely ignorant, they rush to provide her with early knowledge on a wide range of topics. Rather than shielding her from the world’s corruptions, they prefer that she sees them upfront and learns to avoid them; they believe it’s more crucial to safeguard her behavior than to be overly concerned about her innocence.

Although the Americans are a very religious people, they do not rely on religion alone to defend the virtue of woman; they seek to arm her reason also. In this they have followed the same method as in several other respects; they first make the most vigorous efforts to bring individual independence to exercise a proper control over itself, and they do not call in the aid of religion until they have reached the utmost limits of human strength. I am aware that an education of this kind is not without danger; I am sensible that it tends to invigorate the judgment at the expense of the imagination, and to make cold and virtuous women instead of affectionate wives and agreeable companions to man. Society may be more tranquil and better regulated, but domestic life has often fewer charms. These, however, are secondary evils, which may be braved for the sake of higher interests. At the stage at which we are now arrived the time for choosing is no longer within our control; a democratic education is indispensable to protect women from the dangers with which democratic institutions and manners surround them.

Although Americans are very religious, they don’t rely solely on religion to uphold women's virtue; they also aim to empower her reasoning. In this, they've taken a similar approach as in various other areas; they first make strong efforts to enable individual independence to have proper self-control, and they don’t seek religious support until they’ve pushed the limits of human strength. I recognize that this kind of education isn’t without risks; I see that it tends to strengthen judgment at the cost of imagination, creating cold and virtuous women instead of loving wives and pleasant companions for men. Society might be more stable and better organized, but home life often has fewer delights. However, these are lesser issues, which can be faced for the sake of higher priorities. At this point, the time for making choices is no longer under our control; a democratic education is crucial to protect women from the dangers posed by democratic institutions and social norms.





Chapter X: The Young Woman In The Character Of A Wife

In America the independence of woman is irrevocably lost in the bonds of matrimony: if an unmarried woman is less constrained there than elsewhere, a wife is subjected to stricter obligations. The former makes her father's house an abode of freedom and of pleasure; the latter lives in the home of her husband as if it were a cloister. Yet these two different conditions of life are perhaps not so contrary as may be supposed, and it is natural that the American women should pass through the one to arrive at the other.

In America, a woman's independence is permanently lost when she gets married: while an unmarried woman may have more freedom than in other places, a wife faces stricter responsibilities. The single woman turns her father's home into a place of freedom and enjoyment, while the married woman lives in her husband's house as if it were a convent. However, these two different life situations may not be as opposed as they seem, and it's only natural that American women go through one to reach the other.

Religious peoples and trading nations entertain peculiarly serious notions of marriage: the former consider the regularity of woman's life as the best pledge and most certain sign of the purity of her morals; the latter regard it as the highest security for the order and prosperity of the household. The Americans are at the same time a puritanical people and a commercial nation: their religious opinions, as well as their trading habits, consequently lead them to require much abnegation on the part of woman, and a constant sacrifice of her pleasures to her duties which is seldom demanded of her in Europe. Thus in the United States the inexorable opinion of the public carefully circumscribes woman within the narrow circle of domestic interest and duties, and forbids her to step beyond it.

Religious communities and trading nations have notably serious views on marriage: the former see a woman’s stable life as the best guarantee and clearest indicator of her moral integrity; the latter view it as the strongest assurance for the stability and success of the household. Americans are both a puritanical society and a commercial nation, so their beliefs and trading practices often require a lot of self-denial from women, along with a constant sacrifice of their pleasures for their responsibilities, which is rarely expected of women in Europe. Consequently, in the United States, society’s strict opinions often confine women to a limited scope of domestic responsibilities and interests, preventing them from venturing beyond that.

Upon her entrance into the world a young American woman finds these notions firmly established; she sees the rules which are derived from them; she is not slow to perceive that she cannot depart for an instant from the established usages of her contemporaries, without putting in jeopardy her peace of mind, her honor, nay even her social existence; and she finds the energy required for such an act of submission in the firmness of her understanding and in the virile habits which her education has given her. It may be said that she has learned by the use of her independence to surrender it without a struggle and without a murmur when the time comes for making the sacrifice. But no American woman falls into the toils of matrimony as into a snare held out to her simplicity and ignorance. She has been taught beforehand what is expected of her, and voluntarily and freely does she enter upon this engagement. She supports her new condition with courage, because she chose it. As in America paternal discipline is very relaxed and the conjugal tie very strict, a young woman does not contract the latter without considerable circumspection and apprehension. Precocious marriages are rare. Thus American women do not marry until their understandings are exercised and ripened; whereas in other countries most women generally only begin to exercise and to ripen their understandings after marriage.

When a young American woman enters the world, she finds these ideas firmly in place; she sees the rules that come from them. She quickly realizes that she can't stray for a moment from the established norms of her peers without risking her peace of mind, her reputation, or even her social standing. She draws the strength needed for such a submission from her strong sense of self and the assertive habits developed through her upbringing. It's said that she learns to use her independence to surrender it without a fight and without complaint when the time comes to make that sacrifice. However, no American woman falls into marriage as if it were a trap for her naivety and ignorance. She's been prepared in advance for what's expected of her, and she willingly embraces this commitment. She faces her new situation with courage because she chose it. Since parental guidance in America is quite relaxed and marriage is seen as a serious bond, a young woman doesn’t enter into marriage lightly; she does so with considerable thought and caution. Early marriages are uncommon. Thus, American women typically don’t get married until they have developed and matured their understanding, while in other countries, most women usually only begin to do so after they marry.

I by no means suppose, however, that the great change which takes place in all the habits of women in the United States, as soon as they are married, ought solely to be attributed to the constraint of public opinion: it is frequently imposed upon themselves by the sole effort of their own will. When the time for choosing a husband is arrived, that cold and stern reasoning power which has been educated and invigorated by the free observation of the world, teaches an American woman that a spirit of levity and independence in the bonds of marriage is a constant subject of annoyance, not of pleasure; it tells her that the amusements of the girl cannot become the recreations of the wife, and that the sources of a married woman's happiness are in the home of her husband. As she clearly discerns beforehand the only road which can lead to domestic happiness, she enters upon it at once, and follows it to the end without seeking to turn back.

I don't think, however, that the big change in women’s habits in the United States after they get married can only be blamed on societal pressure; often, they impose it on themselves simply by their own will. When it comes time to choose a husband, the clear and logical thinking that has been shaped and strengthened by observing the world teaches an American woman that being carefree and independent in marriage is usually a source of frustration, not joy; it informs her that the fun activities of a girl can't translate to the leisure of a wife, and that a married woman’s happiness is tied to her husband's home. Recognizing clearly the only path to domestic bliss, she commits to it right away and follows it through to the end without considering turning back.

The same strength of purpose which the young wives of America display, in bending themselves at once and without repining to the austere duties of their new condition, is no less manifest in all the great trials of their lives. In no country in the world are private fortunes more precarious than in the United States. It is not uncommon for the same man, in the course of his life, to rise and sink again through all the grades which lead from opulence to poverty. American women support these vicissitudes with calm and unquenchable energy: it would seem that their desires contract, as easily as they expand, with their fortunes. *a

The same determination that the young wives of America show in quickly adapting to the challenging responsibilities of their new lives is also evident in all the major challenges they face. No other country in the world has private fortunes as unstable as those in the United States. It's not unusual for the same person to experience both wealth and poverty multiple times throughout their life. American women handle these ups and downs with a steady and relentless spirit: it seems their desires can easily shrink or grow depending on their circumstances.

a
[ See Appendix S.]

a
[ See Appendix S.]

The greater part of the adventurers who migrate every year to people the western wilds, belong, as I observed in the former part of this work, to the old Anglo-American race of the Northern States. Many of these men, who rush so boldly onwards in pursuit of wealth, were already in the enjoyment of a competency in their own part of the country. They take their wives along with them, and make them share the countless perils and privations which always attend the commencement of these expeditions. I have often met, even on the verge of the wilderness, with young women, who after having been brought up amidst all the comforts of the large towns of New England, had passed, almost without any intermediate stage, from the wealthy abode of their parents to a comfortless hovel in a forest. Fever, solitude, and a tedious life had not broken the springs of their courage. Their features were impaired and faded, but their looks were firm: they appeared to be at once sad and resolute. I do not doubt that these young American women had amassed, in the education of their early years, that inward strength which they displayed under these circumstances. The early culture of the girl may still therefore be traced, in the United States, under the aspect of marriage: her part is changed, her habits are different, but her character is the same.

Most of the adventurers who move every year to settle the western wilds belong, as I noted earlier in this work, to the old Anglo-American lineage from the Northern States. Many of these men, who boldly venture out in search of wealth, were already doing well back home. They take their wives with them, making them face the numerous dangers and hardships that always come with starting these journeys. I have often encountered, even on the edge of the wilderness, young women who, after being raised in the comforts of large New England towns, had transitioned almost directly from their parents' wealthy homes to a basic cabin in the woods. Fever, isolation, and a monotonous life hadn’t weakened their courage. Their features may have been worn and faded, but their expressions were determined: they seemed both sad and resolute. I believe these young American women had developed the inner strength they showed in these situations during their formative years. The early upbringing of girls can still be seen in the United States today through marriage: their roles may have changed, their routines may be different, but their character remains the same.





Chapter XI: That The Equality Of Conditions Contributes To The Maintenance Of Good Morals In America

Some philosophers and historians have said, or have hinted, that the strictness of female morality was increased or diminished simply by the distance of a country from the equator. This solution of the difficulty was an easy one; and nothing was required but a globe and a pair of compasses to settle in an instant one of the most difficult problems in the condition of mankind. But I am not aware that this principle of the materialists is supported by facts. The same nations have been chaste or dissolute at different periods of their history; the strictness or the laxity of their morals depended therefore on some variable cause, not only on the natural qualities of their country, which were invariable. I do not deny that in certain climates the passions which are occasioned by the mutual attraction of the sexes are peculiarly intense; but I am of opinion that this natural intensity may always be excited or restrained by the condition of society and by political institutions.

Some philosophers and historians have suggested, or hinted at, the idea that the strictness of female morality varies based on a country's distance from the equator. This explanation is quite simple; all it takes is a globe and a pair of compasses to quickly resolve one of humanity's most challenging issues. However, I'm not convinced that this materialist principle is backed by evidence. The same nations have shown both chastity and promiscuity at different times in their history, indicating that the strictness or leniency of their morals is influenced by changing factors, not just the unchanging natural qualities of their land. I acknowledge that in certain climates, the passions arising from the mutual attraction between the sexes can be particularly strong, but I believe that this natural intensity can always be influenced or controlled by social conditions and political systems.

Although the travellers who have visited North America differ on a great number of points, they all agree in remarking that morals are far more strict there than elsewhere. It is evident that on this point the Americans are very superior to their progenitors the English. A superficial glance at the two nations will establish the fact. In England, as in all other countries of Europe, public malice is constantly attacking the frailties of women. Philosophers and statesmen are heard to deplore that morals are not sufficiently strict, and the literary productions of the country constantly lead one to suppose so. In America all books, novels not excepted, suppose women to be chaste, and no one thinks of relating affairs of gallantry. No doubt this great regularity of American morals originates partly in the country, in the race of the people, and in their religion: but all these causes, which operate elsewhere, do not suffice to account for it; recourse must be had to some special reason. This reason appears to me to be the principle of equality and the institutions derived from it. Equality of conditions does not of itself engender regularity of morals, but it unquestionably facilitates and increases it. *a [Footnote a: See Appendix T.]

Although travelers who have visited North America have many differing opinions, they all agree that the moral standards there are much stricter than in other places. It's clear that in this regard, Americans are significantly better than their ancestors, the English. A quick comparison of the two nations will confirm this. In England, as in all other European countries, public criticism frequently targets women's shortcomings. Philosophers and politicians often express concern that morals are not strict enough, and the literature from the country regularly suggests this idea. In America, however, all books, including novels, assume women are virtuous, and no one thinks about writing about romantic escapades. This strong adherence to moral standards in America likely stems from factors related to the country's culture, the population's background, and their religious beliefs: however, these factors alone do not fully explain the situation; there must be a unique reason. That reason seems to be the principle of equality and the institutions that arise from it. While equality of conditions doesn't directly create moral order, it certainly makes it easier and fosters its growth. *a [Footnote a: See Appendix T.]

Amongst aristocratic nations birth and fortune frequently make two such different beings of man and woman, that they can never be united to each other. Their passions draw them together, but the condition of society, and the notions suggested by it, prevent them from contracting a permanent and ostensible tie. The necessary consequence is a great number of transient and clandestine connections. Nature secretly avenges herself for the constraint imposed upon her by the laws of man. This is not so much the case when the equality of conditions has swept away all the imaginary, or the real, barriers which separated man from woman. No girl then believes that she cannot become the wife of the man who loves her; and this renders all breaches of morality before marriage very uncommon: for, whatever be the credulity of the passions, a woman will hardly be able to persuade herself that she is beloved, when her lover is perfectly free to marry her and does not.

In aristocratic societies, class and wealth often create such different identities for men and women that they can never truly come together. Their feelings draw them close, but societal norms and the ideas stemming from those norms keep them from forming a lasting, visible bond. As a result, there are many temporary and secret relationships. Nature quietly retaliates against the restrictions imposed by human laws. This isn’t as prevalent when social equality has removed all the imaginary and real barriers that separate men and women. In such cases, no girl thinks she can't become the wife of the man who loves her, making premarital breaches of morality quite rare. No matter how passionate they are, a woman is unlikely to convince herself she is loved if her partner is completely free to marry her and chooses not to.

The same cause operates, though more indirectly, on married life. Nothing better serves to justify an illicit passion, either to the minds of those who have conceived it or to the world which looks on, than compulsory or accidental marriages. *b In a country in which a woman is always free to exercise her power of choosing, and in which education has prepared her to choose rightly, public opinion is inexorable to her faults. The rigor of the Americans arises in part from this cause. They consider marriages as a covenant which is often onerous, but every condition of which the parties are strictly bound to fulfil, because they knew all those conditions beforehand, and were perfectly free not to have contracted them.

The same factors influence married life, though in a more indirect way. Nothing justifies an affair better, either in the minds of those involved or in the eyes of society, than forced or chance marriages. In a country where a woman is always free to choose and is educated to make informed choices, public opinion can be unforgiving towards her mistakes. The strictness of Americans partly comes from this belief. They view marriage as a contract that can be burdensome, but every party involved is strictly obligated to meet all the terms because they understood these terms beforehand and were completely free to avoid entering into the agreement.

b
[ The literature of Europe sufficiently corroborates this remark. When a European author wishes to depict in a work of imagination any of these great catastrophes in matrimony which so frequently occur amongst us, he takes care to bespeak the compassion of the reader by bringing before him ill-assorted or compulsory marriages. Although habitual tolerance has long since relaxed our morals, an author could hardly succeed in interesting us in the misfortunes of his characters, if he did not first palliate their faults. This artifice seldom fails: the daily scenes we witness prepare us long beforehand to be indulgent. But American writers could never render these palliations probable to their readers; their customs and laws are opposed to it; and as they despair of rendering levity of conduct pleasing, they cease to depict it. This is one of the causes to which must be attributed the small number of novels published in the United States.]

b
[ The literature of Europe clearly supports this point. When a European author wants to portray any of these major marital disasters that happen so often among us, they make sure to evoke the reader's sympathy by showcasing mismatched or forced marriages. Even though our morals have become more relaxed over time, an author would struggle to engage us in the struggles of their characters unless they first downplay their flaws. This tactic usually works: the everyday situations we witness prepare us to be more forgiving. However, American writers can never make these justifications believable for their readers; their customs and laws go against it, and since they don't think they can make careless behavior appealing, they stop showing it. This is one reason for the low number of novels published in the United States.]

The very circumstances which render matrimonial fidelity more obligatory also render it more easy. In aristocratic countries the object of marriage is rather to unite property than persons; hence the husband is sometimes at school and the wife at nurse when they are betrothed. It cannot be wondered at if the conjugal tie which holds the fortunes of the pair united allows their hearts to rove; this is the natural result of the nature of the contract. When, on the contrary, a man always chooses a wife for himself, without any external coercion or even guidance, it is generally a conformity of tastes and opinions which brings a man and a woman together, and this same conformity keeps and fixes them in close habits of intimacy.

The very conditions that make marriage fidelity more necessary also make it easier. In aristocratic societies, the goal of marriage is more about joining wealth than joining people; so sometimes the husband is at school while the wife is being cared for by a nurse when they get engaged. It’s not surprising that the marital bond, which ties their fortunes together, allows their hearts to wander; this is a natural outcome of the contract. In contrast, when a man chooses a wife for himself without any outside pressure or even guidance, it’s usually a shared taste and values that bring a man and a woman together, and this same alignment helps keep them closely connected.

Our forefathers had conceived a very strange notion on the subject of marriage: as they had remarked that the small number of love-matches which occurred in their time almost always turned out ill, they resolutely inferred that it was exceedingly dangerous to listen to the dictates of the heart on the subject. Accident appeared to them to be a better guide than choice. Yet it was not very difficult to perceive that the examples which they witnessed did in fact prove nothing at all. For in the first place, if democratic nations leave a woman at liberty to choose her husband, they take care to give her mind sufficient knowledge, and her will sufficient strength, to make so important a choice: whereas the young women who, amongst aristocratic nations, furtively elope from the authority of their parents to throw themselves of their own accord into the arms of men whom they have had neither time to know, nor ability to judge of, are totally without those securities. It is not surprising that they make a bad use of their freedom of action the first time they avail themselves of it; nor that they fall into such cruel mistakes, when, not having received a democratic education, they choose to marry in conformity to democratic customs. But this is not all. When a man and woman are bent upon marriage in spite of the differences of an aristocratic state of society, the difficulties to be overcome are enormous. Having broken or relaxed the bonds of filial obedience, they have then to emancipate themselves by a final effort from the sway of custom and the tyranny of opinion; and when at length they have succeeded in this arduous task, they stand estranged from their natural friends and kinsmen: the prejudice they have crossed separates them from all, and places them in a situation which soon breaks their courage and sours their hearts. If, then, a couple married in this manner are first unhappy and afterwards criminal, it ought not to be attributed to the freedom of their choice, but rather to their living in a community in which this freedom of choice is not admitted.

Our ancestors had a rather strange idea about marriage: they noticed that the few love matches that happened in their time typically ended poorly, so they concluded that it was very risky to follow your heart in such matters. They believed that chance was a better guide than choice. However, it wasn't hard to see that the examples they observed didn't really prove anything. First of all, in democratic societies, when a woman is free to choose her husband, she is given enough knowledge and strength to make such an important decision; on the other hand, young women in aristocratic societies who sneak away from their parents to marry men they hardly know lack those same advantages. It’s no surprise that they misuse their newfound freedom the first time they exercise it, nor that they make such harsh errors when, lacking a democratic upbringing, they decide to marry in line with democratic customs. But that's not all. When a man and woman are determined to marry despite the challenges in an aristocratic society, the obstacles they face are huge. After breaking or loosening the ties of family loyalty, they have to free themselves from the grip of tradition and the pressure of public opinion; and once they finally achieve this difficult feat, they find themselves distanced from their natural friends and family. The prejudice they have overcome isolates them from everyone and places them in a situation that quickly crushes their spirit and darkens their hearts. If a couple married this way ends up unhappy and eventually commits wrongs, it shouldn't be blamed on their freedom of choice, but rather on living in a society that doesn't acknowledge that freedom.

Moreover it should not be forgotten that the same effort which makes a man violently shake off a prevailing error, commonly impels him beyond the bounds of reason; that, to dare to declare war, in however just a cause, against the opinion of one's age and country, a violent and adventurous spirit is required, and that men of this character seldom arrive at happiness or virtue, whatever be the path they follow. And this, it may be observed by the way, is the reason why in the most necessary and righteous revolutions, it is so rare to meet with virtuous or moderate revolutionary characters. There is then no just ground for surprise if a man, who in an age of aristocracy chooses to consult nothing but his own opinion and his own taste in the choice of a wife, soon finds that infractions of morality and domestic wretchedness invade his household: but when this same line of action is in the natural and ordinary course of things, when it is sanctioned by parental authority and backed by public opinion, it cannot be doubted that the internal peace of families will be increased by it, and conjugal fidelity more rigidly observed.

Additionally, it should be noted that the same effort that drives a person to reject a dominant error often pushes them beyond the limits of reason; to boldly declare war, no matter how just the cause, against the beliefs of one’s society and era requires a bold and adventurous spirit, and people with this temperament rarely find true happiness or virtue, no matter what path they choose. It’s worth mentioning that this is why, in the most necessary and just revolutions, it's so uncommon to encounter virtuous or moderate revolutionary figures. Therefore, it’s not surprising if someone who, in a time of aristocracy, decides to rely solely on their own opinions and preferences when choosing a spouse soon discovers that moral breaches and domestic misery invade their home. However, when this same approach is part of the natural and typical course of events, endorsed by parental authority and supported by public opinion, it’s clear that the internal peace of families will benefit from it, and marital fidelity will be more strictly upheld.

Almost all men in democracies are engaged in public or professional life; and on the other hand the limited extent of common incomes obliges a wife to confine herself to the house, in order to watch in person and very closely over the details of domestic economy. All these distinct and compulsory occupations are so many natural barriers, which, by keeping the two sexes asunder, render the solicitations of the one less frequent and less ardent—the resistance of the other more easy.

Almost all men in democracies are involved in public or professional life; meanwhile, the limited common incomes often force a wife to stay home to closely manage the details of household finances. All these separate and necessary responsibilities create natural barriers that, by keeping the two sexes apart, make the advances of one less frequent and less intense—the resistance of the other easier.

Not indeed that the equality of conditions can ever succeed in making men chaste, but it may impart a less dangerous character to their breaches of morality. As no one has then either sufficient time or opportunity to assail a virtue armed in self-defence, there will be at the same time a great number of courtesans and a great number of virtuous women. This state of things causes lamentable cases of individual hardship, but it does not prevent the body of society from being strong and alert: it does not destroy family ties, or enervate the morals of the nation. Society is endangered not by the great profligacy of a few, but by laxity of morals amongst all. In the eyes of a legislator, prostitution is less to be dreaded than intrigue.

Not that equal conditions can ever make people chaste, but they might lessen the danger of their moral failings. Since no one has enough time or opportunity to attack a virtue that’s defending itself, there will be a lot of courtesans and a lot of virtuous women at the same time. This situation leads to unfortunate cases of personal hardship, but it doesn’t weaken society as a whole: it doesn’t break family bonds or undermine the morals of the nation. Society is threatened not by the extreme immorality of a few, but by the lax morals of everyone. From a legislator's perspective, prostitution is less concerning than intrigue.

The tumultuous and constantly harassed life which equality makes men lead, not only distracts them from the passion of love, by denying them time to indulge in it, but it diverts them from it by another more secret but more certain road. All men who live in democratic ages more or less contract the ways of thinking of the manufacturing and trading classes; their minds take a serious, deliberate, and positive turn; they are apt to relinquish the ideal, in order to pursue some visible and proximate object, which appears to be the natural and necessary aim of their desires. Thus the principle of equality does not destroy the imagination, but lowers its flight to the level of the earth. No men are less addicted to reverie than the citizens of a democracy; and few of them are ever known to give way to those idle and solitary meditations which commonly precede and produce the great emotions of the heart. It is true they attach great importance to procuring for themselves that sort of deep, regular, and quiet affection which constitutes the charm and safeguard of life, but they are not apt to run after those violent and capricious sources of excitement which disturb and abridge it.

The chaotic and constantly pressured life that equality forces people to live not only keeps them from the passion of love by not giving them time to enjoy it, but it also diverts them in a more subtle but certain way. Everyone living in democratic times tends to adopt the mindset of the working and trading classes; their thoughts become serious, purposeful, and pragmatic. They are likely to abandon the ideal in favor of pursuing some tangible and immediate goal that seems to be the natural and necessary target of their desires. So, while the principle of equality doesn't eliminate imagination, it brings it down to earth. No one is less prone to daydreaming than the citizens of a democracy, and few of them are known to indulge in those idle and solitary reflections that usually lead to the great emotions of the heart. It’s true that they place great value on finding that kind of deep, steady, and peaceful love that enriches and protects life, but they aren’t inclined to chase after those intense and unpredictable sources of excitement that disrupt and shorten it.

I am aware that all this is only applicable in its full extent to America, and cannot at present be extended to Europe. In the course of the last half-century, whilst laws and customs have impelled several European nations with unexampled force towards democracy, we have not had occasion to observe that the relations of man and woman have become more orderly or more chaste. In some places the very reverse may be detected: some classes are more strict—the general morality of the people appears to be more lax. I do not hesitate to make the remark, for I am as little disposed to flatter my contemporaries as to malign them. This fact must distress, but it ought not to surprise us. The propitious influence which a democratic state of society may exercise upon orderly habits, is one of those tendencies which can only be discovered after a time. If the equality of conditions is favorable to purity of morals, the social commotion by which conditions are rendered equal is adverse to it. In the last fifty years, during which France has been undergoing this transformation, that country has rarely had freedom, always disturbance. Amidst this universal confusion of notions and this general stir of opinions—amidst this incoherent mixture of the just and unjust, of truth and falsehood, of right and might—public virtue has become doubtful, and private morality wavering. But all revolutions, whatever may have been their object or their agents, have at first produced similar consequences; even those which have in the end drawn the bonds of morality more tightly began by loosening them. The violations of morality which the French frequently witness do not appear to me to have a permanent character; and this is already betokened by some curious signs of the times.

I know that all this only fully applies to America and can't currently be applied to Europe. Over the last fifty years, while laws and customs have pushed several European nations strongly toward democracy, I haven't seen that the relationships between men and women have become more orderly or more virtuous. In some areas, the opposite may be true: certain classes are stricter, yet the overall morality of the people seems to be more relaxed. I'm not afraid to point this out because I'm just as unwilling to flatter my peers as I am to criticize them. This reality may be troubling, but it shouldn't surprise us. The positive effects that a democratic society can have on orderly behavior are only noticeable over time. If the equality of conditions supports moral purity, the social upheaval that creates this equality works against it. In the past fifty years, while France has been undergoing this transformation, the country has rarely experienced freedom and has often seen disorder. Amid this widespread confusion of ideas and this general mix of opinions—this chaotic blend of right and wrong, of truth and lies—public virtue has become uncertain, and private morality has been shaky. But every revolution, regardless of its goals or its supporters, initially leads to similar outcomes; even those that ultimately tighten the bonds of morality began by loosening them. The breaches of morality that the French often observe don't seem to me to be lasting; and this is already indicated by some interesting signs of the times.

Nothing is more wretchedly corrupt than an aristocracy which retains its wealth when it has lost its power, and which still enjoys a vast deal of leisure after it is reduced to mere vulgar pastimes. The energetic passions and great conceptions which animated it heretofore, leave it then; and nothing remains to it but a host of petty consuming vices, which cling about it like worms upon a carcass. No one denies that the French aristocracy of the last century was extremely dissolute; whereas established habits and ancient belief still preserved some respect for morality amongst the other classes of society. Nor will it be contested that at the present day the remnants of that same aristocracy exhibit a certain severity of morals; whilst laxity of morals appears to have spread amongst the middle and lower ranks. So that the same families which were most profligate fifty years ago are nowadays the most exemplary, and democracy seems only to have strengthened the morality of the aristocratic classes. The French Revolution, by dividing the fortunes of the nobility, by forcing them to attend assiduously to their affairs and to their families, by making them live under the same roof with their children, and in short by giving a more rational and serious turn to their minds, has imparted to them, almost without their being aware of it, a reverence for religious belief, a love of order, of tranquil pleasures, of domestic endearments, and of comfort; whereas the rest of the nation, which had naturally these same tastes, was carried away into excesses by the effort which was required to overthrow the laws and political habits of the country. The old French aristocracy has undergone the consequences of the Revolution, but it neither felt the revolutionary passions nor shared in the anarchical excitement which produced that crisis; it may easily be conceived that this aristocracy feels the salutary influence of the Revolution in its manners, before those who achieve it. It may therefore be said, though at first it seems paradoxical, that, at the present day, the most anti-democratic classes of the nation principally exhibit the kind of morality which may reasonably be anticipated from democracy. I cannot but think that when we shall have obtained all the effects of this democratic Revolution, after having got rid of the tumult it has caused, the observations which are now only applicable to the few will gradually become true of the whole community.

Nothing is more corrupt than an aristocracy that holds onto its wealth even after losing its power, enjoying a lot of free time while reduced to trivial pastimes. The strong passions and grand ideas that used to inspire it fade away, leaving behind a bunch of petty, consuming vices that cling to it like worms on a carcass. No one denies that the French aristocracy of the last century was extremely immoral, while established habits and old beliefs still upheld some respect for morality among other social classes. It’s also undeniable that today’s remnants of that same aristocracy show a certain strictness in morals, while laxity seems to have spread among the middle and lower classes. So, the same families that were the most dissolute fifty years ago are now the most exemplary, and democracy seems to have strengthened the morality of the aristocratic classes. The French Revolution, by redistributing the wealth of the nobility, forcing them to actively manage their affairs and their families, making them live under the same roof as their children, and in short, giving a more rational and serious focus to their lives, has instilled in them—almost without them realizing it—a reverence for religious beliefs, a love for order, calm pleasures, family closeness, and comfort; while the rest of the nation, which naturally shared these same values, got swept away by the excesses required to dismantle the laws and political customs of the country. The old French aristocracy has experienced the repercussions of the Revolution, but it neither felt the revolutionary passions nor shared in the chaotic excitement that caused that crisis; it’s easy to imagine that this aristocracy feels the positive influence of the Revolution in its behavior. Thus, it can be said, even though it seems paradoxical at first, that today, the most anti-democratic classes of the nation mainly display the kind of morality we might expect from democracy. I truly believe that when we finally reap all the benefits of this democratic Revolution, having moved past the chaos it has caused, the insights that currently apply only to a few will gradually become true for the entire community.





Chapter XII: How The Americans Understand The Equality Of The Sexes

I Have shown how democracy destroys or modifies the different inequalities which originate in society; but is this all? or does it not ultimately affect that great inequality of man and woman which has seemed, up to the present day, to be eternally based in human nature? I believe that the social changes which bring nearer to the same level the father and son, the master and servant, and superiors and inferiors generally speaking, will raise woman and make her more and more the equal of man. But here, more than ever, I feel the necessity of making myself clearly understood; for there is no subject on which the coarse and lawless fancies of our age have taken a freer range.

I have shown how democracy destroys or changes the various inequalities that arise in society; but is this all? Or does it not ultimately impact the significant inequality between men and women, which has seemed, until now, to be based eternally in human nature? I believe that the social changes that bring fathers and sons, masters and servants, and superiors and inferiors closer to the same level will elevate women and increasingly make them equal to men. However, here more than ever, I feel the need to make myself clearly understood; because there's no topic where the crude and unrestrained ideas of our time have been more freely expressed.

There are people in Europe who, confounding together the different characteristics of the sexes, would make of man and woman beings not only equal but alike. They would give to both the same functions, impose on both the same duties, and grant to both the same rights; they would mix them in all things—their occupations, their pleasures, their business. It may readily be conceived, that by thus attempting to make one sex equal to the other, both are degraded; and from so preposterous a medley of the works of nature nothing could ever result but weak men and disorderly women. It is not thus that the Americans understand that species of democratic equality which may be established between the sexes. They admit, that as nature has appointed such wide differences between the physical and moral constitution of man and woman, her manifest design was to give a distinct employment to their various faculties; and they hold that improvement does not consist in making beings so dissimilar do pretty nearly the same things, but in getting each of them to fulfil their respective tasks in the best possible manner. The Americans have applied to the sexes the great principle of political economy which governs the manufactures of our age, by carefully dividing the duties of man from those of woman, in order that the great work of society may be the better carried on.

There are people in Europe who, mixing up the different traits of men and women, would make them not just equal but the same. They would assign both the same roles, impose the same responsibilities, and grant the same rights; they would blend them in everything—their jobs, their hobbies, their businesses. It’s easy to see that by trying to make one sex like the other, both are diminished; and from such a ridiculous mix of nature's designs, the only outcome could be weak men and disordered women. This isn’t how Americans view the kind of democratic equality that can exist between the sexes. They acknowledge that since nature has established significant differences in the physical and moral makeup of men and women, its clear purpose was to give each a distinct role for their different abilities; and they believe that progress doesn’t mean making such unlike beings do nearly the same things, but rather ensuring each one fulfills their own roles as effectively as possible. Americans apply a key principle of political economy, which governs today's industries, by clearly separating the duties of men from those of women, so that society can function better overall.

In no country has such constant care been taken as in America to trace two clearly distinct lines of action for the two sexes, and to make them keep pace one with the other, but in two pathways which are always different. American women never manage the outward concerns of the family, or conduct a business, or take a part in political life; nor are they, on the other hand, ever compelled to perform the rough labor of the fields, or to make any of those laborious exertions which demand the exertion of physical strength. No families are so poor as to form an exception to this rule. If on the one hand an American woman cannot escape from the quiet circle of domestic employments, on the other hand she is never forced to go beyond it. Hence it is that the women of America, who often exhibit a masculine strength of understanding and a manly energy, generally preserve great delicacy of personal appearance and always retain the manners of women, although they sometimes show that they have the hearts and minds of men.

In no other country has there been such consistent effort as in America to establish two clearly defined roles for men and women, ensuring they progress alongside each other but down different paths. American women typically don't manage the family's external affairs, run a business, or get involved in politics; on the flip side, they aren't required to do tough physical labor in the fields or engage in strenuous tasks that require physical strength. No families are so poor that they break this pattern. While an American woman can't escape her domestic roles, she's also never forced to step outside of them. As a result, American women often display a masculine strength of understanding and a vigorous energy, yet they usually maintain a delicate appearance and typical feminine manners, even though they sometimes demonstrate that they possess the hearts and minds of men.

Nor have the Americans ever supposed that one consequence of democratic principles is the subversion of marital power, of the confusion of the natural authorities in families. They hold that every association must have a head in order to accomplish its object, and that the natural head of the conjugal association is man. They do not therefore deny him the right of directing his partner; and they maintain, that in the smaller association of husband and wife, as well as in the great social community, the object of democracy is to regulate and legalize the powers which are necessary, not to subvert all power. This opinion is not peculiar to one sex, and contested by the other: I never observed that the women of America consider conjugal authority as a fortunate usurpation of their rights, nor that they thought themselves degraded by submitting to it. It appeared to me, on the contrary, that they attach a sort of pride to the voluntary surrender of their own will, and make it their boast to bend themselves to the yoke, not to shake it off. Such at least is the feeling expressed by the most virtuous of their sex; the others are silent; and in the United States it is not the practice for a guilty wife to clamor for the rights of women, whilst she is trampling on her holiest duties.

The Americans have never believed that one result of democratic principles is the breakdown of marital authority or a mix-up of natural roles in families. They think that every relationship needs a leader to achieve its goals, and the natural leader in a marriage is the man. Therefore, they don’t deny him the right to guide his partner. They argue that in the smaller unit of husband and wife, just like in the larger society, the goal of democracy is to define and legitimize necessary powers, not to eliminate all authority. This view isn’t exclusive to one gender; women in America don’t see marital authority as an unjust takeover of their rights, nor do they feel diminished by accepting it. On the contrary, it seems to me that many take pride in willingly giving up their own will and consider it a point of pride to submit rather than resist. At least that’s the sentiment expressed by the most virtuous women; others choose not to speak out. In the United States, it’s uncommon for an unfaithful wife to demand women's rights while neglecting her most sacred duties.

It has often been remarked that in Europe a certain degree of contempt lurks even in the flattery which men lavish upon women: although a European frequently affects to be the slave of woman, it may be seen that he never sincerely thinks her his equal. In the United States men seldom compliment women, but they daily show how much they esteem them. They constantly display an entire confidence in the understanding of a wife, and a profound respect for her freedom; they have decided that her mind is just as fitted as that of a man to discover the plain truth, and her heart as firm to embrace it; and they have never sought to place her virtue, any more than his, under the shelter of prejudice, ignorance, and fear. It would seem that in Europe, where man so easily submits to the despotic sway of women, they are nevertheless curtailed of some of the greatest qualities of the human species, and considered as seductive but imperfect beings; and (what may well provoke astonishment) women ultimately look upon themselves in the same light, and almost consider it as a privilege that they are entitled to show themselves futile, feeble, and timid. The women of America claim no such privileges.

It’s often said that in Europe, even the compliments men give to women come with a hint of contempt. Although a European might pretend to be a woman’s servant, it’s clear he doesn’t genuinely see her as his equal. In the United States, men rarely compliment women, but they show their respect for them every day. They fully trust their wives' intelligence and deeply respect their freedom; they believe a woman’s mind is just as capable as a man’s in grasping the truth, and her heart is just as strong in accepting it. They’ve never tried to protect a woman’s virtue any more than a man’s from prejudice, ignorance, and fear. In Europe, where men easily yield to the controlling nature of women, they still seem to lose some of the greatest traits of humanity, viewing women as alluring but flawed beings. Astonishingly, women often see themselves in the same way, almost seeing it as a privilege to act superficial, weak, and timid. American women don’t claim any such privileges.

Again, it may be said that in our morals we have reserved strange immunities to man; so that there is, as it were, one virtue for his use, and another for the guidance of his partner; and that, according to the opinion of the public, the very same act may be punished alternately as a crime or only as a fault. The Americans know not this iniquitous division of duties and rights; amongst them the seducer is as much dishonored as his victim. It is true that the Americans rarely lavish upon women those eager attentions which are commonly paid them in Europe; but their conduct to women always implies that they suppose them to be virtuous and refined; and such is the respect entertained for the moral freedom of the sex, that in the presence of a woman the most guarded language is used, lest her ear should be offended by an expression. In America a young unmarried woman may, alone and without fear, undertake a long journey.

Once again, it can be said that in our morals we have given strange exceptions to men; so that there is, in a sense, one standard for them and another for their partners. According to public opinion, the same action can be seen alternately as a crime or just as a mistake. Americans do not recognize this unfair division of duties and rights; for them, the seducer is just as dishonored as his victim. It's true that Americans rarely shower women with the same eager attention that is common in Europe; however, their behavior towards women always suggests that they believe them to be virtuous and refined. The respect for women's moral freedom is so strong that in the presence of a woman, the most careful language is used, as to avoid offending her with any expression. In America, a young unmarried woman can, alone and without fear, take a long journey.

The legislators of the United States, who have mitigated almost all the penalties of criminal law, still make rape a capital offence, and no crime is visited with more inexorable severity by public opinion. This may be accounted for; as the Americans can conceive nothing more precious than a woman's honor, and nothing which ought so much to be respected as her independence, they hold that no punishment is too severe for the man who deprives her of them against her will. In France, where the same offence is visited with far milder penalties, it is frequently difficult to get a verdict from a jury against the prisoner. Is this a consequence of contempt of decency or contempt of women? I cannot but believe that it is a contempt of one and of the other.

The lawmakers in the United States, who have softened nearly all the penalties of criminal law, still classify rape as a capital offense, and no crime faces harsher judgment from public opinion. This can be explained by the fact that Americans view a woman’s honor as one of the most valuable things, and they believe her independence deserves utmost respect. They think that no punishment is too harsh for a man who violates these principles against a woman's will. In France, where the penalties for the same crime are much lighter, it’s often challenging to get a jury to deliver a guilty verdict against the accused. Is this due to a lack of respect for decency or for women? I genuinely believe it is a disregard for both.

Thus the Americans do not think that man and woman have either the duty or the right to perform the same offices, but they show an equal regard for both their respective parts; and though their lot is different, they consider both of them as beings of equal value. They do not give to the courage of woman the same form or the same direction as to that of man; but they never doubt her courage: and if they hold that man and his partner ought not always to exercise their intellect and understanding in the same manner, they at least believe the understanding of the one to be as sound as that of the other, and her intellect to be as clear. Thus, then, whilst they have allowed the social inferiority of woman to subsist, they have done all they could to raise her morally and intellectually to the level of man; and in this respect they appear to me to have excellently understood the true principle of democratic improvement. As for myself, I do not hesitate to avow that, although the women of the United States are confined within the narrow circle of domestic life, and their situation is in some respects one of extreme dependence, I have nowhere seen woman occupying a loftier position; and if I were asked, now that I am drawing to the close of this work, in which I have spoken of so many important things done by the Americans, to what the singular prosperity and growing strength of that people ought mainly to be attributed, I should reply—to the superiority of their women.

So, Americans don't believe that men and women have to do the same jobs, but they respect each role equally. While their experiences are different, they see both as equally valuable. They don't view women's courage in the same way as men's, but they always acknowledge it. Even if they think men and women should use their intellect differently, they believe that one’s understanding is just as sound as the other’s, and that her intellect is just as sharp. Therefore, while they accept women's social inferiority, they've done everything they can to uplift her morally and intellectually to be on par with men; in this regard, they seem to truly grasp the essence of democratic progress. Personally, I openly admit that, even though women in the United States are often limited to domestic roles and can be quite dependent, I haven't seen women in any other country hold a higher position. If you were to ask me, now that I'm nearing the end of this work where I've discussed many significant aspects of American life, what I think primarily contributes to the unique prosperity and increasing strength of that nation, I'd say it's the excellence of their women.





Chapter XIII: That The Principle Of Equality Naturally Divides The Americans Into A Number Of Small Private Circles

It may probably be supposed that the final consequence and necessary effect of democratic institutions is to confound together all the members of the community in private as well as in public life, and to compel them all to live in common; but this would be to ascribe a very coarse and oppressive form to the equality which originates in democracy. No state of society or laws can render men so much alike, but that education, fortune, and tastes will interpose some differences between them; and, though different men may sometimes find it their interest to combine for the same purposes, they will never make it their pleasure. They will therefore always tend to evade the provisions of legislation, whatever they may be; and departing in some one respect from the circle within which they were to be bounded, they will set up, close by the great political community, small private circles, united together by the similitude of their conditions, habits, and manners.

It might be assumed that the ultimate result and necessary effect of democratic institutions is to blend all the members of the community in both private and public life, forcing them all to live together; however, this would misrepresent the equality that arises from democracy as something very crude and oppressive. No social state or laws can make people identical, as education, wealth, and preferences will always create some differences among them. While different individuals might sometimes find it beneficial to come together for the same goals, they will never derive enjoyment from it. Therefore, they will always look for ways to avoid the constraints of laws, regardless of what those might be; and by stepping outside the boundaries set for them, they will establish, alongside the larger political community, small private groups connected by their similar conditions, habits, and lifestyles.

In the United States the citizens have no sort of pre-eminence over each other; they owe each other no mutual obedience or respect; they all meet for the administration of justice, for the government of the State, and in general to treat of the affairs which concern their common welfare; but I never heard that attempts have been made to bring them all to follow the same diversions, or to amuse themselves promiscuously in the same places of recreation. The Americans, who mingle so readily in their political assemblies and courts of justice, are wont on the contrary carefully to separate into small distinct circles, in order to indulge by themselves in the enjoyments of private life. Each of them is willing to acknowledge all his fellow-citizens as his equals, but he will only receive a very limited number of them amongst his friends or his guests. This appears to me to be very natural. In proportion as the circle of public society is extended, it may be anticipated that the sphere of private intercourse will be contracted; far from supposing that the members of modern society will ultimately live in common, I am afraid that they may end by forming nothing but small coteries.

In the United States, citizens don’t have any superiority over one another; they don't owe each other mutual obedience or respect. They come together for justice, government, and to discuss matters that affect their shared welfare. However, I've never heard of efforts to get everyone to participate in the same activities or to socialize together in the same recreational spaces. Americans, who readily mix in political gatherings and courts, tend to separate into small, distinct groups to enjoy their private lives. Each individual acknowledges all their fellow citizens as equals, but they typically only invite a limited number of them into their circle of friends or guests. This seems completely natural to me. As the public social circle widens, it’s likely that personal interactions will shrink; far from believing that members of modern society will ultimately live in a communal way, I fear they might end up forming only small cliques.

Amongst aristocratic nations the different classes are like vast chambers, out of which it is impossible to get, into which it is impossible to enter. These classes have no communication with each other, but within their pale men necessarily live in daily contact; even though they would not naturally suit, the general conformity of a similar condition brings them nearer together. But when neither law nor custom professes to establish frequent and habitual relations between certain men, their intercourse originates in the accidental analogy of opinions and tastes; hence private society is infinitely varied. In democracies, where the members of the community never differ much from each other, and naturally stand in such propinquity that they may all at any time be confounded in one general mass, numerous artificial and arbitrary distinctions spring up, by means of which every man hopes to keep himself aloof, lest he should be carried away in the crowd against his will. This can never fail to be the case; for human institutions may be changed, but not man: whatever may be the general endeavor of a community to render its members equal and alike, the personal pride of individuals will always seek to rise above the line, and to form somewhere an inequality to their own advantage.

Among aristocratic nations, the different classes are like vast chambers that make it impossible to enter or exit freely. These classes don't communicate with each other, but within each class, people are in daily contact; even if they wouldn't usually get along, the similarity of their situation brings them closer together. However, when neither law nor custom establishes regular interactions between certain people, their connections arise from the accidental similarities in opinions and tastes, resulting in a highly varied private society. In democracies, where community members are typically very similar and are so close that they could anytime blend into one large group, many artificial and arbitrary distinctions emerge. Each person tries to set themselves apart so they won’t get swept away by the crowd against their will. This is an inevitable outcome since human institutions may change, but human nature does not: no matter how much a community tries to make its members equal and alike, individuals' pride will always push them to rise above the norm and create some form of inequality to their advantage.

In aristocracies men are separated from each other by lofty stationary barriers; in democracies they are divided by a number of small and almost invisible threads, which are constantly broken or moved from place to place. Thus, whatever may be the progress of equality, in democratic nations a great number of small private communities will always be formed within the general pale of political society; but none of them will bear any resemblance in its manners to the highest class in aristocracies.

In aristocracies, people are kept apart by high, unchanging barriers; in democracies, they are separated by many small and nearly invisible threads that are constantly being broken or shifted around. So, no matter how much equality progresses, in democratic societies, many small private communities will always develop within the broader political society; however, none of them will resemble the behavior of the upper class in aristocracies.





Chapter XIV: Some Reflections On American Manners

Nothing seems at first sight less important than the outward form of human actions, yet there is nothing upon which men set more store: they grow used to everything except to living in a society which has not their own manners. The influence of the social and political state of a country upon manners is therefore deserving of serious examination. Manners are, generally, the product of the very basis of the character of a people, but they are also sometimes the result of an arbitrary convention between certain men; thus they are at once natural and acquired. When certain men perceive that they are the foremost persons in society, without contestation and without effort—when they are constantly engaged on large objects, leaving the more minute details to others—and when they live in the enjoyment of wealth which they did not amass and which they do not fear to lose, it may be supposed that they feel a kind of haughty disdain of the petty interests and practical cares of life, and that their thoughts assume a natural greatness, which their language and their manners denote. In democratic countries manners are generally devoid of dignity, because private life is there extremely petty in its character; and they are frequently low, because the mind has few opportunities of rising above the engrossing cares of domestic interests. True dignity in manners consists in always taking one's proper station, neither too high nor too low; and this is as much within the reach of a peasant as of a prince. In democracies all stations appear doubtful; hence it is that the manners of democracies, though often full of arrogance, are commonly wanting in dignity, and, moreover, they are never either well disciplined or accomplished.

At first glance, the outward behavior of people might seem unimportant, but it's actually something that people value greatly. They can adapt to almost anything, except living in a society that doesn’t share their customs. That's why it’s worth examining how the social and political climate of a country influences manners. Generally, manners reflect the core character of a people, but they can also emerge from arbitrary agreements among certain individuals; thus, they are both natural and learned. When some individuals recognize that they are the leading figures in society—without dispute and without effort—when they focus on big ideas, leaving small details to others, and when they enjoy wealth they didn't create and don’t fear losing, they likely develop a sense of haughty disdain for daily concerns and their thoughts take on a natural greatness, which is reflected in their language and behavior. In democratic societies, manners often lack dignity because private life tends to be very trivial; they can be quite base, as the mind has few chances to rise above the pressing needs of everyday life. True dignity in manners means always knowing your place, neither too high nor too low; this is something a peasant can have just as much as a prince. In democracies, all positions seem uncertain; that's why the manners in these societies, while often arrogant, usually lack dignity and are seldom well-formed or polished.

The men who live in democracies are too fluctuating for a certain number of them ever to succeed in laying down a code of good breeding, and in forcing people to follow it. Every man therefore behaves after his own fashion, and there is always a certain incoherence in the manners of such times, because they are moulded upon the feelings and notions of each individual, rather than upon an ideal model proposed for general imitation. This, however, is much more perceptible at the time when an aristocracy has just been overthrown than after it has long been destroyed. New political institutions and new social elements then bring to the same places of resort, and frequently compel to live in common, men whose education and habits are still amazingly dissimilar, and this renders the motley composition of society peculiarly visible. The existence of a former strict code of good breeding is still remembered, but what it contained or where it is to be found is already forgotten. Men have lost the common law of manners, and they have not yet made up their minds to do without it; but everyone endeavors to make to himself some sort of arbitrary and variable rule, from the remnant of former usages; so that manners have neither the regularity and the dignity which they often display amongst aristocratic nations, nor the simplicity and freedom which they sometimes assume in democracies; they are at once constrained and without constraint.

The men who live in democracies are too changeable for any group of them to successfully establish a code of good manners and make everyone follow it. So, each person acts in their own way, leading to a certain inconsistency in social behavior during those times, as it's shaped by individual feelings and ideas instead of a common ideal for everyone to emulate. This is especially obvious right after an aristocracy has fallen, rather than long after its demise. New political systems and social elements bring together people in shared spaces who have very different backgrounds and habits, making the diverse makeup of society stand out. There's still a memory of a previous strict code of manners, but what it entailed or where it can be found is forgotten. People have lost the established rules of etiquette, and they haven't yet decided to live without them; instead, everyone tries to create some kind of personal and shifting guideline based on remnants of past customs. Thus, manners lack the structure and dignity often seen in aristocratic societies and the simplicity and freedom sometimes found in democracies; they are both forced and unrestrained at the same time.

This, however, is not the normal state of things. When the equality of conditions is long established and complete, as all men entertain nearly the same notions and do nearly the same things, they do not require to agree or to copy from one another in order to speak or act in the same manner: their manners are constantly characterized by a number of lesser diversities, but not by any great differences. They are never perfectly alike, because they do not copy from the same pattern; they are never very unlike, because their social condition is the same. At first sight a traveller would observe that the manners of all the Americans are exactly similar; it is only upon close examination that the peculiarities in which they differ may be detected.

This, however, isn’t the usual state of things. When equality among people is well-established and complete, since everyone has pretty much the same ideas and does almost the same things, they don’t need to agree or imitate each other to communicate or act alike: their behaviors are often marked by a variety of small differences, but not by any significant ones. They’re never exactly the same, because they aren’t copying from the same model; they’re also never too different, because their social conditions are alike. At first glance, a traveler would notice that all Americans have very similar manners; it’s only upon closer inspection that the unique traits distinguishing them can be identified.

The English make game of the manners of the Americans; but it is singular that most of the writers who have drawn these ludicrous delineations belonged themselves to the middle classes in England, to whom the same delineations are exceedingly applicable: so that these pitiless censors for the most part furnish an example of the very thing they blame in the United States; they do not perceive that they are deriding themselves, to the great amusement of the aristocracy of their own country.

The English poke fun at American manners; however, it's interesting that most of the writers who create these ridiculous portrayals are from the middle class in England, to whom the same criticisms apply quite well. Essentially, these harsh critics are often displaying the exact behavior they criticize in the United States, and they don't realize they are making themselves the joke, much to the amusement of the aristocracy in their own country.

Nothing is more prejudicial to democracy than its outward forms of behavior: many men would willingly endure its vices, who cannot support its manners. I cannot, however, admit that there is nothing commendable in the manners of a democratic people. Amongst aristocratic nations, all who live within reach of the first class in society commonly strain to be like it, which gives rise to ridiculous and insipid imitations. As a democratic people does not possess any models of high breeding, at least it escapes the daily necessity of seeing wretched copies of them. In democracies manners are never so refined as amongst aristocratic nations, but on the other hand they are never so coarse. Neither the coarse oaths of the populace, nor the elegant and choice expressions of the nobility are to be heard there: the manners of such a people are often vulgar, but they are neither brutal nor mean. I have already observed that in democracies no such thing as a regular code of good breeding can be laid down; this has some inconveniences and some advantages. In aristocracies the rules of propriety impose the same demeanor on everyone; they make all the members of the same class appear alike, in spite of their private inclinations; they adorn and they conceal the natural man. Amongst a democratic people manners are neither so tutored nor so uniform, but they are frequently more sincere. They form, as it were, a light and loosely woven veil, through which the real feelings and private opinions of each individual are easily discernible. The form and the substance of human actions often, therefore, stand in closer relation; and if the great picture of human life be less embellished, it is more true. Thus it may be said, in one sense, that the effect of democracy is not exactly to give men any particular manners, but to prevent them from having manners at all.

Nothing is more damaging to democracy than its outward behaviors: many people would gladly tolerate its flaws, but they can’t stand its manners. However, I can’t say that there’s nothing praiseworthy about the behavior of a democratic society. In aristocratic nations, everyone within reach of the elite often tries to imitate them, leading to ridiculous and dull copies. Since a democratic society doesn’t have models of high status, at least it avoids the daily sight of disappointing imitations. In democracies, manners are never as refined as in aristocratic societies, but they’re also never as rough. You won’t hear the crude swearing of the masses or the fancy language of the nobility there: the manners of such people may often be unrefined, but they’re neither brutal nor petty. I’ve already noted that in democracies, there’s no formal code of good behavior; this has some downsides and some upsides. In aristocracies, the rules of decorum force everyone to act the same way; they make all members of the same class appear alike, despite their personal tendencies; they enhance and conceal the true self. In a democratic society, manners are not as polished or uniform, but they are often more genuine. They form, in a way, a light and loosely woven curtain, through which each individual’s true feelings and private opinions are easily seen. The form and substance of human actions often stand in closer relation; and while the grand picture of human life may be less glamorous, it is more truthful. Thus, you could say that the effect of democracy isn’t so much to give people specific manners, but to prevent them from having manners at all.

The feelings, the passions, the virtues, and the vices of an aristocracy may sometimes reappear in a democracy, but not its manners; they are lost, and vanish forever, as soon as the democratic revolution is completed. It would seem that nothing is more lasting than the manners of an aristocratic class, for they are preserved by that class for some time after it has lost its wealth and its power—nor so fleeting, for no sooner have they disappeared than not a trace of them is to be found; and it is scarcely possible to say what they have been as soon as they have ceased to be. A change in the state of society works this miracle, and a few generations suffice to consummate it. The principal characteristics of aristocracy are handed down by history after an aristocracy is destroyed, but the light and exquisite touches of manners are effaced from men's memories almost immediately after its fall. Men can no longer conceive what these manners were when they have ceased to witness them; they are gone, and their departure was unseen, unfelt; for in order to feel that refined enjoyment which is derived from choice and distinguished manners, habit and education must have prepared the heart, and the taste for them is lost almost as easily as the practice of them. Thus not only a democratic people cannot have aristocratic manners, but they neither comprehend nor desire them; and as they never have thought of them, it is to their minds as if such things had never been. Too much importance should not be attached to this loss, but it may well be regretted.

The feelings, passions, virtues, and vices of an aristocracy might sometimes show up in a democracy, but its manners disappear; they are lost and gone forever once the democratic revolution is complete. It seems that nothing lasts longer than the manners of an aristocratic class, as they are maintained by that class for a while even after it has lost its wealth and power—but they vanish so quickly that as soon as they are gone, there's no trace left. It's hard to even describe what those manners were right after they no longer exist. A shift in society creates this change, and just a few generations are enough to finalize it. The main traits of aristocracy are remembered in history after it has been destroyed, but the subtle and refined aspects of manners fade from people's memories almost immediately after its fall. People can no longer imagine what those manners were like once they're no longer around; they are simply gone, and their exit went unnoticed and unfelt. To appreciate the delicate enjoyment that comes from elegant manners, one’s habits and education need to have shaped the heart, and the taste for them is lost just as easily as the practice of them. Therefore, not only can a democratic society not have aristocratic manners, but they also neither understand nor wish for them; since they have never thought about them, it's as if those things never existed. While we shouldn't place too much importance on this loss, it’s still something to be mourned.

I am aware that it has not unfrequently happened that the same men have had very high-bred manners and very low-born feelings: the interior of courts has sufficiently shown what imposing externals may conceal the meanest hearts. But though the manners of aristocracy did not constitute virtue, they sometimes embellish virtue itself. It was no ordinary sight to see a numerous and powerful class of men, whose every outward action seemed constantly to be dictated by a natural elevation of thought and feeling, by delicacy and regularity of taste, and by urbanity of manners. Those manners threw a pleasing illusory charm over human nature; and though the picture was often a false one, it could not be viewed without a noble satisfaction.

I know that it often happens that the same people can have very refined manners while feeling quite the opposite: the surroundings of courts have shown us that impressive appearances can hide the most unworthy hearts. But while aristocratic manners don't make someone virtuous, they can sometimes enhance virtue itself. It was quite a sight to see a large and powerful group of people whose every action appeared to be driven by a natural sense of higher thought and feeling, a refinement of taste, and polished social skills. Those manners created a pleasing illusion about human nature; and although the image was often misleading, it couldn't be looked at without a sense of noble satisfaction.





Chapter XV: Of The Gravity Of The Americans, And Why It Does Not Prevent Them From Often Committing Inconsiderate Actions

Men who live in democratic countries do not value the simple, turbulent, or coarse diversions in which the people indulge in aristocratic communities: such diversions are thought by them to be puerile or insipid. Nor have they a greater inclination for the intellectual and refined amusements of the aristocratic classes. They want something productive and substantial in their pleasures; they want to mix actual fruition with their joy. In aristocratic communities the people readily give themselves up to bursts of tumultuous and boisterous gayety, which shake off at once the recollection of their privations: the natives of democracies are not fond of being thus violently broken in upon, and they never lose sight of their own selves without regret. They prefer to these frivolous delights those more serious and silent amusements which are like business, and which do not drive business wholly from their minds. An American, instead of going in a leisure hour to dance merrily at some place of public resort, as the fellows of his calling continue to do throughout the greater part of Europe, shuts himself up at home to drink. He thus enjoys two pleasures; he can go on thinking of his business, and he can get drunk decently by his own fireside.

Men living in democratic countries don't appreciate the simple, chaotic, or rough entertainments that people indulge in aristocratic communities; they see those pastimes as childish or dull. They're also not particularly interested in the intellectual and refined amusements of the upper classes. They seek something productive and meaningful in their leisure; they want to combine enjoyment with real satisfaction. In aristocratic societies, people easily lose themselves in loud and boisterous fun that helps them forget their struggles: people in democracies dislike being interrupted so abruptly, and they never forget their own identity without feeling sorry for it. They prefer more serious and quiet activities that resemble work, which keep business on their minds. An American, instead of spending his free time dancing merrily at a public place like his European counterparts often do, stays at home to drink. This way, he enjoys two pleasures; he can continue to think about his work while getting pleasantly drunk by his own fireplace.

I thought that the English constituted the most serious nation on the face of the earth, but I have since seen the Americans and have changed my opinion. I do not mean to say that temperament has not a great deal to do with the character of the inhabitants of the United States, but I think that their political institutions are a still more influential cause. I believe the seriousness of the Americans arises partly from their pride. In democratic countries even poor men entertain a lofty notion of their personal importance: they look upon themselves with complacency, and are apt to suppose that others are looking at them, too. With this disposition they watch their language and their actions with care, and do not lay themselves open so as to betray their deficiencies; to preserve their dignity they think it necessary to retain their gravity.

I used to think that the English were the most serious nation on the planet, but after meeting Americans, I've changed my mind. I’m not saying that temperament doesn’t play a significant role in the character of people in the United States, but I believe their political system has an even bigger impact. I think the seriousness of Americans partly stems from their pride. In democratic countries, even those who are less wealthy have a high opinion of their personal importance; they view themselves positively and often assume that others are watching them too. With this mindset, they carefully monitor their language and actions, making sure not to expose their shortcomings; to maintain their dignity, they feel it’s important to keep a serious demeanor.

But I detect another more deep-seated and powerful cause which instinctively produces amongst the Americans this astonishing gravity. Under a despotism communities give way at times to bursts of vehement joy; but they are generally gloomy and moody, because they are afraid. Under absolute monarchies tempered by the customs and manners of the country, their spirits are often cheerful and even, because as they have some freedom and a good deal of security, they are exempted from the most important cares of life; but all free peoples are serious, because their minds are habitually absorbed by the contemplation of some dangerous or difficult purpose. This is more especially the case amongst those free nations which form democratic communities. Then there are in all classes a very large number of men constantly occupied with the serious affairs of the government; and those whose thoughts are not engaged in the direction of the commonwealth are wholly engrossed by the acquisition of a private fortune. Amongst such a people a serious demeanor ceases to be peculiar to certain men, and becomes a habit of the nation.

But I recognize another deeper and stronger reason that instinctively brings about this remarkable seriousness among Americans. In oppressive regimes, communities can sometimes erupt in intense joy; however, they mostly remain gloomy and moody because they live in fear. In absolute monarchies, softened by local customs and traditions, people can often be cheerful and balanced, as they enjoy some freedom and a fair amount of security, freeing them from the most pressing worries of life. However, all free people tend to be serious because their minds are typically focused on some dangerous or challenging goal. This is especially true among those free nations that have democratic societies. In every class, there is a significant number of individuals constantly involved in serious government matters; and those who aren't preoccupied with public affairs are entirely focused on building their personal wealth. In such a society, a serious demeanor stops being unique to a few individuals and becomes a widespread trait of the nation.

We are told of small democracies in the days of antiquity, in which the citizens met upon the public places with garlands of roses, and spent almost all their time in dancing and theatrical amusements. I do not believe in such republics any more than in that of Plato; or, if the things we read of really happened, I do not hesitate to affirm that these supposed democracies were composed of very different elements from ours, and that they had nothing in common with the latter except their name. But it must not be supposed that, in the midst of all their toils, the people who live in democracies think themselves to be pitied; the contrary is remarked to be the case. No men are fonder of their own condition. Life would have no relish for them if they were delivered from the anxieties which harass them, and they show more attachment to their cares than aristocratic nations to their pleasures.

We're told about small democracies in ancient times, where citizens gathered in public spaces wearing garlands of roses and spent most of their time dancing and enjoying theater. I don't believe in such republics any more than I believe in Plato's idea of one; or if the things we read about actually happened, I can confidently say these so-called democracies were made up of very different elements from ours, and they had nothing in common with ours except their name. However, it shouldn't be assumed that, amid all their struggles, people living in democracies feel they should be pitied; quite the opposite is observed. No group of men values their own situation more. Life would feel boring to them if they were freed from the concerns that weigh on them, and they show more attachment to their worries than aristocratic nations do to their pleasures.

I am next led to inquire how it is that these same democratic nations, which are so serious, sometimes act in so inconsiderate a manner. The Americans, who almost always preserve a staid demeanor and a frigid air, nevertheless frequently allow themselves to be borne away, far beyond the bound of reason, by a sudden passion or a hasty opinion, and they sometimes gravely commit strange absurdities. This contrast ought not to surprise us. There is one sort of ignorance which originates in extreme publicity. In despotic States men know not how to act, because they are told nothing; in democratic nations they often act at random, because nothing is to be left untold. The former do not know—the latter forget; and the chief features of each picture are lost to them in a bewilderment of details.

I find myself wondering why these same democratic countries, which take things so seriously, sometimes act so thoughtlessly. Americans, who usually keep a composed demeanor and seem a bit cold, often let themselves get swept away by sudden feelings or quick judgments, leading them to make some pretty strange mistakes. This contrast shouldn’t shock us. There’s a kind of ignorance that comes from too much exposure. In authoritarian countries, people don’t know how to act because they’re not given any information; in democratic nations, they often act on a whim because everything is thrown out there. The former are uninformed—the latter forget, and the main points are lost in a jumble of details.

It is astonishing what imprudent language a public man may sometimes use in free countries, and especially in democratic States, without being compromised; whereas in absolute monarchies a few words dropped by accident are enough to unmask him forever, and ruin him without hope of redemption. This is explained by what goes before. When a man speaks in the midst of a great crowd, many of his words are not heard, or are forthwith obliterated from the memories of those who hear them; but amidst the silence of a mute and motionless throng the slightest whisper strikes the ear.

It's surprising what careless words a public figure can sometimes say in free countries, especially in democracies, without facing consequences; while in absolute monarchies, just a few accidentally spoken words can expose them forever and lead to their ruin with no chance of recovery. This can be understood from what was mentioned earlier. When someone speaks in front of a large crowd, many of their words go unheard, or are quickly forgotten by those listening; but in the stillness of a quiet and motionless group, even the faintest whisper is easily heard.

In democracies men are never stationary; a thousand chances waft them to and fro, and their life is always the sport of unforeseen or (so to speak) extemporaneous circumstances. Thus they are often obliged to do things which they have imperfectly learned, to say things they imperfectly understand, and to devote themselves to work for which they are unprepared by long apprenticeship. In aristocracies every man has one sole object which he unceasingly pursues, but amongst democratic nations the existence of man is more complex; the same mind will almost always embrace several objects at the same time, and these objects are frequently wholly foreign to each other: as it cannot know them all well, the mind is readily satisfied with imperfect notions of each.

In democracies, people are always on the move; a thousand opportunities push them back and forth, and their lives are constantly influenced by unexpected or, so to speak, spontaneous circumstances. As a result, they often have to do things they haven't fully learned, say things they don't fully understand, and dive into work they aren't trained for through years of experience. In aristocracies, each person has one main goal that they keep pursuing tirelessly, but in democratic societies, people's lives are more complicated; the same person often juggles several goals at once, which can be completely unrelated to each other. Since they can't fully grasp all of them, they usually settle for incomplete understandings of each.

When the inhabitant of democracies is not urged by his wants, he is so at least by his desires; for of all the possessions which he sees around him, none are wholly beyond his reach. He therefore does everything in a hurry, he is always satisfied with "pretty well," and never pauses more than an instant to consider what he has been doing. His curiosity is at once insatiable and cheaply satisfied; for he cares more to know a great deal quickly than to know anything well: he has no time and but little taste to search things to the bottom. Thus then democratic peoples are grave, because their social and political condition constantly leads them to engage in serious occupations; and they act inconsiderately, because they give but little time and attention to each of these occupations. The habit of inattention must be considered as the greatest bane of the democratic character.

When people in democracies aren't driven by their needs, they're at least motivated by their desires; because of all the things they see around them, none are completely out of reach. They rush through everything, are often satisfied with "pretty good," and rarely take more than a moment to reflect on what they've done. Their curiosity is both endless and easily satisfied, as they prefer to learn a little about many things quickly rather than deeply understanding anything. They don't have the time or inclination to dig deeply into topics. Consequently, democratic societies seem serious, as their social and political environments constantly push them into serious activities; yet they act thoughtlessly because they spend little time and attention on each of these tasks. The tendency to be inattentive can be seen as the biggest flaw of the democratic character.





Chapter XVI: Why The National Vanity Of The Americans Is More Restless And Captious Than That Of The English

All free nations are vainglorious, but national pride is not displayed by all in the same manner. The Americans in their intercourse with strangers appear impatient of the smallest censure and insatiable of praise. The most slender eulogium is acceptable to them; the most exalted seldom contents them; they unceasingly harass you to extort praise, and if you resist their entreaties they fall to praising themselves. It would seem as if, doubting their own merit, they wished to have it constantly exhibited before their eyes. Their vanity is not only greedy, but restless and jealous; it will grant nothing, whilst it demands everything, but is ready to beg and to quarrel at the same time. If I say to an American that the country he lives in is a fine one, "Ay," he replies, "there is not its fellow in the world." If I applaud the freedom which its inhabitants enjoy, he answers, "Freedom is a fine thing, but few nations are worthy to enjoy it." If I remark the purity of morals which distinguishes the United States, "I can imagine," says he, "that a stranger, who has been struck by the corruption of all other nations, is astonished at the difference." At length I leave him to the contemplation of himself; but he returns to the charge, and does not desist till he has got me to repeat all I had just been saying. It is impossible to conceive a more troublesome or more garrulous patriotism; it wearies even those who are disposed to respect it. *a

All free nations are proud, but they don’t all show that pride in the same way. Americans, for example, seem very sensitive to any criticism and crave praise more than anything. Even the slightest compliment is welcome, but nothing less than the highest praise satisfies them; they constantly push for compliments, and if you don’t give in, they end up praising themselves. It’s like they doubt their own worth and need constant validation. Their vanity is not just greedy but also restless and competitive; they demand everything while giving nothing, and they’re ready to both beg and argue at once. If I tell an American that their country is great, they’ll respond, "Yes, there’s no country like it." If I praise their freedom, they might say, "Freedom is wonderful, but few nations deserve it." If I mention the moral integrity of the United States, they’ll say, "I can imagine that a foreigner, shocked by the corruption of other countries, is amazed by the difference." Eventually, I leave them to think about themselves, but they keep coming back, wanting me to repeat everything I just said. You can’t imagine a more annoying or chatty form of patriotism; it even tires out those who want to respect it.

a
[ See Appendix U.]

a
[See Appendix U.]

Such is not the case with the English. An Englishman calmly enjoys the real or imaginary advantages which in his opinion his country possesses. If he grants nothing to other nations, neither does he solicit anything for his own. The censure of foreigners does not affect him, and their praise hardly flatters him; his position with regard to the rest of the world is one of disdainful and ignorant reserve: his pride requires no sustenance, it nourishes itself. It is remarkable that two nations, so recently sprung from the same stock, should be so opposite to one another in their manner of feeling and conversing.

That's not true for the English. An Englishman confidently enjoys the real or imagined benefits he believes his country has. If he doesn’t acknowledge other nations, he also doesn’t ask for anything for his own. Criticism from foreigners doesn’t bother him, and their praise barely flatters him; he views the rest of the world with a dismissive and clueless attitude: his pride doesn’t need any support, it feeds itself. It’s noteworthy that two nations, so recently descended from the same ancestry, can be so different in their feelings and conversations.

In aristocratic countries the great possess immense privileges, upon which their pride rests, without seeking to rely upon the lesser advantages which accrue to them. As these privileges came to them by inheritance, they regard them in some sort as a portion of themselves, or at least as a natural right inherent in their own persons. They therefore entertain a calm sense of their superiority; they do not dream of vaunting privileges which everyone perceives and no one contests, and these things are not sufficiently new to them to be made topics of conversation. They stand unmoved in their solitary greatness, well assured that they are seen of all the world without any effort to show themselves off, and that no one will attempt to drive them from that position. When an aristocracy carries on the public affairs, its national pride naturally assumes this reserved, indifferent, and haughty form, which is imitated by all the other classes of the nation.

In aristocratic countries, the wealthy have immense privileges that feed their pride, without needing to rely on the lesser advantages that also come their way. Since these privileges were passed down to them, they see them as part of who they are, or at least as a natural right that belongs to them. This gives them a calm sense of superiority; they don’t think about flaunting privileges that everyone acknowledges and no one questions, and these things aren’t new enough to warrant conversation. They remain steady in their unique status, confident that everyone recognizes them without any need to show off, and that no one will try to take that position away from them. When an aristocracy governs public affairs, their national pride naturally takes on this reserved, indifferent, and haughty demeanor, which is mimicked by all other social classes.

When, on the contrary, social conditions differ but little, the slightest privileges are of some importance; as every man sees around himself a million of people enjoying precisely similar or analogous advantages, his pride becomes craving and jealous, he clings to mere trifles, and doggedly defends them. In democracies, as the conditions of life are very fluctuating, men have almost always recently acquired the advantages which they possess; the consequence is that they feel extreme pleasure in exhibiting them, to show others and convince themselves that they really enjoy them. As at any instant these same advantages may be lost, their possessors are constantly on the alert, and make a point of showing that they still retain them. Men living in democracies love their country just as they love themselves, and they transfer the habits of their private vanity to their vanity as a nation. The restless and insatiable vanity of a democratic people originates so entirely in the equality and precariousness of social conditions, that the members of the haughtiest nobility display the very same passion in those lesser portions of their existence in which there is anything fluctuating or contested. An aristocratic class always differs greatly from the other classes of the nation, by the extent and perpetuity of its privileges; but it often happens that the only differences between the members who belong to it consist in small transient advantages, which may any day be lost or acquired. The members of a powerful aristocracy, collected in a capital or a court, have been known to contest with virulence those frivolous privileges which depend on the caprice of fashion or the will of their master. These persons then displayed towards each other precisely the same puerile jealousies which animate the men of democracies, the same eagerness to snatch the smallest advantages which their equals contested, and the same desire to parade ostentatiously those of which they were in possession. If national pride ever entered into the minds of courtiers, I do not question that they would display it in the same manner as the members of a democratic community.

When social conditions are quite similar, even the smallest privileges matter a lot; since everyone sees a million people around them enjoying the same or similar benefits, their pride turns into envy and greed, making them cling to trivial things and stubbornly defend them. In democracies, because life conditions are always changing, people have recently earned the advantages they have; as a result, they take great pleasure in showing off these benefits to others and convincing themselves that they truly enjoy them. Since these benefits can be lost at any moment, those who have them stay vigilant and make a point of demonstrating that they still possess them. People in democracies love their country as much as they love themselves, transferring their personal vanity into their national pride. The restless and insatiable vanity of a democratic society stems entirely from the equality and instability of social conditions, causing even the most arrogant nobility to display the same passion in the minor aspects of their lives where things are uncertain or contested. An aristocratic class is always significantly different from the other classes in the nation due to the scope and permanence of its privileges; yet, it's often the case that the only differences among its members come down to small, temporary advantages that can be lost or gained at any moment. Members of a powerful aristocracy, gathered in a capital or court, have been known to fiercely compete over those trivial privileges that depend on the whims of fashion or the desires of their leader. In those situations, they show the same childish jealousies as people in democracies, the same eagerness to grab even the slightest advantages over their peers, and the same desire to show off the benefits they have. If national pride ever crossed the minds of courtiers, I have no doubt they would express it just like members of a democratic community.





Chapter XVII: That The Aspect Of Society In The United States Is At Once Excited And Monotonous

It would seem that nothing can be more adapted to stimulate and to feed curiosity than the aspect of the United States. Fortunes, opinions, and laws are there in ceaseless variation: it is as if immutable nature herself were mutable, such are the changes worked upon her by the hand of man. Yet in the end the sight of this excited community becomes monotonous, and after having watched the moving pageant for a time the spectator is tired of it. Amongst aristocratic nations every man is pretty nearly stationary in his own sphere; but men are astonishingly unlike each other—their passions, their notions, their habits, and their tastes are essentially different: nothing changey, but everything differs. In democracies, on the contrary, all men are alike and do things pretty nearly alike. It is true that they are subject to great and frequent vicissitudes; but as the same events of good or adverse fortune are continually recurring, the name of the actors only is changed, the piece is always the same. The aspect of American society is animated, because men and things are always changing; but it is monotonous, because all these changes are alike.

It seems that nothing can stimulate and satisfy curiosity quite like the United States. Fortunes, opinions, and laws are always shifting: it’s as if even nature herself is changeable, altered by the actions of humans. Yet eventually, the sight of this vibrant community becomes tedious, and after watching the ongoing spectacle for a while, the observer tires of it. In aristocratic nations, people tend to stay in their own social classes; however, individuals are remarkably different from one another— their passions, ideas, habits, and tastes vary greatly: nothing stays the same, but everything is different. In democracies, on the other hand, people are similar and tend to act in almost the same way. It's true that they face significant and frequent changes, but since the same events of good or bad fortune keep coming back, only the names of the individuals change, the story remains the same. The face of American society is lively because people and circumstances are always evolving; yet it's monotonous because all these changes are similar.

Men living in democratic ages have many passions, but most of their passions either end in the love of riches or proceed from it. The cause of this is, not that their souls are narrower, but that the importance of money is really greater at such times. When all the members of a community are independent of or indifferent to each other, the co-operation of each of them can only be obtained by paying for it: this infinitely multiplies the purposes to which wealth may be applied, and increases its value. When the reverence which belonged to what is old has vanished, birth, condition, and profession no longer distinguish men, or scarcely distinguish them at all: hardly anything but money remains to create strongly marked differences between them, and to raise some of them above the common level. The distinction originating in wealth is increased by the disappearance and diminution of all other distinctions. Amongst aristocratic nations money only reaches to a few points on the vast circle of man's desires—in democracies it seems to lead to all. The love of wealth is therefore to be traced, either as a principal or an accessory motive, at the bottom of all that the Americans do: this gives to all their passions a sort of family likeness, and soon renders the survey of them exceedingly wearisome. This perpetual recurrence of the same passion is monotonous; the peculiar methods by which this passion seeks its own gratification are no less so.

Men living in democratic times have many passions, but most of them either lead to the love of money or stem from it. This isn't because their souls are smaller, but because the significance of money is much greater during these times. When everyone in a community is independent from or indifferent to one another, the only way to gain cooperation is by paying for it: this greatly expands the ways wealth can be used and boosts its value. When the respect for the old ways fades, social class, status, and profession hardly distinguish people from one another: almost solely money remains to create noticeable differences and elevate some above the rest. The distinction that comes from wealth is amplified by the fading of all other distinctions. In aristocratic societies, money only fulfills a few of humanity's vast desires, but in democracies, it appears to address them all. Therefore, the love of wealth can be identified, whether as a main or secondary motive, behind everything Americans do: this gives all their passions a similar character and quickly makes studying them quite tedious. This constant repetition of the same passion is dull; the unique ways this passion seeks satisfaction are equally uninteresting.

In an orderly and constituted democracy like the United States, where men cannot enrich themselves by war, by public office, or by political confiscation, the love of wealth mainly drives them into business and manufactures. Although these pursuits often bring about great commotions and disasters, they cannot prosper without strictly regular habits and a long routine of petty uniform acts. The stronger the passion is, the more regular are these habits, and the more uniform are these acts. It may be said that it is the vehemence of their desires which makes the Americans so methodical; it perturbs their minds, but it disciplines their lives.

In a well-structured democracy like the United States, where people can't get rich through war, public office, or political takeovers, the desire for wealth largely pushes them into business and manufacturing. Even though these activities can lead to significant upheaval and crises, they can't succeed without consistent routines and a long history of small, uniform actions. The stronger the desire, the more disciplined these routines become, and the more consistent the actions are. It's fair to say that it's the intensity of their desires that makes Americans so methodical; it distracts their minds, but it organizes their lives.

The remark I here apply to America may indeed be addressed to almost all our contemporaries. Variety is disappearing from the human race; the same ways of acting, thinking, and feeling are to be met with all over the world. This is not only because nations work more upon each other, and are more faithful in their mutual imitation; but as the men of each country relinquish more and more the peculiar opinions and feelings of a caste, a profession, or a family, they simultaneously arrive at something nearer to the constitution of man, which is everywhere the same. Thus they become more alike, even without having imitated each other. Like travellers scattered about some large wood, which is intersected by paths converging to one point, if all of them keep, their eyes fixed upon that point and advance towards it, they insensibly draw nearer together—though they seek not, though they see not, though they know not each other; and they will be surprised at length to find themselves all collected on the same spot. All the nations which take, not any particular man, but man himself, as the object of their researches and their imitations, are tending in the end to a similar state of society, like these travellers converging to the central plot of the forest.

The comment I'm making about America could actually apply to almost everyone today. Diversity is fading from humanity; the same ways of acting, thinking, and feeling are appearing everywhere. This isn’t just because countries are influencing each other more and copying each other more faithfully, but as people in each nation let go of the unique opinions and feelings tied to their class, profession, or family, they end up getting closer to what it means to be human, which is the same everywhere. As a result, they become more similar, even without actively copying one another. It's like travelers scattered in a large forest, with paths leading to one central point. If they all keep their eyes on that point and move toward it, they gradually get closer together—without intending to, without seeing each other, and without being aware of it. Eventually, they’ll be surprised to find themselves all gathered in the same spot. All nations that study and imitate not just one specific person, but humanity as a whole, are ultimately moving toward a similar kind of society, just like those travelers coming together in the center of the forest.





Chapter XVIII: Of Honor In The United States And In Democratic Communities

It would seem that men employ two very distinct methods in the public estimation *a of the actions of their fellowmen; at one time they judge them by those simple notions of right and wrong which are diffused all over the world; at another they refer their decision to a few very special notions which belong exclusively to some particular age and country. It often happens that these two rules differ; they sometimes conflict: but they are never either entirely identified or entirely annulled by one another. Honor, at the periods of its greatest power, sways the will more than the belief of men; and even whilst they yield without hesitation and without a murmur to its dictates, they feel notwithstanding, by a dim but mighty instinct, the existence of a more general, more ancient, and more holy law, which they sometimes disobey although they cease not to acknowledge it. Some actions have been held to be at the same time virtuous and dishonorable—a refusal to fight a duel is a case in point.

It seems that people use two very different methods to judge the actions of others; sometimes they evaluate them based on the simple ideas of right and wrong that are common around the world, while at other times they rely on a few specific notions that are unique to a certain time and place. These two approaches often differ from each other and can sometimes conflict, but they are never completely the same or completely cancel each other out. Honor, at its peak, influences people's choices more than their beliefs; and even when they follow its demands without hesitation or complaint, they still sense, albeit faintly, the presence of a broader, older, and more sacred law that they sometimes ignore even though they continue to recognize its authority. Some actions are considered both virtuous and dishonorable at the same time—refusing to fight a duel is one example.

a
[ The word "honor" is not always used in the same sense either in French or English. I. It first signifies the dignity, glory, or reverence which a man receives from his kind; and in this sense a man is said to acquire honor. 2. Honor signifies the aggregate of those rules by the assistance of which this dignity, glory, or reverence is obtained. Thus we say that a man has always strictly obeyed the laws of honor; or a man has violated his honor. In this chapter the word is always used in the latter sense.]

a
[ The word "honor" doesn't always mean the same thing in French or English. I. It primarily refers to the dignity, glory, or respect that a person receives from others; in this sense, a person is said to gain honor. 2. Honor represents the collection of rules through which this dignity, glory, or respect is achieved. Thus, we say that a person has always strictly followed the laws of honor; or a person has failed to uphold his honor. In this chapter, the word is always used in the latter sense.]

I think these peculiarities may be otherwise explained than by the mere caprices of certain individuals and nations, as has hitherto been the customary mode of reasoning on the subject. Mankind is subject to general and lasting wants that have engendered moral laws, to the neglect of which men have ever and in all places attached the notion of censure and shame: to infringe them was "to do ill"—"to do well" was to conform to them. Within the bosom of this vast association of the human race, lesser associations have been formed which are called nations; and amidst these nations further subdivisions have assumed the names of classes or castes. Each of these associations forms, as it were, a separate species of the human race; and though it has no essential difference from the mass of mankind, to a certain extent it stands apart and has certain wants peculiar to itself. To these special wants must be attributed the modifications which affect in various degrees and in different countries the mode of considering human actions, and the estimate which ought to be formed of them. It is the general and permanent interest of mankind that men should not kill each other: but it may happen to be the peculiar and temporary interest of a people or a class to justify, or even to honor, homicide.

I think these peculiarities can be explained in ways other than just the whims of certain individuals and nations, which has been the usual way of thinking about it. Humanity has basic and ongoing needs that have created moral laws, which people everywhere have associated with censure and shame. To break these laws was seen as "doing wrong," while "doing right" meant following them. Within this vast human community, smaller groups have formed known as nations; within these nations, further divisions are called classes or castes. Each of these groups acts like a separate category of humanity; and while they aren't fundamentally different from the larger human population, they do have specific needs unique to them. These unique needs help explain the different ways human actions are viewed and assessed around the world. It's in everyone’s best interest that people don’t kill one another, but sometimes it can be the specific and temporary interest of a group or class to justify, or even glorify, murder.

Honor is simply that peculiar rule, founded upon a peculiar state of society, by the application of which a people or a class allot praise or blame. Nothing is more unproductive to the mind than an abstract idea; I therefore hasten to call in the aid of facts and examples to illustrate my meaning.

Honor is just that strange principle, based on a unique social structure, through which a group of people or a class assigns praise or criticism. Nothing is more unhelpful to understanding than an abstract idea; I’ll quickly bring in some facts and examples to clarify what I mean.

I select the most extraordinary kind of honor which was ever known in the world, and that which we are best acquainted with, viz., aristocratic honor springing out of feudal society. I shall explain it by means of the principle already laid down, and I shall explain the principle by means of the illustration. I am not here led to inquire when and how the aristocracy of the Middle Ages came into existence, why it was so deeply severed from the remainder of the nation, or what founded and consolidated its power. I take its existence as an established fact, and I am endeavoring to account for the peculiar view which it took of the greater part of human actions. The first thing that strikes me is, that in the feudal world actions were not always praised or blamed with reference to their intrinsic worth, but that they were sometimes appreciated exclusively with reference to the person who was the actor or the object of them, which is repugnant to the general conscience of mankind. Thus some of the actions which were indifferent on the part of a man in humble life, dishonored a noble; others changed their whole character according as the person aggrieved by them belonged or did not belong to the aristocracy. When these different notions first arose, the nobility formed a distinct body amidst the people, which it commanded from the inaccessible heights where it was ensconced. To maintain this peculiar position, which constituted its strength, it not only required political privileges, but it required a standard of right and wrong for its own especial use. That some particular virtue or vice belonged to the nobility rather than to the humble classes—that certain actions were guiltless when they affected the villain, which were criminal when they touched the noble—these were often arbitrary matters; but that honor or shame should be attached to a man's actions according to his condition, was a result of the internal constitution of an aristocratic community. This has been actually the case in all the countries which have had an aristocracy; as long as a trace of the principle remains, these peculiarities will still exist; to debauch a woman of color scarcely injures the reputation of an American—to marry her dishonors him.

I choose to discuss the most remarkable type of honor ever recognized in the world, the one we're most familiar with: aristocratic honor that emerged from feudal society. I will clarify this using the principle I’ve already established, and I will explain the principle through examples. I'm not examining when or how the medieval aristocracy came to be, why it was so separate from the rest of society, or what built and solidified its power. I'm taking its existence as a given fact and trying to explain the unique perspective it had on most human actions. The first thing that stands out to me is that in the feudal world, actions weren't always judged based on their inherent value; sometimes they were assessed solely based on who performed them or who was affected, which goes against the general moral sense of humanity. For instance, some actions that were considered neutral for someone of a lower class would bring shame to a noble; others would change their entire nature depending on whether the person harmed was part of the aristocracy or not. When these different perspectives first emerged, the nobility stood apart from the common people, commanding from their lofty positions. To uphold this unique status, which was their source of power, they needed not just political privileges but also a specific moral code tailored for themselves. The notion that certain virtues or vices belonged to the nobility rather than the lower classes—that specific actions were acceptable when they affected a commoner but were wrong when they impacted a noble—often stemmed from arbitrary distinctions. However, the assignment of honor or shame to an individual's actions based on their social status was a fundamental characteristic of an aristocratic society. This has been true in all countries with an aristocracy; as long as any trace of this principle exists, these peculiarities will remain; for example, degrading a woman of color hardly damages an American's reputation—marrying her, however, brings disgrace.

In some cases feudal honor enjoined revenge, and stigmatized the forgiveness of insults; in others it imperiously commanded men to conquer their own passions, and imposed forgetfulness of self. It did not make humanity or kindness its law, but it extolled generosity; it set more store on liberality than on benevolence; it allowed men to enrich themselves by gambling or by war, but not by labor; it preferred great crimes to small earnings; cupidity was less distasteful to it than avarice; violence it often sanctioned, but cunning and treachery it invariably reprobated as contemptible. These fantastical notions did not proceed exclusively from the caprices of those who entertained them. A class which has succeeded in placing itself at the head of and above all others, and which makes perpetual exertions to maintain this lofty position, must especially honor those virtues which are conspicuous for their dignity and splendor, and which may be easily combined with pride and the love of power. Such men would not hesitate to invert the natural order of the conscience in order to give those virtues precedence before all others. It may even be conceived that some of the more bold and brilliant vices would readily be set above the quiet, unpretending virtues. The very existence of such a class in society renders these things unavoidable.

In some cases, feudal honor demanded revenge and looked down on forgiving insults; in others, it forcefully urged men to control their own passions and forget about themselves. It didn’t prioritize humanity or kindness, but it praised generosity; it valued generosity more than benevolence. It allowed men to get rich through gambling or war, but not through hard work; it favored major crimes over small gains; greed was less offensive than avarice; it often approved of violence but always condemned deceit and treachery as despicable. These bizarre beliefs didn’t just come from the whims of those who held them. A class that has managed to place itself at the top and above all others, and continuously works to stay in that high position, must especially value virtues that are associated with dignity and glory, which can easily be linked to pride and the desire for power. Such individuals would not hesitate to distort the natural order of the conscience to prioritize those virtues above all else. It can even be imagined that some of the bolder and more impressive vices would be placed above the simple, humble virtues. The very existence of such a class in society makes these things inevitable.

The nobles of the Middle Ages placed military courage foremost amongst virtues, and in lieu of many of them. This was again a peculiar opinion which arose necessarily from the peculiarity of the state of society. Feudal aristocracy existed by war and for war; its power had been founded by arms, and by arms that power was maintained; it therefore required nothing more than military courage, and that quality was naturally exalted above all others; whatever denoted it, even at the expense of reason and humanity, was therefore approved and frequently enjoined by the manners of the time. Such was the main principle; the caprice of man was only to be traced in minuter details. That a man should regard a tap on the cheek as an unbearable insult, and should be obliged to kill in single combat the person who struck him thus lightly, is an arbitrary rule; but that a noble could not tranquilly receive an insult, and was dishonored if he allowed himself to take a blow without fighting, were direct consequences of the fundamental principles and the wants of military aristocracy.

The nobles of the Middle Ages placed military bravery at the top of their virtues, often prioritizing it over many others. This unique view arose naturally from the social conditions of the time. Feudal aristocracy thrived on war and existed for it; their power was established through fighting and was sustained by it. As a result, they needed nothing but military courage, which was naturally regarded as the most important trait. Anything that indicated this quality, even if it compromised reason and humanity, was therefore praised and often enforced by the customs of the era. This was the core principle; human whims were only evident in smaller details. For instance, seeing a light tap on the cheek as an intolerable insult and feeling compelled to kill the person who struck him in a duel is an arbitrary rule. However, the idea that a noble couldn't calmly accept an insult and was dishonored if he didn't fight back after being struck was a direct reflection of the fundamental principles and the demands of the military aristocracy.

Thus it was true to a certain extent to assert that the laws of honor were capricious; but these caprices of honor were always confined within certain necessary limits. The peculiar rule, which was called honor by our forefathers, is so far from being an arbitrary law in my eyes, that I would readily engage to ascribe its most incoherent and fantastical injunctions to a small number of fixed and invariable wants inherent in feudal society.

It’s somewhat accurate to say that the rules of honor were unpredictable; however, these unpredictable aspects of honor were always kept within certain necessary boundaries. The specific code that our ancestors referred to as honor isn’t an arbitrary law to me at all. In fact, I would gladly argue that its most confusing and bizarre demands can be traced back to a few fixed and unchanging needs that are part of feudal society.

If I were to trace the notion of feudal honor into the domain of politics, I should not find it more difficult to explain its dictates. The state of society and the political institutions of the Middle Ages were such, that the supreme power of the nation never governed the community directly. That power did not exist in the eyes of the people: every man looked up to a certain individual whom he was bound to obey; by that intermediate personage he was connected with all the others. Thus in feudal society the whole system of the commonwealth rested upon the sentiment of fidelity to the person of the lord: to destroy that sentiment was to open the sluices of anarchy. Fidelity to a political superior was, moreover, a sentiment of which all the members of the aristocracy had constant opportunities of estimating the importance; for every one of them was a vassal as well as a lord, and had to command as well as to obey. To remain faithful to the lord, to sacrifice one's self for him if called upon, to share his good or evil fortunes, to stand by him in his undertakings whatever they might be—such were the first injunctions of feudal honor in relation to the political institutions of those times. The treachery of a vassal was branded with extraordinary severity by public opinion, and a name of peculiar infamy was invented for the offence which was called "felony."

If I were to trace the idea of feudal honor into the realm of politics, I wouldn't find it hard to explain its principles. The state of society and the political structures of the Middle Ages were such that the ultimate power of the nation never governed the community directly. That power didn't exist in the people's eyes; every man looked up to a specific individual he was obligated to obey; through that intermediary person, he was linked to everyone else. Thus, in feudal society, the entire system of the commonwealth relied on the feeling of loyalty to the lord: to destroy that feeling was to unleash chaos. Loyalty to a political superior was also a sentiment that all members of the aristocracy could continually assess the importance of, since each of them was both a vassal and a lord, needing to command as well as obey. Remaining faithful to the lord, sacrificing oneself for him when necessary, sharing in his fortunes, and supporting him in his endeavors—these were the fundamental principles of feudal honor concerning the political institutions of those times. The betrayal of a vassal was harshly condemned by public opinion, and a term of particular disgrace was created for the offense, which was called "felony."

On the contrary, few traces are to be found in the Middle Ages of the passion which constituted the life of the nations of antiquity—I mean patriotism; the word itself is not of very ancient date in the language. *b Feudal institutions concealed the country at large from men's sight, and rendered the love of it less necessary. The nation was forgotten in the passions which attached men to persons. Hence it was no part of the strict law of feudal honor to remain faithful to one's country. Not indeed that the love of their country did not exist in the hearts of our forefathers; but it constituted a dim and feeble instinct, which has grown more clear and strong in proportion as aristocratic classes have been abolished, and the supreme power of the nation centralized. This may be clearly seen from the contrary judgments which European nations have passed upon the various events of their histories, according to the generations by which such judgments have been formed. The circumstance which most dishonored the Constable de Bourbon in the eyes of his contemporaries was that he bore arms against his king: that which most dishonors him in our eyes, is that he made war against his country; we brand him as deeply as our forefathers did, but for different reasons.

On the contrary, there are hardly any signs in the Middle Ages of the passion that defined the life of ancient nations—I’m talking about patriotism; the term itself isn’t very old in our language. Feudal systems kept the broader country out of people’s view, making the love for it less necessary. People forgot about the nation because their passions were tied to individuals. So, it wasn’t part of the strict code of feudal honor to stay loyal to one's country. Not that our ancestors didn’t love their homeland; it was more of a faint and weak instinct, which has grown clearer and stronger as aristocratic classes have been dismantled and national power has become centralized. This is evident from the differing opinions that European nations have formed about various events in their histories, depending on the generations making those judgments. What disgraced the Constable de Bourbon most in the eyes of his peers was that he fought against his king; what dishonors him in our view is that he waged war against his country. We judge him as harshly as our ancestors did, but for different reasons.

b
[ Even the word "patrie" was not used by the French writers until the sixteenth century.]

b
[ Even the word "homeland" wasn't used by French writers until the sixteenth century.]

I have chosen the honor of feudal times by way of illustration of my meaning, because its characteristics are more distinctly marked and more familiar to us than those of any other period; but I might have taken an example elsewhere, and I should have reached the same conclusion by a different road. Although we are less perfectly acquainted with the Romans than with our own ancestors, yet we know that certain peculiar notions of glory and disgrace obtained amongst them, which were not solely derived from the general principles of right and wrong. Many human actions were judged differently, according as they affected a Roman citizen or a stranger, a freeman or a slave; certain vices were blazoned abroad, certain virtues were extolled above all others. "In that age," says Plutarch in the life of Coriolanus, "martial prowess was more honored and prized in Rome than all the other virtues, insomuch that it was called virtus, the name of virtue itself, by applying the name of the kind to this particular species; so that virtue in Latin was as much as to say valor." Can anyone fail to recognize the peculiar want of that singular community which was formed for the conquest of the world?

I chose feudal times to illustrate my point because its features are clearer and more familiar to us than any other period; however, I could have picked an example from elsewhere and still reached the same conclusion through a different path. Although we know less about the Romans than we do about our own ancestors, we understand that they had certain unique ideas about glory and disgrace that weren’t just based on universal principles of right and wrong. Many human actions were judged differently depending on whether they affected a Roman citizen or a stranger, a free person or a slave; some vices were widely condemned, while some virtues were praised above all others. "In that age," Plutarch says in the life of Coriolanus, "martial prowess was more honored and valued in Rome than all the other virtues, to the point that it was called virtus, the very name of virtue, by using the term of the kind for this specific quality; so that virtue in Latin essentially meant valor." Can anyone overlook the unique needs of that remarkable society which was formed to conquer the world?

Any nation would furnish us with similar grounds of observation; for, as I have already remarked, whenever men collect together as a distinct community, the notion of honor instantly grows up amongst them; that is to say, a system of opinions peculiar to themselves as to what is blamable or commendable; and these peculiar rules always originate in the special habits and special interests of the community. This is applicable to a certain extent to democratic communities as well as to others, as we shall now proceed to prove by the example of the Americans. *c Some loose notions of the old aristocratic honor of Europe are still to be found scattered amongst the opinions of the Americans; but these traditional opinions are few in number, they have but little root in the country, and but little power. They are like a religion which has still some temples left standing, though men have ceased to believe in it. But amidst these half-obliterated notions of exotic honor, some new opinions have sprung up, which constitute what may be termed in our days American honor. I have shown how the Americans are constantly driven to engage in commerce and industry. Their origin, their social condition, their political institutions, and even the spot they inhabit, urge them irresistibly in this direction. Their present condition is then that of an almost exclusively manufacturing and commercial association, placed in the midst of a new and boundless country, which their principal object is to explore for purposes of profit. This is the characteristic which most peculiarly distinguishes the American people from all others at the present time. All those quiet virtues which tend to give a regular movement to the community, and to encourage business, will therefore be held in peculiar honor by that people, and to neglect those virtues will be to incur public contempt. All the more turbulent virtues, which often dazzle, but more frequently disturb society, will on the contrary occupy a subordinate rank in the estimation of this same people: they may be neglected without forfeiting the esteem of the community—to acquire them would perhaps be to run a risk of losing it.

Any nation would provide us with similar grounds for observation; as I’ve already mentioned, whenever people come together as a distinct community, the idea of honor quickly develops among them. This means they create a system of beliefs unique to their group about what is blameworthy or praiseworthy, and these specific rules always stem from the unique habits and interests of the community. This applies to democratic communities just as much as to others, as we will now demonstrate with the example of Americans. Some remnants of the old aristocratic honor from Europe can still be found scattered among American opinions, but these traditional views are few, lack a strong foundation in the country, and hold minimal power. They are like a religion that has a few temples still standing, even though people have stopped believing in it. Amid these faded concepts of foreign honor, some new ideas have emerged, which can be referred to as American honor today. I’ve shown how Americans are consistently driven towards commerce and industry. Their background, social status, political systems, and even the land they occupy compel them in this direction. Their current state is one of being primarily a manufacturing and commercial society, situated in a vast and unexplored country, which they aim to explore for profit. This characteristic distinctly sets the American people apart from others today. Therefore, all those quiet virtues that promote the orderly functioning of the community and encourage business will be particularly valued by them, and neglecting these virtues will lead to public disdain. In contrast, the more turbulent virtues, which often impress but more frequently disrupt society, will hold a lesser place in the views of this same people: they may be overlooked without losing community respect—pursuing them might actually risk losing it.

c
[ I speak here of the Americans inhabiting those States where slavery does not exist; they alone can be said to present a complete picture of democratic society.]

c
[ I'm referring to the Americans living in those states where slavery is not present; they're the ones who truly represent a complete picture of democratic society.]

The Americans make a no less arbitrary classification of men's vices. There are certain propensities which appear censurable to the general reason and the universal conscience of mankind, but which happen to agree with the peculiar and temporary wants of the American community: these propensities are lightly reproved, sometimes even encouraged; for instance, the love of wealth and the secondary propensities connected with it may be more particularly cited. To clear, to till, and to transform the vast uninhabited continent which is his domain, the American requires the daily support of an energetic passion; that passion can only be the love of wealth; the passion for wealth is therefore not reprobated in America, and provided it does not go beyond the bounds assigned to it for public security, it is held in honor. The American lauds as a noble and praiseworthy ambition what our own forefathers in the Middle Ages stigmatized as servile cupidity, just as he treats as a blind and barbarous frenzy that ardor of conquest and martial temper which bore them to battle. In the United States fortunes are lost and regained without difficulty; the country is boundless, and its resources inexhaustible. The people have all the wants and cravings of a growing creature; and whatever be their efforts, they are always surrounded by more than they can appropriate. It is not the ruin of a few individuals which may be soon repaired, but the inactivity and sloth of the community at large which would be fatal to such a people. Boldness of enterprise is the foremost cause of its rapid progress, its strength, and its greatness. Commercial business is there like a vast lottery, by which a small number of men continually lose, but the State is always a gainer; such a people ought therefore to encourage and do honor to boldness in commercial speculations. But any bold speculation risks the fortune of the speculator and of all those who put their trust in him. The Americans, who make a virtue of commercial temerity, have no right in any case to brand with disgrace those who practise it. Hence arises the strange indulgence which is shown to bankrupts in the United States; their honor does not suffer by such an accident. In this respect the Americans differ, not only from the nations of Europe, but from all the commercial nations of our time, and accordingly they resemble none of them in their position or their wants.

Americans have their own somewhat arbitrary way of classifying men's vices. There are certain behaviors that seem wrong to common sense and the shared conscience of humanity, yet they align with the unique and temporary needs of the American community: these behaviors are often just lightly criticized, and sometimes even encouraged. For example, the pursuit of wealth and associated behaviors can be particularly noted. To clear, cultivate, and transform the vast unoccupied land that belongs to him, the American needs the constant support of an intense passion; that passion is the love of wealth. Therefore, the pursuit of wealth is not condemned in America, and as long as it stays within the limits set for public safety, it is respected. Americans praise what our ancestors in the Middle Ages considered greedy ambition, while they view the aggressive desire for conquest and military spirit that drove our ancestors to war as reckless and barbaric. In the United States, fortunes can be lost and regained easily; the country is limitless and its resources appear endless. The people have the needs and desires of a creature that is constantly growing, and no matter how much they strive, they are always surrounded by more than they can take. It's not the downfall of a few individuals that quickly gets fixed, but the idleness and laziness of the community as a whole that would be disastrous for such a society. The boldness to take risks is the main reason for its quick advancement, strength, and greatness. Business here is like a huge lottery, where a few people keep losing money, but the State always benefits; thus, such a society should encourage and honor boldness in business ventures. However, any daring investment risks the fortunes of the investor and everyone who trusts him. Americans, who take pride in commercial risk-taking, have no right to shame those who engage in it. This leads to the unusual leniency shown to bankrupts in the United States; their honor isn’t diminished by such a setback. In this regard, Americans are different not only from European nations but from all commercial nations of today, and, as a result, they don’t resemble any of them in their circumstances or needs.

In America all those vices which tend to impair the purity of morals, and to destroy the conjugal tie, are treated with a degree of severity which is unknown in the rest of the world. At first sight this seems strangely at variance with the tolerance shown there on other subjects, and one is surprised to meet with a morality so relaxed and so austere amongst the selfsame people. But these things are less incoherent than they seem to be. Public opinion in the United States very gently represses that love of wealth which promotes the commercial greatness and the prosperity of the nation, and it especially condemns that laxity of morals which diverts the human mind from the pursuit of well-being, and disturbs the internal order of domestic life which is so necessary to success in business. To earn the esteem of their countrymen, the Americans are therefore constrained to adapt themselves to orderly habits—and it may be said in this sense that they make it a matter of honor to live chastely.

In America, all those vices that tend to mess with moral integrity and damage the bonds of marriage are dealt with more harshly than anywhere else in the world. At first glance, this seems oddly inconsistent with the tolerance shown in other areas, and it’s surprising to find such relaxed yet strict morals among the same people. However, these contradictions are less confusing than they appear. Public opinion in the United States quietly suppresses the love of wealth that drives commercial success and national prosperity, and it particularly criticizes moral laxity that distracts people from seeking well-being, disrupting the stability of home life which is vital for business success. To gain the respect of their fellow citizens, Americans are thus compelled to adopt orderly habits—and in this sense, it can be said that they consider it a point of honor to live chaste lives.

On one point American honor accords with the notions of honor acknowledged in Europe; it places courage as the highest virtue, and treats it as the greatest of the moral necessities of man; but the notion of courage itself assumes a different aspect. In the United States martial valor is but little prized; the courage which is best known and most esteemed is that which emboldens men to brave the dangers of the ocean, in order to arrive earlier in port—to support the privations of the wilderness without complaint, and solitude more cruel than privations—the courage which renders them almost insensible to the loss of a fortune laboriously acquired, and instantly prompts to fresh exertions to make another. Courage of this kind is peculiarly necessary to the maintenance and prosperity of the American communities, and it is held by them in peculiar honor and estimation; to betray a want of it is to incur certain disgrace.

In one way, American honor aligns with the ideas of honor recognized in Europe; it places courage as the highest virtue and sees it as one of the most essential moral qualities for people. However, the concept of courage itself takes on a different meaning. In the United States, military bravery is not highly valued; the courage that is most recognized and respected is the kind that encourages people to face the dangers of the ocean in order to reach port sooner—to endure the hardships of the wilderness without complaining, and to withstand solitude that is harsher than deprivation—the courage that makes them nearly indifferent to the loss of a fortune they worked hard to build and instantly drives them to make new efforts to rebuild. This type of courage is especially vital for the survival and success of American communities, and it is held in high regard; showing a lack of it brings certain disgrace.

I have yet another characteristic point which may serve to place the idea of this chapter in stronger relief. In a democratic society like that of the United States, where fortunes are scanty and insecure, everybody works, and work opens a way to everything: this has changed the point of honor quite round, and has turned it against idleness. I have sometimes met in America with young men of wealth, personally disinclined to all laborious exertion, but who had been compelled to embrace a profession. Their disposition and their fortune allowed them to remain without employment; public opinion forbade it, too imperiously to be disobeyed. In the European countries, on the contrary, where aristocracy is still struggling with the flood which overwhelms it, I have often seen men, constantly spurred on by their wants and desires, remain in idleness, in order not to lose the esteem of their equals; and I have known them submit to ennui and privations rather than to work. No one can fail to perceive that these opposite obligations are two different rules of conduct, both nevertheless originating in the notion of honor.

I have yet another important point that can highlight the concept of this chapter. In a democratic society like the United States, where wealth is limited and unstable, everyone works, and work leads to opportunities. This has completely shifted the idea of honor, turning it against idleness. I’ve occasionally met wealthy young men in America who, despite not wanting to do any hard work, were forced to take on a profession. Their situation and wealth could have allowed them to remain unemployed, but public opinion was too strong to ignore. In contrast, in European countries, where aristocracy still struggles against overwhelming change, I have often seen people, driven by their needs and desires, choose to remain idle so as not to lose the respect of their peers. I've known them to endure boredom and hardship rather than seek work. It’s clear that these opposing expectations represent two different codes of behavior, both arising from the idea of honor.

What our forefathers designated as honor absolutely was in reality only one of its forms; they gave a generic name to what was only a species. Honor therefore is to be found in democratic as well as in aristocratic ages, but it will not be difficult to show that it assumes a different aspect in the former. Not only are its injunctions different, but we shall shortly see that they are less numerous, less precise, and that its dictates are less rigorously obeyed. The position of a caste is always much more peculiar than that of a people. Nothing is so much out of the way of the world as a small community invariably composed of the same families (as was for instance the aristocracy of the Middle Ages), whose object is to concentrate and to retain, exclusively and hereditarily, education, wealth, and power amongst its own members. But the more out of the way the position of a community happens to be, the more numerous are its special wants, and the more extensive are its notions of honor corresponding to those wants. The rules of honor will therefore always be less numerous amongst a people not divided into castes than amongst any other. If ever any nations are constituted in which it may even be difficult to find any peculiar classes of society, the notion of honor will be confined to a small number of precepts, which will be more and more in accordance with the moral laws adopted by the mass of mankind. Thus the laws of honor will be less peculiar and less multifarious amongst a democratic people than in an aristocracy. They will also be more obscure; and this is a necessary consequence of what goes before; for as the distinguishing marks of honor are less numerous and less peculiar, it must often be difficult to distinguish them. To this, other reasons may be added. Amongst the aristocratic nations of the Middle Ages, generation succeeded generation in vain; each family was like a never-dying, ever-stationary man, and the state of opinions was hardly more changeable than that of conditions. Everyone then had always the same objects before his eyes, which he contemplated from the same point; his eyes gradually detected the smallest details, and his discernment could not fail to become in the end clear and accurate. Thus not only had the men of feudal times very extraordinary opinions in matters of honor, but each of those opinions was present to their minds under a clear and precise form.

What our ancestors called honor was really just one of its forms; they used a broad term for what was only a specific type. Honor can be found in both democratic and aristocratic societies, but it’s easy to see that it looks different in each. Not only are the rules different, but we will soon see that there are fewer of them, they are less precise, and people follow them less strictly. The status of a caste is always much more unique than that of a community. Nothing is more out of the ordinary than a small community consistently made up of the same families (like the aristocracy of the Middle Ages), whose goal is to hold onto education, wealth, and power exclusively and through generations. However, the more unique a community's position is, the more specific its needs are, and the broader its ideas of honor are to meet those needs. Therefore, the rules of honor will always be fewer in a community that is not divided into castes than in any other type. If any nations are formed where it’s even hard to find specific social classes, the concept of honor will be limited to a small number of guidelines, which will increasingly align with the moral principles accepted by most people. Thus, the laws of honor will be less unique and less diverse among a democratic society than in an aristocracy. They will also be less clear; this is a necessary result of what was stated before, because as the distinguishing features of honor are fewer and less unique, it must often be hard to tell them apart. Other reasons can be added to this. Among the aristocratic nations of the Middle Ages, generations came and went without change; each family resembled an everlasting, unchanging individual, and the state of opinions was hardly more variable than conditions. Everyone had the same goals consistently in front of them, viewed from the same perspective; their eyes gradually picked up on the smallest details, and their understanding could not help but become clear and accurate in the end. Therefore, not only did the people of feudal times have very specific ideas about honor, but each of those ideas was clear and precise in their minds.

This can never be the case in America, where all men are in constant motion; and where society, transformed daily by its own operations, changes its opinions together with its wants. In such a country men have glimpses of the rules of honor, but they have seldom time to fix attention upon them.

This can never be the case in America, where everyone is always on the move; and where society, changing every day through its own actions, shifts its views along with its needs. In such a country, people catch glimpses of the rules of honor, but they rarely have the time to focus on them.

But even if society were motionless, it would still be difficult to determine the meaning which ought to be attached to the word "honor." In the Middle Ages, as each class had its own honor, the same opinion was never received at the same time by a large number of men; and this rendered it possible to give it a determined and accurate form, which was the more easy, as all those by whom it was received, having a perfectly identical and most peculiar position, were naturally disposed to agree upon the points of a law which was made for themselves alone. Thus the code of honor became a complete and detailed system, in which everything was anticipated and provided for beforehand, and a fixed and always palpable standard was applied to human actions. Amongst a democratic nation, like the Americans, in which ranks are identified, and the whole of society forms one single mass, composed of elements which are all analogous though not entirely similar, it is impossible ever to agree beforehand on what shall or shall not be allowed by the laws of honor. Amongst that people, indeed, some national wants do exist which give rise to opinions common to the whole nation on points of honor; but these opinions never occur at the same time, in the same manner, or with the same intensity to the minds of the whole community; the law of honor exists, but it has no organs to promulgate it.

But even if society were completely stable, it would still be hard to define what "honor" actually means. In the Middle Ages, each class had its own version of honor, and a large number of people never shared the same opinion at the same time. This made it possible to give honor a clear and precise form, especially since those who accepted it all had very similar and distinct positions, making them inclined to agree on the rules that applied only to them. Thus, the code of honor became a comprehensive and detailed system, where everything was anticipated and accounted for in advance, and a fixed and clear standard was applied to human behavior. In a democratic nation like the United States, where social ranks blend together and society forms a single mass made up of similar but not identical elements, it's impossible to reach a consensus on what is or isn’t acceptable by the laws of honor. Among that population, there are some national needs that lead to shared opinions on matters of honor, but these opinions don't occur simultaneously, in the same way, or with the same intensity across the entire community; the law of honor exists, but there are no channels to communicate it.

The confusion is far greater still in a democratic country like France, where the different classes of which the former fabric of society was composed, being brought together but not yet mingled, import day by day into each other's circles various and sometimes conflicting notions of honor—where every man, at his own will and pleasure, forsakes one portion of his forefathers' creed, and retains another; so that, amidst so many arbitrary measures, no common rule can ever be established, and it is almost impossible to predict which actions will be held in honor and which will be thought disgraceful. Such times are wretched, but they are of short duration.

The confusion is even greater in a democratic country like France, where the different social classes that once made up society are brought together but not yet mixed. Every day, they bring into each other's circles various and sometimes conflicting ideas of honor. Each person decides for themselves which parts of their ancestors' beliefs to keep and which to discard, so amidst so many arbitrary choices, no common standard can be established. It's almost impossible to predict which actions will be honored and which will be seen as shameful. Times like these are miserable, but they are usually short-lived.

As honor, amongst democratic nations, is imperfectly defined, its influence is of course less powerful; for it is difficult to apply with certainty and firmness a law which is not distinctly known. Public opinion, the natural and supreme interpreter of the laws of honor, not clearly discerning to which side censure or approval ought to lean, can only pronounce a hesitating judgment. Sometimes the opinion of the public may contradict itself; more frequently it does not act, and lets things pass.

As honor is not clearly defined among democratic nations, its impact is obviously weaker; it's hard to enforce a law that isn’t well understood. Public opinion, which is the natural and ultimate interpreter of honor laws, often struggles to determine where criticism or praise should go, resulting in uncertain judgments. Sometimes, public opinion can be contradictory; more often, it remains inactive and lets things slide.

The weakness of the sense of honor in democracies also arises from several other causes. In aristocratic countries, the same notions of honor are always entertained by only a few persons, always limited in number, often separated from the rest of their fellow-citizens. Honor is easily mingled and identified in their minds with the idea of all that distinguishes their own position; it appears to them as the chief characteristic of their own rank; they apply its different rules with all the warmth of personal interest, and they feel (if I may use the expression) a passion for complying with its dictates. This truth is extremely obvious in the old black-letter lawbooks on the subject of "trial by battel." The nobles, in their disputes, were bound to use the lance and sword; whereas the villains used only sticks amongst themselves, "inasmuch as," to use the words of the old books, "villains have no honor." This did not mean, as it may be imagined at the present day, that these people were contemptible; but simply that their actions were not to be judged by the same rules which were applied to the actions of the aristocracy.

The weakness of the sense of honor in democracies also comes from several other factors. In aristocratic societies, the same ideas of honor are held by only a few individuals, always a limited group, often separate from the rest of their fellow citizens. Honor is easily mixed up and identified in their minds with what sets apart their own status; it seems to them to be the main characteristic of their rank. They apply its various rules with all the fervor of personal interest, and they feel (if I can put it that way) a strong urge to follow its demands. This point is very clear in the old legal texts about "trial by battle." The nobles, in their disputes, were required to use the lance and sword; whereas the commoners fought with sticks among themselves, "inasmuch as," to quote the old texts, "commoners have no honor." This didn’t imply, as one might think today, that these people were worthless; it simply meant that their actions weren’t judged by the same standards that applied to the actions of the aristocracy.

It is surprising, at first sight, that when the sense of honor is most predominant, its injunctions are usually most strange; so that the further it is removed from common reason the better it is obeyed; whence it has sometimes been inferred that the laws of honor were strengthened by their own extravagance. The two things indeed originate from the same source, but the one is not derived from the other. Honor becomes fantastical in proportion to the peculiarity of the wants which it denotes, and the paucity of the men by whom those wants are felt; and it is because it denotes wants of this kind that its influence is great. Thus the notion of honor is not the stronger for being fantastical, but it is fantastical and strong from the selfsame cause.

It's surprising, at first glance, that when the sense of honor is most intense, its demands are often the most unusual; so the more it strays from common sense, the more it is followed. This has led to the idea that the rules of honor are upheld by their own absurdity. Both concepts indeed come from the same origin, but one doesn't come from the other. Honor becomes more bizarre depending on how specific the needs it represents are and how few the people are who feel those needs; and it’s precisely because it represents these kinds of needs that it has such a strong influence. Therefore, the idea of honor isn't stronger just because it's bizarre, but rather it's bizarre and strong for the same reason.

Further, amongst aristocratic nations each rank is different, but all ranks are fixed; every man occupies a place in his own sphere which he cannot relinquish, and he lives there amidst other men who are bound by the same ties. Amongst these nations no man can either hope or fear to escape being seen; no man is placed so low but that he has a stage of his own, and none can avoid censure or applause by his obscurity. In democratic States on the contrary, where all the members of the community are mingled in the same crowd and in constant agitation, public opinion has no hold on men; they disappear at every instant, and elude its power. Consequently the dictates of honor will be there less imperious and less stringent; for honor acts solely for the public eye—differing in this respect from mere virtue, which lives upon itself contented with its own approval.

Additionally, in aristocratic societies, each rank is distinct, yet all ranks are established; everyone has a place within their own social group that they can't give up, and they live among others who are held by the same connections. In these societies, no one can hope or fear to escape notice; no one is so lowly that they lack a platform of their own, and no one can avoid criticism or praise just because they're not well-known. In contrast, in democratic societies, where all members of the community mix in the same crowd and are constantly in motion, public opinion doesn’t really have power over people; they can vanish at any moment and evade its influence. As a result, the rules of honor are less demanding and less strict there; honor exists only for the sake of public perception—unlike mere virtue, which exists content and relying only on its own approval.

If the reader has distinctly apprehended all that goes before, he will understand that there is a close and necessary relation between the inequality of social conditions and what has here been styled honor—a relation which, if I am not mistaken, had not before been clearly pointed out. I shall therefore make one more attempt to illustrate it satisfactorily. Suppose a nation stands apart from the rest of mankind: independently of certain general wants inherent in the human race, it will also have wants and interests peculiar to itself: certain opinions of censure or approbation forthwith arise in the community, which are peculiar to itself, and which are styled honor by the members of that community. Now suppose that in this same nation a caste arises, which, in its turn, stands apart from all the other classes, and contracts certain peculiar wants, which give rise in their turn to special opinions. The honor of this caste, composed of a medley of the peculiar notions of the nation, and the still more peculiar notions of the caste, will be as remote as it is possible to conceive from the simple and general opinions of men.

If the reader has clearly understood everything mentioned previously, they will see that there is a strong and essential connection between the inequality of social conditions and what has been referred to here as honor—a connection that, as far as I know, hasn't been clearly identified before. So, I will make one more effort to explain it thoroughly. Imagine a nation that is separate from the rest of humanity: besides certain common needs that are part of human nature, it will also have its own specific wants and interests. This leads to particular opinions of criticism or approval that emerge within the community, which the people of that nation call honor. Now, imagine that within this nation, a caste develops, which, in turn, separates itself from all other classes and develops its own unique wants, resulting in specific opinions. The honor of this caste, made up of a mix of the unique ideas of the nation and even more distinct ideas of the caste, will be as far removed as possible from the simple, general views of people.

Having reached this extreme point of the argument, I now return. When ranks are commingled and privileges abolished, the men of whom a nation is composed being once more equal and alike, their interests and wants become identical, and all the peculiar notions which each caste styled honor successively disappear: the notion of honor no longer proceeds from any other source than the wants peculiar to the nation at large, and it denotes the individual character of that nation to the world. Lastly, if it be allowable to suppose that all the races of mankind should be commingled, and that all the peoples of earth should ultimately come to have the same interests, the same wants, undistinguished from each other by any characteristic peculiarities, no conventional value whatever would then be attached to men's actions; they would all be regarded by all in the same light; the general necessities of mankind, revealed by conscience to every man, would become the common standard. The simple and general notions of right and wrong only would then be recognized in the world, to which, by a natural and necessary tie, the idea of censure or approbation would be attached. Thus, to comprise all my meaning in a single proposition, the dissimilarities and inequalities of men gave rise to the notion of honor; that notion is weakened in proportion as these differences are obliterated, and with them it would disappear.

Having reached the peak of this argument, I’ll return to my main point. When social classes mix and privileges are removed, the people of a nation become equal and similar again, their interests and needs align, and all the unique ideas that each group called honor gradually fade away. Honor then comes solely from the needs of the nation as a whole, and it reflects the character of that nation to the outside world. Finally, if we entertain the idea that all human races blend together and that all people on Earth ultimately share the same interests and needs, without any distinguishing characteristics, then no conventional value would be attached to anyone's actions; they would all be seen the same way. The basic needs of humanity, recognized by everyone's conscience, would become the universal standard. In this scenario, only simple and general concepts of right and wrong would matter, to which the ideas of praise or blame would naturally be tied. So, to summarize my point in one statement: the differences and inequalities among people created the concept of honor; this concept diminishes as those differences disappear, along with it.





Chapter XIX: Why So Many Ambitious Men And So Little Lofty Ambition Are To Be Found In The United States

The first thing which strikes a traveller in the United States is the innumerable multitude of those who seek to throw off their original condition; and the second is the rarity of lofty ambition to be observed in the midst of the universally ambitious stir of society. No Americans are devoid of a yearning desire to rise; but hardly any appear to entertain hopes of great magnitude, or to drive at very lofty aims. All are constantly seeking to acquire property, power, and reputation—few contemplate these things upon a great scale; and this is the more surprising, as nothing is to be discerned in the manners or laws of America to limit desire, or to prevent it from spreading its impulses in every direction. It seems difficult to attribute this singular state of things to the equality of social conditions; for at the instant when that same equality was established in France, the flight of ambition became unbounded. Nevertheless, I think that the principal cause which may be assigned to this fact is to be found in the social condition and democratic manners of the Americans.

The first thing that stands out to a traveler in the United States is the countless number of people trying to break free from their original circumstances; the second is the shortage of high ambition noticeable amid the overall drive of society. No Americans lack a strong desire to succeed, but very few seem to have hopes that are grand in scale or aim for really high goals. Everyone is constantly trying to gain wealth, power, and status—few think about these things on a larger scale; this is even more surprising since there is nothing in American customs or laws that seems to limit desire or stop it from spreading in every direction. It's hard to pin this unusual situation on the equality of social conditions, because when that same equality was achieved in France, ambition soared without limits. Still, I believe the main reason for this fact lies in the social conditions and democratic ways of the Americans.

All revolutions enlarge the ambition of men: this proposition is more peculiarly true of those revolutions which overthrow an aristocracy. When the former barriers which kept back the multitude from fame and power are suddenly thrown down, a violent and universal rise takes place towards that eminence so long coveted and at length to be enjoyed. In this first burst of triumph nothing seems impossible to anyone: not only are desires boundless, but the power of satisfying them seems almost boundless, too. Amidst the general and sudden renewal of laws and customs, in this vast confusion of all men and all ordinances, the various members of the community rise and sink again with excessive rapidity; and power passes so quickly from hand to hand that none need despair of catching it in turn. It must be recollected, moreover, that the people who destroy an aristocracy have lived under its laws; they have witnessed its splendor, and they have unconsciously imbibed the feelings and notions which it entertained. Thus at the moment when an aristocracy is dissolved, its spirit still pervades the mass of the community, and its tendencies are retained long after it has been defeated. Ambition is therefore always extremely great as long as a democratic revolution lasts, and it will remain so for some time after the revolution is consummated. The reminiscence of the extraordinary events which men have witnessed is not obliterated from their memory in a day. The passions which a revolution has roused do not disappear at its close. A sense of instability remains in the midst of re-established order: a notion of easy success survives the strange vicissitudes which gave it birth; desires still remain extremely enlarged, when the means of satisfying them are diminished day by day. The taste for large fortunes subsists, though large fortunes are rare: and on every side we trace the ravages of inordinate and hapless ambition kindled in hearts which they consume in secret and in vain.

All revolutions heighten people's ambitions; this is especially true for those revolutions that topple an aristocracy. When the barriers that previously held the masses back from fame and power are suddenly removed, there’s a rapid and widespread push toward that coveted status that has long been desired and is finally within reach. In this initial rush of victory, nothing seems impossible for anyone: not only are desires limitless, but the ability to fulfill them seems almost limitless as well. Amid this sudden and sweeping change in laws and customs, the various members of society rise and fall with incredible speed; power shifts so quickly from person to person that no one needs to despair of seizing it for themselves. It’s important to remember that the people who dismantle an aristocracy have lived under its rules; they have seen its glory, and they have unwittingly absorbed its feelings and ideas. Therefore, at the moment an aristocracy crumbles, its influence still lingers throughout the community, and its inclinations persist long after it has been vanquished. Ambition remains intensely high for as long as a democratic revolution lasts, and it continues for some time even after the revolution is complete. The memory of the extraordinary events people have witnessed doesn’t fade away overnight. The passions ignited by a revolution do not vanish just because it has ended. A feeling of instability persists even amidst the restored order: the idea of easy success lingers following the unpredictable changes that created it; desires remain vastly inflated, even as the means to satisfy them decrease day by day. The longing for great wealth endures, despite the rarity of such fortunes: and all around, we see the damage caused by excessive and unfulfilled ambition burning in hearts that it secretly consumes in vain.

At length, however, the last vestiges of the struggle are effaced; the remains of aristocracy completely disappear; the great events by which its fall was attended are forgotten; peace succeeds to war, and the sway of order is restored in the new realm; desires are again adapted to the means by which they may be fulfilled; the wants, the opinions, and the feelings of men cohere once more; the level of the community is permanently determined, and democratic society established. A democratic nation, arrived at this permanent and regular state of things, will present a very different spectacle from that which we have just described; and we may readily conclude that, if ambition becomes great whilst the conditions of society are growing equal, it loses that quality when they have grown so. As wealth is subdivided and knowledge diffused, no one is entirely destitute of education or of property; the privileges and disqualifications of caste being abolished, and men having shattered the bonds which held them fixed, the notion of advancement suggests itself to every mind, the desire to rise swells in every heart, and all men want to mount above their station: ambition is the universal feeling.

Eventually, however, the last remnants of the struggle vanish; the remnants of aristocracy completely disappear; the major events that accompanied its downfall are forgotten; peace follows war, and a sense of order is reinstated in the new society; desires are once again aligned with the means to fulfill them; the needs, opinions, and feelings of people come together once more; the overall status of the community is firmly established, and a democratic society is formed. A democratic nation that has reached this stable and regular state will look very different from what we’ve just described; and we can easily conclude that if ambition grows while societal conditions become more equal, it loses that quality when they have become so. As wealth becomes more divided and knowledge spreads, no one is completely lacking in education or property; with the privileges and restrictions of class abolished, and people having broken free from the constraints that held them back, the idea of advancement comes to every mind, the desire to rise grows in every heart, and everyone wants to elevate their status: ambition becomes a universal feeling.

But if the equality of conditions gives some resources to all the members of the community, it also prevents any of them from having resources of great extent, which necessarily circumscribes their desires within somewhat narrow limits. Thus amongst democratic nations ambition is ardent and continual, but its aim is not habitually lofty; and life is generally spent in eagerly coveting small objects which are within reach. What chiefly diverts the men of democracies from lofty ambition is not the scantiness of their fortunes, but the vehemence of the exertions they daily make to improve them. They strain their faculties to the utmost to achieve paltry results, and this cannot fail speedily to limit their discernment and to circumscribe their powers. They might be much poorer and still be greater. The small number of opulent citizens who are to be found amidst a democracy do not constitute an exception to this rule. A man who raises himself by degrees to wealth and power, contracts, in the course of this protracted labor, habits of prudence and restraint which he cannot afterwards shake off. A man cannot enlarge his mind as he would his house. The same observation is applicable to the sons of such a man; they are born, it is true, in a lofty position, but their parents were humble; they have grown up amidst feelings and notions which they cannot afterwards easily get rid of; and it may be presumed that they will inherit the propensities of their father as well as his wealth. It may happen, on the contrary, that the poorest scion of a powerful aristocracy may display vast ambition, because the traditional opinions of his race and the general spirit of his order still buoy him up for some time above his fortune. Another thing which prevents the men of democratic periods from easily indulging in the pursuit of lofty objects, is the lapse of time which they foresee must take place before they can be ready to approach them. "It is a great advantage," says Pascal, "to be a man of quality, since it brings one man as forward at eighteen or twenty as another man would be at fifty, which is a clear gain of thirty years." Those thirty years are commonly wanting to the ambitious characters of democracies. The principle of equality, which allows every man to arrive at everything, prevents all men from rapid advancement.

But while equality of conditions provides some resources to everyone in the community, it also stops any of them from having extensive resources, which keeps their ambitions within fairly narrow limits. So, in democratic nations, ambition is strong and constant, but it usually isn't aimed at high goals; instead, people spend their lives eagerly chasing smaller, attainable things. What mainly distracts individuals in democracies from pursuing high ambitions isn’t the limited resources they have, but the intense efforts they put in every day to improve their situations. They push themselves to the limit to achieve minor successes, which quickly restricts their perspective and limits their capabilities. They could be much poorer and still achieve greater things. The few wealthy people found in a democracy don't break this rule. A person who gradually ascends to wealth and power adopts habits of caution and self-restraint during this long process that they can't easily let go of afterward. A person can't expand their mindset in the same way they can expand their home. The same applies to the children of such a person; they may indeed be born into wealth, but their parents had humble beginnings, and they have grown up surrounded by attitudes and ideas that are hard to shake off. It's likely they will inherit their father's tendencies along with his riches. Conversely, the poorest descendant of a powerful aristocracy might show tremendous ambition because the traditional values of his lineage and the general spirit of his class still uplift him for some time beyond his financial status. Another factor that makes it difficult for people in democracies to pursue high aims easily is the time they know they will need before they can even approach those goals. "It is a great advantage," Pascal says, "to be a man of quality, since it allows one person to advance at eighteen or twenty as another would at fifty, which is a clear gain of thirty years." Those thirty years are typically missing for ambitious individuals in democracies. The principle of equality, which permits everyone to achieve anything, ultimately prevents rapid progress for all.

In a democratic society, as well as elsewhere, there are only a certain number of great fortunes to be made; and as the paths which lead to them are indiscriminately open to all, the progress of all must necessarily be slackened. As the candidates appear to be nearly alike, and as it is difficult to make a selection without infringing the principle of equality, which is the supreme law of democratic societies, the first idea which suggests itself is to make them all advance at the same rate and submit to the same probation. Thus in proportion as men become more alike, and the principle of equality is more peaceably and deeply infused into the institutions and manners of the country, the rules of advancement become more inflexible, advancement itself slower, the difficulty of arriving quickly at a certain height far greater. From hatred of privilege and from the embarrassment of choosing, all men are at last constrained, whatever may be their standard, to pass the same ordeal; all are indiscriminately subjected to a multitude of petty preliminary exercises, in which their youth is wasted and their imagination quenched, so that they despair of ever fully attaining what is held out to them; and when at length they are in a condition to perform any extraordinary acts, the taste for such things has forsaken them.

In a democratic society, as well as in other places, there are only so many great fortunes to be made; and since the paths to those fortunes are equally open to everyone, the progress of all must inevitably slow down. Because the candidates seem nearly identical, and it’s hard to make a choice without violating the principle of equality—which is the highest law in democratic societies—the first thought that comes to mind is to have everyone move forward at the same pace and go through the same process. As people become more similar, and the principle of equality is more peacefully and deeply integrated into the country’s institutions and customs, the rules for advancement become stricter, progress itself becomes slower, and the challenge of quickly reaching a certain level becomes much greater. Due to the dislike of privilege and the confusion of choice, all individuals are eventually forced, regardless of their standards, to undergo the same test; everyone faces a host of minor preliminary challenges that waste their youth and stifle their creativity, leading them to feel hopeless about ever fully achieving what is promised to them; and by the time they are capable of doing anything extraordinary, they have lost interest in such pursuits.

In China, where the equality of conditions is exceedingly great and very ancient, no man passes from one public office to another without undergoing a probationary trial. This probation occurs afresh at every stage of his career; and the notion is now so rooted in the manners of the people that I remember to have read a Chinese novel, in which the hero, after numberless crosses, succeeds at length in touching the heart of his mistress by taking honors. A lofty ambition breathes with difficulty in such an atmosphere.

In China, where there’s a long-standing emphasis on equality, no one can move from one public office to another without going through a trial period. This trial happens again at every stage of their career; and this idea is so embedded in the culture that I recall reading a Chinese novel where the main character eventually wins over his love interest by achieving honors. It’s hard for lofty ambitions to flourish in such an environment.

The remark I apply to politics extends to everything; equality everywhere produces the same effects; where the laws of a country do not regulate and retard the advancement of men by positive enactment, competition attains the same end. In a well-established democratic community great and rapid elevation is therefore rare; it forms an exception to the common rule; and it is the singularity of such occurrences that makes men forget how rarely they happen. Men living in democracies ultimately discover these things; they find out at last that the laws of their country open a boundless field of action before them, but that no one can hope to hasten across it. Between them and the final object of their desires, they perceive a multitude of small intermediate impediments, which must be slowly surmounted: this prospect wearies and discourages their ambition at once. They therefore give up hopes so doubtful and remote, to search nearer to themselves for less lofty and more easy enjoyments. Their horizon is not bounded by the laws but narrowed by themselves.

The point I make about politics applies to everything; equality everywhere leads to the same results. When the laws of a country don’t hold back people’s progress, competition achieves the same goal. In a well-functioning democratic society, significant and quick advancements are rare; they tend to be the exception. It’s the uniqueness of these moments that makes people forget how seldom they occur. Those living in democracies ultimately realize this: they discover that the laws of their country create a vast area of opportunity, but no one can expect to race through it. They see many small obstacles between them and their ultimate goals, which must be gradually overcome, and this outlook tires and discourages their ambition. As a result, they abandon such uncertain and distant hopes and instead look for more immediate, attainable pleasures. Their view isn’t limited by the laws but restricted by their own choices.

I have remarked that lofty ambitions are more rare in the ages of democracy than in times of aristocracy: I may add that when, in spite of these natural obstacles, they do spring into existence, their character is different. In aristocracies the career of ambition is often wide, but its boundaries are determined. In democracies ambition commonly ranges in a narrower field, but if once it gets beyond that, hardly any limits can be assigned to it. As men are individually weak—as they live asunder, and in constant motion—as precedents are of little authority and laws but of short duration, resistance to novelty is languid, and the fabric of society never appears perfectly erect or firmly consolidated. So that, when once an ambitious man has the power in his grasp, there is nothing he may noted are; and when it is gone from him, he meditates the overthrow of the State to regain it. This gives to great political ambition a character of revolutionary violence, which it seldom exhibits to an equal degree in aristocratic communities. The common aspect of democratic nations will present a great number of small and very rational objects of ambition, from amongst which a few ill-controlled desires of a larger growth will at intervals break out: but no such a thing as ambition conceived and contrived on a vast scale is to be met with there.

I've noticed that big ambitions are less common in democratic times than in aristocratic ones. I can also say that when they do appear despite these natural challenges, they have a different nature. In aristocracies, ambitious careers are often broad, but their limits are set. In democracies, ambition usually operates in a smaller area, but once it stretches beyond that, there are hardly any limits to it. Because individuals are generally weak, live separately, and are always on the move, past examples hold little sway, and laws don't last long. As a result, resistance to new ideas is weak, and society never looks perfectly stable or solidified. So when an ambitious person gains power, they can do almost anything; and when that power is lost, they contemplate overthrowing the government to get it back. This gives significant political ambition a tendency towards revolutionary violence, which is often less pronounced in aristocratic societies. In democratic nations, you'll see many small and rational ambitions, but occasionally, some uncontrolled larger desires will emerge. However, you won't find ambitions that are grandly conceived and designed on a large scale there.

I have shown elsewhere by what secret influence the principle of equality makes the passion for physical gratifications and the exclusive love of the present predominate in the human heart: these different propensities mingle with the sentiment of ambition, and tinge it, as it were, with their hues. I believe that ambitious men in democracies are less engrossed than any others with the interests and the judgment of posterity; the present moment alone engages and absorbs them. They are more apt to complete a number of undertakings with rapidity than to raise lasting monuments of their achievements; and they care much more for success than for fame. What they most ask of men is obedience—what they most covet is empire. Their manners have in almost all cases remained below the height of their station; the consequence is that they frequently carry very low tastes into their extraordinary fortunes, and that they seem to have acquired the supreme power only to minister to their coarse or paltry pleasures.

I have demonstrated elsewhere how the principle of equality secretly influences people to prioritize physical pleasures and a focus on the present moment over everything else. These different tendencies blend with ambition, coloring it in their own way. I believe that ambitious individuals in democracies care less than anyone else about what future generations will think; they are solely engaged with the present. They are more likely to quickly finish many projects than to build lasting legacies, and they care much more about achieving success than gaining fame. What they most want from others is obedience—what they most desire is power. Their behavior often falls short of their status; as a result, they frequently bring low tastes into their remarkable fortunes, and it seems they have gained supreme power just to satisfy their crude or trivial pleasures.

I think that in our time it is very necessary to cleanse, to regulate, and to adapt the feeling of ambition, but that it would be extremely dangerous to seek to impoverish and to repress it over-much. We should attempt to lay down certain extreme limits, which it should never be allowed to outstep; but its range within those established limits should not be too much checked. I confess that I apprehend much less for democratic society from the boldness than from the mediocrity of desires. What appears to me most to be dreaded is that, in the midst of the small incessant occupations of private life, ambition should lose its vigor and its greatness—that the passions of man should abate, but at the same time be lowered, so that the march of society should every day become more tranquil and less aspiring. I think then that the leaders of modern society would be wrong to seek to lull the community by a state of too uniform and too peaceful happiness; and that it is well to expose it from time to time to matters of difficulty and danger, in order to raise ambition and to give it a field of action. Moralists are constantly complaining that the ruling vice of the present time is pride. This is true in one sense, for indeed no one thinks that he is not better than his neighbor, or consents to obey his superior: but it is extremely false in another; for the same man who cannot endure subordination or equality, has so contemptible an opinion of himself that he thinks he is only born to indulge in vulgar pleasures. He willingly takes up with low desires, without daring to embark in lofty enterprises, of which he scarcely dreams. Thus, far from thinking that humility ought to be preached to our contemporaries, I would have endeavors made to give them a more enlarged idea of themselves and of their kind. Humility is unwholesome to them; what they most want is, in my opinion, pride. I would willingly exchange several of our small virtues for this one vice.

I believe that today it’s really important to refine, regulate, and adapt our sense of ambition, but it would be very dangerous to try to weaken or suppress it too much. We should set certain strict limits that it should never go beyond, but within those limits, it shouldn't be overly restricted. I honestly worry more about the mediocrity of desires in democratic society than about boldness. What I fear the most is that in the midst of the endless small tasks of everyday life, ambition could lose its strength and grandeur—that human passions might diminish and, at the same time, become less lofty, leading society to become increasingly calm and less aspirational. I think that the leaders of today’s society would be mistaken to lull the community into a state of too much uniform and peaceful happiness; it’s beneficial to expose them from time to time to challenges and dangers to elevate ambition and provide it with opportunities to act. Moralists often complain that the main flaw of our time is pride. This is true in one sense, as no one believes they are inferior to their neighbor or is willing to submit to their superiors. But it’s also very false in another sense; the same person who can't stand being subordinate or equal has such a low opinion of themselves that they think they are only meant to indulge in trivial pleasures. They willingly settle for low aspirations and don’t dare to undertake high endeavors, which they hardly even envision. So, rather than thinking that humility should be preached to our contemporaries, I would advocate for efforts to give them a broader understanding of themselves and their potential. Humility is unhealthy for them; what they really need, in my opinion, is pride. I would gladly trade several of our minor virtues for this one vice.





Chapter XX: The Trade Of Place-Hunting In Certain Democratic Countries

In the United States as soon as a man has acquired some education and pecuniary resources, he either endeavors to get rich by commerce or industry, or he buys land in the bush and turns pioneer. All that he asks of the State is not to be disturbed in his toil, and to be secure of his earnings. Amongst the greater part of European nations, when a man begins to feel his strength and to extend his desires, the first thing that occurs to him is to get some public employment. These opposite effects, originating in the same cause, deserve our passing notice.

In the United States, once a man has gained some education and financial resources, he either tries to get rich through business or hard work, or he buys land in the countryside and becomes a pioneer. All he asks from the government is not to be interrupted in his work and to be able to keep what he earns. In many European countries, when a man starts to recognize his potential and wants more, the first thing that comes to mind is to seek a public job. These contrasting outcomes, stemming from the same underlying reason, deserve our attention.

When public employments are few in number, ill-paid and precarious, whilst the different lines of business are numerous and lucrative, it is to business, and not to official duties, that the new and eager desires engendered by the principle of equality turn from every side. But if, whilst the ranks of society are becoming more equal, the education of the people remains incomplete, or their spirit the reverse of bold—if commerce and industry, checked in their growth, afford only slow and arduous means of making a fortune—the various members of the community, despairing of ameliorating their own condition, rush to the head of the State and demand its assistance. To relieve their own necessities at the cost of the public treasury, appears to them to be the easiest and most open, if not the only, way they have to rise above a condition which no longer contents them; place-hunting becomes the most generally followed of all trades. This must especially be the case, in those great centralized monarchies in which the number of paid offices is immense, and the tenure of them tolerably secure, so that no one despairs of obtaining a place, and of enjoying it as undisturbedly as a hereditary fortune.

When there are few public jobs that are poorly paid and unstable, while there are many lucrative business opportunities, people's newfound desires driven by the principle of equality turn more toward business than to official duties. However, if, as society becomes more equal, the education of the people remains lacking or their spirit timid—if commerce and industry, stunted in growth, provide only slow and difficult ways to make money—the members of the community, feeling hopeless about improving their situation, flock to the government for help. They believe that taking from the public treasury to meet their needs is the easiest and possibly the only way to rise above a situation that no longer satisfies them; seeking positions in government becomes the most popular career choice. This is especially true in large centralized monarchies where the number of paid positions is vast, and the security of these positions is fairly stable, so no one loses hope of landing a job and enjoying it as peacefully as an inherited fortune.

I shall not remark that the universal and inordinate desire for place is a great social evil; that it destroys the spirit of independence in the citizen, and diffuses a venal and servile humor throughout the frame of society; that it stifles the manlier virtues: nor shall I be at the pains to demonstrate that this kind of traffic only creates an unproductive activity, which agitates the country without adding to its resources: all these things are obvious. But I would observe, that a government which encourages this tendency risks its own tranquillity, and places its very existence in great jeopardy. I am aware that at a time like our own, when the love and respect which formerly clung to authority are seen gradually to decline, it may appear necessary to those in power to lay a closer hold on every man by his own interest, and it may seem convenient to use his own passions to keep him in order and in silence; but this cannot be so long, and what may appear to be a source of strength for a certain time will assuredly become in the end a great cause of embarrassment and weakness.

I won't point out that the overwhelming desire for power is a serious social problem; that it undermines individual independence and spreads a corrupt and submissive attitude throughout society; that it suppresses stronger virtues: nor will I take the time to prove that this sort of behavior only generates unproductive activity, which disrupts the country without increasing its resources: all these points are clear. But I would like to note that a government that promotes this tendency risks its own peace and puts its very existence in jeopardy. I understand that in times like ours, when the love and respect that once supported authority are gradually fading, those in power may feel it's necessary to tighten their grip on each person by appealing to their self-interest, and it may seem practical to use people’s own passions to keep them in check; but this situation won’t last, and what may appear to be a source of strength for a while will eventually turn into a significant source of trouble and weakness.

Amongst democratic nations, as well as elsewhere, the number of official appointments has in the end some limits; but amongst those nations, the number of aspirants is unlimited; it perpetually increases, with a gradual and irresistible rise in proportion as social conditions become more equal, and is only checked by the limits of the population. Thus, when public employments afford the only outlet for ambition, the government necessarily meets with a permanent opposition at last; for it is tasked to satisfy with limited means unlimited desires. It is very certain that of all people in the world the most difficult to restrain and to manage are a people of solicitants. Whatever endeavors are made by rulers, such a people can never be contented; and it is always to be apprehended that they will ultimately overturn the constitution of the country, and change the aspect of the State, for the sole purpose of making a clearance of places. The sovereigns of the present age, who strive to fix upon themselves alone all those novel desires which are aroused by equality, and to satisfy them, will repent in the end, if I am not mistaken, that they ever embarked in this policy: they will one day discover that they have hazarded their own power, by making it so necessary; and that the more safe and honest course would have been to teach their subjects the art of providing for themselves. *a

Among democratic nations, and elsewhere, the number of official appointments has its limits; however, the number of people wanting those positions is unlimited. This number keeps growing steadily and inevitably as social conditions become more equal and is only held back by population limits. So, when public jobs are the only way to pursue ambition, the government faces constant opposition because it has to satisfy unlimited desires with limited resources. It's clear that the hardest people to control and manage are those who constantly seek positions. No matter what efforts leaders make, such people can never be satisfied, and there's always a risk they could end up overturning the country’s constitution and changing the government just to clear out positions. Today's leaders, who try to take on all these new desires triggered by equality and meet them, will regret this approach eventually, if I'm right. They will realize that they’ve put their own power at risk by making it so necessary, and that a safer and more honest strategy would have been to teach their citizens how to take care of themselves.

a
[ As a matter of fact, more recent experience has shown that place-hunting is quite as intense in the United States as in any country in Europe. It is regarded by the Americans themselves as one of the great evils of their social condition, and it powerfully affects their political institutions. But the American who seeks a place seeks not so much a means of subsistence as the distinction which office and public employment confer. In the absence of any true aristocracy, the public service creates a spurious one, which is as much an object of ambition as the distinctions of rank in aristocratic countries.—Translator's Note.]

a
[ In fact, more recent experiences have shown that finding a job is just as intense in the United States as it is in any European country. Americans themselves see it as one of the major issues in their society, and it greatly impacts their political systems. However, the American looking for a job is more interested in the prestige that comes with office and public employment than just a way to earn a living. In the absence of a genuine aristocracy, public service creates a fake one, which is pursued with as much ambition as social ranks in aristocratic nations.—Translator's Note.]





Chapter XXI: Why Great Revolutions Will Become More Rare

A people which has existed for centuries under a system of castes and classes can only arrive at a democratic state of society by passing through a long series of more or less critical transformations, accomplished by violent efforts, and after numerous vicissitudes; in the course of which, property, opinions, and power are rapidly transferred from one hand to another. Even after this great revolution is consummated, the revolutionary habits engendered by it may long be traced, and it will be followed by deep commotion. As all this takes place at the very time at which social conditions are becoming more equal, it is inferred that some concealed relation and secret tie exist between the principle of equality itself and revolution, insomuch that the one cannot exist without giving rise to the other.

A society that has lived for centuries under a system of castes and classes can only achieve a democratic state through a long process of critical changes, often marked by violent struggles and many ups and downs. During this time, property, beliefs, and power shift rapidly from one group to another. Even after this major upheaval is complete, the revolutionary habits formed during it may be noticeable for a long time, and it will likely lead to significant unrest. Since all this happens while social conditions are becoming more equal, it suggests there is some hidden connection between the concept of equality and revolution, to the extent that one cannot exist without leading to the other.

On this point reasoning may seem to lead to the same result as experience. Amongst a people whose ranks are nearly equal, no ostensible bond connects men together, or keeps them settled in their station. None of them have either a permanent right or power to command—none are forced by their condition to obey; but every man, finding himself possessed of some education and some resources, may choose his won path and proceed apart from all his fellow-men. The same causes which make the members of the community independent of each other, continually impel them to new and restless desires, and constantly spur them onwards. It therefore seems natural that, in a democratic community, men, things, and opinions should be forever changing their form and place, and that democratic ages should be times of rapid and incessant transformation.

In this regard, reasoning seems to lead to the same conclusion as experience. Among a group of people whose social classes are nearly equal, there’s no obvious bond that connects individuals or keeps them settled in their roles. None of them have a permanent right or power to lead—none are compelled by their status to follow; instead, each person, having some education and resources, can choose their own path and move away from others. The same factors that make individuals in the community independent from one another also drive them to pursue new and restless desires, constantly pushing them forward. It then appears natural that, in a democratic society, people, things, and ideas should continuously change in form and location, making democratic eras periods of rapid and ongoing transformation.

But is this really the case? does the equality of social conditions habitually and permanently lead men to revolution? does that state of society contain some perturbing principle which prevents the community from ever subsiding into calm, and disposes the citizens to alter incessantly their laws, their principles, and their manners? I do not believe it; and as the subject is important, I beg for the reader's close attention. Almost all the revolutions which have changed the aspect of nations have been made to consolidate or to destroy social inequality. Remove the secondary causes which have produced the great convulsions of the world, and you will almost always find the principle of inequality at the bottom. Either the poor have attempted to plunder the rich, or the rich to enslave the poor. If then a state of society can ever be founded in which every man shall have something to keep, and little to take from others, much will have been done for the peace of the world. I am aware that amongst a great democratic people there will always be some members of the community in great poverty, and others in great opulence; but the poor, instead of forming the immense majority of the nation, as is always the case in aristocratic communities, are comparatively few in number, and the laws do not bind them together by the ties of irremediable and hereditary penury. The wealthy, on their side, are scarce and powerless; they have no privileges which attract public observation; even their wealth, as it is no longer incorporated and bound up with the soil, is impalpable, and as it were invisible. As there is no longer a race of poor men, so there is no longer a race of rich men; the latter spring up daily from the multitude, and relapse into it again. Hence they do not form a distinct class, which may be easily marked out and plundered; and, moreover, as they are connected with the mass of their fellow-citizens by a thousand secret ties, the people cannot assail them without inflicting an injury upon itself. Between these two extremes of democratic communities stand an innumerable multitude of men almost alike, who, without being exactly either rich or poor, are possessed of sufficient property to desire the maintenance of order, yet not enough to excite envy. Such men are the natural enemies of violent commotions: their stillness keeps all beneath them and above them still, and secures the balance of the fabric of society. Not indeed that even these men are contented with what they have gotten, or that they feel a natural abhorrence for a revolution in which they might share the spoil without sharing the calamity; on the contrary, they desire, with unexampled ardor, to get rich, but the difficulty is to know from whom riches can be taken. The same state of society which constantly prompts desires, restrains these desires within necessary limits: it gives men more liberty of changing and less interest in change.

But is this really true? Does having equal social conditions typically lead people to revolt? Is there something about society that keeps it from ever settling down and makes citizens constantly want to change their laws, principles, and behaviors? I don't think so; and since this topic is important, I ask for the reader's full attention. Almost all revolutions that have transformed nations have been aimed at either reinforcing or eliminating social inequality. If you remove the secondary causes behind the major upheavals in the world, you'll usually find that inequality is at the core. Either the poor have tried to take from the rich, or the rich have sought to control the poor. If a society could ever be established where everyone has something to hold onto and little to take from others, a lot would be achieved for world peace. I'm aware that among a large democratic population, there will always be some people in severe poverty and others in great wealth; however, the poor, instead of making up a huge majority as in aristocratic societies, are relatively few, and the laws do not bind them together by unbreakable and inherited poverty. On the other hand, the wealthy are few and powerless; they don't have privileges that are noticeable to the public. Their wealth, no longer tied to land, is often intangible and almost invisible. Since there’s no longer a distinct class of poor people, there’s also no stable class of rich people; the latter emerge daily from the masses and then go back into them. Thus, they don’t form a clear-cut class that can be easily targeted for exploitation; and because they are linked to their fellow citizens by countless unseen ties, the people cannot attack them without harming themselves. Between these two extremes in democratic societies lies a vast number of people who are almost alike, who, without being strictly rich or poor, have enough property to want to maintain order but not enough to provoke envy. These individuals are the natural enemies of violent upheavals: their stability keeps everything around them steady, ensuring the balance of society. Not that these people are satisfied with what they have or that they have a natural aversion to a revolution where they could benefit without facing the consequences; on the contrary, they passionately want to get rich, but the challenge lies in knowing who to take wealth from. The same social conditions that continuously provoke desires also keep those desires within necessary limits: they give people more freedom to change while reducing their interest in actual change.

Not only are the men of democracies not naturally desirous of revolutions, but they are afraid of them. All revolutions more or less threaten the tenure of property: but most of those who live in democratic countries are possessed of property—not only are they possessed of property, but they live in the condition of men who set the greatest store upon their property. If we attentively consider each of the classes of which society is composed, it is easy to see that the passions engendered by property are keenest and most tenacious amongst the middle classes. The poor often care but little for what they possess, because they suffer much more from the want of what they have not, than they enjoy the little they have. The rich have many other passions besides that of riches to satisfy; and, besides, the long and arduous enjoyment of a great fortune sometimes makes them in the end insensible to its charms. But the men who have a competency, alike removed from opulence and from penury, attach an enormous value to their possessions. As they are still almost within the reach of poverty, they see its privations near at hand, and dread them; between poverty and themselves there is nothing but a scanty fortune, upon which they immediately fix their apprehensions and their hopes. Every day increases the interest they take in it, by the constant cares which it occasions; and they are the more attached to it by their continual exertions to increase the amount. The notion of surrendering the smallest part of it is insupportable to them, and they consider its total loss as the worst of misfortunes. Now these eager and apprehensive men of small property constitute the class which is constantly increased by the equality of conditions. Hence, in democratic communities, the majority of the people do not clearly see what they have to gain by a revolution, but they continually and in a thousand ways feel that they might lose by one.

Not only are people in democracies not naturally eager for revolutions, but they're also afraid of them. All revolutions threaten property ownership to some extent, and most people living in democratic countries own property. Not only do they own property, but they also place a high value on it. If we carefully look at the different classes in society, it's clear that the emotions tied to property are strongest and most persistent among the middle class. The poor often care little about what they own because they suffer much more from what they lack than they enjoy what little they possess. The wealthy have many other desires to fulfill besides their wealth, and sometimes the long-term enjoyment of great riches makes them less sensitive to its allure. However, people with a comfortable amount of wealth, positioned between richness and poverty, place enormous importance on their possessions. Since they are still close to poverty, they see its hardships nearby and fear them; they perceive a slim fortune separating them from poverty, upon which they focus their worries and hopes. Each day intensifies their interest in it due to the constant worries it brings, and they become more attached to it through their ongoing efforts to grow their wealth. The idea of giving up even a small part of it is unbearable to them, and they view total loss as the worst possible disaster. These anxious and concerned individuals with modest wealth make up the class that is continually expanding due to increased equality. Therefore, in democratic societies, most people don’t clearly see the benefits of a revolution, but they constantly feel in various ways that they might lose something from one.

I have shown in another part of this work that the equality of conditions naturally urges men to embark in commercial and industrial pursuits, and that it tends to increase and to distribute real property: I have also pointed out the means by which it inspires every man with an eager and constant desire to increase his welfare. Nothing is more opposed to revolutionary passions than these things. It may happen that the final result of a revolution is favorable to commerce and manufactures; but its first consequence will almost always be the ruin of manufactures and mercantile men, because it must always change at once the general principles of consumption, and temporarily upset the existing proportion between supply and demand. I know of nothing more opposite to revolutionary manners than commercial manners. Commerce is naturally adverse to all the violent passions; it loves to temporize, takes delight in compromise, and studiously avoids irritation. It is patient, insinuating, flexible, and never has recourse to extreme measures until obliged by the most absolute necessity. Commerce renders men independent of each other, gives them a lofty notion of their personal importance, leads them to seek to conduct their own affairs, and teaches how to conduct them well; it therefore prepares men for freedom, but preserves them from revolutions. In a revolution the owners of personal property have more to fear than all others; for on the one hand their property is often easy to seize, and on the other it may totally disappear at any moment—a subject of alarm to which the owners of real property are less exposed, since, although they may lose the income of their estates, they may hope to preserve the land itself through the greatest vicissitudes. Hence the former are much more alarmed at the symptoms of revolutionary commotion than the latter. Thus nations are less disposed to make revolutions in proportion as personal property is augmented and distributed amongst them, and as the number of those possessing it increases. Moreover, whatever profession men may embrace, and whatever species of property they may possess, one characteristic is common to them all. No one is fully contented with his present fortune—all are perpetually striving in a thousand ways to improve it. Consider any one of them at any period of his life, and he will be found engaged with some new project for the purpose of increasing what he has; talk not to him of the interests and the rights of mankind: this small domestic concern absorbs for the time all his thoughts, and inclines him to defer political excitement to some other season. This not only prevents men from making revolutions, but deters men from desiring them. Violent political passions have but little hold on those who have devoted all their faculties to the pursuit of their well-being. The ardor which they display in small matters calms their zeal for momentous undertakings.

I have shown elsewhere in this work that equal conditions naturally encourage people to get into business and industry, and that it promotes both the increase and distribution of real property. I have also highlighted how it drives everyone to have a keen and ongoing desire to improve their situation. Nothing stands in greater contrast to revolutionary fervor than these factors. It's possible that the ultimate outcome of a revolution can be beneficial for trade and industry, but its immediate effect will almost always be the downfall of businesses and merchants, because it instantly disrupts the general principles of consumption and temporarily disturbs the existing balance between supply and demand. I know of nothing more contrary to revolutionary behavior than the behavior seen in commerce. Trade is naturally opposed to all violent passions; it prefers to negotiate, values compromise, and intentionally avoids conflict. It is patient, subtle, adaptable, and rarely resorts to extreme actions unless absolutely necessary. Commerce makes people independent of one another, instills a strong sense of their own importance, encourages them to manage their own affairs, and teaches them how to do it effectively; thus, it prepares individuals for freedom while protecting them from revolutions. In a revolution, those who own personal property have more to lose than everyone else; on one hand, their property can be easily seized, and on the other, it can vanish at any moment—a danger that landowners are less likely to face because, although they might lose revenue from their properties, they can still hope to retain the land itself through even the toughest times. Therefore, those with personal property are much more anxious about signs of revolutionary unrest than those who own real property. Thus, nations are less inclined to pursue revolutions as the amount of personal property increases and is more evenly distributed among them, along with the number of people who own it. Furthermore, regardless of the profession someone chooses or the type of property they possess, there is one common trait among them all: no one is entirely satisfied with their current situation—everyone is constantly seeking various ways to improve it. If you consider any individual at any point in their life, you'll find them working on some new plan to enhance what they have; don’t talk to them about human rights and interests: this personal concern occupies all their thoughts for the moment, leading them to set aside political issues for another time. This not only stops people from revolting but also discourages them from wanting to. Intense political passions rarely affect those who have focused all their energy on pursuing their well-being. The enthusiasm they show for minor matters softens their fervor for significant undertakings.

From time to time indeed, enterprising and ambitious men will arise in democratic communities, whose unbounded aspirations cannot be contented by following the beaten track. Such men like revolutions and hail their approach; but they have great difficulty in bringing them about, unless unwonted events come to their assistance. No man can struggle with advantage against the spirit of his age and country; and, however powerful he may be supposed to be, he will find it difficult to make his contemporaries share in feelings and opinions which are repugnant to t all their feelings and desires.

From time to time, ambitious and enterprising people emerge in democratic societies, whose limitless ambitions can't be satisfied by just following the usual path. These individuals tend to embrace revolutions and welcome their arrival; however, they find it challenging to bring about change unless extraordinary events support them. No one can effectively fight against the spirit of their time and place; and no matter how powerful someone might seem, they will struggle to get their peers to adopt views and feelings that go against all their own beliefs and desires.

It is a mistake to believe that, when once the equality of conditions has become the old and uncontested state of society, and has imparted its characteristics to the manners of a nation, men will easily allow themselves to be thrust into perilous risks by an imprudent leader or a bold innovator. Not indeed that they will resist him openly, by well-contrived schemes, or even by a premeditated plan of resistance. They will not struggle energetically against him, sometimes they will even applaud him—but they do not follow him. To his vehemence they secretly oppose their inertia; to his revolutionary tendencies their conservative interests; their homely tastes to his adventurous passions; their good sense to the flights of his genius; to his poetry their prose. With immense exertion he raises them for an instant, but they speedily escape from him, and fall back, as it were, by their own weight. He strains himself to rouse the indifferent and distracted multitude, and finds at last that he is reduced to impotence, not because he is conquered, but because he is alone.

It's a mistake to think that once equality becomes the established and accepted state of society, influencing the culture of a nation, people will easily let themselves be led into dangerous risks by a reckless leader or an aggressive innovator. It's not that they will resist him openly with well-planned strategies or even by setting up a formal plan of opposition. They won’t fight against him vigorously; sometimes they might even cheer him on—but they won’t follow him. To his intensity, they secretly react with their inaction; to his revolutionary ideas, they hold on to their conservative interests; their everyday preferences counter his bold passions; their common sense contradicts his brilliant ideas; to his inspiring visions, they stick with their practical realities. He makes a great effort to lift them up momentarily, but they quickly break away and return, as if pulled back by their own weight. He exhausts himself trying to engage the indifferent and distracted masses, only to realize that he’s left powerless, not because he’s defeated, but because he stands alone.

I do not assert that men living in democratic communities are naturally stationary; I think, on the contrary, that a perpetual stir prevails in the bosom of those societies, and that rest is unknown there; but I think that men bestir themselves within certain limits beyond which they hardly ever go. They are forever varying, altering, and restoring secondary matters; but they carefully abstain from touching what is fundamental. They love change, but they dread revolutions. Although the Americans are constantly modifying or abrogating some of their laws, they by no means display revolutionary passions. It may be easily seen, from the promptitude with which they check and calm themselves when public excitement begins to grow alarming, and at the very moment when passions seem most roused, that they dread a revolution as the worst of misfortunes, and that every one of them is inwardly resolved to make great sacrifices to avoid such a catastrophe. In no country in the world is the love of property more active and more anxious than in the United States; nowhere does the majority display less inclination for those principles which threaten to alter, in whatever manner, the laws of property. I have often remarked that theories which are of a revolutionary nature, since they cannot be put in practice without a complete and sometimes a sudden change in the state of property and persons, are much less favorably viewed in the United States than in the great monarchical countries of Europe: if some men profess them, the bulk of the people reject them with instinctive abhorrence. I do not hesitate to say that most of the maxims commonly called democratic in France would be proscribed by the democracy of the United States. This may easily be understood: in America men have the opinions and passions of democracy, in Europe we have still the passions and opinions of revolution. If ever America undergoes great revolutions, they will be brought about by the presence of the black race on the soil of the United States—that is to say, they will owe their origin, not to the equality, but to the inequality, of conditions.

I don't claim that people living in democratic societies are naturally stagnant; on the contrary, I believe that there is constant activity within these communities, and that they know no rest. However, I think that people act within certain boundaries that they rarely exceed. They are always changing, altering, and restoring minor things, but they avoid making changes to what is fundamental. They enjoy change but fear revolutions. Although Americans frequently modify or repeal some of their laws, they do not show revolutionary zeal. It's clear by how quickly they calm themselves when public excitement starts to rise and just when emotions seem most stirred that they view a revolution as the worst disaster, and each one of them is internally committed to making significant sacrifices to prevent such a catastrophe. No country in the world has a more active and anxious love of property than the United States; nowhere does the majority show less inclination towards principles that threaten to change the laws of property in any way. I've often noticed that revolutionary theories, since they cannot be implemented without a complete and often sudden shift in the state of property and individuals, are viewed much less favorably in the United States than in the large monarchical nations of Europe: while some people may support them, the majority of the population instinctively rejects them with disgust. I will confidently say that most of the ideas typically called democratic in France would be banned by the democracy in the United States. This is easy to understand: in America, people hold democratic opinions and passions, while in Europe, we still have the passions and opinions of revolution. If America ever experiences significant revolutions, they will be sparked by the presence of the Black population in the United States—that is, they will originate not from equality but from inequality of conditions.

When social conditions are equal, every man is apt to live apart, centred in himself and forgetful of the public. If the rulers of democratic nations were either to neglect to correct this fatal tendency, or to encourage it from a notion that it weans men from political passions and thus wards off revolutions, they might eventually produce the evil they seek to avoid, and a time might come when the inordinate passions of a few men, aided by the unintelligent selfishness or the pusillanimity of the greater number, would ultimately compel society to pass through strange vicissitudes. In democratic communities revolutions are seldom desired except by a minority; but a minority may sometimes effect them. I do not assert that democratic nations are secure from revolutions; I merely say that the state of society in those nations does not lead to revolutions, but rather wards them off. A democratic people left to itself will not easily embark in great hazards; it is only led to revolutions unawares; it may sometimes undergo them, but it does not make them; and I will add that, when such a people has been allowed to acquire sufficient knowledge and experience, it will not suffer them to be made. I am well aware that it this respect public institutions may themselves do much; they may encourage or repress the tendencies which originate in the state of society. I therefore do not maintain, I repeat, that a people is secure from revolutions simply because conditions are equal in the community; but I think that, whatever the institutions of such a people may be, great revolutions will always be far less violent and less frequent than is supposed; and I can easily discern a state of polity, which, when combined with the principle of equality, would render society more stationary than it has ever been in our western apart of the world.

When social conditions are equal, people tend to live in isolation, focused on themselves and oblivious to the community. If the leaders of democratic nations either ignore this dangerous trend or encourage it under the belief that it keeps people away from political passions and prevents revolutions, they might end up creating the very situation they want to avoid. There could come a time when the extreme emotions of a few, supported by the ignorance or cowardice of the majority, would force society to go through strange upheavals. In democratic societies, revolutions are rarely sought after, except by a small group; however, this minority can sometimes bring about change. I don't claim that democratic nations are immune to revolutions; I simply state that the societal conditions in these nations do not naturally lead to revolutions but rather help prevent them. A democratic population left to its own devices won't easily take significant risks; it only finds itself in revolutions unexpectedly. It may experience upheaval at times, but it doesn't create it; and when such a population gains enough knowledge and experience, it won't allow revolutions to happen. I understand that public institutions can play a significant role in this regard; they can promote or suppress the tendencies emerging from the social environment. Therefore, I do not claim that people are safe from revolutions just because conditions are equal within the community. Still, I believe that, regardless of the institutions in place, major revolutions will always be less violent and less common than generally thought. I can easily envision a political state that, when paired with the principle of equality, would make society more stable than it has ever been in our western part of the world.

The observations I have here made on events may also be applied in part to opinions. Two things are surprising in the United States—the mutability of the greater part of human actions, and the singular stability of certain principles. Men are in constant motion; the mind of man appears almost unmoved. When once an opinion has spread over the country and struck root there, it would seem that no power on earth is strong enough to eradicate it. In the United States, general principles in religion, philosophy, morality, and even politics, do not vary, or at least are only modified by a hidden and often an imperceptible process: even the grossest prejudices are obliterated with incredible slowness, amidst the continual friction of men and things. I hear it said that it is in the nature and the habits of democracies to be constantly changing their opinions and feelings. This may be true of small democratic nations, like those of the ancient world, in which the whole community could be assembled in a public place and then excited at will by an orator. But I saw nothing of the kind amongst the great democratic people which dwells upon the opposite shores of the Atlantic Ocean. What struck me in the United States was the difficulty in shaking the majority in an opinion once conceived, or of drawing it off from a leader once adopted. Neither speaking nor writing can accomplish it; nothing but experience will avail, and even experience must be repeated. This is surprising at first sight, but a more attentive investigation explains the fact. I do not think that it is as easy as is supposed to uproot the prejudices of a democratic people—to change its belief—to supersede principles once established, by new principles in religion, politics, and morals—in a word, to make great and frequent changes in men's minds. Not that the human mind is there at rest—it is in constant agitation; but it is engaged in infinitely varying the consequences of known principles, and in seeking for new consequences, rather than in seeking for new principles. Its motion is one of rapid circumvolution, rather than of straightforward impulse by rapid and direct effort; it extends its orbit by small continual and hasty movements, but it does not suddenly alter its position.

The observations I've made about events can also apply to opinions. Two things are striking in the United States—the constant change in most human actions and the unusual stability of certain principles. People are always moving; the human mind seems almost unchanged. Once an opinion spreads throughout the country and takes root, it seems that no force on earth can remove it. In the United States, general principles in religion, philosophy, morality, and even politics don’t change, or if they do, it's through a hidden and often unnoticed process: even the most blatant prejudices fade away incredibly slowly, despite the ongoing interaction among people and things. I've heard it said that democracies are naturally inclined to constantly change their opinions and feelings. That might be true for small democracies, like those in the ancient world, where the entire community could gather in one place and be easily stirred by a speaker. But I didn't observe anything like that among the large democratic population across the Atlantic Ocean. What stood out to me in the United States was how hard it is to sway the majority from an opinion once formed or to move them away from a leader they’ve chosen. Speaking or writing can’t change it; only experience can, and even then, experience must be repeated. This is surprising at first glance, but a closer look clarifies the situation. I don't believe it's as easy as it seems to uproot the prejudices of a democratic society—or to change its beliefs—or to replace established principles with new ones in religion, politics, and morals—in short, to impose frequent and significant changes in people's minds. It’s not that the human mind is idle; it's in constant turmoil, but it focuses on endlessly varying the outcomes of known principles and exploring new consequences, rather than searching for new principles. Its movement is more like rapid circling than a straight push through swift and direct effort; it expands its range through small, ongoing, and quick shifts but doesn’t suddenly change its stance.

Men who are equal in rights, in education, in fortune, or, to comprise all in one word, in their social condition, have necessarily wants, habits, and tastes which are hardly dissimilar. As they look at objects under the same aspect, their minds naturally tend to analogous conclusions; and, though each of them may deviate from his contemporaries and from opinions of his own, they will involuntarily and unconsciously concur in a certain number of received opinions. The more attentively I consider the effects of equality upon the mind, the more am I persuaded that the intellectual anarchy which we witness about us is not, as many men suppose, the natural state of democratic nations. I think it is rather to be regarded as an accident peculiar to their youth, and that it only breaks out at that period of transition when men have already snapped the former ties which bound them together, but are still amazingly different in origin, education, and manners; so that, having retained opinions, propensities and tastes of great diversity, nothing any longer prevents men from avowing them openly. The leading opinions of men become similar in proportion as their conditions assimilate; such appears to me to be the general and permanent law—the rest is casual and transient.

Men who are equal in rights, education, wealth, or, to sum it up, in their social status, naturally have similar needs, habits, and preferences. Since they view things from the same perspective, their thoughts tend to lead them to similar conclusions. Even though each person may stray from their peers and their own opinions, they will unconsciously agree on certain widely accepted views. The more I think about the impact of equality on the mind, the more I believe that the intellectual chaos we see around us is not, as many people think, the natural state of democratic societies. Instead, I see it as something that happens during their early stages, particularly when people have already broken the old connections that held them together but are still strikingly different in background, education, and behavior. This diversity means that, since they hold a wide range of opinions, tendencies, and preferences, there's nothing stopping them from expressing them openly. The main opinions of people become more alike as their conditions become similar; this seems to me to be the general and lasting rule—the rest is random and temporary.

I believe that it will rarely happen to any man amongst a democratic community, suddenly to frame a system of notions very remote from that which his contemporaries have adopted; and if some such innovator appeared, I apprehend that he would have great difficulty in finding listeners, still more in finding believers. When the conditions of men are almost equal, they do not easily allow themselves to be persuaded by each other. As they all live in close intercourse, as they have learned the same things together, and as they lead the same life, they are not naturally disposed to take one of themselves for a guide, and to follow him implicitly. Men seldom take the opinion of their equal, or of a man like themselves, upon trust. Not only is confidence in the superior attainments of certain individuals weakened amongst democratic nations, as I have elsewhere remarked, but the general notion of the intellectual superiority which any man whatsoever may acquire in relation to the rest of the community is soon overshadowed. As men grow more like each other, the doctrine of the equality of the intellect gradually infuses itself into their opinions; and it becomes more difficult for any innovator to acquire or to exert much influence over the minds of a people. In such communities sudden intellectual revolutions will therefore be rare; for, if we read aright the history of the world, we shall find that great and rapid changes in human opinions have been produced far less by the force of reasoning than by the authority of a name. Observe, too, that as the men who live in democratic societies are not connected with each other by any tie, each of them must be convinced individually; whilst in aristocratic society it is enough to convince a few—the rest follow. If Luther had lived in an age of equality, and had not had princes and potentates for his audience, he would perhaps have found it more difficult to change the aspect of Europe. Not indeed that the men of democracies are naturally strongly persuaded of the certainty of their opinions, or are unwavering in belief; they frequently entertain doubts which no one, in their eyes, can remove. It sometimes happens at such times that the human mind would willingly change its position; but as nothing urges or guides it forwards, it oscillates to and fro without progressive motion. *a

I think it’s pretty rare for anyone in a democratic community to suddenly create a set of ideas that’s very different from what everyone around them believes; and if someone like that does show up, I imagine they’d have a hard time finding people willing to listen, let alone believe them. When people's situations are nearly equal, they’re not easily swayed by one another. Since they all interact closely, learn the same things together, and lead similar lives, they aren’t naturally inclined to see one of their peers as a leader to follow unconditionally. People rarely take the opinions of their equals or those similar to themselves at face value. Trust in the superior knowledge of certain individuals tends to diminish in democratic societies, as I’ve mentioned before, and the idea that any person can be significantly smarter than the rest of the community quickly fades away. As people become more similar to each other, the belief in equal intelligence seeps into their views, making it tougher for any innovator to gain or exert significant influence over the minds of the populace. In these types of communities, sudden shifts in thinking are likely to be uncommon; because, if we look closely at history, we’ll see that major and rapid changes in human beliefs have often come more from the authority of a name than from logical reasoning. Also, note that because individuals in democratic societies aren’t bonded by any particular connection, each must be convinced on their own; while in aristocratic societies, convincing a few people is usually enough for the rest to follow. If Luther had lived in a more equal time and hadn't had princes and powerful people as his audience, he may have found it harder to change Europe’s outlook. It’s not that people in democracies are particularly certain of their opinions or steadfast in their beliefs; they often have doubts that seem impossible for anyone to resolve. Sometimes, the mind is ready to shift its perspective, but since nothing truly pushes or guides it forward, it just swings back and forth without making any real progress.

a
[ If I inquire what state of society is most favorable to the great revolutions of the mind, I find that it occurs somewhere between the complete equality of the whole community and the absolute separation of ranks. Under a system of castes generations succeed each other without altering men's positions; some have nothing more, others nothing better, to hope for. The imagination slumbers amidst this universal silence and stillness, and the very idea of change fades from the human mind. When ranks have been abolished and social conditions are almost equalized, all men are in ceaseless excitement, but each of them stands alone, independent and weak. This latter state of things is excessively different from the former one; yet it has one point of analogy—great revolutions of the human mind seldom occur in it. But between these two extremes of the history of nations is an intermediate period—a period as glorious as it is agitated—when the conditions of men are not sufficiently settled for the mind to be lulled in torpor, when they are sufficiently unequal for men to exercise a vast power on the minds of one another, and when some few may modify the convictions of all. It is at such times that great reformers start up, and new opinions suddenly change the face of the world.]

a
[If I ask what kind of society is most conducive to significant shifts in thinking, I find that it exists somewhere between total equality for everyone and complete separation of social classes. In a caste system, generations come and go without changing anyone's status; some have nothing more, while others have nothing better to hope for. The imagination rests in this universal quiet and stillness, and the very idea of change fades away from people's minds. When social classes are eliminated and conditions are nearly equalized, everyone experiences constant excitement, but each person stands alone, independent and weak. This situation is very different from the previous one; however, it shares one similarity—major changes in human thought rarely happen during this time. But between these two extremes in a nation's history is a transitional period—one that is as glorious as it is turbulent—when people's conditions are not stable enough for the mind to fall into a stupor, yet sufficiently unequal for individuals to greatly influence each other's thoughts, and when a few can change the beliefs of many. It is during such times that great reformers emerge, and new ideas suddenly transform the world.]

Even when the reliance of a democratic people has been won, it is still no easy matter to gain their attention. It is extremely difficult to obtain a hearing from men living in democracies, unless it be to speak to them of themselves. They do not attend to the things said to them, because they are always fully engrossed with the things they are doing. For indeed few men are idle in democratic nations; life is passed in the midst of noise and excitement, and men are so engaged in acting that little remains to them for thinking. I would especially remark that they are not only employed, but that they are passionately devoted to their employments. They are always in action, and each of their actions absorbs their faculties: the zeal which they display in business puts out the enthusiasm they might otherwise entertain for idea. I think that it is extremely difficult to excite the enthusiasm of a democratic people for any theory which has not a palpable, direct, and immediate connection with the daily occupations of life: therefore they will not easily forsake their old opinions; for it is enthusiasm which flings the minds of men out of the beaten track, and effects the great revolutions of the intellect as well as the great revolutions of the political world. Thus democratic nations have neither time nor taste to go in search of novel opinions. Even when those they possess become doubtful, they still retain them, because it would take too much time and inquiry to change them—they retain them, not as certain, but as established.

Even when a democratic society has gained the trust of its people, it's still tough to get their attention. It's really hard to make people in democracies listen unless you talk to them about themselves. They hardly pay attention to what’s being said because they’re always caught up in their own activities. In democratic nations, very few people are idle; life is filled with noise and excitement, and people are so busy acting that they have little time to think. I want to point out that they’re not just busy; they are passionately dedicated to their work. They are always on the go, and each action consumes their focus: the enthusiasm they show for their tasks overshadows any interest they might have in ideas. It’s extremely challenging to spark the enthusiasm of a democratic crowd for any theory that doesn’t have a clear, direct, and immediate link to their daily lives; that’s why they don’t easily abandon their old beliefs. Enthusiasm is what drives people to break away from the usual paths of thought and brings about major shifts in both intellect and the political landscape. So, democratic societies have neither the time nor the desire to seek out new opinions. Even when their current views start to seem uncertain, they hold on to them, not because they're sure, but because they’re familiar.

There are yet other and more cogent reasons which prevent any great change from being easily effected in the principles of a democratic people. I have already adverted to them at the commencement of this part of my work. If the influence of individuals is weak and hardly perceptible amongst such a people, the power exercised by the mass upon the mind of each individual is extremely great—I have already shown for what reasons. I would now observe that it is wrong to suppose that this depends solely upon the form of government, and that the majority would lose its intellectual supremacy if it were to lose its political power. In aristocracies men have often much greatness and strength of their own: when they find themselves at variance with the greater number of their fellow-countrymen, they withdraw to their own circle, where they support and console themselves. Such is not the case in a democratic country; there public favor seems as necessary as the air we breathe, and to live at variance with the multitude is, as it were, not to live. The multitude requires no laws to coerce those who think not like itself: public disapprobation is enough; a sense of their loneliness and impotence overtakes them and drives them to despair.

There are other, stronger reasons that make it hard for any significant changes to be easily made in the principles of a democratic society. I already mentioned these at the beginning of this section of my work. If the influence of individuals is weak and barely noticeable among such a society, the power that the mass has over each person's mind is extremely strong—I have already explained why. I want to point out that it's incorrect to think this only depends on the form of government, and that the majority would lose its intellectual dominance if it lost its political power. In aristocracies, people often have their own greatness and strength: when they disagree with the majority, they retreat into their own circle, where they find support and comfort. This is not true in a democratic society; there, public approval seems as essential as the air we breathe, and living in opposition to the majority feels like not living at all. The majority doesn’t need laws to force those who think differently; public disapproval is enough. They experience a sense of loneliness and powerlessness that can drive them to despair.

Whenever social conditions are equal, public opinion presses with enormous weight upon the mind of each individual; it surrounds, directs, and oppresses him; and this arises from the very constitution of society, much more than from its political laws. As men grow more alike, each man feels himself weaker in regard to all the rest; as he discerns nothing by which he is considerably raised above them, or distinguished from them, he mistrusts himself as soon as they assail him. Not only does he mistrust his strength, but he even doubts of his right; and he is very near acknowledging that he is in the wrong, when the greater number of his countrymen assert that he is so. The majority do not need to constrain him—they convince him. In whatever way then the powers of a democratic community may be organized and balanced, it will always be extremely difficult to believe what the bulk of the people reject, or to profess what they condemn.

Whenever social conditions are equal, public opinion has a huge impact on each person's mind; it surrounds, guides, and pressures them. This comes from the very nature of society, much more than from its political laws. As people become more similar, each individual feels weaker compared to the others; since he sees nothing that significantly sets him apart or elevates him above them, he doubts himself as soon as they challenge him. Not only does he lose confidence in his strength, but he also questions his right to stand firm; he is close to admitting he's wrong when most of his fellow citizens say that he is. The majority doesn't need to force him—they persuade him. No matter how the powers of a democratic community are structured and balanced, it will always be incredibly difficult to believe what most people reject, or to support what they disapprove of.

This circumstance is extraordinarily favorable to the stability of opinions. When an opinion has taken root amongst a democratic people, and established itself in the minds of the bulk of the community, it afterwards subsists by itself and is maintained without effort, because no one attacks it. Those who at first rejected it as false, ultimately receive it as the general impression; and those who still dispute it in their hearts, conceal their dissent; they are careful not to engage in a dangerous and useless conflict. It is true, that when the majority of a democratic people change their opinions, they may suddenly and arbitrarily effect strange revolutions in men's minds; but their opinions do not change without much difficulty, and it is almost as difficult to show that they are changed.

This situation is really good for keeping opinions steady. When an opinion becomes established among a democratic group and takes hold in the minds of most people, it tends to stand on its own and persist effortlessly because no one challenges it. Those who initially dismissed it as untrue eventually accept it as the common view, and those who still secretly disagree keep quiet; they’re cautious not to start a risky and pointless fight. It’s true that when a majority in a democratic society shifts their views, they can suddenly and unpredictably create dramatic changes in people's minds; however, their opinions don't change easily, and it’s almost just as tough to demonstrate that they have changed.

Time, events, or the unaided individual action of the mind, will sometimes undermine or destroy an opinion, without any outward sign of the change. It has not been openly assailed, no conspiracy has been formed to make war on it, but its followers one by one noiselessly secede—day by day a few of them abandon it, until last it is only professed by a minority. In this state it will still continue to prevail. As its enemies remain mute, or only interchange their thoughts by stealth, they are themselves unaware for a long period that a great revolution has actually been effected; and in this state of uncertainly they take no steps—they observe each other and are silent. The majority have ceased to believe what they believed before; but they still affect to believe, and this empty phantom of public opinion in strong enough to chill innovators, and to keep them silent and at respectful distance. We live at a time which has witnessed the most rapid changes of opinion in the minds of men; nevertheless it may be that the leading opinions of society will ere long be more settled than they have been for several centuries in our history: that time is not yet come, but it may perhaps be approaching. As I examine more closely the natural wants and tendencies of democratic nations, I grow persuaded that if ever social equality is generally and permanently established in the world, great intellectual and political revolutions will become more difficult and less frequent than is supposed. Because the men of democracies appear always excited, uncertain, eager, changeable in their wills and in their positions, it is imagined that they are suddenly to abrogate their laws, to adopt new opinions, and to assume new manners. But if the principle of equality predisposes men to change, it also suggests to them certain interests and tastes which cannot be satisfied without a settled order of things; equality urges them on, but at the same time it holds them back; it spurs them, but fastens them to earth;—it kindles their desires, but limits their powers. This, however, is not perceived at first; the passions which tend to sever the citizens of a democracy are obvious enough; but the hidden force which restrains and unites them is not discernible at a glance.

Sometimes, time, events, or the unaided action of the mind can quietly undermine or completely change an opinion without any visible sign of it happening. It hasn’t faced open attacks, and there’s no conspiracy against it, but its supporters gradually drift away—day by day, a few leave until eventually, it’s only maintained by a minority. Even then, it can still manage to prevail. As its opponents stay silent or only share their thoughts discreetly, they remain unaware for a long time that a significant change has actually taken place; in this state of uncertainty, they take no action—they watch each other and remain quiet. The majority have stopped believing in what they once did, but they still pretend to hold on to it, and this hollow notion of public opinion is strong enough to discourage innovators, making them stay silent and keep their distance. We live in a time that has seen the fastest shifts in opinions among people; however, it’s possible that the dominant views in society will soon become more stable than they have been in centuries: that time hasn’t come yet, but it might be on the way. As I look more closely at the natural needs and tendencies of democratic nations, I become convinced that if social equality is ever firmly established worldwide, significant intellectual and political changes will be less common and more challenging than people think. While people in democracies seem constantly stirred up, uncertain, eager, and changeable in their wills and positions, it’s assumed they will quickly overturn their laws, adopt new beliefs, and change their behaviors. But while the principle of equality makes people more prone to change, it also leads them to certain interests and preferences that require a stable structure to satisfy. Equality pushes them forward, yet at the same time, it holds them back; it ignites their desires but limits their capabilities. This, however, isn’t immediately noticeable; the passions that tend to divide the citizens of a democracy are quite apparent, but the underlying force that restrains and unites them isn’t easily seen at first glance.

Amidst the ruins which surround me, shall I dare to say that revolutions are not what I most fear coming generations? If men continue to shut themselves more closely within the narrow circle of domestic interests and to live upon that kind of excitement, it is to be apprehended that they may ultimately become inaccessible to those great and powerful public emotions which perturb nations—but which enlarge them and recruit them. When property becomes so fluctuating, and the love of property so restless and so ardent, I cannot but fear that men may arrive at such a state as to regard every new theory as a peril, every innovation as an irksome toil, every social improvement as a stepping-stone to revolution, and so refuse to move altogether for fear of being moved too far. I dread, and I confess it, lest they should at last so entirely give way to a cowardly love of present enjoyment, as to lose sight of the interests of their future selves and of those of their descendants; and to prefer to glide along the easy current of life, rather than to make, when it is necessary, a strong and sudden effort to a higher purpose. It is believed by some that modern society will be ever changing its aspect; for myself, I fear that it will ultimately be too invariably fixed in the same institutions, the same prejudices, the same manners, so that mankind will be stopped and circumscribed; that the mind will swing backwards and forwards forever, without begetting fresh ideas; that man will waste his strength in bootless and solitary trifling; and, though in continual motion, that humanity will cease to advance.

Amidst the ruins around me, should I dare to say that revolutions aren't what I fear most for future generations? If people continue to shut themselves off in the narrow circle of personal interests and rely on that kind of excitement, I worry they may become completely inaccessible to the big and powerful public emotions that shake nations—but also expand and enrich them. When property becomes so unpredictable, and the desire for it so restless and intense, I can't help but fear that people might come to see every new idea as a threat, every change as a bothersome task, and every social improvement as a pathway to revolution, leading them to refuse any movement at all for fear of being pushed too far. I dread, and I'll admit it, that they might completely yield to a cowardly love of immediate pleasure, losing sight of their future interests and those of their descendants; preferring to drift along the easy stream of life rather than make a strong and sudden effort for a greater goal when necessary. Some believe that modern society will always change its appearance; for me, I fear it will ultimately become too fixed in the same institutions, the same prejudices, and the same customs, causing humanity to become stagnant and confined; that the mind will swing back and forth forever, without generating new ideas; that people will waste their energy on pointless and solitary distractions; and that, though always in motion, humanity will stop making progress.





Chapter XXII: Why Democratic Nations Are Naturally Desirous Of Peace, And Democratic Armies Of War

The same interests, the same fears, the same passions which deter democratic nations from revolutions, deter them also from war; the spirit of military glory and the spirit of revolution are weakened at the same time and by the same causes. The ever-increasing numbers of men of property—lovers of peace, the growth of personal wealth which war so rapidly consumes, the mildness of manners, the gentleness of heart, those tendencies to pity which are engendered by the equality of conditions, that coolness of understanding which renders men comparatively insensible to the violent and poetical excitement of arms—all these causes concur to quench the military spirit. I think it may be admitted as a general and constant rule, that, amongst civilized nations, the warlike passions will become more rare and less intense in proportion as social conditions shall be more equal. War is nevertheless an occurrence to which all nations are subject, democratic nations as well as others. Whatever taste they may have for peace, they must hold themselves in readiness to repel aggression, or in other words they must have an army.

The same interests, the same fears, and the same passions that keep democratic nations from revolutions also keep them from war; the desire for military glory and the drive for revolution are weakened simultaneously by the same factors. The growing number of property owners—who value peace, along with the increase in personal wealth that war quickly depletes, the gentleness of behavior, the kindness of heart, and the empathy fostered by more equal conditions, plus the rational mindset that makes people less susceptible to the intense emotions stirred up by warfare—all these contribute to dampening the military spirit. It can generally be accepted that, among civilized nations, the warlike passions will become less frequent and less intense as social conditions become more equal. However, war is still a reality that all nations face, including democratic ones. No matter how much they prefer peace, they must be prepared to defend against aggression; in other words, they need to have an army.

Fortune, which has conferred so many peculiar benefits upon the inhabitants of the United States, has placed them in the midst of a wilderness, where they have, so to speak, no neighbors: a few thousand soldiers are sufficient for their wants; but this is peculiar to America, not to democracy. The equality of conditions, and the manners as well as the institutions resulting from it, do not exempt a democratic people from the necessity of standing armies, and their armies always exercise a powerful influence over their fate. It is therefore of singular importance to inquire what are the natural propensities of the men of whom these armies are composed.

Fortune, which has given so many unique benefits to the people of the United States, has placed them in a wilderness where, so to speak, they have very few neighbors: a few thousand soldiers are enough for their needs; but this is specific to America, not to democracy. The equality of conditions, along with the behaviors and institutions that come from it, does not free a democratic society from needing standing armies, and these armies always have a significant impact on their destiny. Therefore, it is crucial to explore the natural tendencies of the individuals who make up these armies.

Amongst aristocratic nations, especially amongst those in which birth is the only source of rank, the same inequality exists in the army as in the nation; the officer is noble, the soldier is a serf; the one is naturally called upon to command, the other to obey. In aristocratic armies, the private soldier's ambition is therefore circumscribed within very narrow limits. Nor has the ambition of the officer an unlimited range. An aristocratic body not only forms a part of the scale of ranks in the nation, but it contains a scale of ranks within itself: the members of whom it is composed are placed one above another, in a particular and unvarying manner. Thus one man is born to the command of a regiment, another to that of a company; when once they have reached the utmost object of their hopes, they stop of their own accord, and remain contented with their lot. There is, besides, a strong cause, which, in aristocracies, weakens the officer's desire of promotion. Amongst aristocratic nations, an officer, independently of his rank in the army, also occupies an elevated rank in society; the former is almost always in his eyes only an appendage to the latter. A nobleman who embraces the profession of arms follows it less from motives of ambition than from a sense of the duties imposed on him by his birth. He enters the army in order to find an honorable employment for the idle years of his youth, and to be able to bring back to his home and his peers some honorable recollections of military life; but his principal object is not to obtain by that profession either property, distinction, or power, for he possesses these advantages in his own right, and enjoys them without leaving his home.

Among aristocratic nations, especially those where birth is the only source of status, the same inequality exists in the military as in society; the officer is noble, and the soldier is a serf. One is naturally expected to lead, while the other is meant to follow. In aristocratic armies, a private soldier's ambition is therefore limited to a narrow scope. The officer's ambition is also restricted. An aristocratic group not only represents a level within the hierarchy of the nation but also has its own internal ranks: its members are placed in a specific and unchanging order. So, one person is destined to command a regiment, while another is suited to lead a company; once they achieve the highest aspirations they can reach, they tend to stop striving and are satisfied with their position. Additionally, there is a strong reason that diminishes the officer's desire for advancement in aristocracies. Among these nations, an officer, regardless of his military rank, also holds a high status in society; the military role is often seen as just an extension of the social status. A nobleman who chooses a military career does so less out of ambition and more out of a sense of duty tied to his birth. He joins the army to find respectable work during the idle years of his youth and to bring home honorable memories of military life, but his main goal is not to gain wealth, recognition, or power through this career, as he already possesses these advantages by virtue of his birth and enjoys them without leaving home.

In democratic armies all the soldiers may become officers, which makes the desire of promotion general, and immeasurably extends the bounds of military ambition. The officer, on his part, sees nothing which naturally and necessarily stops him at one grade more than at another; and each grade has immense importance in his eyes, because his rank in society almost always depends on his rank in the army. Amongst democratic nations it often happens that an officer has no property but his pay, and no distinction but that of military honors: consequently as often as his duties change, his fortune changes, and he becomes, as it were, a new man. What was only an appendage to his position in aristocratic armies, has thus become the main point, the basis of his whole condition. Under the old French monarchy officers were always called by their titles of nobility; they are now always called by the title of their military rank. This little change in the forms of language suffices to show that a great revolution has taken place in the constitution of society and in that of the army. In democratic armies the desire of advancement is almost universal: it is ardent, tenacious, perpetual; it is strengthened by all other desires, and only extinguished with life itself. But it is easy to see, that of all armies in the world, those in which advancement must be slowest in time of peace are the armies of democratic countries. As the number of commissions is naturally limited, whilst the number of competitors is almost unlimited, and as the strict law of equality is over all alike, none can make rapid progress—many can make no progress at all. Thus the desire of advancement is greater, and the opportunities of advancement fewer, there than elsewhere. All the ambitious spirits of a democratic army are consequently ardently desirous of war, because war makes vacancies, and warrants the violation of that law of seniority which is the sole privilege natural to democracy.

In democratic armies, all soldiers can become officers, which creates a widespread desire for promotion and significantly broadens the scope of military ambition. The officer, for his part, sees no natural reason that would limit him to one rank over another; every rank is crucial to him because his status in society usually depends on his military rank. In democratic nations, it often happens that an officer has no assets besides his salary and no distinction other than his military honors. As a result, whenever his duties change, his fortune changes too, making him, in a sense, a completely new person. What was merely an add-on to his position in aristocratic armies has now become the focal point, the foundation of his entire situation. Under the old French monarchy, officers were always referred to by their noble titles; now, they are always addressed by their military rank. This small change in language is enough to indicate that a significant revolution has occurred in both society's structure and that of the army. In democratic armies, the desire for advancement is nearly universal: it's intense, persistent, and lifelong; it is fueled by all other ambitions and only fades with life itself. However, it's easy to see that of all the armies in the world, those in democratic countries are the slowest to advance during peacetime. Since the number of promotions is naturally limited while the number of applicants is nearly limitless, and because strict equality applies to everyone, no one can progress quickly—many can’t make any progress at all. Thus, the desire for advancement is stronger, while the opportunities for it are scarcer there than anywhere else. All the ambitious members of a democratic army are therefore eager for war because war creates openings and allows for the breaking of the seniority rule, which is the only privilege inherent to democracy.

We thus arrive at this singular consequence, that of all armies those most ardently desirous of war are democratic armies, and of all nations those most fond of peace are democratic nations: and, what makes these facts still more extraordinary, is that these contrary effects are produced at the same time by the principle of equality.

We come to the interesting conclusion that, among all armies, those that want war the most are democratic armies, and among all nations, those that love peace the most are democratic nations. What makes this even more remarkable is that these opposing outcomes are both driven by the principle of equality.

All the members of the community, being alike, constantly harbor the wish, and discover the possibility, of changing their condition and improving their welfare: this makes them fond of peace, which is favorable to industry, and allows every man to pursue his own little undertakings to their completion. On the other hand, this same equality makes soldiers dream of fields of battle, by increasing the value of military honors in the eyes of those who follow the profession of arms, and by rendering those honors accessible to all. In either case the inquietude of the heart is the same, the taste for enjoyment as insatiable, the ambition of success as great—the means of gratifying it are alone different.

Everyone in the community, being similar, constantly wishes to change their situation and improve their lives: this makes them appreciate peace, which supports work and allows everyone to pursue their individual projects to completion. On the flip side, this same equality leads soldiers to fantasize about battlefields, increasing the value of military honors in the eyes of those who choose a career in the military and making those honors available to everyone. In both cases, the restlessness of the heart remains the same, the desire for enjoyment is unquenchable, and the ambition for success is just as strong—the ways to achieve it are simply different.

These opposite tendencies of the nation and the army expose democratic communities to great dangers. When a military spirit forsakes a people, the profession of arms immediately ceases to be held in honor, and military men fall to the lowest rank of the public servants: they are little esteemed, and no longer understood. The reverse of what takes place in aristocratic ages then occurs; the men who enter the army are no longer those of the highest, but of the lowest rank. Military ambition is only indulged in when no other is possible. Hence arises a circle of cause and consequence from which it is difficult to escape: the best part of the nation shuns the military profession because that profession is not honored, and the profession is not honored because the best part of the nation has ceased to follow it. It is then no matter of surprise that democratic armies are often restless, ill-tempered, and dissatisfied with their lot, although their physical condition is commonly far better, and their discipline less strict than in other countries. The soldier feels that he occupies an inferior position, and his wounded pride either stimulates his taste for hostilities which would render his services necessary, or gives him a turn for revolutions, during which he may hope to win by force of arms the political influence and personal importance now denied him. The composition of democratic armies makes this last-mentioned danger much to be feared. In democratic communities almost every man has some property to preserve; but democratic armies are generally led by men without property, most of whom have little to lose in civil broils. The bulk of the nation is naturally much more afraid of revolutions than in the ages of aristocracy, but the leaders of the army much less so.

These opposing tendencies of the nation and the military put democratic communities at great risk. When a military spirit leaves a community, the military profession quickly loses its respect, and soldiers drop to the lowest status among public servants: they are undervalued and misunderstood. The opposite of what happens during aristocratic times occurs; those who join the army are no longer from the highest ranks but rather from the lowest. Military ambition only emerges when no other options are available. This creates a cycle of cause and effect that is hard to break: the best people avoid military careers because those careers lack honor, and they lack honor because the best people have stopped pursuing them. It’s not surprising that democratic armies are often restless, irritable, and unhappy with their situation, even though their physical condition is usually much better and their discipline less strict than in other countries. Soldiers feel they hold an inferior position, and their wounded pride either drives them toward conflict, hoping to make their services essential, or sparks a desire for revolutions where they can gain the political influence and recognition that is currently denied to them. The makeup of democratic armies makes this latter danger especially serious. In democratic societies, almost every man has some property to defend; however, democratic armies are often commanded by men without property, most of whom have little to lose in civil conflicts. The general population is naturally much more fearful of revolutions than during aristocratic times, but the army’s leaders are much less concerned about them.

Moreover, as amongst democratic nations (to repeat what I have just remarked) the wealthiest, the best educated, and the most able men seldom adopt the military profession, the army, taken collectively, eventually forms a small nation by itself, where the mind is less enlarged, and habits are more rude than in the nation at large. Now, this small uncivilized nation has arms in its possession, and alone knows how to use them: for, indeed, the pacific temper of the community increases the danger to which a democratic people is exposed from the military and turbulent spirit of the army. Nothing is so dangerous as an army amidst an unwarlike nation; the excessive love of the whole community for quiet continually puts its constitution at the mercy of the soldiery. It may therefore be asserted, generally speaking, that if democratic nations are naturally prone to peace from their interests and their propensities, they are constantly drawn to war and revolutions by their armies. Military revolutions, which are scarcely ever to be apprehended in aristocracies, are always to be dreaded amongst democratic nations. These perils must be reckoned amongst the most formidable which beset their future fate, and the attention of statesmen should be sedulously applied to find a remedy for the evil.

Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, in democratic nations, the wealthiest, most educated, and most capable individuals rarely choose a military career. As a result, the army, when viewed as a whole, ends up being a sort of small nation in itself, where people are less educated and habits are coarser than in the larger society. This small, less civilized group possesses weapons and is the only one that knows how to use them. In fact, the peaceful nature of the community heightens the risks a democratic society faces from the military and aggressive attitude of the army. There’s nothing more dangerous than an army in a peaceful nation; the overall preference for tranquility often leaves the community vulnerable to military control. Thus, it can be generally stated that while democratic nations have an inherent tendency towards peace due to their interests and inclinations, they are frequently pushed towards war and upheaval by their armies. Military revolutions, which are hardly ever feared in aristocratic societies, are always a concern in democracies. These dangers should be considered among the most serious threats to their future, and lawmakers should diligently seek ways to address this issue.

When a nation perceives that it is inwardly affected by the restless ambition of its army, the first thought which occurs is to give this inconvenient ambition an object by going to war. I speak no ill of war: war almost always enlarges the mind of a people, and raises their character. In some cases it is the only check to the excessive growth of certain propensities which naturally spring out of the equality of conditions, and it must be considered as a necessary corrective to certain inveterate diseases to which democratic communities are liable. War has great advantages, but we must not flatter ourselves that it can diminish the danger I have just pointed out. That peril is only suspended by it, to return more fiercely when the war is over; for armies are much more impatient of peace after having tasted military exploits. War could only be a remedy for a people which should always be athirst for military glory. I foresee that all the military rulers who may rise up in great democratic nations, will find it easier to conquer with their armies, than to make their armies live at peace after conquest. There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult—to begin a war, and to end it.

When a nation feels it's being affected by the restless ambition of its military, the first thought that comes to mind is to channel that inconvenient ambition into going to war. I don't speak ill of war: it often broadens people's perspectives and elevates their character. In some situations, it serves as the only check on the excessive growth of certain tendencies that naturally arise from equal conditions, and it should be seen as a necessary corrective for certain deep-rooted issues that democratic communities face. War has its advantages, but we shouldn't fool ourselves into thinking it can reduce the danger I just mentioned. That threat is merely put on hold during the conflict, only to return more intensely once the war ends; armies are much less tolerant of peace after experiencing military action. War could only be a solution for a people who are always craving military glory. I predict that any military leaders who emerge in large democratic nations will find it easier to conquer with their forces than to keep those forces at peace after the conquest. There are two things that a democratic people will always struggle with—starting a war and finishing it.

Again, if war has some peculiar advantages for democratic nations, on the other hand it exposes them to certain dangers which aristocracies have no cause to dread to an equal extent. I shall only point out two of these. Although war gratifies the army, it embarrasses and often exasperates that countless multitude of men whose minor passions every day require peace in order to be satisfied. Thus there is some risk of its causing, under another form, the disturbance it is intended to prevent. No protracted war can fail to endanger the freedom of a democratic country. Not indeed that after every victory it is to be apprehended that the victorious generals will possess themselves by force of the supreme power, after the manner of Sylla and Caesar: the danger is of another kind. War does not always give over democratic communities to military government, but it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government; it must almost compulsorily concentrate the direction of all men and the management of all things in the hands of the administration. If it lead not to despotism by sudden violence, it prepares men for it more gently by their habits. All those who seek to destroy the liberties of a democratic nation ought to know that war is the surest and the shortest means to accomplish it. This is the first axiom of the science.

Again, while war has some unique benefits for democratic nations, it also exposes them to certain risks that aristocracies don’t have to worry about as much. I’ll highlight just two of these risks. Although war satisfies the military, it complicates and often frustrates the vast number of people whose everyday desires rely on peace. So, there's a chance that it could create, in another form, the disruption it aims to prevent. No extended war can avoid threatening the freedom of a democratic society. It’s not that after every victory we should fear that the winning generals will take control through force, like Sylla and Caesar. The danger is different. War doesn’t always hand over democratic societies to military rule, but it inevitably and significantly boosts the power of civil government; it almost forces the concentration of direction and control of all things into the hands of the administration. If it doesn’t lead to tyranny through sudden violence, it gradually prepares people for it through their habits. Anyone looking to undermine the freedoms of a democratic country should understand that war is the most reliable and quickest way to achieve that. This is the first principle of the science.

One remedy, which appears to be obvious when the ambition of soldiers and officers becomes the subject of alarm, is to augment the number of commissions to be distributed by increasing the army. This affords temporary relief, but it plunges the country into deeper difficulties at some future period. To increase the army may produce a lasting effect in an aristocratic community, because military ambition is there confined to one class of men, and the ambition of each individual stops, as it were, at a certain limit; so that it may be possible to satisfy all who feel its influence. But nothing is gained by increasing the army amongst a democratic people, because the number of aspirants always rises in exactly the same ratio as the army itself. Those whose claims have been satisfied by the creation of new commissions are instantly succeeded by a fresh multitude beyond all power of satisfaction; and even those who were but now satisfied soon begin to crave more advancement; for the same excitement prevails in the ranks of the army as in the civil classes of democratic society, and what men want is not to reach a certain grade, but to have constant promotion. Though these wants may not be very vast, they are perpetually recurring. Thus a democratic nation, by augmenting its army, only allays for a time the ambition of the military profession, which soon becomes even more formidable, because the number of those who feel it is increased. I am of opinion that a restless and turbulent spirit is an evil inherent in the very constitution of democratic armies, and beyond hope of cure. The legislators of democracies must not expect to devise any military organization capable by its influence of calming and restraining the military profession: their efforts would exhaust their powers, before the object is attained.

One solution, which seems obvious when soldiers' and officers' ambitions become a concern, is to increase the number of commissions by enlarging the army. This offers temporary relief, but it ultimately leads the country into greater problems down the line. Expanding the army might have a lasting effect in an aristocratic society, since military ambition is limited to a particular class of men, and each individual's ambition hits a certain ceiling; this means it could be possible to satisfy everyone affected by it. However, in a democratic society, increasing the army doesn't really help, because the number of people wanting to join rises in direct proportion to the army's size. Those whose desires are met by new commissions are quickly followed by a new wave of applicants beyond what can be satisfied, and even those who just had their ambitions fulfilled soon start wanting more. The same drive exists in the army as it does in the civilian segments of a democratic society, and what people want isn't just to achieve a certain rank but to have ongoing promotions. Even if these desires aren't overly extensive, they keep coming back. So, when a democratic nation enlarges its army, it only temporarily calms the ambitions of military personnel, which soon become even more intense due to the increase in those who feel it. I believe that a restless and disruptive spirit is an inherent issue with democratic armies, and there's little hope of fixing it. Legislators in democracies shouldn’t expect to create any military organization that can effectively calm and control military ambitions; their efforts would deplete their resources long before they achieve that goal.

The remedy for the vices of the army is not to be found in the army itself, but in the country. Democratic nations are naturally afraid of disturbance and of despotism; the object is to turn these natural instincts into well-digested, deliberate, and lasting tastes. When men have at last learned to make a peaceful and profitable use of freedom, and have felt its blessings—when they have conceived a manly love of order, and have freely submitted themselves to discipline—these same men, if they follow the profession of arms, bring into it, unconsciously and almost against their will, these same habits and manners. The general spirit of the nation being infused into the spirit peculiar to the army, tempers the opinions and desires engendered by military life, or represses them by the mighty force of public opinion. Teach but the citizens to be educated, orderly, firm, and free, the soldiers will be disciplined and obedient. Any law which, in repressing the turbulent spirit of the army, should tend to diminish the spirit of freedom in the nation, and to overshadow the notion of law and right, would defeat its object: it would do much more to favor, than to defeat, the establishment of military tyranny.

The solution to the army's problems isn't within the army itself, but in the country. Democratic nations naturally fear chaos and tyranny; the goal is to channel these instincts into thoughtful, intentional, and lasting values. When people finally learn to use their freedom in a peaceful and beneficial way and appreciate its gifts—when they develop a strong appreciation for order and willingly accept discipline—these individuals, if they choose to serve in the military, will unconsciously and almost reluctantly bring those same habits and ways of thinking with them. The overall mindset of the nation infuses the unique spirit of the army, moderating the opinions and desires shaped by military life, or suppressing them through the powerful influence of public opinion. If we can educate citizens to be responsible, organized, strong, and free, the soldiers will be disciplined and respectful. Any law aimed at curbing the army's unruly nature that also weakens the spirit of freedom in the country and clouds the concept of law and rights would miss the mark: it would actually do more to promote military tyranny than to prevent it.

After all, and in spite of all precautions, a large army amidst a democratic people will always be a source of great danger; the most effectual means of diminishing that danger would be to reduce the army, but this is a remedy which all nations have it not in their power to use.

After all, even with all the precautions, a large army among a democratic population will always pose a significant risk; the best way to lessen that danger would be to downsize the army, but this is a solution that not all nations have the ability to implement.





Chapter XXIII: Which Is The Most Warlike And Most Revolutionary Class In Democratic Armies?

It is a part of the essence of a democratic army to be very numerous in proportion to the people to which it belongs, as I shall hereafter show. On the other hand, men living in democratic times seldom choose a military life. Democratic nations are therefore soon led to give up the system of voluntary recruiting for that of compulsory enlistment. The necessity of their social condition compels them to resort to the latter means, and it may easily be foreseen that they will all eventually adopt it. When military service is compulsory, the burden is indiscriminately and equally borne by the whole community. This is another necessary consequence of the social condition of these nations, and of their notions. The government may do almost whatever it pleases, provided it appeals to the whole community at once: it is the unequal distribution of the weight, not the weight itself, which commonly occasions resistance. But as military service is common to all the citizens, the evident consequence is that each of them remains but for a few years on active duty. Thus it is in the nature of things that the soldier in democracies only passes through the army, whilst among most aristocratic nations the military profession is one which the soldier adopts, or which is imposed upon him, for life.

A democratic army is inherently large relative to the population it serves, as I will explain later. However, people living in democratic societies rarely choose to pursue military careers. As a result, these nations often shift from a system of voluntary recruitment to compulsory enlistment. Their social conditions force them to opt for the latter, and it’s likely that all will eventually do the same. When military service is mandatory, the burden falls evenly on the entire community. This is a necessary outcome of the social conditions and beliefs in these nations. The government can generally do what it wants, as long as it appeals to the entire community at once; it’s the unequal distribution of responsibility, rather than the weight itself, that typically leads to resistance. Since military service is required of all citizens, the natural outcome is that each person only serves a few years on active duty. Consequently, in democracies, soldiers are typically just passing through the army, while in many aristocratic nations, the military profession is one that soldiers adopt or that is imposed on them for life.

This has important consequences. Amongst the soldiers of a democratic army, some acquire a taste for military life, but the majority, being enlisted against their will, and ever ready to go back to their homes, do not consider themselves as seriously engaged in the military profession, and are always thinking of quitting it. Such men do not contract the wants, and only half partake in the passions, which that mode of life engenders. They adapt themselves to their military duties, but their minds are still attached to the interests and the duties which engaged them in civil life. They do not therefore imbibe the spirit of the army—or rather, they infuse the spirit of the community at large into the army, and retain it there. Amongst democratic nations the private soldiers remain most like civilians: upon them the habits of the nation have the firmest hold, and public opinion most influence. It is by the instrumentality of the private soldiers especially that it may be possible to infuse into a democratic army the love of freedom and the respect of rights, if these principles have once been successfully inculcated on the people at large. The reverse happens amongst aristocratic nations, where the soldiery have eventually nothing in common with their fellow-citizens, and where they live amongst them as strangers, and often as enemies. In aristocratic armies the officers are the conservative element, because the officers alone have retained a strict connection with civil society, and never forego their purpose of resuming their place in it sooner or later: in democratic armies the private soldiers stand in this position, and from the same cause.

This has significant consequences. Among soldiers in a democratic army, some develop a liking for military life, but most, having been drafted against their will and eager to return home, don’t see themselves as fully committed to the military profession and are always thinking about leaving it. These individuals don’t develop the needs and only partly engage in the passions that come with that lifestyle. They adjust to their military roles, but their thoughts remain focused on the interests and responsibilities they had in civilian life. Thus, they don’t fully adopt the spirit of the army—instead, they bring the spirit of the larger community into the army and keep it there. In democratic nations, private soldiers are most like civilians: they are tightly influenced by the habits of the nation and public opinion. It is especially through private soldiers that a democratic army can be instilled with a love of freedom and respect for rights, if these values have already been successfully taught to the broader population. Conversely, in aristocratic nations, the soldiers often have little in common with their fellow citizens, living among them as outsiders, and often as adversaries. In aristocratic armies, the officers are the conservative force, as they have maintained a strong connection to civil society and always intend to return to it sooner or later; in democratic armies, it’s the private soldiers who play this role for the same reasons.

It often happens, on the contrary, that in these same democratic armies the officers contract tastes and wants wholly distinct from those of the nation—a fact which may be thus accounted for. Amongst democratic nations, the man who becomes an officer severs all the ties which bound him to civil life; he leaves it forever; he has no interest to resume it. His true country is the army, since he owes all he has to the rank he has attained in it; he therefore follows the fortunes of the army, rises or sinks with it, and henceforward directs all his hopes to that quarter only. As the wants of an officer are distinct from those of the country, he may perhaps ardently desire war, or labor to bring about a revolution at the very moment when the nation is most desirous of stability and peace. There are, nevertheless, some causes which allay this restless and warlike spirit. Though ambition is universal and continual amongst democratic nations, we have seen that it is seldom great. A man who, being born in the lower classes of the community, has risen from the ranks to be an officer, has already taken a prodigious step. He has gained a footing in a sphere above that which he filled in civil life, and he has acquired rights which most democratic nations will ever consider as inalienable. *a He is willing to pause after so great an effort, and to enjoy what he has won. The fear of risking what he has already obtained damps the desire of acquiring what he has not got. Having conquered the first and greatest impediment which opposed his advancement, he resigns himself with less impatience to the slowness of his progress. His ambition will be more and more cooled in proportion as the increasing distinction of his rank teaches him that he has more to put in jeopardy. If I am not mistaken, the least warlike, and also the least revolutionary part, of a democratic army, will always be its chief commanders. [Footnote a: The position of officers is indeed much more secure amongst democratic nations than elsewhere; the lower the personal standing of the man, the greater is the comparative importance of his military grade, and the more just and necessary is it that the enjoyment of that rank should be secured by the laws.]

It often happens, on the contrary, that in these same democratic armies, the officers develop tastes and desires that are completely different from those of the nation—a situation that can be explained as follows. In democratic nations, the person who becomes an officer cuts all ties to civilian life; they leave it behind for good and have no interest in going back. Their true country is the army, as they owe everything they have to the rank they’ve achieved within it; thus, they follow the fortunes of the army, rise or fall with it, and from that point on, focus all their hopes there. Since an officer's needs differ from those of the country, they might passionately crave war or work to instigate a revolution at the very moment when the nation most desires stability and peace. However, there are some factors that temper this restless and warlike spirit. Although ambition is common and constant among democratic nations, it is rarely extreme. A person born in the lower classes who rises to become an officer has already made a monumental leap. They have established themselves in a higher social sphere than they previously occupied in civilian life and have gained rights that most democratic societies will always consider inalienable. They are inclined to pause after such a significant achievement and enjoy what they have earned. The fear of losing what they already possess dampens their desire to acquire what they have not. After overcoming the first and greatest obstacle to their advancement, they become more patient with the slow pace of their progress. Their ambition cools increasingly as the growing distinction of their rank reminds them that they have more to lose. If I’m not mistaken, the least warlike and also the least revolutionary segment of a democratic army will always be its top commanders. [Footnote a: The status of officers is indeed much more secure in democratic nations than elsewhere; the lower a person's standing, the greater the relative importance of their military rank, and it is more just and necessary that the enjoyment of that rank be protected by law.]

But the remarks I have just made on officers and soldiers are not applicable to a numerous class which in all armies fills the intermediate space between them—I mean the class of non-commissioned officers. This class of non-commissioned officers which have never acted a part in history until the present century, is henceforward destined, I think, to play one of some importance. Like the officers, non-commissioned officers have broken, in their minds, all the ties which bound them to civil life; like the former, they devote themselves permanently to the service, and perhaps make it even more exclusively the object of all their desires: but non-commissioned officers are men who have not yet reached a firm and lofty post at which they may pause and breathe more freely, ere they can attain further promotion. By the very nature of his duties, which is invariable, a non-commissioned officer is doomed to lead an obscure, confined, comfortless, and precarious existence; as yet he sees nothing of military life but its dangers; he knows nothing but its privations and its discipline—more difficult to support than dangers: he suffers the more from his present miseries, from knowing that the constitution of society and of the army allow him to rise above them; he may, indeed, at any time obtain his commission, and enter at once upon command, honors, independence, rights, and enjoyments. Not only does this object of his hopes appear to him of immense importance, but he is never sure of reaching it till it is actually his own; the grade he fills is by no means irrevocable; he is always entirely abandoned to the arbitrary pleasure of his commanding officer, for this is imperiously required by the necessity of discipline: a slight fault, a whim, may always deprive him in an instant of the fruits of many years of toil and endeavor; until he has reached the grade to which he aspires he has accomplished nothing; not till he reaches that grade does his career seem to begin. A desperate ambition cannot fail to be kindled in a man thus incessantly goaded on by his youth, his wants, his passions, the spirit of his age, his hopes, and his age, his hopes, and his fears. Non-commissioned officers are therefore bent on war—on war always, and at any cost; but if war be denied them, then they desire revolutions to suspend the authority of established regulations, and to enable them, aided by the general confusion and the political passions of the time, to get rid of their superior officers and to take their places. Nor is it impossible for them to bring about such a crisis, because their common origin and habits give them much influence over the soldiers, however different may be their passions and their desires.

But the comments I just made about officers and soldiers don't apply to a large group that fills the middle ground between them—I’m talking about non-commissioned officers. This group of non-commissioned officers, which hasn't played a role in history until this century, is now going to have a significant impact, I believe. Like the officers, non-commissioned officers have mentally severed any ties to civilian life; like the officers, they commit themselves fully to military service, often making it the singular focus of their aspirations. However, non-commissioned officers have yet to reach a stable, high position where they can pause and breathe more easily before pursuing further advancement. Due to the nature of their work, which is constant, a non-commissioned officer is destined to lead a life that is obscure, restricted, uncomfortable, and uncertain; they see only the dangers of military life, knowing nothing but its hardships and demands—often tougher to endure than the dangers themselves. They suffer more from their current hardships knowing that society and the military structure allow them to rise above them. They could, at any moment, receive their commission and instantly enter a realm of command, honor, independence, rights, and pleasures. This goal looms large in their minds, but they can never be sure of achieving it until it’s truly theirs; the rank they hold is not permanent; they are always at the mercy of their superior officer, which is essential for maintaining discipline: a minor mistake, a whim, can strip them of the results of years of hard work in an instant; until they reach the rank they strive for, they feel they have accomplished nothing; only upon reaching that rank does their career truly begin. A fierce ambition is inevitably sparked in someone who is continuously driven by their youth, needs, passions, the spirit of the times, hopes, and fears. Non-commissioned officers are therefore focused on war—always on war, at any cost; but if war is denied to them, they then seek revolutions to disrupt the authority of established rules, hoping to take advantage of the chaos and political fervor of the moment to unseat their superiors and take their positions. It’s not impossible for them to create such a crisis, as their shared background and experiences give them significant influence over the soldiers, even if their passions and desires differ.

It would be an error to suppose that these various characteristics of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, belong to any particular time or country; they will always occur at all times, and amongst all democratic nations. In every democratic army the non-commissioned officers will be the worst representatives of the pacific and orderly spirit of the country, and the private soldiers will be the best. The latter will carry with them into military life the strength or weakness of the manners of the nation; they will display a faithful reflection of the community: if that community is ignorant and weak, they will allow themselves to be drawn by their leaders into disturbances, either unconsciously or against their will; if it is enlightened and energetic, the community will itself keep them within the bounds of order.

It would be a mistake to think that the various traits of officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers are specific to any one time or place; they will always appear throughout history and among all democratic nations. In every democratic army, non-commissioned officers often embody the least peaceful and organized aspects of the country, while private soldiers typically represent the best. The soldiers will bring into military life the strengths or weaknesses of the society they come from; they will reflect the community accurately: if the community is uninformed and weak, they may be easily led by their commanders into chaos, either unknowingly or against their wishes; if the community is informed and strong, it will help keep them in line.





Chapter XXIV: Causes Which Render Democratic Armies Weaker Than Other Armies At The Outset Of A Campaign, And More Formidable In Protracted Warfare

Any army is in danger of being conquered at the outset of a campaign, after a long peace; any army which has long been engaged in warfare has strong chances of victory: this truth is peculiarly applicable to democratic armies. In aristocracies the military profession, being a privileged career, is held in honor even in time of peace. Men of great talents, great attainments, and great ambition embrace it; the army is in all respects on a level with the nation, and frequently above it. We have seen, on the contrary, that amongst a democratic people the choicer minds of the nation are gradually drawn away from the military profession, to seek by other paths, distinction, power, and especially wealth. After a long peace—and in democratic ages the periods of peace are long—the army is always inferior to the country itself. In this state it is called into active service; and until war has altered it, there is danger for the country as well as for the army.

Any army is at risk of being defeated at the start of a campaign after a long peace; any army that has been engaged in warfare for an extended period has a better chance of winning: this is especially true for democratic armies. In aristocracies, the military profession, being a privileged career, is respected even in peacetime. Talented, accomplished, and ambitious individuals pursue it; the army is regarded on par with the nation and often holds a higher status. In contrast, we have seen that among a democratic society, the most talented individuals tend to move away from the military profession to find recognition, power, and especially wealth through other avenues. After a long period of peace—and in democratic eras, peace often lasts a long time—the army is generally weaker than the nation itself. When called into active service in this state; until war changes that, both the country and the army are at risk.

I have shown that in democratic armies, and in time of peace, the rule of seniority is the supreme and inflexible law of advancement. This is not only a consequence, as I have before observed, of the constitution of these armies, but of the constitution of the people, and it will always occur. Again, as amongst these nations the officer derives his position in the country solely from his position in the army, and as he draws all the distinction and the competency he enjoys from the same source, he does not retire from his profession, or is not super-annuated, till towards the extreme close of life. The consequence of these two causes is, that when a democratic people goes to war after a long interval of peace all the leading officers of the army are old men. I speak not only of the generals, but of the non-commissioned officers, who have most of them been stationary, or have only advanced step by step. It may be remarked with surprise, that in a democratic army after a long peace all the soldiers are mere boys, and all the superior officers in declining years; so that the former are wanting in experience, the latter in vigor. This is a strong element of defeat, for the first condition of successful generalship is youth: I should not have ventured to say so if the greatest captain of modern times had not made the observation. These two causes do not act in the same manner upon aristocratic armies: as men are promoted in them by right of birth much more than by right of seniority, there are in all ranks a certain number of young men, who bring to their profession all the early vigor of body and mind. Again, as the men who seek for military honors amongst an aristocratic people, enjoy a settled position in civil society, they seldom continue in the army until old age overtakes them. After having devoted the most vigorous years of youth to the career of arms, they voluntarily retire, and spend at home the remainder of their maturer years.

I've demonstrated that in democratic armies, especially during peacetime, seniority is the ultimate and unyielding rule for promotion. This is not just a result of how these armies are structured, but also reflects the makeup of the people, and it will always happen. Additionally, since in these nations an officer gains his status from his military rank, and all the recognition and skills he possesses comes from that role, he doesn’t retire or step down until the very end of his life. The result of these two factors is that when a democratic society goes to war after a long period of peace, most of the top officers in the military are older men. I'm not just referring to the generals, but also to the non-commissioned officers, many of whom have remained in place or have only moved up gradually. It may be surprising to note that in a democratic army after a lengthy peace, all the soldiers are essentially young, while the higher-ranking officers are aging; this leaves the former lacking in experience and the latter short on energy. This combination is a significant risk for defeat, as youth is the first requirement for successful leadership in battle: I wouldn't say this if the greatest military leader of modern times hadn't pointed it out. These two factors don’t affect aristocratic armies in the same way: because promotions are often based more on family background than on seniority, there are young people at all levels, bringing fresh energy and vigor. Furthermore, since individuals seeking military accolades in an aristocratic society usually have established positions in civilian life, they rarely remain in the army until they grow old. After spending the most active years of their youth in the military, they typically choose to retire and enjoy their later years at home.

A long peace not only fills democratic armies with elderly officers, but it also gives to all the officers habits both of body and mind which render them unfit for actual service. The man who has long lived amidst the calm and lukewarm atmosphere of democratic manners can at first ill adapt himself to the harder toils and sterner duties of warfare; and if he has not absolutely lost the taste for arms, at least he has assumed a mode of life which unfits him for conquest.

A long period of peace not only fills democratic armies with older officers, but it also instills habits in all the officers—both physically and mentally—that make them unfit for real service. Someone who has spent a long time in the calm and easygoing atmosphere of democratic society can initially struggle to adjust to the tougher demands and stricter responsibilities of warfare; and even if he hasn’t completely lost his desire for combat, he has at least adopted a lifestyle that makes him unsuitable for victory.

Amongst aristocratic nations, the ease of civil life exercises less influence on the manners of the army, because amongst those nations the aristocracy commands the army: and an aristocracy, however plunged in luxurious pleasures, has always many other passions besides that of its own well-being, and to satisfy those passions more thoroughly its well-being will be readily sacrificed. *a

Among aristocratic nations, the comfort of civilian life has less impact on the behavior of the military, because in those nations, the aristocracy controls the army. An aristocracy, no matter how absorbed in luxury, has many other passions beyond their own comfort, and to fulfill those passions more completely, they will easily prioritize their own well-being.

a
[ See Appendix V.]

a
[ See Appendix V.]

I have shown that in democratic armies, in time of peace, promotion is extremely slow. The officers at first support this state of things with impatience, they grow excited, restless, exasperated, but in the end most of them make up their minds to it. Those who have the largest share of ambition and of resources quit the army; others, adapting their tastes and their desires to their scanty fortunes, ultimately look upon the military profession in a civil point of view. The quality they value most in it is the competency and security which attend it: their whole notion of the future rests upon the certainty of this little provision, and all they require is peaceably to enjoy it. Thus not only does a long peace fill an army with old men, but it is frequently imparts the views of old men to those who are still in the prime of life.

I have shown that in democratic armies, during peacetime, promotions are really slow. At first, the officers are impatient about this situation; they become excited, restless, and frustrated, but eventually, most of them come to accept it. Those who are the most ambitious and have the means leave the army; others, adjusting their tastes and desires to their limited resources, eventually see the military profession from a civilian perspective. The thing they value most in it is the stability and security that comes with it: their entire vision of the future relies on the certainty of this modest provision, and all they want is to enjoy it peacefully. So, not only does extended peace fill an army with older individuals, but it often gives older perspectives to those who are still in their prime.

I have also shown that amongst democratic nations in time of peace the military profession is held in little honor and indifferently followed. This want of public favor is a heavy discouragement to the army; it weighs down the minds of the troops, and when war breaks out at last, they cannot immediately resume their spring and vigor. No similar cause of moral weakness occurs in aristocratic armies: there the officers are never lowered either in their own eyes or in those of their countrymen, because, independently of their military greatness, they are personally great. But even if the influence of peace operated on the two kinds of armies in the same manner, the results would still be different. When the officers of an aristocratic army have lost their warlike spirit and the desire of raising themselves by service, they still retain a certain respect for the honor of their class, and an old habit of being foremost to set an example. But when the officers of a democratic army have no longer the love of war and the ambition of arms, nothing whatever remains to them.

I’ve also pointed out that in democratic nations during peacetime, the military profession isn’t held in much esteem and is pursued without much enthusiasm. This lack of public support is a significant demotivator for the army; it weighs heavily on the troops' minds, and when war eventually breaks out, they struggle to regain their energy and spirit. No similar source of moral weakness is found in aristocratic armies: there, the officers maintain their status both in their own eyes and in the eyes of their fellow citizens, because beyond their military rank, they enjoy personal prestige. Even if the effects of peacetime impacted both types of armies similarly, the outcomes would still differ. When the officers of an aristocratic army lose their fighting spirit and the desire to advance through service, they still hold onto a sense of respect for their class’s honor and have a long-standing habit of leading by example. But when the officers of a democratic army lose their love for war and ambition for military achievement, they are left with nothing.

I am therefore of opinion that, when a democratic people engages in a war after a long peace, it incurs much more risk of defeat than any other nation; but it ought not easily to be cast down by its reverses, for the chances of success for such an army are increased by the duration of the war. When a war has at length, by its long continuance, roused the whole community from their peaceful occupations and ruined their minor undertakings, the same passions which made them attach so much importance to the maintenance of peace will be turned to arms. War, after it has destroyed all modes of speculation, becomes itself the great and sole speculation, to which all the ardent and ambitious desires which equality engenders are exclusively directed. Hence it is that the selfsame democratic nations which are so reluctant to engage in hostilities, sometimes perform prodigious achievements when once they have taken the field. As the war attracts more and more of public attention, and is seen to create high reputations and great fortunes in a short space of time, the choicest spirits of the nation enter the military profession: all the enterprising, proud, and martial minds, no longer of the aristocracy solely, but of the whole country, are drawn in this direction. As the number of competitors for military honors is immense, and war drives every man to his proper level, great generals are always sure to spring up. A long war produces upon a democratic army the same effects that a revolution produces upon a people; it breaks through regulations, and allows extraordinary men to rise above the common level. Those officers whose bodies and minds have grown old in peace, are removed, or superannuated, or they die. In their stead a host of young men are pressing on, whose frames are already hardened, whose desires are extended and inflamed by active service. They are bent on advancement at all hazards, and perpetual advancement; they are followed by others with the same passions and desires, and after these are others yet unlimited by aught but the size of the army. The principle of equality opens the door of ambition to all, and death provides chances for ambition. Death is constantly thinning the ranks, making vacancies, closing and opening the career of arms.

I believe that when a democratic society goes to war after a long period of peace, it faces a much greater risk of defeat than any other nation; however, it shouldn't be easily discouraged by setbacks, as the chances of success for such an army increase the longer the war lasts. Once a war has persisted long enough to awaken the entire community from their peaceful activities and disrupt their smaller ventures, the same passions that led them to value peace so highly will turn towards fighting. When war has eradicated all other forms of speculation, it becomes the primary focus, channeling all the ambitious desires sparked by equality into military pursuits. That's why democratic nations, often hesitant to engage in conflict, can achieve remarkable feats once they commit to battle. As the war garners more public attention and is perceived as creating prominent reputations and wealth in a short time, the most talented individuals from the nation pursue military careers. Not just the aristocracy, but enterprising, proud, and combative individuals from all walks of life are drawn in. Given the vast number of individuals vying for military distinction, and with war pushing everyone to their rightful place, great leaders inevitably emerge. A prolonged conflict affects a democratic army similarly to how a revolution impacts a population; it disrupts traditional structures and allows exceptional individuals to rise above the norm. Officers who have become set in their routines during peacetime are replaced, retired, or pass away. In their place, a surge of young individuals is eager to step up, already battle-hardened, their ambitions fueled by active service. They are determined to advance at any cost, followed by others with the same aspirations, while even more join without limits, except for the size of the army. The principle of equality opens the door to ambition for everyone, and death creates opportunities for that ambition. Death continually thins the ranks, creating openings and shaping the trajectory of military careers.

There is moreover a secret connection between the military character and the character of democracies, which war brings to light. The men of democracies are naturally passionately eager to acquire what they covet, and to enjoy it on easy conditions. They for the most part worship chance, and are much less afraid of death than of difficulty. This is the spirit which they bring to commerce and manufactures; and this same spirit, carried with them to the field of battle, induces them willingly to expose their lives in order to secure in a moment the rewards of victory. No kind of greatness is more pleasing to the imagination of a democratic people than military greatness—a greatness of vivid and sudden lustre, obtained without toil, by nothing but the risk of life. Thus, whilst the interests and the tastes of the members of a democratic community divert them from war, their habits of mind fit them for carrying on war well; they soon make good soldiers, when they are roused from their business and their enjoyments. If peace is peculiarly hurtful to democratic armies, war secures to them advantages which no other armies ever possess; and these advantages, however little felt at first, cannot fail in the end to give them the victory. An aristocratic nation, which in a contest with a democratic people does not succeed in ruining the latter at the outset of the war, always runs a great risk of being conquered by it.

There’s also a hidden link between military culture and the nature of democracies, which war reveals. People in democracies are usually very eager to obtain what they desire and enjoy it easily. They tend to revere chance and are more afraid of challenges than of death. This attitude influences their approach to business and manufacturing; this same mindset leads them to willingly risk their lives on the battlefield to achieve quick rewards from victory. There’s no kind of greatness that captures the imagination of a democratic society like military success—a success that shines bright and sudden, gained without hard work, just by putting one’s life on the line. Thus, while the interests and preferences of a democratic community might keep them away from war, their mindset prepares them to fight effectively; they quickly adapt to being good soldiers when pulled away from their work and pleasures. If peace is particularly detrimental to democratic armies, war offers them advantages that no other armies have; these advantages, even if not immediately apparent, will ultimately lead them to victory. An aristocratic nation that doesn’t manage to defeat a democratic people early in the war always faces a significant risk of being overpowered by them.





Chapter XXV: Of Discipline In Democratic Armies

It is a very general opinion, especially in aristocratic countries, that the great social equality which prevails in democracies ultimately renders the private soldier independent of the officer, and thus destroys the bond of discipline. This is a mistake, for there are two kinds of discipline, which it is important not to confound. When the officer is noble and the soldier a serf—one rich, the other poor—the former educated and strong, the latter ignorant and weak—the strictest bond of obedience may easily be established between the two men. The soldier is broken in to military discipline, as it were, before he enters the army; or rather, military discipline is nothing but an enhancement of social servitude. In aristocratic armies the soldier will soon become insensible to everything but the orders of his superior officers; he acts without reflection, triumphs without enthusiasm, and dies without complaint: in this state he is no longer a man, but he is still a most formidable animal trained for war.

It’s a common belief, especially in upper-class societies, that the high level of social equality in democracies eventually makes the regular soldier less reliant on the officer, which undermines discipline. This is a misconception because there are two types of discipline that shouldn’t be confused. When the officer is noble and the soldier is a serf—one wealthy, the other poor—the officer educated and strong, while the soldier is uneducated and weak—the strictest bond of obedience can easily be created between the two. The soldier is conditioned for military discipline even before joining the army; in fact, military discipline is simply an extension of social servitude. In aristocratic armies, the soldier quickly becomes indifferent to everything except the commands of his superiors; he acts without thinking, celebrates without passion, and dies without protest: in this state, he’s no longer a human being, but he remains a highly effective fighting machine.

A democratic people must despair of ever obtaining from soldiers that blind, minute, submissive, and invariable obedience which an aristocratic people may impose on them without difficulty. The state of society does not prepare them for it, and the nation might be in danger of losing its natural advantages if it sought artificially to acquire advantages of this particular kind. Amongst democratic communities, military discipline ought not to attempt to annihilate the free spring of the faculties; all that can be done by discipline is to direct it; the obedience thus inculcated is less exact, but it is more eager and more intelligent. It has its root in the will of him who obeys: it rests not only on his instinct, but on his reason; and consequently it will often spontaneously become more strict as danger requires it. The discipline of an aristocratic army is apt to be relaxed in war, because that discipline is founded upon habits, and war disturbs those habits. The discipline of a democratic army on the contrary is strengthened in sight of the enemy, because every soldier then clearly perceives that he must be silent and obedient in order to conquer.

A democratic society cannot expect to get from soldiers the blind, meticulous, submissive, and unwavering obedience that an aristocratic society can impose easily. The social structure doesn’t set them up for that, and the nation risks losing its natural strengths if it tries to artificially enforce that kind of obedience. In democratic societies, military discipline shouldn't aim to suppress the free expression of abilities; rather, it should guide them. The obedience taught through this discipline is less rigid, but it's more enthusiastic and thoughtful. It stems from the will of the individual obeying; it's based not just on instinct, but also on reason, and thus it can often become stricter on its own when faced with danger. In an aristocratic army, discipline may weaken during war because it's based on established habits, and war disrupts those patterns. Conversely, in a democratic army, discipline tends to strengthen in the presence of an enemy, as every soldier understands that being quiet and obedient is essential to winning.

The nations which have performed the greatest warlike achievements knew no other discipline than that which I speak of. Amongst the ancients none were admitted into the armies but freemen and citizens, who differed but little from one another, and were accustomed to treat each other as equals. In this respect it may be said that the armies of antiquity were democratic, although they came out of the bosom of aristocracy; the consequence was that in those armies a sort of fraternal familiarity prevailed between the officers and the men. Plutarch's lives of great commanders furnish convincing instances of the fact: the soldiers were in the constant habit of freely addressing their general, and the general listened to and answered whatever the soldiers had to say: they were kept in order by language and by example, far more than by constraint or punishment; the general was as much their companion as their chief. I know not whether the soldiers of Greece and Rome ever carried the minutiae of military discipline to the same degree of perfection as the Russians have done; but this did not prevent Alexander from conquering Asia—and Rome, the world.

The nations that achieved the most remarkable military feats had no other training than what I’m talking about. In ancient times, only free men and citizens were allowed in the armies, and they were quite similar to one another, used to treating each other as equals. In this sense, you could say the armies of the past were democratic, even though they came from a form of aristocracy; as a result, there was a kind of brotherly familiarity between the officers and the soldiers. Plutarch's biographies of great leaders provide strong examples of this: soldiers often addressed their general openly, and the general listened and responded to whatever the soldiers had to say. They were maintained in line more by communication and setting a good example than by force or punishment; the general was as much their friend as their leader. I’m not sure if the soldiers of Greece and Rome ever perfected military discipline to the level that the Russians have done, but that didn’t stop Alexander from conquering Asia—and Rome from taking over the world.





Chapter XXVI: Some Considerations On War In Democratic Communities

When the principle of equality is in growth, not only amongst a single nation, but amongst several neighboring nations at the same time, as is now the case in Europe, the inhabitants of these different countries, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of language, of customs, and of laws, nevertheless resemble each other in their equal dread of war and their common love of peace. *a It is in vain that ambition or anger puts arms in the hands of princes; they are appeased in spite of themselves by a species of general apathy and goodwill, which makes the sword drop from their grasp, and wars become more rare. As the spread of equality, taking place in several countries at once, simultaneously impels their various inhabitants to follow manufactures and commerce, not only do their tastes grow alike, but their interests are so mixed and entangled with one another that no nation can inflict evils on other nations without those evils falling back upon itself; and all nations ultimately regard war as a calamity, almost as severe to the conqueror as to the conquered. Thus, on the one hand, it is extremely difficult in democratic ages to draw nations into hostilities; but on the other hand, it is almost impossible that any two of them should go to war without embroiling the rest. The interests of all are so interlaced, their opinions and their wants so much alike, that none can remain quiet when the others stir. Wars therefore become more rare, but when they break out they spread over a larger field. Neighboring democratic nations not only become alike in some respects, but they eventually grow to resemble each other in almost all. *b This similitude of nations has consequences of great importance in relation to war.

As the idea of equality spreads, not just within a single nation but among several neighboring countries simultaneously, as we see now in Europe, the people of these different nations—despite their differences in language, customs, and laws—share a common fear of war and a mutual love of peace. It doesn't matter how much ambition or anger pushes rulers to take up arms; they are calmed by a kind of widespread indifference and goodwill that makes them drop their swords and leads to fewer wars. As equality broadens across multiple countries at once, it drives their people to engage in manufacturing and trade. This not only aligns their tastes but also intertwines their interests so deeply that no nation can harm another without suffering consequences themselves; all nations eventually see war as a disaster that affects both the victor and the vanquished nearly equally. Consequently, in democratic times, it's very hard to draw nations into conflict; yet, if any two do go to war, it’s nearly impossible for others to stay uninvolved. Their interests are so intertwined, and their views and needs so similar, that no one can remain passive if others are disturbed. Wars consequently become rarer, but when they do occur, they tend to escalate across larger areas. Neighboring democratic nations not only start to share similarities in some ways, but they ultimately come to resemble one another in nearly every aspect. This similarity among nations holds significant implications for warfare.

a
[ It is scarcely necessary for me to observe that the dread of war displayed by the nations of Europe is not solely attributable to the progress made by the principle of equality amongst them; independently of this permanent cause several other accidental causes of great weight might be pointed out, and I may mention before all the rest the extreme lassitude which the wars of the Revolution and the Empire have left behind them.]

a
[It’s hardly worth mentioning that the fear of war shown by the nations of Europe isn’t just due to the advancement of equality among them; aside from this ongoing reason, there are several significant temporary reasons that could be highlighted, and I should point out first and foremost the extreme fatigue that the wars of the Revolution and the Empire have left in their wake.]

b
[ This is not only because these nations have the same social condition, but it arises from the very nature of that social condition which leads men to imitate and identify themselves with each other. When the members of a community are divided into castes and classes, they not only differ from one another, but they have no taste and no desire to be alike; on the contrary, everyone endeavors, more and more, to keep his own opinions undisturbed, to retain his own peculiar habits, and to remain himself. The characteristics of individuals are very strongly marked. When the state of society amongst a people is democratic—that is to say, when there are no longer any castes or classes in the community, and all its members are nearly equal in education and in property—the human mind follows the opposite direction. Men are much alike, and they are annoyed, as it were, by any deviation from that likeness: far from seeking to preserve their own distinguishing singularities, they endeavor to shake them off, in order to identify themselves with the general mass of the people, which is the sole representative of right and of might to their eyes. The characteristics of individuals are nearly obliterated. In the ages of aristocracy even those who are naturally alike strive to create imaginary differences between themselves: in the ages of democracy even those who are not alike seek only to become so, and to copy each other—so strongly is the mind of every man always carried away by the general impulse of mankind. Something of the same kind may be observed between nations: two nations having the same aristocratic social condition, might remain thoroughly distinct and extremely different, because the spirit of aristocracy is to retain strong individual characteristics; but if two neighboring nations have the same democratic social condition, they cannot fail to adopt similar opinions and manners, because the spirit of democracy tends to assimilate men to each other.]

b
[ This isn't just because these nations share similar social conditions; it's also due to the nature of those conditions that encourages people to imitate and connect with one another. When members of a community are divided into castes and classes, they don't just differ from each other; they also have no inclination or desire to be the same. Instead, everyone tries more and more to hold onto their own opinions, maintain their unique habits, and be themselves. The traits of individuals are very pronounced. When society is democratic—that is, when there are no longer any castes or classes, and all members have similar levels of education and wealth—the human mindset shifts in the opposite direction. People become much more alike and are, in a sense, irritated by any differences: instead of wanting to keep their unique traits, they strive to blend in with the general population, which they see as the ultimate source of authority and strength. The traits of individuals become almost indistinguishable. In aristocratic societies, even those who are naturally similar attempt to create imaginary differences among themselves; in democratic societies, even those who are different seek only to become alike and to imitate one another—such is the powerful influence of collective human behavior. A similar pattern can be seen between nations: two nations with the same aristocratic social structure may remain distinctly different because the essence of aristocracy values strong individual characteristics. However, if two neighboring nations share a democratic social condition, they will inevitably adopt similar beliefs and behaviors, as the spirit of democracy encourages conformity among people.]

If I inquire why it is that the Helvetic Confederacy made the greatest and most powerful nations of Europe tremble in the fifteenth century, whilst at the present day the power of that country is exactly proportioned to its population, I perceive that the Swiss are become like all the surrounding communities, and those surrounding communities like the Swiss: so that as numerical strength now forms the only difference between them, victory necessarily attends the largest army. Thus one of the consequences of the democratic revolution which is going on in Europe is to make numerical strength preponderate on all fields of battle, and to constrain all small nations to incorporate themselves with large States, or at least to adopt the policy of the latter. As numbers are the determining cause of victory, each people ought of course to strive by all the means in its power to bring the greatest possible number of men into the field. When it was possible to enlist a kind of troops superior to all others, such as the Swiss infantry or the French horse of the sixteenth century, it was not thought necessary to raise very large armies; but the case is altered when one soldier is as efficient as another.

If I ask why the Helvetic Confederacy made the strongest nations in Europe fear them in the fifteenth century, while today the country's power matches its population, I see that the Swiss have become similar to the surrounding communities, and those communities have become more like the Swiss. Now, numerical strength is the only real difference between them, so victory inevitably goes to the largest army. One outcome of the democratic revolution taking place in Europe is that numerical strength dominates on all battlefields, forcing smaller nations to merge with larger states or at least to follow their policies. Since numbers determine victory, every nation should strive to gather as many men as possible for battle. When it was possible to recruit elite troops, like the Swiss infantry or the French cavalry of the sixteenth century, there was no need to raise very large armies. However, that changes when one soldier is just as capable as another.

The same cause which begets this new want also supplies means of satisfying it; for, as I have already observed, when men are all alike, they are all weak, and the supreme power of the State is naturally much stronger amongst democratic nations than elsewhere. Hence, whilst these nations are desirous of enrolling the whole male population in the ranks of the army, they have the power of effecting this object: the consequence is, that in democratic ages armies seem to grow larger in proportion as the love of war declines. In the same ages, too, the manner of carrying on war is likewise altered by the same causes. Machiavelli observes in "The Prince," "that it is much more difficult to subdue a people which has a prince and his barons for its leaders, than a nation which is commanded by a prince and his slaves." To avoid offence, let us read public functionaries for slaves, and this important truth will be strictly applicable to our own time.

The same factor that creates this new desire also provides the means to satisfy it; as I’ve mentioned before, when everyone is the same, they are all weak, and the overall power of the State is naturally much stronger in democratic nations than in others. Therefore, while these nations want to draft the entire male population into the army, they have the ability to achieve this goal: as a result, in democratic times, armies seem to expand even as interest in war diminishes. Additionally, during these periods, the way wars are conducted also changes for the same reasons. Machiavelli points out in "The Prince" that it’s much harder to conquer a people led by a prince and his nobles than one led by a prince and his commoners. To avoid causing offense, let’s substitute public officials for commoners, and this important truth will hold true for our own time.

A great aristocratic people cannot either conquer its neighbors, or be conquered by them, without great difficulty. It cannot conquer them, because all its forces can never be collected and held together for a considerable period: it cannot be conquered, because an enemy meets at every step small centres of resistance by which invasion is arrested. War against an aristocracy may be compared to war in a mountainous country; the defeated party has constant opportunities of rallying its forces to make a stand in a new position. Exactly the reverse occurs amongst democratic nations: they easily bring their whole disposable force into the field, and when the nation is wealthy and populous it soon becomes victorious; but if ever it is conquered, and its territory invaded, it has few resources at command; and if the enemy takes the capital, the nation is lost. This may very well be explained: as each member of the community is individually isolated and extremely powerless, no one of the whole body can either defend himself or present a rallying point to others. Nothing is strong in a democratic country except the State; as the military strength of the State is destroyed by the destruction of the army, and its civil power paralyzed by the capture of the chief city, all that remains is only a multitude without strength or government, unable to resist the organized power by which it is assailed. I am aware that this danger may be lessened by the creation of provincial liberties, and consequently of provincial powers, but this remedy will always be insufficient. For after such a catastrophe, not only is the population unable to carry on hostilities, but it may be apprehended that they will not be inclined to attempt it. In accordance with the law of nations adopted in civilized countries, the object of wars is not to seize the property of private individuals, but simply to get possession of political power. The destruction of private property is only occasionally resorted to for the purpose of attaining the latter object. When an aristocratic country is invaded after the defeat of its army, the nobles, although they are at the same time the wealthiest members of the community, will continue to defend themselves individually rather than submit; for if the conqueror remained master of the country, he would deprive them of their political power, to which they cling even more closely than to their property. They therefore prefer fighting to subjection, which is to them the greatest of all misfortunes; and they readily carry the people along with them because the people has long been used to follow and obey them, and besides has but little to risk in the war. Amongst a nation in which equality of conditions prevails, each citizen, on the contrary, has but slender share of political power, and often has no share at all; on the other hand, all are independent, and all have something to lose; so that they are much less afraid of being conquered, and much more afraid of war, than an aristocratic people. It will always be extremely difficult to decide a democratic population to take up arms, when hostilities have reached its own territory. Hence the necessity of giving to such a people the rights and the political character which may impart to every citizen some of those interests that cause the nobles to act for the public welfare in aristocratic countries.

A wealthy aristocratic society struggles to conquer its neighbors or be defeated by them without significant challenges. It can't conquer them because it can never gather all its forces together for a long time. It can't be conquered either, as an invading enemy encounters numerous small pockets of resistance that slow them down. Fighting against an aristocracy is like battling in a hilly region; the defeated side constantly has chances to regroup and defend from new positions. In contrast, democratic nations can easily mobilize their entire available force. When a democracy is rich and populous, it tends to achieve victory quickly. However, if it is ever defeated and its land invaded, it has limited resources left. If the enemy captures the capital, the nation is essentially lost. This situation is understandable: each individual in the community is isolated and quite powerless, so no one can defend themselves or provide a point of rallying for others. The only strong entity in a democratic country is the State. If the State's military might is crushed due to the army's defeat and its civil authority paralyzed with the fall of the main city, what remains is merely a population without strength or governance, unable to resist the organized force assaulting it. I know this risk can be lessened through the establishment of regional freedoms and powers, but this solution will always be inadequate. After such a disaster, not only does the population struggle to wage war, but they might also not feel inclined to try. According to the laws of nations recognized in civilized societies, the purpose of wars is not to seize private property, but to capture political power. Destroying private property is only occasionally used to achieve this goal. When an aristocratic nation is invaded after its military is defeated, the nobles—who are also the wealthiest members of society—will continue to fight individually rather than surrender, as losing to the conqueror would mean losing their political power, which they value even more than their wealth. Therefore, they prefer to fight rather than face submission, which they see as the worst fate; and they easily rally the populace because the people are used to following and obeying them, with little to lose in the conflict. In a society of equal conditions, conversely, each citizen holds a minimal share of political power, and often none at all; yet everyone is independent and has something to lose, making them more fearful of war than of being conquered. It is always very challenging to motivate a democratic population to take up arms when conflict reaches its own land. Hence, it is crucial to grant such a populace the rights and political status that would instill in every citizen some of the interests that drive the nobles to act for the common good in aristocratic societies.

It should never be forgotten by the princes and other leaders of democratic nations, that nothing but the passion and the habit of freedom can maintain an advantageous contest with the passion and the habit of physical well-being. I can conceive nothing better prepared for subjection, in case of defeat, than a democratic people without free institutions.

It should never be forgotten by the leaders of democratic nations that nothing but the passion and habit of freedom can effectively compete with the passion and habit of physical well-being. I can think of nothing more vulnerable to oppression, in the event of defeat, than a democratic society lacking free institutions.

Formerly it was customary to take the field with a small body of troops, to fight in small engagements, and to make long, regular sieges: modern tactics consist in fighting decisive battles, and, as soon as a line of march is open before the army, in rushing upon the capital city, in order to terminate the war at a single blow. Napoleon, it is said, was the inventor of this new system; but the invention of such a system did not depend on any individual man, whoever he might be. The mode in which Napoleon carried on war was suggested to him by the state of society in his time; that mode was successful, because it was eminently adapted to that state of society, and because he was the first to employ it. Napoleon was the first commander who marched at the head of an army from capital to capital, but the road was opened for him by the ruin of feudal society. It may fairly be believed that, if that extraordinary man had been born three hundred years ago, he would not have derived the same results from his method of warfare, or, rather, that he would have had a different method.

In the past, it was common to engage in battle with a small group of troops, to fight in minor skirmishes, and to conduct lengthy, organized sieges. Modern tactics now focus on fighting decisive battles and quickly advancing on the capital city as soon as a route is clear, aiming to end the war in one decisive action. It’s said that Napoleon was the innovator of this new strategy; however, the development of such a system didn’t rely on any one individual, no matter who they were. The way Napoleon waged war was shaped by the social conditions of his time; his approach worked well because it was perfectly suited to those conditions and because he was the first to use it. Napoleon was the first leader to march an army from one capital to another, but this path was made possible by the collapse of feudal society. It can be reasonably believed that if that remarkable man had been born three hundred years earlier, he wouldn’t have achieved the same outcomes with his warfare tactics, or, rather, he would have had a different approach altogether.

I shall add but a few words on civil wars, for fear of exhausting the patience of the reader. Most of the remarks which I have made respecting foreign wars are applicable a fortiori to civil wars. Men living in democracies are not naturally prone to the military character; they sometimes assume it, when they have been dragged by compulsion to the field; but to rise in a body and voluntarily to expose themselves to the horrors of war, and especially of civil war, is a course which the men of democracies are not apt to adopt. None but the most adventurous members of the community consent to run into such risks; the bulk of the population remains motionless. But even if the population were inclined to act, considerable obstacles would stand in their way; for they can resort to no old and well-established influence which they are willing to obey—no well-known leaders to rally the discontented, as well as to discipline and to lead them—no political powers subordinate to the supreme power of the nation, which afford an effectual support to the resistance directed against the government. In democratic countries the moral power of the majority is immense, and the physical resources which it has at its command are out of all proportion to the physical resources which may be combined against it. Therefore the party which occupies the seat of the majority, which speaks in its name and wields its power, triumphs instantaneously and irresistibly over all private resistance; it does not even give such opposition time to exist, but nips it in the bud. Those who in such nations seek to effect a revolution by force of arms have no other resource than suddenly to seize upon the whole engine of government as it stands, which can better be done by a single blow than by a war; for as soon as there is a regular war, the party which represents the State is always certain to conquer. The only case in which a civil war could arise is, if the army should divide itself into two factions, the one raising the standard of rebellion, the other remaining true to its allegiance. An army constitutes a small community, very closely united together, endowed with great powers of vitality, and able to supply its own wants for some time. Such a war might be bloody, but it could not be long; for either the rebellious army would gain over the government by the sole display of its resources, or by its first victory, and then the war would be over; or the struggle would take place, and then that portion of the army which should not be supported by the organized powers of the State would speedily either disband itself or be destroyed. It may therefore be admitted as a general truth, that in ages of equality civil wars will become much less frequent and less protracted. *c

I’ll keep my comments about civil wars brief to avoid wearing out the reader’s patience. Most of what I've said about foreign wars applies even more to civil wars. People living in democracies aren’t naturally inclined towards a military mindset; they might take on that role when forced into it, but they’re unlikely to band together willingly to face the horrors of war, especially civil war. Only the most daring individuals are willing to take those kinds of risks, while the majority of the population tends to stay still. Even if they wanted to take action, significant barriers would prevent them from doing so; they lack any established authority they’re willing to follow—no recognizable leaders to rally the dissatisfied and provide discipline and direction—no political forces subordinate to the national government that could effectively support resistance against it. In democratic societies, the moral authority of the majority is powerful, and the physical resources it controls far outweigh anything that could be mustered against it. As a result, the party in power, which speaks for the majority, quickly and decisively trumps any private resistance, often snuffing it out before it can even begin. Those attempting a revolution through armed conflict in such nations have no choice but to suddenly take control of the entire government as it stands, which is easier achieved in one swift move than through prolonged warfare; because once a regular war starts, the entity representing the state is almost always guaranteed to win. The only situation where a civil war could emerge is if the army splits into two factions—one rebelling and the other staying loyal. An army is a small, tightly-knit community with significant strength and the ability to sustain itself for a while. While such a war could be bloody, it wouldn't last long; either the rebellious army would intimidate the government just by showing its resources or win a quick victory, ending the conflict, or there would be a struggle, and then that part of the army without backing from the official state powers would soon either disband or be defeated. Therefore, it can be generally accepted that in times of equality, civil wars will be much less common and shorter in duration.

c
[ It should be borne in mind that I speak here of sovereign and independent democratic nations, not of confederate democracies; in confederacies, as the preponderating power always resides, in spite of all political fictions, in the state governments, and not in the federal government, civil wars are in fact nothing but foreign wars in disguise.]

c
[ It should be kept in mind that I'm talking about sovereign and independent democratic nations, not confederate democracies; in confederacies, since the dominant power always rests, despite all political illusions, with the state governments rather than the federal government, civil wars are essentially just foreign wars in disguise.]





Book Four: Influence Of Democratic Opinions On Political Society





Chapter I: That Equality Naturally Gives Men A Taste For Free Institutions

I should imperfectly fulfil the purpose of this book, if, after having shown what opinions and sentiments are suggested by the principle of equality, I did not point out, ere I conclude, the general influence which these same opinions and sentiments may exercise upon the government of human societies. To succeed in this object I shall frequently have to retrace my steps; but I trust the reader will not refuse to follow me through paths already known to him, which may lead to some new truth.

I would fail to properly achieve the goal of this book if, after discussing the opinions and feelings that come from the idea of equality, I didn't also highlight the overall impact these opinions and feelings might have on the governance of human societies before I finish. To accomplish this, I'll often need to revisit familiar topics, but I hope the reader will be willing to travel these familiar routes with me, as they might lead to new insights.

The principle of equality, which makes men independent of each other, gives them a habit and a taste for following, in their private actions, no other guide but their own will. This complete independence, which they constantly enjoy towards their equals and in the intercourse of private life, tends to make them look upon all authority with a jealous eye, and speedily suggests to them the notion and the love of political freedom. Men living at such times have a natural bias to free institutions. Take any one of them at a venture, and search if you can his most deep-seated instincts; you will find that of all governments he will soonest conceive and most highly value that government, whose head he has himself elected, and whose administration he may control. Of all the political effects produced by the equality of conditions, this love of independence is the first to strike the observing, and to alarm the timid; nor can it be said that their alarm is wholly misplaced, for anarchy has a more formidable aspect in democratic countries than elsewhere. As the citizens have no direct influence on each other, as soon as the supreme power of the nation fails, which kept them all in their several stations, it would seem that disorder must instantly reach its utmost pitch, and that, every man drawing aside in a different direction, the fabric of society must at once crumble away.

The principle of equality, which makes people independent from one another, encourages them to rely solely on their own will in their personal actions. This complete independence, which they always experience with their peers and in their private interactions, makes them view any authority with suspicion and quickly leads them to desire political freedom. People living in such times naturally lean towards free institutions. If you randomly pick one of them and examine their deepest instincts, you'll find that of all governments, they will most quickly appreciate and value a government that they themselves have elected and whose administration they can influence. Among all the political effects of equality, this desire for independence is the most noticeable to the observant and tends to worry the timid; and it can't be said that their concern is entirely unfounded, as chaos appears more threatening in democratic countries than elsewhere. Since citizens have no direct influence over each other, once the nation's supreme power—the force that keeps everyone in their respective roles—fails, it seems that disorder would immediately peak, with each person pulling in a different direction, causing the structure of society to collapse.

I am, however, persuaded that anarchy is not the principal evil which democratic ages have to fear, but the least. For the principle of equality begets two tendencies; the one leads men straight to independence, and may suddenly drive them into anarchy; the other conducts them by a longer, more secret, but more certain road, to servitude. Nations readily discern the former tendency, and are prepared to resist it; they are led away by the latter, without perceiving its drift; hence it is peculiarly important to point it out. For myself, I am so far from urging as a reproach to the principle of equality that it renders men untractable, that this very circumstance principally calls forth my approbation. I admire to see how it deposits in the mind and heart of man the dim conception and instinctive love of political independence, thus preparing the remedy for the evil which it engenders; it is on this very account that I am attached to it.

I am, however, convinced that anarchy isn’t the main threat that democratic times face, but rather the least concerning one. The principle of equality creates two tendencies: one that drives people directly toward independence, which can suddenly lead them into anarchy, and the other that takes them down a longer, more hidden, but more reliable path to servitude. Nations easily recognize the first tendency and are ready to fight against it; they are misled by the second one without realizing its direction, which is why it’s especially important to highlight it. Personally, I don’t think it’s a criticism of the principle of equality that it makes people difficult to control; in fact, this very aspect is what I appreciate most. I admire how it plants in people's minds and hearts a vague sense and instinctive love for political independence, thus laying the groundwork for the solution to the problems it creates; this is precisely why I am drawn to it.





Chapter II: That The Notions Of Democratic Nations On Government Are Naturally Favorable To The Concentration Of Power

The notion of secondary powers, placed between the sovereign and his subjects, occurred naturally to the imagination of aristocratic nations, because those communities contained individuals or families raised above the common level, and apparently destined to command by their birth, their education, and their wealth. This same notion is naturally wanting in the minds of men in democratic ages, for converse reasons: it can only be introduced artificially, it can only be kept there with difficulty; whereas they conceive, as it were, without thinking upon the subject, the notion of a sole and central power which governs the whole community by its direct influence. Moreover in politics, as well as in philosophy and in religion, the intellect of democratic nations is peculiarly open to simple and general notions. Complicated systems are repugnant to it, and its favorite conception is that of a great nation composed of citizens all resembling the same pattern, and all governed by a single power.

The idea of secondary powers, positioned between the ruler and their subjects, naturally came to mind for aristocratic societies because those communities included individuals or families who were elevated above the average and seemed destined to lead due to their birth, education, and wealth. In contrast, this idea is generally absent in the minds of people in democratic times for opposite reasons: it can only be introduced artificially and is hard to maintain; however, people naturally envision a single central power that governs the entire community through its direct influence. Furthermore, in politics, as in philosophy and religion, the intellect of democratic societies is especially receptive to simple and broad ideas. Complex systems are off-putting, and the favored concept is that of a large nation made up of citizens who are all similar and governed by one power.

The very next notion to that of a sole and central power, which presents itself to the minds of men in the ages of equality, is the notion of uniformity of legislation. As every man sees that he differs but little from those about him, he cannot understand why a rule which is applicable to one man should not be equally applicable to all others. Hence the slightest privileges are repugnant to his reason; the faintest dissimilarities in the political institutions of the same people offend him, and uniformity of legislation appears to him to be the first condition of good government. I find, on the contrary, that this same notion of a uniform rule, equally binding on all the members of the community, was almost unknown to the human mind in aristocratic ages; it was either never entertained, or it was rejected. These contrary tendencies of opinion ultimately turn on either side to such blind instincts and such ungovernable habits that they still direct the actions of men, in spite of particular exceptions. Notwithstanding the immense variety of conditions in the Middle Ages, a certain number of persons existed at that period in precisely similar circumstances; but this did not prevent the laws then in force from assigning to each of them distinct duties and different rights. On the contrary, at the present time all the powers of government are exerted to impose the same customs and the same laws on populations which have as yet but few points of resemblance. As the conditions of men become equal amongst a people, individuals seem of less importance, and society of greater dimensions; or rather, every citizen, being assimilated to all the rest, is lost in the crowd, and nothing stands conspicuous but the great and imposing image of the people at large. This naturally gives the men of democratic periods a lofty opinion of the privileges of society, and a very humble notion of the rights of individuals; they are ready to admit that the interests of the former are everything, and those of the latter nothing. They are willing to acknowledge that the power which represents the community has far more information and wisdom than any of the members of that community; and that it is the duty, as well as the right, of that power to guide as well as govern each private citizen.

The next idea that comes to mind after discussing a single, central authority, especially in times of equality, is the idea of uniform laws. Since everyone sees that they are not very different from those around them, they struggle to understand why a rule that applies to one person shouldn't apply to everyone else as well. As a result, even the smallest privileges seem unreasonable to them; any minor differences in the political systems of the same group bother them, and they believe that uniform laws are essential for good governance. In contrast, this concept of a uniform rule, equally binding for everyone in the community, was almost nonexistent in aristocratic times; it was either not considered at all or outright rejected. These opposing views eventually become such deep-seated instincts and habits that they continue to influence people's actions, despite some exceptions. While there was a significant variety of conditions during the Middle Ages, there were still groups of people in very similar situations; however, this didn’t stop the laws from imposing distinct duties and rights on each of them. In fact, today, all government powers are focused on imposing the same customs and laws on populations that share very few similarities. As people's conditions become more equal within a society, individuals seem less significant, while the society as a whole becomes more prominent; in other words, every citizen blends in with the rest, and what stands out is the grand image of the population as a whole. This leads people in democratic societies to have a high regard for societal privileges and a very low opinion of individual rights; they tend to agree that the interests of society outweigh those of individuals. They are willing to accept that the authority representing the community is much more knowledgeable and wise than any individual member of that community, believing it is both the duty and right of that authority to guide and govern every citizen.

If we closely scrutinize our contemporaries, and penetrate to the root of their political opinions, we shall detect some of the notions which I have just pointed out, and we shall perhaps be surprised to find so much accordance between men who are so often at variance. The Americans hold, that in every State the supreme power ought to emanate from the people; but when once that power is constituted, they can conceive, as it were, no limits to it, and they are ready to admit that it has the right to do whatever it pleases. They have not the slightest notion of peculiar privileges granted to cities, families, or persons: their minds appear never to have foreseen that it might be possible not to apply with strict uniformity the same laws to every part, and to all the inhabitants. These same opinions are more and more diffused in Europe; they even insinuate themselves amongst those nations which most vehemently reject the principle of the sovereignty of the people. Such nations assign a different origin to the supreme power, but they ascribe to that power the same characteristics. Amongst them all, the idea of intermediate powers is weakened and obliterated: the idea of rights inherent in certain individuals is rapidly disappearing from the minds of men; the idea of the omnipotence and sole authority of society at large rises to fill its place. These ideas take root and spread in proportion as social conditions become more equal, and men more alike; they are engendered by equality, and in turn they hasten the progress of equality.

If we closely examine our contemporaries and dig into the core of their political beliefs, we’ll notice some of the ideas I just mentioned, and we might be surprised to see so much agreement among people who often disagree. Americans believe that in every state, the ultimate power should come from the people; however, once that power is established, they can hardly imagine any limits to it, and they readily accept that it has the right to do whatever it wants. They have no concept of special privileges for cities, families, or individuals: their mindset seems never to have considered that it might be possible not to apply the same laws uniformly to every region and all citizens. These same views are increasingly spreading in Europe; they even creep into nations that strongly oppose the principle of popular sovereignty. Such nations may attribute supreme power to a different source, but they attribute the same characteristics to that power. Among them, the idea of intermediary powers is diminished and erased: the notion of rights inherent to certain individuals is rapidly vanishing from people's minds; the concept of the absolute power and sole authority of society as a whole rises to take its place. These ideas take root and proliferate as social conditions become more equal and people become more alike; they are born out of equality and, in turn, promote the progress of equality.

In France, where the revolution of which I am speaking has gone further than in any other European country, these opinions have got complete hold of the public mind. If we listen attentively to the language of the various parties in France, we shall find that there is not one which has not adopted them. Most of these parties censure the conduct of the government, but they all hold that the government ought perpetually to act and interfere in everything that is done. Even those which are most at variance are nevertheless agreed upon this head. The unity, the ubiquity, the omnipotence of the supreme power, and the uniformity of its rules, constitute the principal characteristics of all the political systems which have been put forward in our age. They recur even in the wildest visions of political regeneration: the human mind pursues them in its dreams. If these notions spontaneously arise in the minds of private individuals, they suggest themselves still more forcibly to the minds of princes. Whilst the ancient fabric of European society is altered and dissolved, sovereigns acquire new conceptions of their opportunities and their duties; they learn for the first time that the central power which they represent may and ought to administer by its own agency, and on a uniform plan, all the concerns of the whole community. This opinion, which, I will venture to say, was never conceived before our time by the monarchs of Europe, now sinks deeply into the minds of kings, and abides there amidst all the agitation of more unsettled thoughts.

In France, where the revolution I'm talking about has progressed more than in any other European country, these ideas have taken hold of public opinion completely. If we listen closely to the language used by different political parties in France, we will see that not a single one has escaped adopting them. Most of these parties criticize the government's actions, but they all agree that the government should always be involved and take action in everything that happens. Even those that have the most differing views still share this belief. The unity, the everywhere presence, the all-powerful nature of the central authority, and the consistency of its rules are the main features of all political systems proposed in our time. These ideas even appear in the most extreme visions of political change: the human mind chases them in its dreams. If these thoughts naturally emerge in the minds of private individuals, they resonate even more strongly with the minds of rulers. As the old structure of European society changes and breaks down, monarchs develop new ideas about their roles and responsibilities; they come to realize for the first time that the central power they embody can and should manage all community matters on its own and under a coherent plan. This belief, which I dare say was never thought of before our time by European monarchs, is now deeply ingrained in the minds of kings and persists amidst the turmoil of their other restless thoughts.

Our contemporaries are therefore much less divided than is commonly supposed; they are constantly disputing as to the hands in which supremacy is to be vested, but they readily agree upon the duties and the rights of that supremacy. The notion they all form of government is that of a sole, simple, providential, and creative power. All secondary opinions in politics are unsettled; this one remains fixed, invariable, and consistent. It is adopted by statesmen and political philosophers; it is eagerly laid hold of by the multitude; those who govern and those who are governed agree to pursue it with equal ardor: it is the foremost notion of their minds, it seems inborn. It originates therefore in no caprice of the human intellect, but it is a necessary condition of the present state of mankind.

Our contemporaries are therefore much less divided than people often think; they frequently argue about who should hold power, but they easily agree on the responsibilities and rights that come with that power. Their common understanding of government is that it's a singular, straightforward, protective, and creative authority. All other political opinions are uncertain; this one remains stable, unchanging, and consistent. It's embraced by politicians and political thinkers alike; the general public eagerly supports it as well. Those in power and those being governed are equally motivated to pursue it: it’s the primary idea in their minds, almost instinctive. It doesn't arise from mere whimsy of the human mind, but is a necessary condition of the current state of humanity.





Chapter III: That The Sentiments Of Democratic Nations Accord With Their Opinions In Leading Them To Concentrate Political Power

If it be true that, in ages of equality, men readily adopt the notion of a great central power, it cannot be doubted on the other hand that their habits and sentiments predispose them to recognize such a power and to give it their support. This may be demonstrated in a few words, as the greater part of the reasons, to which the fact may be attributed, have been previously stated. *a As the men who inhabit democratic countries have no superiors, no inferiors, and no habitual or necessary partners in their undertakings, they readily fall back upon themselves and consider themselves as beings apart. I had occasion to point this out at considerable length in treating of individualism. Hence such men can never, without an effort, tear themselves from their private affairs to engage in public business; their natural bias leads them to abandon the latter to the sole visible and permanent representative of the interests of the community, that is to say, to the State. Not only are they naturally wanting in a taste for public business, but they have frequently no time to attend to it. Private life is so busy in democratic periods, so excited, so full of wishes and of work, that hardly any energy or leisure remains to each individual for public life. I am the last man to contend that these propensities are unconquerable, since my chief object in writing this book has been to combat them. I only maintain that at the present day a secret power is fostering them in the human heart, and that if they are not checked they will wholly overgrow it.

If it's true that, in times of equality, people easily embrace the idea of a strong central authority, it's also clear that their habits and feelings make them inclined to acknowledge such power and support it. This can be explained in a few words, as most of the reasons for this conclusion have already been mentioned. Since people living in democratic societies have no superiors, no inferiors, and no regular or necessary partners in their endeavors, they easily turn inward and see themselves as separate individuals. I have previously discussed this in depth when addressing individualism. As a result, these individuals can never easily pull themselves away from their personal affairs to participate in public matters; their natural tendency is to leave those responsibilities to the only visible and lasting representative of the community's interests, which is the State. Not only do they lack an inherent interest in public affairs, but they often don't have the time to engage in them. Private life during democratic times is so active, so intense, and filled with desires and work that hardly any energy or free time is left for individuals to engage in public life. I'm certainly not arguing that these tendencies are unbeatable, as my main purpose in writing this book is to challenge them. I only assert that right now, a hidden force is nurturing these propensities in people's hearts, and if left unchecked, they will completely overtake it.

a
[ See Appendix W.]

a
[ See Appendix W.]

I have also had occasion to show how the increasing love of well-being, and the fluctuating character of property, cause democratic nations to dread all violent disturbance. The love of public tranquillity is frequently the only passion which these nations retain, and it becomes more active and powerful amongst them in proportion as all other passions droop and die. This naturally disposes the members of the community constantly to give or to surrender additional rights to the central power, which alone seems to be interested in defending them by the same means that it uses to defend itself. As in ages of equality no man is compelled to lend his assistance to his fellow-men, and none has any right to expect much support from them, everyone is at once independent and powerless. These two conditions, which must never be either separately considered or confounded together, inspire the citizen of a democratic country with very contrary propensities. His independence fills him with self-reliance and pride amongst his equals; his debility makes him feel from time to time the want of some outward assistance, which he cannot expect from any of them, because they are all impotent and unsympathizing. In this predicament he naturally turns his eyes to that imposing power which alone rises above the level of universal depression. Of that power his wants and especially his desires continually remind him, until he ultimately views it as the sole and necessary support of his own weakness. *b This may more completely explain what frequently takes place in democratic countries, where the very men who are so impatient of superiors patiently submit to a master, exhibiting at once their pride and their servility.

I’ve also had the chance to show how the growing desire for well-being and the unstable nature of property make democratic nations fearful of any violent disruptions. The desire for public peace is often the only strong emotion left in these nations, and it becomes more intense and powerful as all other feelings fade away. This naturally leads members of the community to continuously grant more rights to the central authority, which seems to be the only one interested in protecting them, using the same means it employs to protect itself. In times of equality, no one is forced to help their fellow citizens, and no one has the right to expect much support from others; everyone becomes both independent and powerless. These two conditions, which should never be viewed separately or confused with each other, create very different attitudes within a citizen of a democratic society. His independence gives him confidence and pride among his peers, while his weakness makes him occasionally feel the need for some external support that he can’t expect from anyone else, since they all are also weak and unsympathetic. In this situation, he naturally looks towards that powerful authority which stands above the overall despair. His needs, especially his desires, constantly remind him of that power until he ultimately sees it as the only necessary support for his own weakness. This can better explain what often happens in democratic countries, where the very people who are quick to resent superiors will patiently submit to a master, revealing both their pride and their servility.

b
[ In democratic communities nothing but the central power has any stability in its position or any permanence in its undertakings. All the members of society are in ceaseless stir and transformation. Now it is in the nature of all governments to seek constantly to enlarge their sphere of action; hence it is almost impossible that such a government should not ultimately succeed, because it acts with a fixed principle and a constant will, upon men, whose position, whose notions, and whose desires are in continual vacillation. It frequently happens that the members of the community promote the influence of the central power without intending it. Democratic ages are periods of experiment, innovation, and adventure. At such times there are always a multitude of men engaged in difficult or novel undertakings, which they follow alone, without caring for their fellowmen. Such persons may be ready to admit, as a general principle, that the public authority ought not to interfere in private concerns; but, by an exception to that rule, each of them craves for its assistance in the particular concern on which he is engaged, and seeks to draw upon the influence of the government for his own benefit, though he would restrict it on all other occasions. If a large number of men apply this particular exception to a great variety of different purposes, the sphere of the central power extends insensibly in all directions, although each of them wishes it to be circumscribed. Thus a democratic government increases its power simply by the fact of its permanence. Time is on its side; every incident befriends it; the passions of individuals unconsciously promote it; and it may be asserted, that the older a democratic community is, the more centralized will its government become.]

b
[ In democratic societies, only the central power has any stability or lasting influence. Everyone else is constantly changing and evolving. Governments naturally try to expand their reach, making it nearly impossible for them not to succeed in this, as they operate with a consistent approach and determination, while individuals’ circumstances, beliefs, and desires are always shifting. Often, community members unintentionally strengthen the central authority. Democratic times are characterized by experimentation, innovation, and bold endeavors. During these periods, many individuals take on challenging or new projects independently, without much regard for others. While they may agree that public authority shouldn't interfere in personal matters as a general rule, each will typically seek government support for their specific project, hoping to gain its influence while wanting to limit it in all other situations. When many individuals apply this particular exception for various purposes, the central power's influence expands gradually, even if each person prefers it to be limited. Thus, a democratic government grows stronger simply due to its continuity. Time works in its favor; every event supports it; individual passions inadvertently contribute to its power; and it can be said that the older a democratic society gets, the more centralized its government will be.]

The hatred which men bear to privilege increases in proportion as privileges become more scarce and less considerable, so that democratic passions would seem to burn most fiercely at the very time when they have least fuel. I have already given the reason of this phenomenon. When all conditions are unequal, no inequality is so great as to offend the eye; whereas the slightest dissimilarity is odious in the midst of general uniformity: the more complete is this uniformity, the more insupportable does the sight of such a difference become. Hence it is natural that the love of equality should constantly increase together with equality itself, and that it should grow by what it feeds upon. This never-dying, ever-kindling hatred, which sets a democratic people against the smallest privileges, is peculiarly favorable to the gradual concentration of all political rights in the hands of the representative of the State alone. The sovereign, being necessarily and incontestably above all the citizens, excites not their envy, and each of them thinks that he strips his equals of the prerogative which he concedes to the crown. The man of a democratic age is extremely reluctant to obey his neighbor who is his equal; he refuses to acknowledge in such a person ability superior to his own; he mistrusts his justice, and is jealous of his power; he fears and he contemns him; and he loves continually to remind him of the common dependence in which both of them stand to the same master. Every central power which follows its natural tendencies courts and encourages the principle of equality; for equality singularly facilitates, extends, and secures the influence of a central power.

The resentment that people feel toward privilege grows as privileges become rarer and less significant, so it seems that democratic feelings flare up the most when there's the least to ignite them. I've already explained why this happens. When conditions are all unequal, no particular inequality is so noticeable as to offend; however, even the smallest difference stands out and is resented among a general sameness: the more complete this sameness, the harder it is to tolerate that difference. So, it makes sense that the desire for equality keeps growing alongside actual equality, feeding off itself. This enduring, ever-growing animosity, which turns a democratic society against even the smallest privileges, tends to support the gradual concentration of all political power in the hands of the State's representative. The sovereign, being undeniably above all citizens, doesn't provoke their envy, and each individual believes that they take away their equals' privileges while granting them to the crown. A person in a democratic age is very unwilling to obey someone who is their equal; they refuse to recognize any superiority in that person, distrust their fairness, and envy their power; they fear and disdain them, constantly wanting to remind each other of their shared dependence on the same ruler. Every central authority that follows its natural course seeks and promotes the principle of equality because equality makes it easier, broadens, and secures the influence of central power.

In like manner it may be said that every central government worships uniformity: uniformity relieves it from inquiry into an infinite number of small details which must be attended to if rules were to be adapted to men, instead of indiscriminately subjecting men to rules: thus the government likes what the citizens like, and naturally hates what they hate. These common sentiments, which, in democratic nations, constantly unite the sovereign and every member of the community in one and the same conviction, establish a secret and lasting sympathy between them. The faults of the government are pardoned for the sake of its tastes; public confidence is only reluctantly withdrawn in the midst even of its excesses and its errors, and it is restored at the first call. Democratic nations often hate those in whose hands the central power is vested; but they always love that power itself.

In a similar way, it can be said that every central government values uniformity: uniformity spares it the need to look into countless small details that would need attention if rules were tailored to individuals, rather than just applying the same rules to everyone. So, the government tends to like what the citizens like and naturally dislikes what they dislike. These shared feelings, which in democratic countries consistently bring together the governing body and every member of the community in a common belief, create a hidden and lasting bond between them. The government’s mistakes are often forgiven because of its shared preferences; public trust is only reluctantly withdrawn even during its excesses and mistakes, and it’s quickly restored at the first opportunity. Democratic nations may often resent those who hold central power, but they always appreciate that power itself.

Thus, by two separate paths, I have reached the same conclusion. I have shown that the principle of equality suggests to men the notion of a sole, uniform, and strong government: I have now shown that the principle of equality imparts to them a taste for it. To governments of this kind the nations of our age are therefore tending. They are drawn thither by the natural inclination of mind and heart; and in order to reach that result, it is enough that they do not check themselves in their course. I am of opinion, that, in the democratic ages which are opening upon us, individual independence and local liberties will ever be the produce of artificial contrivance; that centralization will be the natural form of government. *c

So, through two different approaches, I’ve arrived at the same conclusion. I’ve demonstrated that the principle of equality leads people to the idea of a single, uniform, and strong government. Now, I’ve also shown that this principle gives them a preference for it. Therefore, the nations of our time are moving toward governments of this kind. They are naturally inclined to do so, and it only takes them not to hold themselves back in this direction. I believe that in the democratic eras that are ahead of us, individual independence and local freedoms will always be the result of artificial efforts; that centralization will be the natural form of government.

c
[ See Appendix X.]

c
[ See Appendix X.]





Chapter IV: Of Certain Peculiar And Accidental Causes Which Either Lead A People To Complete Centralization Of Government, Or Which Divert Them From It

If all democratic nations are instinctively led to the centralization of government, they tend to this result in an unequal manner. This depends on the particular circumstances which may promote or prevent the natural consequences of that state of society—circumstances which are exceedingly numerous; but I shall only advert to a few of them. Amongst men who have lived free long before they became equal, the tendencies derived from free institutions combat, to a certain extent, the propensities superinduced by the principle of equality; and although the central power may increase its privileges amongst such a people, the private members of such a community will never entirely forfeit their independence. But when the equality of conditions grows up amongst a people which has never known, or has long ceased to know, what freedom is (and such is the case upon the Continent of Europe), as the former habits of the nation are suddenly combined, by some sort of natural attraction, with the novel habits and principles engendered by the state of society, all powers seem spontaneously to rush to the centre. These powers accumulate there with astonishing rapidity, and the State instantly attains the utmost limits of its strength, whilst private persons allow themselves to sink as suddenly to the lowest degree of weakness.

If all democratic nations are naturally inclined toward centralizing their government, they do so in uneven ways. This variation depends on specific circumstances that can either encourage or hinder the natural outcomes of that society—there are countless factors, but I'll mention just a few. Among people who enjoyed freedom long before they became equal, the influences of free institutions somewhat counteract the tendencies introduced by equality. Even if the central authority gains more power among such individuals, the members of the community will never completely lose their independence. However, when equality emerges in a society that has never experienced, or has long forgotten, what freedom is (as is the case in mainland Europe), the previous habits of the people suddenly blend, through some natural connection, with the new habits and principles that arise from this social state. In this situation, all powers seem to rush toward the center. They gather there with incredible speed, allowing the State to quickly reach the peak of its power, while individuals find themselves dropping to a state of extreme weakness.

The English who emigrated three hundred years ago to found a democratic commonwealth on the shores of the New World, had all learned to take a part in public affairs in their mother-country; they were conversant with trial by jury; they were accustomed to liberty of speech and of the press—to personal freedom, to the notion of rights and the practice of asserting them. They carried with them to America these free institutions and manly customs, and these institutions preserved them against the encroachments of the State. Thus amongst the Americans it is freedom which is old—equality is of comparatively modern date. The reverse is occurring in Europe, where equality, introduced by absolute power and under the rule of kings, was already infused into the habits of nations long before freedom had entered into their conceptions.

The English who emigrated three hundred years ago to create a democratic society on the shores of the New World had all learned to participate in public affairs back home. They were familiar with trial by jury, used to free speech and press, and understood personal freedom along with the idea of rights and how to defend them. They brought these free institutions and strong customs with them to America, and these institutions helped protect them from government overreach. So, among Americans, freedom is what is old—equality is relatively new. In contrast, in Europe, equality, which was imposed by absolute power under kings, had already become ingrained in the habits of nations long before freedom was part of their understanding.

I have said that amongst democratic nations the notion of government naturally presents itself to the mind under the form of a sole and central power, and that the notion of intermediate powers is not familiar to them. This is peculiarly applicable to the democratic nations which have witnessed the triumph of the principle of equality by means of a violent revolution. As the classes which managed local affairs have been suddenly swept away by the storm, and as the confused mass which remains has as yet neither the organization nor the habits which fit it to assume the administration of these same affairs, the State alone seems capable of taking upon itself all the details of government, and centralization becomes, as it were, the unavoidable state of the country. Napoleon deserves neither praise nor censure for having centred in his own hands almost all the administrative power of France; for, after the abrupt disappearance of the nobility and the higher rank of the middle classes, these powers devolved on him of course: it would have been almost as difficult for him to reject as to assume them. But no necessity of this kind has ever been felt by the Americans, who, having passed through no revolution, and having governed themselves from the first, never had to call upon the State to act for a time as their guardian. Thus the progress of centralization amongst a democratic people depends not only on the progress of equality, but on the manner in which this equality has been established.

I’ve said that in democratic nations, the idea of government usually comes to mind as a single, central authority, and the concept of intermediate powers isn’t familiar to them. This is especially true for democratic nations that have experienced the rise of equality through a violent revolution. Since the groups that managed local matters have been suddenly removed by the upheaval, and the disorganized public lacks the structure or experience to take over these responsibilities, the State appears to be the only entity capable of handling all aspects of governance, making centralization the inevitable state of the country. Napoleon shouldn’t be praised or blamed for concentrating nearly all administrative power in his own hands; after the sudden disappearance of the nobility and upper middle classes, this power naturally fell to him. It would have been nearly as challenging for him to refuse it as it was to accept it. However, Americans have never felt this kind of necessity. Having gone through no revolution and governing themselves from the start, they’ve never needed to rely on the State to act as their protector. Therefore, the advancement of centralization in a democratic society relies not just on the advancement of equality, but also on how that equality was achieved.

At the commencement of a great democratic revolution, when hostilities have but just broken out between the different classes of society, the people endeavors to centralize the public administration in the hands of the government, in order to wrest the management of local affairs from the aristocracy. Towards the close of such a revolution, on the contrary, it is usually the conquered aristocracy that endeavors to make over the management of all affairs to the State, because such an aristocracy dreads the tyranny of a people which has become its equal, and not unfrequently its master. Thus it is not always the same class of the community which strives to increase the prerogative of the government; but as long as the democratic revolution lasts there is always one class in the nation, powerful in numbers or in wealth, which is induced, by peculiar passions or interests, to centralize the public administration, independently of that hatred of being governed by one's neighbor, which is a general and permanent feeling amongst democratic nations. It may be remarked, that at the present day the lower orders in England are striving with all their might to destroy local independence, and to transfer the administration from all points of the circumference to the centre; whereas the higher classes are endeavoring to retain this administration within its ancient boundaries. I venture to predict that a time will come when the very reverse will happen.

At the start of a major democratic revolution, when conflict has just begun between different social classes, the people try to centralize public administration under the government to take control of local affairs away from the aristocracy. However, towards the end of such a revolution, it's usually the defeated aristocracy that seeks to hand over control of everything to the State because they fear the tyranny of a populace that has become their equal, and often their master. Thus, it's not always the same social class that pushes to expand government power; during a democratic revolution, there's always one class in society, whether strong in numbers or wealth, that is driven by specific passions or interests to centralize public administration, regardless of the general dislike of being governed by one's neighbor, which is a common and lasting sentiment in democratic nations. It should be noted that currently, the lower classes in England are doing their best to eliminate local independence and move administration from various local points to a central authority, while the upper classes are trying to keep this administration within its traditional limits. I dare to predict that a time will come when the exact opposite will occur.

These observations explain why the supreme power is always stronger, and private individuals weaker, amongst a democratic people which has passed through a long and arduous struggle to reach a state of equality than amongst a democratic community in which the citizens have been equal from the first. The example of the Americans completely demonstrates the fact. The inhabitants of the United States were never divided by any privileges; they have never known the mutual relation of master and inferior, and as they neither dread nor hate each other, they have never known the necessity of calling in the supreme power to manage their affairs. The lot of the Americans is singular: they have derived from the aristocracy of England the notion of private rights and the taste for local freedom; and they have been able to retain both the one and the other, because they have had no aristocracy to combat.

These observations explain why the central authority is always stronger and private individuals are weaker among a democratic population that has gone through a long and tough struggle for equality, compared to a democratic community where citizens have been equal from the start. The example of the Americans clearly illustrates this point. The people of the United States have never been divided by privileges; they have never experienced the dynamic of master and subordinate, and since they neither fear nor resent each other, they have never needed to rely on the central authority to handle their affairs. The situation of the Americans is unique: they have inherited the concept of private rights and an appreciation for local freedom from England's aristocracy, and they have managed to keep both, because they have not had any aristocracy to oppose.

If at all times education enables men to defend their independence, this is most especially true in democratic ages. When all men are alike, it is easy to found a sole and all-powerful government, by the aid of mere instinct. But men require much intelligence, knowledge, and art to organize and to maintain secondary powers under similar circumstances, and to create amidst the independence and individual weakness of the citizens such free associations as may be in a condition to struggle against tyranny without destroying public order.

If education helps people defend their independence at all times, it's especially true in democratic times. When everyone is similar, it's easy to establish a single, all-powerful government simply based on instinct. However, individuals need a lot of intelligence, knowledge, and skill to set up and sustain secondary powers in those situations, and to form free associations among citizens' independence and individual vulnerabilities that can fight against tyranny while still maintaining public order.

Hence the concentration of power and the subjection of individuals will increase amongst democratic nations, not only in the same proportion as their equality, but in the same proportion as their ignorance. It is true, that in ages of imperfect civilization the government is frequently as wanting in the knowledge required to impose a despotism upon the people as the people are wanting in the knowledge required to shake it off; but the effect is not the same on both sides. However rude a democratic people may be, the central power which rules it is never completely devoid of cultivation, because it readily draws to its own uses what little cultivation is to be found in the country, and, if necessary, may seek assistance elsewhere. Hence, amongst a nation which is ignorant as well as democratic, an amazing difference cannot fail speedily to arise between the intellectual capacity of the ruler and that of each of his subjects. This completes the easy concentration of all power in his hands: the administrative function of the State is perpetually extended, because the State alone is competent to administer the affairs of the country. Aristocratic nations, however unenlightened they may be, never afford the same spectacle, because in them instruction is nearly equally diffused between the monarch and the leading members of the community.

So, the concentration of power and the subjugation of individuals will increase in democratic nations, not just in proportion to their equality but also in proportion to their ignorance. It's true that in times of partial civilization, the government often lacks the knowledge necessary to impose a tyranny on the people, just as the people lack the knowledge to overthrow it; however, the impact is not the same on both sides. No matter how uncultured a democratic populace may be, the central authority governing them is never completely without education, as it easily utilizes whatever education exists in the country and, if needed, can seek help from elsewhere. Therefore, among a nation that is both ignorant and democratic, a significant gap will quickly emerge between the intellectual capacity of the ruler and that of each of his subjects. This leads to a straightforward concentration of power in his hands: the administrative role of the State keeps expanding, as only the State is capable of managing the country's affairs. Aristocratic nations, no matter how uninformed they may be, do not present the same scenario because there, education is almost equally distributed between the monarch and the prominent members of the community.

The pacha who now rules in Egypt found the population of that country composed of men exceedingly ignorant and equal, and he has borrowed the science and ability of Europe to govern that people. As the personal attainments of the sovereign are thus combined with the ignorance and democratic weakness of his subjects, the utmost centralization has been established without impediment, and the pacha has made the country his manufactory, and the inhabitants his workmen.

The pasha who currently governs Egypt found that the population was made up of very uneducated and equal individuals, and he has adopted European knowledge and skills to manage the people. As the personal skills of the ruler are paired with the ignorance and democratic shortcomings of his subjects, he has established complete centralization without any obstacles, and the pasha has turned the country into his factory, using the residents as his laborers.

I think that extreme centralization of government ultimately enervates society, and thus after a length of time weakens the government itself; but I do not deny that a centralized social power may be able to execute great undertakings with facility in a given time and on a particular point. This is more especially true of war, in which success depends much more on the means of transferring all the resources of a nation to one single point, than on the extent of those resources. Hence it is chiefly in war that nations desire and frequently require to increase the powers of the central government. All men of military genius are fond of centralization, which increases their strength; and all men of centralizing genius are fond of war, which compels nations to combine all their powers in the hands of the government. Thus the democratic tendency which leads men unceasingly to multiply the privileges of the State, and to circumscribe the rights of private persons, is much more rapid and constant amongst those democratic nations which are exposed by their position to great and frequent wars, than amongst all others.

I believe that extreme centralization of government ultimately drains society, which in turn weakens the government itself over time. However, I don't deny that a centralized social power can effectively carry out significant tasks in a specific time and place. This is especially true in warfare, where success relies much more on the ability to concentrate a nation's resources at one point than on the total amount of those resources. Therefore, it is primarily during wartime that nations seek to bolster the powers of the central government. Military strategists tend to favor centralization because it enhances their strength, while those with a knack for centralization are often drawn to war as it forces nations to consolidate their power in the hands of the government. As a result, the democratic trend of continuously expanding the privileges of the state and limiting the rights of individuals is much more pronounced and consistent in democratic nations that frequently face significant wars than in others.

I have shown how the dread of disturbance and the love of well-being insensibly lead democratic nations to increase the functions of central government, as the only power which appears to be intrinsically sufficiently strong, enlightened, and secure, to protect them from anarchy. I would now add, that all the particular circumstances which tend to make the state of a democratic community agitated and precarious, enhance this general propensity, and lead private persons more and more to sacrifice their rights to their tranquility. A people is therefore never so disposed to increase the functions of central government as at the close of a long and bloody revolution, which, after having wrested property from the hands of its former possessors, has shaken all belief, and filled the nation with fierce hatreds, conflicting interests, and contending factions. The love of public tranquillity becomes at such times an indiscriminating passion, and the members of the community are apt to conceive a most inordinate devotion to order.

I have shown how the fear of disruption and the desire for well-being unknowingly drive democratic nations to expand the role of central government, which seems to be the only force strong, enlightened, and stable enough to protect them from chaos. I would now add that all the specific factors that make a democratic community feel unstable and tense heighten this general tendency and lead individuals to willingly give up their rights for peace of mind. A society is never more inclined to increase the role of central government than in the aftermath of a long and violent revolution, which, after taking property from its previous owners, has undermined all beliefs and filled the nation with intense animosities, clashing interests, and rival factions. The desire for public peace during such times becomes an overwhelming passion, and community members often develop an excessive commitment to order.

I have already examined several of the incidents which may concur to promote the centralization of power, but the principal cause still remains to be noticed. The foremost of the incidental causes which may draw the management of all affairs into the hands of the ruler in democratic countries, is the origin of that ruler himself, and his own propensities. Men who live in the ages of equality are naturally fond of central power, and are willing to extend its privileges; but if it happens that this same power faithfully represents their own interests, and exactly copies their own inclinations, the confidence they place in it knows no bounds, and they think that whatever they bestow upon it is bestowed upon themselves.

I’ve already looked at several incidents that can contribute to the centralization of power, but the main cause still needs to be addressed. The primary incidental cause that can lead to all affairs being managed by a ruler in democratic countries is the ruler's own background and tendencies. People living in times of equality naturally favor central power and are willing to expand its authority; however, if this power genuinely represents their interests and aligns with their own desires, their trust in it is limitless. They believe that whatever they give to it is essentially a gift to themselves.

The attraction of administrative powers to the centre will always be less easy and less rapid under the reign of kings who are still in some way connected with the old aristocratic order, than under new princes, the children of their own achievements, whose birth, prejudices, propensities, and habits appear to bind them indissolubly to the cause of equality. I do not mean that princes of aristocratic origin who live in democratic ages do not attempt to centralize; I believe they apply themselves to that object as diligently as any others. For them, the sole advantages of equality lie in that direction; but their opportunities are less great, because the community, instead of volunteering compliance with their desires, frequently obeys them with reluctance. In democratic communities the rule is that centralization must increase in proportion as the sovereign is less aristocratic. When an ancient race of kings stands at the head of an aristocracy, as the natural prejudices of the sovereign perfectly accord with the natural prejudices of the nobility, the vices inherent in aristocratic communities have a free course, and meet with no corrective. The reverse is the case when the scion of a feudal stock is placed at the head of a democratic people. The sovereign is constantly led, by his education, his habits, and his associations, to adopt sentiments suggested by the inequality of conditions, and the people tend as constantly, by their social condition, to those manners which are engendered by equality. At such times it often happens that the citizens seek to control the central power far less as a tyrannical than as an aristocratical power, and that they persist in the firm defence of their independence, not only because they would remain free, but especially because they are determined to remain equal. A revolution which overthrows an ancient regal family, in order to place men of more recent growth at the head of a democratic people, may temporarily weaken the central power; but however anarchical such a revolution may appear at first, we need not hesitate to predict that its final and certain consequence will be to extend and to secure the prerogatives of that power. The foremost or indeed the sole condition which is required in order to succeed in centralizing the supreme power in a democratic community, is to love equality, or to get men to believe you love it. Thus the science of despotism, which was once so complex, is simplified, and reduced as it were to a single principle.

The allure of centralizing administrative powers will always be less smooth and slower under kings who still have ties to the old aristocratic order than under new rulers who are the products of their own accomplishments, whose backgrounds, biases, tendencies, and habits seem to connect them firmly to the idea of equality. I'm not saying that kings from aristocratic backgrounds living in democratic times don't try to centralize; I believe they work towards that goal just as hard as anyone else. For them, the only advantages of equality lie in that direction, but their chances are not as strong because the community, instead of willingly complying with their wishes, often obeys reluctantly. In democratic societies, the tendency is that centralization must grow as the ruler is less aristocratic. When an ancient line of kings leads an aristocracy, the natural biases of the ruler align perfectly with those of the nobility, allowing the issues inherent in aristocratic societies to thrive without any checks. The opposite occurs when a descendant of a feudal family is placed at the helm of a democratic populace. The ruler is continually influenced, by their upbringing, habits, and associations, to embrace ideas shaped by inequality, while the people tend consistently toward attitudes that arise from equality. During such times, citizens often seek to rein in the central authority more as an aristocratic than as a tyrannical power, and they vigorously defend their independence not only to stay free but especially to maintain their equality. A revolution that topples an ancient royal family to install more recent figures at the head of a democratic society may temporarily weaken central authority; however chaotic such a revolution may seem initially, we can confidently predict that its ultimate and certain outcome will be to expand and solidify that power's privileges. The primary or indeed the only requirement for successfully centralizing supreme power in a democratic society is to genuinely value equality or to convince people that you do. Thus, the art of despotism, which was once quite complicated, is simplified down to a single principle.





Chapter V: That Amongst The European Nations Of Our Time The Power Of Governments Is Increasing, Although The Persons Who Govern Are Less Stable

On reflecting upon what has already been said, the reader will be startled and alarmed to find that in Europe everything seems to conduce to the indefinite extension of the prerogatives of government, and to render all that enjoyed the rights of private independence more weak, more subordinate, and more precarious. The democratic nations of Europe have all the general and permanent tendencies which urge the Americans to the centralization of government, and they are moreover exposed to a number of secondary and incidental causes with which the Americans are unacquainted. It would seem as if every step they make towards equality brings them nearer to despotism. And indeed if we do but cast our looks around, we shall be convinced that such is the fact. During the aristocratic ages which preceded the present time, the sovereigns of Europe had been deprived of, or had relinquished, many of the rights inherent in their power. Not a hundred years ago, amongst the greater part of European nations, numerous private persons and corporations were sufficiently independent to administer justice, to raise and maintain troops, to levy taxes, and frequently even to make or interpret the law. The State has everywhere resumed to itself alone these natural attributes of sovereign power; in all matters of government the State tolerates no intermediate agent between itself and the people, and in general business it directs the people by its own immediate influence. I am far from blaming this concentration of power, I simply point it out.

Reflecting on what has been discussed, the reader will be surprised and concerned to see that in Europe, everything seems to lead to the ongoing expansion of government powers, making those who have private independence weaker, more subordinate, and more at risk. The democratic nations of Europe share the overall trends that push Americans toward centralizing government, and they also face several additional factors that Americans are not familiar with. It seems like every move they make toward equality brings them closer to tyranny. Indeed, if we look around, it becomes clear that this is true. During the aristocratic ages that came before our time, European monarchs had lost or given up many of the rights that come with their power. Not even a hundred years ago, in most European countries, many private individuals and organizations were independent enough to administer justice, raise and maintain armies, collect taxes, and often even create or interpret laws. The State has now taken back these essential elements of sovereign power; in all governmental matters, the State does not allow any intermediary between itself and the people, and in general affairs, it directly influences the people itself. I’m not criticizing this concentration of power; I'm simply pointing it out.

At the same period a great number of secondary powers existed in Europe, which represented local interests and administered local affairs. Most of these local authorities have already disappeared; all are speedily tending to disappear, or to fall into the most complete dependence. From one end of Europe to the other the privileges of the nobility, the liberties of cities, and the powers of provincial bodies, are either destroyed or upon the verge of destruction. Europe has endured, in the course of the last half-century, many revolutions and counter-revolutions which have agitated it in opposite directions: but all these perturbations resemble each other in one respect—they have all shaken or destroyed the secondary powers of government. The local privileges which the French did not abolish in the countries they conquered, have finally succumbed to the policy of the princes who conquered the French. Those princes rejected all the innovations of the French Revolution except centralization: that is the only principle they consented to receive from such a source. My object is to remark, that all these various rights, which have been successively wrested, in our time, from classes, corporations, and individuals, have not served to raise new secondary powers on a more democratic basis, but have uniformly been concentrated in the hands of the sovereign. Everywhere the State acquires more and more direct control over the humblest members of the community, and a more exclusive power of governing each of them in his smallest concerns. *a Almost all the charitable establishments of Europe were formerly in the hands of private persons or of corporations; they are now almost all dependent on the supreme government, and in many countries are actually administered by that power. The State almost exclusively undertakes to supply bread to the hungry, assistance and shelter to the sick, work to the idle, and to act as the sole reliever of all kinds of misery. Education, as well as charity, is become in most countries at the present day a national concern. The State receives, and often takes, the child from the arms of the mother, to hand it over to official agents: the State undertakes to train the heart and to instruct the mind of each generation. Uniformity prevails in the courses of public instruction as in everything else; diversity, as well as freedom, is disappearing day by day. Nor do I hesitate to affirm, that amongst almost all the Christian nations of our days, Catholic as well as Protestant, religion is in danger of falling into the hands of the government. Not that rulers are over-jealous of the right of settling points of doctrine, but they get more and more hold upon the will of those by whom doctrines are expounded; they deprive the clergy of their property, and pay them by salaries; they divert to their own use the influence of the priesthood, they make them their own ministers—often their own servants—and by this alliance with religion they reach the inner depths of the soul of man. *b

At the same time, a lot of smaller powers existed in Europe, representing local interests and managing local issues. Most of these local authorities have mostly disappeared; all are quickly heading toward disappearance or complete dependence. Across Europe, the privileges of the nobility, the freedoms of cities, and the powers of regional bodies are either destroyed or on the brink of destruction. Over the last fifty years, Europe has experienced many revolutions and counter-revolutions that have created turmoil in different ways; however, all these disturbances have one thing in common—they have all shaken or destroyed the secondary powers of government. The local privileges that the French did not eliminate in the countries they conquered have ultimately given way to the policies of the princes who defeated the French. Those princes rejected all innovations from the French Revolution except for centralization: that’s the only principle they accepted from that era. My goal is to point out that all these various rights, which have been gradually taken from classes, organizations, and individuals, have not helped establish new secondary powers on a more democratic foundation, but have consistently been concentrated in the hands of the sovereign. Everywhere, the State gains more direct control over the most ordinary members of the community and more exclusive authority to govern each individual in their smallest affairs. Almost all the charitable institutions in Europe were once managed by private individuals or corporations; now they are almost all dependent on the national government, and in many countries, they are actually managed by that authority. The State has taken it upon itself to provide food for the hungry, help and shelter for the sick, work for the unemployed, and to be the sole provider for all kinds of suffering. Education, like charity, has become a national issue in most countries today. The State takes, and often removes, the child from the mother’s arms to place it in the hands of official agents: the State assumes responsibility for shaping the heart and educating the mind of each generation. Uniformity dominates public education as in everything else; diversity and freedom are vanishing day by day. I also firmly believe that among almost all Christian nations today, both Catholic and Protestant, religion is at risk of falling under government control. Not that rulers are overly eager to decide matters of doctrine, but they increasingly influence the will of those who interpret doctrines; they strip the clergy of their property and pay them salaries; they redirect the influence of the priesthood for their own purposes, making them their ministers—often their servants—and through this alliance with religion, they reach deep into the human soul.

a
[ This gradual weakening of individuals in relation to society at large may be traced in a thousand ways. I shall select from amongst these examples one derived from the law of wills. In aristocracies it is common to profess the greatest reverence for the last testamentary dispositions of a man; this feeling sometimes even became superstitious amongst the older nations of Europe: the power of the State, far from interfering with the caprices of a dying man, gave full force to the very least of them, and insured to him a perpetual power. When all living men are enfeebled, the will of the dead is less respected: it is circumscribed within a narrow range, beyond which it is annulled or checked by the supreme power of the laws. In the Middle Ages, testamentary power had, so to speak, no limits: amongst the French at the present day, a man cannot distribute his fortune amongst his children without the interference of the State; after having domineered over a whole life, the law insists upon regulating the very last act of it.]

a
[ This gradual weakening of individuals in relation to society as a whole can be seen in many ways. I'll choose one example from the law of wills. In aristocracies, it's common to show great reverence for a person's last will. This feeling sometimes even became superstitious among the older nations of Europe: the State’s power, far from interfering with a dying person's wishes, fully supported even the smallest of them, ensuring that person maintained a lasting influence. When all living individuals are weakened, the wishes of the deceased are less respected: they are limited to a narrow scope, beyond which they are overridden or restricted by the supreme authority of the laws. In the Middle Ages, the power of wills had virtually no limits: among the French today, a person cannot distribute their wealth among their children without the State’s involvement; after having controlled their life, the law insists on regulating the very last act of it.]

b
[ In proportion as the duties of the central power are augmented, the number of public officers by whom that power is represented must increase also. They form a nation in each nation; and as they share the stability of the government, they more and more fill up the place of an aristocracy.

b
[ As the responsibilities of the central power grow, the number of public officials representing that power must also rise. They create a nation within each nation; and as they contribute to the stability of the government, they increasingly take on the role of an aristocracy.

In almost every part of Europe the government rules in two ways; it rules one portion of the community by the fear which they entertain of its agents, and the other by the hope they have of becoming its agents.]

In almost every part of Europe, the government governs in two ways: it controls one part of the community through the fear they have of its agents, and the other part through the hope of one day becoming its agents.

But this is as yet only one side of the picture. The authority of government has not only spread, as we have just seen, throughout the sphere of all existing powers, till that sphere can no longer contain it, but it goes further, and invades the domain heretofore reserved to private independence. A multitude of actions, which were formerly entirely beyond the control of the public administration, have been subjected to that control in our time, and the number of them is constantly increasing. Amongst aristocratic nations the supreme government usually contented itself with managing and superintending the community in whatever directly and ostensibly concerned the national honor; but in all other respects the people were left to work out their own free will. Amongst these nations the government often seemed to forget that there is a point at which the faults and the sufferings of private persons involve the general prosperity, and that to prevent the ruin of a private individual must sometimes be a matter of public importance. The democratic nations of our time lean to the opposite extreme. It is evident that most of our rulers will not content themselves with governing the people collectively: it would seem as if they thought themselves responsible for the actions and private condition of their subjects—as if they had undertaken to guide and to instruct each of them in the various incidents of life, and to secure their happiness quite independently of their own consent. On the other hand private individuals grow more and more apt to look upon the supreme power in the same light; they invoke its assistance in all their necessities, and they fix their eyes upon the administration as their mentor or their guide.

But this is only one part of the picture. The government's authority has not only expanded, as we have just observed, throughout the realm of all existing powers, until that realm can no longer contain it, but it goes even further, invading the area previously reserved for private independence. A multitude of actions that were once completely outside the control of public administration have now come under that control in our time, and the number of these actions keeps growing. Among aristocratic nations, the supreme government usually limited itself to managing and overseeing the community in matters that directly concerned national honor; but in all other respects, people were allowed to act on their own free will. In these nations, the government often seemed to overlook the fact that there comes a point where the issues and suffering of individuals affect the overall well-being, and that preventing the downfall of a private person can sometimes be a public concern. The democratic nations of today lean toward the opposite extreme. It is clear that most of our leaders are not satisfied with just governing the people as a whole: it seems they believe they are responsible for the actions and personal circumstances of their citizens—as if they had taken on the role of guiding and advising each one of them through life's various situations and ensuring their happiness regardless of their own preferences. On the other hand, private individuals are increasingly likely to view the supreme power in the same way; they call upon its help in all their needs, looking to the administration as their mentor or guide.

I assert that there is no country in Europe in which the public administration has not become, not only more centralized, but more inquisitive and more minute it everywhere interferes in private concerns more than it did; it regulates more undertakings, and undertakings of a lesser kind; and it gains a firmer footing every day about, above, and around all private persons, to assist, to advise, and to coerce them. Formerly a sovereign lived upon the income of his lands, or the revenue of his taxes; this is no longer the case now that his wants have increased as well as his power. Under the same circumstances which formerly compelled a prince to put on a new tax, he now has recourse to a loan. Thus the State gradually becomes the debtor of most of the wealthier members of the community, and centralizes the largest amounts of capital in its own hands. Small capital is drawn into its keeping by another method. As men are intermingled and conditions become more equal, the poor have more resources, more education, and more desires; they conceive the notion of bettering their condition, and this teaches them to save. These savings are daily producing an infinite number of small capitals, the slow and gradual produce of labor, which are always increasing. But the greater part of this money would be unproductive if it remained scattered in the hands of its owners. This circumstance has given rise to a philanthropic institution, which will soon become, if I am not mistaken, one of our most important political institutions. Some charitable persons conceived the notion of collecting the savings of the poor and placing them out at interest. In some countries these benevolent associations are still completely distinct from the State; but in almost all they manifestly tend to identify themselves with the government; and in some of them the government has superseded them, taking upon itself the enormous task of centralizing in one place, and putting out at interest on its own responsibility, the daily savings of many millions of the working classes. Thus the State draws to itself the wealth of the rich by loans, and has the poor man's mite at its disposal in the savings banks. The wealth of the country is perpetually flowing around the government and passing through its hands; the accumulation increases in the same proportion as the equality of conditions; for in a democratic country the State alone inspires private individuals with confidence, because the State alone appears to be endowed with strength and durability. *c Thus the sovereign does not confine himself to the management of the public treasury; he interferes in private money matters; he is the superior, and often the master, of all the members of the community; and, in addition to this, he assumes the part of their steward and paymaster.

I believe there isn't a country in Europe where public administration hasn't become not only more centralized, but also more curious and detailed. It now interferes in people's private matters more than before; it regulates more businesses, including smaller ones; and it is gaining more influence every day, providing assistance, advice, and coercion to individuals. In the past, a ruler relied on the income from their lands or tax revenue; that's not the case anymore as their needs and power have grown. Instead of imposing new taxes as was done before, now, when a ruler needs more funds, they turn to loans. This way, the State gradually becomes a debtor to many of the wealthier members of society and centralizes a large amount of capital within itself. Smaller capital is gathered in a different way. As people mingle and social conditions equalize, the poor have more resources, education, and desires; they start to think about improving their situation, which teaches them to save. These savings are constantly generating countless small amounts of capital, the slow and steady result of labor, which is always increasing. However, much of this money would remain unproductive if left scattered among its owners. This has led to the creation of a philanthropic initiative, which, if I'm not mistaken, will soon become one of our most significant political institutions. Some charitable individuals thought of collecting the savings of the poor and investing them. In some countries, these charitable organizations are still completely separate from the State, but in almost all of them, they are clearly trying to align themselves with the government; in some cases, the government has taken over, assuming the massive responsibility of centralizing and managing the daily savings of millions from the working class. Thus, the State attracts the wealth of the rich through loans and has access to the savings of the poor through banks. The wealth of the nation continuously flows around the government and passes through its control; the accumulation grows in proportion to the equality of conditions; in a democratic country, the State alone fosters confidence in private individuals because it appears to possess strength and stability. Thus, the ruler doesn’t limit themselves to overseeing the public treasury; they involve themselves in private financial matters; they are the authority, and often the master, of all community members; and additionally, they act as their steward and paymaster.

c
[ On the one hand the taste for worldly welfare is perpetually increasing, and on the other the government gets more and more complete possession of the sources of that welfare. Thus men are following two separate roads to servitude: the taste for their own welfare withholds them from taking a part in the government, and their love of that welfare places them in closer dependence upon those who govern.]

c
[ On one hand, the desire for material well-being keeps growing, while on the other, the government is gaining more control over the means of that well-being. In this way, people are heading down two different paths to servitude: their pursuit of personal welfare keeps them from participating in government, and their attachment to that welfare makes them more dependent on those in power.]

The central power not only fulfils of itself the whole of the duties formerly discharged by various authorities—extending those duties, and surpassing those authorities—but it performs them with more alertness, strength, and independence than it displayed before. All the governments of Europe have in our time singularly improved the science of administration: they do more things, and they do everything with more order, more celerity, and at less expense; they seem to be constantly enriched by all the experience of which they have stripped private persons. From day to day the princes of Europe hold their subordinate officers under stricter control, and they invent new methods for guiding them more closely, and inspecting them with less trouble. Not content with managing everything by their agents, they undertake to manage the conduct of their agents in everything; so that the public administration not only depends upon one and the same power, but it is more and more confined to one spot and concentrated in the same hands. The government centralizes its agency whilst it increases its prerogative—hence a twofold increase of strength.

The central authority not only takes on all the responsibilities previously handled by various entities—extending those responsibilities and surpassing those entities—but it also carries them out with more alertness, strength, and independence than it did before. In our time, the governments of Europe have notably enhanced the art of administration: they accomplish more tasks, and they do everything with greater organization, speed, and less cost; they seem to be constantly learning from the experiences they've taken from private individuals. Day by day, the rulers of Europe maintain stricter oversight over their subordinates, creating new methods to guide them more closely and inspect them with less effort. Not satisfied with simply managing everything through their agents, they also take charge of their agents' actions in every aspect; thus, public administration not only relies on one central power but is increasingly concentrated in one place and held by the same hands. The government centralizes its operations while expanding its authority—resulting in a twofold increase in strength.

In examining the ancient constitution of the judicial power, amongst most European nations, two things strike the mind—the independence of that power, and the extent of its functions. Not only did the courts of justice decide almost all differences between private persons, but in very many cases they acted as arbiters between private persons and the State. I do not here allude to the political and administrative offices which courts of judicature had in some countries usurped, but the judicial office common to them all. In most of the countries of Europe, there were, and there still are, many private rights, connected for the most part with the general right of property, which stood under the protection of the courts of justice, and which the State could not violate without their sanction. It was this semi-political power which mainly distinguished the European courts of judicature from all others; for all nations have had judges, but all have not invested their judges with the same privileges. Upon examining what is now occurring amongst the democratic nations of Europe which are called free, as well as amongst the others, it will be observed that new and more dependent courts are everywhere springing up by the side of the old ones, for the express purpose of deciding, by an extraordinary jurisdiction, such litigated matters as may arise between the government and private persons. The elder judicial power retains its independence, but its jurisdiction is narrowed; and there is a growing tendency to reduce it to be exclusively the arbiter between private interests. The number of these special courts of justice is continually increasing, and their functions increase likewise. Thus the government is more and more absolved from the necessity of subjecting its policy and its rights to the sanction of another power. As judges cannot be dispensed with, at least the State is to select them, and always to hold them under its control; so that, between the government and private individuals, they place the effigy of justice rather than justice itself. The State is not satisfied with drawing all concerns to itself, but it acquires an ever-increasing power of deciding on them all without restriction and without appeal. *d

In looking at the ancient structure of the judicial power across most European countries, two things stand out—the independence of that power and the range of its functions. The courts not only resolved almost all disputes between private individuals, but in many cases, they also acted as mediators between individuals and the State. I'm not referring here to the political and administrative roles that courts in some places have taken over, but rather to the judicial role that is common to all. In most European countries, there were, and still are, many private rights, primarily related to property rights, that are protected by the courts, and the State cannot infringe upon them without their approval. This semi-political power is what mainly sets European courts apart from others; all nations have judges, but not all have granted them the same powers. When we look at what's happening now among the democratic nations of Europe that consider themselves free, as well as among others, we can see that new, more dependent courts are emerging alongside the old ones. These new courts are specifically designed to deal with disputes between the government and private individuals through an extraordinary jurisdiction. The older judicial power remains independent, but its authority is becoming more limited, and there is a rising trend to reduce it to just being the mediator for private interests. The number of these special courts is continually increasing, as are their functions. This means the government is increasingly relieved from the need to have its policies and rights approved by another power. Since judges are indispensable, the State aims to choose them and always keep them under its control, thus presenting the facade of justice rather than true justice. The State is not only focused on bringing all matters under its control but is also gaining greater power to decide on everything without limits or the possibility of appeal. *d

d
[ A strange sophism has been made on this head in France. When a suit arises between the government and a private person, it is not to be tried before an ordinary judge—in order, they say, not to mix the administrative and the judicial powers; as if it were not to mix those powers, and to mix them in the most dangerous and oppressive manner, to invest the government with the office of judging and administering at the same time.]

d
[ A strange reasoning has emerged in France regarding this issue. When a case occurs between the government and a private individual, it is not heard by a regular judge—apparently to avoid mixing administrative and judicial powers; as if it wouldn't be more dangerous and oppressive to give the government the authority to both judge and administer at the same time.]

There exists amongst the modern nations of Europe one great cause, independent of all those which have already been pointed out, which perpetually contributes to extend the agency or to strengthen the prerogative of the supreme power, though it has not been sufficiently attended to: I mean the growth of manufactures, which is fostered by the progress of social equality. Manufactures generally collect a multitude of men of the same spot, amongst whom new and complex relations spring up. These men are exposed by their calling to great and sudden alternations of plenty and want, during which public tranquillity is endangered. It may also happen that these employments sacrifice the health, and even the life, of those who gain by them, or of those who live by them. Thus the manufacturing classes require more regulation, superintendence, and restraint than the other classes of society, and it is natural that the powers of government should increase in the same proportion as those classes.

Among the modern nations of Europe, there's a significant factor, aside from those already discussed, that continually enhances the influence or strengthens the authority of the central power, though it hasn't received enough attention: the rise of manufacturing, which is supported by the advancement of social equality. Manufacturing tends to gather a large number of people in one area, where new and intricate relationships develop. These individuals face significant and abrupt changes between abundance and scarcity, during which public order is at risk. Additionally, it's possible that these jobs compromise the health, and even the lives, of those who benefit from them or those who depend on them. As a result, the manufacturing workforce needs more regulation, oversight, and control than other segments of society, and it is only natural that government power should grow in line with these classes.

This is a truth of general application; what follows more especially concerns the nations of Europe. In the centuries which preceded that in which we live, the aristocracy was in possession of the soil, and was competent to defend it: landed property was therefore surrounded by ample securities, and its possessors enjoyed great independence. This gave rise to laws and customs which have been perpetuated, notwithstanding the subdivision of lands and the ruin of the nobility; and, at the present time, landowners and agriculturists are still those amongst the community who must easily escape from the control of the supreme power. In these same aristocratic ages, in which all the sources of our history are to be traced, personal property was of small importance, and those who possessed it were despised and weak: the manufacturing class formed an exception in the midst of those aristocratic communities; as it had no certain patronage, it was not outwardly protected, and was often unable to protect itself.

This is a truth that applies broadly; what comes next particularly pertains to the nations of Europe. In the centuries before our own, the aristocracy owned the land and had the means to defend it: land ownership was therefore well-protected, and its owners enjoyed significant freedom. This led to laws and customs that have continued, despite the division of lands and the decline of the nobility; today, landowners and farmers are still among those in society who can usually evade the control of the highest authority. In those same aristocratic times, from which all our historical sources derive, personal property was not very important, and those who owned it were looked down upon and weak: the manufacturing class was an exception within those aristocratic societies; lacking reliable support, it was not openly protected and often struggled to defend itself.

Hence a habit sprung up of considering manufacturing property as something of a peculiar nature, not entitled to the same deference, and not worthy of the same securities as property in general; and manufacturers were looked upon as a small class in the bulk of the people, whose independence was of small importance, and who might with propriety be abandoned to the disciplinary passions of princes. On glancing over the codes of the middle ages, one is surprised to see, in those periods of personal independence, with what incessant royal regulations manufactures were hampered, even in their smallest details: on this point centralization was as active and as minute as it can ever be. Since that time a great revolution has taken place in the world; manufacturing property, which was then only in the germ, has spread till it covers Europe: the manufacturing class has been multiplied and enriched by the remnants of all other ranks; it has grown and is still perpetually growing in number, in importance, in wealth. Almost all those who do not belong to it are connected with it at least on some one point; after having been an exception in society, it threatens to become the chief, if not the only, class; nevertheless the notions and political precedents engendered by it of old still cling about it. These notions and these precedents remain unchanged, because they are old, and also because they happen to be in perfect accordance with the new notions and general habits of our contemporaries. Manufacturing property then does not extend its rights in the same ratio as its importance. The manufacturing classes do not become less dependent, whilst they become more numerous; but, on the contrary, it would seem as if despotism lurked within them, and naturally grew with their growth. *e As a nation becomes more engaged in manufactures, the want of roads, canals, harbors, and other works of a semi-public nature, which facilitate the acquisition of wealth, is more strongly felt; and as a nation becomes more democratic, private individuals are less able, and the State more able, to execute works of such magnitude. I do not hesitate to assert that the manifest tendency of all governments at the present time is to take upon themselves alone the execution of these undertakings; by which means they daily hold in closer dependence the population which they govern.

A habit developed of viewing manufacturing property as something unique, not deserving of the same respect and protections as other types of property. Manufacturers were seen as a small class among the general population, whose independence was deemed insignificant, and they could be left to the whims of rulers. Looking back at the laws of the middle ages, it's surprising to see how much royal regulations restricted manufacturing, even in the smallest details. During that time, central authority was as active and detailed as ever. Since then, a significant change has occurred; manufacturing property, which was once in its infancy, has expanded to cover Europe. The manufacturing class has grown and has been enriched by remnants of other social classes, increasing in number, importance, and wealth. Almost everyone who doesn't belong to this class is connected to it in some way. After having been an exception in society, it is poised to become the primary, if not the only, class, yet the old notions and political practices surrounding it still persist. These ideas and practices remain unchanged because they are old and also align perfectly with the new beliefs and habits of today. Therefore, manufacturing property doesn't gain rights in proportion to its significance. The manufacturing class remains dependent, even as its numbers grow; rather, it seems like despotism is embedded within it and naturally expands with its growth. As a nation becomes more involved in manufacturing, the need for roads, canals, ports, and other semi-public works that facilitate wealth acquisition becomes more urgent; and as a nation becomes more democratic, individuals are less capable of executing large projects, while the State becomes more capable. I firmly believe that the clear trend among all governments today is to take on these projects themselves, which further binds the population they govern.

e
[ I shall quote a few facts in corroboration of this remark. Mines are the natural sources of manufacturing wealth: as manufactures have grown up in Europe, as the produce of mines has become of more general importance, and good mining more difficult from the subdivision of property which is a consequence of the equality of conditions, most governments have asserted a right of owning the soil in which the mines lie, and of inspecting the works; which has never been the case with any other kind of property. Thus mines, which were private property, liable to the same obligations and sheltered by the same guarantees as all other landed property, have fallen under the control of the State. The State either works them or farms them; the owners of them are mere tenants, deriving their rights from the State; and, moreover, the State almost everywhere claims the power of directing their operations: it lays down rules, enforces the adoption of particular methods, subjects the mining adventurers to constant superintendence, and, if refractory, they are ousted by a government court of justice, and the government transfers their contract to other hands; so that the government not only possesses the mines, but has all the adventurers in its power. Nevertheless, as manufactures increase, the working of old mines increases also; new ones are opened, the mining population extends and grows up; day by day governments augment their subterranean dominions, and people them with their agents.]


[I’ll share a few facts to back up this statement. Mines are natural sources of manufacturing wealth: as manufacturing has developed in Europe, the output from mines has become more important, and good mining has become harder due to the division of property resulting from equal conditions. Most governments have claimed ownership of the land where the mines are located and have the right to oversee the operations, which is not the case for any other type of property. Thus, mines that were once private property, subject to the same obligations and protections as other land, have come under state control. The government either operates them directly or leases them. The owners are essentially tenants, with their rights stemming from the state; additionally, the state almost everywhere asserts its authority to direct their operations: it sets rules, enforces specific methods, supervises the mining activities constantly, and if anyone resists, they can be removed by a government court, with the contract reassigned to others. This means the government not only owns the mines but also holds power over all the miners. Nevertheless, as manufacturing grows, the operations in old mines also escalate; new mines are opened, the mining workforce expands, and day by day, governments increase their underground territories and fill them with their agents.]

On the other hand, in proportion as the power of a State increases, and its necessities are augmented, the State consumption of manufactured produce is always growing larger, and these commodities are generally made in the arsenals or establishments of the government. Thus, in every kingdom, the ruler becomes the principal manufacturer; he collects and retains in his service a vast number of engineers, architects, mechanics, and handicraftsmen. Not only is he the principal manufacturer, but he tends more and more to become the chief, or rather the master of all other manufacturers. As private persons become more powerless by becoming more equal, they can effect nothing in manufactures without combination; but the government naturally seeks to place these combinations under its own control.

On the other hand, as a state's power grows and its needs increase, the state's consumption of manufactured goods continues to rise, and these products are usually produced in government arsenals or facilities. In every country, the leader becomes the main manufacturer, employing a large number of engineers, architects, mechanics, and skilled workers. Not only is he the top manufacturer, but he also increasingly becomes the chief, or rather the master, of all other manufacturers. As individuals lose influence by becoming more equal, they can't accomplish anything in manufacturing without coming together; however, the government naturally aims to control these collaborations.

It must be admitted that these collective beings, which are called combinations, are stronger and more formidable than a private individual can ever be, and that they have less of the responsibility of their own actions; whence it seems reasonable that they should not be allowed to retain so great an independence of the supreme government as might be conceded to a private individual.

It has to be acknowledged that these groups, known as combinations, are more powerful and intimidating than any single person could ever be, and they have less personal accountability for their actions. Therefore, it makes sense that they shouldn't be granted as much independence from the central government as what might be allowed for an individual.

Rulers are the more apt to follow this line of policy, as their own inclinations invite them to it. Amongst democratic nations it is only by association that the resistance of the people to the government can ever display itself: hence the latter always looks with ill-favor on those associations which are not in its own power; and it is well worthy of remark, that amongst democratic nations, the people themselves often entertain a secret feeling of fear and jealousy against these very associations, which prevents the citizens from defending the institutions of which they stand so much in need. The power and the duration of these small private bodies, in the midst of the weakness and instability of the whole community, astonish and alarm the people; and the free use which each association makes of its natural powers is almost regarded as a dangerous privilege. All the associations which spring up in our age are, moreover, new corporate powers, whose rights have not been sanctioned by time; they come into existence at a time when the notion of private rights is weak, and when the power of government is unbounded; hence it is not surprising that they lose their freedom at their birth. Amongst all European nations there are some kinds of associations which cannot be formed until the State has examined their by-laws, and authorized their existence. In several others, attempts are made to extend this rule to all associations; the consequences of such a policy, if it were successful, may easily be foreseen. If once the sovereign had a general right of authorizing associations of all kinds upon certain conditions, he would not be long without claiming the right of superintending and managing them, in order to prevent them from departing from the rules laid down by himself. In this manner, the State, after having reduced all who are desirous of forming associations into dependence, would proceed to reduce into the same condition all who belong to associations already formed—that is to say, almost all the men who are now in existence. Governments thus appropriate to themselves, and convert to their own purposes, the greater part of this new power which manufacturing interests have in our time brought into the world. Manufacturers govern us—they govern manufactures.

Rulers tend to follow this approach, as their own preferences lead them to it. In democratic nations, it's only through groups that the people's resistance to the government can show itself: therefore, the government always looks unfavorably at associations not under its control. It's noteworthy that in democratic societies, the people often harbor a hidden sense of fear and jealousy toward these associations, which stops them from defending the very institutions they desperately need. The power and longevity of these small private groups, amidst the overall weakness and instability of the community, surprise and frighten the public; the way each association exercises its inherent powers is often seen as a risky privilege. Furthermore, all the associations that emerge in our time are new corporate entities whose rights haven't been validated by history; they come into being when the concept of private rights is weak and government power is unchecked. Thus, it's not surprising that they lose their freedom almost immediately. In many European countries, certain types of associations can't be formed without the State reviewing their rules and approving their existence. In some others, efforts are made to extend this requirement to all associations; the potential consequences of such a successful policy are easy to predict. If the sovereign gains a general right to authorize all kinds of associations under specific conditions, he won't hesitate to claim the right to oversee and manage them to ensure they follow the rules he sets. In this way, the State, after making all who wish to form associations dependent, would then seek to control those who are part of existing associations—essentially, almost everyone alive today. Governments thereby take for themselves and repurpose the majority of the new power that manufacturing interests have introduced in our time. Manufacturers control us—they dictate manufacturing.

I attach so much importance to all that I have just been saying, that I am tormented by the fear of having impaired my meaning in seeking to render it more clear. If the reader thinks that the examples I have adduced to support my observations are insufficient or ill-chosen—if he imagines that I have anywhere exaggerated the encroachments of the supreme power, and, on the other hand, that I have underrated the extent of the sphere which still remains open to the exertions of individual independence, I entreat him to lay down the book for a moment, and to turn his mind to reflect for himself upon the subjects I have attempted to explain. Let him attentively examine what is taking place in France and in other countries—let him inquire of those about him—let him search himself, and I am much mistaken if he does not arrive, without my guidance, and by other paths, at the point to which I have sought to lead him. He will perceive that for the last half-century, centralization has everywhere been growing up in a thousand different ways. Wars, revolutions, conquests, have served to promote it: all men have labored to increase it. In the course of the same period, during which men have succeeded each other with singular rapidity at the head of affairs, their notions, interests, and passions have been infinitely diversified; but all have by some means or other sought to centralize. This instinctive centralization has been the only settled point amidst the extreme mutability of their lives and of their thoughts.

I place so much importance on everything I’ve just said that I’m haunted by the fear that I might have complicated my meaning in trying to make it clearer. If the reader thinks that the examples I’ve provided to support my points are insufficient or poorly chosen—if they believe I’ve exaggerated the reach of supreme power, or, conversely, that I’ve downplayed the extent of the space that remains open for individual independence, I urge them to put the book down for a moment and reflect on the subjects I’ve tried to explain. They should carefully observe what’s happening in France and other countries—ask those around them—look within themselves, and I’d be surprised if they don’t reach, without my help and through other means, the conclusion I’ve been trying to lead them to. They will notice that for the last fifty years, centralization has been growing in countless ways. Wars, revolutions, and conquests have all contributed to it: everyone has worked to increase it. During this same period, as people have rapidly switched out at the helm of power, their ideas, interests, and passions have become incredibly varied; yet all have found some way to centralize. This instinctive push toward centralization has been the only stable point amid the extreme instability of their lives and thoughts.

If the reader, after having investigated these details of human affairs, will seek to survey the wide prospect as a whole, he will be struck by the result. On the one hand the most settled dynasties shaken or overthrown—the people everywhere escaping by violence from the sway of their laws—abolishing or limiting the authority of their rulers or their princes—the nations, which are not in open revolution, restless at least, and excited—all of them animated by the same spirit of revolt: and on the other hand, at this very period of anarchy, and amongst these untractable nations, the incessant increase of the prerogative of the supreme government, becoming more centralized, more adventurous, more absolute, more extensive—the people perpetually falling under the control of the public administration—led insensibly to surrender to it some further portion of their individual independence, till the very men, who from time to time upset a throne and trample on a race of kings, bend more and more obsequiously to the slightest dictate of a clerk. Thus two contrary revolutions appear in our days to be going on; the one continually weakening the supreme power, the other as continually strengthening it: at no other period in our history has it appeared so weak or so strong. But upon a more attentive examination of the state of the world, it appears that these two revolutions are intimately connected together, that they originate in the same source, and that after having followed a separate course, they lead men at last to the same result. I may venture once more to repeat what I have already said or implied in several parts of this book: great care must be taken not to confound the principle of equality itself with the revolution which finally establishes that principle in the social condition and the laws of a nation: here lies the reason of almost all the phenomena which occasion our astonishment. All the old political powers of Europe, the greatest as well as the least, were founded in ages of aristocracy, and they more or less represented or defended the principles of inequality and of privilege. To make the novel wants and interests, which the growing principle of equality introduced, preponderate in government, our contemporaries had to overturn or to coerce the established powers. This led them to make revolutions, and breathed into many of them, that fierce love of disturbance and independence, which all revolutions, whatever be their object, always engender. I do not believe that there is a single country in Europe in which the progress of equality has not been preceded or followed by some violent changes in the state of property and persons; and almost all these changes have been attended with much anarchy and license, because they have been made by the least civilized portion of the nation against that which is most civilized. Hence proceeded the two-fold contrary tendencies which I have just pointed out. As long as the democratic revolution was glowing with heat, the men who were bent upon the destruction of old aristocratic powers hostile to that revolution, displayed a strong spirit of independence; but as the victory or the principle of equality became more complete, they gradually surrendered themselves to the propensities natural to that condition of equality, and they strengthened and centralized their governments. They had sought to be free in order to make themselves equal; but in proportion as equality was more established by the aid of freedom, freedom itself was thereby rendered of more difficult attainment.

If the reader, after looking into these details of human affairs, tries to view the broader picture, they'll notice something striking. On one hand, the most established dynasties are being shaken or overthrown—the people everywhere are violently escaping the grip of their laws—abolishing or limiting the power of their rulers or princes—the nations that aren't in open revolt are at least restless and excited—all of them driven by the same spirit of rebellion. On the other hand, during this very period of chaos, and among these unruly nations, there's a constant increase in the power of the central government, which is becoming more centralized, more audacious, more absolute, more expansive—the people continually falling under the control of public administration—unwittingly giving up bits of their individual independence, until even those who occasionally topple a throne and trample on a line of kings increasingly bow to the slightest command of a clerk. Thus, two opposing revolutions seem to be happening simultaneously; one that continuously weakens the supreme power, and another that continually strengthens it: at no other time in our history has it seemed so weak or so strong. However, upon a closer inspection of the world, it appears these two revolutions are deeply connected, stemming from the same source, and after following separate paths, they ultimately lead people to the same outcome. I can once again emphasize what I've already mentioned or implied in various parts of this book: we must be careful not to confuse the principle of equality itself with the revolution that ultimately establishes that principle in a nation's social conditions and laws: this is the reason behind nearly all the phenomena that astonish us. All the old political powers in Europe, whether large or small, were formed during times of aristocracy, and they represented or defended principles of inequality and privilege to varying degrees. To prioritize the new wants and interests that the growing principle of equality introduced in government, our contemporaries had to overthrow or coerce the established powers. This led them to create revolutions, fueling within many of them that fierce love for unrest and independence that all revolutions, regardless of their purpose, tend to generate. I don't believe there is a single country in Europe where the progress of equality hasn't been preceded or followed by some violent changes in property and social status; and almost all these changes have come with much chaos and lawlessness, because they were instigated by the least civilized portion of society against the most civilized. Hence arose the two conflicting tendencies I've just mentioned. As long as the democratic revolution was fervent, those intent on dismantling old aristocratic powers opposed to that revolution showed a strong spirit of independence; but as the victory of the principle of equality became more solidified, they gradually gave in to the natural tendencies that come with that state of equality, and they fortified and centralized their governments. They sought to be free to achieve equality; but as equality became more established through freedom, the freedom itself became harder to attain.

These two states of a nation have sometimes been contemporaneous: the last generation in France showed how a people might organize a stupendous tyranny in the community, at the very time when they were baffling the authority of the nobility and braving the power of all kings—at once teaching the world the way to win freedom, and the way to lose it. In our days men see that constituted powers are dilapidated on every side—they see all ancient authority gasping away, all ancient barriers tottering to their fall, and the judgment of the wisest is troubled at the sight: they attend only to the amazing revolution which is taking place before their eyes, and they imagine that mankind is about to fall into perpetual anarchy: if they looked to the final consequences of this revolution, their fears would perhaps assume a different shape. For myself, I confess that I put no trust in the spirit of freedom which appears to animate my contemporaries. I see well enough that the nations of this age are turbulent, but I do not clearly perceive that they are liberal; and I fear lest, at the close of those perturbations which rock the base of thrones, the domination of sovereigns may prove more powerful than it ever was before.

These two conditions of a nation have sometimes coexisted: the last generation in France demonstrated how a society could establish a massive tyranny within the community, even while resisting the authority of the nobility and challenging the power of all kings—simultaneously showing the world how to achieve freedom and how to lose it. Nowadays, people observe that established powers are crumbling everywhere—they see all old authority struggling to hold on, all ancient barriers teetering on the brink of collapse, and the insights of the wisest are shaken by this sight: they focus solely on the astonishing revolution unfolding before them, believing that humanity is about to descend into endless chaos; if they considered the ultimate consequences of this revolution, their fears might take on a different form. For my part, I admit that I have no faith in the spirit of freedom that seems to inspire my peers. I can clearly see that the nations of this time are restless, but I do not clearly perceive that they are progressive; and I worry that, after the upheavals shaking the foundations of thrones, the rule of sovereigns may end up being stronger than it ever was before.





Chapter VI: What Sort Of Despotism Democratic Nations Have To Fear

I had remarked during my stay in the United States, that a democratic state of society, similar to that of the Americans, might offer singular facilities for the establishment of despotism; and I perceived, upon my return to Europe, how much use had already been made by most of our rulers, of the notions, the sentiments, and the wants engendered by this same social condition, for the purpose of extending the circle of their power. This led me to think that the nations of Christendom would perhaps eventually undergo some sort of oppression like that which hung over several of the nations of the ancient world. A more accurate examination of the subject, and five years of further meditations, have not diminished my apprehensions, but they have changed the object of them. No sovereign ever lived in former ages so absolute or so powerful as to undertake to administer by his own agency, and without the assistance of intermediate powers, all the parts of a great empire: none ever attempted to subject all his subjects indiscriminately to strict uniformity of regulation, and personally to tutor and direct every member of the community. The notion of such an undertaking never occurred to the human mind; and if any man had conceived it, the want of information, the imperfection of the administrative system, and above all, the natural obstacles caused by the inequality of conditions, would speedily have checked the execution of so vast a design. When the Roman emperors were at the height of their power, the different nations of the empire still preserved manners and customs of great diversity; although they were subject to the same monarch, most of the provinces were separately administered; they abounded in powerful and active municipalities; and although the whole government of the empire was centred in the hands of the emperor alone, and he always remained, upon occasions, the supreme arbiter in all matters, yet the details of social life and private occupations lay for the most part beyond his control. The emperors possessed, it is true, an immense and unchecked power, which allowed them to gratify all their whimsical tastes, and to employ for that purpose the whole strength of the State. They frequently abused that power arbitrarily to deprive their subjects of property or of life: their tyranny was extremely onerous to the few, but it did not reach the greater number; it was fixed to some few main objects, and neglected the rest; it was violent, but its range was limited.

During my time in the United States, I noted that a democratic society like theirs could create unique opportunities for the rise of despotism. Upon returning to Europe, I realized how our rulers had already utilized the ideas, feelings, and needs arising from this social structure to expand their power. This made me think that the nations of Christendom might eventually experience a form of oppression similar to what many ancient nations faced. A closer examination of the topic, along with five more years of reflection, hasn’t lessened my concerns, but has altered what I worry about. No ruler in history was ever so absolute or powerful that they could manage every aspect of a vast empire without help from other powers; none ever tried to impose uniform regulations on all subjects or to personally oversee and instruct every member of society. The idea of such an endeavor never crossed anyone's mind; and if it had, the lack of information, flaws in administrative systems, and particularly the natural barriers created by social inequalities would quickly have prevented such an immense project from being realized. Even when the Roman emperors were at the peak of their power, the various nations within the empire maintained a wide range of customs and traditions; while they were all under the same ruler, most provinces were managed individually and had strong, active municipalities. Despite the emperor holding ultimate authority over the empire and stepping in as the final decision-maker in many issues, the intricacies of everyday life and individual pursuits largely fell outside of his reach. The emperors did wield tremendous and unchecked power, allowing them to indulge their whims at the expense of the state’s resources. They often misused this power to arbitrarily strip their subjects of property or life. Their tyranny was burdensome for the few it affected, but didn’t touch the majority; it focused on a limited number of key issues and overlooked many others; it was forceful, but its impact was constrained.

But it would seem that if despotism were to be established amongst the democratic nations of our days, it might assume a different character; it would be more extensive and more mild; it would degrade men without tormenting them. I do not question, that in an age of instruction and equality like our own, sovereigns might more easily succeed in collecting all political power into their own hands, and might interfere more habitually and decidedly within the circle of private interests, than any sovereign of antiquity could ever do. But this same principle of equality which facilitates despotism, tempers its rigor. We have seen how the manners of society become more humane and gentle in proportion as men become more equal and alike. When no member of the community has much power or much wealth, tyranny is, as it were, without opportunities and a field of action. As all fortunes are scanty, the passions of men are naturally circumscribed—their imagination limited, their pleasures simple. This universal moderation moderates the sovereign himself, and checks within certain limits the inordinate extent of his desires.

But it seems that if despotism were to emerge among today’s democratic nations, it might take on a different form; it would be broader and gentler, degrading people without actively tormenting them. I have no doubt that in an age of education and equality like ours, rulers could more easily gather all political power into their own hands and could interfere more often and decisively in people’s private lives than any ancient ruler ever could. However, this same principle of equality that makes despotism easier also softens its harshness. We’ve seen how social behavior becomes more humane and gentle as people become more equal and similar. When no one in the community holds much power or wealth, tyranny lacks opportunities and a place to operate. As everyone’s fortunes are limited, people’s passions are naturally restrained—their imaginations are limited, and their pleasures are simple. This widespread moderation also tempers the ruler themselves and keeps their excessive desires in check.

Independently of these reasons drawn from the nature of the state of society itself, I might add many others arising from causes beyond my subject; but I shall keep within the limits I have laid down to myself. Democratic governments may become violent and even cruel at certain periods of extreme effervescence or of great danger: but these crises will be rare and brief. When I consider the petty passions of our contemporaries, the mildness of their manners, the extent of their education, the purity of their religion, the gentleness of their morality, their regular and industrious habits, and the restraint which they almost all observe in their vices no less than in their virtues, I have no fear that they will meet with tyrants in their rulers, but rather guardians. *a I think then that the species of oppression by which democratic nations are menaced is unlike anything which ever before existed in the world: our contemporaries will find no prototype of it in their memories. I am trying myself to choose an expression which will accurately convey the whole of the idea I have formed of it, but in vain; the old words "despotism" and "tyranny" are inappropriate: the thing itself is new; and since I cannot name it, I must attempt to define it.

Regardless of these reasons stemming from the nature of society itself, I could mention many others arising from factors outside my focus; however, I will stick to the limits I’ve set for myself. Democratic governments can become violent and even cruel during times of extreme unrest or significant danger, but these crises are likely to be rare and short-lived. When I consider the small grievances of our contemporaries, their gentle behavior, the level of their education, the purity of their faith, the kindness of their morals, their orderly and hardworking routines, and the self-control they mostly maintain in both their vices and virtues, I have no concern that they will encounter tyrants among their leaders, but rather guardians. I believe that the kind of oppression democratic nations face is unlike anything that has existed before in the world: our contemporaries won’t find any previous examples of it in their memories. I’m trying to choose a term that accurately expresses the entire concept I’ve developed, but it’s proving difficult; the old terms "despotism" and "tyranny" don’t fit: the phenomenon itself is new; and since I can’t name it, I must attempt to define it.

a
[ See Appendix Y.]

a
[ See Appendix Y.]

I seek to trace the novel features under which despotism may appear in the world. The first thing that strikes the observation is an innumerable multitude of men all equal and alike, incessantly endeavoring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives. Each of them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of all the rest—his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind; as for the rest of his fellow-citizens, he is close to them, but he sees them not—he touches them, but he feels them not; he exists but in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country. Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications, and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent, if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks on the contrary to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness: it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances—what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living? Thus it every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within a narrower range, and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. The principle of equality has prepared men for these things: it has predisposed men to endure them, and oftentimes to look on them as benefits.

I want to explore the new ways that despotism can show up in the world. The first thing that stands out is the countless number of people who are all equal and similar, constantly trying to grab the small and trivial pleasures that fill their lives. Each of them, living independently, feels like a stranger to everyone else's fate—his children and close friends are his entire world; as for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is near them, but doesn't really see them—he interacts with them, but doesn't feel their presence; he exists only for himself and in his own orbit; and even if his family is still with him, he has effectively lost touch with his community. Above this group of people looms a vast, protective power that takes it upon itself to ensure their satisfaction and oversee their well-being. This power is absolute, meticulous, consistent, considerate, and gentle. It resembles a parent’s authority, but instead of preparing individuals for adulthood, it aims to keep them in a constant state of childhood: it is perfectly fine as long as people are happy, as long as they only think about being happy. This kind of government works hard for their happiness, but it insists on being the only actor and the sole judge of that happiness: it guarantees their safety, anticipates and meets their needs, eases their pleasures, manages their major interests, directs their work, regulates the transfer of property, and divides their inheritances—what's left, then, but to spare them from having to think and from the trouble of living? In doing so, it gradually makes the exercise of individual freedom less valuable and less common; it restricts the will to a narrower space, and slowly takes away all the utility of the individual. The principle of equality has prepared people for this: it has made them likely to accept these conditions and often view them as advantages.

After having thus successively taken each member of the community in its powerful grasp, and fashioned them at will, the supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society with a net-work of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided: men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting: such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to be nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd. I have always thought that servitude of the regular, quiet, and gentle kind which I have just described, might be combined more easily than is commonly believed with some of the outward forms of freedom; and that it might even establish itself under the wing of the sovereignty of the people. Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting passions; they want to be led, and they wish to remain free: as they cannot destroy either one or the other of these contrary propensities, they strive to satisfy them both at once. They devise a sole, tutelary, and all-powerful form of government, but elected by the people. They combine the principle of centralization and that of popular sovereignty; this gives them a respite; they console themselves for being in tutelage by the reflection that they have chosen their own guardians. Every man allows himself to be put in leading-strings, because he sees that it is not a person or a class of persons, but the people at large that holds the end of his chain. By this system the people shake off their state of dependence just long enough to select their master, and then relapse into it again. A great many persons at the present day are quite contented with this sort of compromise between administrative despotism and the sovereignty of the people; and they think they have done enough for the protection of individual freedom when they have surrendered it to the power of the nation at large. This does not satisfy me: the nature of him I am to obey signifies less to me than the fact of extorted obedience.

After having firmly grasped each member of the community and shaped them as it wishes, the supreme power then reaches out over the entire community. It spreads a web of small, complex rules across society, minute and uniform, through which even the most original thinkers and the most energetic individuals cannot push through to rise above the masses. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided: people are seldom forced to act, but they are constantly held back from acting. Such a power doesn't destroy, but it prevents life; it doesn’t tyrannize, but it compresses, weakens, extinguishes, and dulls a people, until each nation becomes nothing better than a flock of timid and hardworking animals, with the government acting as the shepherd. I have always believed that the type of servitude I just described, which is regular, quiet, and gentle, could be combined more easily than commonly thought with some external forms of freedom; and that it might even find its place under popular sovereignty. Our contemporaries are constantly torn by two opposing desires; they want to be led, yet wish to remain free: since they can’t eliminate either of these conflicting tendencies, they try to accommodate both at once. They create a single, protective, and all-powerful government, but one that is elected by the people. They merge the ideas of centralization and popular sovereignty; this gives them a break; they comfort themselves for being under guardianship by the thought that they have chosen their own protectors. Every individual allows themselves to be led, because they see that it’s not just a person or a group that holds onto their chain, but the population as a whole. Through this system, the people break free from their dependency just long enough to choose their master, only to fall back into it again. Many people today are quite content with this compromise between authoritarian governance and popular rule; they believe they’ve done enough to protect individual freedom when they’ve relinquished it to the power of the nation as a whole. This doesn’t satisfy me: the nature of whom I have to obey matters less to me than the fact that I am being forced to obey.

I do not however deny that a constitution of this kind appears to me to be infinitely preferable to one, which, after having concentrated all the powers of government, should vest them in the hands of an irresponsible person or body of persons. Of all the forms which democratic despotism could assume, the latter would assuredly be the worst. When the sovereign is elective, or narrowly watched by a legislature which is really elective and independent, the oppression which he exercises over individuals is sometimes greater, but it is always less degrading; because every man, when he is oppressed and disarmed, may still imagine, that whilst he yields obedience it is to himself he yields it, and that it is to one of his own inclinations that all the rest give way. In like manner I can understand that when the sovereign represents the nation, and is dependent upon the people, the rights and the power of which every citizen is deprived, not only serve the head of the State, but the State itself; and that private persons derive some return from the sacrifice of their independence which they have made to the public. To create a representation of the people in every centralized country, is therefore, to diminish the evil which extreme centralization may produce, but not to get rid of it. I admit that by this means room is left for the intervention of individuals in the more important affairs; but it is not the less suppressed in the smaller and more private ones. It must not be forgotten that it is especially dangerous to enslave men in the minor details of life. For my own part, I should be inclined to think freedom less necessary in great things than in little ones, if it were possible to be secure of the one without possessing the other. Subjection in minor affairs breaks out every day, and is felt by the whole community indiscriminately. It does not drive men to resistance, but it crosses them at every turn, till they are led to surrender the exercise of their will. Thus their spirit is gradually broken and their character enervated; whereas that obedience, which is exacted on a few important but rare occasions, only exhibits servitude at certain intervals, and throws the burden of it upon a small number of men. It is in vain to summon a people, which has been rendered so dependent on the central power, to choose from time to time the representatives of that power; this rare and brief exercise of their free choice, however important it may be, will not prevent them from gradually losing the faculties of thinking, feeling, and acting for themselves, and thus gradually falling below the level of humanity. *b I add that they will soon become incapable of exercising the great and only privilege which remains to them. The democratic nations which have introduced freedom into their political constitution, at the very time when they were augmenting the despotism of their administrative constitution, have been led into strange paradoxes. To manage those minor affairs in which good sense is all that is wanted—the people are held to be unequal to the task, but when the government of the country is at stake, the people are invested with immense powers; they are alternately made the playthings of their ruler, and his masters—more than kings, and less than men. After having exhausted all the different modes of election, without finding one to suit their purpose, they are still amazed, and still bent on seeking further; as if the evil they remark did not originate in the constitution of the country far more than in that of the electoral body. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive how men who have entirely given up the habit of self-government should succeed in making a proper choice of those by whom they are to be governed; and no one will ever believe that a liberal, wise, and energetic government can spring from the suffrages of a subservient people. A constitution, which should be republican in its head and ultra-monarchical in all its other parts, has ever appeared to me to be a short-lived monster. The vices of rulers and the ineptitude of the people would speedily bring about its ruin; and the nation, weary of its representatives and of itself, would create freer institutions, or soon return to stretch itself at the feet of a single master.

I don’t deny that a constitution like this one seems infinitely better to me than one that places all governmental powers in the hands of an unaccountable individual or group. Among all the forms that democratic tyranny might take, this would definitely be the worst. When the sovereign is elected or closely monitored by an actually elected and independent legislature, the oppression they impose on individuals might sometimes be greater, but it is always less degrading; because every person, when oppressed and disarmed, can still imagine that while they obey, they are ultimately doing so to themselves, and that it is one of their own interests that everyone else yields to. Similarly, I can understand that when the sovereign represents the nation and is dependent on the people, the rights and powers that every citizen sacrifices not only benefit the head of the State but the State itself; and that private individuals gain something from the loss of their independence for the public good. Creating a representation of the people in every centralized country thus helps to lessen the problems caused by extreme centralization, but it does not eliminate them. I acknowledge that this approach allows for individual involvement in more significant matters, but it still suppresses them in smaller, more private ones. It’s essential to remember that it is especially dangerous to enslave people in the details of life. Personally, I would think that freedom is less essential in major matters than in minor ones if it were possible to secure one without the other. Subjugation in minor affairs happens daily and is felt by the entire community equally. It doesn’t lead people to resist, but it disrupts them at every turn until they feel compelled to give up their will. This gradually breaks their spirit and weakens their character; in contrast, the obedience demanded on a few important but rare occasions only shows servitude sporadically and places the burden on a few individuals. It is futile to call upon a population that has become so dependent on central authority to occasionally choose representatives for that power; this rare and brief exercise of their free choice, no matter how significant it may be, won’t stop them from gradually losing the ability to think, feel, and act for themselves, and thus ultimately falling below the level of humanity. I add that they will soon be incapable of exercising the one great privilege that remains to them. Democratic nations that have introduced freedom into their political systems while simultaneously increasing the despotism of their administrative systems have fallen into strange contradictions. For managing smaller affairs that require common sense, the people are deemed unfit for the task, but when it comes to the governance of the country, they are given enormous powers; they are alternately treated as playthings of their ruler and as his masters—more than kings yet less than men. After exhausting various voting methods without finding one that works, they remain astonished and still seek further, as if the problems they notice stem more from the country’s constitution than that of the electoral body. It is indeed hard to understand how people who have completely abandoned self-governance can successfully choose those who will govern them; and no one will ever believe that a fair, wise, and effective government can emerge from the votes of a subservient people. A constitution that is republican on the surface but ultra-monarchical in all other aspects has always seemed to me to be an unstable monstrosity. The flaws of the rulers and the incompetence of the people would quickly lead to its downfall; and the nation, weary of its representatives and of itself, would either create freer institutions or soon find itself at the feet of a single master once again.

b
[ See Appendix Z.]

b
[ See Appendix Z.]





Chapter VII: Continuation Of The Preceding Chapters

I believe that it is easier to establish an absolute and despotic government amongst a people in which the conditions of society are equal, than amongst any other; and I think that if such a government were once established amongst such a people, it would not only oppress men, but would eventually strip each of them of several of the highest qualities of humanity. Despotism therefore appears to me peculiarly to be dreaded in democratic ages. I should have loved freedom, I believe, at all times, but in the time in which we live I am ready to worship it. On the other hand, I am persuaded that all who shall attempt, in the ages upon which we are entering, to base freedom upon aristocratic privilege, will fail—that all who shall attempt to draw and to retain authority within a single class, will fail. At the present day no ruler is skilful or strong enough to found a despotism, by re-establishing permanent distinctions of rank amongst his subjects: no legislator is wise or powerful enough to preserve free institutions, if he does not take equality for his first principle and his watchword. All those of our contemporaries who would establish or secure the independence and the dignity of their fellow-men, must show themselves the friends of equality; and the only worthy means of showing themselves as such, is to be so: upon this depends the success of their holy enterprise. Thus the question is not how to reconstruct aristocratic society, but how to make liberty proceed out of that democratic state of society in which God has placed us.

I think it's easier to set up a strict and controlling government among a people where social conditions are equal than in any other setting. If such a government were established among these people, it wouldn't just oppress individuals but would eventually take away some of the best qualities of humanity. Therefore, despotism seems particularly concerning in democratic times. I believe I would have valued freedom at all times, but in our current era, I'm ready to celebrate it even more. On the flip side, I'm convinced that anyone trying to base freedom on noble privilege in the coming ages will fail—those who try to keep power within a single class will also fail. Right now, no leader is skilled or strong enough to create a dictatorship by reinstating permanent class distinctions among their subjects; no legislator is wise or powerful enough to maintain free institutions unless they prioritize equality as their main principle and motto. Anyone today who aims to establish or protect the independence and dignity of their fellow humans must show they’re supporters of equality, and the only true way to do that is by actually being one. The success of their noble cause hinges on this. So, the issue isn’t about rebuilding an aristocratic society, but rather about how to cultivate liberty from the democratic state of society that we find ourselves in.

These two truths appear to me simple, clear, and fertile in consequences; and they naturally lead me to consider what kind of free government can be established amongst a people in which social conditions are equal. It results from the very constitution of democratic nations and from their necessities, that the power of government amongst them must be more uniform, more centralized, more extensive, more searching, and more efficient than in other countries. Society at large is naturally stronger and more active, individuals more subordinate and weak; the former does more, the latter less; and this is inevitably the case. It is not therefore to be expected that the range of private independence will ever be as extensive in democratic as in aristocratic countries—nor is this to be desired; for, amongst aristocratic nations, the mass is often sacrificed to the individual, and the prosperity of the greater number to the greatness of the few. It is both necessary and desirable that the government of a democratic people should be active and powerful: and our object should not be to render it weak or indolent, but solely to prevent it from abusing its aptitude and its strength.

These two truths seem simple, clear, and full of implications to me, and they naturally lead me to think about what type of free government can be set up among a people where social conditions are equal. It follows from the very nature of democratic nations and their needs that the power of government among them must be more uniform, more centralized, more extensive, more pervasive, and more effective than in other countries. Society as a whole is naturally stronger and more active, while individuals are more subordinate and weaker; the former does more, and the latter does less, and this is unavoidable. Therefore, we shouldn't expect the scope of private independence to ever be as wide in democratic as in aristocratic countries—nor should we want that; because in aristocratic nations, the mass is often sacrificed for the individual, and the well-being of the many is compromised for the greatness of the few. It is both essential and desirable for the government of a democratic people to be active and strong: and our goal should not be to make it weak or lazy, but solely to prevent it from misusing its capabilities and power.

The circumstance which most contributed to secure the independence of private persons in aristocratic ages, was, that the supreme power did not affect to take upon itself alone the government and administration of the community; those functions were necessarily partially left to the members of the aristocracy: so that as the supreme power was always divided, it never weighed with its whole weight and in the same manner on each individual. Not only did the government not perform everything by its immediate agency; but as most of the agents who discharged its duties derived their power not from the State, but from the circumstance of their birth, they were not perpetually under its control. The government could not make or unmake them in an instant, at pleasure, nor bend them in strict uniformity to its slightest caprice—this was an additional guarantee of private independence. I readily admit that recourse cannot be had to the same means at the present time: but I discover certain democratic expedients which may be substituted for them. Instead of vesting in the government alone all the administrative powers of which corporations and nobles have been deprived, a portion of them may be entrusted to secondary public bodies, temporarily composed of private citizens: thus the liberty of private persons will be more secure, and their equality will not be diminished.

The main reason why private individuals had more independence during aristocratic times was that the supreme power didn’t try to handle all the governance and administration on its own. Those roles were often left to the aristocracy, which meant that the supreme power was always split up; it never exerted its full force uniformly on each person. Not only did the government not take care of everything directly, but most of the people who carried out its functions got their authority from their birth rather than from the State, meaning they were not always under its control. The government couldn’t just create or remove them at will or force them into strict conformity with its whims—this was an extra layer of protection for individual independence. I acknowledge that we can’t use the same methods today, but I see certain democratic solutions that could replace them. Instead of giving the government sole control over all administrative powers that corporations and nobles once held, some of these powers could be given to secondary public bodies made up of private citizens temporarily: this way, the freedom of individuals would be more secure, and their equality wouldn’t be compromised.

The Americans, who care less for words than the French, still designate by the name of "county" the largest of their administrative districts: but the duties of the count or lord-lieutenant are in part performed by a provincial assembly. At a period of equality like our own it would be unjust and unreasonable to institute hereditary officers; but there is nothing to prevent us from substituting elective public officers to a certain extent. Election is a democratic expedient which insures the independence of the public officer in relation to the government, as much and even more than hereditary rank can insure it amongst aristocratic nations. Aristocratic countries abound in wealthy and influential persons who are competent to provide for themselves, and who cannot be easily or secretly oppressed: such persons restrain a government within general habits of moderation and reserve. I am very well aware that democratic countries contain no such persons naturally; but something analogous to them may be created by artificial means. I firmly believe that an aristocracy cannot again be founded in the world; but I think that private citizens, by combining together, may constitute bodies of great wealth, influence, and strength, corresponding to the persons of an aristocracy. By this means many of the greatest political advantages of aristocracy would be obtained without its injustice or its dangers. An association for political, commercial, or manufacturing purposes, or even for those of science and literature, is a powerful and enlightened member of the community, which cannot be disposed of at pleasure, or oppressed without remonstrance; and which, by defending its own rights against the encroachments of the government, saves the common liberties of the country.

The Americans, who care less about words than the French, still refer to their largest administrative districts as "counties." However, some of the responsibilities of the count or lord-lieutenant are taken on by a provincial assembly. In a time of equality like ours, it would be unfair and unreasonable to have hereditary officials; however, we can replace them with elected public officers to some extent. Elections are a democratic way to ensure that public officers remain independent from the government, possibly even more so than hereditary positions can guarantee in aristocratic nations. Aristocratic countries are filled with wealthy and influential people who can provide for themselves and aren’t easily or secretly oppressed; these individuals help keep the government in check through norms of moderation and restraint. I recognize that democratic countries generally lack such individuals, but something similar can be created artificially. I truly believe that we cannot recreate an aristocracy in this world; however, I think that private citizens can come together to form groups of significant wealth, influence, and power that function similarly to aristocratic entities. This way, many of the key political advantages of aristocracy could be gained without its unfairness or risks. A group formed for political, commercial, or manufacturing purposes, or even for science and literature, becomes a strong and informed member of the community that cannot be easily dismissed or oppressed without a fight, and by defending its own rights against government overreach, it protects the common liberties of the country.

In periods of aristocracy every man is always bound so closely to many of his fellow-citizens, that he cannot be assailed without their coming to his assistance. In ages of equality every man naturally stands alone; he has no hereditary friends whose co-operation he may demand—no class upon whose sympathy he may rely: he is easily got rid of, and he is trampled on with impunity. At the present time, an oppressed member of the community has therefore only one method of self-defence—he may appeal to the whole nation; and if the whole nation is deaf to his complaint, he may appeal to mankind: the only means he has of making this appeal is by the press. Thus the liberty of the press is infinitely more valuable amongst democratic nations than amongst all others; it is the only cure for the evils which equality may produce. Equality sets men apart and weakens them; but the press places a powerful weapon within every man's reach, which the weakest and loneliest of them all may use. Equality deprives a man of the support of his connections; but the press enables him to summon all his fellow-countrymen and all his fellow-men to his assistance. Printing has accelerated the progress of equality, and it is also one of its best correctives.

In times of aristocracy, every person is closely tied to many of their fellow citizens, meaning they can't be attacked without others coming to their aid. In eras of equality, everyone naturally stands alone; they have no inherited friends for support and no class they can rely on for sympathy. They're easily dismissed and can be trampled on without consequence. Today, an oppressed member of society has just one way to defend themselves—they can appeal to the entire nation, and if the nation ignores their grievance, they can reach out to humanity. The only way they can make this appeal is through the press. This is why freedom of the press is far more crucial in democratic nations than anywhere else; it’s the sole remedy for the issues that equality might create. Equality isolates people and weakens them, but the press provides a powerful tool that even the weakest and loneliest individuals can use. While equality strips a person of support from their connections, the press allows them to call upon all their fellow citizens and all of humanity for help. Printing has sped up the advancement of equality, and it also serves as one of its best checks.

I think that men living in aristocracies may, strictly speaking, do without the liberty of the press: but such is not the case with those who live in democratic countries. To protect their personal independence I trust not to great political assemblies, to parliamentary privilege, or to the assertion of popular sovereignty. All these things may, to a certain extent, be reconciled with personal servitude—but that servitude cannot be complete if the press is free: the press is the chiefest democratic instrument of freedom.

I believe that men living in aristocracies can, in a strict sense, manage without freedom of the press; however, that's not true for those living in democratic countries. To safeguard their personal independence, I don't rely on large political gatherings, parliamentary rights, or claims of popular sovereignty. All of these can, to some degree, coexist with personal servitude—but that servitude cannot be total if the press is free: the press is the most important democratic tool for freedom.

Something analogous may be said of the judicial power. It is a part of the essence of judicial power to attend to private interests, and to fix itself with predilection on minute objects submitted to its observation; another essential quality of judicial power is never to volunteer its assistance to the oppressed, but always to be at the disposal of the humblest of those who solicit it; their complaint, however feeble they may themselves be, will force itself upon the ear of justice and claim redress, for this is inherent in the very constitution of the courts of justice. A power of this kind is therefore peculiarly adapted to the wants of freedom, at a time when the eye and finger of the government are constantly intruding into the minutest details of human actions, and when private persons are at once too weak to protect themselves, and too much isolated for them to reckon upon the assistance of their fellows. The strength of the courts of law has ever been the greatest security which can be offered to personal independence; but this is more especially the case in democratic ages: private rights and interests are in constant danger, if the judicial power does not grow more extensive and more strong to keep pace with the growing equality of conditions.

Something similar can be said about the judicial power. It's essential for the judicial power to focus on individual interests and pay attention to the specific issues brought to its attention. Another vital aspect of judicial power is that it never offers help to the oppressed proactively; instead, it waits for those who ask for it, no matter how weak their case may seem. Their grievances will be heard by the system of justice and seek remedy, as this is a fundamental part of how courts operate. This kind of power is particularly suited to the needs of freedom, especially in times when the government is constantly interfering in the smallest details of personal lives, and individuals are often too powerless to defend themselves and too isolated to count on the support of others. The strength of the courts has always been the best protection for personal independence, but this is especially true in democratic times: private rights and interests are always at risk if the judicial power does not expand and strengthen to match the increasing equality of conditions.

Equality awakens in men several propensities extremely dangerous to freedom, to which the attention of the legislator ought constantly to be directed. I shall only remind the reader of the most important amongst them. Men living in democratic ages do not readily comprehend the utility of forms: they feel an instinctive contempt for them—I have elsewhere shown for what reasons. Forms excite their contempt and often their hatred; as they commonly aspire to none but easy and present gratifications, they rush onwards to the object of their desires, and the slightest delay exasperates them. This same temper, carried with them into political life, renders them hostile to forms, which perpetually retard or arrest them in some of their projects. Yet this objection which the men of democracies make to forms is the very thing which renders forms so useful to freedom; for their chief merit is to serve as a barrier between the strong and the weak, the ruler and the people, to retard the one, and give the other time to look about him. Forms become more necessary in proportion as the government becomes more active and more powerful, whilst private persons are becoming more indolent and more feeble. Thus democratic nations naturally stand more in need of forms than other nations, and they naturally respect them less. This deserves most serious attention. Nothing is more pitiful than the arrogant disdain of most of our contemporaries for questions of form; for the smallest questions of form have acquired in our time an importance which they never had before: many of the greatest interests of mankind depend upon them. I think that if the statesmen of aristocratic ages could sometimes contemn forms with impunity, and frequently rise above them, the statesmen to whom the government of nations is now confided ought to treat the very least among them with respect, and not neglect them without imperious necessity. In aristocracies the observance of forms was superstitious; amongst us they ought to be kept with a deliberate and enlightened deference.

Equality brings out several dangerous tendencies in people that can threaten freedom, which lawmakers should always keep in mind. I’ll point out a few key ones. People living in democratic times often struggle to see the value of formal structures; they have an instinctive disdain for them. I’ve explained before why this is the case. These forms provoke their scorn and sometimes even their anger; since they typically seek only immediate and easy pleasures, they rush toward what they want, and even the slightest delay frustrates them. This same attitude, carried into politics, makes them hostile towards structures that slow or hinder their plans. Yet, the very criticism that democratic people have towards these structures is what makes them so valuable for freedom; their primary role is to act as a barrier between the strong and the weak, the leaders and the public, allowing time for the latter to assess their situation. Structures become increasingly necessary as the government becomes more active and powerful while individuals become more complacent and weaker. Thus, democratic societies actually need these forms more than others, yet they tend to respect them less. This is a point that warrants serious consideration. Nothing is more disheartening than the arrogant disregard that many of our contemporaries show toward formal matters; even the smallest issues of form have gained significance today that they never held before: many of humanity’s greatest interests depend on them. I believe that while statesmen in aristocratic times could occasionally dismiss forms without consequence and even rise above them, the politicians managing nations today should treat even the smallest of these structures with respect and not overlook them unless absolutely necessary. In aristocracies, following forms was almost superstitious; in our time, they should be observed with intentional and informed respect.

Another tendency, which is extremely natural to democratic nations and extremely dangerous, is that which leads them ta despise and undervalue the rights of private persons. The attachment which men feel to a right, and the respect which they display for it, is generally proportioned to its importance, or to the length of time during which they have enjoyed it. The rights of private persons amongst democratic nations are commonly of small importance, of recent growth, and extremely precarious—the consequence is that they are often sacrificed without regret, and almost always violated without remorse. But it happens that at the same period and amongst the same nations in which men conceive a natural contempt for the rights of private persons, the rights of society at large are naturally extended and consolidated: in other words, men become less attached to private rights at the very time at which it would be most necessary to retain and to defend what little remains of them. It is therefore most especially in the present democratic ages, that the true friends of the liberty and the greatness of man ought constantly to be on the alert to prevent the power of government from lightly sacrificing the private rights of individuals to the general execution of its designs. At such times no citizen is so obscure that it is not very dangerous to allow him to be oppressed—no private rights are so unimportant that they can be surrendered with impunity to the caprices of a government. The reason is plain:—if the private right of an individual is violated at a time when the human mind is fully impressed with the importance and the sanctity of such rights, the injury done is confined to the individual whose right is infringed; but to violate such a right, at the present day, is deeply to corrupt the manners of the nation and to put the whole community in jeopardy, because the very notion of this kind of right constantly tends amongst us to be impaired and lost.

Another tendency, which is very natural in democratic countries and highly dangerous, is the attitude that leads people to disregard and undervalue the rights of individuals. The attachment people have to a right, and the respect they show for it, usually corresponds to its significance or to how long they’ve had it. The rights of individuals in democratic nations are usually seen as less important, recently developed, and very fragile—this leads to them being sacrificed without hesitation and often violated without any guilt. Interestingly, at the same time and in the same countries where people develop a natural disdain for individual rights, the rights of society as a whole are typically expanded and strengthened: in other words, people become less dedicated to individual rights just when it's most crucial to protect and uphold what's left of them. Therefore, especially in today’s democratic era, those who genuinely care about the freedom and dignity of humanity should always be vigilant against the possibility of the government casually sacrificing individual rights for its broader goals. In these times, no citizen is so insignificant that it's safe to let them be oppressed—no individual rights are so trivial that they can be surrendered without consequences to the whims of a government. The reason is clear: if an individual's private right is violated when society recognizes the significance and sacredness of such rights, the harm is limited to the person whose rights were violated; but to violate such a right today is to deeply corrupt the values of the nation and jeopardize the entire community since the understanding of these rights tends to diminish and disappear among us.

There are certain habits, certain notions, and certain vices which are peculiar to a state of revolution, and which a protracted revolution cannot fail to engender and to propagate, whatever be, in other respects, its character, its purpose, and the scene on which it takes place. When any nation has, within a short space of time, repeatedly varied its rulers, its opinions, and its laws, the men of whom it is composed eventually contract a taste for change, and grow accustomed to see all changes effected by sudden violence. Thus they naturally conceive a contempt for forms which daily prove ineffectual; and they do not support without impatience the dominion of rules which they have so often seen infringed. As the ordinary notions of equity and morality no longer suffice to explain and justify all the innovations daily begotten by a revolution, the principle of public utility is called in, the doctrine of political necessity is conjured up, and men accustom themselves to sacrifice private interests without scruple, and to trample on the rights of individuals in order more speedily to accomplish any public purpose.

There are certain habits, ideas, and vices that are unique to a state of revolution, which a prolonged revolution will inevitably create and spread, no matter what its character, purpose, or setting may be. When a nation rapidly changes its rulers, beliefs, and laws, the people begin to develop a taste for change and become used to seeing all changes brought about by sudden violence. As a result, they start to look down on systems that daily prove ineffective, and they are increasingly impatient with the authority of rules that they have frequently seen ignored. Since conventional ideas of fairness and morality no longer suffice to explain or justify the constant innovations brought on by a revolution, the principle of public utility is invoked, the idea of political necessity is summoned, and people become accustomed to sacrificing personal interests without hesitation and overriding individual rights in order to achieve any public aim more quickly.

These habits and notions, which I shall call revolutionary, because all revolutions produce them, occur in aristocracies just as much as amongst democratic nations; but amongst the former they are often less powerful and always less lasting, because there they meet with habits, notions, defects, and impediments, which counteract them: they consequently disappear as soon as the revolution is terminated, and the nation reverts to its former political courses. This is not always the case in democratic countries, in which it is ever to be feared that revolutionary tendencies, becoming more gentle and more regular, without entirely disappearing from society, will be gradually transformed into habits of subjection to the administrative authority of the government. I know of no countries in which revolutions re more dangerous than in democratic countries; because, independently of the accidental and transient evils which must always attend them, they may always create some evils which are permanent and unending. I believe that there are such things as justifiable resistance and legitimate rebellion: I do not therefore assert, as an absolute proposition, that the men of democratic ages ought never to make revolutions; but I think that they have especial reason to hesitate before they embark in them, and that it is far better to endure many grievances in their present condition than to have recourse to so perilous a remedy.

These habits and ideas, which I'll call revolutionary because all revolutions create them, happen in aristocracies just as much as in democratic nations; but in the former, they're often weaker and always shorter-lived because they clash with existing habits, beliefs, flaws, and obstacles that resist them. As a result, they tend to fade away as soon as the revolution is over, and the nation falls back into its old political routines. This is not always true in democratic countries, where there’s a constant worry that revolutionary tendencies, while becoming more moderate and systematic without fully vanishing from society, will slowly turn into habits of submission to the government’s administrative authority. I can’t think of any countries where revolutions are more dangerous than in democratic societies because, in addition to the temporary and accidental harms they always bring, they can also create lasting and endless issues. I believe there are situations where resistance is justifiable and rebellion is legitimate; therefore, I’m not claiming that people in democratic ages should never revolt. However, I think they have excellent reasons to think twice before committing to it and that it’s often better to tolerate many hardships in their current situation than to resort to such a risky solution.

I shall conclude by one general idea, which comprises not only all the particular ideas which have been expressed in the present chapter, but also most of those which it is the object of this book to treat of. In the ages of aristocracy which preceded our own, there were private persons of great power, and a social authority of extreme weakness. The outline of society itself was not easily discernible, and constantly confounded with the different powers by which the community was ruled. The principal efforts of the men of those times were required to strengthen, aggrandize, and secure the supreme power; and on the other hand, to circumscribe individual independence within narrower limits, and to subject private interests to the interests of the public. Other perils and other cares await the men of our age. Amongst the greater part of modern nations, the government, whatever may be its origin, its constitution, or its name, has become almost omnipotent, and private persons are falling, more and more, into the lowest stage of weakness and dependence. In olden society everything was different; unity and uniformity were nowhere to be met with. In modern society everything threatens to become so much alike, that the peculiar characteristics of each individual will soon be entirely lost in the general aspect of the world. Our forefathers were ever prone to make an improper use of the notion, that private rights ought to be respected; and we are naturally prone on the other hand to exaggerate the idea that the interest of a private individual ought always to bend to the interest of the many. The political world is metamorphosed: new remedies must henceforth be sought for new disorders. To lay down extensive, but distinct and settled limits, to the action of the government; to confer certain rights on private persons, and to secure to them the undisputed enjoyment of those rights; to enable individual man to maintain whatever independence, strength, and original power he still possesses; to raise him by the side of society at large, and uphold him in that position—these appear to me the main objects of legislators in the ages upon which we are now entering. It would seem as if the rulers of our time sought only to use men in order to make things great; I wish that they would try a little more to make great men; that they would set less value on the work, and more upon the workman; that they would never forget that a nation cannot long remain strong when every man belonging to it is individually weak, and that no form or combination of social polity has yet been devised, to make an energetic people out of a community of pusillanimous and enfeebled citizens.

I'll wrap up with a general idea that not only includes all the specific points made in this chapter but also most of the topics this book aims to address. In the aristocratic ages before ours, there were private individuals with significant power and a social authority that was very weak. The structure of society wasn’t clear and was often mixed up with the various powers ruling the community. The main focus of people back then was to boost, enlarge, and secure the ruling power, while also limiting individual freedom and subordinating private interests to those of the public. Today, we face different challenges and concerns. In many modern nations, governments—regardless of their origins, constitutions, or names—have become almost all-powerful, and private individuals are increasingly becoming weak and dependent. In past societies, things were very different; there was no unity or uniformity. In modern society, everything threatens to become so similar that the unique traits of each individual could soon disappear in the overall view of the world. Our ancestors often misused the idea that private rights should be respected, and now we tend to exaggerate the belief that an individual’s interests should always yield to the interests of the majority. The political landscape has changed; we need to find new solutions for new problems. We should establish clear, consistent limits on government power, grant certain rights to private individuals, and ensure they enjoy those rights without dispute. We need to help individuals maintain any independence, strength, and inherent power they still have, and elevate them within the larger society while supporting them in that role—these seem to be the primary goals for legislators in the new era we are entering. It appears that today’s leaders only seek to utilize people to achieve greatness; I wish they would focus more on cultivating great individuals. They should place less importance on the outcomes and more on the individuals achieving them. They must remember that a nation cannot stay strong for long when each of its members is weak, and that no system or combination of social structures has been created that can generate a vigorous populace from a community of timid and weakened citizens.

I trace amongst our contemporaries two contrary notions which are equally injurious. One set of men can perceive nothing in the principle of equality but the anarchical tendencies which it engenders: they dread their own free agency—they fear themselves. Other thinkers, less numerous but more enlightened, take a different view: besides that track which starts from the principle of equality to terminate in anarchy, they have at last discovered the road which seems to lead men to inevitable servitude. They shape their souls beforehand to this necessary condition; and, despairing of remaining free, they already do obeisance in their hearts to the master who is soon to appear. The former abandon freedom, because they think it dangerous; the latter, because they hold it to be impossible. If I had entertained the latter conviction, I should not have written this book, but I should have confined myself to deploring in secret the destiny of mankind. I have sought to point out the dangers to which the principle of equality exposes the independence of man, because I firmly believe that these dangers are the most formidable, as well as the least foreseen, of all those which futurity holds in store: but I do not think that they are insurmountable. The men who live in the democratic ages upon which we are entering have naturally a taste for independence: they are naturally impatient of regulation, and they are wearied by the permanence even of the condition they themselves prefer. They are fond of power; but they are prone to despise and hate those who wield it, and they easily elude its grasp by their own mobility and insignificance. These propensities will always manifest themselves, because they originate in the groundwork of society, which will undergo no change: for a long time they will prevent the establishment of any despotism, and they will furnish fresh weapons to each succeeding generation which shall struggle in favor of the liberty of mankind. Let us then look forward to the future with that salutary fear which makes men keep watch and ward for freedom, not with that faint and idle terror which depresses and enervates the heart.

I see two opposing views among our contemporaries, both of which are harmful. Some people only see the anarchy that the idea of equality can create: they fear their own freedom—they are afraid of themselves. Other thinkers, though fewer in number, have a different perspective: in addition to the path that leads from the principle of equality to chaos, they have found the route that seems to lead to inevitable servitude. They prepare their minds for this unavoidable state; in their despair over losing their freedom, they already bow in their hearts to the master who is about to arrive. The first group gives up freedom because they view it as dangerous; the second group gives it up because they believe it to be impossible. If I believed the latter, I wouldn't have written this book; I would have simply lamented humanity's fate in silence. I've tried to highlight the risks that the principle of equality poses to individual independence because I truly believe that these risks are the most significant and least anticipated of what the future has in store: but I don't think they're insurmountable. People living in the democratic age we are entering naturally desire independence; they are impatient with rules, and they grow tired of the constant state they prefer. They crave power but often despise those who hold it, easily slipping from its reach due to their own flexibility and insignificance. These tendencies will always be present because they stem from the foundation of society, which will not change. For a long time, they will hinder the rise of any tyranny and provide fresh tools for each new generation that fights for human freedom. So let's look to the future with a healthy fear that encourages us to protect our freedom, not with a weak and idle dread that weakens our spirits.





Chapter VIII: General Survey Of The Subject

Before I close forever the theme that has detained me so long, I would fain take a parting survey of all the various characteristics of modern society, and appreciate at last the general influence to be exercised by the principle of equality upon the fate of mankind; but I am stopped by the difficulty of the task, and in presence of so great an object my sight is troubled, and my reason fails. The society of the modern world which I have sought to delineate, and which I seek to judge, has but just come into existence. Time has not yet shaped it into perfect form: the great revolution by which it has been created is not yet over: and amidst the occurrences of our time, it is almost impossible to discern what will pass away with the revolution itself, and what will survive its close. The world which is rising into existence is still half encumbered by the remains of the world which is waning into decay; and amidst the vast perplexity of human affairs, none can say how much of ancient institutions and former manners will remain, or how much will completely disappear. Although the revolution which is taking place in the social condition, the laws, the opinions, and the feelings of men, is still very far from being terminated, yet its results already admit of no comparison with anything that the world has ever before witnessed. I go back from age to age up to the remotest antiquity; but I find no parallel to what is occurring before my eyes: as the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity. Nevertheless, in the midst of a prospect so wide, so novel and so confused, some of the more prominent characteristics may already be discerned and pointed out. The good things and the evils of life are more equally distributed in the world: great wealth tends to disappear, the number of small fortunes to increase; desires and gratifications are multiplied, but extraordinary prosperity and irremediable penury are alike unknown. The sentiment of ambition is universal, but the scope of ambition is seldom vast. Each individual stands apart in solitary weakness; but society at large is active, provident, and powerful: the performances of private persons are insignificant, those of the State immense. There is little energy of character; but manners are mild, and laws humane. If there be few instances of exalted heroism or of virtues of the highest, brightest, and purest temper, men's habits are regular, violence is rare, and cruelty almost unknown. Human existence becomes longer, and property more secure: life is not adorned with brilliant trophies, but it is extremely easy and tranquil. Few pleasures are either very refined or very coarse; and highly polished manners are as uncommon as great brutality of tastes. Neither men of great learning, nor extremely ignorant communities, are to be met with; genius becomes more rare, information more diffused. The human mind is impelled by the small efforts of all mankind combined together, not by the strenuous activity of certain men. There is less perfection, but more abundance, in all the productions of the arts. The ties of race, of rank, and of country are relaxed; the great bond of humanity is strengthened. If I endeavor to find out the most general and the most prominent of all these different characteristics, I shall have occasion to perceive, that what is taking place in men's fortunes manifests itself under a thousand other forms. Almost all extremes are softened or blunted: all that was most prominent is superseded by some mean term, at once less lofty and less low, less brilliant and less obscure, than what before existed in the world.

Before I wrap up the topic that has occupied me for so long, I want to take a final look at the various traits of modern society and understand the overall impact of the principle of equality on humanity's future. However, I'm hindered by the complexity of this task, and faced with such a significant subject, my vision is clouded and my reasoning falters. The society of today's world, which I have tried to outline and evaluate, has only recently come into being. Time has yet to mold it into a definitive shape: the major revolution that has created it is still ongoing, and amid the events of our era, it's almost impossible to determine what will fade away with this revolution and what will endure beyond its conclusion. The emerging world is still partially weighed down by the remnants of the old world that is declining; amid the vast confusion of human affairs, no one can say how much of past institutions and former customs will linger, or how much will vanish entirely. Although the ongoing revolution in social conditions, laws, opinions, and feelings is far from complete, its outcomes already stand in stark contrast to anything previously witnessed. I look back through the ages to the most distant past, but I find no comparison to what is happening right now: as history no longer illuminates the future, the human mind wanders in darkness. Still, within such a broad, new, and complicated perspective, some of the more notable characteristics can already be identified. The good and bad things in life are distributed more evenly around the globe: great wealth is diminishing, while the number of modest fortunes is rising; desires and satisfactions are multiplying, but extreme wealth and unbearable poverty are both rare. The feeling of ambition is widespread, but its scope is rarely grand. Each person stands alone in their frailty; however, society as a whole is active, resourceful, and powerful: private achievements are minor, while those of the State are vast. There’s little strong character, but manners are gentle, and laws are humane. While there are few examples of exceptional heroism or the highest, purest virtues, people's habits are regular, violence is uncommon, and cruelty is nearly absent. Human life spans longer, and property is more secure: life might not be decorated with dazzling achievements, but it is very easy and peaceful. Few pleasures are either very refined or very base; and highly sophisticated manners are as rare as extreme coarseness in tastes. There are neither highly learned individuals nor extremely ignorant communities; genius becomes rarer, while knowledge spreads more widely. The human mind is driven by the small efforts of everyone working together, rather than by the intense actions of a select few. There's less perfection overall, but more abundance in all artistic creations. Connections of race, class, and nationality are loosening; the greater bond of humanity is strengthening. If I try to discover the most universal and significant of these various traits, I will notice that what is happening in people's fortunes can be seen in many other forms. Almost all extremes are softened or dulled: everything that was most prominent is replaced by something more moderate, less grand yet also less lowly, less brilliant yet also less obscure than what existed before in the world.

When I survey this countless multitude of beings, shaped in each other's likeness, amidst whom nothing rises and nothing falls, the sight of such universal uniformity saddens and chills me, and I am tempted to regret that state of society which has ceased to be. When the world was full of men of great importance and extreme insignificance, of great wealth and extreme poverty, of great learning and extreme ignorance, I turned aside from the latter to fix my observation on the former alone, who gratified my sympathies. But I admit that this gratification arose from my own weakness: it is because I am unable to see at once all that is around me, that I am allowed thus to select and separate the objects of my predilection from among so many others. Such is not the case with that almighty and eternal Being whose gaze necessarily includes the whole of created things, and who surveys distinctly, though at once, mankind and man. We may naturally believe that it is not the singular prosperity of the few, but the greater well-being of all, which is most pleasing in the sight of the Creator and Preserver of men. What appears to me to be man's decline, is to His eye advancement; what afflicts me is acceptable to Him. A state of equality is perhaps less elevated, but it is more just; and its justice constitutes its greatness and its beauty. I would strive then to raise myself to this point of the divine contemplation, and thence to view and to judge the concerns of men.

When I look at this endless crowd of people, shaped just like each other, where nothing rises and nothing falls, the sight of such overall sameness makes me sad and uneasy, and I can't help but wish for the past state of society that no longer exists. Back when the world was filled with people of great importance and utter insignificance, enormous wealth and extreme poverty, vast knowledge and utter ignorance, I would focus on the former, who satisfied my sympathies. But I acknowledge that this satisfaction came from my own weakness: it's because I can't see everything around me all at once that I can pick and choose my preferences from among so many others. This isn't how it is for that all-powerful and eternal Being whose gaze inevitably encompasses everything created, and who sees both humanity and individual people distinctly, even at the same time. We can naturally believe that it's not the individual success of a few that pleases the Creator and Preserver of humankind, but the greater well-being of all. What I see as a decline in humanity, He sees as progress; what troubles me is acceptable to Him. A state of equality may be less lofty, but it is fairer, and its fairness makes it great and beautiful. Therefore, I would strive to elevate myself to this perspective of divine contemplation, to better observe and judge the affairs of humankind.

No man, upon the earth, can as yet affirm absolutely and generally, that the new state of the world is better than its former one; but it is already easy to perceive that this state is different. Some vices and some virtues were so inherent in the constitution of an aristocratic nation, and are so opposite to the character of a modern people, that they can never be infused into it; some good tendencies and some bad propensities which were unknown to the former, are natural to the latter; some ideas suggest themselves spontaneously to the imagination of the one, which are utterly repugnant to the mind of the other. They are like two distinct orders of human beings, each of which has its own merits and defects, its own advantages and its own evils. Care must therefore be taken not to judge the state of society, which is now coming into existence, by notions derived from a state of society which no longer exists; for as these states of society are exceedingly different in their structure, they cannot be submitted to a just or fair comparison. It would be scarcely more reasonable to require of our own contemporaries the peculiar virtues which originated in the social condition of their forefathers, since that social condition is itself fallen, and has drawn into one promiscuous ruin the good and evil which belonged to it.

No one on earth can definitively say that the new state of the world is better than the old one; however, it's already clear that this state is different. Some vices and virtues were inherent in an aristocratic society and are completely opposite to the nature of modern people, making them impossible to instill in today’s society. Some positive tendencies and negative traits that were unknown to the past are natural to the present. Certain ideas come to mind easily for one group that are completely unacceptable to the other. They are like two different types of people, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, advantages and drawbacks. Therefore, we must be careful not to judge the emerging society based on ideas from a society that no longer exists; since these societies are very different in their structure, they cannot be compared fairly. It would be almost as unreasonable to expect our contemporaries to uphold the unique virtues that originated in the social conditions of their ancestors, as that social condition has now fallen apart, bringing both good and bad into one chaotic ruin.

But as yet these things are imperfectly understood. I find that a great number of my contemporaries undertake to make a certain selection from amongst the institutions, the opinions, and the ideas which originated in the aristocratic constitution of society as it was: a portion of these elements they would willingly relinquish, but they would keep the remainder and transplant them into their new world. I apprehend that such men are wasting their time and their strength in virtuous but unprofitable efforts. The object is not to retain the peculiar advantages which the inequality of conditions bestows upon mankind, but to secure the new benefits which equality may supply. We have not to seek to make ourselves like our progenitors, but to strive to work out that species of greatness and happiness which is our own. For myself, who now look back from this extreme limit of my task, and discover from afar, but at once, the various objects which have attracted my more attentive investigation upon my way, I am full of apprehensions and of hopes. I perceive mighty dangers which it is possible to ward off—mighty evils which may be avoided or alleviated; and I cling with a firmer hold to the belief, that for democratic nations to be virtuous and prosperous they require but to will it. I am aware that many of my contemporaries maintain that nations are never their own masters here below, and that they necessarily obey some insurmountable and unintelligent power, arising from anterior events, from their race, or from the soil and climate of their country. Such principles are false and cowardly; such principles can never produce aught but feeble men and pusillanimous nations. Providence has not created mankind entirely independent or entirely free. It is true that around every man a fatal circle is traced, beyond which he cannot pass; but within the wide verge of that circle he is powerful and free: as it is with man, so with communities. The nations of our time cannot prevent the conditions of men from becoming equal; but it depends upon themselves whether the principle of equality is to lead them to servitude or freedom, to knowledge or barbarism, to prosperity or to wretchedness.

But these things are still not fully understood. I see that many people today are trying to pick and choose from the institutions, opinions, and ideas that came from the old aristocratic society. They want to let go of some of these elements, but keep others and bring them into their new world. I think these people are wasting their time and energy on noble but fruitless efforts. The goal isn’t to hang onto the unique advantages that social inequality gave people, but to secure the new benefits that equality can offer. We shouldn't aim to make ourselves like our ancestors, but rather to achieve our own kind of greatness and happiness. As I reflect on this point in my work, I see clearly the various subjects that have drawn my attention along the way, and I feel both anxious and hopeful. I see serious dangers we can avoid and significant evils that can be prevented or alleviated; and I firmly believe that for democratic nations to be virtuous and successful, they just need to want it. I know many of my contemporaries argue that nations aren’t truly in control of their own destiny, but are at the mercy of some overwhelming and blind force, stemming from past events, their race, or the land and climate of their country. Those views are false and cowardly; they can only lead to weak individuals and timid nations. Providence has not made humanity completely independent or entirely free. It’s true that each person has a fatal limit beyond which they cannot go; but within that limit, they are powerful and free: the same applies to communities. The nations of our time cannot stop social equality from happening; but it’s up to them to decide whether this principle of equality leads them to servitude or freedom, to knowledge or ignorance, to prosperity or misery.










APPENDIX TO PARTS I. AND II.





Part I.





Appendix A

For information concerning all the countries of the West which have not been visited by Europeans, consult the account of two expeditions undertaken at the expense of Congress by Major Long. This traveller particularly mentions, on the subject of the great American desert, that a line may be drawn nearly parallel to the 20th degree of longitude *a (meridian of Washington), beginning from the Red River and ending at the River Platte. From this imaginary line to the Rocky Mountains, which bound the valley of the Mississippi on the west, lie immense plains, which are almost entirely covered with sand, incapable of cultivation, or scattered over with masses of granite. In summer, these plains are quite destitute of water, and nothing is to be seen on them but herds of buffaloes and wild horses. Some hordes of Indians are also found there, but in no great numbers. Major Long was told that in travelling northwards from the River Platte you find the same desert lying constantly on the left; but he was unable to ascertain the truth of this report. However worthy of confidence may be the narrative of Major Long, it must be remembered that he only passed through the country of which he speaks, without deviating widely from the line which he had traced out for his journey.

For information about all the Western countries that haven't been visited by Europeans, check out the accounts of two expeditions funded by Congress, led by Major Long. This traveler specifically notes that regarding the vast American desert, you can draw a line almost parallel to the 20th degree of longitude (Washington meridian), starting at the Red River and ending at the River Platte. From this imaginary line to the Rocky Mountains, which mark the western edge of the Mississippi Valley, there are huge plains mostly covered in sand, unsuitable for farming, or dotted with large chunks of granite. In summer, these plains lack water, and all you see are herds of buffalo and wild horses. Some groups of Indians live there, but not in large numbers. Major Long was informed that if you travel north from the River Platte, the same desert is always on your left, but he couldn't confirm this information himself. No matter how reliable Major Long’s account may seem, keep in mind that he only traversed the area he describes, sticking closely to the path he planned for his journey.

a
[ The 20th degree of longitude, according to the meridian of Washington, agrees very nearly with the 97th degree on the meridian of Greenwich.]

a
[ The 20th degree of longitude, based on the Washington meridian, is almost the same as the 97th degree on the Greenwich meridian.]





Appendix B

South America, in the region between the tropics, produces an incredible profusion of climbing plants, of which the flora of the Antilles alone presents us with forty different species. Among the most graceful of these shrubs is the passion-flower, which, according to Descourtiz, grows with such luxuriance in the Antilles, as to climb trees by means of the tendrils with which it is provided, and form moving bowers of rich and elegant festoons, decorated with blue and purple flowers, and fragrant with perfume. The Mimosa scandens (Acacia a grandes gousses) is a creeper of enormous and rapid growth, which climbs from tree to tree, and sometimes covers more than half a league.

South America, located in the region between the tropics, produces an amazing variety of climbing plants, with the flora of the Antilles alone offering forty different species. One of the most graceful of these shrubs is the passion flower, which, according to Descourtiz, grows so abundantly in the Antilles that it climbs trees using its tendrils, creating beautiful, moving arbors filled with lush and elegant hangings, adorned with blue and purple flowers and exuding fragrance. The Mimosa scandens (Acacia a grandes gousses) is a fast-growing creeper that climbs from tree to tree and can sometimes cover more than half a league.





Appendix C

The languages which are spoken by the Indians of America, from the Pole to Cape Horn, are said to be all formed upon the same model, and subject to the same grammatical rules; whence it may fairly be concluded that all the Indian nations sprang from the same stock. Each tribe of the American continent speaks a different dialect; but the number of languages, properly so called, is very small, a fact which tends to prove that the nations of the New World had not a very remote origin. Moreover, the languages of America have a great degree of regularity, from which it seems probable that the tribes which employ them had not undergone any great revolutions, or been incorporated voluntarily or by constraint, with foreign nations. For it is generally the union of several languages into one which produces grammatical irregularities. It is not long since the American languages, especially those of the North, first attracted the serious attention of philologists, when the discovery was made that this idiom of a barbarous people was the product of a complicated system of ideas and very learned combinations. These languages were found to be very rich, and great pains had been taken at their formation to render them agreeable to the ear. The grammatical system of the Americans differs from all others in several points, but especially in the following:—Some nations of Europe, amongst others the Germans, have the power of combining at pleasure different expressions, and thus giving a complex sense to certain words. The Indians have given a most surprising extension to this power, so as to arrive at the means of connecting a great number of ideas with a single term. This will be easily understood with the help of an example quoted by Mr. Duponceau, in the "Memoirs of the Philosophical Society of America": A Delaware woman playing with a cat or a young dog, says this writer, is heard to pronounce the word kuligatschis, which is thus composed: k is the sign of the second person, and signifies "thou" or "thy"; uli is a part of the word wulit, which signifies "beautiful," "pretty"; gat is another fragment, of the word wichgat, which means "paw"; and, lastly, schis is a diminutive giving the idea of smallness. Thus in one word the Indian woman has expressed "Thy pretty little paw." Take another example of the felicity with which the savages of America have composed their words. A young man of Delaware is called pilape. This word is formed from pilsit, "chaste," "innocent"; and lenape, "man"; viz., "man in his purity and innocence." This facility of combining words is most remarkable in the strange formation of their verbs. The most complex action is often expressed by a single verb, which serves to convey all the shades of an idea by the modification of its construction. Those who may wish to examine more in detail this subject, which I have only glanced at superficially, should read:—

The languages spoken by the Native Americans, from the Arctic to Cape Horn, are thought to all be based on the same structure and follow the same grammatical rules. This suggests that all Native nations come from the same origin. Each tribe across the Americas has its own dialect, but the actual number of languages is quite small, indicating that the nations of the New World don't have a very ancient origin. Additionally, the languages in America show a level of consistency that suggests the tribes using them haven't gone through significant upheavals or merged with other nations willingly or under pressure. Typically, it's the blending of several languages into one that creates grammatical inconsistencies. It was only recently that the languages of America, particularly those of the North, gained serious attention from linguists, revealing that the language of this so-called uncivilized people was the result of a complex system of ideas and highly refined constructions. These languages have proven to be quite rich, and considerable effort has gone into making them pleasing to the ear. The grammatical system of the Native Americans differs from others in several ways, especially in one key aspect: Some European nations, including the Germans, have the ability to combine different expressions to create a complex meaning. Native Americans have taken this ability to a surprising level, allowing them to link many ideas into a single term. This can be easily illustrated with an example mentioned by Mr. Duponceau in the "Memoirs of the Philosophical Society of America": A Delaware woman playing with a cat or a puppy is noted to say kuligatschis, which is made up of: k, indicating the second person and meaning "you" or "your"; uli, part of the word wulit, meaning "beautiful," "pretty"; gat, a fragment of wichgat, meaning "paw"; and schis, a diminutive suggesting smallness. So, in one word, the Native woman conveys "Your pretty little paw." Another example demonstrates the skill with which Native Americans create their words: A young man from Delaware is referred to as pilape. This word combines pilsit, meaning "chaste," "innocent," and lenape, meaning "man," which translates to "a man in his purity and innocence." This ability to combine words is especially striking in how they form their verbs. Often, the most complex actions are captured by a single verb that conveys all nuances of an idea through changes in its structure. Those who wish to delve deeper into this topic, which I've only skimmed over, should read:—

1. The correspondence of Mr. Duponceau and the Rev. Mr. Hecwelder relative to the Indian languages, which is to be found in the first volume of the "Memoirs of the Philosophical Society of America," published at Philadelphia, 1819, by Abraham Small; vol. i. p. 356-464.

1. The letters between Mr. Duponceau and Rev. Mr. Hecwelder about the Native American languages can be found in the first volume of the "Memoirs of the Philosophical Society of America," published in Philadelphia in 1819 by Abraham Small; vol. i. p. 356-464.

2. The "Grammar of the Delaware or the Lenape Language," by Geiberger, and the preface of Mr. Duponceau. All these are in the same collection, vol. iii.

2. The "Grammar of the Delaware or the Lenape Language," by Geiberger, and the preface by Mr. Duponceau. All of these are in the same collection, vol. iii.

3. An excellent account of these works, which is at the end of the sixth volume of the American Encyclopaedia.

3. A great overview of these works can be found at the end of the sixth volume of the American Encyclopedia.





Appendix D

See in Charlevoix, vol. i. p. 235, the history of the first war which the French inhabitants of Canada carried on, in 1610, against the Iroquois. The latter, armed with bows and arrows, offered a desperate resistance to the French and their allies. Charlevoix is not a great painter, yet he exhibits clearly enough, in this narrative, the contrast between the European manners and those of savages, as well as the different way in which the two races of men understood the sense of honor. When the French, says he, seized upon the beaver-skins which covered the Indians who had fallen, the Hurons, their allies, were greatly offended at this proceeding; but without hesitation they set to work in their usual manner, inflicting horrid cruelties upon the prisoners, and devouring one of those who had been killed, which made the Frenchmen shudder. The barbarians prided themselves upon a scrupulousness which they were surprised at not finding in our nation, and could not understand that there was less to reprehend in the stripping of dead bodies than in the devouring of their flesh like wild beasts. Charlevoix, in another place (vol. i. p. 230), thus describes the first torture of which Champlain was an eyewitness, and the return of the Hurons into their own village. Having proceeded about eight leagues, says he, our allies halted; and having singled out one of their captives, they reproached him with all the cruelties which he had practised upon the warriors of their nation who had fallen into his hands, and told him that he might expect to be treated in like manner; adding, that if he had any spirit he would prove it by singing. He immediately chanted forth his death-song, and then his war-song, and all the songs he knew, "but in a very mournful strain," says Champlain, who was not then aware that all savage music has a melancholy character. The tortures which succeeded, accompanied by all the horrors which we shall mention hereafter, terrified the French, who made every effort to put a stop to them, but in vain. The following night, one of the Hurons having dreamt that they were pursued, the retreat was changed to a real flight, and the savages never stopped until they were out of the reach of danger. The moment they perceived the cabins of their own village, they cut themselves long sticks, to which they fastened the scalps which had fallen to their share, and carried them in triumph. At this sight, the women swam to the canoes, where they received the bloody scalps from the hands of their husbands, and tied them round their necks. The warriors offered one of these horrible trophies to Champlain; they also presented him with some bows and arrows—the only spoils of the Iroquois which they had ventured to seize—entreating him to show them to the King of France. Champlain lived a whole winter quite alone among these barbarians, without being under any alarm for his person or property.

See in Charlevoix, vol. i. p. 235, the story of the first war that the French settlers of Canada fought in 1610 against the Iroquois. The Iroquois, armed with bows and arrows, put up fierce resistance against the French and their allies. Charlevoix isn't a great writer, but he clearly shows the difference between European customs and those of indigenous people, as well as how differently the two groups understood honor. When the French, he says, took the beaver skins from the bodies of the fallen Indians, the Hurons, their allies, were very offended by this action; however, without hesitation, they began to do what they usually did, inflicting horrific brutality on the prisoners and even eating one of the dead, which horrified the French. The indigenous people prided themselves on their moral standards, which they were surprised to find lacking in our society, and they couldn't grasp that stripping dead bodies was less reprehensible than consuming their flesh like wild animals. Charlevoix, in another part (vol. i. p. 230), describes the first torture that Champlain witnessed and the Hurons' return to their village. After traveling about eight leagues, he says, our allies stopped; they singled out one of their captives and confronted him about the brutal acts he had committed against their warriors who had fallen into his hands, informing him that he could expect to be treated the same way; they added that if he had any spirit, he would prove it by singing. He immediately began to sing his death song, then his war song, and all the songs he knew, “but in a very mournful tone,” as Champlain noted, who hadn't realized that all indigenous music has a sad quality. The tortures that followed, along with all the horrors we will mention later, terrified the French, who tried desperately to stop them, but to no avail. The next night, after one of the Hurons dreamed that they were being pursued, the retreat turned into a full-blown flight, and the indigenous people didn't stop until they were out of danger. As soon as they saw the cabins of their village, they cut long sticks, to which they tied the scalps they had collected, and carried them in triumph. At this sight, the women swam to the canoes, where they received the bloody scalps from their husbands and tied them around their necks. The warriors offered one of these gruesome trophies to Champlain; they also gave him some bows and arrows—the only spoils of the Iroquois they had dared to take—asking him to show them to the King of France. Champlain spent an entire winter living alone among these people without any fear for his safety or possessions.





Appendix E

Although the Puritanical strictness which presided over the establishment of the English colonies in America is now much relaxed, remarkable traces of it are still found in their habits and their laws. In 1792, at the very time when the anti-Christian republic of France began its ephemeral existence, the legislative body of Massachusetts promulgated the following law, to compel the citizens to observe the Sabbath. We give the preamble and the principal articles of this law, which is worthy of the reader's attention: "Whereas," says the legislator, "the observation of the Sunday is an affair of public interest; inasmuch as it produces a necessary suspension of labor, leads men to reflect upon the duties of life, and the errors to which human nature is liable, and provides for the public and private worship of God, the creator and governor of the universe, and for the performance of such acts of charity as are the ornament and comfort of Christian societies:—Whereas irreligious or light-minded persons, forgetting the duties which the Sabbath imposes, and the benefits which these duties confer on society, are known to profane its sanctity, by following their pleasures or their affairs; this way of acting being contrary to their own interest as Christians, and calculated to annoy those who do not follow their example; being also of great injury to society at large, by spreading a taste for dissipation and dissolute manners; Be it enacted and ordained by the Governor, Council, and Representatives convened in General Court of Assembly, that all and every person and persons shall on that day carefully apply themselves to the duties of religion and piety, that no tradesman or labourer shall exercise his ordinary calling, and that no game or recreation shall be used on the Lord's Day, upon pain of forfeiting ten shillings.

Although the strict Puritan values that shaped the establishment of the English colonies in America have relaxed significantly, clear remnants of them can still be found in their customs and laws. In 1792, when the anti-Christian republic of France was just beginning its short-lived existence, the legislative body of Massachusetts enacted a law requiring citizens to observe the Sabbath. We present the preamble and key articles of this law, which deserves the reader's attention: "Whereas," states the legislator, "observing Sunday is a matter of public interest; since it necessitates a break from work, encourages people to think about their responsibilities in life and the mistakes inherent to human nature, and allows for public and private worship of God, the creator and ruler of the universe, as well as acts of charity that enhance and comfort Christian communities:—Whereas irreligious or carefree individuals, neglecting the responsibilities imposed by the Sabbath and the benefits these responsibilities bring to society, are known to disrespect its sanctity by indulging in their pleasures or businesses; this behavior is contrary to their own interests as Christians and tends to irritate those who do not follow their example; furthermore, it significantly harms society by promoting a taste for indulgence and immoral behavior; Be it enacted and ordained by the Governor, Council, and Representatives gathered in General Court of Assembly, that everyone shall on that day diligently engage in religious and pious duties, that no tradesman or laborer shall pursue their usual work, and that no games or recreational activities shall take place on the Lord's Day, under penalty of a ten shilling fine."

"That no one shall travel on that day, or any part thereof, under pain of forfeiting twenty shillings; that no vessel shall leave a harbour of the colony; that no persons shall keep outside the meeting-house during the time of public worship, or profane the time by playing or talking, on penalty of five shillings.

"That no one is allowed to travel on that day, or any part of it, under threat of losing twenty shillings; that no ship can leave a harbor of the colony; that no one can stay outside the meeting house during public worship, or disrespect the time by playing or talking, on penalty of five shillings."

"Public-houses shall not entertain any other than strangers or lodgers, under penalty of five shillings for every person found drinking and abiding therein.

"Public houses must only serve strangers or guests, with a fine of five shillings for every person found drinking and staying there."

"Any person in health, who, without sufficient reason, shall omit to worship God in public during three months, shall be condemned to a fine of ten shillings.

"Any healthy person who fails to worship God publicly for three months without a valid reason will be fined ten shillings."

"Any person guilty of misbehaviour in a place of public worship, shall be fined from five to forty shillings.

"Anyone found misbehaving in a public place of worship will be fined between five and forty shillings."

"These laws are to be enforced by the tything-men of each township, who have authority to visit public-houses on the Sunday. The innkeeper who shall refuse them admittance, shall be fined forty shillings for such offence.

"These laws are to be enforced by the tything-men of each township, who have the authority to visit public houses on Sundays. Any innkeeper who refuses them entry will be fined forty shillings for this offense."

"The tything-men are to stop travellers, and require of them their reason for being on the road on Sunday; anyone refusing to answer, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding five pounds sterling. If the reason given by the traveller be not deemed by the tything-man sufficient, he may bring the traveller before the justice of the peace of the district." (Law of March 8, 1792; General Laws of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 410.)

"The tything-men are to stop travelers and ask them why they are on the road on Sunday; anyone who refuses to answer will be fined up to five pounds sterling. If the reason provided by the traveler is not considered sufficient by the tything-man, he may bring the traveler before the justice of the peace for the district." (Law of March 8, 1792; General Laws of Massachusetts, vol. i. p. 410.)

On March 11, 1797, a new law increased the amount of fines, half of which was to be given to the informer. (Same collection, vol. ii. p. 525.) On February 16, 1816, a new law confirmed these same measures. (Same collection, vol. ii. p. 405.) Similar enactments exist in the laws of the State of New York, revised in 1827 and 1828. (See Revised Statutes, Part I. chapter 20, p. 675.) In these it is declared that no one is allowed on the Sabbath to sport, to fish, to play at games, or to frequent houses where liquor is sold. No one can travel, except in case of necessity. And this is not the only trace which the religious strictness and austere manners of the first emigrants have left behind them in the American laws. In the Revised Statutes of the State of New York, vol. i. p. 662, is the following clause:—

On March 11, 1797, a new law raised the fines, with half the amount going to the informer. (Same collection, vol. ii. p. 525.) On February 16, 1816, a new law upheld these measures. (Same collection, vol. ii. p. 405.) Similar laws can be found in the laws of the State of New York, revised in 1827 and 1828. (See Revised Statutes, Part I. chapter 20, p. 675.) These laws state that no one is allowed to engage in sports, fish, play games, or visit places where alcohol is sold on the Sabbath. No one can travel unless it's necessary. This isn't the only evidence of the religious strictness and severe behaviors of the first settlers that have influenced American laws. In the Revised Statutes of the State of New York, vol. i. p. 662, is the following clause:—

"Whoever shall win or lose in the space of twenty-four hours, by gaming or betting, the sum of twenty-five dollars, shall be found guilty of a misdemeanour, and upon conviction shall be condemned to pay a fine equal to at least five times the value of the sum lost or won; which shall be paid to the inspector of the poor of the township. He that loses twenty-five dollars or more may bring an action to recover them; and if he neglects to do so the inspector of the poor may prosecute the winner, and oblige him to pay into the poor's box both the sum he has gained and three times as much besides."

"Whoever wins or loses twenty-five dollars in gaming or betting within twenty-four hours will be found guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon conviction, they will be fined at least five times the amount lost or won, and this fine will go to the township's poor inspector. If someone loses twenty-five dollars or more, they can take legal action to recover their money; if they don't, the poor inspector can go after the winner and make them pay both the winnings and an additional three times that amount into the poor's fund."

The laws we quote from are of recent date; but they are unintelligible without going back to the very origin of the colonies. I have no doubt that in our days the penal part of these laws is very rarely applied. Laws preserve their inflexibility, long after the manners of a nation have yielded to the influence of time. It is still true, however, that nothing strikes a foreigner on his arrival in America more forcibly than the regard paid to the Sabbath. There is one, in particular, of the large American cities, in which all social movements begin to be suspended even on Saturday evening. You traverse its streets at the hour at which you expect men in the middle of life to be engaged in business, and young people in pleasure; and you meet with solitude and silence. Not only have all ceased to work, but they appear to have ceased to exist. Neither the movements of industry are heard, nor the accents of joy, nor even the confused murmur which arises from the midst of a great city. Chains are hung across the streets in the neighborhood of the churches; the half-closed shutters of the houses scarcely admit a ray of sun into the dwellings of the citizens. Now and then you perceive a solitary individual who glides silently along the deserted streets and lanes. Next day, at early dawn, the rolling of carriages, the noise of hammers, the cries of the population, begin to make themselves heard again. The city is awake. An eager crowd hastens towards the resort of commerce and industry; everything around you bespeaks motion, bustle, hurry. A feverish activity succeeds to the lethargic stupor of yesterday; you might almost suppose that they had but one day to acquire wealth and to enjoy it.

The laws we refer to are fairly recent, but they don't make sense without looking back at the very beginnings of the colonies. I’m sure that these days, the punishment aspects of these laws are rarely enforced. Laws remain rigid long after the customs of a nation have changed over time. However, it’s still striking how much attention is given to the Sabbath when a foreigner arrives in America. In one large American city, all social activities start to come to a halt even by Saturday evening. You walk its streets at a time when you’d expect adults to be busy with work and young people out having fun, yet you find only emptiness and quiet. Not only has everyone stopped working, but they also seem to have vanished. You can't hear any industrial activity, joyful sounds, or even the typical buzz of a bustling city. Chains are hung across the streets near churches, and the half-closed blinds of homes barely let in any sunlight. Occasionally, you might spot a lone person quietly moving through the empty streets and alleys. The next morning, at daybreak, the sound of carriages, the clanging of hammers, and the voices of people fill the air again. The city comes to life. A frenzied crowd rushes towards areas of business and industry; everything around you speaks of movement, activity, and urgency. A frantic energy replaces the sluggishness of the previous day; it feels like they have only one day to make money and enjoy it.





Appendix F

It is unnecessary for me to say, that in the chapter which has just been read, I have not had the intention of giving a history of America. My only object was to enable the reader to appreciate the influence which the opinions and manners of the first emigrants had exercised upon the fate of the different colonies, and of the Union in general. I have therefore confined myself to the quotation of a few detached fragments. I do not know whether I am deceived, but it appears to me that, by pursuing the path which I have merely pointed out, it would be easy to present such pictures of the American republics as would not be unworthy the attention of the public, and could not fail to suggest to the statesman matter for reflection. Not being able to devote myself to this labor, I am anxious to render it easy to others; and, for this purpose, I subjoin a short catalogue and analysis of the works which seem to me the most important to consult.

I don’t need to say that in the chapter you just read, I didn't intend to provide a full history of America. My main goal was to help the reader understand how the views and behaviors of the early settlers influenced the fate of the various colonies and the Union as a whole. So, I’ve only included a few selected excerpts. I’m not sure if I’m mistaken, but it seems to me that by following the direction I've hinted at, it would be easy to create descriptions of the American republics that would capture public interest and offer valuable insights for policymakers. Since I can't devote myself to this task, I'm eager to make it easier for others; therefore, I’m including a brief list and overview of the works that I believe are most important to refer to.

At the head of the general documents which it would be advantageous to examine I place the work entitled "An Historical Collection of State Papers, and other authentic Documents, intended as Materials for a History of the United States of America," by Ebenezer Hasard. The first volume of this compilation, which was printed at Philadelphia in 1792, contains a literal copy of all the charters granted by the Crown of England to the emigrants, as well as the principal acts of the colonial governments, during the commencement of their existence. Amongst other authentic documents, we here find a great many relating to the affairs of New England and Virginia during this period. The second volume is almost entirely devoted to the acts of the Confederation of 1643. This federal compact, which was entered into by the colonies of New England with the view of resisting the Indians, was the first instance of union afforded by the Anglo-Americans. There were besides many other confederations of the same nature, before the famous one of 1776, which brought about the independence of the colonies.

At the top of the general documents that would be useful to check out, I highlight the work titled "An Historical Collection of State Papers, and other Authentic Documents, Intended as Materials for a History of the United States of America," by Ebenezer Hasard. The first volume of this collection, printed in Philadelphia in 1792, includes a complete copy of all the charters granted by the Crown of England to the settlers, as well as the main acts of the colonial governments during the early days of their existence. Among other authentic documents, we also find a significant number related to the affairs of New England and Virginia during this time. The second volume is almost entirely focused on the acts of the Confederation of 1643. This federal agreement, made by the New England colonies to resist the Indians, was the first instance of unity demonstrated by the Anglo-Americans. Additionally, there were many other confederations of a similar nature before the famous one of 1776, which led to the independence of the colonies.

Each colony has, besides, its own historic monuments, some of which are extremely curious; beginning with Virginia, the State which was first peopled. The earliest historian of Virginia was its founder, Captain John Smith. Captain Smith has left us an octavo volume, entitled "The generall Historie of Virginia and New England, by Captain John Smith, sometymes Governor in those Countryes, and Admirall of New England"; printed at London in 1627. The work is adorned with curious maps and engravings of the time when it appeared; the narrative extends from the year 1584 to 1626. Smith's work is highly and deservedly esteemed. The author was one of the most celebrated adventurers of a period of remarkable adventure; his book breathes that ardor for discovery, that spirit of enterprise, which characterized the men of his time, when the manners of chivalry were united to zeal for commerce, and made subservient to the acquisition of wealth. But Captain Smith is most remarkable for uniting to the virtues which characterized his contemporaries several qualities to which they were generally strangers; his style is simple and concise, his narratives bear the stamp of truth, and his descriptions are free from false ornament. This author throws most valuable light upon the state and condition of the Indians at the time when North America was first discovered.

Each colony also has its own historic landmarks, some of which are quite fascinating, starting with Virginia, the first state to be settled. The earliest historian of Virginia was its founder, Captain John Smith. He left behind an octavo volume titled "The generall Historie of Virginia and New England, by Captain John Smith, sometymes Governor in those Countryes, and Admirall of New England," which was printed in London in 1627. The book includes interesting maps and engravings from that time; the narrative covers the years from 1584 to 1626. Smith's work is highly regarded and well-deservedly so. He was one of the most famous adventurers during a time of incredible exploration; his book shows the enthusiasm for discovery and the adventurous spirit that defined the men of his era, when chivalry blended with a passion for commerce and the pursuit of wealth. However, Captain Smith is particularly noteworthy for combining the virtues typical of his peers with several qualities that were generally uncommon among them; his writing is straightforward and to the point, his stories are authentic, and his descriptions lack unnecessary embellishment. This author provides invaluable insight into the state and condition of the Native Americans at the time North America was first discovered.

The second historian to consult is Beverley, who commences his narrative with the year 1585, and ends it with 1700. The first part of his book contains historical documents, properly so called, relative to the infancy of the colony. The second affords a most curious picture of the state of the Indians at this remote period. The third conveys very clear ideas concerning the manners, social conditions, laws, and political customs of the Virginians in the author's lifetime. Beverley was a native of Virginia, which occasions him to say at the beginning of his book, that he entreats his readers not to exercise their critical severity upon it, since, having been born in the Indies, he does not aspire to purity of language. Notwithstanding this colonial modesty, the author shows throughout his book the impatience with which he endures the supremacy of the mother-country. In this work of Beverley are also found numerous traces of that spirit of civil liberty which animated the English colonies of America at the time when he wrote. He also shows the dissensions which existed among them, and retarded their independence. Beverley detests his Catholic neighbors of Maryland even more than he hates the English government: his style is simple, his narrative interesting, and apparently trustworthy.

The second historian to consult is Beverley, who starts his narrative in 1585 and wraps it up by 1700. The first part of his book includes historical documents that are directly related to the early days of the colony. The second part provides a fascinating look at the condition of the Native Americans during this distant period. The third part gives a clear understanding of the customs, social conditions, laws, and political practices of the Virginians during the author’s lifetime. Beverley was a Virginia native, which leads him to ask his readers at the start of his book not to be overly critical, stating that since he was born in the Indies, he doesn’t aim for linguistic perfection. Despite this humble attitude, the author reveals his frustration with the dominance of the mother country throughout his work. Beverley’s writing also reflects the spirit of civil liberty that inspired the English colonies in America at the time he wrote. He points out the conflicts among the colonies that hindered their quest for independence. Beverley expresses more disdain for his Catholic neighbors in Maryland than for the English government itself; his writing style is straightforward, his narrative engaging, and it appears to be reliable.

I saw in America another work which ought to be consulted, entitled "The History of Virginia," by William Stith. This book affords some curious details, but I thought it long and diffuse. The most ancient as well as the best document to be consulted on the history of Carolina, is a work in small quarto, entitled "The History of Carolina," by John Lawson, printed at London in 1718. This work contains, in the first part, a journey of discovery in the west of Carolina; the account of which, given in the form of a journal, is in general confused and superficial; but it contains a very striking description of the mortality caused among the savages of that time both by the smallpox and the immoderate use of brandy; with a curious picture of the corruption of manners prevalent amongst them, which was increased by the presence of Europeans. The second part of Lawson's book is taken up with a description of the physical condition of Carolina, and its productions. In the third part, the author gives an interesting account of the manners, customs, and government of the Indians at that period. There is a good deal of talent and originality in this part of the work. Lawson concludes his history with a copy of the charter granted to the Carolinas in the reign of Charles II. The general tone of this work is light, and often licentious, forming a perfect contrast to the solemn style of the works published at the same period in New England. Lawson's history is extremely scarce in America, and cannot be procured in Europe. There is, however, a copy of it in the Royal Library at Paris.

I came across another important work in America titled "The History of Virginia" by William Stith. This book has some interesting details, but I found it quite long and wordy. The oldest and most valuable document for understanding the history of Carolina is a small quarto titled "The History of Carolina" by John Lawson, published in London in 1718. The first part of this work details a journey of exploration in western Carolina, but the account is generally confusing and superficial. However, it includes a striking description of the mortality among Native Americans at that time, caused by smallpox and excessive drinking of brandy, along with an intriguing depiction of the moral decay that was spreading among them, which was worsened by European interaction. The second part of Lawson's book focuses on Carolina's geography and its natural resources. In the third part, the author provides an engaging overview of the customs, traditions, and governance of the Native Americans during that era. This section shows a lot of skill and originality. Lawson wraps up his history with a copy of the charter granted to the Carolinas under Charles II. The overall tone of this work is light and often risqué, offering a stark contrast to the serious style of other works published in New England at the same time. Lawson's history is extremely rare in America and unavailable in Europe, but there is a copy in the Royal Library in Paris.

From the southern extremity of the United States, I pass at once to the northern limit; as the intermediate space was not peopled till a later period. I must first point out a very curious compilation, entitled "Collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society," printed for the first time at Boston in 1792, and reprinted in 1806. The collection of which I speak, and which is continued to the present day, contains a great number of very valuable documents relating to the history of the different States in New England. Among them are letters which have never been published, and authentic pieces which had been buried in provincial archives. The whole work of Gookin, concerning the Indians, is inserted there.

From the southern edge of the United States, I move immediately to the northern limit, as the area in between wasn’t settled until later. First, I want to highlight a fascinating collection called "Collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society," which was first printed in Boston in 1792 and reprinted in 1806. This collection, which still continues today, includes many valuable documents related to the history of various New England states. Among them are letters that have never been published and authentic documents that were hidden away in provincial archives. The entire work of Gookin regarding the Indians is included there.

I have mentioned several times in the chapter to which this note relates, the work of Nathaniel Norton entitled "New England's Memorial"; sufficiently, perhaps, to prove that it deserves the attention of those who would be conversant with the history of New England. This book is in octavo, and was reprinted at Boston in 1826.

I have mentioned several times in the chapter related to this note the work of Nathaniel Norton called "New England's Memorial"; enough, perhaps, to show that it deserves the attention of anyone interested in New England's history. This book is in octavo format and was reprinted in Boston in 1826.

The most valuable and important authority which exists upon the history of New England, is the work of the Rev. Cotton Mather, entitled "Magnalia Christi Americana, or the Ecclesiastical History of New England, 1620-1698, 2 vols. 8vo, reprinted at Hartford, United States, in 1820." *b The author divided his work into seven books. The first presents the history of the events which prepared and brought about the establishment of New England. The second contains the lives of the first governors and chief magistrates who presided over the country. The third is devoted to the lives and labors of the evangelical ministers who, during the same period, had the care of souls. In the fourth the author relates the institution and progress of the University of Cambridge (Massachusetts). In the fifth he describes the principles and the discipline of the Church of New England. The sixth is taken up in retracing certain facts, which, in the opinion of Mather, prove the merciful interposition of Providence in behalf of the inhabitants of New England. Lastly, in the seventh, the author gives an account of the heresies and the troubles to which the Church of New England was exposed. Cotton Mather was an evangelical minister who was born at Boston, and passed his life there. His narratives are distinguished by the same ardor and religious zeal which led to the foundation of the colonies of New England. Traces of bad taste sometimes occur in his manner of writing; but he interests, because he is full of enthusiasm. He is often intolerant, still oftener credulous, but he never betrays an intention to deceive. Sometimes his book contains fine passages, and true and profound reflections, such as the following:—

The most valuable and significant authority on the history of New England is the work of Rev. Cotton Mather, titled "Magnalia Christi Americana, or the Ecclesiastical History of New England, 1620-1698, 2 vols. 8vo, reprinted in Hartford, United States, in 1820." *b The author split his work into seven books. The first book discusses the events that led to the establishment of New England. The second covers the lives of the first governors and leaders who presided over the region. The third focuses on the lives and efforts of the evangelical ministers who cared for the souls during this time. In the fourth book, the author details the founding and development of Harvard University. The fifth outlines the principles and practices of the Church of New England. The sixth revisits certain facts that, in Mather's view, show the merciful intervention of Providence on behalf of the people of New England. Finally, in the seventh, the author recounts the heresies and challenges that the Church of New England faced. Cotton Mather was an evangelical minister born in Boston, where he lived his entire life. His narratives are marked by the same passion and religious zeal that contributed to the founding of the New England colonies. While his writing sometimes shows signs of poor taste, he engages readers due to his enthusiasm. He can be intolerant and often gullible, but he never intends to deceive. At times, his book features eloquent passages and insightful reflections, such as the following:—

"Before the arrival of the Puritans," says he (vol. i. chap. iv.), "there were more than a few attempts of the English to people and improve the parts of New England which were to the northward of New Plymouth; but the designs of those attempts being aimed no higher than the advancement of some worldly interests, a constant series of disasters has confounded them, until there was a plantation erected upon the nobler designs of Christianity: and that plantation though it has had more adversaries than perhaps any one upon earth, yet, having obtained help from God, it continues to this day." Mather occasionally relieves the austerity of his descriptions with images full of tender feeling: after having spoken of an English lady whose religious ardor had brought her to America with her husband, and who soon after sank under the fatigues and privations of exile, he adds, "As for her virtuous husband, Isaac Johnson,

"Before the Puritans arrived," he says (vol. i. chap. iv.), "there were several attempts by the English to settle and improve areas of New England north of New Plymouth. However, these attempts were mainly focused on personal gain, leading to a continuous series of disasters that hindered their progress, until a settlement was established with the loftier goals of Christianity. That settlement, despite facing more opposition than perhaps any other on Earth, has continued to this day with help from God." Mather sometimes lightens the seriousness of his accounts with images that convey deep emotion: after mentioning an English woman whose strong faith had brought her to America with her husband, and who soon succumbed to the hardships of exile, he adds, "As for her virtuous husband, Isaac Johnson,

     He tryed
     To live without her, liked it not, and dyed."
     He tried
     To live without her, didn’t like it, and died."

b
[ A folio edition of this work was published in London in 1702.]

b
[ A folio edition of this work was published in London in 1702.]

Mather's work gives an admirable picture of the time and country which he describes. In his account of the motives which led the Puritans to seek an asylum beyond seas, he says:—"The God of Heaven served, as it were, a summons upon the spirits of his people in the English nation, stirring up the spirits of thousands which never saw the faces of each other, with a most unanimous inclination to leave all the pleasant accommodations of their native country, and go over a terrible ocean, into a more terrible desert, for the pure enjoyment of all his ordinances. It is now reasonable that, before we pass any further, the reasons of his undertaking should be more exactly made known unto posterity, especially unto the posterity of those that were the undertakers, lest they come at length to forget and neglect the true interest of New England. Wherefore I shall now transcribe some of them from a manuscript, wherein they were then tendered unto consideration:

Mather's work provides an insightful look at the time and place he describes. In his account of the reasons that drove the Puritans to seek refuge overseas, he says:—"The God of Heaven seemed to call upon the spirits of His people in England, stirring up the hearts of thousands who had never met each other, with a strong desire to leave all the comforts of their homeland and cross a treacherous ocean into an even more daunting wilderness, all for the pure enjoyment of His ordinances. It’s important that, before we go any further, we clearly outline the reasons for this endeavor for future generations, especially for the descendants of those who undertook it, so they do not eventually forget and overlook the true interests of New England. Therefore, I will now copy some of them from a manuscript where they were originally presented for consideration:

"General Considerations for the Plantation of New England

"General Considerations for the Plantation of New England

"First, It will be a service unto the Church of great consequence, to carry the Gospel unto those parts of the world, and raise a bulwark against the kingdom of Antichrist, which the Jesuits labour to rear up in all parts of the world.

"First, it will be a significant service to the Church to spread the Gospel to those parts of the world and build a defense against the kingdom of Antichrist, which the Jesuits are trying to establish everywhere."

"Secondly, All other Churches of Europe have been brought under desolations; and it may be feared that the like judgments are coming upon us; and who knows but God hath provided this place to be a refuge for many whom he means to save out of the general destruction?

"Secondly, all other churches in Europe have faced ruin, and we might fear that similar judgments are on the way for us. Who knows, maybe God has chosen this place to be a refuge for many who He intends to save from widespread destruction?"

"Thirdly, The land grows weary of her inhabitants, insomuch that man, which is the most precious of all creatures, is here more vile and base than the earth he treads upon; children, neighbours, and friends, especially the poor, are counted the greatest burdens, which, if things were right, would be the chiefest of earthly blessings.

"Thirdly, the land gets tired of its people, to the point that man, who is the most valuable of all beings, is here more contemptible and lowly than the ground he walks on; children, neighbors, and friends, especially the poor, are seen as the biggest burdens, when, in a just world, they would be regarded as the greatest of earthly blessings."

"Fourthly, We are grown to that intemperance in all excess of riot, as no mean estate almost will suffice a man to keep sail with his equals, and he that fails in it must live in scorn and contempt: hence it comes to pass, that all arts and trades are carried in that deceitful manner and unrighteous course, as it is almost impossible for a good upright man to maintain his constant charge and live comfortably in them.

"Fourthly, we've become so excessive in our indulgence that almost no middle-class lifestyle is enough for a person to keep up with their peers, and anyone who can't manage it has to live in shame and disgrace. As a result, every profession and trade is conducted in such a dishonest and unfair way that it's almost impossible for a decent, honest person to manage their expenses and live comfortably in those fields."

"Fifthly, The schools of learning and religion are so corrupted, as (besides the unsupportable charge of education) most children, even the best, wittiest, and of the fairest hopes, are perverted, corrupted, and utterly overthrown by the multitude of evil examples and licentious behaviours in these seminaries.

"Fifthly, the schools of education and religion are so corrupt that, in addition to the unbearable cost of education, most children—even the best, smartest, and most promising—are twisted, corrupted, and completely ruined by the many bad examples and immoral behavior in these institutions."

"Sixthly, The whole earth is the Lord's garden, and he hath given it to the sons of Adam, to be tilled and improved by them: why, then, should we stand starving here for places of habitation, and in the meantime suffer whole countries, as profitable for the use of man, to lie waste without any improvement?

"Sixthly, the whole earth is the Lord's garden, and he has given it to the sons of Adam to be cultivated and improved by them. So, why should we be left here starving for places to live while entire countries, which could benefit humanity, remain unused and neglected?"

"Seventhly, What can be a better or nobler work, and more worthy of a Christian, than to erect and support a reformed particular Church in its infancy, and unite our forces with such a company of faithful people, as by timely assistance may grow stronger and prosper; but for want of it, may be put to great hazards, if not be wholly ruined?

"Seventhly, what could be a better or more noble task, and more deserving of a Christian, than to establish and support a reformed local church in its early stages, and join our efforts with a group of committed individuals who, through timely help, can become stronger and thrive; but without that support, may face significant risks, if not be completely lost?"

"Eighthly, If any such as are known to be godly, and live in wealth and prosperity here, shall forsake all this to join with this reformed Church, and with it run the hazard of an hard and mean condition, it will be an example of great use, both for the removing of scandal and to give more life unto the faith of God's people in their prayers for the plantation, and also to encourage others to join the more willingly in it."

"Eighthly, if anyone known to be godly and living in wealth and prosperity here chooses to give that up to join this reformed Church and risks facing a difficult and humble situation, it will serve as a powerful example. This will help remove scandal, boost the faith of God's people in their prayers for the community, and encourage others to join more willingly."

Further on, when he declares the principles of the Church of New England with respect to morals, Mather inveighs with violence against the custom of drinking healths at table, which he denounces as a pagan and abominable practice. He proscribes with the same rigor all ornaments for the hair used by the female sex, as well as their custom of having the arms and neck uncovered. In another part of his work he relates several instances of witchcraft which had alarmed New England. It is plain that the visible action of the devil in the affairs of this world appeared to him an incontestable and evident fact.

Further on, when he discusses the principles of the Church of New England regarding morals, Mather strongly criticizes the practice of toasting at the table, which he condemns as a pagan and terrible custom. He equally bans all hair accessories used by women, as well as their habit of leaving their arms and necks bare. In another section of his work, he shares several examples of witchcraft that had caused concern in New England. It’s clear that he viewed the visible influence of the devil in worldly matters as an undeniable and obvious truth.

This work of Cotton Mather displays, in many places, the spirit of civil liberty and political independence which characterized the times in which he lived. Their principles respecting government are discoverable at every page. Thus, for instance, the inhabitants of Massachusetts, in the year 1630, ten years after the foundation of Plymouth, are found to have devoted Pound 400 sterling to the establishment of the University of Cambridge. In passing from the general documents relative to the history of New England to those which describe the several States comprised within its limits, I ought first to notice "The History of the Colony of Massachusetts," by Hutchinson, Lieutenant-Governor of the Massachusetts Province, 2 vols. 8vo. The history of Hutchinson, which I have several times quoted in the chapter to which this note relates, commences in the year 1628, and ends in 1750. Throughout the work there is a striking air of truth and the greatest simplicity of style: it is full of minute details. The best history to consult concerning Connecticut is that of Benjamin Trumbull, entitled "A Complete History of Connecticut, Civil and Ecclesiastical," 1630-1764, 2 vols. 8vo, printed in 1818 at New Haven. This history contains a clear and calm account of all the events which happened in Connecticut during the period given in the title. The author drew from the best sources, and his narrative bears the stamp of truth. All that he says of the early days of Connecticut is extremely curious. See especially the Constitution of 1639, vol. i. ch. vi. p. 100; and also the Penal Laws of Connecticut, vol. i. ch. vii. p. 123.

This work by Cotton Mather reflects the spirit of civil liberty and political independence that defined his era. The principles regarding government can be found throughout the text. For example, in 1630, just ten years after the founding of Plymouth, the people of Massachusetts committed £400 sterling to establish the University of Cambridge. Transitioning from the general history of New England to the specifics of its various states, it's important to mention "The History of the Colony of Massachusetts" by Hutchinson, Lieutenant-Governor of the Massachusetts Province, in 2 volumes. Hutchinson's history, which I’ve cited several times in the chapter related to this note, starts in 1628 and concludes in 1750. The book has a notable sense of truth and an incredibly straightforward style, filled with detailed accounts. The best resource for the history of Connecticut is Benjamin Trumbull's "A Complete History of Connecticut, Civil and Ecclesiastical," covering 1630-1764, in 2 volumes published in 1818 in New Haven. This history provides a clear and composed narration of all events that took place in Connecticut during the specified time period. The author utilized the best sources, and his storytelling reflects authenticity. Everything he mentions about Connecticut's early days is particularly fascinating. Be sure to look at the Constitution of 1639, vol. i. ch. vi. p. 100; and also the Penal Laws of Connecticut, vol. i. ch. vii. p. 123.

"The History of New Hampshire," by Jeremy Belknap, is a work held in merited estimation. It was printed at Boston in 1792, in 2 vols. 8vo. The third chapter of the first volume is particularly worthy of attention for the valuable details it affords on the political and religious principles of the Puritans, on the causes of their emigration, and on their laws. The following curious quotation is given from a sermon delivered in 1663:—"It concerneth New England always to remember that they are a plantation religious, not a plantation of trade. The profession of the purity of doctrine, worship, and discipline, is written upon her forehead. Let merchants, and such as are increasing cent. per cent., remember this, that worldly gain was not the end and design of the people of New England, but religion. And if any man among us make religion as twelve, and the world as thirteen, such an one hath not the spirit of a true New Englishman." The reader of Belknap will find in his work more general ideas, and more strength of thought, than are to be met with in the American historians even to the present day.

"The History of New Hampshire," by Jeremy Belknap, is a well-respected work. It was published in Boston in 1792, in 2 volumes, 8vo. The third chapter of the first volume is particularly noteworthy for the valuable insights it provides about the political and religious principles of the Puritans, the reasons for their emigration, and their laws. The following interesting quote is from a sermon delivered in 1663:—"It concerns New England to always remember that it is a religious settlement, not a trading settlement. The commitment to pure doctrine, worship, and discipline is clearly marked. Let merchants and those who are making profits remember this—that worldly gain was not the goal of the people of New England, but religion. And if anyone among us prioritizes religion as twelve and the world as thirteen, that person does not embody the spirit of a true New Englander." Readers of Belknap will find in his work broader ideas and stronger thoughts than those typically found in American historians even today.

Among the Central States which deserve our attention for their remote origin, New York and Pennsylvania are the foremost. The best history we have of the former is entitled "A History of New York," by William Smith, printed at London in 1757. Smith gives us important details of the wars between the French and English in America. His is the best account of the famous confederation of the Iroquois.

Among the Central States that we should focus on for their distant beginnings, New York and Pennsylvania stand out the most. The best history we have of New York is titled "A History of New York," by William Smith, published in London in 1757. Smith provides significant details about the wars between the French and English in America. His work is the most comprehensive account of the famous confederation of the Iroquois.

With respect to Pennsylvania, I cannot do better than point out the work of Proud, entitled "The History of Pennsylvania, from the original Institution and Settlement of that Province, under the first Proprietor and Governor, William Penn, in 1681, till after the year 1742," by Robert Proud, 2 vols. 8vo, printed at Philadelphia in 1797. This work is deserving of the especial attention of the reader; it contains a mass of curious documents concerning Penn, the doctrine of the Quakers, and the character, manners, and customs of the first inhabitants of Pennsylvania. I need not add that among the most important documents relating to this State are the works of Penn himself, and those of Franklin.

Regarding Pennsylvania, I can't recommend anything better than Proud's work titled "The History of Pennsylvania, from the original Institution and Settlement of that Province, under the first Proprietor and Governor, William Penn, in 1681, till after the year 1742," by Robert Proud, 2 vols. 8vo, printed in Philadelphia in 1797. This book deserves special attention from readers; it includes a wealth of intriguing documents about Penn, the Quaker faith, and the character, customs, and lifestyles of Pennsylvania's early inhabitants. It's also worth noting that among the most significant documents related to this state are the writings of Penn himself and those of Franklin.





Part II.





Appendix G

We read in Jefferson's "Memoirs" as follows:—

"At the time of the first settlement of the English in Virginia, when land was to be had for little or nothing, some provident persons having obtained large grants of it, and being desirous of maintaining the splendor of their families, entailed their property upon their descendants. The transmission of these estates from generation to generation, to men who bore the same name, had the effect of raising up a distinct class of families, who, possessing by law the privilege of perpetuating their wealth, formed by these means a sort of patrician order, distinguished by the grandeur and luxury of their establishments. From this order it was that the King usually chose his councillors of state." *c

At the time the English first settled in Virginia, when land was available for very little or nothing, some forward-thinking individuals secured large grants of land and wanted to uphold the prestige of their families by passing their property down to their heirs. The practice of handing down these estates through generations, to men with the same surname, created a distinct class of families. These families, with the legal right to preserve their wealth, formed a sort of elite class, recognized for the opulence and lavishness of their lifestyles. This elite class was typically where the King chose his state councilors.

c
[ This passage is extracted and translated from M. Conseil's work upon the life of Jefferson, entitled "Melanges Politiques et Philosophiques de Jefferson."]

c
[ This passage is taken and translated from M. Conseil's work on the life of Jefferson, titled "Political and Philosophical Miscellanies of Jefferson."]

In the United States, the principal clauses of the English law respecting descent have been universally rejected. The first rule that we follow, says Mr. Kent, touching inheritance, is the following:—If a man dies intestate, his property goes to his heirs in a direct line. If he has but one heir or heiress, he or she succeeds to the whole. If there are several heirs of the same degree, they divide the inheritance equally amongst them, without distinction of sex. This rule was prescribed for the first time in the State of New York by a statute of February 23, 1786. (See Revised Statutes, vol. iii. Appendix, p. 48.) It has since then been adopted in the Revised Statutes of the same State. At the present day this law holds good throughout the whole of the United States, with the exception of the State of Vermont, where the male heir inherits a double portion. (Kent's "Commentaries," vol. iv. p. 370.) Mr. Kent, in the same work, vol. iv. p. 1-22, gives a historical account of American legislation on the subject of entail: by this we learn that, previous to the Revolution, the colonies followed the English law of entail. Estates tail were abolished in Virginia in 1776, on a motion of Mr. Jefferson. They were suppressed in New York in 1786, and have since been abolished in North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and Missouri. In Vermont, Indiana, Illinois, South Carolina, and Louisiana, entail was never introduced. Those States which thought proper to preserve the English law of entail, modified it in such a way as to deprive it of its most aristocratic tendencies. "Our general principles on the subject of government," says Mr. Kent, "tend to favor the free circulation of property."

In the United States, the main rules of English law regarding inheritance have been completely rejected. The first rule we follow, according to Mr. Kent, about inheritance is this: If a person dies without a will, their property goes to their heirs in a direct line. If there’s only one heir, that person gets everything. If there are multiple heirs of the same level, they share the inheritance equally, regardless of gender. This rule was first established in New York by a law on February 23, 1786. (See Revised Statutes, vol. iii. Appendix, p. 48.) It has since been included in the Revised Statutes of the state. Nowadays, this law is valid across the United States, except in Vermont, where the male heir receives twice the share. (Kent's "Commentaries," vol. iv. p. 370.) Mr. Kent also provides a historical overview of American laws about entail in the same work, vol. iv. p. 1-22, which reveals that, before the Revolution, the colonies followed the English law of entail. Estates tail were abolished in Virginia in 1776, thanks to a proposal from Mr. Jefferson. They were eliminated in New York in 1786 and have since been abolished in North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and Missouri. In Vermont, Indiana, Illinois, South Carolina, and Louisiana, entail was never established. States that chose to keep the English law of entail modified it to remove its most aristocratic features. "Our general principles on the subject of government," says Mr. Kent, "tend to favor the free circulation of property."

It cannot fail to strike the French reader who studies the law of inheritance, that on these questions the French legislation is infinitely more democratic even than the American. The American law makes an equal division of the father's property, but only in the case of his will not being known; "for every man," says the law, "in the State of New York (Revised Statutes, vol. iii. Appendix, p. 51), has entire liberty, power, and authority, to dispose of his property by will, to leave it entire, or divided in favor of any persons he chooses as his heirs, provided he do not leave it to a political body or any corporation." The French law obliges the testator to divide his property equally, or nearly so, among his heirs. Most of the American republics still admit of entails, under certain restrictions; but the French law prohibits entail in all cases. If the social condition of the Americans is more democratic than that of the French, the laws of the latter are the most democratic of the two. This may be explained more easily than at first appears to be the case. In France, democracy is still occupied in the work of destruction; in America, it reigns quietly over the ruins it has made.

It’s clear to any French reader examining inheritance law that French legislation is way more democratic than American law. American law splits a father’s estate equally only if he hasn’t left a will. “Every person,” the law states, “in the State of New York (Revised Statutes, vol. iii. Appendix, p. 51), has full freedom, power, and authority to manage his property by will, leaving it whole or dividing it among anyone he chooses as heirs, as long as he doesn’t leave it to a political body or corporation.” In contrast, French law requires the testator to divide their property fairly equally among their heirs. Many American states still allow entails under certain conditions, but French law completely bans them. If the social situation in America is more democratic than in France, then French laws are the more democratic of the two. This can be explained more easily than it seems at first glance. In France, democracy is still focused on dismantling the old order; in America, it presides peacefully over the aftermath of what it has destroyed.





Appendix H

Summary Of The Qualifications Of Voters In The United States As They Existed In 1832

Summary Of The Qualifications Of Voters In The United States As They Existed In 1832

All the States agree in granting the right of voting at the age of twenty-one. In all of them it is necessary to have resided for a certain time in the district where the vote is given. This period varies from three months to two years.

All the states agree on allowing people to vote at the age of twenty-one. In all of them, you need to have lived in the area where you're voting for a certain amount of time. This period ranges from three months to two years.

As to the qualification: in the State of Massachusetts it is necessary to have an income of Pound 3 or a capital of Pound 60. In Rhode Island, a man must possess landed property to the amount of $133.

As for the qualifications: in the State of Massachusetts, you need to have an income of £3 or a capital of £60. In Rhode Island, a person must own land valued at $133.

In Connecticut, he must have a property which gives an income of $17. A year of service in the militia also gives the elective privilege.

In Connecticut, he must own property that earns an income of $17. A year of service in the militia also grants the right to vote.

In New Jersey, an elector must have a property of Pound 50 a year.

In New Jersey, a voter must own property worth £50 a year.

In South Carolina and Maryland, the elector must possess fifty acres of land.

In South Carolina and Maryland, the voter must own fifty acres of land.

In Tennessee, he must possess some property.

In Tennessee, he needs to own some property.

In the States of Mississippi, Ohio, Georgia, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York, the only necessary qualification for voting is that of paying the taxes; and in most of the States, to serve in the militia is equivalent to the payment of taxes. In Maine and New Hampshire any man can vote who is not on the pauper list.

In the states of Mississippi, Ohio, Georgia, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New York, the only requirement to vote is to pay taxes; and in most states, serving in the militia counts as paying taxes. In Maine and New Hampshire, any man who is not on the welfare list can vote.

Lastly, in the States of Missouri, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Indiana, Kentucky, and Vermont, the conditions of voting have no reference to the property of the elector.

Lastly, in the states of Missouri, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Indiana, Kentucky, and Vermont, the requirements for voting are not based on the elector's property.

I believe there is no other State besides that of North Carolina in which different conditions are applied to the voting for the Senate and the electing the House of Representatives. The electors of the former, in this case, should possess in property fifty acres of land; to vote for the latter, nothing more is required than to pay taxes.

I believe there is no other state besides North Carolina where different rules apply for voting for the Senate compared to electing the House of Representatives. To vote for the Senate, voters must own fifty acres of land; to vote for the House, all that's required is to pay taxes.





Appendix I

The small number of custom-house officers employed in the United States, compared with the extent of the coast, renders smuggling very easy; notwithstanding which, it is less practised than elsewhere, because everybody endeavors to repress it. In America there is no police for the prevention of fires, and such accidents are more frequent than in Europe; but in general they are more speedily extinguished, because the surrounding population is prompt in lending assistance.

The small number of customs officers in the United States, compared to the size of the coastline, makes smuggling very easy; however, it happens less frequently than in other places because everyone tries to stop it. In America, there is no fire prevention police, and such incidents occur more often than in Europe; but overall, they are put out more quickly because the local community is quick to help.





Appendix K

It is incorrect to assert that centralization was produced by the French Revolution; the revolution brought it to perfection, but did not create it. The mania for centralization and government regulations dates from the time when jurists began to take a share in the government, in the time of Philippele-Bel; ever since which period they have been on the increase. In the year 1775, M. de Malesherbes, speaking in the name of the Cour des Aides, said to Louis XIV:— *d

It’s wrong to say that centralization was created by the French Revolution; the revolution perfected it, but it didn’t start it. The obsession with centralization and government regulations began when jurists got involved in the government during Philip IV’s reign; since then, it has continued to grow. In 1775, M. de Malesherbes, speaking on behalf of the Cour des Aides, told Louis XIV:— *d

d
[ See "Memoires pour servir a l'Histoire du Droit Public de la France en matiere d'impots," p. 654, printed at Brussels in 1779.]

d
[ See "Memoirs to Contribute to the History of Public Law in France Regarding Taxes," p. 654, printed in Brussels in 1779.]

". . . Every corporation and every community of citizens retained the right of administering its own affairs; a right which not only forms part of the primitive constitution of the kingdom, but has a still higher origin; for it is the right of nature, and of reason. Nevertheless, your subjects, Sire, have been deprived of it; and we cannot refrain from saying that in this respect your government has fallen into puerile extremes. From the time when powerful ministers made it a political principle to prevent the convocation of a national assembly, one consequence has succeeded another, until the deliberations of the inhabitants of a village are declared null when they have not been authorized by the Intendant. Of course, if the community has an expensive undertaking to carry through, it must remain under the control of the sub-delegate of the Intendant, and, consequently, follow the plan he proposes, employ his favorite workmen, pay them according to his pleasure; and if an action at law is deemed necessary, the Intendant's permission must be obtained. The cause must be pleaded before this first tribunal, previous to its being carried into a public court; and if the opinion of the Intendant is opposed to that of the inhabitants, or if their adversary enjoys his favor, the community is deprived of the power of defending its rights. Such are the means, Sire, which have been exerted to extinguish the municipal spirit in France; and to stifle, if possible, the opinions of the citizens. The nation may be said to lie under an interdict, and to be in wardship under guardians." What could be said more to the purpose at the present day, when the Revolution has achieved what are called its victories in centralization?

". . . Every corporation and every community of citizens has the right to manage its own affairs; a right that is not only part of the kingdom's original constitution but also has an even deeper origin, as it is a right of nature and reason. Nevertheless, your subjects, Sire, have been stripped of this right; and we cannot help but point out that in this regard, your government has taken things to childish extremes. Since powerful ministers decided it was a political principle to prevent the calling of a national assembly, one consequence has followed another, leading to the situation where the decisions made by the residents of a village are declared invalid unless authorized by the Intendant. Naturally, if the community needs to undertake an expensive project, it must operate under the control of the Intendant's sub-delegate, and thus must adhere to the plan he suggests, hire his preferred workers, and pay them as he sees fit; if legal action is necessary, permission from the Intendant must be obtained. The case must be presented before this primary tribunal before it can proceed to a public court; and if the Intendant's opinion differs from that of the residents, or if their opponent has his favor, the community is stripped of the ability to defend its rights. Such are the methods, Sire, that have been used to extinguish the municipal spirit in France and to stifle, if possible, the voices of the citizens. The nation can be said to be under an interdict, in custody under guardians. What more could be said today, now that the Revolution has achieved what are called its victories in centralization?"

In 1789, Jefferson wrote from Paris to one of his friends:—"There is no country where the mania for over-governing has taken deeper root than in France, or been the source of greater mischief." (Letter to Madison, August 28, 1789.) The fact is, that for several centuries past the central power of France has done everything it could to extend central administration; it has acknowledged no other limits than its own strength. The central power to which the Revolution gave birth made more rapid advances than any of its predecessors, because it was stronger and wiser than they had been; Louis XIV committed the welfare of such communities to the caprice of an intendant; Napoleon left them to that of the Minister. The same principle governed both, though its consequences were more or less remote.

In 1789, Jefferson wrote from Paris to one of his friends:—"There is no country where the obsession with over-governing has taken deeper root than in France, or caused greater harm." (Letter to Madison, August 28, 1789.) The truth is that for several centuries, the central power of France has done everything it could to expand central administration; it has recognized no limits other than its own strength. The central power that emerged from the Revolution progressed more quickly than any of its predecessors because it was stronger and smarter than they had been; while Louis XIV entrusted the welfare of communities to the whims of an intendant, Napoleon assigned it to the Minister. The same principle guided both, although its consequences varied in time and distance.





Appendix L

The immutability of the constitution of France is a necessary consequence of the laws of that country. To begin with the most important of all the laws, that which decides the order of succession to the throne; what can be more immutable in its principle than a political order founded upon the natural succession of father to son? In 1814, Louis XVIII had established the perpetual law of hereditary succession in favor of his own family. The individuals who regulated the consequences of the Revolution of 1830 followed his example; they merely established the perpetuity of the law in favor of another family. In this respect they imitated the Chancellor Meaupou, who, when he erected the new Parliament upon the ruins of the old, took care to declare in the same ordinance that the rights of the new magistrates should be as inalienable as those of their predecessors had been. The laws of 1830, like those of 1814, point out no way of changing the constitution: and it is evident that the ordinary means of legislation are insufficient for this purpose. As the King, the Peers, and the Deputies, all derive their authority from the constitution, these three powers united cannot alter a law by virtue of which alone they govern. Out of the pale of the constitution they are nothing: where, when, could they take their stand to effect a change in its provisions? The alternative is clear: either their efforts are powerless against the charter, which continues to exist in spite of them, in which case they only reign in the name of the charter; or they succeed in changing the charter, and then, the law by which they existed being annulled, they themselves cease to exist. By destroying the charter, they destroy themselves. This is much more evident in the laws of 1830 than in those of 1814. In 1814, the royal prerogative took its stand above and beyond the constitution; but in 1830, it was avowedly created by, and dependent on, the constitution. A part, therefore, of the French constitution is immutable, because it is united to the destiny of a family; and the body of the constitution is equally immutable, because there appear to be no legal means of changing it. These remarks are not applicable to England. That country having no written constitution, who can assert when its constitution is changed?

The unchangeability of the French constitution is a natural result of the country's laws. Starting with the most important law, which determines the line of succession to the throne; what can be more unchangeable in principle than a political order based on the natural succession from father to son? In 1814, Louis XVIII established the permanent law of hereditary succession for his own family. The individuals who managed the aftermath of the Revolution of 1830 followed his lead; they simply confirmed the continuity of the law for a different family. In this, they mimicked Chancellor Meaupou, who, when he set up the new Parliament on the ruins of the old one, made sure to declare in the same ordinance that the rights of the new magistrates would be as untransferable as those of their predecessors had been. The laws of 1830, like those of 1814, do not provide a way to change the constitution: it is clear that the usual legislative processes are inadequate for this. Since the King, the Peers, and the Deputies all derive their power from the constitution, these three powers together cannot change a law that is the only basis for their governance. Outside the scope of the constitution, they are nothing: where and how could they have a base to change its terms? The choice is clear: either their attempts are futile against the charter, which remains in force despite them, in which case they only rule in the name of the charter; or they manage to change the charter, and then, with the law that enabled their existence nullified, they themselves cease to exist. By abolishing the charter, they would be abolishing themselves. This is even more evident in the laws of 1830 than in those of 1814. In 1814, royal authority was positioned above the constitution; but in 1830, it was openly created by and reliant on the constitution. Thus, part of the French constitution is unchangeable because it is linked to the fate of a family; and the constitution as a whole is equally unchangeable because there seem to be no legal means for altering it. These observations do not apply to England. That country has no written constitution, so who can say when its constitution changes?





Appendix M

The most esteemed authors who have written upon the English Constitution agree with each other in establishing the omnipotence of the Parliament. Delolme says: "It is a fundamental principle with the English lawyers, that Parliament can do everything except making a woman a man, or a man a woman." Blackstone expresses himself more in detail, if not more energetically, than Delolme, in the following terms:—"The power and jurisdiction of Parliament, says Sir Edward Coke (4 Inst. 36), 'is so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds.' And of this High Court, he adds, may be truly said, 'Si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima; si dignitatem, est honoratissima; si jurisdictionem, est capacissima.' It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations; ecclesiastical or temporal; civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this being the place where that absolute despotic power which must, in all governments, reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new-model the succession to the Crown; as was done in the reign of Henry VIII and William III. It can alter the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of instances in the reigns of King Henry VIII and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom, and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the Act of Union and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible to be done; and, therefore some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament."

The most respected authors who have written about the English Constitution agree that Parliament has absolute power. Delolme states: "It's a fundamental principle among English lawyers that Parliament can do anything except turn a woman into a man or a man into a woman." Blackstone elaborates even further, if not more vigorously, than Delolme, saying: "The power and authority of Parliament, as Sir Edward Coke mentions (4 Inst. 36), 'is so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be limited, either by cause or by persons, within any bounds.' And of this High Court, it can truly be said, 'If you consider its antiquity, it is the oldest; if its dignity, it is the most honorable; if its jurisdiction, it is the most capacious.' It holds sovereign and unchallengeable authority in creating, confirming, expanding, restricting, repealing, reviving, and interpreting laws related to all possible matters; whether ecclesiastical or secular; civil, military, maritime, or criminal. This is where the absolute power that must exist in every government is granted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All issues and grievances, actions and remedies that exceed the normal legal process fall within the scope of this extraordinary court. It can regulate or restructure the succession to the Crown, as happened during the reigns of Henry VIII and William III. It can change the established religion of the nation, as seen in various instances during the reigns of King Henry VIII and his three children. It can even alter and recreate the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves, as was done by the Act of Union and the various statutes for triennial and septennial elections. In short, it can do anything that isn’t naturally impossible to accomplish; therefore, some have boldly referred to its power as the omnipotence of Parliament."





Appendix N

There is no question upon which the American constitutions agree more fully than upon that of political jurisdiction. All the constitutions which take cognizance of this matter, give to the House of Delegates the exclusive right of impeachment; excepting only the constitution of North Carolina, which grants the same privilege to grand juries. (Article 23.) Almost all the constitutions give the exclusive right of pronouncing sentence to the Senate, or to the Assembly which occupies its place.

There’s no doubt that the American constitutions widely agree on the issue of political jurisdiction. All the constitutions that address this topic give the House of Delegates the exclusive right to impeach, except for North Carolina's constitution, which gives that privilege to grand juries. (Article 23.) Nearly all the constitutions assign the exclusive right to pronounce sentence to the Senate, or to the Assembly that replaces it.

The only punishments which the political tribunals can inflict are removal, or the interdiction of public functions for the future. There is no other constitution but that of Virginia (p. 152), which enables them to inflict every kind of punishment. The crimes which are subject to political jurisdiction are, in the federal constitution (Section 4, Art. 1); in that of Indiana (Art. 3, paragraphs 23 and 24); of New York (Art. 5); of Delaware (Art. 5), high treason, bribery, and other high crimes or offences. In the Constitution of Massachusetts (Chap. I, Section 2); that of North Carolina (Art. 23); of Virginia (p. 252), misconduct and maladministration. In the constitution of New Hampshire (p. 105), corruption, intrigue, and maladministration. In Vermont (Chap. 2, Art. 24), maladministration. In South Carolina (Art. 5); Kentucky (Art. 5); Tennessee (Art. 4); Ohio (Art. 1, 23, 24); Louisiana (Art. 5); Mississippi (Art. 5); Alabama (Art. 6); Pennsylvania (Art. 4), crimes committed in the non-performance of official duties. In the States of Illinois, Georgia, Maine, and Connecticut, no particular offences are specified.

The only punishments that political tribunals can impose are removal or a ban from holding public office in the future. Virginia (p. 152) is the only constitution that allows them to impose any kind of punishment. The crimes under political jurisdiction are outlined in the federal constitution (Section 4, Art. 1); in Indiana's constitution (Art. 3, paragraphs 23 and 24); New York's constitution (Art. 5); and Delaware's constitution (Art. 5), which include high treason, bribery, and other serious crimes or offenses. Massachusetts' constitution (Chap. I, Section 2); North Carolina's constitution (Art. 23); and Virginia's constitution (p. 252) mention misconduct and maladministration. New Hampshire's constitution (p. 105) cites corruption, intrigue, and maladministration. Vermont's constitution (Chap. 2, Art. 24) mentions maladministration. South Carolina (Art. 5), Kentucky (Art. 5), Tennessee (Art. 4), Ohio (Art. 1, 23, 24), Louisiana (Art. 5), Mississippi (Art. 5), Alabama (Art. 6), and Pennsylvania (Art. 4) define crimes related to the failure to perform official duties. In Illinois, Georgia, Maine, and Connecticut, no specific offenses are listed.





Appendix O

It is true that the powers of Europe may carry on maritime wars with the Union; but there is always greater facility and less danger in supporting a maritime than a continental war. Maritime warfare only requires one species of effort. A commercial people which consents to furnish its government with the necessary funds, is sure to possess a fleet. And it is far easier to induce a nation to part with its money, almost unconsciously, than to reconcile it to sacrifices of men and personal efforts. Moreover, defeat by sea rarely compromises the existence or independence of the people which endures it. As for continental wars, it is evident that the nations of Europe cannot be formidable in this way to the American Union. It would be very difficult to transport and maintain in America more than 25,000 soldiers; an army which may be considered to represent a nation of about 2,000,000 of men. The most populous nation of Europe contending in this way against the Union, is in the position of a nation of 2,000,000 of inhabitants at war with one of 12,000,000. Add to this, that America has all its resources within reach, whilst the European is at 4,000 miles distance from his; and that the immensity of the American continent would of itself present an insurmountable obstacle to its conquest.

It’s true that the European powers can engage in naval wars with the Union, but it’s generally easier and less risky to support a maritime conflict than a land war. Maritime warfare only requires one type of effort. A trading nation that agrees to provide its government with the necessary funding is bound to have a fleet. It’s much simpler to persuade a country to spend money, often without realizing it, than to get them to agree to sacrifices of lives and personal effort. Additionally, being defeated at sea rarely threatens the existence or independence of the nation experiencing it. When it comes to land wars, it’s clear that European nations can’t really pose a significant threat to the American Union this way. Transporting and maintaining more than 25,000 soldiers in America would be quite a challenge; this number represents a nation of about 2,000,000 men. The most populous European nation fighting against the Union would be like a country of 2,000,000 people going to war with one of 12,000,000. Plus, America has all its resources close at hand, while Europeans are 4,000 miles away from theirs. The vastness of the American continent itself would serve as an overwhelming barrier to any conquest.





Appendix P

The first American journal appeared in April, 1704, and was published at Boston. See "Collection of the Historical Society of Massachusetts," vol. vi. p. 66. It would be a mistake to suppose that the periodical press has always been entirely free in the American colonies: an attempt was made to establish something analogous to a censorship and preliminary security. Consult the Legislative Documents of Massachusetts of January 14, 1722. The Committee appointed by the General Assembly (the legislative body of the province) for the purpose of examining into circumstances connected with a paper entitled "The New England Courier," expresses its opinion that "the tendency of the said journal is to turn religion into derision and bring it into contempt; that it mentions the sacred writers in a profane and irreligious manner; that it puts malicious interpretations upon the conduct of the ministers of the Gospel; and that the Government of his Majesty is insulted, and the peace and tranquillity of the province disturbed by the said journal. The Committee is consequently of opinion that the printer and publisher, James Franklin, should be forbidden to print and publish the said journal or any other work in future, without having previously submitted it to the Secretary of the province; and that the justices of the peace for the county of Suffolk should be commissioned to require bail of the said James Franklin for his good conduct during the ensuing year." The suggestion of the Committee was adopted and passed into a law, but the effect of it was null, for the journal eluded the prohibition by putting the name of Benjamin Franklin instead of James Franklin at the bottom of its columns, and this manoeuvre was supported by public opinion.

The first American journal was published in April 1704 in Boston. See "Collection of the Historical Society of Massachusetts," vol. vi. p. 66. It would be a mistake to think that the periodical press has always been completely free in the American colonies: there was an attempt to set up a form of censorship and preliminary approval. Check the Legislative Documents of Massachusetts from January 14, 1722. The Committee appointed by the General Assembly (the legislative body of the province) to look into issues related to a paper called "The New England Courier" stated that "the tendency of this journal is to mock religion and bring it into disrepute; that it mentions the sacred writers in a disrespectful and irreligious way; that it puts malicious interpretations on the actions of Gospel ministers; and that His Majesty’s Government is insulted and the peace and tranquility of the province are disturbed by this journal. The Committee therefore believes that the printer and publisher, James Franklin, should be banned from printing and publishing this journal or any other work in the future without first submitting it to the province's Secretary; and that the justices of the peace for Suffolk County should be authorized to require James Franklin to pay bail for his good behavior over the next year." The Committee's suggestion was adopted and became law, but it was ineffective because the journal got around the ban by listing Benjamin Franklin's name instead of James Franklin at the bottom of its columns, a move that was supported by public opinion.





Appendix Q

The Federal Constitution has introduced the jury into the tribunals of the Union in the same way as the States had introduced it into their own several courts; but as it has not established any fixed rules for the choice of jurors, the federal courts select them from the ordinary jury list which each State makes for itself. The laws of the States must therefore be examined for the theory of the formation of juries. See Story's "Commentaries on the Constitution," B. iii. chap. 38, p. 654-659; Sergeant's "Constitutional Law," p. 165. See also the Federal Laws of the years 1789, 1800, and 1802, upon the subject. For the purpose of thoroughly understanding the American principles with respect to the formation of juries, I examined the laws of States at a distance from one another, and the following observations were the result of my inquiries. In America, all the citizens who exercise the elective franchise have the right of serving upon a jury. The great State of New York, however, has made a slight difference between the two privileges, but in a spirit quite contrary to that of the laws of France; for in the State of New York there are fewer persons eligible as jurymen than there are electors. It may be said in general that the right of forming part of a jury, like the right of electing representatives, is open to all the citizens: the exercise of this right, however, is not put indiscriminately into any hands. Every year a body of municipal or county magistrates—called "selectmen" in New England, "supervisors" in New York, "trustees" in Ohio, and "sheriffs of the parish" in Louisiana—choose for each county a certain number of citizens who have the right of serving as jurymen, and who are supposed to be capable of exercising their functions. These magistrates, being themselves elective, excite no distrust; their powers, like those of most republican magistrates, are very extensive and very arbitrary, and they frequently make use of them to remove unworthy or incompetent jurymen. The names of the jurymen thus chosen are transmitted to the County Court; and the jury who have to decide any affair are drawn by lot from the whole list of names. The Americans have contrived in every way to make the common people eligible to the jury, and to render the service as little onerous as possible. The sessions are held in the chief town of every county, and the jury are indemnified for their attendance either by the State or the parties concerned. They receive in general a dollar per day, besides their travelling expenses. In America, the being placed upon the jury is looked upon as a burden, but it is a burden which is very supportable. See Brevard's "Digest of the Public Statute Law of South Carolina," vol. i. pp. 446 and 454, vol. ii. pp. 218 and 338; "The General Laws of Massachusetts, revised and published by authority of the Legislature," vol. ii. pp. 187 and 331; "The Revised Statutes of the State of New York," vol. ii. pp. 411, 643, 717, 720; "The Statute Law of the State of Tennessee," vol. i. p. 209; "Acts of the State of Ohio," pp. 95 and 210; and "Digeste general des Actes de la Legislature de la Louisiane."

The Federal Constitution has introduced the jury system in federal courts just like the States did in their own courts; however, since it hasn't set any specific rules for choosing jurors, federal courts pick them from the regular jury list created by each State. Therefore, the State laws need to be looked at for the theory behind jury formation. See Story's "Commentaries on the Constitution," B. iii. chap. 38, p. 654-659; Sergeant's "Constitutional Law," p. 165. Also, check the Federal Laws from 1789, 1800, and 1802 on the subject. To fully understand American principles regarding jury formation, I reviewed the laws of various States, and my inquiries led to the following observations. In America, all citizens who can vote have the right to serve on a jury. The significant State of New York, however, has made a slight distinction between the two rights, but in a manner quite different from the laws of France; in New York, there are fewer people eligible to be jurors than there are voters. Generally speaking, the right to be part of a jury, like the right to elect representatives, is available to all citizens: however, this right is not granted indiscriminately. Each year, a group of local or county officials—called "selectmen" in New England, "supervisors" in New York, "trustees" in Ohio, and "sheriffs of the parish" in Louisiana—select a certain number of citizens from each county who are qualified to serve as jurors and are expected to be able to perform their duties. These officials, being elected themselves, instill no distrust; their powers, like those of most elected officials, are quite broad and somewhat arbitrary, and they often use them to remove unsuitable or unqualified jurors. The names of the jurors selected are sent to the County Court, and the jury that will decide on any case is randomly chosen from the entire list of names. Americans have worked in every way to make the average person eligible for jury duty and to make the service as light as possible. Sessions take place in the main town of each county, and jurors are compensated for their time either by the State or by the parties involved. They generally receive about a dollar a day, plus travel expenses. In America, being called for jury duty is seen as a burden, but it's a manageable one. See Brevard's "Digest of the Public Statute Law of South Carolina," vol. i. pp. 446 and 454, vol. ii. pp. 218 and 338; "The General Laws of Massachusetts, revised and published by authority of the Legislature," vol. ii. pp. 187 and 331; "The Revised Statutes of the State of New York," vol. ii. pp. 411, 643, 717, 720; "The Statute Law of the State of Tennessee," vol. i. p. 209; "Acts of the State of Ohio," pp. 95 and 210; and "Digeste general des Actes de la Legislature de la Louisiane."





Appendix R

If we attentively examine the constitution of the jury as introduced into civil proceedings in England, we shall readily perceive that the jurors are under the immediate control of the judge. It is true that the verdict of the jury, in civil as well as in criminal cases, comprises the question of fact and the question of right in the same reply; thus—a house is claimed by Peter as having been purchased by him: this is the fact to be decided. The defendant puts in a plea of incompetency on the part of the vendor: this is the legal question to be resolved. But the jury do not enjoy the same character of infallibility in civil cases, according to the practice of the English courts, as they do in criminal cases. The judge may refuse to receive the verdict; and even after the first trial has taken place, a second or new trial may be awarded by the Court. See Blackstone's "Commentaries," book iii. ch. 24.

If we closely look at how juries are set up in civil cases in England, we can see that jurors are directly under the judge's control. It's true that the jury's verdict, whether in civil or criminal cases, combines both the question of fact and the question of law in one answer. For example, if Peter claims a house as his because he bought it, that's the fact to be decided. The defendant argues that the vendor was incompetent, which is the legal issue to be resolved. However, juries don't have the same level of infallibility in civil cases as they do in criminal cases according to English court practices. The judge can refuse to accept the verdict, and even after the first trial, the Court can grant a second or new trial. See Blackstone's "Commentaries," book iii. ch. 24.





Appendix S

I find in my travelling journal a passage which may serve to convey a more complete notion of the trials to which the women of America, who consent to follow their husbands into the wilds, are often subjected. This description has nothing to recommend it to the reader but its strict accuracy:

I find a passage in my travel journal that might give a better idea of the challenges faced by American women who choose to follow their husbands into the wilderness. This description really has nothing to offer the reader except its complete accuracy:

". . . From time to time we come to fresh clearings; all these places are alike; I shall describe the one at which we have halted to-night, for it will serve to remind me of all the others.

". . . Occasionally we arrive at new clearings; all these spots are similar; I will describe the one where we’ve stopped tonight, as it will help me remember all the others."

"The bell which the pioneers hang round the necks of their cattle, in order to find them again in the woods, announced our approach to a clearing, when we were yet a long way off; and we soon afterwards heard the stroke of the hatchet, hewing down the trees of the forest. As we came nearer, traces of destruction marked the presence of civilized man; the road was strewn with shattered boughs; trunks of trees, half consumed by fire, or cleft by the wedge, were still standing in the track we were following. We continued to proceed till we reached a wood in which all the trees seemed to have been suddenly struck dead; in the height of summer their boughs were as leafless as in winter; and upon closer examination we found that a deep circle had been cut round the bark, which, by stopping the circulation of the sap, soon kills the tree. We were informed that this is commonly the first thing a pioneer does; as he cannot in the first year cut down all the trees which cover his new parcel of land, he sows Indian corn under their branches, and puts the trees to death in order to prevent them from injuring his crop. Beyond this field, at present imperfectly traced out, we suddenly came upon the cabin of its owner, situated in the centre of a plot of ground more carefully cultivated than the rest, but where man was still waging unequal warfare with the forest; there the trees were cut down, but their roots were not removed, and the trunks still encumbered the ground which they so recently shaded. Around these dry blocks, wheat, suckers of trees, and plants of every kind, grow and intertwine in all the luxuriance of wild, untutored nature. Amidst this vigorous and various vegetation stands the house of the pioneer, or, as they call it, the log house. Like the ground about it, this rustic dwelling bore marks of recent and hasty labor; its length seemed not to exceed thirty feet, its height fifteen; the walls as well as the roof were formed of rough trunks of trees, between which a little moss and clay had been inserted to keep out the cold and rain.

The bell that pioneers hang around their cattle's necks to help find them in the woods announced our approach to a clearing, even from a distance; soon after, we heard the sound of a hatchet chopping down trees. As we got closer, signs of destruction revealed the presence of civilized man; the road was littered with broken branches, and tree trunks, partially burned or split by wedges, still stood along the path we were following. We moved on until we reached a forest where all the trees looked like they had been suddenly struck dead; in the middle of summer, their branches were as bare as in winter. Upon closer inspection, we noticed a deep ring had been cut around the bark, which stops the sap flow and quickly kills the tree. We learned this is usually the first action a pioneer takes; since they can't cut down all the trees on their new land in the first year, they plant corn beneath the branches and kill the trees to keep them from harming their crops. Beyond this field, which was only partially cleared, we unexpectedly came across the owner's cabin, located in the middle of a plot of land more carefully tended than the surrounding area, yet where man continued to struggle against the forest; there, trees had been cut down, but their roots were still in the ground, and the trunks were still cluttering the area they once shaded. Around these dead logs, wheat, tree sprouts, and various plants grew wildly and intertwined in all the richness of untamed nature. Amidst this lush and diverse vegetation stood the pioneer’s home, or what they called a log house. Like the land around it, this rustic dwelling showed signs of recent, hurried work; it was about thirty feet long and fifteen feet high, with walls and a roof made of rough tree trunks, and some moss and clay stuffed in between them to keep out the cold and rain.

"As night was coming on, we determined to ask the master of the log house for a lodging. At the sound of our footsteps, the children who were playing amongst the scattered branches sprang up and ran towards the house, as if they were frightened at the sight of man; whilst two large dogs, almost wild, with ears erect and outstretched nose, came growling out of their hut, to cover the retreat of their young masters. The pioneer himself made his appearance at the door of his dwelling; he looked at us with a rapid and inquisitive glance, made a sign to the dogs to go into the house, and set them the example, without betraying either curiosity or apprehension at our arrival.

As night was falling, we decided to ask the owner of the log cabin for a place to stay. When they heard our footsteps, the kids playing among the scattered branches jumped up and ran towards the house, as if they were scared of us. Meanwhile, two large, almost wild dogs with their ears perked and noses stretched out came growling out of their kennel to protect their young masters. The owner himself appeared at the door of his home; he looked at us with a quick and curious glance, signaled for the dogs to go back inside, and showed them how to do it, without showing any curiosity or fear about our arrival.

"We entered the log house: the inside is quite unlike that of the cottages of the peasantry of Europe: it contains more than is superfluous, less than is necessary. A single window with a muslin blind; on a hearth of trodden clay an immense fire, which lights the whole structure; above the hearth a good rifle, a deer's skin, and plumes of eagles' feathers; on the right hand of the chimney a map of the United States, raised and shaken by the wind through the crannies in the wall; near the map, upon a shelf formed of a roughly hewn plank, a few volumes of books—a Bible, the six first books of Milton, and two of Shakespeare's plays; along the wall, trunks instead of closets; in the centre of the room a rude table, with legs of green wood, and with the bark still upon them, looking as if they grew out of the ground on which they stood; but on this table a tea-pot of British ware, silver spoons, cracked tea-cups, and some newspapers.

We walked into the log house, and the inside is very different from the cottages of European peasants: it has more than what’s unnecessary, but less than what’s essential. There’s a single window with a muslin blind; an enormous fire on a clay hearth lights up the entire place; above the hearth, there’s a good rifle, a deer's skin, and eagle feathers; to the right of the chimney, a map of the United States flutters in the wind through the cracks in the wall; next to the map, on a shelf made from a rough-hewn plank, are a few books—a Bible, the first six books of Milton, and a couple of Shakespeare's plays; along the wall, there are trunks instead of closets; in the center of the room, there’s a rough table with green wooden legs that still have their bark on, making it look like it grew right from the ground beneath it; but on this table, there’s a British teapot, silver spoons, chipped teacups, and some newspapers.

"The master of this dwelling has the strong angular features and lank limbs peculiar to the native of New England. It is evident that this man was not born in the solitude in which we have met with him: his physical constitution suffices to show that his earlier years were spent in the midst of civilized society, and that he belongs to that restless, calculating, and adventurous race of men, who do with the utmost coolness things only to be accounted for by the ardor of the passions, and who endure the life of savages for a time, in order to conquer and civilize the backwoods.

The owner of this house has strong, angular features and thin limbs typical of someone from New England. It's clear that this guy wasn’t born in the isolation where we found him: his build suggests that he spent his early years in civilized society and belongs to that restless, strategic, and adventurous group of people who casually do things driven only by intense emotions, and who live like savages for a while to conquer and settle the wilderness.

"When the pioneer perceived that we were crossing his threshold, he came to meet us and shake hands, as is their custom; but his face was quite unmoved; he opened the conversation by inquiring what was going on in the world; and when his curiosity was satisfied, he held his peace, as if he were tired by the noise and importunity of mankind. When we questioned him in our turn, he gave us all the information we required; he then attended sedulously, but without eagerness, to our personal wants. Whilst he was engaged in providing thus kindly for us, how came it that in spit of ourselves we felt our gratitude die upon our lips? It is that our host whilst he performs the duties of hospitality, seems to be obeying an irksome necessity of his condition: he treats it as a duty imposed upon him by his situation, not as a pleasure. By the side of the hearth sits a woman with a baby on her lap: she nods to us without disturbing herself. Like the pioneer, this woman is in the prime of life; her appearance would seem superior to her condition, and her apparel even betrays a lingering taste for dress; but her delicate limbs appear shrunken, her features are drawn in, her eye is mild and melancholy; her whole physiognomy bears marks of a degree of religious resignation, a deep quiet of all passions, and some sort of natural and tranquil firmness, ready to meet all the ills of life, without fearing and without braving them. Her children cluster about her, full of health, turbulence, and energy: they are true children of the wilderness; their mother watches them from time to time with mingled melancholy and joy: to look at their strength and her languor, one might imagine that the life she has given them has exhausted her own, and still she regrets not what they have cost her. The house inhabited by these emigrants has no internal partition or loft. In the one chamber of which it consists, the whole family is gathered for the night. The dwelling is itself a little world—an ark of civilization amidst an ocean of foliage: a hundred steps beyond it the primeval forest spreads its shades, and solitude resumes its sway."

"When the pioneer saw that we were crossing his threshold, he came out to greet us and shake hands, as is their custom; but his expression was completely blank. He started the conversation by asking what was happening in the world; and once his curiosity was satisfied, he fell silent, as if he were worn out by the noise and demands of humanity. When we asked him questions in return, he provided all the information we needed; he then diligently but without enthusiasm attended to our needs. While he was focusing on taking care of us so kindly, how was it that, despite ourselves, we felt our gratitude fade on our lips? It's because our host, while fulfilling the duties of hospitality, seems to be acting out of an exhausting obligation of his situation: he treats it as a responsibility imposed upon him, rather than a pleasure. Next to the hearth sits a woman with a baby in her lap: she gives us a nod without making much of an effort. Like the pioneer, this woman is in the prime of life; her appearance seems to exceed her circumstances, and her clothing even shows a lingering sense of style; yet her delicate limbs appear frail, her features are drawn, her eyes are soft and sad; her whole expression shows signs of a deep sense of religious resignation, a calmness of all passions, and a kind of natural, tranquil strength, ready to face life's hardships without fear or bravado. Her children gather around her, full of health, energy, and boisterousness: they are true children of the wilderness; their mother watches them occasionally with a mix of sadness and happiness: looking at their vitality and her weariness, one could imagine that the life she has given them has drained her own, and yet she doesn't regret what they have cost her. The home these emigrants live in has no internal walls or loft. In the single room it consists of, the entire family gathers for the night. The dwelling itself is a little world—an ark of civilization amid an ocean of trees: a hundred steps beyond, the ancient forest unfolds its shadows, and solitude takes back control."





Appendix T

It is not the equality of conditions which makes men immoral and irreligious; but when men, being equal, are at the same time immoral and irreligious, the effects of immorality and irreligion easily manifest themselves outwardly, because men have but little influence upon each other, and no class exists which can undertake to keep society in order. Equality of conditions never engenders profligacy of morals, but it sometimes allows that profligacy to show itself.

It's not the equality of conditions that makes people immoral and irreligious; it's when people, being equal, are also immoral and irreligious that the effects of immorality and irreligion become clear, because individuals have very little influence on each other, and there’s no class that can maintain order in society. Equality of conditions doesn’t create moral corruption, but it does sometimes let that corruption become visible.





Appendix U

Setting aside all those who do not think at all, and those who dare not say what they think, the immense majority of the Americans will still be found to appear satisfied with the political institutions by which they are governed; and, I believe, really to be so. I look upon this state of public opinion as an indication, but not as a demonstration, of the absolute excellence of American laws. The pride of a nation, the gratification of certain ruling passions by the law, a concourse of circumstances, defects which escape notice, and more than all the rest, the influence of a majority which shuts the mouth of all cavillers, may long perpetuate the delusions of a people as well as those of a man. Look at England throughout the eighteenth century. No nation was ever more prodigal of self-applause, no people was ever more self-satisfied; then every part of its constitution was right—everything, even to its most obvious defects, was irreproachable: at the present day a vast number of Englishmen seem to have nothing better to do than to prove that this constitution was faulty in many respects. Which was right?—the English people of the last century, or the English people of the present day?

Setting aside everyone who doesn't think at all and those who are too afraid to express their thoughts, the vast majority of Americans still seem satisfied with the political systems that govern them; and I believe they genuinely are. I see this public opinion as a sign, but not as proof, of the greatness of American laws. The pride of a nation, the fulfillment of certain dominant desires through law, a mix of circumstances, unnoticed flaws, and especially the power of a majority that silences critics can easily keep a society under an illusion, just like it can for an individual. Look at England in the eighteenth century. No nation was ever so eager to praise itself, and no people was ever more self-satisfied; back then, every part of its constitution was considered correct—everything, even its most obvious flaws, was beyond reproach. Today, many English people seem to spend their time proving that this constitution has many problems. Who was right? The English people of the last century, or the English people of today?

The same thing has occurred in France. It is certain that during the reign of Louis XIV the great bulk of the nation was devotedly attached to the form of government which, at that time, governed the community. But it is a vast error to suppose that there was anything degraded in the character of the French of that age. There might be some sort of servitude in France at that time, but assuredly there was no servile spirit among the people. The writers of that age felt a species of genuine enthusiasm in extolling the power of their king; and there was no peasant so obscure in his hovel as not to take a pride in the glory of his sovereign, and to die cheerfully with the cry "Vive le Roi!" upon his lips. These very same forms of loyalty are now odious to the French people. Which are wrong?—the French of the age of Louis XIV, or their descendants of the present day?

The same thing happened in France. It’s clear that during Louis XIV’s reign, most of the nation was deeply attached to the government that ruled at that time. However, it’s a huge mistake to think that there was anything inferior about the character of the French people back then. There may have been some kind of servitude in France at the time, but there definitely wasn’t a servile spirit among the population. The writers of that time had a genuine enthusiasm for praising their king's power; there wasn’t a single peasant so unnoticed in his cottage that he didn’t take pride in his sovereign’s glory and wouldn’t die happily with "Vive le Roi!" on his lips. These same expressions of loyalty are now detested by the French people. Which is mistaken?—the French of Louis XIV's era, or their descendants today?

Our judgment of the laws of a people must not then be founded Future Condition Of Three Races In The United States exclusively upon its inclinations, since those inclinations change from age to age; but upon more elevated principles and a more general experience. The love which a people may show for its law proves only this:—that we should not be in too great a hurry to change them.

Our judgment of a society's laws shouldn't be based solely on its current preferences, since those preferences shift over time; instead, it should be based on higher principles and broader experiences. The love a society has for its laws only shows that we shouldn't rush to change them.





Appendix V

In the chapter to which this note relates I have pointed out one source of danger: I am now about to point out another kind of peril, more rare indeed, but far more formidable if it were ever to make its appearance. If the love of physical gratification and the taste for well-being, which are naturally suggested to men by a state of equality, were to get entire possession of the mind of a democratic people, and to fill it completely, the manners of the nation would become so totally opposed to military tastes, that perhaps even the army would eventually acquire a love of peace, in spite of the peculiar interest which leads it to desire war. Living in the midst of a state of general relaxation, the troops would ultimately think it better to rise without efforts, by the slow but commodious advancement of a peace establishment, than to purchase more rapid promotion at the cost of all the toils and privations of the field. With these feelings, they would take up arms without enthusiasm, and use them without energy; they would allow themselves to be led to meet the foe, instead of marching to attack him. It must not be supposed that this pacific state of the army would render it adverse to revolutions; for revolutions, and especially military revolutions, which are generally very rapid, are attended indeed with great dangers, but not with protracted toil; they gratify ambition at less cost than war; life only is at stake, and the men of democracies care less for their lives than for their comforts. Nothing is more dangerous for the freedom and the tranquillity of a people than an army afraid of war, because, as such an army no longer seeks to maintain its importance and its influence on the field of battle, it seeks to assert them elsewhere. Thus it might happen that the men of whom a democratic army consists should lose the interests of citizens without acquiring the virtues of soldiers; and that the army should cease to be fit for war without ceasing to be turbulent. I shall here repeat what I have said in the text: the remedy for these dangers is not to be found in the army, but in the country: a democratic people which has preserved the manliness of its character will never be at a loss for military prowess in its soldiers.

In the chapter related to this note, I've highlighted one source of danger: now I’m going to point out another kind of threat, which is rarer but much more intense if it ever appears. If the desire for physical pleasure and a taste for well-being, which are naturally encouraged in a state of equality, were to completely take over the minds of a democratic society, the attitudes of the nation would become so opposed to military interests that even the army might develop a preference for peace, despite its inherent motivation for war. Living in a generally relaxed environment, troops might eventually prefer to advance slowly through the gradual but comfortable growth of a peace-oriented military rather than chasing quicker promotions through the hard work and hardships of combat. With these feelings, they would take up arms without enthusiasm and use them without vigor; they would allow themselves to be led into battle instead of actively seeking conflict. It's important to understand that this peaceful state of the army wouldn’t necessarily make it resistant to revolutions; military revolutions, which usually happen very quickly, come with significant risks but not with prolonged hardships; they satisfy ambition at a lower cost than war does; only life is at stake, and people in democracies tend to care less about their lives than about their comfort. Nothing poses a greater risk to the freedom and stability of a society than an army that is fearful of war, because such an army, no longer concerned with maintaining its importance and influence on the battlefield, will try to assert itself in other areas. This could lead to a situation where the individuals in a democratic army lose their civic interests without gaining the qualities of soldiers, and the army becomes unfit for war without losing its tendency toward unrest. I’ll reiterate what I mentioned in the text: the solution to these dangers is not found within the army but in the country itself: a democratic society that retains its manliness will always have military strength within its soldiers.





Appendix W

Men connect the greatness of their idea of unity with means, God with ends: hence this idea of greatness, as men conceive it, leads us into infinite littleness. To compel all men to follow the same course towards the same object is a human notion;—to introduce infinite variety of action, but so combined that all these acts lead by a multitude of different courses to the accomplishment of one great design, is a conception of the Deity. The human idea of unity is almost always barren; the divine idea pregnant with abundant results. Men think they manifest their greatness by simplifying the means they use; but it is the purpose of God which is simple—his means are infinitely varied.

Men associate their grand vision of unity with methods, while they link God with outcomes: this notion of greatness, as people see it, often leads us into triviality. Forcing everyone to take the same path towards a single goal is a human idea; however, introducing endless variety in actions, while ensuring that all these efforts contribute to achieving one significant purpose, is a divine concept. The human understanding of unity tends to be unproductive; whereas the divine idea is rich with possibilities. People believe they show their greatness by simplifying their methods, but it is God's purpose that is straightforward—His means are incredibly diverse.





Appendix X

A democratic people is not only led by its own tastes to centralize its government, but the passions of all the men by whom it is governed constantly urge it in the same direction. It may easily be foreseen that almost all the able and ambitious members of a democratic community will labor without 2 ceasing to extend the powers of government, because they all hope at some time or other to wield those powers. It is a waste of time to attempt to prove to them that extreme centralization may be injurious to the State, since they are centralizing for their own benefit. Amongst the public men of democracies there are hardly any but men of great disinterestedness or extreme mediocrity who seek to oppose the centralization of government: the former are scarce, the latter powerless.

A democratic society is not just guided by its own preferences toward centralizing its government; the desires of all the people in power continually push it in the same direction. It’s easy to predict that nearly all the capable and ambitious individuals in a democratic community will work tirelessly to expand government authority because they all hope to one day hold that power. It’s pointless to try to convince them that excessive centralization could harm the State, as they are centralizing for their own interests. Among public figures in democracies, there are hardly any who oppose the centralization of government except for those with significant selflessness or extreme average qualities: the former are rare, and the latter are ineffective.





Appendix Y

I have often asked myself what would happen if, amidst the relaxation of democratic manners, and as a consequence of the restless spirit of the army, a military government were ever to be founded amongst any of the nations of the present age. I think that even such a government would not differ very much from the outline I have drawn in the chapter to which this note belongs, and that it would retain none of the fierce characteristics of a military oligarchy. I am persuaded that, in such a case, a sort of fusion would take place between the habits of official men and those of the military service. The administration would assume something of a military character, and the army some of the usages of the civil administration. The result would be a regular, clear, exact, and absolute system of government; the people would become the reflection of the army, and the community be drilled like a garrison.

I often wonder what would happen if, during a time of relaxed democratic norms and fueled by the restless nature of the military, a military government were ever established in any of today’s nations. I believe that even such a government wouldn’t differ much from the description I provided in the chapter related to this note, and it wouldn’t have the harsh features of a military oligarchy. I am convinced that, in that scenario, there would be a blending of the habits of officials and those of the military. The government would take on some military traits, and the army would adopt some practices of civilian administration. The result would be a structured, clear, precise, and absolute government system; the people would mirror the army, and the community would be trained like a garrison.





Appendix Z

It cannot be absolutely or generally affirmed that the greatest danger of the present age is license or tyranny, anarchy or despotism. Both are equally to be feared; and the one may as easily proceed as the other from the selfsame cause, namely, that "general apathy," which is the consequence of what I have termed "individualism": it is because this apathy exists, that the executive government, having mustered a few troops, is able to commit acts of oppression one day, and the next day a party, which has mustered some thirty men in its ranks, can also commit acts of oppression. Neither one nor the other can found anything to last; and the causes which enable them to succeed easily, prevent them from succeeding long: they rise because nothing opposes them, and they sink because nothing supports them. The proper object therefore of our most strenuous resistance, is far less either anarchy or despotism than the apathy which may almost indifferently beget either the one or the other.

We can't definitively say whether the biggest threat of our time is freedom gone too far or oppressive rule, chaos or tyranny. Both are equally concerning, and either can arise from the same root cause: a "general apathy" that stems from what I call "individualism." This apathy allows the government, with just a few troops, to carry out oppressive acts one day, while the next day a group with only thirty members can also impose its own oppression. Neither side can create something enduring; the factors that let them achieve success quickly also prevent long-term success. They emerge because there’s no one to challenge them, and they fade away because there’s no one to support them. So, what we should resist most vigorously is not so much anarchy or tyranny, but the apathy that can easily lead to either one.





Constitution Of The United States Of America

We The People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America:

We the People of the United States, in order to create a better Union, establish Justice, ensure domestic Peace, provide for the common defense, promote the general well-being, and secure the rights of Liberty for ourselves and our Future generations, do enact and establish this Constitution for the United States of America:





Article I





Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a

Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Congress of the United States, which will be made up of a Senate and House of Representatives.





Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members of

chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each States shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

chosen every two years by the people of the various States, and the Electors in each State must have the qualifications required for Electors of the largest branch of the State Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

No person can be a Representative unless they are at least twenty-five years old, have been a citizen of the United States for seven years, and when elected, be a resident of the state they represent.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts, eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

Representatives and direct taxes will be distributed among the states in this Union based on their respective populations. This will be calculated by adding the total number of free people, including those bound to service for a set term, and excluding non-taxed Native Americans, plus three-fifths of all other individuals. The actual count will happen within three years after the first meeting of the United States Congress and every ten years after that, in a manner determined by law. The number of representatives will not exceed one for every thirty thousand people, but each state will have at least one representative. Until the count is completed, New Hampshire will be entitled to elect three representatives, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

When there are vacancies in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority will issue Writs of Election to fill those Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

The House of Representatives will elect their Speaker and other Officers; and they will have the exclusive power of Impeachment.





Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed

of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

of two Senators from each State, selected by the Legislature, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the expiration of the sixth Year, so that one-third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.

As soon as they are gathered after the first Election, they will be split as evenly as possible into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators in the first Class will be vacant after the second Year, those in the second Class after the fourth Year, and those in the third Class after the sixth Year, ensuring that one-third is elected every two Years. If there are Vacancies due to Resignation or other reasons during the Legislature's break in any State, the Executive can make temporary Appointments until the Legislature meets next, at which point they will fill those Vacancies.

No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

No one can be a Senator unless they are at least thirty years old, have been a citizen of the United States for nine years, and, when elected, are a resident of the state they are chosen to represent.

The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. The Senate shall choose their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Vice President of the United States will be the President of the Senate, but will not have a vote unless there is a tie. The Senate will choose their other officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President or when they are acting as President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Judgment in cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of Honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment according to Law.

The Senate has the exclusive power to conduct all impeachments. When acting in this capacity, they must take an oath or affirm. When the President of the United States is on trial, the Chief Justice will preside. No one can be convicted without the approval of two-thirds of the Members present. The judgment in impeachment cases will only result in removal from office and disqualification from holding any position of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. However, the convicted individual can still face indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to the law.





Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for

Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.

Senators and Representatives will be determined by the Legislature of each State; however, Congress can change these Regulations at any time by Law, except for the locations where Senators are elected.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

The Congress must meet at least once every year, and that meeting will take place on the first Monday in December, unless they set a different day by law.





Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns

and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of Absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

and the qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each will constitute a quorum to conduct business; however, a smaller number can adjourn from day to day and may be allowed to compel the attendance of absent members, in such a manner and under such penalties as each house may establish.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with a Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member.

Each House can set its own rules for how it operates, discipline its members for improper behavior, and, with the agreement of two-thirds, expel a member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the Journal.

Each House will keep a record of its activities and publish it occasionally, except for parts they think need to be kept secret; and the votes of the Members of either House on any issue will be entered in the record if one-fifth of those present request it.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days or to any location other than where the two Houses are meeting.





Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation

for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

for their services, which will be determined by law, and paid for by the Treasury of the United States. They shall, in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of peace, be protected from arrest while attending sessions of their respective houses, as well as while going to and returning from those sessions; and for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned anywhere else.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

No Senator or Representative can be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States during the time they are elected if that office was created or if the pay for that office was increased during their term. Also, no person holding any office under the United States can be a member of either House while they are in that office.





Section 7. All Bills for Raising Revenue shall originate in the House of

Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Representatives; but the Senate can suggest or agree with amendments like it does for other bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Every bill that has passed the House of Representatives and the Senate must be presented to the President of the United States before it becomes law. If the President approves, he will sign it; if not, he will return it with his objections to the House where it originated. That House will then record the objections in their journal and reconsider the bill. If, after re-evaluation, two-thirds of that House agree to pass the bill, it will be sent along with the objections to the other House. If two-thirds of that House also approve, it will become law. In all such cases, the votes from both Houses will be recorded as Yeas and Nays, and the names of those voting for and against the bill will be entered in each House's journal. If the President does not return a bill within ten days (excluding Sundays) after it has been presented to him, it will become law as if he had signed it, unless Congress adjourns and prevents its return, in which case it will not become law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill.

Every order, resolution, or vote that requires the agreement of the Senate and House of Representatives (except for adjournment questions) must be presented to the President of the United States. Before it can take effect, it must be approved by him, or if he disapproves it, it must be repassed by two-thirds of both the Senate and House of Representatives, following the rules and limitations set for a bill.





Section 8. The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes,

Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

Duties, taxes, and fees to pay off debts and ensure the common defense and general welfare of the United States; however, all duties, taxes, and fees must be uniform across the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To manage trade with other countries, between the different states, and with the Native American tribes;

To establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To create a consistent rule for naturalization and uniform laws regarding bankruptcies across the United States; to mint money, regulate its value along with that of foreign currency, and set the standard for weights and measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish penalties for counterfeiting U.S. securities and currency;

To establish Post Offices and Post Roads;

To set up Post Offices and Post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To advance the progress of science and useful arts by granting authors and inventors exclusive rights to their writings and discoveries for a limited time;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To establish courts below the Supreme Court; To define and punish piracy and crimes committed on the high seas, and violations of international law;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To declare war, issue letters of marque and reprisal, and create rules about captures on land and water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two years;

To raise and support armies, but no funding for that purpose shall last longer than two years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To establish and support a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.

To create rules for managing and regulating the land and naval forces.

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.

To allow the Militia to be called up to enforce the laws of the Union, put down uprisings, and defend against invasions.

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To take care of organizing, equipping, and training the Militia, and for managing those members who may serve the United States, while allowing the individual States to appoint the Officers and have the authority to train the Militia based on the standards set by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

To have exclusive authority to make laws in all cases whatsoever over a district (not exceeding ten square miles) that may, through the agreement of specific states and the approval of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to have similar authority over all places purchased with the consent of the legislature of the state where they are located, for the construction of forts, storage facilities, arsenals, docks, and other necessary buildings;—and to create any laws that are necessary and appropriate for implementing the powers mentioned above, along with all other powers granted by this Constitution to the Government of the United States or any department or officer thereof.





Section 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the

States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

States that currently exist can choose to allow this, and Congress cannot prohibit it before the year 1808, but a tax or duty can be imposed on such imports, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

The right to the Writ of Habeas Corpus will not be suspended, except in cases of rebellion or invasion when public safety requires it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. No Capitation, or other direct Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. No Capitation or other direct Tax shall be imposed unless it’s proportional to the Census or Enumeration mentioned earlier.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No taxes or duties can be imposed on items exported from any state.

No preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

No Commerce or Revenue Regulation will favor the Ports of one State over those of another; nor will Vessels heading to or from one State be required to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

No money shall be taken from the Treasury except as a result of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of all public money's receipts and expenditures shall be published periodically.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

No title of nobility will be granted by the United States. And no one holding any office of profit or trust under them can accept any gift, payment, office, or title of any kind from any king, prince, or foreign state without the consent of Congress.





Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or

Confederation; grant Letters of Marque or Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

Confederation; issue Letters of Marque or Reprisal; mint Money; issue Bills of Credit; accept anything other than gold and silver Coin as payment for Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law that undermines the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.

No state shall, without the approval of Congress, impose any taxes or duties on imports or exports, except for what is absolutely necessary to enforce its inspection laws. The net revenue from all taxes and duties imposed by any state on imports or exports shall go to the U.S. Treasury, and all such laws will be subject to Congress's review and control.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

No state can, without Congress's approval, impose any tonnage tax, keep troops or warships during peacetime, make agreements or compacts with another state or a foreign power, or go to war unless actually invaded or in imminent danger that doesn't allow for delay.





Article II





Section 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the

United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same Term, be elected as follows:

United States of America. He will serve in his position for a term of four years and, along with the Vice President, who will also be elected for the same term, will be chosen in the following manner:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

Each state will choose, in the way that its legislature decides, a number of electors equal to the total number of senators and representatives that the state is entitled to in Congress. However, no senator, representative, or person holding a position of trust or profit under the United States can be appointed as an elector.

[The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice-President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall choose from them by Ballot the Vice-President.]*d

[The Electors will meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for two people, with at least one not being from their own State. They will create a list of all the people voted for and the number of votes each received; this list will be signed, certified, and sent sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, addressed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate will open all the certificates in front of the Senate and House of Representatives, and the votes will then be counted. The person with the most votes will be the President, as long as that number is a majority of all the appointed Electors; if there are multiple people with a majority and an equal number of votes, the House of Representatives will immediately choose one of them for President by ballot; and if no one has a majority, the House will choose the President from the five highest on the list in the same manner. When selecting the President, votes will be taken by States, with each State’s representation having one vote; a quorum for this purpose will consist of members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States will be necessary for a choice. In every case, after the President is chosen, the person with the most votes from the Electors will be the Vice President. However, if two or more people have equal votes, the Senate will select the Vice President from them by ballot.]

*d
[ This clause is superseded by Article XII, Amendments. See page 396.]

*d
[ This clause is replaced by Article XII, Amendments. See page 396.]

The Congress may determine the Time of choosing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

The Congress can decide when to choose the Electors and the day they will cast their votes, and that day will be the same across the United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time this Constitution was adopted, can be eligible for the office of President; nor can anyone be eligible for that office who has not reached the age of thirty-five and has been a resident of the United States for at least fourteen years.

In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-president, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

In the event that the President is removed from office, dies, resigns, or is unable to perform the powers and duties of the office, the Vice President will take over. Congress can create a law to address situations involving the removal, death, resignation, or inability of both the President and Vice President, specifying which officer will act as President. That officer will serve in this role until the disability is resolved or a new President is elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

The President will receive a salary for their services at set times, which cannot be raised or lowered during their term. They will not receive any other benefits from the United States or its entities during that time.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Before he begins his job, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."





Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and

Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the various States, when called into actual Service of the United States; he can request a written Opinion from the head Officer in each of the executive Departments on any matter related to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he has the Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

He has the power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, as long as two-thirds of the Senators present agree; and he will nominate, and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, Supreme Court justices, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise specified here and that are established by law. However, Congress can by law give the President the appointment authority for any inferior officers they see fit, or delegate that responsibility to the courts or department heads.

The President shall have Power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

The President has the power to fill any vacancies that occur during the Senate's recess by granting commissions that will expire at the end of their next session.





Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information

of the state of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other Public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

of the state of the Union, and suggest to their consideration such measures that he deems necessary and appropriate; he may, in extraordinary situations, call together both Houses or either one of them, and in case of disagreement between them regarding the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to a time he finds suitable; he shall receive ambassadors and other public officials; he shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed and shall commission all the officers of the United States.





Section 4. The President, Vice-President and all civil Officers of the

United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.

United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.





Article III





Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in

one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the Supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

one Supreme Court, and in such lower Courts as Congress may establish from time to time. The Judges, both of the Supreme and lower Courts, shall hold their Offices as long as they behave well, and shall receive a salary for their Services at regular intervals, which shall not be reduced while they are in Office.





Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and

Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all cases of Admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made or to be made under their Authority;—to all cases involving Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls;—to all cases of Admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to disputes in which the United States is a Party;—to disputes between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants from different States, and between a State, or its Citizens, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

In all cases involving ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, as well as cases where a state is a party, the Supreme Court will have original jurisdiction. In all other cases mentioned, the Supreme Court will have appellate jurisdiction, regarding both law and fact, with exceptions and regulations set by Congress.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

The trial for all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, will be by jury; and this trial will take place in the state where the crimes were committed. If the crimes weren’t committed in any state, the trial will be held at a place or places that Congress may, by law, designate.





Section 3. Treason against the United States shall consist only in

levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

levying war against them, or supporting their enemies by providing aid and comfort. No one will be convicted of treason unless there are two witnesses to the same overt act, or unless the person confesses in open court.

The Congress shall have power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood or Forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.

The Congress has the authority to declare the punishment for treason, but no conviction for treason will lead to the loss of the convicted person's property or status, except during their lifetime.





Article IV





Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the

Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings from every other State. And the Congress may establish general laws that outline how these Acts, Records, and Proceedings should be verified, and their effects.





Section 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all

Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or another crime, who flees from justice and is found in another State, shall, upon request of the executive authority of the State from which they fled, be handed over to be returned to the State with jurisdiction over the crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

No person who is bound to work or labor in one state, according to its laws, and who escapes to another state, will be freed from that work or labor due to any law or regulation there. Instead, they must be returned upon request by the person to whom that work or labor is owed.





Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union;

but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

but no new State shall be created or established within the area of any other State; nor shall any State be formed by joining two or more States, or parts of States, without the agreement of the Legislatures of the States involved as well as Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

The Congress has the power to manage and create all necessary rules and regulations regarding the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution should be interpreted as harming any claims of the United States or any specific state.





Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this

Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Request of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be assembled) against domestic Violence.





Article V

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Whenever two-thirds of both Houses of Congress think it's necessary, they can propose amendments to this Constitution, or, if two-thirds of the state legislatures request it, they can call a convention to propose amendments. In either case, these amendments will be considered valid and part of the Constitution once ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states or by conventions in three-fourths of the states, depending on the ratification method proposed by Congress. However, no amendment made before the year 1808 can change the first and fourth clauses of the ninth section of the first article, and no state can lose its equal representation in the Senate without its consent.





Article VI

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

All debts incurred and commitments made before the adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as they were under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

This Constitution, along with the laws of the United States that are created in accordance with it, and all treaties made or to be made under the authority of the United States, will be the highest law of the land. Judges in every state are required to follow this, regardless of anything in the state constitution or laws that contradicts it.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

The Senators and Representatives mentioned earlier, along with the Members of the various State Legislatures and all executive and judicial Officers of both the United States and the individual States, must take an Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution; however, no religious test will ever be required as a Qualification for any Office or public Trust under the United States.





Article VII

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

The ratification of the conventions of nine states will be enough for the establishment of this Constitution among the states that ratify it.

Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of Our Lord One thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth. In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,

Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present on the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of Our Lord One thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth. In witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our Names,

     Geo. Washington
     Presidt. and deputy from Virginia.

     New Hampshire
     John Langdon
     Nicholas Gilman

     Massachusetts
     Nathaniel Gorham
     Rufus King

     Connecticut
     Wm. Saml. Johnson
     Roger Sherman

     New York
     Alexander Hamilton

     New Jersey
     Wil. Livingston.
     David Brearley.
     Wm. Paterson.
     Jona. Dayton

     Pennsylvania
     B Franklin
     Thomas Mifflin
     Robt. Morris.
     Geo. Clymer
     Thos. Fitzsimons
     Jared Ingersoll
     James Wilson
     Gouv. Morris

     Delaware
     Geo. Read
     Gunning Bedford Jun
     John Dickinson
     Richard Bassett
     Jaco. Broom

     Maryland
     James McHenry
     Dan of St Thos. Jenifer
     Danl. Carroll

     Virginia
     John Blair—
     James Madison Jr.

     North Carolina
     Wm. Blount
     Richd. Dobbs Spaight
     Hu. Williamson

     South Carolina
     J. Rutledge
     Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
     Charles Pinckney
     Peirce Butler.

     Georgia
     William Few
     Abr. Baldwin

     Attest. William Jackson, Secretary
     Geo. Washington  
     President and deputy from Virginia.  

     New Hampshire  
     John Langdon  
     Nicholas Gilman  

     Massachusetts  
     Nathaniel Gorham  
     Rufus King  

     Connecticut  
     Wm. Samuel Johnson  
     Roger Sherman  

     New York  
     Alexander Hamilton  

     New Jersey  
     William Livingston  
     David Brearley  
     William Paterson  
     Jonathan Dayton  

     Pennsylvania  
     Benjamin Franklin  
     Thomas Mifflin  
     Robert Morris  
     George Clymer  
     Thomas Fitzsimons  
     Jared Ingersoll  
     James Wilson  
     Gouverneur Morris  

     Delaware  
     George Read  
     Gunning Bedford Jr.  
     John Dickinson  
     Richard Bassett  
     Jacob Broom  

     Maryland  
     James McHenry  
     Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer  
     Daniel Carroll  

     Virginia  
     John Blair—  
     James Madison Jr.  

     North Carolina  
     William Blount  
     Richard Dobbs Spaight  
     Hugh Williamson  

     South Carolina  
     John Rutledge  
     Charles Cotesworth Pinckney  
     Charles Pinckney  
     Pierce Butler.  

     Georgia  
     William Few  
     Abraham Baldwin  

     Attest. William Jackson, Secretary  

The Word 'the,' being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first Page, The word 'Thirty' being partly written on an Erasure in the fifteenth Line of the first Page, The Words 'is tried' being interlined between the thirty-second and thirty-third Lines of the first Page, and the Word 'the' being interlined between the forty-third and forty-fourth Lines of the second page.

The word 'the' is written between the seventh and eighth lines of the first page. The word 'Thirty' is partly written over an erasure in the fifteenth line of the first page. The words 'is tried' are interlined between the thirty-second and thirty-third lines of the first page, and the word 'the' is interlined between the forty-third and forty-fourth lines of the second page.

[Note by the Department of State.—The foregoing explanation in the original instrument is placed on the left of the paragraph beginning with the words, 'Done in Convention,' and therefore precedes the signatures. The interlined and rewritten words, mentioned in it, are in this edition printed in their proper places in the text.]

[Note by the Department of State.—The explanation in the original document is located on the left side of the paragraph starting with the words, 'Done in Convention,' and thus comes before the signatures. The revised and rewritten terms referenced are printed in their appropriate locations in the text of this edition.]





Bill Of Rights

In addition to, and amendment of, the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress and ratified by the Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the Fifth Article of the original Constitution

In addition to, and modification of, the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress and approved by the Legislatures of the various States, according to the Fifth Article of the original Constitution

Article I

Article 1

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Congress can't create any laws that establish a religion or prevent people from practicing their faith. They also can't limit freedom of speech, the press, or the right of people to gather peacefully and ask the government to address their complaints.

Article II

Article II

A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.

A well-regulated militia is essential for the security of a free state, and the people's right to own and carry weapons shall not be violated.

Article III

Article III

No Soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

No soldier can be housed in any home during peacetime without the owner’s consent, and during wartime, it must be done as prescribed by law.

Article IV

Article IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The right of people to feel safe in their bodies, homes, documents, and belongings against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. No warrants shall be issued except based on probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation, and specifically detailing the place to be searched and the people or items to be seized.

Article V

Article V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

No one can be held to answer for a serious or otherwise notorious crime unless it's based on a formal charge or indictment from a Grand Jury, except in cases involving the military or militia, when they're on active duty during wartime or a public emergency; nor can anyone be tried twice for the same offense; nor can someone be forced to testify against themselves in any criminal case, nor can they be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and private property cannot be taken for public use without fair compensation.

Article VI

Article 6

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

In all criminal cases, the accused has the right to a quick and public trial by an unbiased jury from the state and district where the crime was committed, with that district determined by law. They must be informed about the nature and reasons for the charges against them; they have the right to face the witnesses testifying against them; to have the legal power to obtain witnesses in their favor; and to have the support of a lawyer for their defense.

Article VII

Article VII

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

In lawsuits at common law, when the amount in dispute is more than twenty dollars, the right to a jury trial will be upheld, and no fact decided by a jury can be re-examined in any Court of the United States, except according to common law rules.

Article VIII

Article 8

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Excessive bail won't be required, nor will excessive fines be imposed, and cruel or unusual punishments won't be inflicted.

Article IX

Article 9

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

The list of specific rights in the Constitution shouldn't be taken to deny or belittle other rights that the people hold.

Article X

Article X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

The powers that the Constitution doesn't give to the United States, nor prohibits from the States, are reserved for the States or the people.

Article XI

Article 11

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

The judicial power of the United States can't be interpreted to apply to any lawsuit in law or equity initiated or pursued against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

Article XII

Article 12

The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President; and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such a number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

The electors will meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice President, ensuring that at least one of them is not from the same state as the others. They will indicate on their ballots who they are voting for as President and use separate ballots for the Vice President. They will create distinct lists of all persons voted for as President and Vice President, as well as the number of votes each received. They will sign and certify these lists and send them sealed to the U.S. government, addressed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate will open all the certificates in front of the Senate and House of Representatives, and the votes will then be counted. The person with the most votes for President will be the President, provided they have a majority of the total number of electors appointed. If no one has a majority, then the House of Representatives will immediately select the President from the top three candidates with the highest votes by ballot. In this process, votes will be taken by state, with each state delegation casting one vote. A quorum will consist of members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all states is required for a decision. If the House of Representatives fails to choose a President before March 4 of the following year, the Vice President will assume the role of President, similar to what happens if the President dies or has another constitutional disability. The person receiving the most votes for Vice President will become Vice President if they have a majority of the total electors. If no one has a majority, the Senate will choose between the two candidates with the highest votes. A quorum for this will require two-thirds of all Senators, and a majority of the entire Senate is needed for a choice. However, no one who is constitutionally ineligible to be President can be eligible to be Vice President of the United States.

Article XIII

Article 13

Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 1. Neither slavery nor forced labor, except as punishment for a crime for which the person has been duly convicted, will exist in the United States or any area under its jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress has the power to enforce this article through appropriate legislation.

Article XIV

Article 14

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Section 1. All people born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, are citizens of the United States and of the state where they live. No state can make or enforce any law that limits the privileges or rights of citizens of the United States; nor can any state take away anyone's life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection under the law.

Section 2. Representatives will be distributed among the states according to their respective populations, counting everyone in each state, excluding non-taxed Native Americans. However, if the right to vote in any election for choosing electors for the President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, or any state officials, is denied to any male residents of that state who are twenty-one years old and citizens of the United States, or is restricted in any way, except for participation in rebellion or other crimes, then the basis of representation in that state will be reduced in proportion to the number of those male citizens compared to the total number of male citizens who are twenty-one years old in that state.

Section 3. No person can be a Senator or Representative in Congress, an elector for President and Vice-President, or hold any civil or military office under the United States or any state, if they previously took an oath as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, and then engaged in insurrection or rebellion against it, or provided aid or comfort to its enemies. However, Congress can remove such disability by a two-thirds vote in each House.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for pension payments and rewards for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. However, neither the United States nor any state will take on or pay any debt or obligation incurred to support insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claims for the loss or emancipation of any slave; all such debts, obligations, and claims will be considered illegal and void.

Section 5. Congress will have the power to enforce the provisions of this article through appropriate legislation.

Article XV

Article 15

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 1. Citizens of the United States have the right to vote, and that right cannot be denied or limited by the United States or any State because of race, color, or past status as a servant.

Section 2. Congress has the authority to enforce this article through appropriate laws.






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